PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Energy Infrastructure: Chinese Companies - 12 February 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
The protection and security of the energy sector is an absolute priority for this Government. We have a range of effective measures in place that give the Government powers to balance an open investment environment to facilitate growth with protecting the areas of our economy that are most sensitive to national security.
The Government firmly believe that the biggest risk to our energy system and energy security is remaining dependent on international fossil fuel markets, controlled by petrostates and dictators. That is why we have a mission to make Britain a clean energy superpower to end that dependence. We have a world-leading offshore wind industry in the UK and international investment plays a crucial role in supporting jobs across the country. As part of that mission, my Department engages in discussions with a wide range of investors, including those from other countries. We are also clear that alongside that, the growth of UK supply chains is critical. That is why we have set out plans for a clean industry bonus to drive investment in manufacturing, as well as setting up Great British Energy and the national wealth fund.
The Government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security whenever we identify concerns, and we will take a consistent, long-term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China, rooted in UK and global interests. The Government will co-operate with China where it can, compete where it needs to and challenge where it must.
It has been reported that the Chinese company Mingyang is interested in producing turbines for a new project in the North sea. Around £60 million of Scottish Government funding has been earmarked for a wind turbine factory near Inverness, in addition to a potential £27 million for Orient Cable to provide subsea cables for island communities. That is despite the European Union bringing anti-trust cases against China and the Norwegian Government blocking Mingyang from its green infrastructure projects.
Will the Minister reassure the House that the Department will follow the same rigorous processes to assess those risks as the previous Government, which ultimately blocked Huawei from the 5G network? This must include an assessment of any opportunities for remote access to the turbines, as the software will normally remain in the control of the manufacturers even once commissioned, leaving them vulnerable to being switched off. We need local control.
Will the Department reassure the House that discussions are ongoing with the Scottish Government to ensure that no public money is invested before this risk assessment has taken place? How will Ministers work with the Scottish Government and Cabinet colleagues to ensure that offshore and undersea infrastructure is safe?
The Government have to consider both those aspects together: the need for investment and for greater capacity in our supply chains, and the security risk. While I cannot get into the details of the individual case, given the nature of the ongoing discussions, I reassure the hon. Lady that we are taking these factors into account. We do want to make sure that the most robust processes are followed as we look at the details of this particular issue.
As we extend energy infrastructure in this country, can my hon. Friend the Minister confirm how this Government will ensure that we have control of the operation of that infrastructure? Does she agree it is vital that through the industrial strategy we see a renaissance in our manufacturing and greater resilience in our supply chain, all of which adds to the energy security of this country?
The Minister’s party says again and again that the transition to renewable energy will reduce our reliance on hostile regimes. Chinese-controlled technology embedded in our critical energy infrastructure is evidently a threat to our security. Can the Minister assure us that she is taking this threat seriously? Can she explain how using wind turbines made by Mingyang reduces our reliance on foreign states?
Just last week I, along with many MPs in the Minister’s party, was briefed by the Royal Navy on the vulnerability of our subsea communications and energy infrastructure. We have seen a pervasive rise in sabotage attacks on subsea cables in the Baltic, affecting our Scandinavian allies. If Chinese-manufactured turbines are installed, security experts have warned that sensors could spy on British seas, defence submarine programmes and the layout of our energy infrastructure. We would be reliant on Chinese equipment and software, and on Chinese suppliers for updates and maintenance, handing Beijing significant opportunity for interference. In the current international climate, it is unthinkable to disregard the security implications of this decision.
Can the Minister confirm that the Government have scrapped the GIGA—green industries growth accelerator —scheme that we launched to build British supply chains in energy technologies? What discussions has she had with the Ministry of Defence about its concerns over our ability to ensure the security of our energy system? What safeguards will be in place to prevent Chinese maintenance ships accessing the turbines for repairs? What guarantees has she had, if any, from our defence and security agencies that this investment will pose no threat to our national security? If such assurances are not forthcoming, will she revisit this decision and put a halt to the madness of allowing the People’s Republic of China to have such a significant stake in our energy system?
Having been in my position, the hon. Gentleman will know why it is so important that I do not provide a running commentary on individual cases, but I have made it clear that we are taking into account the national security considerations as well as our need for investment in the supply chain. Let me touch on the legacy that we were left by the previous Minister: he was perfectly happy to leave our energy system exposed, with the British people paying the price. The retreat—the “under new management” line that he was parroting earlier this week—would leave us even more exposed to those petrostates and dictators. We are getting on with our clean power mission to end our energy insecurity, and I shall take no lessons from the shadow Minister on energy security given his Government’s record.
I point out to the Minister the role that Grimsby plays in servicing and supporting operations of offshore wind, not only around UK waters but as far as Taiwan. Those skills, competencies and capabilities exist here in the country, so what additional support will be given to expand those capabilities and support for skills in this country?
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