PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill (First sitting) - 25 June 2020 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

I beg to move,

That—

(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 25 June) meet;

(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 June;

(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 30 June;

(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 2 July;

(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 7 July;

(e) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 9 July;

(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following table:

TABLE

Day	Time	Witness
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 12.30 pm	Jonathan Hall QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 13.00 pm	The National Police Chiefs’ Council
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 14.30 pm	Prison Reform Trust
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 15.00 pm	The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 15.30 pm	Law Society of Scotland
Thursday 25 June	Until no later than 16.00 pm	Professor Donald Grubin, Newcastle University
Tuesday 30 June	Until no later than 9.55 am	The Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers
Tuesday 30 June	Until no later than 10.25 am	The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
Tuesday 30 June	Until no later than 10.55 am	Professor Andrew Silke, Cranfield University

(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clause 1; Schedule 1; Clause 2; Schedule 2; Clause 3; Schedule 3; Clauses 4 to 6; Schedule 4; Clauses 7 to 19; Schedule 5; Clauses 20 and 21; Schedule 6; Clauses 22 and 23; Schedule 7; Clauses 24 and 25; Schedule 8; Clauses 26 and 27; Schedule 9; Clause 28; Schedule 10; Clauses 29 to 36; Schedule 11; Clauses 37 to 45; Schedule 12; Clauses 46 to 48; Schedule 13; Clauses 49 to 53; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;

(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 14 July.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I have one point of clarification to make. Yesterday, in the Programming Sub-Committee, we discussed whether we should invite the Prison Officers Association or the Prison Governors Association. On further investigation, it transpires that the Professional Trades Union for Prison, Correctional and Secure Psychiatric Workers is in fact the Prison Officers Association—that is its full name. We will therefore see the Prison Officers Association on Tuesday at 9.25 am. We had contacted the Prison Governors Association, but I am told that, rather surprisingly, it did not reply. That should satisfy the request that the shadow Minister made yesterday.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Chris Philp.)

Resolved,

That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Chris Philp.)

Q May I first take the opportunity to thank you for your service as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Mr Hall? The whole House is very grateful for the work that you do in this area, and I want to put on the record our thanks to you for doing that.

I am sure we have all read the notes that you very helpfully prepared on this legislation and published on your website at the end of May and the beginning of June. I have them in front of me and have read them with great interest. To start, I want to ask about TPIMs—terrorism prevention and investigation measures—which were the subject of some debate on Second Reading. I want first to ask about the current circumstances in which a TPIM expires and has to be reapplied for from scratch without it being possible to use the previous evidence from two or more years before. Do you think there are circumstances in which public safety may still demand a TPIM beyond the two-year period? Are these proposals a better way of handling it than the current method?

Jonathan Hall: The answer is yes, there are be circumstances in which someone ought to be subject to controls for longer than two years. Yes, there will be circumstances in which it will be appropriate to rely on terrorism-related activity that predates the imposition of the first TPIM. I understand the business case, if you like, for allowing an extension beyond the two-year period. However, the reason I question in the first instance whether it is justified is that it is none the less possible, as the law currently stands, to extend beyond two years. There are two current examples—I will not go into the details—of where a second and fresh TPIM has been imposed.

The practical consequence of the current regime is that some will come off controls, and if they have literally lain doggo and have done nothing for that two-year period, the police and MI5 will have to start assembling a new case, assuming that the person re-engages with terrorism-related activity. There could be a gap period during which that terrorism-related activity is going on, during which the case is being built when they are re-imposed.

If TPIMs were currently imposed against attack planners, I would have fewer observations to make about the ability to extend further. However, in practice, as I said in my note, having spoken to officials, TPIMs are really currently used against radicalisers. It is certainly the case that public safety is not helped by radicalisation activities, but as things currently stand, people subject to TPIMs are not the attack planners, who, if they are free from restrictions, might go and do something very violent. More likely, they will re-engage in radicalising activities. As shown by the fact that two new TPIMs have been imposed, it is currently possible to manage that risk.

I understand the business case, more than I do for the lowering of the standard of proof, which we can come to separately. At the moment, I do not understand why it is needed as TPIMs are currently used.

Q You mentioned that, in the two cases where there have been renewals, there was a hiatus—a gap—between the expiry of the first TPIM and the second coming into force. Could you give the Committee any information about how long that gap was?

Jonathan Hall: Yes, I have worked it out. In one case it was a gap of a year, and in the second it was a gap of 16 months.

Q In those hiatuses—those gaps—of between a year and almost a year and a half, there is clearly a risk to which the public is being exposed. The rationale for the proposed changes is to remove the possibility of that gap.

Jonathan Hall: What I would say is that the risk was managed, as the law currently stands. There was a gap, but in fact, it is not as if something very bad happened from those sources in that period, as far as I can work out, having read the materials that I have read.

Q But it is about risk; not all risks actualise. A risk may exist, but no consequence may follow. What we are trying to prevent with TPIMs is the risk itself. It is fair to say that the risk would have existed in that 12 to 16-month period.

Jonathan Hall: Yes.

Q You mentioned the burden of proof earlier, which I am sure other Members will ask about in due course. With the TPIM regime as it stands, very few TPIMs are actually enforced. Published data, dating back to November last year, said that five were in force at that time. Have you seen any evidence of the Government overreaching, stretching or even misusing the TPIM powers, or would you say that the Government have exercised the powers that already exist with care and circumspection?

Jonathan Hall: The latter. I am quite satisfied that the Government are doing that.

Q So in the context of the Government having behaved responsibly and carefully so far, what basis do you have for being concerned about the change to the burden of proof, given that the powers that have existed for some years now have been used, as you have said, very carefully?

Jonathan Hall: You asked me about the current TPIMs. I cannot speak for all the uses of control orders and TPIMs that have happened before my period. There is a risk that mistakes can be made about assessing intelligence. I have reason to believe that. My concern is that you are opening up a greater margin of error if the standard of proof is lowered. It is a fairness issue based on the authorities having all the cards.

The point that you make, which is that the authorities can be generally trusted to make TPIMs against the right people, to my mind rather demonstrates that a change is unnecessary. The authorities have been able to impose TPIMs, as far as I can see, where they have wanted to. I am not aware of cases where the authorities would like to have imposed a TPIM if the standard of proof had been lower—where they could say, “We think this person’s a terrorist, but they may not be and we’d like to impose a TPIM, but we can’t, because we cannot show on the balance of probabilities.” I am not aware of that sort of case. So I agree that the authorities can be trusted and, at the moment, I think things are working okay.

The regime of control orders and TPIMs has fluctuated over the years since it was introduced. It has been subject to a lot of scrutiny and consideration by my predecessors and by the courts. It has landed in a reasonably good place. The danger about changing unnecessarily is that, maybe not now, but in a few years’ time, you might provoke an overreaction.

I will give an example of that. When the control order regime came in, it was seen as a bit illiberal and that led to the removal of the power to relocate individuals when the TPIM regime was introduced. Eventually, my predecessor David Anderson, the Government and Parliament agreed that it was necessary to bring back that power of relocation. So if you like, there was a period when the public were less safe because the ability to relocate had been removed, and the reason why that ability to relocate had been removed is that it was the reaction to what had been seen as a slightly illiberal measure. If it is right that the current standard of proof is usable and fair, and I think it is, in a word, if it ain’t broke, why fix it?

Q I want to pick up on a couple of those points. We should both try to be brief, because other Committee members want to ask questions. You mentioned that the state holds all the cards, but is it not the case that a judge looks at a TPIM prior to it coming into force and if it is—I forget the phrase—“manifestly unreasonable”, or some test like that, they will strike it down? Secondly, there is, of course, a right of appeal against TPIMs, so anyone made the subject of a TPIM has those two judicial protections in place, do they not?

Jonathan Hall: Yes, but of course if the standard of proof is lowered, the extent of judicial protection is lowered, because the judge will not be asking him or herself, “Was the Secretary of State right to be satisfied on the balance of probability that this person is a terrorist?” The judge would have to say, “Well, in theory, they may not be a terrorist, but the Home Secretary’s view that they may be a terrorist is reasonable,” so you would remove the judicial protection.

Q It would not remove it; it would alter the balance.

Jonathan Hall: Yes.

It certainly would not remove it.

Jonathan Hall: No.

Q You mentioned the original control orders set up in 2005 by the then Labour Government, which had reasonable suspicion as the burden of proof: precisely the same burden of proof being proposed today. The years following, probably between 2005 and 2012, were the years during which the lower burden of proof—the one we are now proposing—was enforced. I know you were not the reviewer at the time, but are you aware of any evidence of misuse in that seven-year period when the lower burden of proof prevailed?

Jonathan Hall: I am not aware of any misuse, but I am aware of circumstances in which the intelligence was misunderstood.

Q Finally, a moment ago you posed the question, “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?”, and you said you were not aware of any cases where a lower burden of proof would have been required to control someone. Of course, we are looking prospectively rather than retrospectively. If there are conceivable circumstances in future whereby someone is potentially a threat to the British public—our constituents, who would need protection from them—and we cannot establish the matter to the higher standard but could for the lower, it clearly would be useful to change the burden of proof.

On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) raised the question of someone who had been a member of Daesh returning from Syria. Of course, if somebody has been circulating in Syria, it is very hard to establish their activities on the balance of probabilities. It is hard to get witness testimony and there will be no intelligence surveillance, but the fact remains that they have been to Syria and done whatever they have done over there. In those circumstances, is it conceivable that, when British citizens who are members of Daesh return from somewhere like Syria, the lower burden of proof might be helpful, or in fact necessary?

Jonathan Hall: I have thought a little about this. It is certainly the case that evidential coverage of what goes on in Daesh-controlled areas will be limited, which is why prosecution is particularly difficult. Intelligence coverage might be more, but it might be patchy. I think that if someone has been in Syria for a long time, it is a pretty obvious inference that they have been up to no good, so I do not think that you would need the lower standard of proof. You would not say, “I reasonably suspect that because you spent five years in Syria, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” My own view is that a judge would say, “On the balance of probabilities, you were engaged in terrorism-related activity.” Of course, there will always be some coverage. I do not think that what you said is right, although I see where you are coming from.

Q It is clearly much harder to establish that, on the balance of probabilities, somebody was up to no good in Syria, given that the evidential base is patchy at best and possibly even non-existent.

Jonathan Hall: Yes, but I think that, with respect, what you are missing out is the big factual matter, which would be undisputed, that they were in Syria. The Secretary of State’s starting point would be, “Here is a matter of fact, undisputed, that somebody spent all those years in Syria.” I think that that would provide a fairly good jumping-off point for an inference that they were engaged in terrorism-related activity.

Q They would no doubt argue that they might have been in Syria and might have been members of or living in Daesh territory, but that they were not engaged in terrorist activities expressly, and we would likely have no further evidence to establish that they were.

Jonathan Hall: I think that judges, when they come to consider these matters, are prepared to draw robust inferences. They are not fools. No doubt the Secretary of State would also not be fooled by someone who simply claimed that they were there for humanitarian reasons.

Q I have one further question, which is on a different part of the Bill: the new serious terrorism sentences and the requirement to serve all of those in prison without the prospect of early release by the Parole Board. You commented in one of your notes that the Parole Board would therefore not have involvement in release decisions in the way that they currently do in many cases. Are you reassured by the fact that, although the Parole Board would not take release decisions, the usual MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements —arrangements would be engaged, the Prison Service would closely monitor and evaluate the prisoner prior to release, and of course the probation service would be closely involved both before and after release during the licence period, which is now going to be longer than would otherwise have been the case? Would you accept that the involvement of those agencies, particularly the MAPPA arrangements and the probation service, provide a good level of supervision and evaluation?

Jonathan Hall: The difficulty with terrorism risk is that it is quite difficult to measure. You have actuarial tools to look at whether people who have committed burglary will reoffend, and they are reasonably robust. You do not have those sorts of tools for terrorism. As I probably said in my notes, some of the factors that you normally associate with reoffending—for example, not having a stable family background—do not tend to work so well with terrorism offenders. You find terrorism offenders who come from a stable background and have a job, so it is inherently difficult to identify the probability that someone will reoffend.

The approach that I took when I did my MAPPA review was that the more information, the better. I agree that the probation service, the police and MI5 will be carrying out assessments, but you lose the confrontation that takes place at a Parole Board hearing. As you have probably done, I have attended such a hearing, where there is an opportunity for the chairman to speak to the offender in quite a formal setting. It brings something different to the table, which you would obviously lose. You would definitely have covert intelligence sources, and you would have overt management in the sense of the police being able to speak to the offender, but you would lose the opportunity for a confrontation before they have been released. You are losing something—that is probably how I would put it.

Q You said that it is inherently difficult to assess dangerousness and threat. Given that, is it not safest to get them to serve the whole of their sentence in prison, to be on the safe side? All the Parole Board can do is release them early, and all we are doing is removing the Parole Board’s ability to do that. One loses nothing in terms of public safety. Given the difficulties with assessing threat that you have outlined, is it not safe and prudent as custodians of public safety, which we all are in different ways, to remove the prospect of early release?

Jonathan Hall: The Parole Board has two choices: it could release early, but it could, and often will, decide not to release early and say, “Actually, you’re far too dangerous.” That additional source of information about their risk will then be very useful to the security services when they are eventually released.

Q I will try to self-censor, Mr Robertson, for brevity. I will start by asking a general question. Assistant Chief Constable, you are responsible for counter-terrorism policing. Taken in the round and viewed as a whole, will the measures in the Bill make your job easier or harder? Will they make the public less or more safe?

Tim Jacques: It will make our job easier, and yes, I believe it will make the public safer.

Q Good. Thank you. We have heard TPIMs and the burden of proof extensively debated, and we have questions about why the burden of proof should be lower—reasonable suspicion rather than a higher level. Do you think that in future there might be cases where somebody threatens the safety of the public, and you are unable to meet the higher burden of proof on the balance of probabilities, but you could meet the lower burden of proof—reasonable suspicion—and that without this change that is proposed in the Bill, the public would be exposed to greater risk?

Tim Jacques: That is a very long question. On the first point, policing itself is not the applicant for TPIMs; the Security Service is. Am I able to share its view in this forum?

Please do.

Tim Jacques: First—Jonathan touched on this—there have not been occasions thus far when the current burden of proof has prevented the application of a TPIM. In terms of the numbers, there are six now in place in the UK. Neither we nor the Security Service envisage a large increase in those numbers as a result of the provisions in the Bill. The Security Service points to three instances where it thinks this would have utility from an operational perspective. The first is where an individual’s risk profile is rapidly increasing—hypothetically, somebody who we know might be operating online, but our belief is that they are moving towards posing an actual threat on the street with an attack plan in place. If that is very rapid, which it can now be—we have seen instances of that—then being able to use a lower standard of proof is something that MI5 thinks would be of use.

Secondly—Jonathan touched on this too—there is the issue of somebody returning from abroad, who we believe has been involved in terrorist-related activity overseas, and the issues of evidence in that. The Home Secretary can currently impose temporary exclusion orders at the lower standard of proof. If somebody wants to come back and has a right to come back to the UK, they can be imposed on the lower standard of proof. If someone somehow makes it to the UK under the radar or without our knowledge, the higher burden of proof would have to be applied to impose a TPIM. That is the second case that MI5 would point to.

The third issue, which Jonathan also touched on, relates to sensitive material. TPIMs are challengeable and there is an automatic review and so on. The disclosure of sensitive material would potentially compromise sensitive techniques and therefore make our job and that of the Security Service harder, but the lower standard would assist them in their national security role.

Q For those three reasons, you are being categorically clear with this Committee and with Parliament that the proposed lower standard of proof would be a benefit to the police and the security services, and that it would make the public safer.

Tim Jacques: That is the view of the security services. We are not the applicant, but that is their clear view.

Q Thank you for making that extremely clear. I am sure that the Committee will pay close attention to the advice being given to us through you by the security services. I have one more question on TPIMs, relating to the current two-year expiry date and the proposal to make them annually renewable. They will not be indefinite unless the threat is indefinite. Do the security services for whom you speak see a threat to the public as a consequence of the gaps that we have heard Mr Hall describe: the 12-month gap in one case and the 16-month gap in the other?

Tim Jacques: Because we jointly manage TPIMs once imposed, I can speak on this. Yes, we do see an increase in the threat if that gap occurs, and that gap has occurred, as Jonathan has pointed out previously.