PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting) - 14 April 2026 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Contributions from Jayne Kirkham, are highlighted with a yellow border.
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chair(s) Clive Efford
Members† Akehurst, Luke (North Durham) (Lab)
† Ballinger, Alex (Halesowen) (Lab)
Bool, Sarah (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
† Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)
† Carns, Al (Minister for the Armed Forces)
Cox, Pam (Colchester) (Lab)
† Foster, Mr Paul (South Ribble) (Lab)
† Francois, Mr Mark (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)
† Kirkham, Jayne (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
† Martin, Mike (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)
† Reed, David (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
† Roome, Ian (North Devon) (LD)
† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
† Taylor, Rachel (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
† Wakeford, Christian (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)
ClerksGeorge James, Sanjana Balakrishnan, Claire Cozens, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Select Committee on the Armed Forces BillTuesday 14 April 2026
(Afternoon)
[Clive Efford in the Chair]
Armed Forces BillAmendment proposed (this day): 9, in clause 20, page 34, line 27, at end insert “or
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
Chair(s) Clive Efford
Members† Akehurst, Luke (North Durham) (Lab)
† Ballinger, Alex (Halesowen) (Lab)
Bool, Sarah (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
† Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)
† Carns, Al (Minister for the Armed Forces)
Cox, Pam (Colchester) (Lab)
† Foster, Mr Paul (South Ribble) (Lab)
† Francois, Mr Mark (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
† Jones, Gerald (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare) (Lab)
† Kirkham, Jayne (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
† Martin, Mike (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)
† Reed, David (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
† Roome, Ian (North Devon) (LD)
† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
† Taylor, Rachel (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
† Wakeford, Christian (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)
ClerksGeorge James, Sanjana Balakrishnan, Claire Cozens, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Select Committee on the Armed Forces BillTuesday 14 April 2026
(Afternoon)
[Clive Efford in the Chair]
Armed Forces BillAmendment proposed (this day): 9, in clause 20, page 34, line 27, at end insert “or
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
14:00:01
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing clause stand part.
14:01:02
Al Carns
The Minister for the Armed Forces
I would like to make a correction to an earlier statement about new clause 12, before I continue to address amendment 9. I would like to clarify a point that arose in the debate on new clause 12 in relation to service protection orders. The powers in the Armed Forces Act 2006 create a time limit for charging former members and ex-regular reservists with a service offence committed while subject to service law of six months from the date they ceased to be subject to service law.
After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.
After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.
14:01:42
David Reed
Exmouth and Exeter East
I will just pick up on a point I raised this morning, which I discussed with an hon. Friend who has experience in this space. Take, for example, a crime that is committed while a person is serving that is not serious enough to warrant their being remanded into custody—it goes over the six months because it is a knotty case. Because there is zero tolerance on drugs, someone might say, “Right, this is a knotty case. I am going to get into trouble for it, and I am going to get kicked out regardless, so I will just take some drugs. I will be kicked out within a very short space of time”. If they then let those six months elapse, what is the process for that?
14:02:28
Al Carns
I am always very reticent to get into the detail and legalities of the exacts, given there are multiple variables that we are discussing, whether it be drugs or whether it be a criminal offence. If a person is serving and a crime is committed, they will not be allowed to leave until the process for dealing with the justice of that case is well thought through, whether that be within the military system or transferred into the civilian justice system, because they cannot just leave the military while there is a case ongoing. However, if the hon. Member has a specific concern about a specific case with correct parameters, we will ensure we write to him on it and all of its different variables. It is quite difficult to provide the specifics on that now.
14:03:02
David Reed
I will make that intervention now, and then we can carry on that conversation. If there is zero tolerance of drugs, and if the person who has committed a crime knows they will be kicked out—as they should be—it would be good to hear from the Ministry of Defence if there is a loophole in which someone could say, “I will do this act knowing full well that I will be kicked out very quickly”. It would be good to understand what the process is. Does that person continue to be housed by the armed forces? Where do they stay? Are they still part of their unit? What happens to them?
Al Carns
The broader welfare of individuals who are dismissed for misuse of drugs is a separate issue to the original offence and the judicial system, which will be followed through whether they are serving or whether they have left or been removed from the armed forces. What I am specifically saying is that they can still be charged six months after. The Bill will ensure that any of those processes that are put in place for them while in the military can seamlessly transfer to the civilian justice system, so that justice can be carried through. However, if there is a specific issue, bracket it in parameters, give it to us and we will make sure that we respond.
14:04:49
The Chair
Order. We will come back to amendment 9.
Al Carns
Coming back to amendment 9, I agree that pulling together a court martial board to deal with senior officers poses more challenges than it does for junior personnel. Such cases are rare, and changes were made quite recently to address the issue. Changes were made in secondary legislation in 2024 to provide more flexibility in the formation of court martial boards for trials where the defendant is a senior officer, to address any potential difficulties in finding sufficiently senior personnel who do not know the defendant to sit on the board. Having boards that are tri-service has also helped assist with that. The changes ensure that the president of the board—the most senior person on the board—will be at least a one-star when the defendant is a one-star or above, and that practical attempts are always made to try to find a suitable two-star. When a two-star cannot be found, a one-star works. For defendants below one-star, the president of the board is always one rank higher.
We talked about capacity and the availability of ranks, and we will look into the detail of how we ensure that the Defence Serious Crime Command has the authority to leverage people to deliver the right consistency on boards. In terms of capacity in dealing with senior officer trials, there are around 200 one-stars in the armed forces and around 470 personnel at one star or above. There are sufficient personnel to meet the few occasions when senior personnel are tried. We keep those matters under review through the governance board of the service justice system, the service justice board and the service justice executive group, in which all key stakeholders are represented.
Clause 20 amends section 156 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to correct an anomaly relating to those who are eligible to sit on a court martial board. The Armed Forces Act 2021 reduced qualification for those non-commissioned officers who were entitled to sit on a court martial board from a warrant officer to those of substantive OR-7 rank, for example a colour sergeant. However, a technical oversight meant that other subsections of section 156 were not also amended to reflect those changes. Consequently, only warrant officers and equivalent who became commissioned officers automatically qualified to sit on a court martial board, while OR-7s still had to undergo a three-year qualification period. Clause 20 simply enables those who receive their commission and were of former substantive OR-7 rank to automatically qualify to sit on the court martial board. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on those grounds, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
We talked about capacity and the availability of ranks, and we will look into the detail of how we ensure that the Defence Serious Crime Command has the authority to leverage people to deliver the right consistency on boards. In terms of capacity in dealing with senior officer trials, there are around 200 one-stars in the armed forces and around 470 personnel at one star or above. There are sufficient personnel to meet the few occasions when senior personnel are tried. We keep those matters under review through the governance board of the service justice system, the service justice board and the service justice executive group, in which all key stakeholders are represented.
Clause 20 amends section 156 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to correct an anomaly relating to those who are eligible to sit on a court martial board. The Armed Forces Act 2021 reduced qualification for those non-commissioned officers who were entitled to sit on a court martial board from a warrant officer to those of substantive OR-7 rank, for example a colour sergeant. However, a technical oversight meant that other subsections of section 156 were not also amended to reflect those changes. Consequently, only warrant officers and equivalent who became commissioned officers automatically qualified to sit on a court martial board, while OR-7s still had to undergo a three-year qualification period. Clause 20 simply enables those who receive their commission and were of former substantive OR-7 rank to automatically qualify to sit on the court martial board. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on those grounds, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Mr Mark Francois
Rayleigh and Wickford
I do not think we need to have a debate on clause 20 stand part because we had a pretty thorough debate on the amendment, which covered most of the issues. I will seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment, but I would like to put down the marker that we have had an interesting debate and we might wish to return to this subject on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Power to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Power to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 22 to 24 stand part.
14:14:25
Al Carns
Clause 21 provides judge advocates with the power to impose post-charge conditions on adult defendants in the court martial or service civilian court, where the defendant is not held in service custody.
Currently, judge advocates can only set post-charge conditions on a defendant’s behaviour or movements if the defendant appears before them in service custody. If a defendant appears before them who is not in service custody, they are unable to set any conditions. That causes problems when risks occur, such as absconding, reoffending, or interfering with witnesses. The clause provides that the defendant must be informed in writing of the grounds for the application and be given notice of the hearing. The defendant will be able to attend the hearing, be legally represented and make representations to the judge advocate. Defendants will also have the right to apply for a variation or discharge of any conditions set.
Clause 21 provides commanding officers and the service police with arrest powers for breach of a condition. It also establishes a service offence of failing to attend a hearing concerning a judge advocate-imposed condition, without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Finally, clause 21 provides a judge advocate with the ability to impose urgent conditions where they consider it necessary, without the need for the defendant to have notice of the hearing or to be present. In that situation, the judge advocate must arrange for a hearing with the defendant present to take place as soon as practicable and the conditions will stop having an effect at the end of that hearing. By creating a new pathway for judicially imposed obligations with specific enforcement, the measure will contribute to ensuring attendance, preventing reoffending, protecting witnesses, and safeguarding defendants.
Clause 22 will enable a new procedure to be introduced into the court martial rules, allowing for the dismissal of a charge as well as a mechanism to enable a previously dismissed charge to be brought again under certain conditions. The clause simply enables court martial rules to replicate a procedure that currently exists in the criminal justice system, known as the voluntary bill procedure. Once updated, the court martial rules will allow the Director of Service Prosecutions, in exceptional circumstances, to seek the High Court’s consent to reinstate a charge previously dismissed where it is in the interests of justice to do so. While there is no exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the High Court can grant consent, case law provides some guidance. Cases where the voluntary procedure has been used are where there has been a substantive error of law that is clear or obvious; where new evidence has become available; or where there was a serious procedural irregularity.
Clause 23 will enable the courts martial to use mental health-related powers, equivalent to those already in the civilian system under the Mental Health Act 1983, which include the ability to make a hospital order on conviction as part of sentencing. Currently, in cases where the accused has been found not guilty by virtue of insanity or where the accused has been found unfit to stand trial and there is a finding that they did the act charged against them by the service court, a judge advocate is able to make a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. A hospital order provides initial hospital treatment instead of imprisonment for a criminal offence.
However, there is no provision for cases where the accused is diagnosed as requiring mental health care while awaiting trial; before a finding of fitness to stand trial has been made; or the accused has been convicted of an offence and not yet sentenced. While the service justice system has very few cases where such a provision may be required, a recent case highlighted that these powers may be required when the accused is dealt with before a fitness to plead and/or a defence of insanity has not succeeded and the accused is found guilty.
The clause ensures that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline receive safe, lawful and appropriate care, and that defence meets its legal and moral obligations to protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while in service.
I move on to clause 24. The Armed Forces Act 2021 introduced powers, known as slip rules, for commanding officers in summary hearings, the summary appeal court and the service civilian court, equivalent to the powers that already exist in the court martial. Slip rule powers simply enable punishments or activation orders made in error to be varied or rescinded quickly without the matter having to be referred to an appeal. Clause 24 addresses the error so that secondary legislation can implement the activation orders power for the service civilian court as originally intended.
Currently, judge advocates can only set post-charge conditions on a defendant’s behaviour or movements if the defendant appears before them in service custody. If a defendant appears before them who is not in service custody, they are unable to set any conditions. That causes problems when risks occur, such as absconding, reoffending, or interfering with witnesses. The clause provides that the defendant must be informed in writing of the grounds for the application and be given notice of the hearing. The defendant will be able to attend the hearing, be legally represented and make representations to the judge advocate. Defendants will also have the right to apply for a variation or discharge of any conditions set.
Clause 21 provides commanding officers and the service police with arrest powers for breach of a condition. It also establishes a service offence of failing to attend a hearing concerning a judge advocate-imposed condition, without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Finally, clause 21 provides a judge advocate with the ability to impose urgent conditions where they consider it necessary, without the need for the defendant to have notice of the hearing or to be present. In that situation, the judge advocate must arrange for a hearing with the defendant present to take place as soon as practicable and the conditions will stop having an effect at the end of that hearing. By creating a new pathway for judicially imposed obligations with specific enforcement, the measure will contribute to ensuring attendance, preventing reoffending, protecting witnesses, and safeguarding defendants.
Clause 22 will enable a new procedure to be introduced into the court martial rules, allowing for the dismissal of a charge as well as a mechanism to enable a previously dismissed charge to be brought again under certain conditions. The clause simply enables court martial rules to replicate a procedure that currently exists in the criminal justice system, known as the voluntary bill procedure. Once updated, the court martial rules will allow the Director of Service Prosecutions, in exceptional circumstances, to seek the High Court’s consent to reinstate a charge previously dismissed where it is in the interests of justice to do so. While there is no exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the High Court can grant consent, case law provides some guidance. Cases where the voluntary procedure has been used are where there has been a substantive error of law that is clear or obvious; where new evidence has become available; or where there was a serious procedural irregularity.
Clause 23 will enable the courts martial to use mental health-related powers, equivalent to those already in the civilian system under the Mental Health Act 1983, which include the ability to make a hospital order on conviction as part of sentencing. Currently, in cases where the accused has been found not guilty by virtue of insanity or where the accused has been found unfit to stand trial and there is a finding that they did the act charged against them by the service court, a judge advocate is able to make a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. A hospital order provides initial hospital treatment instead of imprisonment for a criminal offence.
However, there is no provision for cases where the accused is diagnosed as requiring mental health care while awaiting trial; before a finding of fitness to stand trial has been made; or the accused has been convicted of an offence and not yet sentenced. While the service justice system has very few cases where such a provision may be required, a recent case highlighted that these powers may be required when the accused is dealt with before a fitness to plead and/or a defence of insanity has not succeeded and the accused is found guilty.
The clause ensures that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline receive safe, lawful and appropriate care, and that defence meets its legal and moral obligations to protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while in service.
I move on to clause 24. The Armed Forces Act 2021 introduced powers, known as slip rules, for commanding officers in summary hearings, the summary appeal court and the service civilian court, equivalent to the powers that already exist in the court martial. Slip rule powers simply enable punishments or activation orders made in error to be varied or rescinded quickly without the matter having to be referred to an appeal. Clause 24 addresses the error so that secondary legislation can implement the activation orders power for the service civilian court as originally intended.
14:14:25
David Reed
Exmouth and Exeter East
It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Clauses 21 to 24 cover powers to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention.
We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.
We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.
Al Carns
These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst
Solihull West and Shirley
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—
(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,
(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,
(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and
(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,
(b) must require that—
(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and
(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,
(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.
This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.
“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—
(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,
(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,
(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and
(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,
(b) must require that—
(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and
(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,
(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.
This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—
““independent” means independent of—
(a) the chain of command, and
(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.
Clause stand part.
Clause 26 stand part.
Amendment 19, in clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—
““independent” means independent of—
(a) the chain of command, and
(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.
Clause stand part.
Clause 26 stand part.
14:13:27
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly.
At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.
I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.
Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.
At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.
I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.
Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.
Let me take a moment to set out the key elements of the amendment in turn. First, there is the requirement that victims are provided with a standardised explanation of both the service justice system and the civilian justice system, which is essential. One of the difficulties in this area is that these two systems are often described in abstract terms, or worse, in partial terms, depending on the perspective of the person explaining them. The service justice system is sometimes presented as highly specialised but perhaps opaque, and the civilian system as unfamiliar but distant. Neither of those descriptions is sufficient on its own. What is needed is a consistent, standardised explanation that ensures every victim receives the same baseline understanding, regardless of who they are speaking to, where the case arises or at what stage they are engaged.
Secondly, there is the requirement that information must be presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner. Here, the word “neutral” matters because neutrality is not the natural condition of many institutions; it is something that must be actively constructed and carefully maintained. Without it, there is a risk, however unintended, of institutional bias shaping how options are presented. I do not suggest for a single moment that anyone in the service or civilian sector is acting in bad faith—that is not the point I seek to make. The point is that each system will, understandably and quite naturally, tend to see its own processes in a more favourable light. I think that is just a reflection of human nature. It is also why statutory neutrality requirements exist in other areas of public decision making.
Thirdly, the amendment requires that information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system. This is particularly important because victims are not just choosing a jurisdiction blindly; they are, in effect, engaging with two different procedural ecosystems, each with its own structures, timelines, safeguards and forms of support. It is therefore simply not enough to say, “You can choose either A or B.” The decision must be grounded in an understanding of what that choice actually means in practice.
Fourthly, and crucially, the amendment requires that victims are informed of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy, and of how it can be accessed. That is one of the most important aspects of the entire amendment because, if we are serious about victim autonomy, we must also be serious about ensuring that that autonomy is meaningful. Autonomy without support is often not autonomy at all; it is simply exposure to complexity without guidance. Independent advice is the mechanism by which we ensure that victims are not left to navigate difficult procedural choices alone. It provides reassurance, context and the ability to test understanding before a decision is made.
Consequentially, amendment 19 goes on to define what “independent” means for these purposes: independent of the chain of command and independent of any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution. That strikes me as a sensible and necessary clarification because independence in this context is not just an afterthought; it is a structural safeguard. It ensures that advice is not merely formally independent but genuinely so, in perception and in practice.
I support the intention behind clause 25; it is right that victims should have a voice in decisions around jurisdiction—that reflects a modern understanding of victim engagement and consent within the criminal justice system—but with that empowerment comes a responsibility on us as legislators to ensure that the framework within which that choice has to be made is robust, transparent and fair. I gently suggest that, without the safeguards set out in amendment 18, there is a risk that the system may fall short of that standard.
There are three specific risks that I want to particularly highlight. The first is the risk of informational imbalance. If victims are not given standardised, comprehensive and neutral information, there is a danger that the quality of the advice that they receive will vary depending on their personal geography, the personnel who deliver it or institutional familiarity. That is not satisfactory—and is not a satisfactory basis on which to make what is, for many victims, a deeply consequential decision.
The second point is the risk of unconscious steering. I do not suggest for a moment that anyone intends to influence victims improperly, but where complex systems are explained verbally, often under pressure and in emotionally charged circumstances, small differences in emphasis can have large effects on perception. That is precisely why a structured, written and standardised set of information is so important.
The third risk is a lack of evidential clarity around the decision itself. The amendment’s requirement for a written record of the information provided, the victim’s stated preference and the reasons given should not be seen purely as a box-ticking exercise. It is an important safeguard that ensures transparency, accountability and the ability to review decisions if questions arise about how and why a jurisdictional choice was made.
Taken together, these provisions strengthen clause 25. They ensure that the discretion it provides is exercised in a framework of clarity rather than ambiguity. The service justice system, like any justice system, ultimately depends upon the confidence of its users. Confidence is not built on outcomes alone; it is built on the process that people go through. It is built on the perception that decisions are fair, that individuals are properly informed, and that the system itself is not tilted, intentionally or otherwise, in one direction or the other. If victims have a sense that they were not properly informed when making a jurisdictional choice, that will inevitably undermine confidence in the process that follows.
Conversely, if victims are confident that they were given clear, neutral and comprehensive information supported by access to independent advice, then the legitimacy of the process is strengthened even where the outcomes are difficult. That is the real value of amendment 18. It is not about adding a further level of complexity or detail for its own sake; it is about strengthening the integrity of consent within the justice process.
Amendment 19 ensures that the concept of independence is not left open for interpretation by others, but is clearly defined in a way that preserves both actual and perceived impartiality.
We should not be content with a system in which victims are merely asked for a preference; we should insist on a system in which that preference is informed, structured and supported by genuinely independent advice. If we can achieve that, I genuinely believe that we will not only improve clause 25 but strengthen confidence in the wider service justice system. In an area of such sensitivity, that should not be considered secondary—it is central to the legitimacy of the entire framework. For that reason, I hope that hon. Members will support these amendments.
Secondly, there is the requirement that information must be presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner. Here, the word “neutral” matters because neutrality is not the natural condition of many institutions; it is something that must be actively constructed and carefully maintained. Without it, there is a risk, however unintended, of institutional bias shaping how options are presented. I do not suggest for a single moment that anyone in the service or civilian sector is acting in bad faith—that is not the point I seek to make. The point is that each system will, understandably and quite naturally, tend to see its own processes in a more favourable light. I think that is just a reflection of human nature. It is also why statutory neutrality requirements exist in other areas of public decision making.
Thirdly, the amendment requires that information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system. This is particularly important because victims are not just choosing a jurisdiction blindly; they are, in effect, engaging with two different procedural ecosystems, each with its own structures, timelines, safeguards and forms of support. It is therefore simply not enough to say, “You can choose either A or B.” The decision must be grounded in an understanding of what that choice actually means in practice.
Fourthly, and crucially, the amendment requires that victims are informed of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy, and of how it can be accessed. That is one of the most important aspects of the entire amendment because, if we are serious about victim autonomy, we must also be serious about ensuring that that autonomy is meaningful. Autonomy without support is often not autonomy at all; it is simply exposure to complexity without guidance. Independent advice is the mechanism by which we ensure that victims are not left to navigate difficult procedural choices alone. It provides reassurance, context and the ability to test understanding before a decision is made.
Consequentially, amendment 19 goes on to define what “independent” means for these purposes: independent of the chain of command and independent of any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution. That strikes me as a sensible and necessary clarification because independence in this context is not just an afterthought; it is a structural safeguard. It ensures that advice is not merely formally independent but genuinely so, in perception and in practice.
I support the intention behind clause 25; it is right that victims should have a voice in decisions around jurisdiction—that reflects a modern understanding of victim engagement and consent within the criminal justice system—but with that empowerment comes a responsibility on us as legislators to ensure that the framework within which that choice has to be made is robust, transparent and fair. I gently suggest that, without the safeguards set out in amendment 18, there is a risk that the system may fall short of that standard.
There are three specific risks that I want to particularly highlight. The first is the risk of informational imbalance. If victims are not given standardised, comprehensive and neutral information, there is a danger that the quality of the advice that they receive will vary depending on their personal geography, the personnel who deliver it or institutional familiarity. That is not satisfactory—and is not a satisfactory basis on which to make what is, for many victims, a deeply consequential decision.
The second point is the risk of unconscious steering. I do not suggest for a moment that anyone intends to influence victims improperly, but where complex systems are explained verbally, often under pressure and in emotionally charged circumstances, small differences in emphasis can have large effects on perception. That is precisely why a structured, written and standardised set of information is so important.
The third risk is a lack of evidential clarity around the decision itself. The amendment’s requirement for a written record of the information provided, the victim’s stated preference and the reasons given should not be seen purely as a box-ticking exercise. It is an important safeguard that ensures transparency, accountability and the ability to review decisions if questions arise about how and why a jurisdictional choice was made.
Taken together, these provisions strengthen clause 25. They ensure that the discretion it provides is exercised in a framework of clarity rather than ambiguity. The service justice system, like any justice system, ultimately depends upon the confidence of its users. Confidence is not built on outcomes alone; it is built on the process that people go through. It is built on the perception that decisions are fair, that individuals are properly informed, and that the system itself is not tilted, intentionally or otherwise, in one direction or the other. If victims have a sense that they were not properly informed when making a jurisdictional choice, that will inevitably undermine confidence in the process that follows.
Conversely, if victims are confident that they were given clear, neutral and comprehensive information supported by access to independent advice, then the legitimacy of the process is strengthened even where the outcomes are difficult. That is the real value of amendment 18. It is not about adding a further level of complexity or detail for its own sake; it is about strengthening the integrity of consent within the justice process.
Amendment 19 ensures that the concept of independence is not left open for interpretation by others, but is clearly defined in a way that preserves both actual and perceived impartiality.
We should not be content with a system in which victims are merely asked for a preference; we should insist on a system in which that preference is informed, structured and supported by genuinely independent advice. If we can achieve that, I genuinely believe that we will not only improve clause 25 but strengthen confidence in the wider service justice system. In an area of such sensitivity, that should not be considered secondary—it is central to the legitimacy of the entire framework. For that reason, I hope that hon. Members will support these amendments.
14:25:48
David Reed
My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go.
Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.
However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.
These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.
The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.
Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.
However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.
These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.
The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.
14:25:49
Al Carns
I thank the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for speaking to amendments 18 and 19. I acknowledge their sentiment, which is to ensure that the information provided to victims is appropriate and timely. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when a victim of an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson is asked to indicate a preference on jurisdiction, they can do so in an informed way. The information provided must be accurate, helpful and, of course, objective, so I share the hon. Member’s objectives.
The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.
Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.
In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.
Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.
In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.
The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.
Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.
In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.
Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.
In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.
Where initial contact has been made with service police, the scheme will be available, should a victim want it, to help them reach a preference on jurisdiction. We are therefore working to provide an early, non-statutory version of the guidance to independent legal advocates, which will provide an invaluable opportunity to get in-practice feedback on the guidance and help us to better tailor it to meet the needs of victims before the first version of the statutory guidance is published.
I hope that I have reassured the Committee that the clause as drafted allows us to deal with the points that the hon. Member raises, but in a way that provides practitioners with the flexibility to meet the needs of the victim, as they vary from case to case.
I move on to clauses 25 and 26. Investigations, prosecutions and victim support have all significantly improved in the service justice system in recent years. The defence serious crime command, launched in December 2022, delivers investigations into serious offences and sexual offences consistent with national civilian policing standards. The Victim Witness Care Unit provides independent, trauma-informed and end-to-end support.
We have independent verification of the progress made. His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate found in a November 2024 report on the Service Prosecuting Authority that timelines and victim support in the service justice system are at a level it
The civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales faces challenges. Sir Brian Leveson’s July 2025 report said that it “is in crisis”. Part 2 of his report in February 2026 states that the open caseload in the Crown court is in the order of 80,000 cases, with trials listed as far ahead as 2030 in the most seriously affected courts. The court martial has no backlog and cases progress without delay. Noting the procedural difference between the two systems, 2024 administrative data bears this out. Following charge, adult rape-flagged cases reach an outcome in the Crown court in 358 days, with 19% of victims withdrawing from proceedings. In contrast, this takes 199 days in the court martial, with no victims withdrawing.
Government administrative data also suggests that the conviction rate for adult rape-flagged cases in the court martial, excluding guilty pleas, is 51% from 2022 to 2024, and 36% in the Crown court in the financial years 2022-23 to 2024-25. This calls into question claims that the conviction rate in the court martial is three times lower than in the Crown court. We maintain that reliable comparisons of conviction rates are difficult to make, because of differences in volume, victim withdrawal rates, procedures and case profile between the two systems.
We want to go further than the progress made so far, and that is why measures in this Bill strengthen the support given to victims to help them to indicate their preferred jurisdiction. We have a system of concurrent jurisdiction. Under this system, prosecutors make a decision on a case-by-case basis whether to deal with an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson in one of its criminal justice systems or, instead, the service justice system. This is underpinned by prosecutors’ protocols set out in sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Under those protocols, prosecutors take into account the views of the victim. Clause 25 strengthens the support available to victims when that view is sought. The protocols are kept under review, and we have identified some opportunities for improvement. For example, when civilian or service police ask the victim for their view on jurisdiction, too little information is provided about the similarities and differences between the systems. Furthermore, civilian police do not always seek the victim’s view or might do so too late. This is understandable, as civilian police are not often aware of concurrent jurisdiction or the service justice system.
Under clause 25, the Secretary of State for Defence must issue guidance to those, such as civilian or service police, who seek the victim’s view on jurisdiction. This guidance will describe the similarities and differences between the systems as well as information on when and how the discussion with the victim should take place. Before issuing the guidance, the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations, the Victims’ Commissioners, prosecutors and police to ensure that the guidance is victim-focused—that is critical—and works in practice across all parts of the United Kingdom.
Clause 26 is a minor amendment to the processes of reissuing the prosecutors’ protocols under sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006. This allows the Lord Advocate and the directors of the various prosecution agencies to make insubstantial changes to the protocols without consulting statutory consultees.
I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn, and commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.
I hope that I have reassured the Committee that the clause as drafted allows us to deal with the points that the hon. Member raises, but in a way that provides practitioners with the flexibility to meet the needs of the victim, as they vary from case to case.
I move on to clauses 25 and 26. Investigations, prosecutions and victim support have all significantly improved in the service justice system in recent years. The defence serious crime command, launched in December 2022, delivers investigations into serious offences and sexual offences consistent with national civilian policing standards. The Victim Witness Care Unit provides independent, trauma-informed and end-to-end support.
We have independent verification of the progress made. His Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate found in a November 2024 report on the Service Prosecuting Authority that timelines and victim support in the service justice system are at a level it
The civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales faces challenges. Sir Brian Leveson’s July 2025 report said that it “is in crisis”. Part 2 of his report in February 2026 states that the open caseload in the Crown court is in the order of 80,000 cases, with trials listed as far ahead as 2030 in the most seriously affected courts. The court martial has no backlog and cases progress without delay. Noting the procedural difference between the two systems, 2024 administrative data bears this out. Following charge, adult rape-flagged cases reach an outcome in the Crown court in 358 days, with 19% of victims withdrawing from proceedings. In contrast, this takes 199 days in the court martial, with no victims withdrawing.
Government administrative data also suggests that the conviction rate for adult rape-flagged cases in the court martial, excluding guilty pleas, is 51% from 2022 to 2024, and 36% in the Crown court in the financial years 2022-23 to 2024-25. This calls into question claims that the conviction rate in the court martial is three times lower than in the Crown court. We maintain that reliable comparisons of conviction rates are difficult to make, because of differences in volume, victim withdrawal rates, procedures and case profile between the two systems.
We want to go further than the progress made so far, and that is why measures in this Bill strengthen the support given to victims to help them to indicate their preferred jurisdiction. We have a system of concurrent jurisdiction. Under this system, prosecutors make a decision on a case-by-case basis whether to deal with an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson in one of its criminal justice systems or, instead, the service justice system. This is underpinned by prosecutors’ protocols set out in sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Under those protocols, prosecutors take into account the views of the victim. Clause 25 strengthens the support available to victims when that view is sought. The protocols are kept under review, and we have identified some opportunities for improvement. For example, when civilian or service police ask the victim for their view on jurisdiction, too little information is provided about the similarities and differences between the systems. Furthermore, civilian police do not always seek the victim’s view or might do so too late. This is understandable, as civilian police are not often aware of concurrent jurisdiction or the service justice system.
Under clause 25, the Secretary of State for Defence must issue guidance to those, such as civilian or service police, who seek the victim’s view on jurisdiction. This guidance will describe the similarities and differences between the systems as well as information on when and how the discussion with the victim should take place. Before issuing the guidance, the Secretary of State must consult the devolved Administrations, the Victims’ Commissioners, prosecutors and police to ensure that the guidance is victim-focused—that is critical—and works in practice across all parts of the United Kingdom.
Clause 26 is a minor amendment to the processes of reissuing the prosecutors’ protocols under sections 320A to 320C of the Armed Forces Act 2006. This allows the Lord Advocate and the directors of the various prosecution agencies to make insubstantial changes to the protocols without consulting statutory consultees.
I therefore ask that the amendment be withdrawn, and commend clauses 25 and 26 to the Committee.
14:34:07
Dr Shastri-Hurst
On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.
14:37:03
David Reed
Clause 27 aligns the service justice system with the civilian courts and introduces a constructive way for offenders to reduce their disqualification period through completion of an approved course. On our side of the Committee we see that as a practical and proportionate reform that supports rehabilitation, encourages personal responsibility and delivers greater consistency across both systems, and we are happy to support it.
14:37:07
Al Carns
These provisions address a gap in existing legislation, so I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Rehabilitation periods
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Rehabilitation periods
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
14:37:15
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 29 stand part.
14:38:15
Al Carns
I will begin with clause 28. The minor service sentences of reduction in rank or disrating, of forfeiture of a specified term of seniority or all seniority, and of service supervision and punishment orders all serve a useful purpose in punishing service personnel. However, these sentences are effectively made redundant by having no rehabilitation period. That undermines the purpose of the punishment, which by its nature is designed to have an impact on an individual’s career. The single services have no opportunity to consider whether administrative action should be taken against a serviceperson because the convictions are considered immediately spent. Administrative action has a range of options and may include assessing whether the nature of the conviction means that the individual is unsuitable for life in the service, or whether they are suitable for promotion during the period of rehabilitation. Considering these options following a conviction is vital to maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.
Clause 28 will establish rehabilitation periods of 12 months for these sentences. As a result, the rehabilitation periods will be harmonised with those for other minor service sentences: custody for one year or less, removal from His Majesty’s service, service detention, reprimand and severe reprimand and a fine. The clause also aligns the rehabilitation periods in Scotland with those in England and Wales. The required amendments relate to differences in terminology. Clause 28 will preserve the intended disciplinary effect within military administrative processes and maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.
I turn to clause 29. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prevents the single services from taking administrative action when a conviction becomes immediately spent. Increasingly, the civilian police in England and Wales issue simple cautions for a wide range of offences, and those cautions are treated as spent right away. As a result, the services are unable to take administrative action in response to conduct that may still be relevant to a role in the armed forces. A single lapse in conduct, however minor it may appear in civilian terms, can have serious consequences in a military environment, where values, standards and cohesion are not optional but fundamental to keeping our people and our nation safe. As we continue to professionalise the armed forces and rebalance the demographic representation, the current approach is increasingly inappropriate, especially where the conduct resulting in a caution is incompatible with the high values and standards expected of our armed forces.
Clause 29 will create an exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act that enables the single services to place a disclosure obligation on serving members of the armed forces to report spent cautions. Once it is disclosed, the single services will be able to consider the caution and, if necessary, take an appropriate approach to conduct associated with it.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to maintain the highest standards, ensuring that every incident is addressed appropriately, that victims are supported, and that we can better retain and recruit our personnel. At a time when we are committed to halving violence against women and girls and to driving up the integrity and professionalisation of our armed forces, this change is not only timely but essential.
Clause 28 will establish rehabilitation periods of 12 months for these sentences. As a result, the rehabilitation periods will be harmonised with those for other minor service sentences: custody for one year or less, removal from His Majesty’s service, service detention, reprimand and severe reprimand and a fine. The clause also aligns the rehabilitation periods in Scotland with those in England and Wales. The required amendments relate to differences in terminology. Clause 28 will preserve the intended disciplinary effect within military administrative processes and maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.
I turn to clause 29. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prevents the single services from taking administrative action when a conviction becomes immediately spent. Increasingly, the civilian police in England and Wales issue simple cautions for a wide range of offences, and those cautions are treated as spent right away. As a result, the services are unable to take administrative action in response to conduct that may still be relevant to a role in the armed forces. A single lapse in conduct, however minor it may appear in civilian terms, can have serious consequences in a military environment, where values, standards and cohesion are not optional but fundamental to keeping our people and our nation safe. As we continue to professionalise the armed forces and rebalance the demographic representation, the current approach is increasingly inappropriate, especially where the conduct resulting in a caution is incompatible with the high values and standards expected of our armed forces.
Clause 29 will create an exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act that enables the single services to place a disclosure obligation on serving members of the armed forces to report spent cautions. Once it is disclosed, the single services will be able to consider the caution and, if necessary, take an appropriate approach to conduct associated with it.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to maintain the highest standards, ensuring that every incident is addressed appropriately, that victims are supported, and that we can better retain and recruit our personnel. At a time when we are committed to halving violence against women and girls and to driving up the integrity and professionalisation of our armed forces, this change is not only timely but essential.
David Reed
Clauses 28 and 29 are practical and proportionate reforms. Clause 28 defines rehabilitation periods for certain service punishments under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Sanctions such as reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority and service supervision and punishment orders will no longer be treated as spent. Again, that is a good approach.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.
Al Carns
This is about improving our service justice system and, of course, the ability of our command chain to enact the highest standards. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 4.
Al Carns
Clause 30, which introduces schedule 4, provides the statutory basis for extending the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth for raising the issue in a ten-minute rule Bill and getting it the attention that it deserves.
Although the RFA is a civilian organisation, its personnel routinely operate alongside the Royal Navy. Indeed, they are essential to the Royal Navy. They face similar risks, pressures and, in many cases, operational demands. RFA personnel have distinct welfare needs shaped by long deployments, a demanding operational tempo and the challenges of supporting military operations. Bringing the RFA within the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner will ensure that those issues are visible at the highest levels of defence oversight.
Clause 30 and schedule 4 will not alter the employment status of RFA personnel. They will remain civilian employees with full employment rights, including trade union representation. The extension to the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit is designed to avoid interfering with existing statutory protections or established industrial relations frameworks and union representation.
Clause 30 will insert into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new subsection that introduces schedule 14ZB to enable the commissioner to conduct thematic investigations into systemic RFA welfare concerns, such as those relating to accommodation, on-board facilities, training, welfare support, access to welfare services or the effects of extended time at sea, enabling wider patterns and areas requiring improvement to be identified. It will also strengthen accountability by giving the commissioner a clear mechanism to raise concerns directly with the Secretary of State. This will ensure that identified welfare themes, whether they are linked to operations, to support arrangements or to wider Ministry of Defence responsibilities, are formally captured and considered. While clause 30 and schedule 4 expand the commissioner’s remit, they also set clear boundaries. Individual employment disputes, civil proceedings, matters covered by collective agreements or complaints brought by unions will remain outside the scope, preserving clarity and the integrity of the existing processes.
Having served in the military for 24 years, I spent several months, if not years, on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, or working with it, and I hold it in the highest regard. The RFA underpins the Royal Navy’s deployable standards and capabilities. I think this is a fantastic move to ensure that it gets the representation it deserves. In practical terms, clause 30 and schedule 4 will provide an independent avenue through which RFA personnel can escalate systemic welfare issues. Over time, that will strengthen support to the RFA and ensure that its personnel’s welfare is considered alongside that of service personnel, while respecting their distinct civilian status. I commend clause 30 and schedule 4 to the Committee.
Although the RFA is a civilian organisation, its personnel routinely operate alongside the Royal Navy. Indeed, they are essential to the Royal Navy. They face similar risks, pressures and, in many cases, operational demands. RFA personnel have distinct welfare needs shaped by long deployments, a demanding operational tempo and the challenges of supporting military operations. Bringing the RFA within the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner will ensure that those issues are visible at the highest levels of defence oversight.
Clause 30 and schedule 4 will not alter the employment status of RFA personnel. They will remain civilian employees with full employment rights, including trade union representation. The extension to the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit is designed to avoid interfering with existing statutory protections or established industrial relations frameworks and union representation.
Clause 30 will insert into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new subsection that introduces schedule 14ZB to enable the commissioner to conduct thematic investigations into systemic RFA welfare concerns, such as those relating to accommodation, on-board facilities, training, welfare support, access to welfare services or the effects of extended time at sea, enabling wider patterns and areas requiring improvement to be identified. It will also strengthen accountability by giving the commissioner a clear mechanism to raise concerns directly with the Secretary of State. This will ensure that identified welfare themes, whether they are linked to operations, to support arrangements or to wider Ministry of Defence responsibilities, are formally captured and considered. While clause 30 and schedule 4 expand the commissioner’s remit, they also set clear boundaries. Individual employment disputes, civil proceedings, matters covered by collective agreements or complaints brought by unions will remain outside the scope, preserving clarity and the integrity of the existing processes.
Having served in the military for 24 years, I spent several months, if not years, on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, or working with it, and I hold it in the highest regard. The RFA underpins the Royal Navy’s deployable standards and capabilities. I think this is a fantastic move to ensure that it gets the representation it deserves. In practical terms, clause 30 and schedule 4 will provide an independent avenue through which RFA personnel can escalate systemic welfare issues. Over time, that will strengthen support to the RFA and ensure that its personnel’s welfare is considered alongside that of service personnel, while respecting their distinct civilian status. I commend clause 30 and schedule 4 to the Committee.
David Reed
I will expand on clause 30. I pay tribute to my near-ish neighbour in Cornwall, the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, for her work on the issue and how she has progressed it in the House of Commons. I think that clause 30, which will extend the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to include the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reflects a clearer understanding of the role of RFA personnel and the part they play in our national security. It will ensure that those who serve in this unique capacity are afforded a basic safeguard: an independent route through which serious welfare concerns can be raised and addressed.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel.
I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important.
There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient.
Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way.
The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege.
I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office.
Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel.
I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important.
There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient.
Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way.
The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege.
I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office.
Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.
Jayne Kirkham
Truro and Falmouth
I feel I should say something about this, as I started it. I did so because I consider Falmouth to be the home of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Bay class ships, as it is where they are maintained and repaired, so the RFA personnel are in great part my constituents.
RFA personnel are fundamental to the Navy and to the military. In many cases, as has been pointed out, they allow them to do their job. Recently, they worked on operations relating to the shadow fleet and protecting cables. One of the Bay class ships became a hospital ship off the west coast of Africa during Ebola. The RFA has played multiple roles, often as the forgotten service; it slips between the civil service and the military. Many in the RFA feel that their work has not been appreciated, so I am pleased that the Government have picked up on that and put this clause in the Armed Forces Bill—it is much appreciated. It is the start of work on building recognition of the RFA and on retention and recruitment within the service, which has struggled of late. I appreciate this measure and am very pleased that it has been included.
RFA personnel are fundamental to the Navy and to the military. In many cases, as has been pointed out, they allow them to do their job. Recently, they worked on operations relating to the shadow fleet and protecting cables. One of the Bay class ships became a hospital ship off the west coast of Africa during Ebola. The RFA has played multiple roles, often as the forgotten service; it slips between the civil service and the military. Many in the RFA feel that their work has not been appreciated, so I am pleased that the Government have picked up on that and put this clause in the Armed Forces Bill—it is much appreciated. It is the start of work on building recognition of the RFA and on retention and recruitment within the service, which has struggled of late. I appreciate this measure and am very pleased that it has been included.
Mr Francois
As the title of clause 30 is “Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary”, I will ask the Minister something about the commissioner and then something about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?
It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?
Mike Martin
Tunbridge Wells
I can help out a little with the right hon. Gentleman’s question. The post was not filled. The Government were having some difficulty in filling the post, and—
The Chair
Order. We are going down a rabbit hole. The Committee is not here to debate who will fill the commissioner’s role; we are here to debate the clause. Can we get back on subject, please?
Mr Francois
Thank you, Mr Efford. I just wanted to know who got the job.
Turning to the RFA, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth for what she has done to raise the profile of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The issue is clearly extremely close to her heart. I believe that she was trying to advance a private Member’s Bill, having done well in the ballot, but there has been a slight problem with that, because—almost exceptionally, other than during covid—the Government’s business managers have hardly provided any time at all in this Session for private Members’ Bills. All those Members who had Bills that were important to them never really got a chance to make their case, so it is good that she has had the opportunity to put something on the record today.
The commissioner has important powers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East said, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has a very important role. From memory, it was created in 1905. The Minister, from his time as the chief of staff of the carrier group, knows how important it is. Technically, its personnel are not members of the armed forces, but members of the merchant navy. However, it is fair to say that the Royal Navy could not operate without them, as was well said by the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, who understands these matters.
The RFA has a slightly unusual constitutional position, but is a vital part of Britain’s defence none the less. Indeed, a few days ago, a number of Russian shadow fleet tankers were shadowed through the English channel by the RFA Tidespring, because no escort was operationally available. That is pretty embarrassing for the Government, when the Prime Minister has talked so tough about boarding shadow fleet tankers but has boarded precisely none of them. We touched on that point in the Chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Why we did not have a warship available to undertake the task, when the Russians had a warship to escort their own shadow fleet? The middle of the channel is international waters. Where are we on all this?
Turning to the RFA, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth for what she has done to raise the profile of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The issue is clearly extremely close to her heart. I believe that she was trying to advance a private Member’s Bill, having done well in the ballot, but there has been a slight problem with that, because—almost exceptionally, other than during covid—the Government’s business managers have hardly provided any time at all in this Session for private Members’ Bills. All those Members who had Bills that were important to them never really got a chance to make their case, so it is good that she has had the opportunity to put something on the record today.
The commissioner has important powers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East said, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has a very important role. From memory, it was created in 1905. The Minister, from his time as the chief of staff of the carrier group, knows how important it is. Technically, its personnel are not members of the armed forces, but members of the merchant navy. However, it is fair to say that the Royal Navy could not operate without them, as was well said by the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, who understands these matters.
The RFA has a slightly unusual constitutional position, but is a vital part of Britain’s defence none the less. Indeed, a few days ago, a number of Russian shadow fleet tankers were shadowed through the English channel by the RFA Tidespring, because no escort was operationally available. That is pretty embarrassing for the Government, when the Prime Minister has talked so tough about boarding shadow fleet tankers but has boarded precisely none of them. We touched on that point in the Chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Why we did not have a warship available to undertake the task, when the Russians had a warship to escort their own shadow fleet? The middle of the channel is international waters. Where are we on all this?
The Chair
Order. Can we get back to the Bill? The right hon. Member is asking a lot of questions that I am sure are very interesting, but they are not germane to the Bill. Can we get back to the subject that we are debating?
Mr Francois
Yes, Mr Efford. I will conclude there. I just wanted to know why the RFA is doing a job that the Royal Navy is supposed to do. After our debate yesterday, perhaps the Minister will enlighten the Committee.
The Chair
It is up to the Minister whether he wishes to answer any of that.
Al Carns
First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth. She generated this, and now it has come to fruition, so well done. The reality is that there is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The RFA does an exceptional job across everything from high-end technical to refuelling and enabling our carrier strike group.
When we talk about embarrassment and availability of capability, the unfortunate reality is that we have the cards that we have been dealt, after successive Governments under-invested in the significant hard capability that we require to deter hostile states. As a Minister in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford owns an element of responsibility for that.
When we talk about embarrassment and availability of capability, the unfortunate reality is that we have the cards that we have been dealt, after successive Governments under-invested in the significant hard capability that we require to deter hostile states. As a Minister in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford owns an element of responsibility for that.
Mr Francois
For the record, whatever we did or did not do in Government, we did not bring in the £2.6 billion of operational spending cuts in the financial year just gone. That is why our availability is so poor, and that was a purely Labour decision, was it not?
The Chair
Order. We are getting off the subject again. Can we come back to the clause, please?
Al Carns
There is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Its personnel are the best of us. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Christian Wakeford.)
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Christian Wakeford.)
Adjourned till Thursday 16 April at half-past Eleven o’clock.
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