PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
North Atlantic Submarine Activity - 13 April 2026 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I wish to make a statement on north Atlantic activity. Let me begin by thanking the many members of our armed forces who are currently deployed in over 30 operations across the globe. Their efforts are often unseen by the British people, but they are always appreciated. They defend the very freedoms that we enjoy.

Last week, my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary revealed details of one such operation. While the focus of many has been drawn to the middle east, UK armed forces, in partnership with our allies, have been deployed to deter the increased Russian activity that we have witnessed in the Atlantic. The specific operation involved a Russian Akula-class submarine and a concurrent deployment of two specialist submarines from GUGI—Russia’s main directorate of deep-sea research.

Last November, the Defence Secretary outlined to the House how GUGI vessels, including the spy ship Yantar, are directed by President Putin to engage in hybrid warfare activities against the UK and its allies, specifically around critical undersea infrastructure. Their mission is to survey pipelines and cables during peacetime and then potentially, if required, sabotage them in conflict.

In response to the Russian subsurface activity, the Defence Secretary deployed a Royal Navy warship and a Royal Air Force P8 aircraft alongside allies and partners to ensure that the Russian vessel was monitored during every phase of the operation. The Akula subsequently retreated home, having been closely tracked throughout, and we continued to monitor the two GUGI submarines when they were in and around UK waters and, of course, beyond. Our armed forces left them in no doubt that they were being monitored, that their movements were not covert as planned, and that their attempted secret operation had been exposed. The two GUGI submarines have now left UK waters and headed back north, and this operation, which lasted more than a month, has now concluded.

In often treacherous conditions, our pilots racked up over 450 flying hours and our frigates sailed several thousand nautical miles. Some 500 British personnel were involved in the response. I know that the whole House will join me in paying tribute to every single person involved.

We exposed this military operation undertaken by Russia for three key reasons: first, to send a message to Putin that he failed to remain covert, and that any attempt to damage critical undersea infrastructure will not be tolerated and cannot be denied; secondly, to demonstrate that even with significant capabilities and personnel deployed in the middle east, we will always do what is necessary to protect our homeland; and thirdly, to highlight a significant operation carried out by our armed forces, who met this challenge with the characteristic determination and professionalism that we all know too well.

This operation reminds us why the seabed matters, especially for the island nation of Britain: it connects us to everything, and that connection is sustained beneath our waters without interruption through a vast network of cables and pipelines on which much of our way of life relies—much of the gas that heats our homes, 99% of international telecoms and data traffic, and trillions of pounds of global trade each day. Because the seabed matters to us, it is a prime target for our adversaries.

The UK’s undersea network is highly resilient, but the threats are increasing, so we are stepping up our action to defend it, including by providing an extra £100 million for our vital P8 submarine-hunting aircraft; launching our Atlantic Bastion programme to combine the latest autonomous technologies with the best warships and aircraft to create a British-built hybrid naval force; and making the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the cold war, after years of hollowing-out and underfunding by various Governments. The threat is clear, and our resolve to confront it is absolute. That is why this year we are deploying our carrier group where it is most needed—the north Atlantic and the High North—and supporting NATO’s new mission, Arctic Sentry.

I want to put on the record our thanks to our allies, with whom we have co-operated closely throughout this operation, including Norway. Our shared commitment to confront Russian aggression in the north Atlantic is at the heart of our Lunna House agreement, and together we are now building a combined fleet of new submarine-hunting frigates and new uncrewed systems.

Let me say a few words on Ukraine, from where I returned just last week. Today, two wars on two continents are being fought at the very same time. Putin wants us distracted while he steps up strikes on Ukraine relentlessly, and indeed at enormous scale, with around 7,000 attacks a day on the front line and 55,000 drone and missile strikes last year alone. We must always remember our duty to Ukraine and recognise that Russian aggression is growing across Europe once again.

Let me finish where I began, with praise for our people. We have the very finest armed forces that a nation could hope for. They are second to none. As I speak, we have personnel deployed across every domain, every moment of the day, in every part of the world. They are in constant confrontation with our adversaries, from the depths of the seabed to the reaches of space. When a crisis erupts, as it has done in the middle east, I understand people questioning why all UK military assets and personnel have not been sent to deal with it. But as demands on defence rise, we must deploy our resources to best effect across multiple priorities.

Because of our increase in defence investment, we will be able to call on more and more resources in the coming years. As we defend our interests and partners in the middle east, we will tackle increasing threats in the High North. We will stand with Ukraine. We will meet our NATO obligations. Above all, we will always fulfil the first duty of government: to protect our homeland and keep the British people safe. I commend this statement to the House.

I call the shadow Minister.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. With all eyes on the middle east, let us not forget that Russia remains the most acute, persistent and active threat to the United Kingdom. Putin’s goal of conquering Ukraine is unchanged, and that continues to place our entire European continent in jeopardy. His ongoing nefarious activity, most notably in our own territorial waters, should be a stark wake-up call. We must start acting on the threats that are visible and right in front of us.

We may be critical of the Government’s tortoise-like approach to giving defence what it needs—slow and steady does not win this race, and it certainly does not keep us safe—but what does unite us is the full-throated support for the men and women of the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force, who keep the wolf at bay in these dangerous times. I pay particular tribute to all those who are serving in the middle east at the moment, those who served in recent Atlantic operations, and especially those who crew our continuous at-sea deterrent patrols, 24/7, 365 days a year, every year.

When the Secretary of State came to this House last year to highlight the actions of the Russian spy vessel Yantar, he told Putin:

“we see you, we know what you are doing, and we will not shy away from robust action”—[Official Report, 22 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 1016.]

That was the right message, but at some point simply saying “We see you” is not enough. Words must be backed by action.

This is not just a question of traditional defence. There is a growing and under-appreciated threat to our national resilience and our way of life. Just 65 undersea cables carry 99% of global communication, and a far smaller number of pipelines and interconnectors link our gas and electricity supplies to others. Can the Minister guarantee that there are no hostile devices, kinetic or otherwise, on, near or underneath any of those cables, pipelines or interconnectors? The reality is that he cannot. The Secretary of State said with confidence that there was no sabotage on this occasion, but what of the many other incidents in UK waters—in the Baltic, in the cables running to North America, west of the British Isles, where monitoring capacity is limited at best?

The truth is that we do not fully know how secure our critical underwater infrastructure is. That is why we are dismayed that the much-touted defence readiness Bill has been delayed by a full year. Worse still, at a time that demands cross-party unity, it was deeply disappointing to hear the Prime Minister flatly reject the Leader of the Opposition’s offer of greater engagement earlier today. That was the wrong call.

On Russia’s shadow fleet, when the Prime Minister announced on 25 March that British forces would be permitted to board sanctioned vessels transiting UK waters, we rightly supported that decision. The Chief of the Defence Staff, when asked at the recent London Defence Conference, said plainly, “We are ready”. Yet no action has been taken. We set a red line, and we have watched Russia repeatedly cross it. Worse, Russian military vessels are now accompanying shadow fleet ships, deliberately escalating the situation. This is deterrence in reverse.

The Minister and I know better than anyone else in this Chamber the very real challenges of boarding vessels at sea, and the serious legal questions surrounding what happens to a ship and its crew once the decision to seize them is made. These are the same challenges that I faced while serving in the Royal Marines and boarding pirate vessels off the coast of Somalia. Back then, those legal and logistical hurdles were just as real, but it was clear that the global economy was being directly impacted by piracy and that we had to act, so we found a lawful way to do so. Why can we not do that now, when the situation is far more grave?

It has been reported that the Attorney General has denied the legal basis for interdiction. If that is the case, let me ask the Minister this directly: what is the Government’s current position? Can he tell the House how many sanctioned vessels have transited UK waters unchecked? Russia is brazenly moving military supplies through our waters. That must be met with robust action, not statements.

Today’s statement is a start, but only a start. It is clear that the Government are not moving fast enough to deter our adversaries. Deterrence requires capability, and capability requires funding. I know that the Minister has not had sight of the defence investment plan, but can he at least tell the country when it will be published? Seven months delayed, it is simply becoming a farce. Does he agree with the Conservatives and the Defence Committee that the Government must commit to spending 3% of GDP on defence within this Parliament, not the next?

The Conservatives have already identified savings that would deliver over £20 billion in additional defence spending. We want to go further, and we renew our offer to work across the aisle to find savings. The choice is simple: if we are serious about deterring Russia and other hostile states from the High North or our overseas bases, we must reach 3% on defence now, not later, and give our armed forces the resources they need to keep us safe.

We can agree that no sabotage took place this time from the Russian sub-surface activity off the coast of the UK. We have backed our words with action when it comes to deterring Russia, with £4.5 billion in UK military support to Ukraine last year and a total of £21.8 billion. The Ukraine defence contact group just raised an astonishing $45 billion to buy weapons, munitions and capability for the Ukrainians. The Ministry of Defence stands ready to board any vessels that meet the criteria—there is a lot of misinformation out there. Having very expensive frigates escorting every vessel at such range is putting significant demands on the Russian fleet and degrading its capabilities. Let me add that we have spent £5 billion extra this year alone on the defence budget, and by 2028-29 we will spend around £73 billion on it.

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

I thank the Minister for his statement and the Defence Secretary for his public statement, which have increased public awareness about the growing threats that our nation faces. On behalf of the Defence Committee, I pay tribute to all our armed forces personnel involved in disrupting the Russian activity around our critical undersea infrastructure. This incident underscores the growing threat that Russia poses, and the need to increase defence investment now and finally to publish the defence investment plan.

Turning to the incident itself, I take on board the Minister’s words, but it has been widely reported, including publicly at the London defence conference, that Putin had explosives planted on our undersea cables. For the record, can he confirm whether Russians were involved in either sabotage or precursors to sabotage on or around our undersea cables?

The reality is that Russia failed on this occasion, and it failed because we exposed its activity, which meant that there was no way, shape or form that it could deny its activity in the first place. I was at the London defence conference and I heard certain discussions about undersea cables. I can confirm that no sabotage took place this time, but the Russians put a lot of effort into mapping and understanding our undersea critical national infrastructure, and we will do everything to map, track and expose it, should it take place.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and I associate my party with his thanks and appreciation for the dedicated service of our armed forces personnel around the world.

While the world’s attention was on Trump and Netanyahu’s catastrophic war in Iran, Vladimir Putin was collecting vital information about our critical infrastructure. In response, the Defence Secretary told Putin, for the second time: “We see you.” But we need much greater confidence that the Government have the plan and resolve not just to observe Russia’s activities, but to meet and resist them, should that be required.

As Putin plans for future conflict, our Government appear frozen. Delay and inaction is sapping the confidence of industry and our allies, while enabling Putin’s war machine in Ukraine. The Government must remedy these failings as a matter of urgency. Our national security and the sovereignty of our Ukrainian allies demand it. Will the Minister commit to publishing the defence investment plan before Parliament is prorogued, and will he publish a plan to raise £20 billion in defence bonds to be spent on urgent projects, including rebuilding our naval capabilities, which are critical for protecting our undersea infrastructure?

The Minister rightly highlighted Russia’s continued assault on Ukraine. Péter Magyar’s spectacular victory in yesterday’s Hungarian elections should unlock European financial support to Ukraine. At just the same time, Donald Trump authorised a suspension of sanctions on Russian energy assets. The Government cannot allow this opportunity to slip, so will the Minister work with EU partners so that the UK’s £30 billion share of the frozen Russian assets in Europe can be sent to Ukraine’s defence alongside the promised €90 billion from the EU, and will he work with colleagues across Government finally to put an end to the scandal of UK companies providing maritime services for the export of Russian oil, gas and coal?

I am glad that the Government took a defensive stance on Iran. We were clear that we did not have a legal mandate, there was not a plan and there was no clear end state, and if we are going to put people in harm’s way, we need those three things before we can do so.

While the defence investment plan not has not arrived yet, five classes of ship or submarine are on order or being built, including 13 frigates on order—eight Type 26s and five Type 31s—which is a collaborative effort to ensure that our maritime capability is fit for purpose as threats diversify and increase, in particular in the High North. We are learning the lessons from Ukraine and ensuring that we have the best autonomous capability, and our Atlantic Bastion platform is moving in the right direction. We have worked exceptionally hard, and the Foreign Office is pushing as well, to sanction thousands of Russian individuals, companies and, of course, vessels, to reduce the illegal flow of resource back into Russia, which is funding the illegal and brutal war waged by Putin on Ukraine.

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his statement. GUGI has been at work since the 1960s, as I understand it; it has been doing extensive mapping for quite some time. In our report on subsea cables, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy came up with a great many recommendations, with which he will be more than familiar. When it comes to the defence investment plan, may I draw his focus to our recommendation on a sovereign capability in repair ships? Will he promise to look at that or agree to meet me to discuss it?

I thank my hon. Friend for his really focused question. We have been watching the underwater research programme for years now. We understand exactly what they are up to and why they are up to it. They understand some of the vulnerabilities—I would not say weaknesses—in the west, and they are trying to identify and, indeed, threaten them at a point in time of their choosing. I recognise the report’s recommendation on a sovereign capability to fix cables. We are working with industry and partners, and of course we have a multitude of capabilities within defence that can support the types of operations that may need to take place should anything happen to our undersea cables.

I am delighted that the Minister has made this statement, because I have raised this issue a number of times in this place. My constituency looks directly at the High North, and it is off the coast of my constituency that this Russian activity took place—let us make no mistake about it. My constituents find it deeply worrying.

As the Minister himself has admitted, we have only so many surface ships. They are based mostly in Devonport and Portsmouth. The sailing time from the south of England to Orkney, Shetland or my constituency is a matter of days, and we have to move very fast in this situation with Russia. Let us remember history: before the first world war, Winston Churchill and others took the decision to relocate part of the fleet to Invergordon and to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. Are we quite certain that we are basing the surface ships that we have—we hope we will have more—in the position where they need to be to keep a close eye on the High North and protect our vital strategic interests?

I thank the hon. Member for a really focused question. Part of this problem set is about looking at early warning when systems appear, either in our waters or close to our waters, or indeed close to any critical national infrastructure. That is a multi-domain operation, ranging from space all the way down to other intelligence assets, which gives us very early warning of what is happening, where, when and why, and allows us to pre-position capabilities to meet them, or to ensure that we can understand exactly what they are up to and therefore put in an operation to deter that if required.

I was in Latvia at the weekend, where they very much know what the threat is from Putin and the Russians. I thank the Minister for his statement and the helpful way in which this has been described in public. It is clear that we need to do a lot more to explain to the British public what the threat is from the Russians and how it is getting worse—not least if we are to increase defence expenditure, as I have been advocating in this place for some time, and tough decisions have to be made. We need to have a better programme of education and information to demonstrate how serious a threat Putin and the Russians are to the security of this country.

I completely agree. A more effective and better understood communication and education plan about what those threats really mean to the population is essential. If I were to turn around to the population and say that there was a cyber-attack on Jaguar Land Rover, people in and around Jaguar Land Rover would be affected and would take notice. If I were to say that the cost of the attack on Jaguar Land Rover was half that of lifting the two-child benefit cap, that would resonate far more widely across the nation. If I were to say that cyber-attacks cost more than £10 billion last year alone, and that the MOD has seen a 50% increase in hostile state attacks, that would start to resonate. We need to ensure that we continue to communicate that narrative in the easiest way, but also that it resonates with every section of society. I could not agree more with my hon. Friend.

Over decades, the backbone of our ability to detect Russian submarines has been provided by our towed array patrol ships, from Leander right the way through to our increasingly decrepit Type 23. Does the Minister agree that the logic of what he has said, given that the threat has increased significantly over the past several months and over the past couple of years, is that we should be looking again at the orders for eight Type 26s with 2087 towed array on the back of them, and upgrade that to deal with the threat that we now face? Where we are now is not where we were a few short years ago, when that order book for eight Type 26s was constructed.

I recognise the right hon. Member’s experience in this space. I would say that eight Type 26 towed array frigates is the right level. I would like to see our ability to cover the ocean expanded through the use of autonomy and some of the lessons that we have learned from Ukraine. That is why I talk about the Atlantic Bastion; major capability platforms matched with mass uncrewed systems will provide us with a far more effective way to find, deter and neutralise subsurface threats in the future.

I join the Minister in thanking our armed forces personnel who identified this threat and allowed us to take the action he has described. I note that real-terms defence spending fell by 22% in the eight years or so prior to 2017. It is this Government that are turning that around with fresh investment and more co-operation with the sector. We know that our undersea infrastructure is vulnerable to a great many threats and, as we face threats on a number of different fronts, we must not lose sight of that. We have a job, however, to explain to the British public why we need this investment. Can I encourage him, when or if we face a similar threat in the future, to make sure that the public understand that? It is a choice that might mean that we do not have the opportunity to spend in other areas of public life.

We have a job to ensure that we communicate with and educate the population on the whole variety of threats, whether it is the threat posed by Russia in Ukraine or the threat emanating from the High North that comes into the Atlantic. A lot of people say that we do not have a frontline with the Russians. The reality is that we do; it sits in the north Atlantic. But those are not the only threats. There are also threats in the influence space and, of course, in cyber-space, which we must compete with while also responding to contingency operations in the middle east, as hon. Members have seen us do over the last seven weeks.

The Prime Minister said, I think about three weeks ago, that the Royal Navy would go after sanctioned Russian tankers. Yet, if the press reports are to be believed, those very same sanctioned Russian tankers have sailed with impunity through the English channel. My question is this: why have we not done anything? Is there some legal bar, or is there a practical bar when it comes to Royal Navy resources to mount interdiction operations in the English channel?

I have a lot of experience, as does the shadow Minister, in boarding ships. The MOD is absolutely ready to go, but we must ensure that those ships meet certain criteria; as soon as they do, they will be boarded and deterred.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, while the Government rightly continue to defend our people, interests and allies in the middle east, we must never lose sight of the war in Europe and our determination to always stand with Ukraine during this conflict?

I completely agree, and the key phrase is “never lose sight”. There have been more than a million casualties—Russia has taken more casualties than America took in the entire second world war—55,000 drones and missiles have been fired in the last year, thousands of tanks have been destroyed, and cities have been plunged into poverty, into the cold, with no lights and no hospital services across an entire nation. Why? All to support an individual’s ambition to rewrite history and rewrite international borders through the use of brutal force. Unacceptable.

Back in February, former Royal Navy officers and other expert witnesses warned the Defence Committee that although tapping an undersea cable is very difficult, they are vulnerable to sabotage, and more than three quarters of the UK’s natural gas is imported via undersea pipelines from Norway. Given Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, does the UK not need to press ahead faster with the Atlantic Bastion initiative? In light of recent defence budget pressures, can the Minister confirm whether funding levels are adequate to maintain long-term submarine detection and tracking capabilities?

I respect the hon. Member’s insight into this issue, especially given his constituency. Atlantic Bastion is moving forward fast; we are using some of the requirements and the needs in the middle east to see what we can test and trial. We are pushing forward as fast as we can. Taking the lessons from Ukraine and ensuring that they are inculcated into what we are doing in the slightly rougher and bigger seas in the north Atlantic is an exceptional challenge, but we are moving forward as fast as we can to do it. When combined with our Type 26 fleet, between us, Norway and hopefully others we will have one of the most effective counter-submarine fleets in the world.

It was a privilege recently to spend a week at Camp Viking with our Royal Marines, seeing at first hand the work they are doing to defend the High North. Does the Minister agree that it is clear strategically that the security of the High North and of the north Atlantic are intrinsically linked because of the sea lanes, the data cables and the presence of the Russian northern fleet around the Kola peninsula? Alongside the carrier group, can he set out what else we will be doing as a nation to protect the Arctic and our interests and allied interests there, not only to diminish and constrain Putin’s war machine, but to protect access to the north Atlantic?

As my hon. Friend will know, we have the carrier group deploying up there. That will be a NATO exercise with a multitude of different assets attached, running through all sorts of mission rehearsals and deterrent operations. On top of that, we have had international engagement with our joint expeditionary force partners, and that will increase over time—and of course we have 1,500 exceptionally effective Marines deployed in the High North, protecting our NATO flank and our allies and partners.

Can we be absolutely clear from this statement, which I very much commend for its candour and bluntness, that these two GUGI submarines have now left UK waters? They were carrying out hostile acts in UK waters, and I cannot believe that many people in the MOD are happy with the limp-wristed response of the rest of the Government to this episode. Has the ambassador been summoned for a public dressing down? Have we expelled any Russian diplomats in retaliation? Are we making it clear to our Russian adversaries that if they mess in our territorial waters, we will demand their immediate surrender, and that they should surface and be escorted to a British port or we will open fire, or at least fire a warning shot? Just saying, “We see you,” is not going to be enough. That is not going to bother President Putin one jot, and he will carry on doing exactly what he is doing until we are prepared to escalate this and show that we are prepared to deter what he is doing to our country.

I can confirm that the submarines were not within the 12 nautical miles of UK territorial waters, and the hon. Member will know that the rules of the sea have all sorts of rules and regulations around the use of force. We have been watching and observing those vessels, and calling this out and telling the world exactly what they are up to actually reduces their ability to do something and then deny it and blame it on someone else, which in itself is probably the most effective deterrence that we have done.

While the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) talks down our Royal Navy, I think the House is today united in praising it for its work to deter Russian activity at deep sea. Does my hon. and gallant Friend agree that, through Atlantic Bastion and the emerging defence SMEs, defence companies should get the finance they need to be able to thrive and protect our deep-sea assets?

I know that my hon. Friend is exceptionally passionate about this, as am I. I fully support our Royal Navy activity in the High North, and I also expect that as we move forward with big capability procurements, SMEs will get a fair showing to ensure that we can capitalise on the entrepreneurial spirit that is driving what is a technological revolution in Ukraine. We have done thousands of contracts, and there will be thousands more, but we also have a really difficult challenge on our hands. New technology in Ukraine is driving change faster than ever before. Capabilities that were ordered previously may have to have their roles changed or adapted. Indeed, some of the capability we have now is outdated and needs to be replaced. That complexity is why the defence investment plan is taking time, but it will come, and when it does, it will be fantastic.

I hope to give the Minister a focused question. He has rightly laid out the importance of the data cables to the UK as an island, and also highlighted Russia’s continued activity over many decades. The frigates that we have in the Royal Navy are really the centrepiece of the anti-submarine war, so my short, focused question is: how many frigates could we put to sea tomorrow?

Depending on the situation, we could put frigates to sea at any point in time. That comes down to the balance of risk around health and safety and operational readiness, depending on the threat.

Russia is in our seas and undermining our North sea cables. It is on social media spreading myths and disinformation. It is even in our politics: we must remember that the former Reform leader in Wales is currently serving time in prison for accepting Russian bribes. Members across the House recognise the ever-present threat that Russia poses to this country, but I am not sure that the public are always quite as aware of the scale and presence of Russia as it affects our society at every level. I thank the Minister for coming to the House today and updating us on what has been going on. It is really important that we expose what Russia is up to. Can I urge him to work with colleagues across Government to ensure that we continue to expose Russia wherever it is attacking us?

Yes, there is a physical threat from Russian submarines, Russian surface ships, bombers and the war in Ukraine, but there is actually a more subversive threat—one that is based on the influence on the hearts and minds of our nation and on the political divide of our nation. That is why we have seen members of some parties do over 10 years in prison because of their connections to the Russian regime. In some of those areas, I and my ministerial colleagues are now working exceptionally hard to quantify what that threat looks like from a cyber and influence perspective, and then to put measures in place to neutralise it, so that democracy can thrive.

I join the hon. and gallant Minister in paying tribute to our armed forces. After the Defence Secretary gave a press conference calling out this operation, Russia said that it posed no threat to undersea infrastructure. I asked this question when the Minister responded to an urgent question back in November after lasers were fired at RAF pilots by Russia: why has the Russian ambassador not been summoned by the Foreign Office, given this clear threat to our national security?

We regularly make clear to our Russian counterparts what they are up to and what is happening, and ensure that the severity of their activities is explained to them. The idea that Russia poses no threat to our critical national infrastructure is fundamentally wrong. The reason for Russia’s mapping it and trying to understand it is to find a gap, develop capabilities and, at a time of its choosing, perhaps use them. We acknowledge that we are watching. We have clear indicators and warnings, and I have complete assurance in our armed forces’ ability to deter it.

The Minister may be aware that the RAF’s investment in the P-8 submarine hunting programme was made in 2015, at a time when Russian activity in the north Atlantic was much less of a threat to the UK. I welcome the £100 million announced just now, but that is less than one third of the cost of one of those aircraft, so can I ask him what assessment he has made of the P-8 submarine hunting capability in the light of the increased Russian activity? Will he assure the House that he will go further if the RAF needs him to?

That is a fantastic question. The Nimrod capability was taken out of service many years ago. The P-8 programme is a huge success. Many other allies and partners use those same aircraft. When we combine that with some of the best frigates and the best Navy personnel, and with our subsurface capability, that multi-domain spectrum of finding submarines and tracking them is second to none. A £100 million investment has gone into the P-8 programme. Of course we will ensure that that money is spent wisely on maintenance, and other gaps if required, and we will spend more if there are issues with the P-8 programme in the future. It is the frontline of our deterrence and indicator network.

This incident highlights the need to move at pace to scale up our hybrid naval capabilities, so will the Minister commit to do so, drawing on the strengths of north-east industry?

A country without a navy has destroyed, or rendered irrelevant, one of the biggest fleets in the world, the Black sea fleet. The lessons that we can learn from the hybrid activity in Ukraine are some of the most important ones for our island nation, and we will ensure that they are inculcated and integrated into our major capability platforms to ensure that we have a high-low mix of hardware and sophisticated software combined into fantastic high-end systems such as the Type 26 frigate.

First, I pay tribute to the dedication and bravery of our armed forces, and in particular to the many members of our armed forces involved in this operation who are based at RAF Lossiemouth in the Poseidon fleet, and those in the Typhoons who provide quick reaction alert from Lossiemouth. They are on the frontline in our defensive operations and in protecting the integrity of our defence against Russia.

The point that the hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Jamie Stone) made about the threat of Russian vessels in the north Atlantic growing is really important. There is an advantage to basing more vessels in the north of these isles, and there are plenty of ports around Scotland that could accommodate that. Will the Minister give that serious consideration?

We have a multitude of indicators and warnings that highlight when threats come into our areas of interest. When they do, we make sure that we mobilise capability to meet and deter that threat. I think all parties realise the absolute centrality of Scotland within our defensive network, through its geographical position and the access and insight it gives us to the High North, which is critical to our defence.

Building on the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Widnes and Halewood (Derek Twigg), I commend my hon. and gallant Friend on his statement and encourage him to do all he can to continue to raise awareness of the subversive actions of Russia, whether in the grey zone or through hybrid activities. Does he agree that the recent success of our armed forces in the north Atlantic rebuffs the Leader of the Opposition’s recent remarks—which she has still failed to apologise for—about our armed forces simply “hanging around”? What we have seen is that, whether at sea, in the air or on land, our armed forces work day in, day out to keep our homeland safe, and we should be proud of all they do.

We have seen billions of pounds-worth of cyber-attacks in the UK and a 30% increase in Russian surface and subsurface capability in the High North. We have seen tactics and training cross-pollinated between Russia and Ukraine, and now Iran, across 10 different countries, with low and slow-flying drones and high-end ballistic missiles mixed into a very effective strike programme. On the other side, we have also seen the capabilities from Ukraine deploying into the middle east to defend against those very same tactics. It is clear for everyone to see that there are countries working together to undermine the west, not just in the physical domain, but in the cyber and influence domains. The quicker we push back against that, the better.

It is clear that under the current leadership, the US is no longer a reliable ally, threatening European colleagues and Commonwealth nations and undermining the very purpose of NATO. As we face increasing threats from Russia, we are reliant on the US for our nuclear deterrent, for our kit and for technology. Will the Minister share his plans to increase the prioritisation of British and European partners’ equipment, so that we can have some independence from the US and also boost our domestic market?

We have a multitude of allies and partners. The US has been a partner for the last 20 years and will continue to be so for some time to come. We share a plethora of different capabilities and have done so for the last 20 years. We also do the same with our European allies. As the hon. Member will know, the Lunna House agreement with Norway has resulted in a frigate deal. Our Trinity House deal with the Germans and, of course, our capability and co-operation with Poland have resulted in millions of pounds of investment, but also thousands of skilled jobs, from Scotland and Cornwall to Ireland and Wales.

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his statement. I pay tribute to our incredibly brave naval personnel for the important work they do, often in difficult weather conditions, to keep us all safe. It strikes me that Harlow is quite a way from the Arctic circle and that the Arctic circle is considerably colder than Harlow, particularly at this time of year. Would he touch on the unique challenges that our naval fleet face in those conditions? Although it is hugely important that we support NATO with its Arctic Sentry mission, would he reflect on the challenges and reassure me and my constituents that our naval fleet are prepared for those challenges?

I am in no doubt, and am absolutely clear, that we have one of the best navies in the world. I have served in the Royal Navy for 24 years as a member of His Majesty’s Royal Marines. Operating in the High North is exceptionally difficult. I have only done a little bit of it in my time on the carrier strike group as the chief of staff, but when you are in Sea State 9 on a pointy frigate, yes, you need to have some mettle to continue doing your job, when it is day in, day out for weeks on end. What I can say is that the Royal Navy perseveres; it does a fantastic job. When that is combined with our P-8s in the sky and, of course, the silent service underneath the waves, I have no doubt that our nation is very well protected.

The Minister may recall that back in November when we discussed the Yantar, I asked him about the circumstances under which the fleet contingency group would be given the green light to conduct a maritime interdiction operation. He responded that it would need to meet international law. I was pleased on 25 March when the Prime Minister put out a statement saying that the Royal Marines special forces would be given the opportunity to interdict Russian shadow fleet vessels, but subsequently, we have not seen any of that take place. The Minister mentioned that criteria would need to be met. There are 544 sanctioned Russian shadow fleet vessels. Can he confirm whether all of them—by virtue of being sanctioned—meet the criteria for being interdicted, or are there vessels in that list of 544 that are in scope, but have not yet transited through our waters?

As is absolutely clear, the maritime interdiction of a Russian-flagged vessel such as the Yantar is very different from one where the vessel either does not have a flag or changes its flag regularly. The criteria must be met to enable those boardings. The MOD is absolutely ready to go, but unfortunately I will not go through the detail here, because it may allow some of those vessels to put in place the mitigations that would reduce our ability to board them.

With the Russian navy now escorting shadow fleet vessels down through the English channel, could a mitigation or a blocker for interdicting one of those vessels be a naval vessel with them? Was it an error of judgment by the Government to put them on notice that we were about to start those interdictions?

We had already supported a US boarding of a sanctioned vessel and, of course, multiple other allies as well. Russian naval escorts do escort some of these vessels. When they do, that is also putting a considerable strain on the Russian fleet, which is relatively limited when combined with its subsurface capability, and this is having an effect. What I can say is that the MOD is absolutely ready to board any ship that meets the parameters, and will do so if that happens.

I pay tribute to the Royal Navy and echo the point made by the Minister in respect of our brave personnel. I agree with him that we have the best Navy in the world—I just wish it were larger. I am unclear from what the Minister has said about whether we have had more than a narrative of what has happened over the last month and of our capabilities in respect of these events. What has actually changed in the Government’s planning with respect to defending our undersea infrastructure from Russia, in terms of either the disposition of our forces or procurement, perhaps? Also, he mentions the resilience of our undersea infrastructure. Can he tell the House a little about what plans we have to cope with an attack on undersea cables and how quickly we could recover from one?

It is a delight to see a Member from the hon. Member’s party sat in the Chamber during a statement on a defence subject—it is a first. I remind him of the capability that we have seen as this Russian operation takes place. The UK has deployed assets to map and track it, and then expose it. That, in fact, is one of the best deterrents, because no longer can Russia or indeed Putin claim that an operation or sabotage that took place was not them. That was the whole purpose of that operation, which has been fantastically conducted by the best Royal Navy in the world. Remember, it is not just the ship or the aircraft; a whole plethora of individuals—in fact, 500 people—sat behind this operation, conducting it, and it was successfully prosecuted.

I would like to return to the issue of UK maritime services facilitating the export of Russian energy, which I raised in this Chamber three months ago. Does the Minister not see the irony that, at a time when we are all grappling with how we fund our own defence, the Government are still letting UK plc bankroll Putin’s war machine—a war machine that is mapping our infrastructure? What action do the Government plan to take to stop it?

We have taken some of the most extensive action on sanctions of any country, sanctioning thousands of individuals and enterprises, and we will continue to do so as long as that money is fuelled into the illegal and barbaric war in Ukraine.

A recent Policy Exchange document entitled, “Closing the Back Door” highlighted that, as a result of the Irish Government freeloading on the UK and NATO, they were increasingly reliant on the UK for security, particularly regarding air defence and maritime security, resulting in an inability to protect their own airspace and territorial waters, including crucial transatlantic cables. That has created a back-door vulnerability for the UK and NATO. What discussions has the Minister had with the Irish Government to up their game and provide for some security measures? Does he have any concerns that a future Irish Government that included Sinn Féin could lead to any co-operation breaking down?

We need to accept that Ireland in itself is exceptionally close to the mainland and we therefore have shared security interests. The Prime Minister has had constructive conversations with his Irish counterparts to ensure that, where applicable, we share those resources and protect both Ireland and, of course, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Minister talked about Government investment to deter adversaries in the north Atlantic, the Atlantic Bastion programme, extra money for P-8 aircraft and the additional service vessels on order, but unless I missed it, he did not say anything about plans for the AUKUS submarines that are in development with the United States. Will he comment on the future of the AUKUS programme?

The AUKUS programme is not in question; it continues at full strength. It is a fantastic trilateral partnership between us, the Australians and the Americans.

Given Northern Ireland’s geographical position, it occupies a geo-security location of increasing significance, particularly with regard to transatlantic undersea cables. I am disappointed, then, that there are still only five Royal Navy personnel based in Northern Ireland. Last month, there was a memorandum of understanding between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland on providing sea and naval cover for the entire British Isles. That is particularly important to the Republic, given that its cyber-economy relies on those cables. It has been reported in the press that that cover is being provided free of charge to the Republic of Ireland. Is that correct? Surely not.

Northern Ireland’s essential role in our transatlantic relationship, and in the security of our great isle, is not lost on me—nor indeed is the essential role that Northern Ireland played in world war two. If I can—if it is within the operational parameter—I will write back to the hon. and learned Gentleman with the details on the numbers in Northern Ireland. Any discussions taking place with another country, in the diplomatic space, usually involve bilateral benefits.

I thank the hon. and gallant Member for his statement—no one inside or outside this House doubts his commitment. The Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy made a statement to the House about six weeks ago. I asked him then about the very issue that my right hon. Friend the Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) just mentioned. As the Minister is aware, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force protect not only the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, but the Republic of Ireland. Pipelines and undersea cables go from the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland and then into the Atlantic ocean. Can the Minister confirm that Russian submarines have not been active in the soft underbelly of the Republic of Ireland, which is a back door to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?

I will not go into specific detail on the geographical movement of submarines, but I can say that there are interdependencies between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and a multitude of other European nations in relation to undersea cables. We are working with our allies and partners, and will continue to do so, to ensure that those cables are absolutely protected and that, if any threat appears, it is mapped, tracked and deterred.