PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Offensive Weapons Bill (Seventh sitting) - 6 September 2018 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Chair(s) Mike Gapes, †James Gray
Members† Atkins, Victoria (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)
† Foster, Kevin (Torbay) (Con)
† Foxcroft, Vicky (Lewisham, Deptford) (Lab)
† Haigh, Louise (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)
† Huddleston, Nigel (Mid Worcestershire) (Con)
† Jones, Sarah (Croydon Central) (Lab)
† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
† Maclean, Rachel (Redditch) (Con)
† Maynard, Paul (Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty's Treasury)
Morgan, Stephen (Portsmouth South) (Lab)
† Morris, James (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)
† Pursglove, Tom (Corby) (Con)
† Robinson, Mary (Cheadle) (Con)
† Scully, Paul (Sutton and Cheam) (Con)
† Siddiq, Tulip (Hampstead and Kilburn) (Lab)
† Smyth, Karin (Bristol South) (Lab)
† Timms, Stephen (East Ham) (Lab)
ClerksMike Everett, Adam Mellows-Facer, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 6 September 2018
[James Gray in the Chair]
Offensive Weapons BillQuestion proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 deals with the age verification systems needed to enforce the measures, it. We will discuss again the standards that will be required by the Home Office if the legislation is to have effect. I hope the Minister can give details of what she considers will meet the requirements of subsection 4(a), which refers to sellers operating
“a system for checking that persons who bought articles to which section 141A applied by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer were not under the age of 18.”
What would be a reasonable system? Requiring a person to check a box to say they are over 18? Referring to the electoral roll? Requiring use of a credit or debit card owned by someone over 18, though that would not prove that the individual buying was the owner of the card? What kind of standards will the Home Office require?
Concerns have been raised about the work of trading standards with regard to online test purchases, which is frequently found to be unsuccessful. Can the Minister provide us with statistics on the online test purchases conducted, on the basis for bringing forward the clause, and on prosecutions brought by trading standards over the last year against retailers that have failed to comply with existing legislation on the sale of bladed articles to under-18s?
The clause is the first of the Bill to deal with knives. I report to the Committee with a heavy heart that there were 702 knife crimes in my borough of Newham last year—the second-highest number in London and a 15% increase on the previous year. Of those, 214 involved injury. In London as a whole, there were 80 fatal stabbings in 2017, including of 20 teenagers. I need not elaborate to underline the horror of those figures, and particularly of the fact that so many young people lost their lives as a result of being stabbed.
That was in 2017. In the first three months of 2018, there were 30 fatal stabbings in London. The fatality rate for those three months was 50% higher than in 2017. Of the 30 people who died, six were teenagers. It was reported in April, I think, that in the first couple months of this calendar year, London had a higher murder rate than New York, which is extremely troubling and chilling for all of us.
I looked this morning at the website of my local paper, the Newham Recorder. There are three headlines there at the moment: “Guilty: Three teenagers convicted for stabbing 14-year-old boy in Manor Park”; “Police appeal to find Fatjon Koka following stabbing in Stratford”; and “Man to appear in court following Romford Road stabbing”. Those are three separate and entirely unrelated items in the current issue of my local newspaper. The changes to the law in the Bill to bear down on this scourge are extremely welcome. There is clearly a pressing need to get a grip on what is going on, to change things, and to stop this seemingly rapidly escalating problem affecting so many people, particularly the young.
To get on top of this problem, we will have to increase police resources. For a number of years, the Government cut police resources and police numbers, and crime did not rise, but an increase in crime was utterly inevitable given the scale of the reduction in police numbers. The crime surge was delayed, but it is now very much with us. It is hitting us extremely hard. I very much hope that the clause and the other measures in the Bill will help, but we will need significant additional police resources.
On Tuesday, the Committee discussed how the Bill would affect sellers of corrosive products outside the UK. The same issues arise in the case of sellers of knives who are outside the UK; as I understand it, the Bill deals with them in the same way as sellers of corrosive products. We had a debate on Tuesday about my new clause 9, and as I indicated in the context of corrosive products, I am not convinced that the way the Bill deals with this problem is altogether satisfactory. The concern is greater here, because as I informed the Committee on Tuesday, Mr Raheel Butt has pointed out to me that it seems to be the norm for online purchases of appalling knives to be made from suppliers outside the UK, on platforms such as eBay. The Minister pointed out on Tuesday that the purchase of knives disguised to look like something else is clearly illegal in the UK, but there is no shortage of online platforms offering those products in the UK. They are freely available to purchasers here, even though their purchase is illegal, and in the particular case I mentioned, the suppliers were all located outside the UK.
Will the clause not have effect if a seller is outside the UK, as was the case with corrosive products, which we discussed on Tuesday? Will we therefore need to depend on separate measures—set out, I think, in clause 18, in which a responsibility is placed on delivery companies—to address the problem of sales from outside the UK? If so, can the Minister can clarify the position in cases where sellers are located elsewhere in the EU? As I have pointed out previously, eBay offers some pretty ghastly weapons supplied by firms in Germany, which is a member of the European Union, as are we, at the moment. Will clause 12 have no effect on sellers located elsewhere in the EU, as I think the Minister indicated was the case in the parallel discussion we had on Tuesday? If so, I am a little bit puzzled as to why. If a seller in Germany sells a weapon that is illegal in the UK to somebody in the UK, or a knife to a 16-year-old in the UK, how is it not possible to prosecute that company somewhere else in the European Union for having committed an offence?
We had a debate on Tuesday about amendment 53, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley, which proposed that the age threshold for knife purchases be raised from 18 to 21, and the Minister quite properly explained some of the difficulties with that. However, I hope that we will not leave this issue here. There is a compelling case for saying that some of those very unpleasant weapons, the only purpose of which can be to do damage to others, should not be freely available, as they are at the moment, to 19 and 20-year-olds. I take the point that there is not an amendment that would have that effect on the amendment paper at the moment, but I hope that we will not let this matter pass. We have to change the way the age restrictions work and find ways to limit the supply of weapons that are inflicting appalling injuries—and indeed death—on far too many people in our country.
As part of the strategy, we are investing £22 million over the next two years in a new early intervention youth fund to provide joined-up support to youth groups and communities working with children and young people. The right hon. Member for East Ham mentioned police resources; I will touch on that lightly, as we discuss this subject in many forums. Although the policing response is incredibly important, there are other much bigger drivers of the upsurge in violence. Sadly, we all know the upturn in county lines and know that the drugs market is a major driver of the violence, but that is for another occasion.
A lot of colleagues have written to me about the proposals in this Bill. There seems to be a misunderstanding among some online retailers—not all, by any means—that this law does not apply to them. It does not matter their size; since 1998 the law has been that bladed products cannot be sold online to people under the age of 18. The law was updated in 2006 to make it clear that that covered online sales. The purpose of the provisions is to make absolutely clear our expectations of people who sell knives and bladed products online.
We are introducing clause 12 because we do not want to have simply a box-ticking exercise for retailers, who could be delivering potentially dangerous products without sufficient checks on the people they send them to. We expect our measures—both at the point of sale and at the point of delivery—to really clamp down on the ability of young people to order knives online.
Clause 12 amends section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which makes it an offence to sell bladed articles to people under 18. That defence—namely, that the seller took
“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”—
is modified, or explained, in clause 12 for when the sale is conducted remotely. If sellers do not put in place minimum requirements to meet the conditions set out in the clause, they will not be able to avail themselves of the defence that they took “all reasonable precautions” or “exercised all due diligence” to avoid an offence being committed.
The first requirement is that the seller has a system in place to verify the age of the purchaser. Sellers are expected to have robust age-verification processes to reassure themselves that the person to whom they are selling is 18 or above. The legislation does not prescribe what constitutes a robust age-verification procedure, and that is deliberate, because we know all too well how quickly the online world is moving. The age-verification industry is evolving rapidly, as we saw with the Digital Economy Act 2017. We do not want to put something in statute that is a commercial decision for retailers or that might result in out-of-date measures in 12 months’ time or ones that could already be improved.
Frankly, it is for business owners to decide which solution is best for their business model. I draw an analogy with the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which does not set out what is expected of anyone running a business such as a construction company or an iron foundry, but does set out the expectation that those employers will take all reasonable practicable steps to protect their workforce and members of the public.
A second requirement is for the package to be marked clearly to the effect that it contains an article with a blade—or one that is sharp and pointed—and that it can be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Frankly, I should have hoped that sellers would already have similar arrangements, if they wanted to ensure that a knife sold remotely would not be handed over to a person under 18, under current legislation. However, unfortunately some sellers do not mark the package as age-restricted, so we are building the further safeguard into the Bill.
The third requirement is for the seller to take all reasonable precautions to ensure that when the package is delivered it is handed to a person aged 18 or over. Again, the seller has a responsibility to ensure that the company delivering the item understands that age must be verified before it is handed over. The fourth requirement is for the seller not to deliver the package, or arrange for it to be delivered, to a locker. Some delivery companies nowadays have those facilities. That is not permissible for the sale of bladed articles—bladed products—under the clause. Obviously it would fall foul of the age verification process.
We expect that, with the placing of those minimum requirements on a statutory footing, they will be standard practice to comply with existing legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 and 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 15
Delivery of bladed products to residential premises etc
“premises other than a registered business address”.
Amendment 48 to clause 15, page 15, line 1, leave out subsections (5) and (6).
Amendment 47 to clause 15, page 15, line 1, leave out “solely”.
As the clause makes clear, it will not apply if there is any business carried out from the address in question. Subsection (6) says:
“The circumstances where premises are not residential premises for the purposes of that subsection include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.”
For example, if somebody lived in a flat above a shop and had the same address as the shop, I think that as the clause stands there would be no bar to their having a knife delivered to their home.
Surely what we ought to be doing is stopping the delivery of weapons to places where people live. Amendments 46 and 48 attempt to do that by restricting the delivery of weapons to a registered business address. At the moment, clause 15 says that weapons cannot be delivered to residential addresses. My amendment suggests that that should be turned around, so that the clause says that they can only be delivered to a registered business address. Amendment 47 would do things rather differently, changing the definition of “residential premises”, so that premises where people both live and work would be included in the bar, by removing “solely” from clause 15(5).
I am conscious that neither approach is entirely without problems, so I do not plan to press the amendments to a vote. However, it is important to raise this issue, as the clause seems to have a significant loophole. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that that loophole will be plugged? I would also like to make some wider comments about the clause 15. Would you like me to do that now, Mr Gray, in the debate on these amendments, or shall I wait?
“As a self-employed cabinet maker and a wood carver, I rely on having such tools for my business and, indeed, having them delivered to my home and place of work from time to time.”
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, although his amendment is a sensible one, it is necessary to ensure that the self-employed are not unduly caught up by this well-meaning clause?
I must say that I have got a bit less sympathy for people who are selling knives from home than for people like my hon. Friend’s constituent, who are simply obtaining tools for their own use to pursue their occupations. Of course, if we went down the amendments 46 and 48 route, whereby such things could be supplied only to a registered business address, that would avoid the difficulty to which my hon. Friend rightly refers. The amendment 47 approach would exclude delivery to people such as my hon. Friend’s constituent, and I accept that that would be difficult to justify. That is why I made the point that I do not think that either of the two approaches I have described is the solution to the problem. The Government are right to want to restrict sales of very dangerous weapons to people’s homes. There is a bit of a loophole here, and I hope it can be addressed.
Amendment 46 would have the effect of restricting the range of addresses to which a remote seller can send a bladed product. It might mean, for example, that bladed products bought online could not be sent to a school or a hospital, which may not be registered as business addresses. A person working from home—for example, someone working part-time or engaged in irregular work from home—might not have registered their home as a business address. A farm might or might not be registered as a business address. We are very conscious of the fact that clause 15 will already have an impact on the online trade of bladed products, which can cover anything from breadknives to specialist bladed knives used for woodworking or agricultural activities, as the right hon. Member for East Ham described. We are trying to limit the impact on that legitimate trade by allowing deliveries to businesses to continue. The business could be a farm, a hospital, a school or a business run from someone’s home.
We considered using a registered business address as the basis for the offence, but we decided against that because there is no simple way for sellers to ascertain whether a premise is a registered business address—particularly if the person working there is self-employed or part-time. Of course, not all types of businesses that we would want to be able to receive deliveries will necessarily operate from a registered business address. We therefore took the approach of preventing the dispatch of bladed products to a premise that is used solely as a residential premise. That will allow deliveries to continue to hospitals, hotels, care homes, schools, restaurants, farms and any residential premise from which a business operates, such as a plumber who operates from home.
The right hon. Gentleman gave the example of a flat above a shop. It depends on the construction of the premise, but if it is a divided premise—in other words, if the flat has nothing to do with the shop—I suspect it would be viewed as a residential premise and so would be covered by the clause.
There are many ways in which to tackle this issue, and the step-by-step process that the Bill proposes will make it less and less likely that a young person who is sadly on a path of criminality will think it is worth the hassle, frankly. Sellers emailing buyers to confirm their business address and to ask what sort of business they operate and so on will put a responsibility on the buyer as well, and rightly so. I hope that that explanation of our approach satisfies the right hon. Gentleman, and I invite him to withdraw his amendments.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I think I am right in saying that the clause’s sole purpose is to ensure that the clause around sale to under-18s is absolutely safeguarded; as the Minister just described, the Bill, as it goes through, step by step, enforces previous clauses. However, it does not seem that other options presented to the Government, the Home Office and the Committee that would equally enforce those clauses have been properly considered by the Home Office, and I am confused about why they have not been added to the Bill.
One potential solution lies within the Bill itself. As we have discussed, clause 18 sets out the provisions by which an international seller can use a delivery company to deliver a bladed article, and the obligations on that delivery company to ensure that it is delivered into the hands of an adult. Could we not mirror that clause for UK sales, so that delivery companies for all UK sellers required age verification to prove that a buyer was over 18? Alternatively, the Minister could consider section 151 of the Licensing Act 2003, which covers the delivery of alcohol to children and when a seller is liable to a fine if a delivery is made to a person under the age of 18.
As the Committee has established, the clause’s potential consequences are extremely far-reaching; we have heard one example already, but others abound. I am sure that many Committee members will have received representations from businesses in their constituencies. As someone from Sheffield, I have obviously heard from plenty of knife manufacturers from the great steel city. I will come on to their concerns shortly.
I am concerned that an outright prohibition on sales to residential addresses, and all the unintended consequences that would follow, would not be necessary if the Government were clear on measures for online age verification. Surely, if we are prescriptive enough on age verification standards, these clauses would be unnecessary. However, the Bill makes no provision for such standards. We still do not know what the guidance, which the Government intend to issue, will say, when it will be issued or whether it will be statutory. It would be helpful if the Minister provided the Committee with the draft guidance that the Government intend to issue to online retailers on age verification. The Digital Economy Bill Committee, which passed verification measures, received draft guidance to help us scrutinise that Bill.
Those who sell knives and currently deliver them to residential addresses have come up with an alternative solution to the ban. They have provided it in evidence to the Committee and I believe it may solve more issues than the Government’s proposals. They propose a mandatory online knife dealers’ licensing scheme that would rely on a defined age verification standard, funded by the dealer licence fee; it would be an offence to sell knives online in the UK without a licence or to ship knives on behalf of an unlicensed dealer. We could go further and make it an offence to purchase from a non-licensed site. The licence conditions could set out approved age verification systems and processes requiring full audit trail and record keeping—essentially an ISO 2001. What consideration was given to such a scheme? Was it fully considered by the Home Office in response to its consultation proposals? Why it was rejected in favour of the proposals in the clause?
If the clause’s purpose is to ensure that under absolutely no circumstances are children to purchase knives—I think we are sure of that—is the problem that the Home Office does not have faith in the age verification systems currently used and required in other areas of law? If we do not trust the systems currently on the market, could we not require couriers to demand identification?
A raft of options is available to the Government and, if we are honest, they have chosen one that will not have much of an impact on the problem. If a child wants to get hold of a knife and they cannot buy one online, they will find other ways to get hold of one. As we have heard, many overseas sellers are evading the current legislation, and they will continue to do so because we do not have sufficient legislation around platforms and their responsibility in enforcement. I will come to that shortly.
It would be much more effective to require online retailers to adhere to a high standard of AV on their websites, which could be carried to platforms such as eBay, Amazon and Facebook Marketplace, and the Wish app that we have discussed. That would have a wider reach in preventing children from accessing knives online. Under such a licensing scheme, platforms could be required to restrict the viewing of knives or corrosive products to over-18s so that children could not see the products online, let alone attempt to purchase them.
The clause as it stands ignores the capability of internet sales to be better controlled than face-to-face sales, because they provide a superior audit trail. It presumes that online retailers will have, or will have easy access to, physical stores where face-to-face age checks may take place, and it ignores expert panel recommendations from the Better Regulation Delivery Office, which has reported on how proper age verification can take place online. An important point was made in response to the Government consultation about disabled people and people who live in isolated areas, who might rely on delivery for steak knives or gardening tools and would find it difficult to access the nearest collection point designated by an online retailer. Will the Minister explain how those people could work around the Bill’s provisions?
It seems odd that age verification software has not been chosen, given that it is now relatively well established and used well in other areas of law. Either clear AV standards or measures on delivery would clearly solve the difficulties that will follow on from the catch-all restrictions of this ban.
Should the Government not take up those alternatives, it is clear from evidence to the Committee that it will be necessary to extend the defences and carve-outs to amend the definition of products in order to define them more tightly. The made-to-measure carve-out in clause 16(3), which is supposed to cover products where the bladed product has been made to a unique specification and for that particular purpose, is nowhere near sufficient to cover the plethora of small businesses, agricultural workers and hobbyists who will be caught by the clause and who have raised their concerns.
We have received more representations for this clause than for almost any other. The issues at stake matter to those retailers, small businesses and individuals who have been in touch. Their combined concerns are for a highly restrictive section that covers a wide range of products.
The definition of “bladed product” in clause 17 is at the heart of the issue; it is a new definition that does not currently exist in English law. It has caused most concern by potentially extending the remit of this legislation so that it could be far wider than anything that exists. A bladed article, which currently exists under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, is
This definition of a bladed product is any knife product that
I believe it is the Government’s intention that that definition should be narrower than the definition of a bladed article under the Criminal Justice Act, but that is certainly not the reading of many of those who have given evidence to the Committee—including the British Retail Consortium, whose members will be required to enforce and comply with the clause. They have said that clause 17 has a different requirement for bladed products that cannot be delivered to a residential address. We are told that the intention is that the list of products in clause 17 should be shorter than that under the Criminal Justice Act. The explanatory memorandum simply states:
It does not seem self-explanatory to the BRC or to me.
The BRC does not understand the intention of the clause and is concerned that, in fact, it will be interpreted by the criminal justice system as being more extensive than the Criminal Justice Act definition, and could include anything with a blade, such as a coffee grinder or a food processor. It is concerned that the clause would give rise to different interpretations and leave a lot open to case law. The key aim is certainty, as I am sure we would agree. Those members request further explanation in guidance or by including an order-making power in the Bill to list the items that are allowed to be delivered. That is not an unreasonable request for certainty for online retailers.
The members believe that an order setting out the items to be banned or allowed would be amended as appropriate, as technology provides a watertight method by which such deliveries could be made safely and age verification securely checked. Businesses that employ such technology could receive assured advice from their primary authority and be allowed to make residential deliveries of appropriate articles.
Reading through the written evidence, it is clear that it is the definition of a bladed product that has caused so much consternation and has captured a range of interests, pursuits, hobbies, businesses and occupations. They include Ken Hilton from the National Federation of Coppice Workers, who outlined the impact that clause 15 will have on his members and their livelihoods. As I understand it, they have been captured only because the definition of “bladed product” would extend to their tools. They have said:
“A great many of the tools a coppice worker will use are specialised and not available in a retail environment and have to be obtained either by mail order or from the internet and sent by post. Many coppice workers work in remote rural areas and do not have ready access to high streets even if the tools were available… If section 15 remains intact a great number of coppice workers will not be able to carry on. This will be a loss…for them and…industry”—
and he makes the case for the whole country, although I must confess I did not know what a coppice worker was until starting work on this legislation.
There is another piece of evidence from an owner of an agricultural smallholding. He says:
There is another from an artist:
I was also particularly struck by the evidence provided by the chairman of Whitby and Co, the UK’s largest multi-saw and pocketknife distributors. They raise several reasonable queries. For example, they make the valid point that our knife crime statistics are not broken down into offences by weapon, so we do not know—as far as I am aware—how many offences are committed with blades, knifes or other pointed objects such as screwdrivers, or glass or nails. It would be very helpful if the Government provided the basis on which they are focusing on bladed products rather than pointed objects, as in other parts of the legislation. There is also some query about the validity of the online test purchases that the Home Office has undertaken.
By no stretch of the imagination do these examples provide an exhaustive list of all those affected by the clause and the inadequate defences in the Bill. I am concerned that there will be an impact on a huge range of specialist businesses and individuals. It is vital that the Government look again at the definition of bladed products. If they do not provide a tighter definition, they must provide clear guidance on exactly what the definition will cover. As the CPS has said:
Even if the definition were amended, it would not deal with these groups and associations. Presently, the only carve-out is for a sporting purpose, a historical re-enactment or if the blade has been specifically designed or adapted.
The concerns of retailers operating in this space are obvious. They believe they conduct legitimate sales, with thorough age verification checks on any number of products. Of course we support the objective of the clause to limit the ability of all under-18s to purchase knives online, but there are several other options available to the Government that would better achieve that.
When I read clauses 15 to 17, I did wonder whether the Government intend to stop the delivery of cutlery to people’s homes. The Minister is indicating that that is not the Government’s intention, but it is not clear to me where that is carved out in the wording of the Bill. As my hon. Friend pointed out, clause 17 tells us what a bladed product is, and I cannot see there where cutlery is carved out. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about that.
In the case of clause 12, which is about the sale of bladed articles to under-18s, clause 18, which puts an onus on the delivery company where the seller is outside the UK, had to be alongside it. In clause 15, as far as I can see, there is not another parallel clause placing responsibility on the delivery company.
I hope I am wrong—if I am, I am sure the Minister will point it out—but it looks to me as though sellers outside the UK will be entirely exempted from the requirement set out in clause 15, because there is no way for them to be penalised for sending a dangerous weapon to residential premises somewhere. If that is the case, the clause will simply force everybody who wants these things delivered to their homes to buy them from overseas suppliers instead of UK suppliers, such as those based in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley. That would be a pretty damaging outcome.
If clause 15 is going to be made to work, something must be done to address the problem of overseas sellers simply carrying on sending dangerous weapons to people’s homes, which the Bill as it stands makes no effort to address. The clause will be pointless because people will get round it in a very straightforward way.
Various points have been raised. I have noticed in the correspondence over the past few months that there seems to be a misunderstanding, so this is a great opportunity to clarify exactly what is meant by clauses 15 and 17. We are not seeking to stop the online sale of knives or bladed products. We are trying to craft the law so that those who are entitled under the law to buy knives that have sharp blades can do so if they are over 18. We have used the phrase “bladed product” precisely because we want to differentiate it from the phrase “bladed articles” used in the 1988 Act, which is not as restrictive.
In answer to the right hon. Gentleman’s question, we have excluded cutlery, because we appreciate that people will want to be able to buy cutlery. With the best will in the world, a table knife will not meet the criteria set out in clause 17(1)(b). If we had not defined it, it would be an offence to sell a disposable plastic knife to someone under-18, which would miss the point of the legislation. The wording seeks to pinpoint the risks that we are trying to address.
If we did not have such a system, the seller could do everything they were supposed to do to check age at the point of sale, but the item may be put through the letterbox anyway and get into the hands of someone under 18. We know that has happened; we just want to stop it happening again. Again, I do not pretend that this is a magic solution that will solve all knife crime, but we are trying to build a journey for bladed articles and products that makes it substantially more difficult for young people, if they are so minded, to get around the measures that retailers take when selling them.
The condition that such articles cannot be delivered to a locker is also important. The clause is about deterring young people from trying to buy such articles online and getting around the law.
I want to ask her, as well, about my point on overseas sellers. As I understand it, someone selling products to customers outside of the UK will be able to carry on posting them directly to customers’ homes without any hindrance. Is that correct?
We will move on to the international element in clause 18, but extraterritorial jurisdiction issues mean that because the point of sale is overseas and English jurisdiction does not stretch to Germany or China, we have had to try to deal with what we can here in the UK. We will move on to that debate in due course, but there is a reason we have differentiated UK and international sales. If a manufacturer or a seller has an existing agreement with a delivery company, and the delivery company knows the person to whom they are selling products, we expect them to make age checks themselves. That is a different scenario from, say, the woodcutter in Hampstead who sells the items. They can use all the delivery companies in this country as long as they follow the steps, and someone will have to go to a shop or a post office to pick the package up.
I could go through every item and say tick or cross, but I do not believe that is the duty of this Committee. The definition is set out in the Bill. It is for those affected by the definition to ensure that they meet the standards expected by law, which are already in existence; the concept of not being able to sell knives to under-18s has been in existence now for nearly 30 years. This is about addressing the problem of children getting hold of knives online, which we want to try to stop as much as possible. The Bill is directed at achieving that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 16
Defences to offence under section 15
This is a probing amendment to allow debate on the appropriate scope of defences under Clause 16.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. Given the vigorous debate we have had on clause 15, clause 16 is also important, because it provides the defences to the offence that we have just been discussing. One of those defences is simply that the seller did all they reasonably could to avoid delivery to residential premises, but the other three set out circumstances in which the law will deem it justified to sell and deliver to residential premises and a defence can therefore be made.
The Minister referred to a balancing act. That is the test that we have here. On the one hand, there is clearly a concern—we have heard it today—to ensure that the defences are wide enough to protect legitimate businesses. On the other hand, there is also a concern to concern that we do not draft the defences so widely that they can be abused to avoid culpability, or in a way that means that the offence set out in clause 15 becomes worthless.
The amendment is designed to provoke discussion about whether we have that balance right. It asks a couple of immediate questions. First, why is there a particular purpose test in clause 16(3), which relates to sellers who have adapted bladed products in accordance with specific instructions, but there is no particular purpose tests in clause 16(2), where a bladed product has been designed or manufactured in accordance with specific instructions? It is not immediately clear to me why the purpose of either the adaptation or the design is relevant to one but not the other.
Secondly, does there need to be more restrictions on the range of purposes that will allow for the defence to arise? All that is required now is that it is a particular purpose. I am guessing that it is implied in law that the purpose must to be lawful—for example, adapting a blade for the particular purpose of making it more efficient as a weapon does not amount to a defence—but I would appreciate confirmation.
We have already heard about the other defence, and the specific purposes set out that would make it acceptable to deliver to residential premises—sporting purposes and historical re-enactments. It gets to the point where I wonder whether, in an ideal world, we might simply provide an exhaustive list of purposes for which it would be acceptable to deliver. I appreciate that that would not be easy, or without risks, but it might be a much clearer way of approaching the challenge. Obviously a list could be added, perhaps by statutory instrument.
The amendment flags up concerns about whether the defences will really do the job of protecting from prosecution the businesses that we do not want to be prosecuted, while ensuring that the provisions cannot be abused by those who want to do harm.
I will deal with subsections (2) and (3) together because the rationale behind them is the same. Subsection (2) provides an exemption if the bladed product was designed or manufactured in accordance with specifications provided by the buyer. Subsection (3) provides that it is a defence if the bladed product was adapted for the purpose of enabling or facilitating its use for a particular purpose. So those who sell or manufacture custom-made bladed articles, or who adapt them, will continue to deliver those specialist items at a residential address. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East mentioned the impact on disabled people. The provisions may well help in circumstances where, for example, someone has to have a knife adapted because of disability. The defence would be available to the seller that it was delivered to a residential address for that purpose.
Subsection (4) provides for a defence if the bladed product is to be used for sporting purposes or historical re-enactment. We received a lot of submissions on historical re-enactments—I am surprised and delighted to see that so many people in the country engage in that interesting activity. Subsections (8) and (9) set out what is meant by the phrases “historical re-enactment” and “sporting purposes”.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Gentleman for probing the defences. It may be useful if I set out the background to the defences in the Bill. Clause 15 makes it a criminal offence to arrange for the delivery of bladed products bought remotely in the UK to premises used solely for residential purposes.
A large number of businesses are involved in the manufacture and sale of bladed products. That includes craftsmen, and the selling of knives not readily available on the high street. That may include sporting swords or replica historical knives. The scale of those businesses is such that they are viable only as online sellers; they do not sell enough to be able to afford a high street presence. The only way buyers who need those types of bladed products can acquire them is online.
We have taken the representations we received during the consultation on board. We note that many of these products are very expensive and highly unlikely to be bought by a young person for criminal purposes. The issue of the clause’s impact was raised strongly in the consultation, so we have taken a number of steps to try to ensure that we get the response right. We have made it clear that the clause will not cover deliveries to businesses. We have limited the definition of bladed product so that it excludes things such as table knives and plastic disposable knives. We have also exempted encased razor blades and folding knives with a blade of less than 3 inches.
Under clause 16, we have provided defences for three types of bladed product, including bladed products that are designed and manufactured for a buyer in accordance with specifications provided by the buyer, and bladed products for the purposes of sport or historical re- enactment. There is a power in clause 16(7) for the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to add further defences, by secondary legislation, should it become clear that they are required.
I appreciate that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has tabled this as a probing amendment. Adding the phrase “for a particular lawful purpose” at the end of the defence for bespoke bladed products would mean that to use the defence, it would need to be shown both that the product was made to specifications from the buyer and that the buyer was acquiring it for a lawful purpose. We suspect that adding this phrase might be meaningless, as the buyer would presumably just say yes, but it is also unnecessary. Such items are expensive and there will be a relationship between maker and buyer that makes the risk of their being sold to a person under 18 very slight. Again, this is part of the balancing exercise to ensure that the intent of the Bill is implemented by the legislation. I therefore invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Paul Maynard.)
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