PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Official Secrets Act - 15 September 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

Before I call the Minister, I wish to make a brief statement. I found out only this morning that the charges against the two individuals relating to espionage for the Chinese authorities were to be dropped. I do not think that is good. Of course, we do not discuss the detail of security matters relating to Parliament on the Floor of the House, but given the very important issues raised by this case, I ask officials to consider whether any further steps should be taken—operational, strategic or legal—to ensure that all those who work in this Parliament are able to undertake their activities securely and without interference. I am a very unhappy Speaker with what has happened. The fact that it has taken two years, until today, for somebody to withdraw this case is not good enough.

This morning, the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to proceed with the prosecution of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, who had been charged with espionage for China under the Official Secrets Act 1911. Members right across the House will be aware that the charges related to allegations of Chinese espionage within Parliament and will want reassurance, as will you, Mr Speaker. Many Members will be as extremely disappointed as I am that there will now not be a trial.

The decision not to proceed with this prosecution is an independent one for the CPS to make in its role as the UK’s independent prosecuting authority. However, I want to be clear that the Government remain gravely concerned about the threat of Chinese espionage. Parliament and our democracy are sacrosanct, and any attempt by any foreign power to infiltrate or interfere with parliamentary proceedings is completely unacceptable. With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will therefore set out the measures the Government are taking to tackle any residual risks arising from this case and outline the wider approach the Government are taking to protecting our democracy and countering state threats, including those from China.

The decision of the CPS related to charges under the Official Secrets Act 1911, which was the relevant legislation in force at the time. It is well known that state threats legislation had not kept pace with the changing threats we face. The Official Secrets Act was passed to counter the threat from German spies before the first world war. It referred to espionage as obtaining

“any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document, or information”

that

“might be…useful to an enemy”.

Clearly, that language—drafted well over 100 years ago —does not reflect the types of espionage or state threats we face in the modern day, nor the breadth of states that engage directly in that activity.

For that reason, the UK passed and has now commenced the National Security Act 2023 with cross-party support. That legislation, which replaced the Official Secrets Act 1911, brings new criminal offences and powers to bear against the full range of modern-day state threats. Moreover, the National Security Act is state agnostic, removing the unhelpful “enemy” language from the Official Secrets Act and focusing on the malign activity we are all concerned about.

The Act also introduced the foreign influence registration scheme, which the Government brought into force on 1 July. FIRS encourages transparency, strengthening the resilience of our democratic institutions against covert influence, and gives our intelligence agencies and law enforcement additional tools to detect, deter, disrupt and prosecute state threat actors. It requires that any foreign influence in our democracy, including from China, be declared. We can now be confident that should cases of espionage or state threats be uncovered in the future, we will be in a much better position to prosecute them under the new National Security Act.

This case hits at the heart of our democracy, so let me be clear: the Government will not tolerate any state threats to the UK and its democratic institutions. We will robustly challenge China when necessary, as we would challenge any country for unacceptable behaviour on our soil. I can confirm that the Foreign Office has démarched the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese embassy in London to make clear that we will not tolerate any activity that interferes in our democracy. MI5 is considering the provision of additional advice to those most at risk of being targeted by state-led espionage, and the Government are taking robust action to counter state threats and continue to build up the UK’s resilience.

In April, we established a new cross-Government state threats unit to better co-ordinate our response to state threats. As I set out following the recently completed review of transnational repression, new training modules on identifying and countering state threats are being offered to all 45 territorial police forces through the College of Policing and are mandatory for counter-terrorism policing officers. We have committed to legislate as soon as parliamentary time allows to take forward the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism and state threats legislation. That includes creating a new proscription-style tool for state threats.

As the former Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) set out in his statement to the House following the conclusion of the China audit, we are investing £600 million in our intelligence services to support them in detecting and disrupting state threats to the UK. In September, the National Cyber Security Centre co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I know there will be calls to go further, and I reassure the House and the country that we will keep all tools under review and act as necessary.

As you are aware, Mr Speaker, the safety and security of our Parliament is of the utmost importance. That is why the National Protective Security Authority will issue new protective security guidance to parliamentarians and political staff on protection against foreign interference and espionage. That guidance outlines the potential risks we all may face in our day-to-day work, and how we can all better protect ourselves. I urge colleagues to read and follow the advice once issued. I also urge Members to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses. It allows the NCSC to alert individuals if it identifies evidence of malicious activity on their personal devices or accounts, and swiftly advise them on steps to take to protect their information.

The strategic defence review was clear that China presents a sophisticated and persistent challenge. As the national security strategy reinforced, instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. As I have set out, we are addressing those threats, but there are also opportunities we need to grasp as we navigate our complex relationship with China. The last Government did not describe China as an enemy, and this Government do not think our relationship can be simplified down to a single word. Instead, we are taking a consistent, long-term approach to China, firmly rooted in the UK’s global interests.

I finish by paying tribute to our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, who do so much to keep us all safe. They operate often in secret, often in the shadows and often at great personal danger, but they have our enduring gratitude. While we are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, the legislation it relied on has already been changed. Should we need to go further, we will not hesitate to do what is necessary to keep our country safe. I commend this statement to the House.

I call the shadow Home Secretary.

Let me start by thanking the Security Minister for the briefing and information he provided ahead of his statement. Let me also join him in paying tribute to the officers in our police force and in the security service. They work so hard and take personal risks to keep us safe.

Let us start with Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee’s assessment of China, published a year or two ago. It found that China had penetrated every sector of our economy. When the Security Minister a moment ago said that China merely posed a “challenge”, he was wrong I think to use that word. China poses a threat. It poses a threat because it participates and organises systemic espionage into our public institutions, including Parliament. It purloins intellectual property from universities and from companies, particularly in the technology sectors, and it routinely spies on the UK as a state. They also engage in transnational repression of Chinese citizens here, for instance running secret, undeclared police stations and putting bounties on the heads of individuals. The word “challenge” is not strong enough; the state of China poses a threat.

The Security Minister said that the Government would “robustly challenge China”, but let me gently point to some of the decisions that the Government have taken in practice. We saw a signal back at the G7 last year, when the Prime Minister was, I am afraid to say, obsequious in dealing with President Xi, appearing to prioritise economic links above security considerations. We have not seen any decision to place China in the enhanced tier of the FIRS scheme, although that regime has been in place for several months, and the Government seem to be viewing with favour the application for a new super-embassy in London, to which our allies, including America, are urging us not to consent and which many of our intelligence services say will be used as a base for espionage activities. So the Government’s record on China causes deep concern, but of equal concern is this specific case—and, Mr Speaker, you explained why that is of particular concern to Parliament, given that the alleged espionage activities touch directly on Parliament and the way in which Members of Parliament do their duty.

I have in front of me a briefing provided to the press by the Crown Prosecution Service, dated 26 April 2024, when these charges were first laid. That briefing states that one of the subjects was commissioned over a period exceeding a year, between December 2021 and February 2023, by a Chinese intelligence asset. There are 34 reports on what this note describes as “very specific topics”, some of which relate directly and personally to Members of Parliament. One of the deputy national security advisers told the Crown Prosecution Service that he assessed this information to be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state, and said that it was

“prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

Given the gravity of that assessment, it is astonishing that these charges have now been withdrawn. The Crown Prosecution Service clearly assessed these allegations, and the evidence, against the law—against the 1911 Act —in 2024, and found the test to have been met; so why today, more than a year later, have we suddenly been told that the test is no longer met? My question to the Security Minister is a simple one: given the gravity of the charges that I have just read out, what has changed between last year and this year? Why has a case that met the threshold and met the test in April 2024 all of a sudden been determined not to do so?

May I ask specifically whether anyone in the Government put any pressure on the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to this case? Did the Government co-operate fully with the police, the security services and the CPS in providing the information required, including information relating to the definition of “an enemy”? Can the Security Minister give the House those express assurances? I certainly share your concern, Mr Speaker, and, I am sure, the concern of many others, that what appears to be extremely serious espionage, assessed as such in the written disclosure that I read out—assessed by the deputy national security adviser as being prejudicial to our national interests—has all of a sudden, and with no explanation, been dropped, even though previously, just a year and a bit ago, it was assessed that this case did meet the threshold. The House and the country need to know what exactly has changed.

Let me seek to address the shadow Home Secretary’s points. He raised the question of whether China constitutes a threat or not. I think I was very clear in the language that I used. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, and as the Government set out in the strategic defence review, China presents a “sophisticated and persistent challenge”. The reality is that, in government, there is an absolute requirement to co-operate with nations all around the world. When there are areas in which we need to challenge China, of course we will do so. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman and other Opposition Members will completely understand that when there are areas, in terms of economic co-operation, in which we need to work closely with China, of course we will do so, because it is absolutely in our national interest.

I referenced the comments of the previous Foreign Secretary, and the shadow Home Secretary might want to look back at what was said following the China audit. The previous Foreign Secretary was absolutely crystal clear: we will take a long-term, strategic approach to China that is rooted in the UK’s national interest. I understand why the shadow Home Secretary wants to boil down such a complex bilateral relationship into a single word, but the reality is that it is neither helpful nor sensible to do so.

The shadow Home Secretary will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with his characterisations of what he described as the “signals” that this Government have sent to China. In truth, I will not take any lessons from him on that, not least because—I have said this to him previously—it was not so long ago that a Conservative Prime Minister took the leader of China to the pub. When it comes to signals, I am not sure that the shadow Home Secretary speaks with a huge amount of authority.

The shadow Home Secretary spoke about FIRS. He knows that the Government’s position is that no decision has been taken with regard to the enhanced tier and China, and any decision taken by the Government will be announced in the normal way. FIRS is a crucial tool, and I am proud that this Government have got on and implemented it as of 1 July.

The shadow Home Secretary specifically raised the issue of the embassy in London, as I am sure other hon. Members will. He will know that China’s application to build a new embassy in London is going through an independent planning process. A final decision on planning permission will be made in due course by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, but I can be absolutely clear, in relation to FIRS, the nature of the threat and the embassy, that national security has been, and will continue to be, a core priority for this Government throughout the process.

The shadow Home Secretary asked about the CPS decision. I know that he understands that he is asking me about decisions made by the CPS that are entirely independent of Government. This was an independent decision made by the CPS, and it is not for any Government Minister to speculate on the reasons behind it. As I have said—I have been crystal clear—the Government are extremely disappointed with the outcome in this case, and we remain extremely concerned about the espionage threat posed to the United Kingdom.

I hope that the Intelligence and Security Committee will get a good chance to dig into what has happened in this place, because we are hampered in the Chamber by not being able to look at sensitive issues. I also hope that the Minister will lend his weight to the approval of many senior Members of this House, prior to the last election—it got as far as the last Prime Minister—to create a Committee to look at sensitive spending, but also sensitive issues. In the summer, this Government chose to reintroduce extradition arrangements with Hong Kong, despite the application of the Chinese security Act. Given what the Minister has said today, how can we square both of those positions?

I hope that my hon. Friend knows that this Government hugely appreciate and respect the relationship we have with Hongkongers. Through the processes in place, we will absolutely ensure that nobody, be they a Hongkonger or any other nationality, is extradited for reasons of political expediency. I can also point her to the important work, which we take incredibly seriously, on transnational repression. I previously made a statement to this House, and I hope that she and others understand the seriousness with which we take these activities. We are working closely with our international allies, and we are doing everything we can to ensure that the UK is a hard target for these threats, wherever they might originate.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

As always, I am very grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement.

For years, the Chinese Communist party has worked to undermine the democratic institutions and values that underpin our society. This House is all too aware of the warnings, not least from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s excoriating report on China. That report made it clear that the previous Government lacked a coherent strategy for dealing with the threat posed by the Chinese state and that insufficient resources had been committed to meet that challenge. We expect to see better from this Government.

We are faced with a case in which two men, one of them a parliamentary researcher with close links to senior MPs, were accused of serious offences under the Official Secrets Act, only for the Crown Prosecution Service to drop those charges due to insufficient evidence. In this context, the decision is deeply worrying. It raises serious questions about the UK’s capacity to detect and prosecute espionage linked to hostile states, particularly China. So what specific issues with the evidence led the CPS to conclude that the threshold for prosecution was no longer met?

More broadly, what does this outcome say about our preparedness to respond to threats from foreign intelligence services operating on our soil, and even within the corridors of this Parliament? The Government must make protecting our democracy a national security priority. That means implementing the recommendations of the ISC’s China report in full, and ensuring that we are not left exposed to foreign interference simply because our systems are not equipped to respond.

Finally, the Minister again today committed to introduce legislation for a proscription mechanism for state and state-linked bodies as soon as parliamentary time allows. Could he update us on the timeline for bringing this forward and what its scope will be?

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I aways am, for the very sensible and reasonable way in which she has made her comments. She raises a number of important observations, many of which I agree with. I do have to say to her what I said to the shadow Home Secretary, which is that it would be completely inappropriate for me to speculate about the reasons why the CPS sought to make this decision. I completely understand why right hon. and hon. Members would ask me about it, but I hope they also understand that I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision. That is very much a matter for it, not for the Government.

On the other points the hon. Member raised, let me give her an assurance that the Government do everything we possibly can to ensure that the UK is a hard target to guard against those malign forces, wherever they may come from, that seek to infiltrate or interfere with our democratic processes. We will ensure that our security and intelligence services and agencies and law enforcement have the necessary tools and resources they need to do the difficult job of guarding against the threats we face. Obviously, as she understands very well, there is also a legislative framework for that, and that is why, I understand, she asked the question about Jonathan Hall KC and the recommendations that she has made recently. As she knows, we have made an absolute commitment that we will legislate as soon as we can, and I give her an assurance that that work continues at pace.

I thank the Minister for his statement. I think we have a duty—all democracies have a duty—to protect democracy from its enemies. I do not doubt that our allies face exactly the same challenges, so I would be interested to know what discussions we have had with our allies about this very challenge. The Minister mentioned that MPs and their offices would get new guidance. Can he commit to a date for that being issued?

My hon. Friend raises an important point about our allies. Many of the threats and challenges we face are shared ones, which is precisely why the UK Government convened the five countries ministerial conference last week. We were proud to host our allies from the Five Eyes nations, with which we work very closely, along with other important international co-operation arrangements. We do work very closely with our allies to ensure that, collaboratively and collectively, we are best able to guard against the threat we face.

I can give my hon. Friend an assurance that we will seek to ensure that the new guidance is in place as soon possible. I also point to the fact that I wrote to all Members of this House just before the recess with advice on protective security and other matters. However, should any Member feel that they need additional support, we will work very closely with you, Mr Speaker, and the Parliamentary Security Department to ensure that they get it.

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

The Minister made the point that the charges brought were under the old legislation, the Official Secrets Act, which has now been superseded. Has he made an assessment of whether the charges would have proceeded had the new offences been in place at the time the charges were brought? Will he be working with ministerial colleagues, law enforcement and others to look at whether new offences are needed in this case and in others?

If I may say so, that is a very clever question from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee. I hope that the right hon. Lady will understand that, given that the decision was communicated this morning, the Department and the Government will be looking at it very closely. I am confident that the new National Security Act gives the Government—I genuinely pay tribute to the previous Government for their work in introducing that groundbreaking legislation—the tools we need, but I know she will understand that we will look very closely at the decision communicated this morning and satisfy ourselves that we have all the necessary powers and tools to guard against the nature of the threat we face.

I thank the Minister for his statement. The first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe, and I know that he has a track record of doing just that. He also rightly recognises that politics is not just about MPs or Members of the other place; it is also about political staff, the Clerks, everybody who works in this place, and everybody in local government. What reassurances can he give my constituents and the greater population that he will ensure that we stop foreign influence over our democratic processes for everybody?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who raises an important point. I can give him and his constituents the assurances he seeks. The Government take these threats incredibly seriously and we will do everything we need to do to keep the public safe. On behalf of the Prime Minister, I chair the Defending Democracy taskforce. The Prime Minister recently renewed the mandate of that cross-departmental mechanism, which ensures that we are able to provide a whole-of-Government approach to the threats we face. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. These are not party political issues. I have always believed that these are matters that should be a shared endeavour. I will want to work with him and Members right across the House to ensure that, collectively, we keep ourselves safe.

I call the Member who has been heavily involved in this, Alicia Kearns.

I will be responding in a personal capacity, but may I start by thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the support you have given to us over the past two years? I also place on record my gratitude to our intelligence community and counter-terrorism police, who are exceptional.

From a securities perspective, today’s events are disastrous. They will embolden our enemies and make us look unwilling to defend our own nation, even when attacked in this place, the mother of all Parliaments. I am relieved that the National Security Act will make it safer and easier in future to prosecute foreign spies, but I urge the Minister to reform the Treason Act so that traitors are prosecuted and face justice, put China in the enhanced tier, and support private prosecution.

It remains unclear to me why Chris Cash and Christopher Berry cannot be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. The evidence shows a clear line between those two, the United Front Work Department and the politburo—the very top of the Chinese Communist party. The information shared was prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK, and I believe it put Members at personal risk. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) was told by agency heads that the evidence was overwhelming and the case beyond doubt. Counter-terrorism police this morning agreed and said the same to me—that the evidential standard had been met at the time of charges.

My question for the Minister is simple: if officials, the security services and the police agree that the case was a slam dunk, why has the Crown Prosecution Service not been able to get it over the line? If the CPS was not confident, why, given the compelling evidence, did it not put it to a jury and test it? Whoever is responsible for this decision—whether the Director of Public Prosecutions, an official in his own Department or the Attorney General—they have weakened the defence of our country today and I am desperately sorry to see it.

I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for her remarks, and I completely understand why she has phrased them in the way that she has. Let me also join her in thanking you, Mr Speaker, for the work you have done to keep parliamentarians safe. Over the next few days, weeks, months and years, it is vital that we work together. I look forward to meeting you later on today to discuss how we can ensure that we work together to safeguard all our parliamentary colleagues.

Turning to the substance of the remarks made by the hon. Lady, I agree with her characterisation of the National Security Act. I will look very carefully at the points she made specifically with regard to treason. On her assessment of the decision that has been made, I completely understand why she has arrived at that conclusion, as will Members right across the House. In my opening remarks, I expressed my extreme disappointment at the decision that has been made. These remarks, and the judgments people are forming in the House this afternoon, will be heard by the CPS. I know that she will take every opportunity—as will the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), whom she referenced in her introductory remarks—to seek a meeting with the CPS at the earliest available opportunity to hear and better understand the decision-making process it has been through.

As I have said previously, I am not able to speculate on the reason why the CPS has taken this decision. I am extremely disappointed that it has done so, but I will do everything I can to ensure that Government are organised so that we can ensure we have the resources in the right place to stand against the threats that we face.

I have raised with the Security Minister on several occasions the fears of the Hong Kong community in Bracknell and across the country, and today is just another reminder of the long arm of the Chinese state that so worries my constituents. Given that, and given the real and genuine fears of the Hong Kong community, does the Minister agree that it is important that as we seek, rightly, to reform the immigration system—it is good to see the Migration Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Dover and Deal (Mike Tapp), in his place next to the Security Minister—we nevertheless safeguard and protect the bespoke route of the British national overseas visa, recognising the historic commitment we have to the Hong Kong community?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the work he has done to support his constituents and champion Hongkongers. Hopefully he heard my earlier remarks about the respect and admiration that we have for Hongkongers and the importance that we attach to our relationship. I completely understand the fears that have been represented by my hon. Friend and a number of his constituents; I have had a number of meetings with members of that community and will have further such meetings. I look forward to working with him and with colleagues in the Department to ensure that those from the community feel that the Government will protect them, because that is what we will always want to do.

I make the following comments as somebody who has been sanctioned and hounded by the Chinese Government all the way through the past few years. I was briefed by the security services at the beginning that this was a slam-dunk prosecution—they were clear that they had met every single requirement within the Official Secrets Act. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp) said earlier, the deputy national security adviser was very clear in his assessment of the information communicated by the two characters who were being prosecuted that at least 10 of the 34 charges that were laid were absolutely about passing secure information to the Chinese intelligence agency that would be “directly or indirectly, useful” to the Chinese state. That is very clear. It cannot, therefore, be for a lack of evidence that this has been dropped by the CPS.

The key here was the whole idea of the Official Secrets Act defining that work as against an enemy—that is the key. So why in heaven’s name did the Government not take the opportunity, when it arose after the China audit, to raise China into the upper tier, as they did with Russia, North Korea and Iran? The Minister speaks of threats, but he does not say that China is a threat; he says it is a “challenge”, which is a ludicrous position to take.

I honestly feel today that this Government have let you down, Mr Speaker—the Speaker of this Parliament—after you bravely stood for people like me to protect us against the overtures of the Chinese. They have let down Parliament. Nobody knows now whether they are safe, because these charges have been dropped. It is absolutely key, furthermore, that until we define China as what it is—a persistent threat that targets individuals, like me and others, and states—this will be a shame and a blot on our reputation as a strong state against terrorism.

I recognise that the right hon. Gentleman has, for entirely understandable reasons, a very long-standing interest in these matters, but I am afraid I do not agree with the assessment he has just offered. This Government take the threats that we face, regardless of where they come from, incredibly seriously. We will do everything that we need to do to safeguard our Parliament and our parliamentarians and to ensure that our democracy is not undermined or infiltrated by malign forces, wherever they might come from. I give the right hon. Gentleman and the House a categorical assurance that we understand that national security is the first duty of Government, and nothing—nothing—will get in the way of that.

As someone who chaired the Intelligence and Security Committee throughout its China inquiry and who criticised the previous Government’s position on China, I am sad to see that this Government do not seem to understand the importance of signals. It sends a signal to describe “Chinese challenges” but not “Chinese communist threats”. It sends a signal to allow China to build a super-embassy against the advice of the security services. It sends a signal not to put China in the top tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and it sends a signal above all to allow it to buy up increasingly important parts of our economy and national infrastructure. Can we stop sending the wrong signals?

The only signal that this Government will send is that threats to our country, wherever they come from, will not be tolerated.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his remarks, but I hope that he would acknowledge that the incidents he described, about which he rightly has concerns, were condemned by the UK Government at the time. The UK Government have been clear about the fact that we will not tolerate transnational repression on those living in the UK. FIRS falls out of the National Security Act, and he knows that we have already announced that two nations will be included on the enhanced tier. Any further decision about other nations being included will be made in due course.

The Minister euphemistically described our relationship with China as “complex”. It is not complex. It is characterised by espionage, malign behaviour and a massive trade imbalance. How is that complex, and why do this Government persist in opposing the views of their advisers and permitting—even facilitating—this massive centre for espionage close to the centre of our financial quarter?

I have a lot of time for the right hon. Gentleman, but I do not agree with what he has just said, I am afraid, nor do I agree with the characterisation he makes around the embassy. I have said to him and the House previously that national security will be the overriding priority with regard to any decision that is made independently in a quasi-judicial process led by the Secretary of State. I can again give him an assurance that when it comes to any decision about the embassy, as has been detailed in letters that the previous Foreign Secretary and I have sent, national security will absolutely be at the forefront of any consideration.

There is a very nasty smell about the collapse of this Chinese spying affair case. Just over a year ago, the Crown Prosecution Service counter-terrorism unit said after complex investigations that these were very serious allegations and that charges were brought, but now we are supposed to believe that it cannot provide any evidence whatsoever. It feels to me as if one of two things has happened here: either the Crown Prosecution Service was wrong—potentially incompetent—or someone very high up in the Government has interfered with this situation. Which is it, Minister?

When the hon. Member takes a moment to think carefully about these things, he will understand that Government Ministers should not speculate on the reasons provided for a particular decision by the Crown Prosecution Service, which is independent of Government. It would be entirely improper for any Minister to do that. I am happy to give him and any other Member who needs it an absolute assurance of how seriously we take the threats we face from a range of different malign forces around the country. This Government will ensure that we are best able, best prepared and best resourced to guard against the nature of the threat, and nothing will stop us doing that.

The Security Minister mentioned the Official Secrets Act 1911, but he will know that it was updated in 1920 and, indeed, in 1989. As one of the co-authors of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s China report, along with my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), I say to the Minister, following the comments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), that that report highlighted China as a threat, not a challenge.

There has been reference to the ISC looking at the case as it is currently looking at the data leak around the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, but the reality is that the legislation that set up the Committee—one part over 30 years ago and one part over a decade ago —is not fit for purpose. A lot of trust is invested in that Committee. Is it not time that with more power and funding going to the Intelligence and Security Committee —with even more responsibility being put on it, to be fair—it should be given more powers so that this Parliament and the people we represent know there is proper democratic parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community in this country? They are wonderful and they do a fantastic job, but they are sometimes fallible.

I am grateful to the right hon. Member for his remarks, as well as the work he has done in this area and his service on the Committee. As a former Committee member, he will understand that the Committee is fiercely independent of Government, and rightly so, but I happen to think it does an outstanding job. It is a great asset for Parliament.

As Security Minister, I will want to work incredibly closely with the Committee and co-operate with it whenever we can. It is clearly not for me to suggest particular matters that it may wish to investigate, but knowing the Chair and the deputy Chair as I do, I think it entirely likely that it may decide to look closely at this particular matter.

The Minister is clearly not happy with the CPS’s decision, and therefore the Government are not, and the House is obviously not either. Because the two suspects did not face a trial, double jeopardy does not come into play. Will the Minister undertake to explore with the Attorney General the scope for him to bring a case against those two, if not under the Official Secrets Act to test the case with a jury, then under the new legislation, which clearly would present no problem in court terms?

I certainly agree with the hon. Member in his assessment of my being not happy. The decision was communicated this morning. The points he raised were reasonable, constructive and helpful, so let me take them away and consider them with colleagues across Government.

The threat to our national security from China is real, and I share the disappointment and concern expressed. However, the Minister will also be aware that China has used entirely bogus national security charges to imprison a British citizen, Jimmy Lai, who has now been in solitary confinement for five years and whose health is deteriorating rapidly. This morning, his son Sebastien Lai asked to see the Prime Minister to press him to do more. Will the Minister reinforce that case and take every action possible to get the Chinese to release Jimmy Lai?

Jimmy Lai should be released immediately.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, published an inquiry report into transnational repression earlier this year. It welcomed the introduction of a foreign influence registration scheme but expressed concern about the absence of China on the enhanced tier. Its absence risks undermining the credibility and coherence of the scheme. Will the Minister listen to colleagues from across the House, pick up the recommendations of the report and include China on the enhanced tier?

I am grateful to the hon. Member for the work he does on the Committee. I hope that when I gave evidence to the Committee, I conveyed the seriousness and importance that we attach to matters relating to transnational repression. I am genuinely grateful to the Committee for the work it has done and the report it published. I will respond to it as soon as I am able to do so.

The Minister has repeatedly said that it is not his job to speculate on the CPS. He is right, but it is his job to defend the security of this country and therefore to ask the CPS why it has not brought charges. Has he done that? Has he rung the CPS before he came to the House to speak to it and to understand why it has not gone ahead? If not, why not?

I accept the charge the hon. Gentleman makes against me that it is my responsibility to defend our national security, and I hope he understands that that is something I take incredibly seriously. The decision was communicated this morning. This was an independent decision, but I give him and others an assurance that we will, of course, look incredibly closely at it.

In early June, the Government told me that the report regarding the inclusion of China in the enhanced tier would come forward in due course. As the Minister said in his statement, the chargé d’affaires at the Chinese embassy has now been démarched. Can the Minister outline why China has not been included in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, because if national security is the first duty of Government and nothing will get in the way of that, why are the Government dithering when it comes to formally challenging China?

We are not doing what the hon. Gentleman suggests we are. What we are seeking to do is ensure that we have all the right tools to guard against the nature of the threats that we face. We take that incredibly seriously. He knows our policy with regard to FIRS, which this Government introduced on 1 July, but no doubt we will have more to say about it in due course.

Is the alarming takeaway from this, both for this House and for any potential spy, that we are being asked to believe that the espionage in which Messrs Cash and Berry engaged is not a criminal offence? Is that where our defence of national security has got to?

The takeaway is that the CPS made an independent decision this morning, and that this Government will do everything we can to keep the country safe. That is the takeaway.

The Minister is an honourable man, but our disquiet and our constituents’ concerns run very deep. While I welcome the improved legislation in place to deal with the issue, the fact of the matter is that once again—I say this with great respect—the Government are being seen nationally as weak on criminal activity, and particularly on the action of the three defendants. When will the Government remind the world that this great nation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is a strong nation that meets our enemies face to face and on any footing? Will the Government send the message that any foreign operatives on our soil will be rooted out and will pay a price for working against this sovereign nation?

I hold the hon. Gentleman in the highest regard, so I hope that he will not mind me gently pointing out to him that I could not have been clearer in my earlier remarks about how seriously we take these issues. We will work very closely with allies and partners right around the world to ensure that we do everything we can to guard against the threats that we face.

I call Alicia Kearns on a point of order. May I just say what a pleasure it is to see you back?

Thank you, Mr Speaker. That is very kind. I shall be returning home to my four-month-old in a couple of hours.

On a point of order, Mr Speaker, Government Front Benchers are unable to answer the questions of this House regarding the decision making of the Crown Prosecution Service, so can you kindly advise how this House can scrutinise the Crown Prosecution Service and its decisions, as that is clearly the will of the House?

I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving me notice of her point of order. I believe that this is a matter for the Attorney General—who is responsible for the CPS—and as he sits in the other place, maybe we will have to use the Solicitor General as a way forward. In this case, I hope that a clear message has gone back to everybody that when we still have Members of Parliament who have sanctions, we cannot let this go in the way that seems to have been done.

Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker, I am one of the MPs who is currently sanctioned by China, and as one of the founders of the China Research Group I am one of the MPs who was spied upon here. I find it astonishing not just that this case, which was a slam dunk last year, has now been dropped, but that we are not even being told why it has been dropped. The one bright spot in this whole process has been your leadership on the issue, Mr Speaker, and in particular your decision to ban the Chinese ambassador from this building for as long as Members of this House are sanctioned. I worry that certain people will now come to you with honeyed words. How can I put on the record our thanks to you for your leadership, and also our hope that you will continue to stand strong on behalf of Members of this House?

I think you have certainly put it on the record.

I take seriously the sanctions that have been laid. My worry is that we have foreign state actors who do not believe in democracy, and democracy within this House. We must defend our democracy; we must defend Members of Parliament. I have to say a big thank you to our head of security, who has worked very hard on this. I am sure—not that they would make this judgment—that we are all disappointed with the outcome, including the Minister.