PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Policing and Crime Bill - 13 June 2016 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
Brought up, and read the First time.
Government new schedule 1—Schedule to be inserted as Schedule A3 to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.
Government new clause 30—Public records.
New clause 63—Police and Crime Commissioners: parity of funding between police and families at inquests—
“(1) A police and crime commissioner has the duties set out in this section when the police force they are responsible for is a Properly Interested Person for the purposes of—
(a) an inquest into the death of a member of an individual’s family, or
(b) an inquest into the deaths of members of a group of families,
under the Coroners Act 1988.
(2) The police and crime commissioner must make recommendations to the Secretary of State as to whether the individual’s family or the group of families at the inquest require financial support to ensure parity of legal representation between parties to the inquest.
(3) If a police and crime commissioner makes a recommendation under subsection (2) then the Secretary of State must provide financial assistance to the individual’s family or the group of families to ensure parity of funding between families and the police.
(4) The individual’s family or the group of families may use funding authorised under this section solely for the purpose of funding legal representation at the inquest.”
This new clause would put into law the principle of parity of funding between police and families at inquests. It would ensure that funding to a bereaved family, or a group of bereaved families, for purposes of legal representation during an inquest is an amount broadly equal to the level of funding that the police force receives. This new clause seeks to place an obligation on the PCC to recommend to the Home Secretary as to whether a bereaved family, or a group of bereaved families requires funding to support their legal representation at the inquest. The Home Secretary must provide such funding if it is recommended.
New clause 64—Police complaints and the media—
“(1) Subject to subsection (3), the Prime Minister must commission an independent inquiry into the operation of the police complaints system in respect of relationships between the police and media.
(2) The inquiry must include, but is not limited, to—
(a) how adequately police forces investigated complaints about police officers in dealing with people working within, or connected to, media organisations,
(b) the thoroughness of any reviews by police forces into complaints specified in subsection (a),
(c) in the cases where a complaint in subsection (a) led to a criminal investigation, the conduct of prosecuting authorities in investigating the allegation,
(d) the extent to which police officers took illegal payment to suppress investigations of complaints of relationships between police officers and people working within, or connected to, media organisations,
(e) the implications of subsections (a) to (d) for the relationships between media organisations and the police, prosecuting authorities, and relevant regulatory bodies, and recommended actions.
(3) The inquiry can only commence once the Secretary of State is satisfied that it would not prejudice any ongoing relevant legal cases.”
This new clause would compel the Prime Minister to instigate an independent inquiry such as Leveson 2 into the relationships between the press and police and the extent to which that has operated in the public interest.
New clause 65—IPCC functions following complaints about the police’s handling of an event which has led to large scale loss of life—
“(1) The Independent Police Complaints Commission (the ‘Commission’) shall undertake the functions set out in subsection (3) to (5) when—
(a) there has been an event which has led to large scale loss of life, and
(b) the conditions in subsection (2) have been met.
(2) Subsection (1) applies when, for that event—
(a) the Commission has received complaints of a serious nature about the actions of the police either before, during or in response to the event, or as part of a police investigation into the event,
(b) the Commission has been asked to undertake such action by fifty per cent plus one or more of the total of—
(i) representatives of those deceased due to the event, and
(ii) any injured survivors of the event.
(3) The Commission shall report to the individuals identified in section 2(b) during any police investigation into the disaster regarding the progress of the investigation, and how the individuals identified in section 2(b) can assist with it, including, if there are no lawyers representing the individuals identified in section 2(b), the implications of engaging lawyers at that stage.
(4) Following a further request to the Commission by fifty percent plus one or more of the representatives of those deceased due to the event, the Commission shall set up a panel (the “Commission’s Panel“) which shall register as a data controller under the Data Protection Act 1998 and review all documentation relating to the event, the deceased and the representatives and report thereon.
(5) In establishing the Commission’s Panel under subsection (4), the Commission must consult the individuals identified in subsection 2(b).
(6) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report in subsection (4) before Parliament.
(7) While a review under subsection (4) is in progress, the Commission’s Panel must report to the individuals identified in section 2(b) every three months on the progress of the review.”
Government amendments 85, 22 to 30, 86, 87 and 31.
Amendment 126, in clause 27, page 42, line 38, leave out from “(a)” to end of subsection, and insert—
“(iii) but the period between the allegation first coming to the attention of a person mentioned in paragraph (a) and any initiation of disciplinary proceedings does not exceed the period specified in the regulations.
(3A) The regulations under this section must specify that there is no maximum period time after which historic allegation of misconduct cannot be investigated for cases which meet the following conditions—
(a) the case involves allegations of gross misconduct,
(b) the case is certified by the Secretary of State to be liable to lead to serious loss of confidence in the police service and the Secretary of State determines that investigating and, if appropriate, hearing the case is necessary and proportionate.
(3AA) The provisions of this section apply where the alleged misconduct, inefficiency or ineffectiveness took place prior to this Act coming into force.
(3AB) Regulations under this section must include sanctions for disciplinary proceedings in respect of a person defined under subsection (3A).”
This amendment would provide for disciplinary proceedings to take place a specified period after the allegation first comes to light, instead of a limit based on when the person concerned left a police force. It would also provide for this time period to be extended in cases of serious misconduct. It would also allow for proceedings to apply to retrospective cases and provides for sanctions for disciplinary proceedings.
Amendment 127, in clause 31, page 48, line 24, after “the”, insert “Independent”.
This amendment would retain the word “Independent” in the Office for Police Conduct (the new title for the current Independent Police Complaints Commission).
Amendment 128, page 48, line 28, after “The”, insert “Independent”.
Please see explanatory statement for Amendment 127.
Amendment 129, page 48, line 33, after “the”, insert “Independent”.
Please see explanatory statement for Amendment 127.
Amendment 131, page 49, line 6, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) In subsection leave out “chairman of the Commission, or as another member of the Commission” and insert “Director General, or as another member of the Office”.
This amendment would ensure that both the Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and any member of the Office, must not have held any of the roles set out in Section 9(3) of the Police Reform Act 2002.
Amendment 130, page 49, line 14, after “the”, insert “Independent”.
Please see explanatory statement for Amendment 127.
Government amendments 32 to 61, 88, 63 to 84 and 14 to 17.
Government new clause 49—Retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles: PACE.
Government new clause 50—Retention of fingerprints and DNA profiles: Terrorism Act 2000.
Government new clause 51—Extension of cross-border powers of arrest: urgent cases.
Government new clause 52—Cross-border enforcement: powers of entry to effect arrest.
Government new clause 53—Cross-border enforcement: minor and consequential amendments.
New clause 12—Deaths in custody: mental health—
“(1) Section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 1(2)(c), at end insert ‘other than while deprived of their liberty under Schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005.’”
New clause 22—Surrender of travel documentation—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person is arrested under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or under article 26 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I.12) S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I.12), in respect of an offence mentioned in section 41(1) or (2) of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008,
(b) the person is released without charge and on bail under Part 4 of the 1984 Act or (as the case may be) Part 5 of the 1989 Order, and
(c) the release on bail is subject to a travel restriction condition.
(2) If police are satisfied that a person is in possession of travel documents, as a pre-condition of release from custody, the person must surrender their travel documentation.”
This amendment would require terrorist suspects to surrender passports and any other travel documentation as a condition of release from custody.
New clause 23—Powers to require removal of disguises—
“(1) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended as follows.
(2) Omit section 60AA (Powers to require removal of disguises) and insert—
‘Section 60AA Powers to require removal of disguises.’
(1) Where a constable in uniform reasonably believes that an offence has been, or is being, committed he may—
(a) require any person to remove any item which the constable reasonably believes that person is wearing wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his identity;
(b) seize any item which the constable reasonably believes any person intends to wear wholly or mainly for that purpose.
(2) A person who fails to remove an item worn by him or her when required to do so by a constable in the exercise of his power under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month or to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or to both.
(3) The powers conferred by this section are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any power otherwise conferred.
(4) This section does not extend to Scotland.’”
This new clause would remove the requirement for prior authorisation in existing section 60AA so that where a constable reasonably believes that an offence has been, or is being, committed they may require the removal of items where they are used wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing identity.
New clause 24—Access to Independent Mental Health Advocates—
“(1) A person detained in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to an independent mental health advocate (see section 130A of the Mental Health Act 1983).”
This new clause would extend the right to an independent mental health advocate to those detained under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 25—Child sexual exploitation: duty to share information—
“The local policing body that maintains a police force shall have a duty to disclose information about children who are victims of sexual exploitation or other forms of abuse to relevant child mental health service commissioners in England and Wales.”
This new clause would place a duty on local police forces to store information with their local commissioners of child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) to improve local commissioning of mental health support for victims of child sexual exploitation.
New clause 26—Detention under the Mental Health Act 1983: training—
“(1) The chief police officer of every police force must ensure that provision is made for training police officers in the exercise the powers granted to them by sections 136 and 137 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(2) The training provided under subsection (1) must include material on—
(a) diversity and equality, and
(b) cultural issues that police officers should be aware of when exercising power under the Mental Health Act 1983.
(3) The chief police officer of each police force must make an annual report to the Home Secretary on the provision they have made to comply with the requirements of this section.”
This new clause would require each police force to provide its officers with training on how to exercise power under the Mental Health Act, with particular reference to diversity issues.
New clause 29—Access to legal advice—
“(1) A person detained against their will in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to ask for and receive independent legal advice.”
This new Clause would ensure the individual detained under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act has access to legal advice.
New clause 40—Disallowing use of tasers on psychiatric wards—
“A police officer may not use a taser or electroshock weapon during a deployment on a psychiatric ward.”
This new clause would prohibit the use of tasers by police officers on psychiatric wards.
New clause 42—Deployment of police officers on psychiatric wards: reporting—
“(1) Any incident of police officers being deployed on a psychiatric ward must be reported to the Home Secretary by the chief police officer of the relevant force within one week of the incident.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must contain the following information—
(a) the nature of the incident,
(b) the number of police officers who were deployed,
(c) the actions taken by the officers during their deployment, and
(d) the outcome of the incident.”
This new clause would require the Home Secretary to be notified whenever police officers are deployed on psychiatric wards.
New clause 43—Use of tasers on psychiatric wards: reporting—
“(1) Any incident of a police officer using a taser during a deployment on a psychiatric ward must be reported to the Home Secretary by the chief police officer of the relevant force within one week of the incident.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must contain the following information—
(a) the reason for the use of the taser,
(b) the action taken following the use of the taser, and
(c) the process that will be followed for reviewing the incident.”
This new clause would require the Home Secretary to be notified whenever a police officer uses a taser on a psychiatric ward.
New clause 45—Child sexual exploitation: assessment of needs for therapeutic support—
“(1) Where the police or a local authority have a reasonable belief that a child has been sexually exploited or subject to other forms of child abuse, the police or local authority must refer the child to a named mental health service.
(2) The named mental health service must conduct an assessment of the child’s needs and where appropriate make necessary arrangements for the child’s treatment or care.
(3) The Secretary of State must by regulations—
(a) define ‘named mental health service’ for the purpose of this section;
(b) specify a minimum level of “necessary arrangements” for the purpose of the section.”
This new clause would place a duty on the police or local authority to ensure that children who are believed to have experienced sexual abuse or exploitation are referred to an appropriate mental health service for assessment and appropriate support.
New clause 58—Prohibition on using a person’s home as a place of safety—
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 136, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) If a person appears to a constable to be suffering from mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care or control, the constable may, if he thinks it necessary to do so in the interests of that person or for the protection of other persons—
(a) remove the person to a place of safety within the meaning of section 135, or
(b) if the person is already at a place of safety within the meaning of that section, keep the person at that place or remove the person to another place of safety.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, a suitable place as defined by section 135(6) shall not include a house, flat or room where a person is living.””
This amendment would prevent a person’s home from being used as places of safety for the purposes of section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
New clause 59—Detention under the Mental Health Act 1983: Access to an appropriate adult—
“(1) A person detained in a place of safety under section 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 shall have the right to an appropriate adult.
(2) For the purposes of subsection 1, ‘appropriate adult’ means:
(a) a relative, guardian or other person responsible for the detained person’s care;
(b) someone experienced in dealing with mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable people but who is not a police officer or employed by the police; or
(c) some other responsible adult aged 18 or over who is not a police officer or employed by the police.”
This new clause would extend the right to an appropriate adult to those detained under sections 135 or 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Government new schedule 2—Cross-border enforcement: minor and consequential amendments.
Government amendments 89 to 95.
Amendment 123, in clause 75, page 92, line 1, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) In section 135 (warrant to search for and remove patients), leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) Subject to section 136A, in this section “place of safety” means residential accommodation provided by a local social services authority under Part III of the National Assistance Act 1948, a hospital as defined by this Act, an independent hospital or care home for mentally disordered persons or any other suitable place.””
This amendment is consequential to amendment 124.
Amendment 124, page 92, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) After section 136 insert—
‘136A Prohibition on using police stations as places of safety
(1) A person may not, in the exercise of a power to which this section applies, be removed to, kept at or taken to a police station as a place of safety.
(2) The powers to which this section applies are—
(a) the power to remove a person to a place of safety under a warrant issued under section 135(1);
(b) the power to take a person to a place of safety under section 135(3A);
(c) the power to remove a person to, or to keep a person at, a place of safety under section 136(1);
(d) the power to take a person to a place of safety under section 136(3).
(3) In this section “person” means a person of any age.’”
This amendment would prevent a police station from being used as a place of safety for the purposes of sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Amendment 125, in clause 76, page 93, line 25, leave out sub paragraph (i) and insert—
“(i) In a case where the person is removed to a place of safety, the time when the constable takes that person into custody (within the meaning of section 137 of the Mental Health Act 1983) in order to remove them to that place.”
This amendment would meant that the period of detention started at the point a person was detained rather than the time they arrived at a place of safety.
Government amendments 96 to 106, 109, 110, 117 and 118.
New clause 66—Guidance: unattributable briefings—
“(1) The College of Policing shall issue a code of practice relating to police-media relations.
(2) This code should set out clear guidance to ensure that all police media communications are reportable, quotable and attributable unless in exceptional circumstances.
(3) The code of practice shall be issued in line with requirements of section 39A of the Police Act 1996.”
This new clause would require The College of Policing to issue a code of practice relating to police-media relations. The aim of this clause is to ensure that all police media communications should be reportable, quotable and attributable unless in exceptional circumstances.
It is our intention to introduce a robust and independent inspection regime for fire and rescue authorities in England. New clause 48 and new schedule 1 will support that objective by strengthening the inspection framework currently provided for in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. The amendments provide for the appointment of a chief fire and rescue inspector, who will be required to prepare a programme for the inspection of fire and rescue services. The Secretary of State will have the power to require inspections outside the published programme if necessary.
Fire and rescue inspectors will be required to produce reports on their inspections, and the chief inspector will make an annual report to Parliament—something that does not currently take place. We will enable fire inspectors to carry out joint inspections with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary. That will be particularly important where police and crime commissioners and metro mayors take on the responsibilities of fire and rescue authorities.
Finally, these provisions will ensure that inspectors have access to the information they need to undertake a rigorous and independent examination of fire and rescue authorities and the persons employed by them. That means that no door will be locked and all information will be available to the inspector.
Although we believe that the vast majority of inspections will be undertaken by consent, we need to be alert to the fact that additional powers might be needed. If inspectors do not feel that they are getting the access that they deserve and need to produce reports, they will have the power to ask for such things. These amendments will help fire and rescue authorities be more transparent and more accountable.
We have gone from the fire services inspectorate to the National Audit Office and then to nothing, and we are now going back to the fire services inspectorate. Has the Minister taken into account, for example, the United Kingdom Accreditation Service, which could give external advice to the new inspectorate, very much along the lines suggested by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill)? Will the new chief inspector also be the national adviser for fire? I would be grateful if the Minister explained a little of the background.
This proposal is separate, which is why we have put the new inspector alongside Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary. They will tell us exactly what expertise they require. As ex-firefighters, the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) and I can assume what they will need to look at, but I accept that some fire and rescues services will need to draw on financial expertise from other areas.
This is a really positive move for the fire service, and the chiefs have welcomed it. They have been supportive in the meetings that I have had with them. I am not sure whether they all support the proposal, because the ones who do not support it might not have been banging on my door quite as hard as the ones who do. Naturally, I will come back to the issue in responding to the debate if we have time.
I will touch briefly on DNA and fingerprint retention, which is an extremely important and sensitive topic. New clauses 49 and 50 will help the prevention and detection of crime by enabling DNA profiles and fingerprints to be retained on the basis of convictions outside England and Wales, in the same way as the material could be used if the offence had taken place in England and Wales. We are trying to protect the public. The measures, which have been requested, will apply specifically to offences committed outside England and Wales that would be offences in England and Wales. The amendments made by new clauses 40 and 50 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 will enhance the effectiveness of the national DNA and fingerprint databases and help our police keep us safe, which we all want, especially in the light of the heightened threat.
New clauses 51, 52 and 53 and new schedule 2 will strengthen the existing cross-border powers of arrest provided for in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and appear to be supported across the House.
I want to listen to the shadow Home Secretary’s comments, so I will touch only briefly on the new clauses that he has tabled, which we have discussed together with the shadow Policing Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey). I know that the Home Secretary, too, has discussed them with the shadow Home Secretary. It may assist the House if I say a few words about them now. As I said earlier, we welcome the constructive approach from the Opposition, and in particular from the Hillsborough families and the campaign group. We would not be discussing these issues now without their bravery, for which I praise them. The work carries on; it will not stop, whatever happens today.
We recognise the strength of feeling on these issues, and particularly the public concern to ensure that police officers who commit the most serious acts of wrongdoing can be held to account for their actions, no matter when they come to light. We are talking here not about criminal actions, for which criminal proceedings can be brought against individuals, but about disciplinary action against a police officer.
Having looked carefully at the new clauses tabled by the shadow Home Secretary, and following discussions that I have had with the shadow Policing Minister, we will table an amendment in the House of Lords to allow, in exceptional circumstances, an unlimited extension of the 12-month time limit that we propose in the Bill. It is understood that that does not apply to every offence. We will work with the shadow Home Secretary and his team—and, I hope, the Hillsborough families and Bishop James—on the drafting of the relevant regulations so that we can make sure that they do what it says on the tin. We will keep the 12-month rule, but in exceptional circumstances, based on regulations, we will be able to look at historical cases—not criminal cases—and take action against a former police officer. The 12-month time limit will remain, but we will work on the regulations. That is a significant move on our part.
The measure will apply to police officers serving with a police force at the point at which the provisions come into force. In line with established principles, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to apply such a provision retrospectively. However, this is a significant move so that, as the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Steve Rotheram) suggests, families will have further protection in future.
On new clause 66, which is about the police and the media, I assure the House that the consultation that is going on with the College of Policing, which we have discussed with the shadow ministerial team, is actively looking at the guidance on the issue. I am not going to predict exactly what the college will come forward with, but it would not be actively looking at the issue if it was not there, and we will wait for the college to come forward.
Whatever happens in the House this afternoon—I do not know whether Her Majesty’s Opposition will divide the House on the issue, but we will wait and see—the matter will not stop there. We will still work with Bishop James and wait for the report, before going forward depending on the will of the House.
On new clause 64, which is about Leveson part 2, the Government have made it clear on many occasions—not least at the Dispatch Box—that we will wait for the criminal proceedings that are still ongoing to come to a conclusion, and then the Home Secretary will move forward.
I have tried to highlight some of the issues involved in these amendments. There are a lot of other proposals that we can discuss this afternoon, but I wanted to set out the Government’s position on some of the Opposition’s new clauses and on some of the amendments and new clauses that I have tabled.
However, the Bill presents an opportunity to do much more to improve police accountability, and that is an opportunity that we in the House now need to grab. Today, I want to present a package of proposals that respond to the historic verdict of the Hillsborough inquest, which finally concluded, after 27 years, that, as the families had known from day one, the loss of their loved ones was not an accident and they had been unlawfully killed, but that that fact had been covered up for all those years.
This package seeks to rebalance this country and to make it fairer. It seeks to rebalance it away from the establishment and in favour of ordinary families. It is a package that will stand as a permanent tribute to the dignity and determination of the Hillsborough families. Knowing them as I do, they would want nothing more than that no other family in the future should go through what they have gone through.
Let me take the House briefly through this package of proposals. New clause 63 would give bereaved families equal funding for legal representation at inquests where the police are involved. It seeks to establish the crucial principle that there should be parity between the two sides. The reason that is important is that it says very clearly that the public interest lies in finding the truth. That is how public resources should be directed: they should not be directed towards creating an unbalanced contest at an inquest, with public money used to protect vested interests in the public sector.
Amendment 126 seeks to close the long-standing loophole of retirement being used by police officers as a route to evade misconduct proceedings. New clause 64 seeks to hold the Government to their promise to the victims of press intrusion to hold a second-stage inquiry looking at the culture of relations between police and the press. New clause 66 seeks to legislate for a code of practice with regard to the media relations policy of each police force, and to spell out that attributable briefing by police forces, which was so damaging in the case of Hillsborough, is not permitted unless it is in the most exceptional circumstances. Amendments 127 and 128 seek to strengthen the Independent Police Complaints Commission. New clause 67, which will be considered later, seeks to strengthen the offence of misconduct in public office.
Let me start with the area where there is greatest consensus—police misconduct. I listened carefully to what the Minister said, and I am grateful for the movement that he indicated to the shadow Policing Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), in Committee whereby there should not merely be an arbitrary 12-month period after retirement, because, as we know, police wrongdoing may come to light much later. We are glad that the Government have indicated that they are prepared to move on this matter in the other place and table an amendment to that effect. While I will not press my amendment to a vote, I would still like to press the Minister a little further on this point. He is saying that this should be applied only in the most exceptional circumstances, but that potentially rules out many people who might be guilty of gross misconduct but would not be caught by his “exceptional” test. He needs to reassure the House on this point.
If we can agree to move forward on that basis, that is a considerable example of progress that matters greatly to the Hillsborough families, who, as they were continuing their 27-year struggle, felt very aggrieved when they saw individuals who had retired on a full pension and who they felt were beyond reach and could not be held to account. I believe that this should apply retrospectively. Misconduct is misconduct whenever it occurred, and people should be held to account for their actions.
The issue of police-press relations is the biggest area of unfinished business, although, in fact, we have not even really started to make any changes with respect to putting right the wrongs of Hillsborough. As we know, the briefing of the press in those first days after the tragedy caused incalculable harm and damage, not just to the families who had lost loved ones, but to the thousands of people, such as my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton, who had returned from the match in a state of trauma, only to read a couple of days later that the police were blaming them for the deaths of their friends and family.
That is why feelings are so strong, not just in Merseyside but across the country. It simply cannot be right that a police force is able, unattributably, to brief malicious and unproven information to a newspaper. We need a stronger and more transparent regime for press relations, so that false impressions cannot be put out there with the intention of setting a narrative about a particular incident. Families who are fighting for justice often find that it is very difficult to overturn the false version of events. That was certainly the case for the Hillsborough families.
New clause 64 invites the House to reinforce the promise made by the Prime Minister to the victims of press intrusion. Let me go back to what the Prime Minister said in November 2012:
the Leveson inquiry—
He also said:
It has been put to me that that promise was made face to face with some of the victims of hacking and press intrusion—people such as the McCanns and Milly Dowler’s family. It seems to Labour Members as though the Government have subtly shifted their position in the intervening years. As we heard a moment ago from the Minister, it is no longer a question of when the inquiry will go ahead; it is a question of whether it will go ahead. The Government now say that following the conclusion of the outstanding investigations on the matter, they will take a decision on whether the second stage of the inquiry will go ahead.
That is true of other events as well. We remember the way in which the media were manipulated in the case of the Shrewsbury 24, for example. There have been many examples of this over time. Indeed, part 1 of the Leveson inquiry found unhealthy links between senior Met officers and newspaper executives, which led to the resignation of the then Met police chief and others. The issue cannot be left there. Public officials and police officers have also been convicted of offences related to these matters.
The Minister really needs to provide an explicit answer on this specific point today. He cannot wriggle out of this commitment. It is not the kind of commitment you can wriggle out of, given everything that those people have been through. A promise should be a promise, when it is made to people who have suffered in the way that many of the victims of press intrusion have suffered. I know that the Hillsborough families feel exactly the same. They were the victims of the biggest example of inappropriate police briefing of newspapers—and it was not just one newspaper. People think it was just one newspaper that reported the lies, but many of them reported the lies that were given to Whites news agency in Sheffield, and those lies went round the world. Only this week, I had an email from someone in the United States saying that they were astonished to find out the truth when they watched the recent BBC2 documentary on Hillsborough, and that for 27 years they had thought that the events were the result of hooliganism. It is impossible to exaggerate the harm that those lies caused.
I say to the Minister tonight that we need a better answer. If he were to stand up now at the Dispatch Box and say clearly to the House that there will be a second-stage inquiry into the culture of relations between the police and the press, I would be the first to say that we would not press our new clause 64 to a vote. However, there is growing suspicion among organisations—Hacked Off, obviously, but others too—and campaigners for justice that they are slowly being let down and that this matter is being slowly slid into the long grass. We have had anonymous briefings from people close to the Culture Secretary and others in Government to suggest that it has already been canned. Well, we on the Labour Benches are not prepared to accept that, so I say clearly to the Minister that unless he can provide a much more direct reassurance, we will push the matter to a vote this evening to force the Prime Minister to honour his own promise—it is not our promise; it is his promise—to the victims of press intrusion and hacking.
The Minister makes a fair point that there are ongoing investigations. I take his point that some of the investigations will have a material impact on issues that we are considering. We are not saying that we want the inquiry to start right now. We accept that there are matters to be concluded in the courts before it can proceed. What we are after is the removal of any doubt that it will proceed at the appropriate moment and that the promise the Prime Minister gave to those victims will be honoured. That is what we are seeking to establish tonight. That is what we are asking the Minister to lay down very clearly.
This goes beyond party politics. The victims and their families have suffered enough, and Members on both sides of the House owe it to them to make good on the promise that was given to them. That is why I look forward to Members from both sides of the House joining us in the Lobby tonight, because it clearly looks as though the Government are not going to give way.
Finally, let me turn to our new clause 63 on parity. The new clause seeks to establish the principle of parity of legal funding for bereaved families at inquests involving the police. In introducing it, I want to say that it is very important that people do not see Hillsborough as a one-off belonging to a bygone era. To be honest, many bereaved families still face a very similar experience when they go to an inquest. They often find themselves pitched into an adversarial and aggressive courtroom when they are still raw with grief. They are unable to match the spending of the police or the public sector in what they spend on their own legal representation. Those families find their lives picked apart. They are made to look like they are perpetrators, not victims. That is a very common experience. Many people who suffer it do not have the huge support that the Hillsborough families had. They are ordinary families battling away on their own, with no one else coming to support them. That is why the principle of parity is so tremendously important.
Public money should pay to establish the truth. That means that there should be parity between the two sides in that process. It should not be the case that the public sector packs a courtroom with highly paid QCs. That is such an important principle to establish coming out of Hillsborough—to be honest, if there is to be one lasting legacy from Hillsborough, that should be it. I was tempted by the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) to make this point before. The Hillsborough families were represented by Michael Mansfield at the recent inquest. If that had been the case back in 1990, there is no chance on God’s earth that the cruel and inhumane 3.15 pm cut-off time would have been allowed to stand. Have we ever had a situation in this country before where bereaved families have been told that they cannot have information about what happened to their loved ones in their dying minutes? That was the case here. Have we ever had a situation before where only after 27 years are families finally told who gave their loved ones the kiss of life and carried them over the pitch? What an affront to natural justice that is. Yet it was allowed to stand, because those families did not have someone who could challenge it.
A few weeks ago, Margaret Aspinall, chair of the Hillsborough Family Support Group, came to Parliament to deliver a very personal reflection on what it was like all those years ago. I am very grateful to all right hon. and hon. Members who attended; I am sure they will agree that it was an intensely moving occasion. Margaret described the indescribable pain and hurt she felt when she was sent a cheque of just over £1,000, which was supposedly compensation for the life of her son James. She said she had to put it towards the legal fund that the group was asking members to contribute to. In itself that was not enough because she had the cost of travelling to the inquest in Sheffield every day. She was living on the breadline and having to borrow money from her family and her mum to make it all work. How can it be right that families in such circumstances, who have not done anything wrong, find themselves in that situation? It cannot be right that they should be scrimping, saving and doing all those things, when taxpayers’ money is being paid for the other side to do them down.
In people’s experiences today we can see parallels with those of the Hillsborough families. To give a current example, a young boy, Zane Gbangbola, died in 2014 in the floods in his home in Surrey. The family contest that hydrogen cyanide was brought into the house from a former landfill site that had not been properly sealed. It is a high-profile case, yet the family have been turned down three times for legal aid. This ordinary family were just going about their business, and all of a sudden their son is dead and Mr Gbangbola is permanently in a wheelchair. The inquest starts today, and the only reason that the family have quality legal representation is because they were given an anonymous £25,000 donation on Friday. That cannot possibly be right.
It is not just the cost but how people are questioned that is gross and unjust. I will give one final example to illustrate. The House will know that, after a long fight by her family, an inquest was recently held into the death of Cheryl James, who died at the Deepcut barracks in Surrey. The QC acting for Surrey police was the same Mr John Beggs. I know, from speaking to Cheryl’s father, that the family were deeply hurt by an intrusive and aggressive line of questioning that focused on several very personal questions. They were particularly hurt by one untrue allegation levelled at them. According to Mr Beggs, Mr James, in making inquiries to Surrey police, had distracted the latter from the Milly Dowler investigation. Can Members imagine how he felt when he heard that? In trying to get to the truth about what happened to his daughter, he found himself the subject of an outrageous, appalling slur, which the Dowler family, such is their decency, stepped in to correct.
It should not be like this. It must not be like this. It is well known that police forces are instructed to hire this individual if they feel in a tight spot, and they pay huge amounts of public money to do so. It should not be allowed to carry on. We should call time on it today.
To finish, we are seeking to establish a simple principle. In the words of Mr James, this is about “parity of arms”—if it has to be like that. If there is to be an adversarial battle in the courtroom, we should at least give bereaved families the same ability as the public sector to defend themselves. That is an unanswerable principle, and I am sorry the Government have decided they cannot support it tonight. I know they are saying they are waiting for the conclusion of Bishop James’s report, but this is bigger than Hillsborough—it is very much evident in Hillsborough, but it is much bigger—and concerns a number of families facing a similar injustice today.
Is it not the case that public money should fund the establishment of the truth and, in particular, help people to get to the truth at the first time of asking, so that the truth can be used by public bodies to learn—to look at where they went wrong and see how they can improve? Instead, they do the opposite. They go into those courtrooms to defend themselves and reputations, spending large amounts of taxpayers’ money in doing so. I hope that the Government would agree with the spirit of what I am saying tonight. If they do, I would hope for a clear commitment this evening that they support the aim of parity of funding for families at inquests. From there, I hope we might be able to move forward. From what I can gather, however, the Government have not done enough, and unless the Minister is able to provide this level of reassurance, we will press the new clause to a vote.
I do not know the Silk—I have never met him—to whom he twice referred and accused of unattractive conduct. That Silk was speaking on instructions, and I assume that, in line with the traditions and professional standards of the Bar, he did not set out deliberately to attack people. He was acting for the two relevant public authorities on the two separate occasions. It was his duty to put the cases for those clients. The cases might well have been unattractive and might well have come across as deeply upsetting to the people who were cross-examined, but it was his professional duty to act in that way. Another barrister might have done it differently or another client might have given different instructions, but it is a bit mean, if I may say so, to call out a particular barrister here in the House of Commons.
In the short time available I want to speak to new clause 23, which removes the requirement for prior authorisation in section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, so that
“Where a constable…reasonably believes that an offence has been, or is being, committed he may…require any person to remove any item”
when it is used
“wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing identity”.
The context in which I tabled the new clause—with about 22 other right hon. and hon. Members—goes back, as I said, to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Section 60 states:
“If a police officer of or above the rank of inspector reasonably believes…that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any locality in his police area, and that it is expedient to give an authorisation under this section to prevent their occurrence, or…that persons are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons in any locality in his police area without good reason, he may give an authorisation that the powers conferred by this section are to be exercisable at any place within that locality for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours.”
That section gave the police a geographically limited and time-limited power to do certain things. That was extended in 2001 by the addition of section 60AA, which gave the police a power, in that geographical area and for that limited time, to require the removal of disguises. Provided that there was prior authorisation, provided that that authorisation was written, and provided that it was for 24 hours unless extended by another officer for a further 24 hours, within that limited location, the constable in uniform was enabled to
“require any person to remove any item which the constable reasonably believes that person is wearing wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing his identity”
and to
“seize any item which the constable reasonably believes any person intends to wear wholly or mainly for that purpose.”
So it was not until 2001 that the 1994 Act was amended to allow the police, in certain limited circumstances, to be authorised to deal with disguises.
As the House will recall, in August 2011 there were widespread riots throughout the country, following which the Government issued a consultation paper to consider whether three things needed to be looked at: the use of the word “insulting” in the 1994 Act, new powers to request the removal of face coverings, and new powers to impose curfews. The Government thought it appropriate to consult about new powers relating to such matters as disguises, saying:
“The…consultation aims to progress the commitment made by the Prime Minister following the recent disorder in respect of new powers to request the removal of face coverings. After the ransacking and arson by looters wearing masks to conceal identification, the Government announced that the police would be given extended powers to demand the removal of face coverings under any circumstances, where there was reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
Interestingly, the Government did not respond to the consultation other than in relation to “insulting words or behaviour”; the law was amended in that regard. In respect of the power to require the removal of face coverings, the law remains as it was in 2001. As I have said, that power is geographically limited and time-limited, and requires prior authorisation.
I have had the benefit of two meetings with my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims, who generously allowed me, and two of my hon. Friends, to try to persuade him that the law needed to be changed. On that occasion there were only eight officials in the room, but he seemed to be unpersuaded, on the basis of the advice that he had been given by officials and police officers, that a change in the law was necessary. Indeed, I think it was suggested to me that our new clause would weaken the powers of the police to remove disguises.
We need to recognise that the people who attend demonstrations wearing balaclavas or other face coverings are not doing that simply to prevent their identities from being discovered. Clearly, if a demonstration involves unlawful activity and the police are able to film it, or it is covered by local authority CCTV cameras, there is no better way for people to avoid detection, or avoid being caught, than disguising their faces. In most, although not all, criminal cases, the identity of the perpetrator is a fairly central part of the prosecution case. I am reasonably sure that in the olden days when robbers used to run into banks with shotguns and hold them up, normally wearing stockings over their faces, they were not wearing silk stockings on their heads because they liked the feeling of silk on their faces; they were wearing those silk stockings—or even tights, in which case it would be nylon on their faces—in order to prevent themselves from being discovered.
The same thing, I suspect, goes for people who are intent on pretty unattractive behaviour in the streets here in London, and in Manchester at last year’s Conservative party conference, where people in masks spat at delegates going into the conference hall, but they also do it to intimidate. There is nothing more intimidating than seeing somebody covered like that coming at you or demonstrating with a view to causing trouble. Yes, of course, there are laws already on the statute book or, no doubt, under common law which make it possible for a police officer to arrest somebody wearing a face mask if they are committing an offence. But in the event that there is a large-scale demonstration and there are not enough police officers to make it safe or practical for the police officer to go in, and therefore the police need to rely upon video evidence or film evidence of the perpetrator, it strikes me as unreal for a police officer to rely upon the existing power, which is geographically limited and time-limited, in order to deal with the matter.
The Government did not reply to their own consultation in 2011, and I do need to press them a little harder to ensure that this matter is properly ventilated. One of my jobs as a Member of Parliament is to express the concerns of the public from my constituency, and from other parts of the country as well, who are dissatisfied about the level of policing for this sort of behaviour.
Football is very important to people in Scotland, as the right hon. Gentleman will understand; every weekend we send more people to football games per head of population than anywhere else in the UK does. Everybody in Scotland can understand the fear of their loved ones not returning from watching what is just a game of football; we had the Ibrox disaster in 1971 and there is still a scar deep in the Scottish consciousness. We are completely committed in principle to helping the right hon. Gentleman with whatever he needs to try to get justice for those people. Unfortunately, the police system in Scotland is devolved so we are perhaps not able to offer any support this evening, other than in principle, but I would like to place that on the record, and wish him and his colleagues all the best in the fight for justice.
New clause 26 would place an obligation on chief constables to ensure that their police officers were properly trained in diversity and equality in relation to mental health issues, and specifically issues that relate to ethnic minorities. I have worked closely with Black Mental Health UK over the past five years, and it has raised concerns directly with the Home Office and Members for a number of years. I want to read out a paragraph from its briefing. It states:
“The joint Home Office and Department of Health review of sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 acknowledged that ‘in particular Black African Caribbean men—are disproportionately over-represented in S136 detentions compared to the general population’ and that ‘Black African Caribbean men in particular reported that the use of force was more likely to be used against them by the police.’”
These are legitimate and real concerns, they have been subject to academic research and they need to be addressed.
Nearly three years ago, the Home Secretary co-hosted a fantastic conference at the QEII Centre with Black Mental Health UK, and my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims spoke at it. Great strides are being made, but we need to ensure that further progress happens in the months and years ahead. New clause 26 would therefore require chief police officers to make an annual report to the Home Secretary on what progress has been made in relation to diversity and equality training. I will not push it to a vote tonight, as I have had assurances from Ministers that the matter will be looked at seriously.
I said that I would try to speak for only five minutes, but I might have to stray a little bit over that, Madam Deputy Speaker.
New clause 29 relates to access to legal advice before someone is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. I know that the Opposition have tabled new clause 24, on advocacy, but mine is a probing new clause. The removal of someone’s liberty should never happen lightly. Again, there is great concern among the African-Caribbean community and Black Mental Health UK that a young black male is more likely than other people to have their liberty removed. New clause 29 is a genuine request to address a genuine concern, but I am not sure whether it is deliverable.
At the point of sectioning, the situation is almost always highly stressed. The needs of the individual who is ill should be central to that sectioning. There is very real concern about this situation. I am interested in the Opposition’s new clause 24 in relation to advocacy. Advocacy is often talked about but has not been delivered in the way that it should be. Again, my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench are aware of that issue.
New clauses 42 and 43 relate to the deployment of police officers on wards and the use of Tasers. I am well aware that the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) will be speaking to new clause 40 on Tasers. I cannot be absolutist in my approach. I know that Black Mental Health UK never wants to see police officers used on mental health wards, and I share that view, but there will always be occasions where that possibility remains. When police officers are deployed to mental health wards, there should be an almost immediate notification to the police and crime commissioner and the Independent Police Complaints Commission that that deployment has taken place. I know that Home Office Ministers are working closely with the Department of Health on collating better statistics about the use of force and restraint, but we cannot wait 365 days before receiving that information. When police are deployed on mental health wards, that information needs to be made available immediately. Again I have received assurances from Ministers that work will be done on that matter. I know that time is short, but when the Minister sums up, I hope that he will again reassure me and Matilda MacAttram that that work will be done.
Finally, I turn to the use of Tasers on mental health wards. The right hon. Member for North Norfolk will argue, with great justification and passion, that Tasers should never be used on mental health wards. My heart is with him, but my head says that there may be some highly charged situations where a Taser needs to be used. Right now, we know that Tasers are being used, but we are not collating or collecting the information, and there is no way for the House to know what is going on, or for concerned individuals to find out what is going on. When a Taser is used—I hope that they will never be used—a report needs to be made within a week to the police and crime commissioner and the IPCC. I am not suggesting for a minute that any police officer will take the action of using a Taser lightly, but we must remember that we are talking about Tasers and force being used in safe hospital environments. Again, I have received assurances from Ministers in relation to the issue, and I hope that the Minister will refer to those assurances in responding to the debate.
Finally, I draw the Minister’s attention to a trial in Los Angeles, where Tasers are linked to body cameras by Bluetooth, so that the camera starts recording immediately when a Taser is drawn. It does not need to be manually started by the police officer. Perhaps the Home Office would like to look at that.
I apologise for having spoken for a little longer than I said I would, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I am sorry that the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims has left the Chamber, because I wanted to pay tribute to him for being one of the very few Ministers we have encountered who writes back to the Committee and says that the Government will adopt some of our recommendations. He did so in respect of a 28-day limit on pre-charge bail, an issue that we have raised on a number of occasions. Most recently, in our report on police bail, we considered the case of Mr Paul Gambaccini and the need to prevent police bail from going on and on without limit. The limit is very welcome and very important.
I want to concentrate next on new clause 22, which relates to the surrender of travel documentation. I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) will speak to that new clause when he makes his winding-up speech, but I support it very strongly. It will go a long way towards addressing in the law our concern about terrorist suspects who can leave the country because they have not given up their passports or even been asked for them.
In the Home Affairs Committee’s review of counter-terrorism, we took interesting evidence from the sister of Siddhartha Dhar. Mr Dhar fled the United Kingdom while on police bail and despite being asked politely by the police to send in his passport. In fact, he never received the polite letter that the Metropolitan police sent to him asking him to hand in his passport, because he left the country when he was released from custody. He was already in Syria when that letter was sent.
What the Government propose in the Bill is welcome, but new clause 22 goes a little further. I very much hope that the Government will change their mind and accept it, because it is in keeping with the evidence given to us by the head of counter-terrorism, Mark Rowley, who said that when someone surrenders a passport immediately, the police and the security services know where that passport is and that, if someone breaches that requirement —in other words, if they do not hand over their passport—they should be in breach of their bail conditions.
Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the police have the power now to go with an individual when granting bail and physically take their passport or travel document before they release them?
Before Leveson 1 started, I went to see Lord Justice Leveson, who said that he did not think he would be around in the same role for Leveson 2, so if there is to be a Leveson 2 inquiry, it will be without Leveson, as he is doing other things that will take a number of years. When the Home Secretary gave evidence to our Committee on 16 December, she said that there were two cases outstanding and that she did not think Leveson 2 could start until those two cases were dealt with. Although I accept that, we have now found out that there are still outstanding matters that need to be considered. I do not know whether those are the two cases to which the Home Secretary referred. Perhaps the Minister who winds up the debate can tell us the number.
That situation could go on forever. There is no reason why we should not have a second Leveson inquiry, or Leveson 2 without Leveson, as I said. We could start the process of appointing a chairman and initiating the mechanics, perhaps with a panel, as was the case with Leveson 1, and when the legal proceedings have concluded, the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister could come to the House and say, “We will now start the second inquiry”. Why wait for all those proceedings to be concluded before starting that process?
That would give comfort not just to those who fought so hard in the Hillsborough case, but to other members of the public, some of whom have had helicopters flying over their houses when they happened to be abroad because of the relationship between the police and the press—we only get to know about the high-profile cases. There is a very good reason why we should have the second inquiry, and I hope very much that that will be done.
In a highly unusual move, with the Scottish National party acting as the honest broker between the Government and the Opposition, the hon. Member for Dumfries and Galloway (Richard Arkless), who has left the Chamber, came up with a form of words that the shadow Home Secretary was prepared to accept. How wonderful! I do not know whether there will be discussions behind the Chair, but there is an opportunity to avert a vote if the Government say, “We are going to have it, but we are not going to have it yet.” That is all they need to say. Judging by what the shadow Home Secretary said, the Government will accept that, and we can proceed with Report and Third Reading without dividing the House on the important changes in policing law that the Government are proposing, many of which we accept—I certainly do—as being part and parcel of modernising our police force.
The shadow Home Secretary spoke movingly and passionately about the impact of Hillsborough and other such scandals, but of equal concern to lawyers such as me—I have had 25 years in the criminal courts—is the long-term day-to-day cosiness of relationships that, I am sorry to say, develop between police officers, not necessarily at the highest level but at an operational level, and reporters. Unless something is done to deal with that, there is a risk of miscarriages of justice. However these things are done, they do not come purely on the back of headline catching; there is a more insidious culture in some ways, which can be dealt with only through very firm management by the leadership of the police service, and if that is lacking it needs to be looked at appropriately.
I accept the concern about outstanding cases, but there is no doubt that this issue is potentially important. Any practitioner at the Bar will know of any number of occasions where the local press—this is not just about the nationals—has been aware, surprisingly, that a particular person was going to be arrested or that a particular search was going to be carried out. I am afraid that that cannot happen accidentally, so there is an issue here of general concern.
Let me turn briefly to new clause 23, to which I am a signatory. Again, I accept that the Minister wants to take the issue forward, but I agree with the sentiments expressed by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier). There is inevitably a reluctance among officials—I used to find that as a Minister—and senior officers to complicate regulations if they think that what they have got will do. I do not doubt that the advice the Minister has been given was given in good faith, but I say as a London MP who speaks to officers on the beat—on the frontline—in my constituency that their concerns about the inadequacy of the current provisions are genuine, and their experience perhaps does not mirror the advice the Minister may be getting from some of the top brass in the service. That advice may also not always mirror the concerns of my constituents, who go up to London to work and who are sometimes caught in these particularly unpleasant and intimidating demonstrations. My right hon. and learned Friend therefore makes an important point in his new clause.
Let me turn now to the main issue I wanted to raise, which I hinted at in my two interventions on the Minister: new clause 48 and the fire inspection regime. As I said to the Minister, who was generous in his responses to me, I welcome the change. In some ways, I wish I had been able to bring it in when I was the Minister responsible for the fire services, but the political and administrative climate was not there for it to be done, so I genuinely congratulate him on introducing it. He has more front-line experience of the fire services than I do, having actually done the job of putting fires out. My involvement with the fire services goes back to my involvement with the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) some—I hate to say it—30 years ago, when I was the leader of the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority, immediately after the abolition of the Greater London Council. I would like to say that I lied about my age to join up, but that was not quite the case. However, I have been involved with the fire services in one way or another ever since.
At the time, we had the old-school inspectorate. Then we moved to an arrangement with a chief adviser. I think we all hoped that peer review and the work of bodies such as the Chief Fire Officers Association and others would achieve improvement from within. However, the Minister is right to have concluded that that arrangement is not delivering all that we want, and the recent evidence in the Public Accounts Committee report sets that out very clearly. It is therefore right to move to the inspectorate, and I warmly support it.
The reason I have raised what seems an arcane and technical point is this. I have taken on board what the Minister has said, but I want to amplify why I think it is right. One problem with the old inspectorate was that it tended to be a bit of an old boys’ club for retired senior officers. Almost invariably, the inspectors and the assistant and acting inspectors came from a very narrow group of retired senior officers, and there was a bit of a revolving door. There were therefore real questions about the inspectorate being up to the minute in its knowledge and about the degree of independence that it would bring. An inspector can have to say pretty hard things to a chief officer and his management team, and that is not too easy if someone has come fairly recently from within the ranks of a fairly close-knit service.
That is why there should, where appropriate, be greater flexibility to bring in a contractor with expertise in the appropriate fields. That may not be for the whole of an inspection, but it could be for a specific part. The obvious example is in relation to financial matters, but this would also work in relation to things such as the assurance of operational resilience, because there is now expertise in the private sector, as well as in the public sector, that can appropriately be brought to bear.
I first took this issue up after being contacted by families who told me of their distress at having to wait to bury their loved ones because inquests are required into the deaths of dementia sufferers who are subject to a DoLS, irrespective of the circumstances of their death.
Councils were inundated with DoLS applications from care homes after a Supreme Court ruling in 2014, which effectively lowered the threshold for what constitutes deprivation of liberty in care. Guidance issued by the Chief Coroner to local coroners following the Supreme Court judgment said that all persons who died subject to a DoLS order must be the subject of a coroner’s investigation, whether or not their death was from natural causes, because such persons are deemed for the purposes of the 2009 Act to be in state detention.
The new clause was suggested by the Chief Coroner himself in response to, and in recognition of, the distress caused to relatives. The Chief Coroner indicated to the Law Commission and the Government that a simple amendment to the 2009 Act might solve the problem of unnecessary cases being reported to the coroner, at least in the short term. The amendment proposed by the Chief Coroner said:
“For the purposes of this Act, a person who dies while subject to an authorisation granted under Schedule A1 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 depriving that person of his or her liberty and detaining him or her in a hospital or care home does not die while in custody or otherwise in state detention.”
Constituents have contacted me, including one woman who wrote after her mother died in a nursing home. She told me:
“My mum suffered from dementia and other health problems and we sat with her for four days and nights before she passed away. Within one hour of her death, uniformed police arrived and we were asked to leave the room.”
Since the tabling of this amendment on 25 May, the Law Commission issued its interim statement, “Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty”, which said that there is a compelling case for replacing DoLS and that the Coroners and Justice Act should be amended to remove the proposed new scheme from the definition of “state detention”. I quote:
“The current law—which requires an inquest where a person dies while under a DoLS even if the cause of their death was entirely natural—was seen to be causing unnecessary work for corners and upset to families. We received reports, for example, of police arriving at the deceased’s deathbed; one consultee reported their impression of a ‘crime scene’; another referred to issues over whether the deceased’s body should be taken to the official mortuary rather than by the family’s preferred funeral director.”
The Law Commission has therefore recommended that the Coroners and Justice Act be amended when the new system is introduced. I am proposing that we take the opportunity to amend it now, through this Bill. The Law Commission’s report is an interim one, so we will have to wait for the final report, and then for legislation to be drafted and enacted. That could take up to two years, during which many more families will continue to suffer distress.
We talk a lot about supporting carers. I know from my own personal experience how distressing it can be to watch a loved relative struggle to cope with dementia and their families struggle to support them. It is heartless then to put relatives who have cared to the limits of their emotional capacity through this further trauma at the time of the death of their loved one.
I am not going to press the amendment, but I hope that the Minister has heard what I have said and that he will talk to his colleagues in the Department of Health.
New clauses 42 and 43, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne, relate to police officers being deployed in psychiatric wards. New clause 42 raises some important questions about occasions when police officers are requested to take action within health-based settings, particularly acute psychiatric settings. That speaks to an important developing relationship between the police and the health service. Sometimes, because of the particular nature of an individual’s condition, or other circumstances, it may be appropriate for police to be deployed in psychiatric settings, but that should happen only in very exceptional circumstances. We might need to look at how acute psychiatric units go about risk-profiling patients who are currently in acute psychiatric settings in order to ensure that it is very rare and exceptional for police officers to be called on to take action within those settings. I broadly support the intentions of the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend, who has done a lot of very important work in this area, of which he is a champion.
I also have a lot of sympathy for my hon. Friend’s new clause 43, which is about Tasers. I agree that only in the most exceptional circumstances should Tasers be used within acute psychiatric settings and that we should have very clear guidance and guidelines as to the appropriate time for the deployment of that kind of force.
New clause 58, tabled by the right hon. Member for North Norfolk, who has not yet had an opportunity to speak to it, raises important issues in relation to implementing the changes to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act. It refers to the controversial idea of a person’s private dwelling being characterised as a place of safety. This speaks to the relationship between policing and the health service in terms of the operation of places of safety. We need to think about how we can provide a broader range of alternative places of safety, some of which might be based not in the national health service but in the voluntary sector or in crisis houses, and about the capacity of the system to provide appropriate places of safety.
The overall changes to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act are essential and quite transformative. We have to be very clear about what we mean by the exceptional circumstances in which people are detained, perhaps moving to a system where it becomes inappropriate in all circumstances even for adults to be detained in police cells. I recognise that there may be a need to define the exceptional circumstances in which that might happen. The proposed changes are positive. The new clauses I have discussed raise important questions that the Minister should consider in summing up.
I have tabled a number of new clauses and amendments. The first issue I want to deal with is whether we should disallow the use of Tasers on psychiatric wards. Before I get into the detail, I, like other speakers, want to acknowledge the inspiring leadership of many police leaders who, through force of strong moral leadership, have managed to change practice in many parts of the country. We owe them an enormous debt of gratitude.
On the issue of Tasers on psychiatric wards, the hon. Gentleman referred to Black Mental Health UK, an important campaigning organisation. As he said, it has drawn attention to the fact that
“in particular Black African Caribbean men”
are
“disproportionately over-represented in S136 detentions compared to the general population.”
That, incidentally, is a conclusion from the joint Home Office and Department of Health review of sections 135 and 136. It has also been reported that the police are more likely to use force against black African-Caribbean men.
I want to challenge the assumption that force is necessary at the level with which it is used at the moment. Black Mental Health UK refers in its briefing for this debate to the United Nations committee against torture, which has stated that Taser X26 weapons provoke extreme pain and constitute a form of torture and that in certain cases they can also cause death. Although they are termed non-lethal, almost 10 known deaths have been associated with the use of Tasers in the past 10 years.
I want to get a debate going on the subject. I am delighted that the Home Secretary herself has said:
“I have been hearing stories, for example, of Tasers having been used in mental health wards and you think, ‘Hang on a minute, what is happening here?’”
That is what we should all be doing: we should be questioning whether that is appropriate, and that is why I tabled new clause 40.
My amendment 124 would, in effect, prohibit the use of police cells as a place of safety for adults. I welcome the fact that the Government are implementing, through this Bill, the joint review’s recommendation to end the use of police cells for children and young people. However, the inspiring leadership of many police officers, working closely with mental health services, means that, in all but the most extreme cases, the use of police cells for such purposes has ended in some parts of the country. In London, for example, hardly any adults go into police cells as a result of section 136, and the same is true about the west midlands over the past two years. If those areas of the country with impressive leadership can do it, we should challenge every part of the country to do so, and the Bill should lead the way.
I welcome the fact that the Minister himself said on Second Reading:
“Unless we actually put a stop to that”—
the use of police cells—
“and say, ‘Enough is enough,’ we will not get the provision we need from other agencies.”—[Official Report, 7 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 102-103.]
That is absolutely right. We cannot use the fact that the NHS is under pressure as an excuse not to do this. If it is wrong, it is wrong, and it needs to be challenged.
My new clause 45 would ensure that, in every case where there has been evidence of child sexual exploitation, the victims are referred for a mental health assessment. “Future in mind”, the report that I published in March 2015 following a taskforce that we set up to consider children’s mental health services, set out the need for trauma-focused care and for sexually abused and exploited children to receive
“a comprehensive specialist initial assessment, and referral to appropriate services providing evidence-based interventions according to their need.”
The new clause seeks to implement that recommendation.
In its briefing for this debate, the Local Government Association supports the intention, but again raises concern about investment. Are we really saying that the lack of availability of mental health services is a reason not to ensure that every child who has suffered sexual exploitation gets the chance to receive a proper assessment? Surely we have to set what is right in legislation and then ensure that we provide the facilities to make it happen. Anything short of that is not acceptable.
New clause 58 would prohibit the use of a person’s home as a place of safety under section 136. Under section 135, when a police officer goes to someone’s home, it may be appropriate for them to stay with that person, but the organisation Mind has raised serious concerns about taking someone by force to their home as a place of safety under section 136.
New clause 59 centres on the right of those detained under sections 135 and 136 to an appropriate adult. Anyone detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 has a right to an independent mental health advocate, except when the detention is under sections 135 or 136. In such circumstances, the person may be very vulnerable, so surely the Bill should embrace the idea, as Mind has argued, that they should have a right to an appropriate adult.
Finally, I want to address the issue of when the clock should start. I welcome the fact that the Bill reduces to 24 hours the maximum length of time for which someone should be held under section 136 while the assessment takes place. There is a critical question, however, about when the clock starts. If there is pressure on resources and facilities, someone could be kept in a police van and driven around a city—that does happen sometimes. That time, under the Government’s proposed definition, would not count. Some hours could pass before the person arrived at the place of safety. Mind’s argument, which is contained in amendment 125, is that the clock should start when a person is detained rather than when they arrive at a place of safety.
I conclude by saying that the amendments and new clauses in this group are all designed to improve the rights of people with mental ill health, who are too often let down by the system at the moment.
Let me explain the mischief of face coverings, with which the House is well acquainted. In my intervention on my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier), I mentioned two events: the Conservative party conference in Manchester, and an incident in my constituency in which, during the badger cull, two people in masks parked outside a farmhouse several evenings in a row as it was getting dark, deliberately intending to intimidate. A similar thing happened at the Blackpool conference. I was there when people, women in particular, were intimidated by people in masks. If only the police had been able to ask those people to take off the masks, I think the intimidation would have stopped almost on the spot. I suspect that in those two incidents, the mere act of the constable on duty asking those people to take off the masks would have stopped the mischief there and then.
That is the journey on which I want to take my right hon. Friend the Minister. It is perhaps not the entirety of new clause 23, but let us simply look at section 60AA of the Public Order Act 1994, which requires a constable on duty to obtain prior written consent before a mask is taken off—[Interruption.] The Minister is going to intervene. May I just explain where I am coming from on this? Very often, a constable will get on the radio and obtain verbal consent, and the written consent is given afterwards. Technically, a crime is being committed because they have not got prior written consent.
Let us do away with the whole issue of written consent. We train our constables to a very high level, and we put a great deal of trust in them. Let us trust them in individual situations. If they think that face masks are a problem, we should give them the power to demand that the face masks be removed immediately. It may even be possible to do this by secondary legislation. Section 60AA—[Interruption.] Does my right hon. Friend the Minister want me to give way? If he does as I suggest, I think we will achieve what we want to achieve.
The hon. Member for Broxbourne raised the fact that the state’s power to deprive someone of their liberty is one of the most draconian acts at its disposal. As the right hon. Member for North Norfolk said, someone who is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, other than under sections 135 or 136, is entitled to a mental health advocate. If they are detained under sections 135 or 136 of that Act, they are not. The only way in which they could access legal advice, as I think the hon. Member for Broxbourne said, is if they are detained at a police station.
Quite rightly, the Government want to prevent people from being taken to police stations in the first place—I give them credit for this—because a police cell is clearly not the correct place for someone who is in mental health crisis. The important thing is that such individuals need some advocacy. At the moment, if an individual is not taken to a police cell or a police station, they will not have access to independent legal advice or any type of advocacy. New clause 24 is designed to get some parity with the rest of the 1983 Act, in which people do have advocacy. I am pleased that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley), who responded to a similar amendment in Committee, has just taken her seat. She has promised to look at this issue.
I do not intend to press the new clause to a vote, but it is important that we put in place a system under which people who are detained under sections 135 and 136 of the 1983 Act can, at least, access some advice. I agree with the point made by the right hon. Member for North Norfolk in new clause 59, which is designed to do a similar thing by ensuring that individuals have access to an adult who could speak or advocate on their behalf. I have had discussions with the Minister, and she has given undertakings to look at how that could be done.
I agree with the hon. Member for Halesowen and Rowley Regis (James Morris) that many of the things in the Bill are not necessarily the responsibility of the police. They have stepped up to the mark, in many cases, to fill a gap created by a lack of funding or support. In some cases, because of the disjunction between mental health services, local authorities and others, the police are seen as the last resort. He is right to highlight that.
That brings me on to new clause 26, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Broxbourne, and which I welcome. There is good practice already in many police forces, which undergo mental health training—in Durham, the chief constable has instigated a whole force review to make sure that people have access to mental health training—but it is important that we have consistency. Police forces will be empowered and given greater expertise if they know how to use not just sections 136 and 137 of the 1983 Act, but other sections. I pay tribute to police forces up and down the country, because there is some good practice.
In Committee, we referred to the concordat, which is a good move forward in ensuring that there is a joined-up approach at local level between police forces, local authorities and the health service. I tabled an amendment in Committee to put that concordat into some sort of statutory framework. I know that the Minister is exploring with colleagues at the Department of Health how we can get some agreement, or some sort of reporting, on what is happening at a local level.
The right hon. Member for North Norfolk has the done the House a great service by tabling new clause 40 because it concerns a subject that is not being talked about. I totally agree with him; I can envisage no circumstances in which it would be necessary to use a Taser on a mental health ward. The right hon. Gentleman praised Black Mental Health UK, which has done a lot of work on the issue. When I met Black Mental Health UK, I was struck by the stark fact that something has to be done. I know that the Home Secretary and the Minister have looked at the figures, and the only mathematical conclusion we can reach is that people from black and Afro-Caribbean communities are being detained under the 1983 Act disproportionately compared with any other section of the community. Those figures cannot just be the result of chance. I urge the Government to look seriously at the matter and think about how we can put mechanisms in place to ensure that that is not the case.
On new clause 43, I agree with the hon. Member for Broxbourne that if the use of Tasers is not going to be prohibited, we should at least have statistics to show when and where they are being used. New clause 58 is similar to an amendment that I tabled in Committee. I give credit to the Government for their efforts to ensure that people in mental health crisis do not end up in a police cell, but unless we have very close monitoring and reporting, we might end up in the de facto position that the right hon. Member for North Norfolk has just mentioned in relation to sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act.
We should soon have a situation in which police cells will not be the first resort, as they have been in the past. I am not criticising the police for taking people to the cells; they were often the only places available. However, we need to monitor closely what happens to people when they are detained under sections 135 and 136 of the Act. I would not want keeping people at home to become the de facto position. That might be helpful for the statistics on keeping people out of police cells, but people’s homes might not be the best possible place for individuals in crisis. The hon. Member for Halesowen and Rowley Regis made the point that they do not necessarily have to be placed in a health facility. The hon. Member for Broxbourne has said on numerous occasions that this country needs a network of places of safety for individuals in mental health crisis. Those places could be run by health authorities, by charities or by others, but we need such a network because neither a police cell nor, in some cases, a hospital is the best place for certain people in crisis.
I am glad that the proposed changes to the Bill are being taken seriously by the Government. I pay tribute to the way in which both Ministers have addressed these matters in Committee. Even though some of the proposals are not going to be put in the Bill, I believe that the Ministers, working with colleagues in the Department of Health, will be able to achieve a situation in which people in mental health crisis do not end up in the criminal justice system. That should be our aim.
I want to speak briefly to new clause 48 and new schedule 1, which propose the re-creation of a national fire service inspectorate in England. My friend the Minister is, like me, a former firefighter. When I ask him to do things in our exchanges on fire brigade matters, he sometimes throws back at me the fact that I did not do them when I was Fire Minister and asks why should he do them now. I want to ask him why he is recreating the fire service inspectorate when we did away with it and put other arrangements in place. I will be interested to hear his explanation. I welcome the fact, as the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and others have done, that the Government recognise there is a vacuum and that something has to be created to fill the gap. Whether that is an inspectorate as set out in the new clause or whether that wording changes when the Bill goes to the House of Lords, the fact that the Government are moving in this direction is welcome.
In Westminster Hall last week, we discussed with the Minister the increasing number of calls related to flooding that the fire service now deals with, the transition towards dealing with more medical emergency calls and the arrangements with the national health service for the fire service to do more social care visits alongside fire safety visits. These changes all demonstrate the fact that the fire service is moving into different territory, and that different skills are being developed which require different resources as well as the staff to carry them out.
As I mentioned in Westminster Hall, criticisms are being levelled at the fire service, parts of which are being blamed for the reductions in the service. The fire and rescue service has been a victim of its own success in recent decades, having cut the number of calls and fires and reduced the number of deaths and serious injuries. That has resulted in the loss of fire stations, fire appliances and firefighters. The Minister will remember that I stated in that debate that there are nearly 7,000 fewer firefighters in the UK now than there were in 2010. That fact has raised a number of eyebrows, and questions are being asked about attendance times being met and resources being available. People are now asking whether the service is still equipped to do the job that it needs to do.
Having said all that, I am curious about the lateness of the arrival of the new clauses. The Minister referred positively to the consensus in Committee and to the ability of both sides to help each other out to make progress on the Bill. I commend the shadow Fire Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), for arguing for a provision to assess the ability of the fire service to carry out its functions. To the Minister’s credit, he has now tabled the new clause and the new schedule to address that issue.
I mentioned in an intervention my curiosity about whether the Government had considered the United Kingdom Accreditation Service as a potential vehicle to carry out the function that is being proposed here. The Minister knows that I had 23 years in the fire service, 13 of which were spent as an operational firefighter, and I participated in drills in the fire station as set out by Her Majesty’s inspectorate. I have to question the value of those drills, because we would train for weeks to get them right but they still did not always go entirely right. I question the value of putting in that amount of rehearsal. I wonder whether all that practice actually made the whole exercise worthless.
We decided to abolish Her Majesty’s inspectorate because of the scepticism and cynicism surrounding it—the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst referred to an old boys’ network earlier—and I would have hoped that the Government would now be proposing something new. However, they seem to be proposing a re creation of what went before. Having moved it to the Department for Communities and Local Government and then back to the Home Office, there seems to be replication so that, along with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons, we will now have Her Majesty’s inspectorate of fire services.
I look forward to hearing more from the Minister and to listening to the debates in the other place, where I suspect the Bill will get more scrutiny than it has in this place. Public confidence in the fire service is high and has always been high, but the fire service needs professional underpinning and validation not only for public confidence and value for money, but for the safety of firefighters who put themselves on the frontline to protect the public. I look forward to a more extensive debate when the Bill goes to the other place, and to some comments from the Minister when he sums up. This is a positive step forward, but we need to make sure that the fire service can demonstrate to its own satisfaction, to our satisfaction and to that of the public that it is equipped, resourced and able to do the job we all admire it for doing and want it to carry on doing in the future.
I want to speak to new clause 23, which was so ably introduced by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier). I understand that it will not be pushed to a vote, that there will be a review in relation to PACE and that the Minister has listened carefully to all the arguments that have been made. If we are to have a review, there is an opportunity—I will use my brief remarks to talk about it—to have a debate in this country about face coverings generally. Many people in our country feel that it is quite un-British, and is not necessary for any reason, except in exceptional circumstances.
I do not want to suggest that we should take heavy-handed, universal action to prevent people from covering their face in this country, because that is also in a sense un-British. Fundamentally, as a nation, we actually believe in the freedom of people to live their lives in the way that, for whatever reason, they want, so long as they do not alarm or intimidate others. I know that other countries—for example, France and I believe Belgium, which are perfectly moderate, sensible, freedom-loving countries—have decided to ban face coverings in public, but we probably do not want to proceed in that way in this country.
If we are to have a review, I believe that this is an opportunity to have a debate. I certainly join my hon. Friends who have expressed concern about certain situations in which people feel intimidated, such as in the environs of a hunt, an animal research laboratory, or a demonstration outside Parliament. People are of course entitled to demonstrate—nobody is denying that—but it is very intimidating for the police and the public to see people engaged in demonstrations with any kind of face covering.
I understand that it is perfectly possible under present arrangements for the authorities to issue written instructions so that a police constable can require people to remove their face coverings and all the rest of it, but I would like us to go further. I suggest that the way to deal with this problem is to say—in a particular situation that might be threatening, intimidatory, violent or confrontational on both sides—there should certainly be a right for a police constable to require somebody to remove a face covering. It should be possible for a chief constable to have such a right, as well as to lay down general prohibitions against face coverings.
It should also be possible—there should be a public debate about this, because I know that there are different points of view—for the Home Secretary to issue a ban against face coverings in certain situations or in particularly sensitive geographical places, such as the central areas of the cities of London and Westminster, the central part of our capital city, which is sensitive for all sorts of reasons, or in hospitals, schools, law courts and doctors’ surgeries. I know not everybody in the House will agree, but many members of the public are concerned about this.
That is all I wanted to say. I hope that, as the Minister has promised a review, he will be open-minded about this. He may wish to comment on what I have suggested when he sums up.
I want to say a little about the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) on the new inspectorate. At the outset, may I say that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst was brutally honest when he said he would have liked to have made this change, but was prevented by circumstances when he was the Minister? Perhaps the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse—my predecessor in many different capacities, including as a firefighter—was also prevented from doing so by different circumstances when he was Minister.
We must learn from our mistakes—to be brutally honest, we all make mistakes in life—so the first thing to say is that it is absolutely correct that the inspectorate will not be an old boys’ network. It will be based on Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, and on police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy reviews. Firefighters will not have weeks to practise their escape drills, which I remember so vividly from when I was in the job. For people of a certain age, such escapes were done on the old ladders, which were on big wheels that could get firefighters to places some of the modern ladders will not reach.
Importantly, the inspector will have the power to bring in the experts he or she thinks fit to do inspections. The inspector should not be an ex-chief fire officer from somewhere, which is similar to the arrangements in Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary. I know that will ruffle a few feathers within the network, with people saying, “We’re experts, we know best”, but it is important for the inspector to come in and ask, “Why? Why do you do it that way?” and then to bring in other expertise. I think that is the way to do it.
I think the former Fire Minister, the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse, will find that when we started to talk about this issue—it was raised in Committee by the shadow Fire Minister, the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown)—I had only been in the job for two weeks, because the role of Police and Fire Minister was very new. However, I knew what I wanted to do, as did the Home Secretary, and I freely admit that a little bit of encouragement from the shadow Minister has helped us on our way. There are areas in which we will be able to work much more along the lines of how Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary does its inspections, so that people are not prepared for the day having known about the inspection for weeks in advance, as happened in my time.
I want to speak to some of the Government amendments that I did not have the opportunity to talk about earlier, and I will turn to some of the excellent contributions made during this debate. One of the most important areas of agreement that I have reached, with the Home Secretary’s permission, is in relation to the 12-month rule for officers who have retired or left the force. Since long before I held my current position, it has always struck me as strange that, criminal proceedings apart, an officer of no matter what rank could step down and start their pension almost the day before they became subject to investigations within the police force. In some cases that does not happen. I have the duty of signing documents that revoke police officers’ pensions when they have broken the rules so badly that they lose their pension. I do that quite regularly. It is difficult to sign something that will dramatically change someone’s future, and I do not in any way do so lightly. I often quiz my officials about whether it is the right way to go, not least because a good proportion of the contributions to the pension were that person’s own contributions, not the state’s contributions. However, the rules are quite specific in those cases.
Although we did not want to leave things completely open—I know the shadow Home Secretary will understand that—we thought there was a real opportunity to leave a great legacy on behalf of the Hillsborough victims. The change to the 12-month rule will be for exceptional circumstances. It is difficult to put them into primary legislation, so we will do it by regulations. I hope that the shadow Front-Bench team will work with us on those regulations, along with other parties in the House. They will be one of the biggest legacies of what we are doing.
I am sorry that we do not quite agree with Her Majesty’s Opposition on two issues. On Leveson 2, the Home Secretary has set her position out in front of the Home Affairs Committee, and I have set it out too. I am categorically not saying that it is not going to happen, but no decision will be made until after the criminal investigations. That is the position that the Home Secretary has set out—it is way above my pay grade—and that is how it will stay.
We also disagree on another area—it is a shame, but I respect the view of others in the House, and if we have to go through the Lobby we will. Bishop James Jones is carrying out his review as requested, and we are not going to pre-empt what he will say in that review. There are assumptions about what will be in it, and some will be right and some will be wrong.
Whatever happens in any Division, things will not stop there. If the Opposition win, so be it. If we win the Divisions tonight, we will still wait for the conclusions of the investigations, the court cases and Bishop Jones’s review. Our position will stay exactly the same.
I will address some of the contributions that have been made about mental health. The hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) talked about the issue extensively in Committee. When I was Minister with responsibility for disabilities I had long and fruitful meetings with the right hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), the Minister in the coalition Government with responsibility for mental health, and we agree on 90% on this issue—we speak from the same platform in many ways. Many changes to how the police deal with and look after—I stress look after—people with mental health issues came about because of his work as a Minister. He pushed the Department of Health to places that I am sure, at times, it did not want to go to. Perhaps I have done the same in my new role with the police, with the Home Secretary’s support, by saying that some things are still fundamentally wrong in the 21st century.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) said earlier, my heart tells me that the use of a Taser within a secure mental health facility must be wrong, but my brain and my experience tell me that in exceptional circumstances—it must not be the norm—it could happen. I have met several of the lobbyists who have been referred to, who have campaigned very hard on the issue. The Under-Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley), is going to take work forward on it, as promised in meetings with colleagues from across the House.
We are in a really exciting position. This is not just about mental health issues but about social services more broadly, particularly with regard to children. I have been with police on a Friday evening, long before I got this role, getting something to eat before going out on patrol. The constables would be given notes, particularly from the sergeant and sometimes from the community inspector, asking us to go and visit Mary, or John, because social services had said that they had not seen them for a couple of days, and as they were vulnerable people we had a duty. Well, sorry, but social services had that duty first. We—I use the word “we” because I am very passionate about this—must be the last resort. The police cannot be the first port of call.
Work on the issue has been going on for the past couple of years. It is being done in different ways around the country, but street triage has transformed the use of powers under sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983. This next point is not simply one of semantics: the use of section 135 or 136 is an arrest. People are not being sectioned; they are being arrested. There is sometimes confusion about that. The power an officer is using at that point is a power to protect and arrest. We need to make that clear. We have seen different uses of sections 135 and 136 in different parts of the country. It has dropped dramatically—the use of section 136 in particular—because of the work taking place. I completely agree that more needs to be done, but we are in a position where we can drive that work forward only because, frankly, we have said that enough is enough.
I understand the reasons behind many of the amendments that have been tabled, particularly on the use of Tasers. I understand the risks that the right hon. Member for North Norfolk alluded to, but Tasers have saved lives. I talked earlier about what my heart tells me and what my brain tells me. I used to volunteer in a mental health hospital before and during my time in the Army, because my mother worked as a mental health nurse. I asked mum—she is retired now—“Is there a case in which you would have to use this sort of force?”, and she said, “Sadly, in exceptional circumstances there is.” However, she also emphasised the quality of training in mental health facilities and how someone can be restrained safely.
The other important issue that the right hon. Gentleman raised concerns people who have been abused, whether it is sexual abuse or other types of abuse. We must ensure that they get the right care early on, and we must not assume that that abuse will show up in someone’s first medical analysis. I know that from friends who suffer from post-traumatic stress—I have friends who served in the Falklands who are only now showing the signs.
I turn to facial coverings and new clause 23, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) and other colleagues. I think we have reached a consensus. I arranged for Assistant Chief Constable Paul Netherton to lead on the issue for the whole country within the police. Very unusually for a senior police officer, or indeed for any police officer, he said, “Don’t give me any more powers. I am happy with the powers we have,” In our meetings, however—I am happy to share this with the House—it was conceded that the way the current legislation is being interpreted through guidance is an issue. There is also some confusion about the powers under section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which concerns the need for a written authority. In reality, the police get on their radios and say, “This is the situation. I want to remove it. I think that an offence is going to take place.” The request is instantly given, and it is signed later on. That is not breaking any law; that is how the procedure works on a daily basis.
The Home Secretary and I both understand that there are real concerns about whether the measure is being implemented in a way that ensures public confidence as well as that of the police. Rather than change the law against the advice that I am getting from the police, we have proposed a review into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 code A. That does not happen often, but this autumn a review will take place into stop and search. The powers in the Bill are similar to those stop-and-search powers, and we will ask for them to be included in that code. That significant change will alleviate some of the concerns, but we must ensure that we provide those powers.
I hope that the way in which I and the Under-Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands, dealt with the debate in Committee has helped the Bill to progress positively. It is a long time since I received such encouragement for a Bill—other than for the Mesothelioma Act 2014, which I took through the House with a little bit of disagreement. I am adamant that this Bill, and the measures it contains, will be a legacy for the Hillsborough families and the campaign that they have taken forward for 27 years. I am sorry that we cannot agree on everything, but as I have indicated, even if we disagree tonight, we will probably agree tomorrow.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 48 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Schedule 1
Schedule to be inserted as Schedule A3 to the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004
“SCHEDULE A3
English Inspectors
Interpretation
1 (1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of this Schedule.
(2) References to an English inspector are to an inspector appointed under section 28(A1).
(3) References to the inspection function are to the function conferred on the English inspectors by section 28(A3).
(4) References to a person providing services to a fire and rescue authority are to a person providing services, in pursuance of contractual arrangements (but without being employed by a fire and rescue authority), to assist the fire and rescue authority in relation to the exercise of its functions.
(5) “Public authority” includes any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.
Delegation
2 An English inspector may arrange for the inspection function to be exercised (to such extent as the inspector may determine) by another public authority on behalf of the inspector.
Working with Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary
3 An English inspector, when exercising the inspection function, must co-operate with Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary.
4 An English inspector may act jointly with Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary where it is appropriate to do so for the efficient and effective exercise of the inspection function.
Assistance for other public authorities
5 (1) The chief fire and rescue inspector for England may, if he or she thinks it appropriate to do so, provide assistance to any other public authority for the purpose of the exercise by that authority of its functions.
(2) The chief fire and rescue inspector for England may do anything he or she thinks appropriate to facilitate the carrying out of an inspection under section 10 of the Local Government Act 1999 (inspection of best value authorities).
(3) Anything done under this paragraph may be done on such terms (including terms as to payment) as the chief fire and rescue inspector for England thinks fit.
Powers of English inspectors to obtain information etc
6 (1) An English inspector may serve on a relevant person a notice requiring the person—
(a) to provide the inspector with any information or documents that the inspector reasonably requires for the purpose of the exercise of the inspection function;
(b) to produce or deliver up to the inspector any evidence or other things that the inspector reasonably requires for that purpose.
This is subject to sub-paragraphs (6) to (8).
(2) In sub-paragraph (1), “relevant person” means—
(a) a fire and rescue authority in England;
(b) an employee of a fire and rescue authority in England;
(c) a person providing services to a fire and rescue authority in England;
(d) an employee of a person providing services to a fire and rescue authority in England.
(3) A notice under this paragraph must—
(a) specify or describe the information, documents, evidence or other things that are required by the inspector;
(b) specify the period within which the information, documents, evidence or other things must be provided, produced or delivered up.
(4) A notice under this paragraph may specify the form and manner in which any information, documents, evidence or other things are to be provided, produced or delivered up.
(5) An English inspector may cancel a notice under this paragraph by written notice to the person on whom it was served.
(6) A notice under this paragraph must not be used to obtain information, or any document or other thing, from a person if—
(a) the information, or the document or other thing, was obtained by that person (directly or indirectly) from a body or other entity mentioned in sub-paragraph (7), or
(b) the information, or the document or other thing, relates to a body or other entity mentioned in that sub-paragraph.
(7) The bodies and other entities referred to in sub-paragraph (6) are—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(c) the Government Communications Headquarters, or
(d) any part of Her Majesty’s forces, or of the Ministry of Defence, which engages in intelligence activities.
(8) A notice under this paragraph must not require a person—
(a) to provide information that might incriminate the person;
(b) to provide an item subject to legal privilege within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 10 of that Act).
(9) In this paragraph—
“document” means anything in which information of any description is recorded;
“English inspector” includes—
(a) a person appointed under section 28(A5) as an assistant inspector or other officer;
(b) a person authorised by an English inspector to act on behalf of the inspector for the purposes of this paragraph.
Powers of English inspectors to obtain access to premises
7 (1) An English inspector may serve on a person a notice requiring the person to allow the inspector access, which the inspector reasonably requires for the purpose of the exercise of the inspection function, to—
(a) premises that are occupied for the purposes of —
(i) a fire and rescue authority in England,
(ii) a person providing services to a fire and rescue authority in England, and
(b) documents and other things on those premises.
(2) A notice under this paragraph must—
(a) specify or describe the premises to which the inspector requires access;
(b) specify the time when access is required (which may be immediately after the service of the notice).
(3) Where there are reasonable grounds for not allowing the inspector to have access to the premises at the time specified under sub-paragraph (2)(b), the requirement under this paragraph has effect as a requirement to secure that access is allowed to the inspector at the earliest practicable time specified by the inspector after there cease to be such grounds.
(4) An English inspector may cancel a notice under this paragraph by written notice to the person on whom it was served.
(5) In this paragraph “document” and “English inspector” have the same meanings as in paragraph 6 (and, for that purpose, the reference in paragraph (b) of the definition of “English inspector” in paragraph 6(9) to paragraph 6 is to be read as a reference to this paragraph).
Failure to comply with notice under paragraph 6 or 7
8 (1) If a person who has received a notice under paragraph 6 or 7—
(a) fails or refuses without reasonable excuse to do what is required by the notice, or
(b) (in the case of a notice under paragraph 6) knowingly or recklessly provides information in response to the notice that is false in a material respect,
the chief fire and rescue inspector for England may certify in writing to the High Court that the person has failed to comply with the notice.
(2) The High Court may then inquire into the matter and, after hearing any witness who may be produced against or on behalf of the person, and after hearing any statement offered in defence, deal with the person as if the person had committed a contempt of court.
Sensitive information: restriction on further disclosure
9 (1) Where an English inspector, in exercise of the inspection function, receives information within sub-paragraph (2), the inspector must not disclose the information, or the fact that it has been received, unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(2) The information is—
(a) intelligence service information;
(b) information obtained from a government department which, at the time it is provided to the inspector, is identified by the department as information the disclosure of which may, in the opinion of the relevant authority—
(i) cause damage to national security, international relations or the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or
(ii) jeopardise the safety of any person.
(3) Where an English inspector discloses to another person information within sub-paragraph (2) that the inspector received in exercise of the inspection function, or the fact that the inspector has received such information in exercise of the inspection function, the other person must not disclose that information or that fact unless the relevant authority consents to the disclosure.
(4) A prohibition on disclosure in sub-paragraph (1) or (3) does not apply to disclosure by one English inspector to another.
(5) In this paragraph—
“English inspector” includes—
(a) a person appointed under section 28(A5) as an assistant inspector or other officer;
(b) a person authorised by an English inspector to act on behalf of the inspector for the purposes of paragraph 6 or 7;
“government department” means a department of Her Majesty’s Government but does not include—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service, or
(c) the Government Communications Headquarters (“GCHQ”);
“intelligence service information” means information that was obtained (directly or indirectly) from or that relates to—
(a) the Security Service,
(b) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(c) GCHQ, or
(d) any part of Her Majesty’s forces, or of the Ministry of Defence, which engages in intelligence activities;
“Minister of the Crown” includes the Treasury;
“relevant authority” means—
(a) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Security Service, the Director-General of the Security Service;
(b) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to the Secret Intelligence Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service;
(c) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to GCHQ, the Director of GCHQ;
(d) in the case of intelligence service information obtained (directly or indirectly) from or relating to Her Majesty’s forces or the Ministry of Defence, the Secretary of State;
(e) in the case of information within sub-paragraph (2)(b)—
(i) the Secretary of State, or
(ii) the Minister of the Crown in charge of the government department from which the information was obtained (if that Minister is not a Secretary of State).
Provision of intelligence service information to English inspectors
10 (1) A person who provides information that is intelligence service information to an English inspector exercising the inspection function must—
(a) make the inspector aware that the information is intelligence service information, and
(b) provide the inspector with such additional information as will enable the inspector to identify the relevant authority in relation to the information.
(2) In this paragraph, “English inspector”, “intelligence service information” and “relevant authority” have the same meaning as in paragraph 9.””—(Mike Penning.)
Like the provision made by amendment NC48, this new Schedule is about the inspection of fire and rescue authorities in England. It makes provision in relation to English inspectors about delegation, joint working with her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary and the giving of assistance to public authorities. It also confers power on English inspectors to obtain information from fire and rescue authorities (and their employees) and from persons providing services to fire and rescue authorities (and their employees) and to obtain access to premises occupied for the purposes of fire and rescue authorities and persons providing services to them.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 30
Public records
“(1) In Schedule 1 to the Public Records Act 1958 (definition of public records), in Part 2 of the Table at the end of paragraph 3, insert at the appropriate place—
“Office for Police Conduct.”
(2) The records that become public records for the purposes of that Act as a result of the amendment made by subsection (1) include all records of the Office for Police Conduct of the kind mentioned in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1 to that Act (whether created before or after the coming into force of this section, and whether created under that name or under the name of the Independent Police Complaints Commission).
(3) If the amendment made by subsection (1) comes into force before subsection (1) of section 31 comes into force, the reference in that amendment to the Office for Police Conduct is, until subsection (1) of that section comes into force, to be read as a reference to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.”—(Mike Penning.)
This new clause provides for the records of the Office for Police Conduct to become public records for the purposes of the Public Records Act 1958.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 63
Police and Crime Commissioners: parity of funding between police and families at inquests
“(1) A police and crime commissioner has the duties set out in this section when the police force they are responsible for is a Properly Interested Person for the purposes of—
(a) an inquest into the death of a member of an individual’s family, or
(b) an inquest into the deaths of members of a group of families,
under the Coroners Act 1988.
(2) The police and crime commissioner must make recommendations to the Secretary of State as to whether the individual’s family or the group of families at the inquest require financial support to ensure parity of legal representation between parties to the inquest.
(3) If a police and crime commissioner makes a recommendation under subsection (2) then the Secretary of State must provide financial assistance to the individual’s family or the group of families to ensure parity of funding between families and the police.
(4) The individual’s family or the group of families may use funding authorised under this section solely for the purpose of funding legal representation at the inquest.”—(Andy Burnham.)
This new clause would put into law the principle of parity of funding between police and families at inquests. It would ensure that funding to a bereaved family, or a group of bereaved families, for purposes of legal representation during an inquest is an amount broadly equal to the level of funding that the police force receives. This new clause seeks to place an obligation on the PCC to recommend to the Home Secretary as to whether a bereaved family, or a group of bereaved families requires funding to support their legal representation at the inquest. The Home Secretary must provide such funding if it is recommended.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Amendment made: 85, page 20, line 39, leave out from first “person” to end of line 40 and insert
Amendments made: 22, page 28, line 11, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 23, page 28, leave out lines 40 to 42.
Amendment 24, page 28, line 45, at end insert—
Amendment 25, page 29, line 11, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 26, page 29, line 12, leave out “interception”.
Amendment 27, page 29, leave out lines 19 to 21 and insert—
Amendment 28, page 29, line 25, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 29, page 29, line 30, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 30, page 29, line 35, leave out ““intercept information”” and insert
Amendment 86, page 30, line 6, after “paragraph 22)” insert “—
Amendment 87, page 30, line 22, at end insert—
Amendment made: 31, clause 26, page 42, line 14, at end insert—
Amendments made: 32, clause 32, page 49, line 19, after “place”, insert
Amendment 33, page 49, line 28, at end insert—
Amendments made: 34, clause 33, page 51, leave out lines 37 and 38 and insert—
Amendment 35, page 51, line 39, at beginning insert
Amendment 36, page 51, line 40, leave out from “which” to end of line 41 and insert
Amendment 37, page 52, line 28, leave out
and insert
Amendment 38, page 52, line 35, leave out from “operator” to “to” in line 36.
Amendment 39, page 52, line 37, leave out
Amendment 40, page 52, line 37, at end insert—
Please see the explanatory statement for amendment 37.
Amendment 41, page 52, line 45, at end insert “, or
Amendment 42, page 53, line 18, after “required” insert
Amendment 43, page 53, leave out lines 19 and 20.
Amendment 44, page 53, leave out lines 27 to 29.
Amendment 45, page 53, line 33, at end insert
Amendment 46, page 54, line 1, leave out “or 6B”.
Amendment 47, page 54, line 2, leave out “or 6B”.
Amendment 48, page 54, line 4, at end insert—
Amendment 49, page 54, line 11, leave out “or 6B”.
Amendment 50, page 54, line 19, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 51, page 54, line 45, at end insert “, or
Amendment 52, page 55, leave out lines 8 to 10.
Amendment 53, page 55, line 11, at end insert—
Amendment 54, page 55, line 28, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 55, page 55, line 29, leave out “interception”.
Amendment 56, page 55, leave out lines 38 to 40 and insert—
Amendment 57, page 55, line 43, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 58, page 55, line 46, leave out “intercept information” and insert
Amendment 59, page 56, line 2, leave out ““intercept information”” and insert
Amendments made: 60, page 142, line 34, after “paragraphs”, insert “55(10)”.
Amendment 61, page 142, line 35, at end insert—
Amendment made: 88, page 201, line 25, leave out sub-paragraph (5). —(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 63, page 213, line 5, leave out “if it” and insert
Amendment 64, page 213, line 41 , leave out from beginning to “after” in line 42 and insert—
Amendment 65, page 220, line 3 , at end insert—
Amendment made: 66, page 237, line 7, at end insert
Amendments made: 67, page 251, line 16, at end insert—
Amendment 68, page 251, line 31, after “or”, insert “in respect of”.
Amendment 69, page 251, line 38, at end insert—
Amendment 70, page 251, line 40, after “place”, insert
Amendment 71, page 251, line 40, at end insert—
Amendment 72, page 252, line 9, at end insert—
Amendment 73, page 253, line 34, at end insert—
Amendment 74, page 254, leave out lines 24 to 27 and insert—
Amendment 75, page 254, line 30 , at end insert—
Amendment 76, page 255, line 24, leave out
and insert
Amendment 77, page 255, line 36, leave out
Amendment 78, page 255, line 41, after “(2)(b)”, insert “and (7)(a),”.
Amendment 79, page 257, line 21, at end insert—
Amendment 80, page 257, line 21, at end insert—
Amendment 81, page 257, line 22, at end insert—
Amendment 82, page 257, line 34, at end insert—
Amendment 83, page 258, line 18, at end insert—
Amendment 84, page 258, line 25 , after “1(1)” insert “—
Amendment 14, page 258, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (4) and insert—
Amendment 15, page 259, line 21 , at end insert—
Amendment 16, page 260, line 23 , at end insert—
Amendment 17, page 262, line 4 , at end insert—
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Amendments made: 89, page 71, line 35, leave out “otherwise” and insert
Amendment 90, page 72, line 2, at end insert—
Amendment 91, page 73, line 29, at end insert—
Amendment 92, page 74, line 8, after “by” insert
Amendment 93, page 75, line 1 after “constable,” insert
Amendments made: 94, page 91, line 21, leave out from beginning to “other” in line 23 and insert—
Amendment 95, page 91, line 28, at end insert—
Amendment made: 96, page 95, line 30, leave out “in public”.—(Mike Penning.)
Application of maritime enforcement powers: general
Amendments made: 97, page 96, line 13, after “waters” insert “or international waters”.
Amendment 98, page 96, line 15 after “waters” insert “or international waters”. .—(Mike Penning.)
Amendment made: 99, page 97, line 11, at end insert “or in international waters”. —(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 100, page 97, line 28, leave out “relevant waters” and insert
Amendment 101, page 97, line 34, leave out subsection (2). —(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 102, page 103, line 31, after “waters” insert “or international waters”.
Amendment 103, page 103, line 33, after “waters” insert “or international waters”. —(Mike Penning.)
Amendment made: 104, page 104, line 33, at end insert “or in international waters”.—(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 105, page 105, line 8, leave out “relevant waters” and insert
Amendment 106, page 105, line 14, leave out subsection (2). —(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 109, page 142, line 43, at end insert—
Amendment 110, page 142, line 46, at end insert—
Amendments made: 117, line 13 after “charge;” insert
Amendment 118, line 17 after “enforcement;” insert
Brought up, and read the First time.
Government new clause 54—Powers to seize invalid travel documents.
Government new clause 55—Anonymity of victims of forced marriage.
Government new clause 56—Licensing functions under taxi and PHV legislation: protection of children and vulnerable adults.
Government new clause 57—Powers of litter authorities in Scotland.
New clause 3—Digital Crime Review—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall have a duty to provide for a review of legislation which contains powers to prosecute individuals who may have been involved in the commission of digital crime in order to consolidate such powers in a single statute.
(2) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must have regard to the statutes and measures that he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) Malicious Communications Act 1988, section 1,
(b) Protection from Harassment Act 1997, section 2, 2a, 4, 4a,
(c) Offences against the Person Act 1861, section 16, 20, 39, 47,
(d) Data Protection Act 1998, section 10, 13 and 55,
(e) Criminal Justice Act 1998, section 160,
(f) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, section 30(1), (3),(5),(6), 78(5),
(g) Computer Misuse Act 1990, as amended by Serious Crime Act 2015 and Police and Justice Act 2006,
(h) Contempt of Court Act 1981,
(i) Human Rights Act 1998,
(j) Public Order Act 1986, section 4, 4a, 5, 16(b), 18,
(k) Serious Organised Crime Act 2005, section 145, 46,
(l) Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, section 48,
(m) Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2014, section 32, 34, 35, 36, 37,
(n) Protection of Children Act 1978,
(o) Obscene Publications Act 1959,
(p) Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section 28, 29-32,
(q) Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 145, 146,
(r) Communications Act 2003, section 127, 128-131,
(s) Data retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, section 4,
(t) Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1992, section 5,
(u) Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015,
(v) Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, section 33(5), 29(6),
(w) Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 2,
(x) Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 4, 8, 10, 62,
(y) Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, section 43,
(z) Magistrates Court Act 1980, section 127,
() Suicide Act 1961, section 2(1) as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009,
() Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, section 63,
() Theft Act 1968, section 21, and
() Criminal Law Act 1977, section 51(2)
(3) It shall be a duty of the Secretary of State to determine for the review any other statute under which persons have been prosecuted for a crime falling under section 1 of this Act.
(4) In the conduct of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with any person or body he deems appropriate, including but not limited to—
(a) the Police,
(b) Crown Prosecution Service,
(c) judiciary, and
(d) relevant community organisations.”
New clause 4—Surveillance and monitoring: offences—
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person—
(a) uses a digital device to repeatedly locate, listen to or watch a person without legitimate purpose,
(b) installs spyware, a webcam or any other device or software on another person’s property or digital device without the user’s agreement or without legitimate reason,
(c) takes multiple images of an individual unless it is in the public interest to do so without that individual’s permission and where the intent was not legitimate nor lawful,
(d) repeatedly orders goods or services for another person if the purpose of such actions is to cause distress, anxiety or to disrupt that person’s daily life,
(e) erases data remotely whilst a digital device is being examined by the police or any other lawful investigation,
(f) monitors a digital device registered to a person aged 17 or less if the purpose of that monitoring is to obtain information about a third person,
(g) monitors any other person’s digital device if the intent of the monitor is either to damage or steal data from that person, or
(h) creates a false persona on line without lawful reason if the purpose of such a creation is to intend to attempt to defraud, groom, impersonate or seriously damage the reputation of any other person.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(a) or (b) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or a fine.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1)(a) “repeatedly” shall be deemed as on two occasions or more.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1)(d) is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding the statutory limit.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under subsections (1)(e), (f), (g) or (h) is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
(6) The Secretary of State shall introduce restrictions on the sale of spyware to persons under the age of 16 and requests all persons who are purchasing such equipment to state their intended use of such equipment.”
New clause 5—Digital crime training and education—
‘(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that each Police Service shall invest in training on the prioritisation, investigation and evidence gathering in respect of digital crime and abuse.
(2) It shall be the responsibility of the Home Department to ensure that all Police services record complaints and outcomes of complaints of digital crime and abuse.
(3) It shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Home Department to publish annual statistics on complaints and outcomes of digital crime and abuse.”
New clause 6—Offence of abduction of a vulnerable child aged 16 or 17—
“(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if, knowingly and without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he or she—
(a) takes a child to whom this section applies away from the responsible person; or
(b) keeps such a child away from the responsible person; or
(c) induces, assists or incites such a child to run away or stay away from the responsible person or from a child’s place of residence.
(2) This section applies in relation to a child aged 16 or 17 who is—
(a) a child in need as defined in section 17 of the Children Act 1989; or
(b) a child looked after under section 20 of the Children Act 1989; or
(c) a child housed alone under part 7 of the Housing Act 1996; or
(d) a child who is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm subject to section 47 1(b) of the Children Act 1989.
(3) In this section “the responsible person” is—
(a) a person with a parental responsibility as defined in the Children Act 1989; or
(b) a person who for the time being has care of a vulnerable child aged 16 and 17 by virtue of a care order, an emergency protection order, or protection from section 46 of the Children Act 1989; or
(c) any other person as defined in regulations for the purposes of this section.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both such imprisonment and fine; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
(5) No prosecution for an offence above shall be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.”
New clause 10—Prevention of child sexual exploitation and private hire vehicles—
“(1) The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 47(1) insert—
“(1A) A district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(3) At end of section 48 (1) insert—
“(c) a district council must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 7 of the London Cab Order 1934 is amended as follows.
(5) After section 7(2) insert—
“(2A) Transport for London must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation.””
(6) Section 7 of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(7) After section 7(2) insert—
“(3) The licensing authority must carry out its functions under this section with a view to preventing child sexual exploitation.””
This new clause would place local authorities under a duty to consider how they can prevent child sexual exploitation when they issue licences for taxis and private hire vehicles.
New clause 13—Grooming for criminal behaviour: offence—
“(1) A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if—
(a) A has met or communicated with another person (B) on at least two occasions and subsequently—
(i) A intentionally meets B,
(ii) A travels with the intention of meeting B in any part of the world or arranges to meet B in any part of the world, or
(iii) B travels with the intention of meeting A in any part of the world,
(b) A intends to say or do anything to or in respect of B, during or after the meeting mentioned in paragraph (a)(i) to (iii) and in any part of the world, which if done will—
(i) encourage,
(ii) persuade, or
(iii) intimidate
B with the effect that B commits a criminal offence from which A will,
or intends to, profit.
(c) B is under 16, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over.
(2) For subsection (1)(b)(iii) to apply, A does not have to profit directly nor be the sole beneficiary of a criminal offence committed by B.
(3) In subsection (1) the reference to A having met or communicated with B is a reference to A having met B in any part of the world or having communicated with B by any means from, to or in any part of the world.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both,
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”
New clause 14—Grooming for criminal behaviour: prevention orders—
“(1) A court may make an order under this section in respect of a person aged 18 or over (A) where—
(a) A has committed an offence under section (Grooming for criminal behaviour); or
(b) the court is satisfied that A’s behaviour makes it necessary to make such an order, for the purpose of protecting one or more persons aged 16 or under from being encouraged, persuaded or intimidated by A into committing a crime from which A intends to profit.
(2) A chief officer of police may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for an order under this section in respect of a person who resides in his police area or who the chief officer believes is in, or is intending to come to, his police area if it appears to the chief officer that—
(a) the person has committed an offence under section (Grooming for criminal behaviour); or
(b) the person’s behaviour makes it reasonable to make such an order, for the purpose of protecting one or more other persons aged 16 or under from being encouraged, persuaded, facilitated or intimidated into committing a crime from which others will, or intend to, profit.
(c) the person has acted in such a way as to give reasonable cause to believe that it is necessary for such an order to be made.
(3) An application under subsection (2) may be made to any magistrates’ court whose commission area includes—
(a) any part of the applicant’s police area, or
(b) any place where it is alleged that the person acted in a way mentioned in subsection (2)(b).
(4) A grooming for criminal behaviour prevention order (GCBPO) that includes one or more requirements must specify the person who is to be responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement who may be an individual or an organisation.
(5) Before including a requirement, the court must receive evidence about its suitability and enforceability from—
(a) the individual to be specified under subsection (1), if an individual is to be specified;
(b) an individual representing the organisation to be specified under subsection (1), if an organisation is to be specified.
(6) Before including two or more requirements, the court must consider their compatibility with each other.
(7) It is the duty of a person specified under subsection (4)—
(a) to make any necessary arrangements in connection with the requirements for which the person has responsibility (the “relevant requirements”);
(b) to promote the compliance of the GCBPO subject with the relevant requirements;
(c) if the person considers that the GCBPO subject—
(i) has complied with all the relevant requirements, or
(ii) has failed to comply with a relevant requirement,
to inform the prosecution and the appropriate chief officer of police.
(8) In subsection (7)(c) “the appropriate chief officer of police” means—
(a) the chief officer of police for the police area in which it appears to the person specified under subsection (1) that—
(i) the GCBRO subject lives, or
(ii) one or more persons aged 16 or under as mentioned in subsection (1)(b) lives;
(b) if it appears to a person specified under subsection (4) that the GCBPO subject lives in more than one police area, whichever of the relevant chief officers of police that person thinks it most appropriate to inform.
(9) The subject of a GCBPO, in addition to any specific restrictions and requirements detailed within the order, must—
(a) keep in touch with the person specified under subsection (4) in relation to that requirement, in accordance with any instructions given by that person from time to time; and
(b) notify the person of any change of address.
These obligations have effect as requirements of the order.”
New clause 15—Sentencing guidelines review: children—
“(1) With an year of the day on which this Act is passed the Sentencing Council must conduct a review of it sentencing guidelines as they relate to crime against children and crimes where the victim is a child.
(2) The Sentencing Council must publish the findings of its review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.
(3) In conducting this review the Sentencing Council must consult—
(a) the Secretary of State for Justice,
(b) and any other bodies it thinks relevant.
(4) For the purpose of this section “child” has the same meaning as in section 105 of the Children Act 1989.”
This new clause would require the Sentencing Council to review the sentencing guideline for offences committed against children.
New clause 16—Soliciting via telecommunications order: applications, grounds and effect—
“(1) A chief officer of police may by complaint to a magistrates’ court apply for an order under this section (a “soliciting via telecommunication order“) in respect of a telecommunications service provider if it appears to the chief officer that a phone number (“the relevant phone number”) administered by a telecommunications service provider is being used for the purposes of advertising a person’s services as a prostitute.
(2) The chief office of police may make an application under subsection (1) only if the relevant phone number has been advertised in the chief officer‘s police area.
(3) Such an order requires the telecommunications service provider to take all reasonable steps to prevent calls to the relevant phone number being connected.
(4) It shall be an offence for a telecommunication service provider to fail to comply with terms of an order issued under this section.
(5) An organisation found guilty of an offence under subsection (5) shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine no greater than £50,000.”
This new clause would enable the police to request that a magistrate issues an order to mobile phone providers that they block a number if that number is on cards advertising prostitution and create an offence if they fail to comply with a fine of up to £50,000.
New clause 18—Cruelty to persons under sixteen: penalty—
“(1) The Children and Young Persons Act 1933 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1(1)(a) leave out the words “ten” and insert “fourteen.””
To increase the maximum tariff for child cruelty from 10 years imprisonment to 14 years.
New clause 33—Police observance of the Victims’ Code: enforcement—
“(1) The Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5(1B) omit paragraph (a) together with the final “or”.
(3) After section 5(1B) insert—
“(1BA) Subsection (1C) of this section applies if a written complaint is made to the Commissioner by a member of the public who claims that—
(a) a police officer
(b) a police service employee other than a police officer
(c) another person determined under section (1BC)
has failed to perform a Code duty owed by him to the member of the public.
(1BB) For the purposes of subsection (1BA) a Code duty is a duty imposed by a code of practice issued under section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (code of practice for victims).
(1BC) The Secretary of State may by regulation amend the categories of person identified in subsection (1BA) as the Secretary of State thinks fit.”
(4) In section 5(4A), after “(1A)”, insert “or (1BA)”.
(5) In section 6(3), at the beginning insert “Except as provided in subsection (3A)”.
(6) After section 6(3), insert—
“(3A) Subsection (3) shall apply in relation to a complaint under section 5(1BA) as if for “a member of the House of Commons” there were substituted “the Commissioner”.”
(7) In section 7(1A), after “5(1A)”, insert “or 5(1BA)”.
(8) In section 8(1A), after “5(1A)”, insert “or 5(1BA)”.
(9) After section 10(2A), insert—
“(2B) In any case where the Commissioner conducts an investigation pursuant to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, he shall send a report of the results of the investigation to—
(a) the person to whom the complaint relates,
(b) the principal officer of the department or authority concerned and to any other person who is alleged in the relevant complaint to have taken or authorised the action complained of, and
(c) the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses appointed under section 48 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.”
(10) After section 10(3B) insert—
“(3C) If, after conducting an investigation pursuant to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, it appears to the Commissioner that—
(a) the person to whom the complaint relates has failed to perform a Code duty owed by him to the person aggrieved, and
(b) the failure has not been, or will not be, remedied, the Commissioner shall lay before each House of Parliament a special report upon the case.
(3D) If the Commissioner lays a special report before each House of Parliament pursuant to subsection (3C) the Commissioner may also send a copy of the report to any person as the Commissioner thinks appropriate.
(3E) For the purposes of subsection (3C) “Code duty” has the meaning given by section 5(1BB) of this Act.”
(11) In section 10(5)(d), for “or (2A)” substitute “, (2A) or (2B)”.
(12) In section 12(1), after paragraph (b) of the definition of “person aggrieved”, insert—
“(c) in relation to a complaint under section 5(1BA) of this Act, means the person to whom the duty referred to in section 5 (1BA) of this Act is or is alleged to be owed;”.”
New clause 34—Police, etc. provision for victims’ entitlement: framework—
“(1) The Victims’ Code (a code of practice issued under section 32 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (code of practice for victims)) shall include, but not be limited to, the entitlement of victims to receive as follows.
(2) A victim of crime shall be entitled to receive—
(a) accurate and timely information from—
(i) the police
(ii) such other agencies of the criminal justice system concerned with the detection and prosecution of the relevant crime and with the support of victims of crime as the Secretary of State deems fit;
(b) The police must ensure provision to victims of adequate notice of all relevant court and other legal proceedings, including information about decisions by and discussions between the police and other agencies of the criminal justice system relating to the person convicted of the crime concerned (“the perpetrator”), including—
(i) information about any prison sentence previously served by the perpetrator,
(ii) information about relevant changes to the perpetrator’s circumstances whilst on parole or in custody,
(iii) information about any crimes committed by the perpetrator outside the UK where the victim of the crime concerned is a British national,
(iv) access, where required, to adequate interpretation and translation services, and
(v) information about the direct contact details of the criminal justice agencies and individuals involved in the court or other legal proceedings concerned.
(3) During criminal justice proceedings, the police and other relevant agencies and authorities of the criminal justice system must ensure that victims of crime—
(a) are not subjected to unnecessary delay by any other party to the proceedings;
(b) are treated with dignity and respect by all parties involved; and
(c) do not experience discriminatory behaviour from any other party to the proceedings.
(4) Children and vulnerable adults must be able to give evidence to a court secure location away from that court or from behind a protective screen.
(5) The investigating police force concerned must ensure the safety and protection of victims of crime during proceedings, including but not restricted to—
(a) a presumption that victims of crime may remain domiciled at their home with adequate police protection if required; and
(b) ensuring that the victim and those accompanying them are provided with access to discreet waiting areas during the relevant court proceedings.
(6) All victims of crime shall have access to an appropriate person to liaise with relevant agencies on their behalf and to inform them about, and explain the progress, outcomes and impact of, their case.
(7) Witnesses under the age of 18 shall have access to a trained communications expert, to be known as a Registered Intermediary, to help them understand as necessary what is happening in the criminal proceedings.
(8) Victims of crime shall have access to transcripts of any relevant legal proceedings at no cost to themselves.
(9) Victims of crime shall have the right to attend and make representations to a pre-court hearing to determine the nature of the court proceedings.
(10) The Secretary of State must take steps to ensure that victims of crime—
(a) have access to financial compensation from public funds for any detriment arising from the criminal case concerned;
(b) are given the right to approve or refuse the payment of any compensation order made by a court against a person convicted of a crime against them;
(c) have reimbursed to them, from public funds, any expenses incurred by them in attending in court and in any related legal process, whether in the UK or overseas;
(d) have available to them legal advice where considered necessary by a judge in court proceedings; and
(e) are not required to disclose personal data in legal proceedings which puts their safety at risk unless specifically ordered to do so by a judge.”
New clause 35—Police etc. training: treatment of victims—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall publish and implement a strategy for providing training on the impact of crime on victims and victims’ rights for staff of the following organisations—
(a) the police
(b) the Crown Prosecution Service, and
(c) any other public agency or authority that the Secretary of State deems appropriate.
(2) The Secretary of State may also by regulation make provision for judges, barristers and solicitors involved in criminal cases involving sexual and domestic violence undertake specialist training.
(3) The Secretary of State shall publish an agreed timetable for the delivery and completion of the training required by this section.”
New clause 36—Establishment and conduct of homicide reviews—
“(1) In this section “homicide review” means a review of the circumstances a person aged 16 or over has, or appears to have, died as the result of a homicide and—
(a) no one has been charged with the homicide, or
(b) the person(s) charged has been acquitted.
(2) The Secretary of State may in a particular case direct a police force or other specified person or body or a person or body within subsection (5) to establish, or to participate in, a homicide review.
(3) It is the duty of any person or body within subsection (5) establishing or participating in a homicide review (whether or not held pursuant to a direction under subsection (2)) to have regard to any guidance and standards issued by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses as to the establishment and conduct of such reviews.
(4) Any reference in subsection (2) to the Secretary of State shall, in relation to persons and bodies within subsection (5)(b), be construed as a reference to the PSNI or Department of Justice in Northern Ireland as may be appropriate.
(5) The persons and bodies within this subsection are—
(a) in relation to England and Wales—chief officers of police for police areas in England and Wales; local authorities; local probation boards established under section 4 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (c 43); the National Health Service Commissioning Board; clinical commissioning groups established under section 14D of the National Health Service Act 2006; providers of probation services; Local Health Boards established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006; NHS trusts established under section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 18 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland—the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland; the Probation Board for Northern Ireland; Health and Social Services Boards established under Article 16 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 (SI 1972/1265 (NI 14)); Health and Social Services trusts established under Article 10 of the Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 (SI 1991/194 (NI 1)).
(6) In subsection (5)(a) “local authority” means—
(a) in relation to England, the council of a district, county or London borough, the Common Council of the City of London and the Council of the Isles of Scilly;
(b) in relation to Wales, the council of a county or county borough.”
New clause 37—Statutory duty on elected local policing bodies—
“(1) An elected local policing body must assess—
(a) the needs of victims in each elected local policing body’s police area, and
(b) the adequacy and effectiveness of the available victims’ services in that area.
(2) An elected local policing body must—
(a) prepare and consult upon an Area Victims’ Plan for its police area,
(b) having taken account of any responses to its consultation and any Quality Standard, publish the Plan in such a manner as sets out clearly how the identified victim needs will be met by the available victims’ services, and
(c) submit its Area Victims’ Plan to the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses on an annual basis.
(3) In this section—
“elected local policing body” and “police area” have the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, and “Quality Standard” means the standard published under section 49(1)(f) of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.”
New clause 38—Duties of the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses—
“(1) Section 49 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (general functions of Commissioner) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (c) insert—
“(d) assess the adequacy of each elected local policing body’s Area Victims’ Plans submitted to the Commissioner under section (Statutory duty on elected local policing bodies) of the Policing and Crime Act 2016,
(e) make to elected local policing bodies such recommendations about submitted Area Victims’ Plans as the Commissioner considers necessary and appropriate;
(f) prepare a statement of standards (the “Quality Standard”) in relation to the provision of victims’ services;
(g) publish the Quality Standard in such manner as the Commissioner considers appropriate;
(h) review the Quality Standard at intervals of not more than five years;
(i) in preparing or reviewing a Quality Standard, consult the public, and for that purpose may publish drafts of the standard;
(j) assess the steps taken to support victims and witnesses in giving evidence;
(k) make such recommendations in relation to that assessment as the Commissioner considers necessary and appropriate;
(l) issue guidance and standards for the establishment and conduct of homicide reviews under section (Establishment and conduct of homicide reviews) of the Policing and Crime Act 2016.””
New clause 39—National anti-doping provisions—
“(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to—
(a) all athletes participating in sport in the UK who are members of a governing body of sport or an affiliate organisation or licensee of a governing body of sport (including any clubs, teams, associations or leagues);
(b) all athletes participating in such capacity in sporting events, competitions or other activities in the UK organised, convened, authorised or recognised by a governing body of sport or any of its member or affiliate organisations or licensees (including any clubs, teams, associations or leagues), wherever held;
(c) any other athlete participating in sport in the UK who, by virtue of a contractual arrangement or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of a governing body of sport for purposes of anti-doping; and
(d) any person belonging to the entourage of an athlete, whether or not such person is a citizen of, or resident in, the United Kingdom.
(2) An athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she knowingly takes a prohibited substance with the intention, or one of the intentions, of enhancing his or her performance.
(3) A person belonging to the entourage of an athlete is guilty of an offence if he or she encourages or assists or hides awareness of the relevant athlete taking a prohibited substance with the intention, or one of the intentions, of enhancing such athlete’s performance.
(4) A medical professional commits an offence if they proscribe a prohibited substance to an athlete and believe, or ought reasonably to believe, that the substance will be used by the athlete to enhance their performance.
(5) For the purposes of this section a “prohibited substance” is as defined by the World Anti-Doping Agency.
(6) Any person guilty of an offence under subsection (2), (3) or (4) shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both; or
(b) On conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or to both.
(7) UK Anti-Doping shall discuss the following issues with the World Anti-Doping Agency annually—
(a) the effectiveness of section 11 of the International Standard for Testing (athlete whereabouts requirements) and its harmonisation with EU privacy and working time rules and the European Convention on Human Rights;
(b) the effectiveness of the international work of the World Anti-Doping Agency; and
(c) progress on the development of a universal rollout of athlete biological passports.
(8) UK Anti-Doping shall submit the results of the annual discussions referred to in subsection (7) to the Secretary of State, who shall in turn—
(a) lay before both Houses of Parliament an annual report documenting—
(i) whether the athlete whereabouts requirements are effective in combating the abuse of drug-taking and in compliance with EU privacy and working time rules and the European Convention on Human Rights, and
(ii) the performance of the World Anti-Doping Agency in general; and
(b) determine whether the Government should remain a member and continue to support the World Anti-Doping Agency.”
New clause 41—Local Safeguarding Children Board: prevention of child sexual exploitation—
“(1) The Children Act 2004 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 14 after “children”, insert “and preventing child sexual exploitation, child abuse and child neglect.””
New clause 44—Modern technology: specialist digital unit (child abuse)—
“(1) The chief officer of each police force in Wales and England must ensure that within their force there is a unit that specialises in analysing and investigating allegations of online offences against children and young people.
(2) The chief officer must ensure that such a unit has access to sufficient digital forensic science resource to enable it to perform this function effectively and efficiently.”
New clause 46—Anonymity for victims who have private sexual photographs and films disclosed without their consent with intent to cause distress—
“(1) Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (b) insert—
(c) an offence under section 33 of the Criminal Courts and Justice Act 2015.”
New clause 47—Compensation for victims who have private sexual photographs and films disclosed without their consent with intent to cause distress—
“(1) Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (9), insert—
“(9A) The court may order a person guilty of an offence under this section to pay compensation to the victim of the offence, under sections 130 to 132 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.
(9B) Compensation under subsection (9A) may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the offence and any financial loss resulting from the offence.”
New clause 60—Duty to report on Child Abduction Warning Notices—
“(1) Each police force in England and Wales must report to the Secretary of State each year on—
(a) the number of Child Abduction Warning Notices issued;
(b) the number of Child Abduction Warning Notices breached; and
(c) the number of Sexual Risk Orders and Sexual Harm Prevention Orders issued following the breach of a Child Abduction Warning Notice.
(2) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report each year on—
(a) the number of Child Abduction Warning Notices issued in each police force in England and Wales;
(b) the number of Child Abduction Warning Notices breached in each police force in England and Wales; and
(c) the number of Sexual Risk Orders and Sexual Harm Prevention Orders issued following the breach of a Child Abduction Warning Notice in each police force in England and Wales
and must lay a copy of the report before Parliament.”
New clause 61—Disclosure of private sexual photographs and films without consent and with the intent to cause distress, fear or alarm, or recklessness as to distress, fear or alarm being caused—
“(1) Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) after “disclose” insert “or threaten to disclose”.
(3) In subsection (1)(b) after “distress” insert “fear or alarm or recklessness as to distress, fear or alarm being caused”.
(4) After subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) It is also an offence to knowingly promote, solicit or profit from private photographs and films that are reasonably believed to have been disclosed without consent and with the intent to cause distress, fear or alarm, or recklessness as to distress, fear or alarm being caused”.
(5) Leave out subsection (8).”
This new clause clarifies and expands the definition of the offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films without consent and with the intent to cause distress, also known as revenge pornography, so that it includes reckless intent. This new clause also makes it an offence to knowingly promote, solicit or profit from private photographs and films that are reasonably believed to have been disclosed without consent.
New clause 62—Meaning of “private” and “sexual”—
“(1) Section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (3)(a) after “exposed genitals” insert “breasts, buttocks,”.
(3) Leave out subsection 4.
(4) Leave out subsection 5.”
This new clause expands the definition of “sexual” and ensures the disclosure of pornographic photoshopped images, posted with the intent to cause distress, fear or alarm or recklessness as to distress, fear or alarm being caused, are covered by the law.
New clause 67—Misconduct in public office—
“(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person is a public officer,
(b) the person wilfully neglects to perform their duty or wilfully misconducts themselves in the performance of their public duty to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public‘s trust in the office holder, and
(c) the person acts without reasonable excuse or justification.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or, in relation to offences committed, to a fine, or to both;
(b) in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(c) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine, or to both.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a public officer is an officer who discharges any duty in the discharge of which the public are interested and includes, but is not limited to—
(a) executive or ministerial officers,
(b) police officer, including a police officer in a period of suspension and a former police officer doing part-time police work,
(c) constable,
(d) special constable,
(e) community support officer,
(f) employee of a police force with responsibility for the computer system of that police force,
(g) prison officer,
(h) Independent Monitoring Board member,
(i) nurse working within a prison,
(j) coroner,
(k) army officer,
(l) accountant in the office of the Paymaster General,
(m) Justice of the Peace
(n) magistrate,
(o) district judge,
(p) clergy of the Church of England,
(q) mayor,
(r) local councillor,
(s) employee of a local authority, and
(t) civil servant or other employee of a public body.”
This new clause seeks to codify the common law offence of misconduct in public office and prescribes a list of ‘public officers’ to which this offence shall apply
Government amendments 107, 108, 111 to 116 and 119 to 122.
I note what the Minister said earlier in support of localism, but would cautiously remind him if he were still in the Chamber that although Wales is one of the four nations of the United Kingdom, it is the only one that has no responsibility for its police forces. The Governments of both Scotland and Northern Ireland are able to acknowledge the specific needs of their communities and direct their police forces to work effectively in response to those needs, but Wales must follow the policing priorities of England.
The four police forces of Wales are unique in the United Kingdom in that they are non-devolved bodies operating within a largely devolved public services landscape. They are thus required to respond to the agendas of two Governments, and to serve a nation whose people have the right to use either the English or the Welsh language. It should be noted that the Assembly’s budget already funds 500 extra police community support officers.
What I am describing contrasts starkly with the situation in Wales. Power over policing is due to be devolved to English city regions: Manchester and Liverpool, for example. The present approach to devolution has been criticised in a House of Lords Constitutional Committee report, published last month, which described it as piecemeal and lacking a coherent vision. I would strongly argue that the devolution of policing to Wales would benefit the people of Wales, and that they are ill served by the antiquated England and Wales arrangement, which, inevitably, is designed with the priorities of English cities in mind.
Our demographics are different in Wales. The need to maintain effective services in rural areas with scattered populations cries out for better consideration. The impact of tourism—populations rocket at bank holidays and in summer months—stretches resources to the limit. Abersoch, in my constituency, has 1,000 year-round residents, yet North Wales police have to deal with an influx of 20,000 visitors in the summer season. I went on patrol with officers last August, and saw that drunken behaviour meant that police officers had to focus attention on that one community, travelling for hours back and forth along country roads to the nearest custody cells 30 miles away. The current arrangement of policing in England and Wales is dominated by English metropolitan concerns, and fails to provide for Wales's needs.
When devolution of policing to Wales was discussed in Committee, the Minister present referred to the Silk commission on devolution in Wales, which was established by his party in 2011 with cross-party membership. Part 2 was published in 2014 and recommended devolution. He made much at the time of the fact that there was no consensus on this recommendation as a result of the St David’s day process and “Powers for a purpose”.
Those involved in that process have told me it was little more than a tick-box exercise: if all party representatives liked it, the power was in the bag; if not, chuck it out, regardless of the implications for the governance and needs and, indeed, people of Wales. I note that in Committee Labour indicated a grudging support for devolving policing, albeit in the distant future: 10 years away. It seems pressure from Plaid is driving the accelerator. This is not a matter of jam tomorrow; we are living in hope of this today.
This opportunity is before the House here and now. The contents of future legislation and future amendments lack this certainty. If this House votes for devolution today, policing will be devolved to Wales, and the Government will then have to amend the Wales Bill accordingly at the very start of its journey. Indeed, surely, the Wales Bill deals first and foremost with constitutional matters, but here is our opportunity to make sure. I urge Labour to grasp the opportunity and support the National Assembly for Wales and all four police and crime commissioners in Wales and vote for the devolution of policing today.
New clauses 3, 4 and 5 relate to aspects of digital crime. I would note that these and new clause 44 are probing amendments. The Government state that resources are already provided to counter digital crime in the form of the National Cyber Crime Unit. I would respond that the National Cyber Crime Unit is relatively small, and that the national cyber security programme concentrates primarily on the security of businesses and infrastructure. Action Fraud addresses crime in relation to online fraud. The priorities are business, financial and serious crime, and do not cover the safeguarding of victims of abuse crimes such as domestic violence, stalking, harassment or hate crime.
The first of the new clauses proposes a review of legislation relating to digital crime and to consolidate the numerous Acts into a single statute. There are now over 30 statutes that cover online crime. Criminal justice professionals, including the police and CPS, believe this to be confusing at best and overwhelming at worst. Victims’ complaints are sometimes subject to delay, and there are times when officers are uncertain whether specific activities are criminal or not. The law has developed incrementally as technology advances, and there is an urgent need to codify and clarify the current situation. Consolidation will save police time and money. It will avoid duplication of officers on cases. Swifter action on victims’ complaints will reduce distress and anxiety.
As regards new clause 4, surveillance and monitoring highlights further issues against which there is currently no redress. The identification of these actions as offences will enable the police to counter activities that are evidently related to surveillance with intention to cause distress, and the law should respond appropriately.
New clause 5 addresses the need for training that is fit for purpose. Even in large police areas, fewer than 5% of officers and staff, including call and first response personnel, are trained in cyber-crime. Victims report being advised to go offline and not to use social media by officers. This defies modern communication media. It is equivalent to telling victims of harassment not to venture outside their own homes. The Home Office believes that training is a matter for individual forces, but in the absence of strong central leadership, this can only perpetuate present inconsistencies and variations from force to force. National training would help to raise the status of victims.
Finally, I turn to new clause 44, which calls for the establishment of a specialist digital unit to investigate online offences against children and young people. As I mentioned earlier, there is a real risk intrinsic in dependency on central units, although I acknowledge the work done by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. But, once again, children’s charities report to us that the scale of abuse of children online in terms of offenders, devices and images is leaving police swamped. There are delays in forensic analysis of devices—delays in some cases of up to 12 months. These delays pose risks to the safeguarding of children.
In Committee, the Minister mentioned the child abuse image database, and praised the accuracy of imagery interpretation and how it aids identification. It is of course to be commended that this database will take some of the load from individual forces. I would argue, none the less, that there is precedent for digital units on a similar model to domestic violence units as a means to ensure that all forces direct proper resources to this serious issue.
Those are the amendments that I have chosen to discuss, and I reiterate that they are probing amendments, but in closing I repeat my intention to press a Division on new clause 2.
We all need to get our Government and Governments around the world to wake up to the extent to which crime and criminal activity has now moved online. Our laws are not giving victims the protection they need and our police forces face a revolution if they are to tackle the crime that they face now effectively in the future.
There has been a significant shift in the way people experience harm in this world. New clause 44, as the hon. Lady has set out, calls for the police to have special digital units to deal particularly with child abuse images. Many police forces in this country, including my own in Hampshire, have gone a long way to building up this sort of specialist expertise, but the new clause is an interesting piece of advice on which I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response, as well as the response on police training.
There are serious questions to ask as to whether the providers of online space are doing what they need to do to keep their communities safe. They have not only a corporate social responsibility to do that, but I also think an economic imperative, because it is their brand names that are tarnished, and rightly so, when their products are used for illegal purposes.
Another aspect is not particularly brought up in the amendments today, but I will mention it: the importance of the international implications of all these things. If we are to get a solution to the sorts of crimes that are being committed online in this new digital world that does not respect country boundaries, we need to have some buy-in from international Governments, too. I myself have met companies in the US, but we need to go further than that and see whether we can actually get the sort of action that we need on an international basis by perhaps looking to the United Nations, or indeed the youth part of the UN, to explore how we can get more effective laws in the future that are not constricted by international boundaries.
Our law is struggling to cope. These amendments recognise that. The real need to recognise that online crime is different is a battle that was won when this Government put in place the revenge pornography law a year or so ago. We have already seen 1,000 reports to the police and thousands more people using the revenge pornography helpline, yet two-thirds of those cases that have been reported to the police have seen no action because of problems of the evidence that victims have been able to give or indeed because the victims have withdrawn it. Again, the new clauses are picking up those issues and calling on the Government to consider again. New clause 46 calls for anonymity of victims. That was considered at the time the law was put in place, but the advice then was to wait to see how things progressed. The statistics suggest that now is a time to think again, as new clause 41, which also deals with compensation, also seeks to do.
The myriad amendments before us today show the level of complexity involved and the level of concern among hon. Members from at least three parties represented in the Chamber tonight—I am sure Labour Front Benchers would share in this, too—but I worry that they offer a piecemeal set of solutions. The hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd picked up on that. Surely what is needed is a wholesale review of the law, police training and the development of international support for digital providers to take seriously the importance of keeping their communities safe online. I support the spirit of these amendments, but I am struck by the need for a more comprehensive review, perhaps in the form of the digital economy Bill, which Her Gracious Majesty announced in the Gracious Speech only last month.
Currently, we have numerous prevention orders available to the police to combat grooming for child sexual exploitation, including sexual risk orders, sexual harm prevention orders and child abduction warning notices. I would like to see the creation of a similar order to be used where children are being groomed by organised crime to act as drug runners. That would be a practical way of disrupting activities including the phenomenon of “county lines”, whereby criminals groom and coerce children and young people into selling class A drugs many miles from home, often in quiet towns. Organised crime is aggressively creating new markets for drugs, in every seaside town and every small country village across the country. Criminals used to do their own drug running, but now they are actively identifying groups of vulnerable children to use, including those living in children’s homes and pupil referral units, to minimise the risk to themselves. As I said in a previous debate, county lines is the next big grooming scandal on the horizon. It takes many forms, but its basis is using vulnerable children and adults to develop new markets for drugs.
One example I saw involved a 15-year-old girl who was offered £500 to go “up country” to sell drugs. She had the class A drugs plugged inside her but was then set up by the original gang and assaulted on the train, and had the drugs forcibly removed from her. She was told she must pay back £3,000 to the group for the stolen drugs, and had to continue to sell drugs and provide sexual favours. The threat of child sexual exploitation for girls in gangs is known, but the added factor of being trafficked to remote locations compounds their vulnerability. Those young people are at risk of physical violence, sexual exploitation, and emotional and physical abuse. That model of grooming arguably involves both trafficking and modern slavery. Children from Greater Manchester are being groomed by criminal gangs and have been found selling drugs in places as far away as Devon. These gang members are rather like modern-day Fagins or Bill Sikes: hard men who groom youngsters and get them to do their dirty work. They need to be stopped in their tracks.
The recent Home Office report “Ending gang violence and exploitation” said that young girls are often groomed for involvement in criminal behaviour and harmful sexual behaviour as part of gang culture. Indeed, the most recent Rotherham trial showed the connection between organised crime and drugs and child sexual exploitation. I have read the recent Home Office report and also the National Crime Agency report on county lines from August 2015, and I think this development is not fully understood or recognised. Someone, somewhere needs to take ownership of a strategy to disrupt this aggressive organised network, and that strategy needs to put the safeguarding children first. I am not pretending for one minute that Fagin orders would be a silver bullet, but they would indicate a change in culture and a recognition that the responsibility lies with the adults who groom the children. We really cannot afford to make the same mistakes as we did with child sexual exploitation, where we let terrible things happen to children because we blamed them for bringing about their own exploitation.
Child sexual exploitation and drug running and involvement with criminal activities are often intertwined, which is why we need a two-pronged approach. Just as we have prevention orders for child sexual exploitation, we should have similar prevention orders for adults grooming children for criminal behaviour. We need a response to county lines that ensures that children are found, safeguarded and supported out of gangs, and that adults are stopped as early as possible from grooming and manipulating children, and are punished to the full extent of the law. Until then, it will continue to be the young victims who are exploited, blamed and then punished as their abusers and puppet masters continue with a trade that nets organised crime millions of pounds a year.
We should use the digital economy Bill to create the offence of living off immoral earnings for these internet providers, because, by turning a blind eye and not interrogating the data that are coming through their pipes, that is effectively what they are doing. They should turn off such material so that eyes below the age of 18 cannot see it. They are living off immoral earnings and they are not living up to their duty to society and to our children. We need to find some way to make them face up to their obligations.
I have three children, two of whom are very small. I feel as if I am in a daily fight for them with the media—whether it is TV, online or whatever it might be. We carefully ration what they get and what they can see. I hope to God that, as they grow and become teenagers, I can protect them from the worst excesses, but I need some help. I need help from the Government. I also need help from those who control the data and our access to the internet. They can do it in any number of ways and they should be forced to do it on pain of significant financial penalties. It is only when the pound is there and their profits are threatened that they will finally focus and come up with the technical solutions that we need.
I know that you, Mr Deputy Speaker, have been an aficionado of my political career, so you will know that, 15 years ago I was charged with getting rid of prostitutes’ cards in telephone boxes. It was costing Westminster council about a quarter of a million pounds a year to remove these things, and so I was given the job of getting rid of them. We tried clearing them out and putting up false cards so that people were misdirected. We tried all sorts of things. In the end, the only solution that we came up with that we and BT felt would work was barring the numbers. I visited all the mobile companies and, as people had landlines in those days, all the landline companies as well—NTL, BT and all the rest. I said to them, “When we notify you of this number, we would like you to bar it.” They said, “We will not do that, but we will if you manage to make placing the cards an offence.” They thought that I would give up at that stage, as there would be too much of a mountain to climb. None the less, we decided to have a go, and so ensued a two-year campaign to get that offence on the statute book.
During those two years, I learned the truth about prostitutes’ cards and, indeed, the advertising of prostitution generally. Effectively, being allowed to advertise for free and in an unrestricted way on our streets, in the back of our newspapers and online is organised crime. When someone gets one of these numbers, they are ringing not a prostitute who is a victim, but a switchboard. When they ring the number and say what they want, they will get a menu of women—mostly it is women—trafficked or otherwise, of all ages, creeds and races. They can pick from the menu. Those numbers then gather a bit of value. Once someone is a punter and they have used the number and got what they wanted, they will use it again and again and again.
I started to learn that understanding the economics behind these telephone numbers is key to how we can eradicate them. Once we realise that these numbers carry a value and that there is a stream of income attached to them, it becomes even more pressing that we should bar them. When we add to that the fact that the printing of the cards, the advertising, and the websites also cost money—prostitutes’ cards are printed in the hundreds of thousands to make them incredibly cheap—we can see why making it dangerous to advertise a telephone number could become an extremely effective deterrent. If they advertise a number that is gathering income, and it is barred within 24 hours, they lose all of that income. Hitting them in the pocket is the most effective way to do it.
Eventually, after a two-year campaign, we got the offence made illegal. I was helped by friends in the House of Lords. The night that it was enacted by Her Majesty the Queen, we arrested the first carder—an Italian law student. I remember it well. He was bailed and disappeared back to Italy. The very next week, I had a meeting with the mobile phone companies and they completely welched on the deal. They did not realise that we would get it done, and that by campaigning for two years and by having a bit of gumption, we would manage to achieve our goal.
The phone companies completely reneged on the deal. As a result, I have been waiting for the opportunity to try to put to the Government the idea that there is this solution to the problem. I present here a simple solution, which is, effectively, if the chief officer of police finds a number being advertised in their area for the purposes of prostitution, they can apply to a magistrate to have the number barred. That means that both the police officer and the magistrate have to judge whether that is a measured thing to do; it is not automatic. It is for the police to decide. I would advise the police officers to warn the owner of the number that this is about to happen before they do it. It is a relatively simple solution, and I guarantee that it will result in the disappearance of these cards from Liverpool, Manchester, the west end or wherever they may be.
My hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton) is right that the scheme could be extended. There could be numbers used for dealing drugs and for selling cigarettes. Numbers for prostitution and drugs could be on the internet. People can access such numbers quite freely at the moment. We need to cut the numbers. If we do it swiftly, we will certainly go a huge way towards suppressing the activity and making it difficult for criminal and customer to connect. I do not intend to press my amendment to a vote, but I ask the Government to look at it—the Minister has promised to do so—and hopefully it will come back in the Lords.
I have tabled another two new clauses. You will have noticed, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I have had a theme during my time in this House, which is the protection of children. It has alarmed me for some time that the legislation protecting children is elderly, out of date and very patchy. The offence of child cruelty, which I am seeking to raise the tariff for tonight, dates back to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. It still includes things such as allowing a child to be burned, which used to arise when we sent them up chimneys. The legislation is very elderly and is really not fit for purpose. The last time the sentence for child cruelty was looked at was in 1988. We have not looked at it for nearly 30 years, and yet the number of offences is rising quite significantly. Clearly, the deterrent effect is not working. I am given to understand that the Sentencing Council will review child cruelty over the coming summer. If it does so, we are duty bound to try to give it a bit of headroom and move the tariff up from 10 years to 14 years for the most severe offences.
New clause 15 is about reviewing all child offences. We have been very good in the House in seeking to protect vulnerable groups by legislation generally. If someone commits a crime against someone who is gay because they are gay, they will get an aggravated sentence. Similarly, if they commit a crime against someone who is black because they are black, they will get an aggravated sentence. If they commit an offence against someone on the grounds of their religion, they will get an aggravated sentence. Yet if they commit an offence against a child because they are a child, they will not necessarily get an aggravated sentence.
Children are not a protected group in law, unlike other minority and vulnerable groups, and they should be. I am grateful to Public Bill Office for helping me try to draft an amendment that would allow me to do that. The best way that we could find to do it was to require the Sentencing Council to review all offences for children within 12 months, to allow us all to have our say about aggravating the sentences when offences are committed against children.
I have attempted to insert this principle in previous Bills—principally, in the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. Sadly, the Government would not accept my amendment, which would have ensured that anyone who sold a psychoactive substance to a child would get a stiffer sentence than if they sold it to a 55-year-old man. It seems crazy to me that that would not happen, but the Government would not accept the amendment, so this is my attempt to do something similar.
All my amendments are probing. I am willing to give the Government time, in consultation, to look at them again. I hope that they will come back in the Lords, but if they do not, I gather that, pleasingly, we get a policing and crime Bill along in the House once every six months, so I will get another chance. On that basis, I hope that my hon. Friends will look at the amendments at least and give them a thumbs-up for future consideration.
I start with new clause 6, which relates to the extension of child abduction warning notices, known as CAWNs, which are a vital tool for the police in the prevention of the abuse and exploitation of children. CAWNs are issued by the police at the request of a parent or legal guardian. They disrupt contact between a child and an adult believed to be in the process of grooming that child for sex. Currently, the police can issue a CAWN in relation to any child under the age of 16, but only a tiny minority of 16 and 17-year-olds, including children who have been taken into care under section 31 of the Children Act 1989, those who are subject to an emergency protection order and those in police protection. All other 16 and 17-year-olds are left unprotected.
By definition, children in care are vulnerable. The last available annual statistics show that 4,320 16 and 17-year-olds who became looked after by the local authority would not be eligible for the protection of a child abduction warning notice. The Minister has previously expressed some scepticism about the proposals to extend the use of those notices to all children in care. I recognise the sensitivities about the law in this area, given that 16 and 17-year-olds are legally able to marry and consent to sexual activity, but that group of children—yes, they are legally children—are living unstable and risky lives. They face a significantly greater risk of sexual exploitation than others and are targeted by adults who exploit their vulnerability, yet the police are denied access to a critical intervention tool that would help to keep them safe.
I agree with the Minister that CAWNs are an imperfect tool, but we agree that children of any age, including those who are 16 and 17, must be able to rely on the state for protection. For three years, I have been pushing successive Ministers to find a solution. The way to deal with complex issues is not to avoid them altogether. We need to persevere and collaborate so that we can find the best possible solutions. It is vital that we get legislation to protect all children up to the age of 18 from abuse, and it is important that we get that legislation right. I know that the Minister is not minded to support new clause 6, so what assurances can she give us that the Government plan to ensure that children up to the age of 18 are protected from the early stages of sexual grooming?
Next, I turn my attention to new clause 60, which, unlike new clause 6, relates to the existing use of child abduction warning notices by the police. CAWNs are not legally enforceable. Breaching a notice is not a criminal offence but does form an evidence base for future action. That further action, according to Government guidance, is meant to take the form of a sexual harm prevention order or a sexual risk order, both of which require a higher threshold to use. They are legally enforceable and punishable with criminal sanctions.
In theory, that is a good system. It allows the police to intervene formally to prevent harm at the earliest possible stage when concerns have been expressed about an adult’s behaviour towards a child. Even when demonstrable evidence is sparse, the police have the ability to take further action, using the breach of a CAWN as evidence. The police currently have the tools to escalate their response to keep, and continue to keep, a child safe. The problem is that police forces in England and Wales are failing to record the breach of a child abduction warning notice. Indeed, they are failing to record the issuing of a notice in the first place and the actions that follow from that breach.
As the tactics of perpetrators change, so must our approach. That involves constant vigilance on how perpetrators operate and constant monitoring of the effectiveness of our response. In that light, failing to record the effectiveness of the current system is unforgivable. If the Minister is unable to assess whether the regime works, how can she assess the safety of the children we have a duty to protect?
New clause 60 would deal with the issue directly by requiring police forces to collect annually the number of child abduction warning notices issued or breached and the number of sexual risk orders and sexual harm prevention orders issued following such a breach. It would require the Secretary of State to report to Parliament annually on those data. We need to get the legislation right: every Member must take responsibility for the children to whom we owe a duty of care. That can be done only by having the proper data to hand. For that reason, I intend to press new clause 60 to a Division.
New clause 10 and Government amendment 56 both relate to the licensing of taxis and private hire vehicles. From the experience of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham, I know the importance having a robust taxi licensing scheme for protecting passengers and drivers. Both the Jay and Casey independent reports on the disaster in Rotherham recognised the vulnerability of a weak taxi licensing system and what it means for child protection.
To create the system in Rotherham, there was much consultation not only with taxi drivers but with the survivors of child abuse. Rotherham Borough Council has now implemented a new licensing system, which is one of the points covered in new clause 10. Two years after the horror that we discovered in Rotherham, the Government have failed to take action to make the taxi profession safer across the UK for all vulnerable people in our society. They must learn lessons when such things go catastrophically wrong. In Committee, Labour pushed the Government to place taxi and private vehicle licensing authorities under a statutory obligation to prevent child sexual exploitation.
Taxi drivers are in a position of considerable trust. The overwhelming majority of taxi drivers live up to the responsibility that their role creates for them, but unfortunately a minority do not. Better regulation is needed urgently to improve the training and awareness of drivers, so that they can play a part in keeping vulnerable children safe from harm and so that they know how to report abuse if they see it. All local authorities must ensure that checks are carried out to prevent perpetrators or potential perpetrators from being licensed. Monitoring must be in place, complaints must be investigated and passengers must feel confident.
I am delighted to see that the Government have listened to Labour and have responded to our new clause by tabling one of their own, which would empower the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to licensing authorities. However, can the Minister give us an assurance that Government new clause 56 would have the same effect as our new clause 10? I notice that the Government’s new clause will empower but not require the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance. Can the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State does intend to issue guidance, and to do so without delay? I would appreciate an indication of the timeline involved, both on the roll-out of the consultation and on when the guidance will take effect.
The Government have been good at making promises about tackling child sexual exploitation, but not so good at following them up with action. Will the Minister make some commitments on taxi licensing? I would appreciate a steer on the contents of the guidance, although I realise that they will be the subject of consultation. The Minister may want to write to me on that point.
Councils continue to report a lack of intelligence sharing by the police on issues crucial to deciding the suitability of applicants for taxi licences. Although the new common-law disclosure policy should allow for information sharing, the interpretation varies and many police forces do not share data. Guidance to councils alone will not resolve the problem. Will the Home Office take steps to ensure that the police co-operate fully with councils so that applicants for taxi licences can be screened effectively?
Finally, will the Minister confirm the status of the guidance? Government new clause 56 states that licensing authorities “must have regard” to it. I hope the Minister will clarify that the guidance must be followed, not just looked at and put in a drawer. If the Minister can provide confirmation on those questions, we are minded to withdraw our new clause and support the Government’s.
New clause 41 would make it explicit in the law that local safeguarding children boards have an obligation to prevent child sexual exploitation and other forms of child abuse. Such boards should bring together professionals in education, law enforcement, social care and the voluntary sector to help protect children. They are collaborative bodies, established by the Labour Government, which have the potential to ensure that the focus of every organisation on the board is the protection and welfare of children. Local safeguarding children boards have the potential to act as the canary to child sexual exploitation and abuse, bringing together professionals who can develop a full picture of the harm being perpetrated against a child. But far more emphasis must be given to the prevention of child sexual exploitation and child abuse.
Chief Constable Simon Bailey has said that in 2015 more than £1 billion was spent on investigating child abuse allegations. Sadly, by the time the police are involved, it is likely that children have already been harmed and will be living with the trauma for the rest of their lives. The Prime Minister has given child sexual exploitation the status of a “national threat” in the strategic policing requirement. I therefore hope that the Minister will support our new clause to explicitly broaden the objectives of local safeguarding children boards to include a focus on the prevention of sexual exploitation.
I support new clauses 13 and 14. I praise my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey), who works tirelessly for the protection of children in her constituency and across the country. She has been a role model and a mentor to me, and I want to put on record my gratitude to her for all the help she has given to me and to all the children in this country. She has been tireless, and I am very grateful for that.
My hon. Friend’s new clauses, which deal with the grooming of children for criminal behaviour, raise an important issue that the House must tackle. Children are not just at risk of grooming for sex. They face exploitation by criminals for terrorism, trafficking and drug-related offences, for instance—we have heard other examples. The Government must take the issue seriously and offer a holistic approach to tackling child grooming and exploitation. Will the Minister work closely with my hon. Friend to turn her new clauses 13 and 14 into legislation?
New clauses 46, 47, 61 and 62 were tabled by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). Through my campaigning work to prevent violence, exploitation and harm against children, I have seen the most dramatic and shocking increase in the proliferation of sexual images, often taken and shared by children. The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the current legislation has been in effect for only a year. I hope he will support my call on the Government to conduct a thorough review of the effectiveness of the legislation, the number of prosecutions and convictions, and the suitability of the sentences given.
I welcome Government new clause 55, which will create lifetime anonymity for victims of forced marriage. The crime of forced marriage is another form of domestic violence. The victims, mostly women, suffer violence, threats of violence, coercion, manipulation, psychological trauma and economic control. As with every other form of domestic violence, victims have their right to determine their own lives forcibly removed from them by their abusers. Anonymity will encourage victims to come forward and seek help from the police. It will give a survivor of this form of domestic violence a chance to regain control and rebuild their life. Now that the Government recognise the benefit of anonymity for victims of forced marriage, female genital mutilation and sexual abuse, I hope they will consider extending anonymity to victims of other forms of domestic and sexual violence and do more to raise awareness of these awful crimes.
I would like briefly to comment on a number of the provisions tabled by the shadow Home Office team, led by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). It is unfortunate but true that our criminal justice system does not always place support for the victim at its core. I know from my work with victims of domestic and sexual violence that they often feel totally unsupported when reporting a crime or after a prosecution. Many victims face the most horrendous ordeal in court, where they are forced to relive their trauma over and over again. Yet there is no statutory framework in the criminal justice system for the provision of services for victims—there is no legal regime promoting and protecting victims’ rights from the beginning to the end of their engagement with the criminal justice system. Similarly, the role of the Victim’s Commissioner has great potential, but the position is under-resourced and exists without significant powers. Victims’ rights will be taken seriously only if and when they are enshrined in law. I hope the Government will hear our calls today and make that a reality.
I wish to end by commenting on new clause 2, which would devolve responsibility for policing to the Welsh Assembly. I have had the pleasure of working with the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts) on other clauses in the Bill relating to child protection, so I have no doubt that the convictions she has expressed in this new clause are heartfelt and sincere and need to be taken seriously. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) has outlined, Labour believes that the people of Wales should have a greater say over the policing of Wales, and that should be pursued through the Wales Bill.
I am grateful for the indications of support for my new clauses that I have had from members of different parties, including those not represented in the House. In particular, members of the Women’s Equality party are assiduous and effective campaigners on the issue of revenge pornography; indeed, they were the authors of new clauses 61 and 62.
The hon. Member for Rotherham, who spoke from the Opposition Front Bench, rightly said that it was only last year that we undertook the criminalisation of revenge pornography. That was a quite remarkable step, and none of us should underestimate its importance. However, to pick up a point that she made, the statistics already demonstrate that this is a stubborn problem, which will require more action if we are to bring about the changes in attitude that will ultimately see this behaviour reduced and, hopefully, eliminated.
From April to December last year, 1,160 cases were reported, which is quite remarkable, given the period we are dealing with—indeed, those figures are from England and Wales alone. Only 11% of the cases that have been reported have led to charge, with 82 prosecutions and 74 cautions resulting from those charges. That suggests that with regard to the need to see a change in attitude and behaviour, we first need to see it among some of the criminal justice professionals dealing with this—the police officers, prosecutors, and judges.
This takes me back to my early career, when as a trainee and then a qualified solicitor, I worked for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Edinburgh, where one of my first bosses—she was then a senior legal assistant—was Elish Angiolini, who became the first female Lord Advocate, and the first solicitor Lord Advocate, in Scotland. At that time, along with other colleagues, she did tremendous amounts to drive forward improvements in how the victims of sexual abuse in general, but child sexual abuse in particular, were treated by the court system. A lot of it seems very rudimentary and basic stuff now, but in the early and mid-1990s, when we were arranging for court visits ahead of trials so that victims of these sorts of offences could give their evidence from behind a screen or by live link, it seemed pretty revolutionary, and it met with substantial resistance from the police—not so much the police, in fairness, but certainly many within the legal profession. We were right to drive those changes, as has been demonstrated by the way in which the law and procedure in that area has developed ever since. A similar attitude and a similar drive is now required in relation to the offence of revenge pornography.
New clause 46 goes right to the heart of this by seeking to extend the protection of anonymity to victims of revenge pornography. That would mean that we would not necessarily have to wait for a review to look further at where cases and procedures will develop in this area. As we have heard, the principle of anonymity is accepted by the Government in relation to victims of forced marriage. I welcome new clause 55, which extends that protection. However, it surely strikes at the heart of the offence that we introduced last year that we should seek to protect those women—they are nearly all women—who are, in essence, subject to an invasion of privacy. No really meaningful remedy is available to them if making complaints seeking to reinforce the criminal sanctions that come as a result of that invasion of privacy only makes them vulnerable to further invasions of privacy. That is why it is important that at some point, by whatever means—I will listen very carefully to the Minister’s response—we should look at extending the protection of anonymity to these victims.
New clause 47 would allow the court to make compensation orders to victims of revenge pornography. Many campaigning in this field would like a full civil remedy to be available, although that would have taken us somewhat beyond the scope of this Bill. However, we ought to be taking advantage of the quite remarkable degree of consensus that we have seen across the Chamber tonight. I hope the Government will recognise that and take full advantage of it, because that sort of consensus is rare enough, and when we see it we ought to make the most of it.
New clause 61 would extend the test from an intent to cause alarm, as in section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, to include recklessness. This strikes at what is required evidentially to provide mens rea in relation to the commission of the offence. It would bring people in England and Wales into line with the protections that are already afforded to people in Scotland through the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016.
The offence would also be extended from one that required disclosure of the material to one that required a threat to disclose it. Research indicates that no fewer than one in 10 ex-partners make that threat. If the outcome is to provide meaningful protection, it would make sense to extend the ambit of the offence to include a threat to disclose. That is being pursued by the #CtrlAltDel campaign, which is being led by the Women’s Equality party and which I commend to the House.
The final new clause standing in my name is new clause 62, which brings me to the point made by the right hon. Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller).
I do not have a great deal to say about new clause 62, but it might assist the House if I explain that, by seeking to extend the definition of the offence, we are striking at the stress caused by, and the actual outcome of, the behaviour suffered by victims of this abuse. At the moment, the definition is drawn tightly, for reasons that I think are understood by all. Those experienced in the field, however, say that the harm and distress caused is the same for those who have suffered this wider disclosure and that it would make sense to ensure that they are equally covered by the criminal law.
We lost our helicopter in Dyfed-Powys because policing is not devolved to Wales. Northern Ireland and Scotland have kept their helicopter services, yet Wales has been put in a centralised service called the National Police Air Service, which means that our helicopter has been pooled from Dyfed-Powys. The only figures available from the month of January—the first operational month for NPAS as far as Dyfed-Powys is concerned—show that 86% of requests by police officers in Dyfed-Powys were not honoured by NPAS.
This is not just about police officers not having the service and support that they deserve; the residents of Dyfed-Powys are also clearly being let down. Let us remember that we are now hitting high season, during which the population of Dyfed-Powys will swell considerably, not least with people who will enjoy our fantastic coastline, so use of the helicopter will become far more important.
Devolving policing is not just about securing equality for Wales. It is devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and it will be devolved to cities in England, but why is it not being devolved to Wales?
I am very disappointed that the Labour party is abstaining on this issue, but I am delighted that we have the support of the Lib Dems. Where are the Welsh MPs? Not a single Tory MP who represents a Welsh constituency is here to debate a vital policy issue for my country. Only two Labour MPs from Wales have been in the Chamber—the hon. Members for Swansea East (Carolyn Harris) and for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones)—and I am delighted that the hon. Member for Newport East (Jessica Morden) is here as well. These debates will be recorded by the people of Wales and they will be reported by the press, I hope. The people of Wales will draw their own conclusions from the lack of action by the Unionist parties.
The measure is modelled on the anonymity that we introduced for victims of female genital mutilation last year. It will mean that victims of forced marriage are anonymous from the time an allegation is made, and it will prohibit the publication or broadcast of any information likely to result in their being identified to the public. The protection given will be broad and wide ranging. It will cover traditional print and broadcast media as well as information published online, including on social media. Breach of the prohibition will be an offence punishable by an unlimited fine. We believe that this measure, together with the wider package of work that the Government have taken forward on forced marriage, will send a clear message that this abhorrent practice will not be tolerated in the UK.
New clause 15, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse), proposes a sentencing guidelines review. I have met him to discuss the new clause and his other amendments, and he also knows from his discussions with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), who is responsible for sentencing, and the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims that the Ministry of Justice is looking at the matter of sentencing overall with a view to introducing proposals in a Bill that was announced in the recent Gracious Speech. On that basis, I hope that he will agree that it would be right to look at all these matters in the round, rather than looking at them in isolation.
Turning to new clause 16, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, whose work on soliciting has involved a 20-year campaign. He deserves great credit for all his achievements on tackling soliciting through the use of cards in telephone boxes and through other means. I think we can all agree that telephone boxes across the country—those that are left—are much cleaner and more pleasant as a result of his work. He has indicated that his main focus is on tackling the organised crime groups that profit from the exploitation of vulnerable people. That is a laudable aim that I share, but I hope he will agree that it would be premature to legislate before we fully understand the most effective ways of disrupting a criminal gang’s ability to raise income through prostitution as well as through other means such as drugs and firearms. We need to know more about the extent to which organised criminals derive profits in this way.
We also need properly to consider whether there are existing powers that could be used to disrupt organised crime gangs operating in this way. I am concerned that, without that information, we would simply be providing the police with a power whose application would be onerous—a court order would be required—and whose use could be ineffective if gangs simply chose to change their numbers and print new cards. He explained the business case for those cards very effectively. I have asked my officials to work with the National Crime Agency to develop our understanding of the link between organised crime and prostitution, and I undertake to keep my hon. Friend informed of our progress and intentions.
New clause 67 deals with misconduct in a public office. In the last Parliament, we legislated for a new police corruption offence that supplements the common law offence of misconduct in public office and carries a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. It has been in force since April 2015. New clause 2 covers the devolution of policing, which was raised by the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts). I hope she will forgive my pronunciation of the name of her constituency. Was that close enough? As we discussed in Committee, my pronunciation is poor but I will keep trying. She argued powerfully for the devolution of policing in Wales, but the Government have been clear that in the absence of consensus on the Silk commission’s proposals on this matter, policing should not be devolved to the Welsh Government and National Assembly until such consensus can be reached.
The current England and Wales-wide arrangements for policing work well, and the proponents of devolution have failed adequately to address the significant risks that would arise if those arrangements were disrupted. I disagree with the hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd when she says that policing in England and Wales is set up for urban areas in England. I represent a rural constituency in England, and the way in which policing operates by devolving power to the police and crime commissioners to ensure that we have the right policing for each area is certainly right for my constituency. However, we are debating the Wales Bill tomorrow, and it will be important to debate these matters fully then, as the hon. Member for Rotherham has also suggested.
I am conscious of the time, and I want to try to get through as much of my speech as possible, so I will turn to digital crime issues. We debated in Committee many of the points that have been raised. My right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Mrs Miller) made very important and powerful points about the law on digital crime. However, I do not accept the premise that the criminal law is defective in this area. It is important to acknowledge that the crimes are the same; the fact that they are committed online does not change anything. I would not wish to create a whole new suite of offences that may confuse the courts and make it more difficult to get convictions.
New clause 44—I realise that I am darting about, but I am doing my best to get through my speech—is about a specialist digital unit. Again, we discussed this in Committee. The way operational policing decisions are taken is a matter for chief officers; it is not something on which the Home Office should legislate to say that every force should operate in such a way. That is down to chief officers locally and, of course, police and crime commissioners. [Interruption.] I am now coming to the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham.
I want to take new clause 6 and all the points about child protection together. We have had many debates about the issue of vulnerable young people and children, how best we can protect them and how to stop their going missing. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey), who, as her Front-Bench colleague said, has been such a pioneer in this area. When she talks, I know that she is talking common sense. The hon. Member for Rotherham and other Members will know that I am determined to tackle this issue, but I think we need to do it in the right way. That is why I have convened the round table in a couple of weeks’ time to look at the overall issue of child abduction warning notices. I am not convinced that a warning notice from the police in relation to a child abduction offence is necessarily the right way to make sure we protect such vulnerable young people. I want to consider all issues relating to child abduction warning notices—I think the hon. Member for Stockport has been invited to the round table, but if not, I now extend an invitation to her—and to look at everything we are doing in this area and at ensuring we have the right tools in the armoury for the law enforcement agencies, because it is so important that the police are able to use those tools and to protect young people with the right tools for those young people.
I am extremely conscious of the time and that I need to leave a moment before 9 o’clock, so I will now sit down. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will agree the Government new clauses and amendments, and that they will not press their own.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing order No. 83E).
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
Brought up.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
Amendment made: 107, page 137, line 16, at end insert—
Amendment made: 108, page 138, leave out lines 13 to 16.—(Mike Penning.)
Amendments made: 111, page 143, line 4, leave out “132 and”.
Amendment 112, page 143, line 4, at end insert—
Amendment 113, page 143, line 31, at end insert—
Amendment 114, page 143, line 34, at end insert—
Amendments made: 115, page 143, line 43, at end insert—
Amendment 116, page 144, line 7, at end insert—
Amendments made: 119, line 26 after “information;” insert
Amendment 120, line 26 after “information;” insert
Amendment 121, line 27 after “children” insert
Amendment 122, line 27 after “children;” insert
On resuming—
Under Standing Order No. 83M, consent motions are therefore required for the Bill to proceed. Copies of the motions are available in the Vote Office and on the parliamentary website, and have been made available to Members in the Chamber. Does the Minister intend to move the consent motions?
The House forthwith resolved itself into the Legislative Grand Committee (England and Wales) (Standing Order No. 83M).
[Mrs Eleanor Laing in the Chair]
Resolved,
That the Committee consents to the following certified clauses and schedules of the Policing and Crime Bill and a certified amendment made by the House to the Bill:
Clauses and schedules certified under Standing Order No. 83L(2) as relating exclusively to England and Wales and being within devolved legislative competence
Clauses 7, 11 to 16, 18, 20 to 26, 28, 30 to 32, 37 to 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 48 to 64, 67 to 70, 72 to 77, 101 to 103, 110 to 112, 115 and 135 of the Bill as carried over into this Session (Bill 3) (including the amendments made on Report);
Schedules 3 to 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13 to the Bill as carried over into this Session (Bill 3) (including the amendments made on Report);
New clauses NC30, NC49, NC55 and NC56 on Report.
Amendment certified under Standing Order No. 83L(4) as relating exclusively to England and Wales
Amendment 145 made in the Public Bill Committee to clause 22 (now clause 27).—(Mike Penning.)
The House forthwith resolved itself into the Legislative Grand Committee (England) (Standing Order No. 83M(4)(d)).
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83M(4)(d)),
That the Committee consents to the following certified clauses and schedules of the Policing and Crime Bill:
Clauses and schedules certified under Standing Order No. 83L(2) as relating exclusively to England and being within devolved legislative competence
Clauses 1 to 6 and 8 to 10 of the Bill as carried over into this Session (Bill 3);
Schedules 1 and 2 to the Bill as carried over into this Session (Bill 3).—(Mike Penning.)
Question agreed to.
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair to report the decisions of the Committees (Standing Order No. 83M(6)).
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair; decisions reported.
Third Reading
Queen’s consent signified.
Since becoming Home Secretary in 2010, I have put in place the most radical programme of police reform in a generation. Today, that programme is changing policing for the better, making it more transparent, more accountable and more efficient. But the task of reform is not yet finished. If we are to continue ensuring that the police can protect the most vulnerable in our society, if we are to continue helping the police build trust between themselves and the public, and if we are to continue ensuring that the police and other emergency services deliver for the taxpayer, we must go further and faster.
The Policing and Crime Bill will allow us to do that: it will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our emergency services by placing an overarching duty on them to collaborate where it makes sense to do so; it will enable police and crime commissioners to take on the governance of fire and rescue authorities where a local case has been made; it will make changes to pre-charge bail to prevent the injustice of people spending months, or even years, on bail only for no charges to be brought; it will ensure that those experiencing a mental health crisis receive the help they need rather than prolonged detention in a police cell; and it will radically reform the complaints and disciplinary systems to help strengthen public confidence and trust in policing, an outcome that I know will be welcomed by the Hillsborough families, who have campaigned tirelessly for effective accountability in policing when things go badly wrong.
Throughout its passage in this House the Bill has been subject to many lively and constructive debates. I welcome the broad measure of cross-party support for many of its provisions. I commend the work of my right hon. and hon. Friends, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley) who is responsible for preventing abuse, exploitation and crime, all the members of the Public Bill Committee and the officials who have supported their work.
There have been a small number of areas of disagreement, most notably on the role of police and crime commissioners in relation to the governance of fire and rescue authorities, the role of volunteers within police forces and the cut-off for taking disciplinary action against former police officers—although on the last of those issues, I am pleased that we have been able to make some progress. I am sure that all these issues will continue to be examined carefully as the Bill makes its way through the Upper House, but the process of scrutiny that the Bill has already been subject to in this House has greatly strengthened and improved it.
Among the important measures added to the Bill in Committee and on Report are those to reform the governance of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, strengthen inspection powers in relation to fire and rescue services, enhance the powers of the police to retain the DNA and fingerprints of persons previously convicted of an offence outside England and Wales, provide for a new offence of breach of pre-charge bail conditions relating to travel, strengthen cross-border powers of arrest and police powers to seize cancelled travel documents, confer lifelong anonymity on the victims of forced marriage and strengthen the safeguarding of vulnerable people through the introduction of statutory guidance in respect of the licensing of taxis and private hire vehicles. Those additional measures, alongside those contained in the Bill on its introduction, will support the vital work of our police forces. They will put in place provisions to ensure the greater efficiency and effectiveness of our emergency services. They will introduce changes to protect the rights of the public when they come into contact with the criminal justice system and they will provide important powers to help the police cut crime and keep our communities safe.
This Bill will ensure that the police can continue to meet the challenges they face day in and day out, and it will ensure that we can get on with the important job of police reform. I commend the Bill to the House.
None the less, the Bill leaves this House in a better state than it came to us in. I pay tribute to my shadow ministerial team, my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and for West Ham (Lyn Brown), all of whom have played an important part in improving the Bill. I thank the Home Secretary and her ministerial team for the constructive way in which they have continued to debate these matters with us. I also thank all members of the Bill Committee and the Chairmen, the Member for Bury North (Mr Nuttall) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth).
The Bill makes some real improvements, but we still have some concerns. The issues broadly fall into four categories: measures we support; measures we have helped to improve; measures we oppose; and the missed opportunities in the Bill. I will go briefly through each.
On the measures we support, the super-complaints system is a genuine step forward, and we congratulate the Home Secretary on bringing it to the House. We also support the strengthening of the IPCC and of the regulation of the police in general. The ban on the use of police cells for people in mental health crisis is a crucial step forward, but it needs to be matched with a commissioning strategy in the NHS that ensures alternative places of safety for people who will no longer be held in police cells.
On the measures that we have helped to improve, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham for the work that she has done to strengthen the measures in the Bill on child sexual exploitation, and particularly on the licensing regime for private hire vehicles. There are further improvements to come on child abduction warning notices.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington, the shadow Policing Minister, pushed the issue of police bail in Committee, based on the case of Siddhartha Dhar, the individual who waltzed out of the country while on bail. I am pleased that the Government have responded, although Mark Rowley said in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee that there should be the very tightest of regimes, whereby people have to surrender passports while they are still in police custody at police stations. I believe that the Bill could still be tightened on that point.
We have had a good exchange today on police misconduct. We welcome the fact that the Government have been prepared to extend the 12-month limit for exceptional instances of misconduct. We will work with the Home Secretary and the Minister for Policing, Fire, Criminal Justice and Victims on getting that right, but that, too, appears to be a genuine step forward.
There are two main measures that we oppose. First, we believe that the greater use of volunteers in the police service is dangerous in the context of the further cuts being made to police budgets, contrary to what the Government promised in the spending review. Police services in England and Wales are facing real-terms cuts to their budgets this year, which will not be backfilled by the local precept. We believe that it is dangerous to impose those cuts without setting out a vision for policing and saying precisely what the boundaries are for what volunteers can and cannot do, and the Government need to think again before going down that road.
On the fire service, my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham made a powerful case that we should not just merge the two services and, in effect, make the fire service the junior partner of the police service. The Bill will allow a hostile takeover of a fire service, authorised by the Home Secretary but over the heads of local people and without their consent. We do not believe that that will strengthen the fire service, which has an important role as a separate statutory service. All the pros and cons of the single employer model have not been fully debated, and we feel that this is a road down which the Government should not go because they have failed to make the case for it.
I will finish with the missed opportunities. I conclude my speech on Third Reading with a sense that Parliament has missed a moment to make some real changes on the back of the historic Hillsborough verdict. Today, we have debated two issues. First, there should be a principle of equality in legal funding for bereaved families at inquests where police are represented. Secondly, we have debated the Prime Minister’s promise to the victims of press abuse and intrusion that there would be a second-stage inquiry into the relationship between the police and the press. On both fronts, we have not made any progress tonight. It was disappointing that the Government chose to oppose the measures that we in the Opposition proposed.
Representatives of the Hillsborough Family Support Group—the chair, Margaret Aspinall, and Sue Roberts—were here today, and I can tell the House that they have gone home disappointed and feeling that Parliament is already forgetting what their fight was all about. It was a monumental miscarriage of justice that now requires a commensurate response from the House. Changes must be made to stop any family in future going through what they have been through, but sadly, families can still go through it. Many families continue to go into inquests raw with grief, face aggressive questioning by Queen’s Counsel hired at great public expense and find the whole experience deeply unsatisfactory.
It is disappointing that the Government were not even able to accept the principle that we should have equal funding. It would have been a step forward if they had been able to do so. I understand that they are asking Bishop James Jones to look at these matters, but of course, this issue goes much broader than Hillsborough. It is about fairness in our criminal justice system, and I believe that the Government are missing an opportunity by not acting on it quickly. Quite frankly, it is obscene for police forces to continue to spend large amounts of money on hiring aggressive lawyers to challenge families in the way that they do at inquests. This scandal should not be allowed to continue, and we in the Opposition will continue to fight against it until there is real change.
In conclusion, the Bill was an opportunity to make this country fairer, to even up the scales and even to tip them in favour of ordinary families and away from the establishment. I fear that we have failed to do that, and it will now be up to the other place to see whether it can make progress. Who can vote against the principle of equal funding for bereaved families at inquests? I cannot believe that anyone would actually vote against it. There is a debate about how to achieve it, but I find it very strange indeed that people can really vote against that principle. How can Members go through the Lobby tonight voting against the Prime Minister’s commitment to the victims of hacking, press intrusion and abuse? The Government have weakened their position tonight. They said before that there would be an inquiry. Now they say that there might be an inquiry once outstanding legal matters are concluded. That is not fair to the families who were given a firm promise by the Prime Minister.
This is my direct appeal to the other place: vote for equality of legal funding for families, and vote for the honouring of the promise to the victims of press intrusion. In doing so, make Hillsborough a moment of real change in this country.
It is not often that the Home Affairs Committee praises the Government, but they have done quite well in the Bill in picking up a number of the recommendations that we made about detention in police cells, which is to be stopped, and in particular about the seizure of the travel documents of those who have committed or are suspected of committing criminal offences. We would have liked the Home Secretary to go a little further and accept Mark Rowley’s evidence, but she has gone a long way towards dealing with the issues that we were concerned about, and I am glad that that provision is in the Bill.
The third recommendation that the Home Secretary has accepted, for which we are grateful, concerned the time that people spend continuously on bail. We listened to the evidence of Paul Gambaccini and others who came before the Committee, who could not understand why bail kept being renewed month after month with nobody telling them what was going to happen. Reputations have been ruined as a result. Of all the provisions in the Bill, the one relating to that situation will stand out. It does not mean that the police will not be able to do their job; it just means that citizens will not be continuously in limbo, not knowing what is going to happen. We welcome the fact that the Home Secretary has accepted all three of those measures that we put forward.
I want to thank the Policing Minister, who is one of the rare Ministers who write to the Committee and say, “We have decided to take up your recommendations.” That does not happen often, and the fact that he did it shows his courtesy and his willingness to take on suggestions, obviously with the support of the Home Secretary.
I strongly agree with what the shadow Home Secretary says about Leveson 2. I cannot understand the Government’s reluctance to accept that we will have to have a second inquiry. We need that inquiry. It was promised to me and to the then Chairs of the Justice Committee and the Culture, Media and Sport Committee by the Prime Minister in his private office behind the Speaker’s Chair after Mr Speaker had granted the urgent question and an emergency debate under Standing Order No. 24, which resulted in the entire debate on hacking. We should try to ensure that we have a timetable that will give comfort to those who have been waiting for that second inquiry.
At Home Office questions, I mentioned that the Home Secretary was now the third longest-serving Home Secretary in the history of our country. We have to look back to 1822 to find Viscount Sidmouth, who served for 10 years as Home Secretary—longer than the present Home Secretary has done. I do not know whether that will be her fate. It is important to remember that there has been a revolution in the policing landscape under this Home Secretary. Everything has been turned upside down. There have been massive changes. When she came to the Dispatch Box, I thought she would say that the reform agenda was finished, but when she said that it was ongoing, that caused us trepidation in the Home Affairs Committee, because we will have to continue our scrutiny.
There are many good things in the Bill. I am sure we will return to the subjects of policing and crime again in this Parliament, and I hope the Government will be able to accept even more of the Home Affairs Committee’s recommendations.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0.