PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Arms and Military Cargo Export Controls: Israel - 2 June 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

I rise to speak about British arms and military cargo export controls—specifically, our exports to Israel amid one of the most devastating conflicts in modern memory. “It’s horrific. Gaza has become a slaughterhouse. That’s what it is: a slaughterhouse.” Those are the words of Tom Potokar, a British doctor working in Khan Yunis, as he urged world leaders to “stop talking and do something”.

Since 7 October, Israel has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians. As a father, the thought of the loss of a single child is heartbreaking; the estimate of more than 50,000 children killed or injured in the Gaza strip is inconceivable. Yet despite the scale of this destruction, our Government have continued to export weapons to Israel, without pause, without transparency and without apparent regard for international humanitarian law. Despite the UK Government suspending around 30 of 350 export licences in September 2024, a new report, “Exposing UK arms exports to Israel” uses data from the Israel Tax Authority to reveal the sheer volume that we continue to send.

A report in The Guardian last month suggested that despite the suspension of key arms export licences to Israel back in September, UK firms have exported thousands of military items, including munitions, to Israel.

The exports have included items such as bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles and similar munitions of war. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is completely conceivable that those weapons have been used to kill and maim children in Gaza, and therefore the only humane and reasonable option is for us to suspend all arms export licences to Israel, and ensure that no British manufactured munitions are going to Netanyahu’s Israel?

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention, which is easy for me to respond to—yes, I agree wholeheartedly. Since October 2023 there have been at least 14 shipments of military goods from the UK to Israel. Those include over 8,500 munitions, bombs, grenades, missiles, and 146 armoured vehicle parts. In October 2023 alone, the UK exported 150,000 bullets.

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Since October 2023, analysis by Action on Armed Violence identified more than 500 RAF-linked flights from Akrotiri to Israeli airspace. While described as “reconnaissance”, the Ministry of Defence refuses to confirm whether any carried military cargo. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister must confirm without delay the exact purpose of those flights? Have any of them transported military equipment to support Israel? Has the UK conducted surveillance over Gaza, and has any intelligence been used with the Israel Defence Forces? If RAF assets were operating during such incidents, is there not clear evidence of serious international humanitarian law violations, and a duty to share all relevant intelligence with the International Criminal Court without delay?

That is something I will touch on later in my speech, but I also hope that we will be getting some answers on those exact points in due course. Between October and December 2024 this Labour Government approved £127.6 million in single-issue arms licences to Israel, which is more than the total approved from 2020 to 2023 combined. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry South (Zarah Sultana) was accused of “sensationalism” for highlighting that to the Foreign Secretary, but these are the Government’s own figures. Included in that total is £60 million in incorporation licences, up from just £2 million in the previous quarter. That prompts the question: why have single and incorporation licences surged both since we took office, and after the so-called suspension? Open licences are not included in those figures, meaning that the true scale of UK military exports to Israel remains unknown and unaccountable. The report also exposes that despite pledging to halt F-35 part shipments directly to Israel, evidence suggests that the UK continues supplying crucial components. These jets, 15% British made, fuel relentless attacks on Gaza, registering over 15,000 flight hours since October 2023, and dropping bombs that kill hundreds of people indiscriminately.

One horrific example of why we must stop supplying the parts for the F-35 fighter jets is the al-Mawasi attack last July. F-35s dropped 2,000 lb bombs on a designated safe zone in Gaza, killing 90 civilians and injuring 300. The use of such powerful munitions in densely populated areas is clearly a violation of international humanitarian law. As my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson) said, key parts of the F-35s that carried out that attack may well have come from Britain; they clearly have done in other attacks. If we want to avoid any complicity in such Israeli war crimes, do we not need to stop these exports immediately?

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I am very glad that the al-Mawasi attack has been mentioned and I wholeheartedly agree with the sentiments he expressed.

Freedom of information data reveals that the F-35 open general export licence was used 14 times to export to Israel in 2023—three times as much as in any other year. Israel is heavily reliant on F-35s for its attack on Gaza and is expanding its fleet. Without UK components, those jets could not fly.

The latest report from the Palestinian Youth Movement further details the F-35 supply chain. It shows that subassemblies and parts for F35s, including those used for repairs and maintenance, are all “logged and documented”, and that the global supply chain for the US-run F-35 maintenance programme has “robust traceability”. Therefore, the Government’s claim that it is impossible to halt supplies of F-35 components to Israel without undermining the global F-35 supply chain does not stand up to scrutiny. That raises serious questions around the UK’s legal duty to prevent genocide, yet the weapons continue to flow.

Does the hon. Member share my concern that some equipment, such as drone engines, may be being exported to Israel without the need for export licences and are potentially getting into the hands of military organisations, perhaps not directly to drop bombs but to engage in other military activity, such as providing reconnaissance and decoys? Does he support requiring all exported items that can be used within a military conflict zone to have a full licence, so that the public know exactly where UK businesses are engaging?

The hon. Member raises some really important points and I am in agreement with her intervention.

When reviewing arms export licences to Israel, the UK must also consider violations across the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including the west bank, where Palestinians face home demolitions, forcible displacement and settler violence—actions breaching the fourth Geneva convention and risking UK legal obligations under the arms export criteria.

The Foreign Secretary’s recent condemnation of Israel’s actions as “monstrous” was welcome but incomplete, because the very same Government continue to facilitate such actions. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot condemn atrocity while simultaneously fuelling the machinery that enables it. We cannot claim to uphold international law while profiting from its breach. I urge the Minister to respond fully—not with platitudes but with clarity, honesty and, above all, accountability.

I commend the hon. Gentleman for securing the debate. I spoke to him beforehand and he gave me permission to intervene. He will understand the need to bring an end to this war and to bring hope to the children of the region. However, will he acknowledge that Israel is still under daily attack and cannot be left without any means to defend itself from those who hide among civilian targets? We must ensure that actions taken here do not simply reset the gauge of casualties.

I agree with the hon. Member that all countries have the right to defend themselves. I have condemned the vile events of 7 October in other places, and do so again here. All countries have the right to defend themselves, but no country has the right to commit war crimes.

Despite the International Court of Justice’s ruling that there is a “plausible risk of genocide” in Gaza, the UK continues to authorise arms exports to Israel, making us in potential breach of our obligations under the genocide convention, the Geneva conventions and the arms trade treaty.

In the hearing of Al-Haq v. Secretary of State for Business and Trade, it was revealed that the Government decided there was no serious risk of genocide back in July 2024, yet in Parliament we are told that the Government are waiting on a court determination. In court, we are told that it is not for the courts to decide, as those treaties are not incorporated into domestic law and are Parliament’s responsibility. If it is not Parliament or the courts, who are the Government accountable to for the decision to continue to transfer arms to Israel, potentially breaching international law and facilitating a genocide? Will the Government publish their most recent assessment of the risk that Israel is committing genocide?

I am in especial agreement on the importance of preventing those things. I am very eager, as I am sure the hon. Member is, to hear from the Minister in relation to those comments.

Let us turn to the Government’s own assessments. In the same hearing, it was revealed that by September ’24, Israel had launched tens of thousands of air strikes and killed more than 40,000 Palestinians in Gaza. The public are being told to trust our judgment on the weapons that this country is sending to a state conducting a genocide. This is the same Government who, after reviewing 413 incidents, determined that only 0.5% of them potentially violated international humanitarian law. Not a single incident involving only the deaths of Palestinians was deemed even possibly unlawful.

While the Foreign Secretary repeatedly talks about the UK’s “robust” licensing regime, the reality is that British export data is notoriously opaque. Can the Government confirm whether they have reached a new assessment since September? If so, can they disclose it to the public? If the Government are truly confident in the legality of their exports, will they publish custom codes, product descriptions and a full paper trail from sender to end user? Would this level of opacity be tolerated if it were British civilians under the rubble?

We are repeatedly told that the UK arms exports are “defensive in nature”, reduced to nothing more than “a helmet or goggles”, but let us be clear: the Government have never defined what “defensive” means, especially when exports include components for F-35 fighter jets capable of dropping 2,000-lb bombs on densely populated areas. Since September 2024, there has been no evidence that UK exports were limited to non-lethal equipment or that they were not intended for use in Gaza. The Government do not claim that it is too difficult to track where these weapons end up; instead, they invoke vague concerns about “international peace and security”, as though suspending exports to Israel would somehow endanger global stability, including support for Ukraine, but that is a false dichotomy. Palestinian lives are not less valuable.

The F-35 programme is one of the most sophisticated supply chains on earth. If we wanted to, we could track every part. The real question is: do we want to? How do the Government define a weapon as defensive? What precisely makes an F-35 component defensive? Is it the Government’s position that the need to continue to supply F-35 components outweighs the risk of genocide? If so, is there any circumstance that would lead to the UK stopping that supply? The Government have claimed that there are red lines that would trigger a halt to exports, but Gaza is already a slaughterhouse. Children are emaciated or dying of hunger, hospitals have been intentionally destroyed and Israel’s leaders vow to wipe out Gaza, and still the weapons flow, so finally, Minister, where is our red line? I call on this Government to suspend all arms exports to Israel, to ensure that no British-made weapons are used in Israel’s brutal plans to annex, starve and ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population. The credibility of this House depends not just on what we condemn, but on what we enable, and history will remember that we enabled too much.

I am responding on this issue on behalf of the Government tonight, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) for securing this important and timely debate. Let me address the House this evening by first setting out the Government’s policy, and then setting out our approach to transparency, which formed a key part of my hon. Friend’s contribution.

It is accepted on all sides of this House that, as the Government have made clear, what was witnessed on 7 October 2023 was not an act of liberation, but an act of barbarism by Hamas. Over the many months of this conflict, the UK Government have made the case for an immediate ceasefire, the release of all the hostages detained, the protection of civilians, access for aid and aid workers to Gaza, and the need for a path to long-term peace and security in the region. The responsibility of Hamas is clear, but so too is the appalling humanitarian crisis that has since unfolded in Gaza as a result of Israel’s subsequent actions. The way in which Israel is conducting its operations is indefensible, disproportionate, and—in the view of the UK Government—counterproductive to any lasting peace settlement.

The Government’s policy remains that the only way to secure peace and stability is through an immediate ceasefire, the release of the hostages held captive by Hamas, the protection of civilians, and the lifting of all Israeli restrictions on aid being sent into Gaza. Last month, at the United Nations Security Council, the UK Government made the case for urgent humanitarian aid to enter Gaza, and expressed our outrage at both the killing of Palestinian Red Crescent workers and the strikes on the UN Office for Project Services compound in March. We also issued a statement with 27 international partners on the mechanisms needed to deliver those vital aid supplies, and together with the leaders of France and Canada, we made clear our strong opposition to the latest expansion of Israel’s military operations.

Let me make a little progress, and then I will be open to interventions.

I turn next to the actions taken by this Government in support of those statements. We have supported the restoration of funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency; we have suspended arms licences; we provided £129 million in humanitarian assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the last financial year; and we have decided to suspend negotiations on the upgraded free trade agreement with this Israeli Government.

In the week before last, the Foreign Secretary said that we were suspending arms negotiations with the Israeli Government, yet just last week, we had a trade envoy—Lord Austin—visiting Israel and saying how wonderful it was to be there. Can the Minister please explain how those two matters do not contradict each other?

There are long-standing relationships of trade and economics with Israel—for instance, as I understand it, one in eight of the prescribed drugs available through the national health service is provided by an Israeli company. We have taken a clear position of not upgrading the free trade agreement but recognising, for example, that those supplies are important. The trade envoy roles are accountable to the Secretary of State in the Department for Business and Trade, and we were clear that Lord Austin would not directly deal with the Israeli Government when he was there and has no responsibility for the free trade agreement negotiations that otherwise would have been taking place in the coming months.

Let me make a little more progress, then I will be happy to take further interventions.

I will turn to the specific issue of export licences. On coming into office, the Foreign Secretary commissioned an immediate assessment into Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law. On the basis of that assessment, on 2 September, we suspended arms export licences for items to the Israel Defence Forces that could be used in military operations in Gaza.

As a result of that decision, licences were suspended for a range of military equipment, stopping the export of F-16 fighter aircraft components, of targeting systems and of licensable parts that make unmanned aerial vehicles. That measure is still in place. I reiterate that based on our current assessment of potential breaches of international humanitarian law, we are not licensing military equipment provided directly to the IDF that could be used for military operations in Gaza.

It is right to acknowledge that our export licences granted in relation to Israel cover a wider remit than simply those items that may be used in Gaza. There are a relatively small number of licences for the IDF relating to equipment that we assess would not be used in the current conflict, including, for example, parts for air defence systems that defend Israel from acts such as the major aerial attack from Iran in April 2024.

We also think it is right to continue to provide military grade body armour used by non-governmental organisations and journalists, and to provide parts of the supply chain that are ultimately re-exported out of Israel to support the defence of our NATO allies. The Government are fully committed to upholding our responsibilities under domestic and international law, and have acted in a manner consistent with our legal obligations, including under the arms trade treaty and the genocide convention.

On the global F-35 programme, we are of course facing a critical moment of European security, with war on the continent at our neighbours’ doorsteps. Undermining the F-35 programme at this juncture would, in the Government’s view, disrupt international peace and security, NATO deterrence and European defence as a whole.

Let me finish the explanation, then I will be happy to take interventions.

Our exporters provide components for the F-35 aircraft to a global spares pool and the common production line for new aircraft, where they have no sight and no control over the specific ultimate end users for their exports. Put plainly, it is not possible to suspend licensing of F-35 components for use by one F-35 nation without ceasing supply to the entire global F-35 programme. It was therefore judged necessary by the Government to exclude F-35 components from the scope of the suspension.

Let me be very clear, however, that the UK Government are not selling F-35 components directly to the Israeli authorities. The licence that allows the export of F-35 components was amended in September to specifically make it clear that direct shipments to Israel for use in Israel are not permitted.

The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr (Steve Witherden) mentioned the Government’s red lines. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade said that there were red lines that would make the Government stop sending F-35 parts, but the Minister has just been clear that it is not possible to stop sending those parts. If the Secretary of State says that there are red lines—and how are we not at those red lines, given what is happening in Gaza—what exactly is going on?

We are not directly sending parts to Israel for the F-35s. We are continuing to support the global component pool of the F-35 programme for the reason that I have set out. We as a Government judge that there is a material risk to the security of our NATO allies, and more broadly to European security, if the F-35 aircraft that are used by a number of our allies were no longer able to secure the supplies and the aircraft were therefore no longer able to fly.

I want to understand who is making the rules about the spare parts pool. Surely if we are trading into that pool, we have a right to set the rules. If those components are going on to F-35s that are being bought by Israel, we have a right to block those parts or to kick Israel out, as we did with Turkey in 2019.

We make approximately 15% of the components that contribute to the F-35 programme; it is an international programme of which we are but one partner. We continue to supply the programme because our judgment as a Government is that not doing so would undermine the continuing functioning of the programme, which is in the Government’s view, as I say, of critical importance to European and global security.

Will the Minister give way?

I have given way several times on that point, so I am keen to make some progress. The Government have made these judgments calmly and soberly, and will continue to do so with full awareness of our responsibility.

Let me now turn to the question of transparency. As the UK Government, we publish quarterly official statistics and an annual report about export licences granted and refused. We provide a searchable database allowing users to produce bespoke reports, drawing on this data, and we are committed to openness on strategic export licensing, which provides the means for Parliament and the public to hold us to account.

Will the Minister give way?

I am keen to make a little more progress before I take further interventions.

Because these are exceptional circumstances, the Government have heard requests from Members on both sides of the House for us to release further details, including information on licence applications in progress, and as full information as we can disclose on the types of equipment that are covered by each extant licence. Recognising the exceptional nature of this issue and the importance of providing transparent and robust information to ensure that Parliament and the public can hold the Government to account, in December we laid in the Library of the House an exceptional release of export licensing data focused specifically on Israel, setting out plainly how many licences remained extant at that time, how many had been granted since June 2024, and how many had been refused.

In summarising that release, let me assure Members that remaining licences relate to non-military items, military items for civilian use, or items not for use in military operations in Gaza. These licences also extend to components in items for re-export to other countries—that is, those that then leave Israel. Ongoing licensing applications are also decided on that basis. In fact, of the 352 licences extant for Israel, as of 6 December 191 were non-military. They included commercial aircraft components, equipment for private manufacturing firms, and parts for submersible vessels for use in scientific research. That left 161 licences relating to military equipment. However, less than half those related to the Government of Israel or the IDF. Most related either to UK components that private Israeli companies would incorporate before re-exporting an item to a third country, or to military-grade equipment for civilians such as body armour for journalists and NGOs.

I can advise the House that recent reporting on this topic does not provide distinctions between items for civilian and for military use, or between items remaining in Israel and those for re-export. The UK is not allowing the direct export of arms for use in Israel’s military operations in Gaza.

The Minister is giving a detailed response, but may I return him to the issue of the international pool of F-35 spares? Is it the Government’s contention that a conditional licence is impossible—that is, that we could provide F-35 spares, but on the basis that they are not then sent to Israel to be used in Gaza?

I am acutely conscious of the time, Madam Deputy Speaker. The exclusion from the suspension decision for F-35 components should not, in principle, apply to licences for F-35 components that could be identified as going to Israel for use by Israel. Exports of F-35 components directly to Israel are therefore suspended unless they are for re-export.

Let me return to the specific point that I know has been the subject of much scrutiny in relation to recent reporting outside the House. The majority of military licences approved last year are for components of military items for re-export to third countries, including the UK’s NATO allies, of about £142 million-worth of military goods licensed for Israel and in 2024. The vast majority of that overall value was supporting the production of items for use outside Israel. That includes more than £120 million, or about 85% of the total licence value, for components to support exports of military items from Israeli companies to a single programme for a NATO ally.

These remaining licences have no utility in military operations in Gaza. The suspension of such licences was not required by our export licence criteria, and would have done nothing but harm UK companies and UK businesses engaged in authorised and legal trade. Since September, we have refused all licence applications for military goods that might be used by Israel in the current conflict in line with the suspension decision. More applications were refused in 2024 than in the preceding four years combined.

Question put and agreed to.