PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Ajax Armoured Vehicle - 8 December 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the latest developments concerning Ajax and other Army vehicles.

I thank the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) for tabling the question and Mr Speaker for allowing me to provide an update on the current situation, expanding on the written ministerial statement that I laid on 26 November.

As safety is the top priority for the ministerial team, prior to Ajax’s initial operating capability being announced, I asked for and was given assurances in writing by senior Ministry of Defence personnel that the system was safe. However, on 22 November, around 30 service personnel operating the Ajax family of vehicles reported noise and vibration symptoms during Exercise Titan Storm. In line with our safety protocols, the exercise was stopped immediately, and those affected received full medical care and attention. These personnel continue to be monitored. None of the symptoms are life-threatening and there have been no hospitalisations.

The safety of our service personnel remains a top priority for the Ministry of Defence. As such, and out of an abundance of caution, I directed a pause on the use of Ajax for training and exercising while safety investigations are carried out. There are three investigations currently under way: one by the Defence Accident Investigation Branch; another by the Army safety investigation team; and the ministerial review that I have directed to be carried out in addition. While investigations remain ongoing, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on the potential outcomes or to speculate on the causes of the symptoms. However, I can confirm that officials have been meeting General Dynamics daily since the incident on Titan Storm, and I am meeting General Dynamics tomorrow to ensure a collaborative approach to the issue.

The safety of our people remains the top priority for me and the ministerial team. As such, we will take whatever decisions are required to end the saga one way or another. Where people have concerns around Ajax, I remind them that each organisation involved with Ajax has its own whistleblowing processes to ensure that any concerns are addressed appropriately and, importantly, confidentially.

On vehicle safety more broadly, which the hon. Gentleman asked about, on the issue of the MAN support vehicle fleet—Army trucks—which I mentioned in my recent appearance in front of the Defence Committee, I can confirm that an issue was identified with the vehicles, and that a mitigation and repair schedule was created, which is being rolled out. That is an example of a system working properly in relation to MAN SV.

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Madam Deputy Speaker.

May I state how shocking it was to hear of the Army exercise that took place on 22 November that resulted in more than 30 casualties among soldiers operating Ajax? There have been reports of symptoms ranging from sickness to hearing loss. As the Minister said, the priority must be the safety of our personnel, and we wish all those affected a swift recovery.

This matter is particularly disturbing for me, as the renewed incidents with noise and vibrations sound strikingly similar to the problems that I was assured had been resolved when I was the Minister for Defence Procurement. In the Defence Committee, the Minister confirmed that he received similar assurances when he agreed to announce that Ajax had reached the key milestone of initial operating capability on 6 November.

The Minister and I may have our political differences, but may I suggest that we have something in common on this issue? We have both been misled about the viability of the Ajax programme. After all, it is not just about the recurrence of extremely worrying noise and vibration problems; over the weekend, we have seen reports of serious allegations from anonymous General Dynamics employees suggesting systemic flaws with the Ajax platform. That includes a disgraceful incident in which a General Dynamics employee publicly belittled the injured soldiers. That is utterly unacceptable.

Given all that, and contrary to assurances given to and accepted in good faith by successive Ministers, including myself, surely the only possible conclusion is that the Ajax vehicle is fundamentally flawed. Does the Minister agree that the manufacturer, General Dynamics, must have been aware of that for years and must be held to account? As such, remembering that the procurement reform I launched in February 2024 stressed the need for a second opinion, will he bring in a completely independent organisation or company steeped in engineering excellence—from outside the Ministry of Defence, with no skin in the game—to pronounce on the one question that we all need answered: is Ajax viable without a fundamental redesign? If not, how much more will it cost to remedy?

On a personal note, I imagine that the Minister is as furious as I am at having been repeatedly given what now turn out to be false assurances by those responsible for the Ajax programme. Surely he is now left with a binary choice: fix it, or fail it.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions and the tone in which he asked them. I too was disgusted when I heard the news of the injuries to our service personnel, especially after a point at which the vehicle was assured to be safe. It is for that very reason that I will not speculate—I hope he understands why—until the investigations have reported, so that we can understand the cause of the noise and vibration injuries. A decision can then be made based on that information. I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern, and I want to ensure that information given to Ministers—be it to me or any other Minister, in this Government or any other—is accurate and timely, so it is appropriate that we get to the bottom of this. I also share his concern around a particular issue with one GD employee, which he raised. I can confirm that General Dynamics has written to the Department to apologise for the recent social media posts from a member of its staff, and that was the right thing to do.

The hon. Gentleman asked about an independent review of the platforms. As well as the Defence Accident Investigation Branch and the British Army’s teams investigating, I have asked that an external organisation with experience of noise and vibration be brought in. We are building a team of experts from a number of organisations outside the usual GD production line to add expertise and external challenge to the work. Hopefully, I will be in a situation to say more to the House in my next update; I hope to table a written ministerial statement ahead of the Christmas recess to keep the House informed about progress.

I share the hon. Gentleman’s concern for our service personnel. It is not good enough for our service personnel to sustain injuries in this fashion on a platform that they were reassured was safe, just as I was. That is why getting to the bottom of this issue is a priority for me. I await the reports of those three investigations to understand what happened and therefore what decisions we will take as a result.

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

What an absolute shambles. The Minister should be livid at how things have transpired, given the billions of pounds of British taxpayers’ money that has been spent over the years on the Ajax programme and the injuries sustained by our brave service personnel. In addition to problems with Ajax, the Boxer mechanised infantry vehicle is years late into service, and the 6,000 or so MAN support vehicles are currently grounded due to broken parts. Is there a wider systemic problem with land vehicle procurement and sustainment? Where exactly does this leave us with the British Army’s readiness at a time of such increased international tensions?

I thank my hon. Friend for his question, as well as for the questions he asked me in front of his Select Committee last week, which gave me the opportunity to provide an update to his Committee and the public on the investigations.

The MAN SV fleet is a system that is working properly, in the sense that problems have been identified with a vehicle that is nearly 20 years old. When problems are identified, it is right that fixes are then identified and rectifications are put in place. That is what is happening with the MAN SV fleet, which should return to full capabilities early in the new year. In the meantime, duty holders have the ability to operate those vehicles within strict parameters, to make sure Army tasks can continue to be carried out. However, my hon. Friend will know that the defence procurement system we inherited is in need of quite significant reform. We have started that process already, but there is more work to be done, because we need to move to warfighting readiness—for all our forces to be able to deter aggression, and defeat it if necessary. To do that, we have to get on top of what could be quite significant issues with a number of platforms, and that is what we intend to do.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I associate myself with the comments of the Minister and the shadow Secretary of State regarding the service personnel injured in the recent training incident involving the Ajax vehicles.

The recent revelations about the Ajax programme raise questions that go far beyond this single family of vehicles—they go to the heart of how the Ministry of Defence manages major defence projects, our ability to meet our NATO obligations, and the safety of the men and women who serve so bravely. Meant to enter service in 2017, the Ajax is now getting on for nine years behind schedule, and after more than £6 billion has been spent, the Minister still cannot give a cast-iron guarantee that Ajax is safe to operate. Will he confirm whether the Department has prepared any contingency plan should the Ajax ultimately be deemed unsafe or unviable? If further delays or design overhauls are needed, what assessment has been made of the impact on our NATO commitments, particularly our contribution to the UK’s armoured capability? Our allies will be watching closely, as will our enemies.

Finally, given that this programme has been allowed to drift for so many years at eye-watering cost, is the MOD considering an internal investigation into how these failings were able to progress this far without detection? If that investigation were to be undertaken, could it be expanded further to touch on the issues already raised by the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi), about the Boxer tank, the Boeing E-7 reconnaissance plane, and other MOD acquisition failures over recent years? Taxpayers deserve answers and value for money, and our armed forces deserve equipment they can trust.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his words about our service personnel. Every one of them should know that the vehicles or equipment they have been asked to operate are safe, which is why it is important that we get to the bottom of what has happened. We await those reports so that we can provide confidence to our people about what we are asking them to do, albeit with the level of risk that both we and they know they carry.

To reassure the hon. Gentleman, the cost of the entire Ajax programme remains £6.3 billion—that price has not changed since 2014. We will be able to take next steps once we understand the cause of the issue, but the Defence Secretary has been very clear that we are bringing this saga to an end, one way or another. A decision will be made once it can be properly informed by the evidence of what has happened.

To scrap the Ajax programme completely would be a very bold move, considering that the UK has sunk over £6 billion into it and it is nine years late. The vehicle is still making soldiers ill every time they get in it, even though Ministers both current and former have been repeatedly briefed that it is good to go. It is not good to go, but to decide that it never will be would be very brave. Considering that this Labour Government are the first UK Government since the cold war to increase defence spending, that they have a very ambitious defence reform agenda, and that finally confidence in the armed forces and the morale of serving personnel are going back up—certainly compared with way before I was in the military—does the Minister think we have enough confidence to take a bold decision like that?

I thank my constituency neighbour for his question. Taking bold decisions is the hallmark of this Government, because it would not be enough simply to tinker with some of the procurements we inherited, given the necessary increase in our capabilities to meet the threats that exist. When the defence investment plan is published, it will set out bold decisions, but it is really important in relation to Ajax that we get to the bottom of what happened during Exercise Titan Storm. The Ajax vehicle has completed 42,000 km of testing without such injuries, so we need to understand what has happened with the vehicles that have caused these injuries. Not all the vehicles on that exercise caused injuries, and that needs to be taken into account as part of the investigations. I am looking forward to those results when they come, so that we can make a clear and bold decision one way or another to bring this saga to an end.

I think the procurement Minister will know that I asked his predecessor whether the National Armaments Director would have carte blanche to tear up the book when it comes to defence procurement. She answered from the Dispatch Box that not only would they have that ability but they would be held to account for so doing. Defence Committee members do not want them coming in front of us in a year’s time to say, “We wanted to change things, but they wouldn’t let us.” Now that the Minister is in his role, will he reassure us that the policy remains that the National Armaments Director, for their £600,000 a year, will be given carte blanche to tear up the book when it comes to procurement?

Rupert Pearce is already making substantial changes to how we procure and delivering a programme of change, with reform within Defence Equipment and Support and the wider national armaments director group that is essential if we are to achieve warfighting readiness. Not only does he have a clear policy steer in the defence industrial strategy and the strategic defence review, but I have witnessed quite impressive substantial change in the few weeks he has been in place. I hope that the Defence Committee will be able to hear from him shortly. There is a lot more work to do if we are to get on top of a procurement system that is too slow, too expensive and does not yield the results for our people that they need it to yield, but he is making a good start in that respect.

I am aware that the problems with the Ajax system have existed for years and that the Conservative party ducked the issues when they were in government. Given that the workers at the Oakdale site in my constituency are diligent and hard-working, and that Christmas is fast approaching, what assurances can the Minister give me that defence jobs associated with this programme in Newport West and Islwyn and across south Wales are safe for the long term?

I thank my hon. Friend for her question. When I was in Merthyr speaking to the members of the General Dynamics team, I recognised the importance of the economic contribution that GD makes not just to Merthyr but to the wider community. It is really important that we look at what has happened and what lessons can be learned. As a Government, we are increasing defence spending and supporting businesses large and small across the country. I will be happy to meet her and her south Wales colleagues to discuss this further, if that would be useful.

I very much welcome the cross-party tone that both Front Benches have adopted in these exchanges. This problem reflects a very long-term, systemic problem in MOD defence acquisition. While there are glimmerings of light and some brilliant people in the Department who want to do things differently—the response to Ukraine shows that we can do things differently—there is a need for a big culture change in the MOD to achieve that. Will the Minister undertake to ensure that people involved in defence acquisition are sent on the courses where such lessons are properly learned and that the change in behaviour and attitude actually takes place? If that radical organisational culture transformation is not implemented, no reform will work unless we throw out all the people and start again, and I suggest that is rather impractical. We must change how these people think and operate in order to change the system and avoid things like this happening again.

I thank the hon. Member. One of the hallmarks of a good defence debate in the House, certainly since I was elected in 2017, is that we have more in common across the parties and share a desire to get to the right solution. I am pleased that there is often less party politics in defence debates, because it is so important that we get to the right solution and do not seek to blame or attack. That does not mean that there is no party politics, but we are certainly united on this issue in wanting to get to the right solution.

On the hon. Member’s point about culture change, I entirely agree that it is not enough just to change the process. I speak frequently in the MOD about the necessity of culture change to adjust our processes and to learn the lessons from Ukraine to be faster and more agile. There are things that we can do and that we are undertaking, but there is more to be done. In respect of the senior responsible officer recommendations, which featured in particular in the Sheldon review into previous problems with the Ajax programme, those have been implemented, and there have been big improvements in the leadership provided on single programmes by the SRO reform, but I will not be able to speculate on what will happen here until we get the results of those investigations. However, I will update the House when that happens.

I fully recognise the seriousness of the situation and the need to fully investigate, which must be the priority, and I fully agree with the Minister’s comments about the need to keep our personnel safe. As he knows, Ajax are assembled at General Dynamics in my constituency, where more than 700 dedicated employees are working on the programme. I thank the Minister for visiting last month to mark the British Army initial operating capabilities ceremony, after many months and years of robust testing. I seek his reassurance that he will keep the employees at General Dynamics in his thoughts and offer them as much reassurance as possible. In addition, will he meet me, staff and trade unions at General Dynamics once the initial findings are known?

As we look into what has happened, it is important that everyone, including General Dynamics employees, has the opportunity to share any concerns. That is why General Dynamics, the British Army, Defence Equipment and Support and elsewhere in the supply chain have the appropriate whistleblowing structures. I am happy to meet my hon. Friend and staff representatives, including the trade unions, which I met when I visited his constituency. It is important that we look not just at the Ajax, but at the other vehicles that are maintained in his constituency, to ensure that we learn the lessons appropriately, based on evidence. That is why I am deliberately not jumping to any conclusions at this stage; I am waiting for the reviews to come back. I know that many in his constituency will be eager to see the results as well.

The former First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, Lord West, who is also a former Labour security Minister, said in the other place that

“the Ajax programme, no matter how much one dresses it up, has been a complete and utter disaster.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 December 2022; Vol. 826, c. 452.]

Does the Minister agree?

I always enjoy hearing Lord West’s unique take on defence policy; he has considerable experience, so I am sure he uses his words wisely. I am not going to jump to any conclusions about what happened in Titan Storm until I have seen the results of the investigations. I want to understand what happened with the vehicles that caused injuries to our service personnel and why other vehicles from the same family of vehicle, produced around the same time, did not cause injuries to other service personnel. That is being looked at as part of the review. Once we have that, I will report back to the House.

These concerns are very worrying, no less so for those employed in the sector in south Wales. Will the Minister work with defence companies in Wales and with Welsh MPs to offer reassurances to the staff, and more widely to continue to ensure that Wales is at the forefront of retaining and growing job opportunities in the defence sector?

My hon. Friend is right to talk about the staff. They can play an important role in helping us to understand what happened to the vehicles and why it happened. As a Government, we are committed to the defence sector in Wales. Indeed, we are in discussions with the Welsh Labour Government about a defence growth zone for Wales, which will take a share of £250 million. There are opportunities in south Wales, in particular using some of the floor plates and infrastructure around the General Dynamics site. I am happy to talk to her more about that.

The Minister knows that, as a former armoured infanteer, I have a keen interest in this topic, but I want to touch on the wider issue of Ajax as it relates to 3rd (UK) Division. If Ajax cannot be fixed, then potentially we will not have a formation recce capability. As it stands, we do not have one, because the vehicle is not deployable. If it cannot be fixed later on, that will be a longer-term issue, particularly as Scimitar is now out of service. Warrior goes out of service in 2027, and Bulldog goes out of service in 2030, with no replacement identified. The Ares platform is fundamentally not an infantry fighting vehicle, and although the Minister has assured us before that he is restoring the armoured infantry capability to 3rd (UK) Division, it is not a like-for-like replacement. Will the Minister look at the current ORBAT—order of battle—for an armoured infantry battalion and how the Ares cannot replace Warrior? A non-stabilised .50 calibre machine gun does not replace a 30 mm cannon. This urgently needs to be looked at, because the Army seems to be chopping and changing its mind and not to know what it wants from its armoured capability.

The hon. Gentleman does himself a disservice by saying that he has only a keen interest. He is by far the best parliamentary questioner of the Ministry of Defence, and that keen interest is felt upon my desk with 30 parliamentary questions every single day. I appreciate his keen interest in the area. He raises a serious issue. In reshaping the Army’s capabilities to increase its lethality, as the Chief of the General Staff is seeking to do, there is a necessity to replace old platforms with new and to adjust how the Army fights. That is in particular using a greater combination of deeper fires, drones and other capabilities. There is a role, though, for armour and the different variations of armour from light to heavy, and that will be what we buy, as will be set out in the defence investment plan that will be published in due course.

More than 30 soldiers fell ill, so I place on record our thanks as a House to Army Medical. Does my hon. Friend agree that when it comes to the forthcoming defence investment plan, Army Medical, of which 2 Med Group is headquartered in my constituency, will stand to benefit from that plan and that we will learn the lessons from this Ajax incident?

I thank my hon. Friend for talking about Army Medical and 2 Med Group in particular. The strategic defence review set out how we need to invest in our enablers, and that includes Defence Medical Services, ensuring that as we move towards warfighting readiness, we maintain the ability to treat any of our personnel who may be injured or need medical attention. That work is ongoing, and he should expect to see investment in the defence investment plan.

This is not the Minister’s fault, but it is his responsibility. This issue has gone from Labour to a coalition Government to a Tory Government. It is now back with Labour, and we have a system that is nine years late, has cost £6 billion and has just injured a further 30 of our service personnel. GD is a US prime. Does the Minister think for one second that the US would allow themselves to get messed around by a UK prime in the same way? Does he have any indication that he can share with the House about defence contingency planning if he has to press the button to cancel this project, in terms of the CV90 or Rheinmetall Lynx?

The hon. Member is right that we need to end this saga. It has gone on for too long, and I am not happy with any of our equipment being used by our service personnel if it is not safe. Since I became a Minister, I have taken a number of decisions to pause the use of certain equipment because I had safety concerns about it. I did so again with Ajax, because the safety of our people is a priority for me. That is something I feel strongly, as a representative of a military city and coming from a military family. It is too early, until I see the reports, to look at what may happen next, but I reassure him that when we get to that stage, we will report to the House.

The Ajax vehicle was ordered in 2014, and was due to be delivered in 2017. It has now been delivered eight years late, in a state of service that is completely unusable by our personnel. This is a catastrophic failure by MOD procurement. As we increase spending as we respond to the war in Ukraine, how is the Minister ensuring that MOD procurement is fit for purpose, so that we do not have another disaster like this?

It is important that we look at what in particular happened with Ajax and the Ajax family of vehicles, to see what lessons we need to learn and what decisions we need to take as a result. However, the wider point that my hon. Friend raises about defence reform is valid. Defence procurement takes too long. It is the system that we inherited in 2024. It is too expensive, and it does not allow for spiral development in the way it needs to. The procurement of Ajax was a novel form, where the platform was procured and brought into service, with iterations then retrofitted on to each platform. I am looking at whether that model and that type of procurement is right for the platforms we are looking to buy.

It is hard to think of a comparable disaster without going back to perhaps the early 1960s and the cancellation successively of Blue Streak and Skybolt. I worry that if and when the decision has to be taken that this platform is not fit to be issued to our armed forces, there will be a huge legal stand-off between the MOD and the company as to who is responsible for picking up the bill. Has thought been given to sharpening the pencils of the MOD lawyers?

The right hon. Gentleman is inviting me to speculate on what could be a decision made after the report comes back. The Defence Secretary and I are clear about the fact that all options remain on the table. We are looking into the causes and what lessons can be learned on the basis of the three reviews that I mentioned earlier. I hope that those who work in the sector and may be sharing information with members of the media will also share their insights and experiences with the ministerial review, so that we can take their concerns on board and ensure that when a decision is made, once the reviews have reported, it is the right decision for our armed forces and, perhaps most important, for the safety of our service personnel.

I thank the Minister for his response to the urgent question, and also for his unshakeable commitment to putting the safety of service personnel first. Can he tell us when the Ajax programme was last paused before this incident?

The programme was paused under the last Government when problems were identified in relation to noise and vibration, and I think it was right that they made that decision to pause it in order to understand what had happened. They then commissioned work to establish what had gone wrong and what mitigations were required, and it was on the basis of much of that work that I was given an assurance that the platform was safe. In view of the injuries sustained by our service personnel, we are looking at what has been provided to us, in terms of accuracy and timeliness but also to understand what has happened in relation to this incident. I shall be able to say more in due course, when the reviews report.

Under the last Government, the Conservatives signed a contract for £1.5 billion with Boeing to order five E-7 Wedgetail aircraft. The order reportedly circumvented the MOD’s established procurement system, and the RAF is still without an operational platform. The Ajax scandal has dragged on for even longer, and last week a General Dynamics manager used social media to ridicule Army leadership and those personnel who had suffered from excessive noise and vibration while using the Ajax platform. What is the Government’s contingency plan in case this £6.3 billion investment collapses, and, regardless, will they launch an inquiry into both platforms?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he said about Wedgetail. There was a very good debate in Westminster Hall only a few months ago during which a number of the issues relating to the Wedgetail procurement were raised, and the first test flight happened shortly after that.

As for Ajax, it is right for us to take an evidence-based approach that involves looking systematically at the experience of both the vehicles that were potentially causing injuries and those that were not, so we can understand what has happened, and on the back of that we will make a decision on how to proceed. I think that that is the right approach, to be taken calmly and coolly but also professionally. I want the engineering reports to be the priority, and I want those who are working on them to have the time that they need to produce a thorough set of recommendations in respect of what has happened and what needs to happen next.

I thank the Minister for the action that he has taken on Ajax. As other Members have said, this relates not only to issues in that programme but to long-running issues in defence procurement, which, as I know from businesses in my constituency, is often too slow and too expensive and fails to deliver the effective kit that our men and women in uniform deserve. Once the investigations are concluded—as mentioned by the Minister—how will the lessons be taken forward into the implementation of the Defence Industrial Strategy and other action to ensure that our courageous service people get the right kit, at the right price, at the right time?

I can reassure my hon. Friend that we are not waiting just for the output of these reviews to make substantial reforms to our procurement system. We know it is too slow, and we know it is too expensive. In the Defence Industrial Strategy that we published a few months ago we set out our ambition to cut our contracting timelines, to have more iterative development, to invest more in skills, and to deliver more of that increasing defence budget to British companies. We will of course look at what the reviews say, and I can reassure the House that if decisions are required, the Secretary of State and I will be making them.

Given the issues surrounding Ajax and the operational gap that this leaves in the Army, is the Minister confident that no capability and usability issues with Boxer or the Project Hunter alternative individual weapon system will come out of the woodwork? On Friday I met representatives of a local defence business who shared some of their concerns with me.

I thank my constituency neighbour for her question. If there is a local defence business in the hon. Lady’s constituency, it is not far from mine, and I would be very happy to speak to her about that. First of all, we are looking at what has happened, and then we will make a decision based on the evidence. That is the right approach here, but I am very happy to look at this issue. Boxer is a good platform that has not had the issues that Ajax has had. I have seen Boxer under construction in Stockport and Telford, and I have seen the dedicated workforce who are delivering that. There is the potential for more to happen there.

While the problems with the Ajax programme are familiar, what we have heard today is quite extraordinary, because both the Minister and the shadow Defence Secretary have said from the Dispatch Box that they have been misled by officials. That raises questions for this House, because we should be able to rely on what is said by Ministers in good faith from the Dispatch Box. Has the Minister discussed this issue with the Cabinet Secretary? I agree with the Chair of the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Slough (Mr Dhesi): Members from across the House do not think that these problems apply only to this programme; they are more systemic. What the Minister and the shadow Defence Secretary have said is extremely important to how this House operates and whether individuals are held to account. What action will the Minister take with the Cabinet Secretary to address that?

I deliberately did not use the same words as the shadow Defence Secretary because I have not seen the evidence of what has happened in this case. I am reserving judgment about the advice given to me, but I am asking for a review into the accuracy and timeliness of it to ensure that the information given to me is right. However, I am aware of the Sheldon review, which highlighted concerns in the past. I have spoken to the shadow Minister, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), and I shall seek to speak to further Members from across the House and, indeed, to former Members who have experience in this area, because it is vital that we can have confidence in the equipment that we are asking the men and women of our armed forces to use. In order to make a decision on the use of that equipment, we need to have absolute certainty that it is safe. That is the decision that I will be taking with the Secretary of State once we have seen the reports, but I am very happy to have further conversations on a cross-party basis to understand the concerns and to make sure that our defence procurement system is accurate and timely and, importantly, keeps our people safe.

Defence innovation is vital in adapting our armed forces to the drone age and the war in Ukraine, but also to the Government’s economic strategy. What confidence can the country have in the MOD’s ability to deliver, given the debacle with Ajax?

Every single day, brilliant people in defence companies large and small deliver incredible capabilities for the UK’s armed forces. In many cases, we are using faster procurement and new permissions for our friends in Ukraine. There are lessons that we are learning from the experience of supporting our friends in Ukraine, including on speeding up the delivery of systems. We are also looking at how we can reduce the contracting time and enable platforms to be spiral-developed faster than what we have today. There are lessons to be learned, and the defence industrial strategy sets out a number of them. We will look carefully at the reviews to see what lessons can be applied to the Ajax platform, and if there are wider lessons that need to be learned, we will take them seriously.

Civilians talk tactics and veterans talk logistics. Although the MAN trucks might not be as sexy as Ajax, their loss, however temporary, will be keenly felt. Can the Minister outline what practical steps are being taken to make sure that the wheels are not coming off—so to speak—any other mission-critical equipment?

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right about the importance of logistics. I am reminded that without Colonel James Sunderland—a logistics colonel who sat on the Conservative Benches—the House is slightly light on that expertise at the moment. It is important that we look at whether the system is working properly. When faults were identified in the MAN support vehicle, the correct mitigations were put in place and then rolled out. I make a clear distinction between understanding what has happened and knowing what mitigations are required and how we will roll those out. That is how the system should work, but with the Ajax we are not yet certain what has happened. We have a number of investigations that will hopefully soon provide us with the clarity and the answers that we require.

I thank the Minister very much for his answers, and for his clear commitment to do better and to solve the problems. We appreciate his honesty in this House. It is understood that some 6,000 vehicles, some of which have been in service for two decades, are being fitted with replacement parts and that some were fitted incorrectly. These vehicles are used to get food, fuel and supplies to the troops. What steps will the Minister take to look at other Army vehicles to ensure that there are no improper parts in them, so that this does not create a knock-on effect on essential supplies getting to troops in the battle zone?

I thank the hon. Member for his question. The Army has a number of vehicles that, as we have heard in this discussion, have been in service for a long period. In refreshing our capabilities, it is not just the Ajax platform that we as a nation are seeking to update, but the Land Rovers and a whole host of other platforms. We are seeking to do so to provide the men and women in our forces with the equipment they need to increase our warfighting readiness.

Sitting behind that, we need to have systems that procure faster and better than we have seen in the past, and that provide more value for the taxpayer, even though we are spending more on defence than ever before, because I want to see increased value for the taxpayer. We are making sure that we deliver a safe working environment for all our service personnel, because when we ask them to do extraordinary things, I want to have confidence that the equipment and vehicles I am asking them to do those things in are as safe as they possibly can be.

I thank the Minister for his responses.