PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Security Update: Official Secrets Act Case - 13 October 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I want to update the House on the facts surrounding the collapse of the trial of Christopher Berry and Christopher Cash. However, following the Home Secretary’s statement, I also want to take the opportunity to express my deepest sympathies for the victims and families of those affected by the abhorrent terror attack that occurred at Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on Yom Kippur. Tragically, two members of the UK’s Jewish community lost their lives. They remain in the thoughts of the whole House at this very difficult time.

I also express my gratitude for the rapid reactions of emergency responders, the security services and members of that local community. Two days later, a mosque in Peacehaven, East Sussex, was targeted in an arson attack. Fortunately, no one was injured. My thoughts, and I am sure the thoughts of the whole House, will be with members of that local community as well. We remain united in standing against hate in all its forms.

As I told the House in September, the Government remain extremely disappointed by the outcome of the Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry case. I understand the strength of feeling across the House and share the deep frustration at the fact that these individuals will not face trial. While the decision not to proceed was an independent one made by the Crown Prosecution Service, the Government remain gravely concerned about the security of our democratic institutions and are crystal clear that our Parliament must and will be protected from espionage. That is why I am today announcing that MI5’s National Protective Security Authority will be taking further steps to protect our democratic institutions from foreign interference. I will set out more details on that in a moment.

Since I addressed the House on 15 September, there has been correspondence between hon. Members, the Government and the Crown Prosecution Service. There has also been widespread—and, at times, wholly inaccurate—reporting in the media. I will address the details set out by the Crown Prosecution Service and the basis on which the Government provided evidence to support the case, but first let me underline a fundamental point that has too often been overlooked in recent days, including by the Conservative party. The CPS brought these charges under the previous Government, and under the legislation that was in place at the time: the Official Secrets Act 1911—an antiquated law that is clearly no longer fit for purpose in addressing the complex and sophisticated nature of the state threats that we face today.

It has been clear for many years that the legislation has not kept pace with the modern state threats that we face today. It was evident that the Official Secrets Act was no longer fit for purpose as early as 2015, when Conservative Ministers tasked the Law Commission with reviewing this antiquated legislation—10 years ago. In 2020, the Law Commission and the Intelligence and Security Committee of this House were both clear that the legislation, drafted before the first world war, needed to be updated as a matter of urgency. It referred to espionage as

“any sketch, plan, model, article, or note, or other document or information…which…might be…useful to an enemy”.

Those terms are archaic in the modern threat landscape that we now face. That is why the Labour party supported the passing of the National Security Act 2023 on a cross-party basis, closing the loopholes that have been exposed by this case.

The Director of Public Prosecutions has written to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), and the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), about this case, and it is welcome that these facts have been set out. The DPP has made it clear that charges were brought in April 2024 based on the law as it stood at the time of the offences. The deputy National Security Adviser—a senior official with very extensive experience in matters relating to national security—provided a witness statement in December 2023, under the previous Government. Further witness statements were requested and provided in February and July of this year.

All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Conservative Government at the time of the offence. Every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within those constraints. The decision on whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the Crown Prosecution Service, which was hamstrung by antiquated legislation that had not been updated by the previous Conservative Government—[Interruption.]

Order. I say to both Front-Bench teams: please, this is a very important and serious matter. We could do without the side chatter.

Despite the evolving nature of the state threats that we face, the DPP has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party, any member of this Government, or any senior civil servant or special adviser working within it. I want to be clear again today, as the Government have been before, that suggestions that the Government concealed evidence, withdrew witnesses or restricted the ability of witnesses to draw on particular bits of evidence are all untrue. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so.

What has changed is the CPS’s assessment of the case law. The DPP has explained that in a separate case—the Crown v. Roussev—the High Court ruled on the threshold for evidence needed to prosecute under the antiquated 1911 legislation. In the light of this new judgment, the CPS independently decided to seek further evidence. But the fact remains that it was not the policy of the Conservative Government to classify China as a threat to national security. As the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly) said as Foreign Secretary, summing up China in one word as a threat was

“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise.”

I have listened with interest in recent days to advice from former Conservative Ministers on how the UK should now define our approach to China, but I must remind them and the House that what matters is what their policy was in government. The previous Government set out their position on China in the 2021 integrated review, in which they described China as a “systemic challenge” to UK security. In the integrated review refresh of 2023, they described China as an “epoch-defining challenge”. As the Prime Minister has explained, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to the assessment made by the CPS. Ministers cannot retrospectively change policy that existed under the Conservative Government and, as stated before, the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official.

At this moment of profound global change and insecurity, these matters have led to discussion about this Government’s approach to China, so let me set that out for the House. We must tackle the threats that China poses, which range from cyber-security attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. This Government are unequivocal that the first duty of Government is to keep people safe. We fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, yet we must also be alive to the fact that China presents us with opportunities. It is the world’s second largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, the UK’s third largest trading partner. The only way to act in the UK’s best interest is to take a long-term and strategic approach. That means working in close co-ordination with Five Eyes and wider allies to build collective resilience to the threats that China poses, investing in our intelligence services and being unequivocal about our position on human rights. It also means developing a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement without compromising on our national security. Let me set out the recent actions that the Government have taken to strengthen UK security against state threats, including those posed by China.

MI5’s national protective security authority has today launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference. The guidance will help Members in this House and the other place, Members of the devolved legislatures, local councillors, mayors and elected representatives’ staff to better understand the nature of the threat. It also provides simple, effective steps for at-risk individuals to take to protect themselves, their teams and the integrity of our democratic processes. The guidance will kick-start a wider cross-Government action plan that is being driven through the defending democracy taskforce to reduce foreign interference and espionage threats to UK democratic institutions. It will be delivered in close co-ordination with the parliamentary security authorities. I urge all Members of this House to be alert and follow the guidance, and to take up the National Cyber Security Centre’s important opt-in service for Members of both Houses.

The Government also remain steadfast in our commitment to holding Chinese state-linked actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage. In September, the NCSC co-sealed a US-led technical advisory calling out Chinese state-sponsored cyber-threat actors targeting global networks, including in the UK. I can reassure the House that we continue to keep all tools under review, and will act as necessary to reduce their threat.

The Government are also committed to legislating to further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference. That specifically includes a new elections Bill to strengthen safeguards against covert foreign political funding, and involves taking forward the recommendations from the independent reviewer for legislation on state threats.

Let me finish by reiterating this Government’s unwavering commitment to national security and to keeping our country safe. We will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm, and to ensure that the UK is best placed to tackle state threats, including those emanating from China. I commend the statement to the House.

May I associate myself with the Minister’s remarks about Heaton Park synagogue? I thank Mr Speaker for all his work on Members’ security. No one has worked harder to protect the integrity of our Parliament.

The Security Minister is very well regarded, so I am sorry to see that he has been sent here again to make these arguments, which will not wash. This is about the ineptitude of the Government, and I cannot accept much of what he says. He has brought some updates to the House, which we acknowledge, but in essence, China spied on this Parliament and the Government are issuing us with leaflets. That is not good enough. There are Members here who have been spied on and sanctioned by China. Even Madam Deputy Speaker has been sanctioned. All MPs speaking today should be acting in the national interest—nothing else.

Let us remind ourselves of what has happened. Two men have been accused of spying on MPs in this very building. The CPS has what it felt was a clear and compelling case to prosecute, but the trial has collapsed because, for months and months, the Government have refused to give the CPS vital information. That was not a mistake; it was not a misunderstanding; it looks like a deliberate decision to collapse the case and curry favour with the regime in China. Instead of admitting that, the Security Minister has come here blaming the Official Secrets Act, when we know that the Act was enough to prosecute the case. Its deficiencies had nothing to do with the Government’s failures.

May I remind the House how serious this is? If the Government do not prosecute those who spy on us, it sends a message to the public that the Government do not care about their safety; it sends a message to our allies, who share intelligence with us, that Britain cannot be trusted; and it sends a message to those who spy on us that they can get away with it.

Let us look at the facts. First, the Government blamed the CPS. The Minister came to the House on 15 September and claimed that he had become aware of the situation only that day, and that the CPS decision had been an entirely independent one—an assertion that he has repeated today. He said:

“I am not able to talk about why the CPS has decided to make this decision.”—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1186.]

He said that it was not for him to “speculate on the reason”. He told my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to “seek a meeting” if she wanted to find out the reasons. However, we now know, despite all he has just said, that the trial collapsed because the Government refused to give the CPS what it needed, and the Minister knew full well why it had collapsed. The Director of Public Prosecutions has said that he spent months trying to get the Government to provide the evidence that the CPS needed.

Secondly, the Government tried blaming the previous Government. Just like the Prime Minister, the Minister claims that the CPS could not prosecute because the previous Government did not describe China as a threat. I cannot believe that he would actually say that. He knows what we said, but let me remind him. For starters, the 2021 integrated review described China as—listen carefully—the “biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.” The 2023 integrated review refresh said several times that China posed—listen carefully—a threat. In 2024, the then Minister for Security said from the Dispatch Box that China poses a serious threat. But even if the previous Government had not said China was a threat, which they did, this Government needed only to convince a jury that it was a threat, and the Minister knows that. I am astonished that he has repeated that nonsense today.

The Minister’s and Prime Minister’s argument has been refuted by no less than a former DPP, two former Cabinet Secretaries—one a former National Security Adviser—two former heads of MI6, and a professor of public law at the University of Cambridge, who said today that Ministers’ statements so far are “misleading” about the legal position. They are all clear that those people could have been prosecuted under the old legislation. Is the Government’s position that they are all wrong and the Government are right? The Minister referred to R v. Roussev. That case last year made it easier to prosecute, not harder. As the former Director of Public Prosecutions said of recruiting people to spy on MPs,

“That of itself clearly constitutes a threat to national security.”

Only this Government could mess that up.

We know that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has a very close relationship with China. Are we supposed to believe that he was not involved in the “substance of the case and discussions around it”, as they say? What does that even mean? He was in those meetings, acting in the name of the Prime Minister. Do the Government really expect us to believe that he never mentioned any of this to the Prime Minister at any point?

We know from the CPS that it spent months and months asking the Government for the evidence that it needed. The Government say that the NSA did not take the decision not to give it the evidence, so who did? Who made that decision—can the Minister answer that question today? Is the Government’s argument seriously that no Minister knew anything about this until the trial collapsed? If that is the case, it is astonishing. My suspicion is that that is not the case, and that Ministers did know. They had the Chinese super-embassy in their in-tray, and they are allegedly being asked to pay £1 billion in compensation for the nationalisation of British Steel. I suspect that they have decided that closer economic ties with China were more important than due process and our national security. If that is the case, and that was the Government’s decision, they should tell us and have the backbone to admit it. They should explain it to the public, the CPS and our international allies, and let them all be the judge.

This issue is not going away—there is nowhere to hide. I wrote to the Prime Minister today and would like to know when I will get a response to my questions. We have also written to the Crown Prosecution Service to ask whether the trial can be reopened if the Government finally provide the evidence that they have been holding back. We know that the evidence that the CPS needs exists. If the Government decide not to provide it, then we will know that that is because this weak Prime Minister does not have the backbone to stand up to Beijing.

I find it genuinely astonishing that at no point did the Leader of the Opposition acknowledge that all the acts that we have been talking about this afternoon happened when she was in government, on her watch.

I believe that it is important to discuss these matters in a fair and reasonable way, so I particularly made sure that the right hon. Lady had early sight of the statement, to give her ample opportunity. She has clearly not read the statement—she either did not read the statement or did not listen to what I have said, because she has asked me a number—[Interruption.]

Order. This statement is very important, both to me and my constituents. Please let us hear the Minister.

I took every opportunity to give the right hon. Lady as long as I possibly could so that she could look at the points that we were seeking to raise today. But she has asked me questions that I answered in my earlier responses. I say that to her because it is important that we seek to discuss these things in a reasonable way. Matters relating—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston (Neil O'Brien) guffaws from a sedentary position, but I think it is important that we should seek to discuss matters relating to national security in a reasonable and consensual way. That is the approach of this Government.

I am genuinely really sorry that the right hon. Lady has taken the opportunity to make a whole series of baseless smears this afternoon. Perhaps we should not be too surprised: the statement that we have heard from the Leader of the Opposition is sadly typical of what we have heard from some of her colleagues in recent days. For days, the Conservative party has been making baseless claims that the Government deliberately collapsed an independent legal process through political interference. There is not a shred of evidence to back up any of the accusations that she has made. I do not think that is a responsible way to discuss matters of national security.

I remind the Leader of the Opposition that, whatever Members might say this afternoon, we are here today because of legislation and policy that existed under the previous Government. The Leader of the Opposition referenced the letter that she had written to the Prime Minister. We want to respond to her in a timely fashion, so I will now respond to the points that she made to the Prime Minister. In case she has forgotten, it was she herself who said in September last year:

“I have shied away from calling China a threat”.

She articulated the previous Government’s policy as Business Secretary, saying in September 2023:

“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.

Those are the right hon. Lady’s own words.

Opposition Front Benchers have raised a number of questions, including in the letter published by the right hon. Lady earlier today. I am very happy to set out the Government’s response to her questions. First, on the question of what Ministers knew about the Government’s interactions with the CPS, Ministers were aware that evidence was being provided by the deputy National Security Adviser to the CPS as it built a case for prosecution, as was first agreed under the previous Government. Ministers and special advisers did not take decisions about that evidence and they were not cited in the contents. The deputy National Security Adviser was given full freedom to provide evidence without interference, as was the case before the general election.

Secondly, the right hon. Lady asked in her letter whether the Prime Minister was briefed by Ministers or the National Security Adviser about the case. The Prime Minister has already confirmed that he was briefed on the case by officials, not least because the case began under the previous Conservative Government.

Thirdly, there have been various reports alleging that in a meeting in September, the National Security Adviser ruled that China could not be defined as a threat and took decisions relating to witnesses or evidence. That is simply untrue. Of course, the NSA takes part in discussions about national security and diplomatic relations—that is literally his job. But any discussions were on the basis that the case would be going ahead and about how to handle the implications. The National Security Adviser was not involved in any decisions about the substance of the evidence. That means, to answer the fourth question raised by the Leader of the Opposition, that he made no decisions about the content of any evidence—[Interruption.] Hon. Members have asked for a thorough explanation and I am giving it to them; they might pay the House the courtesy of listening to the responses.

The National Security Adviser made no decisions about the content of any evidence relating to the case itself. This was a matter for the deputy National Security Adviser—a hugely experienced, highly capable senior official who provided evidence under the previous Administration.

On questions about when I and other Ministers were aware that the case would not be proceeding, I should say that Ministers were informed after the DPP had made his decision and shortly before reporting restrictions were lifted. Hon. Members will note that I came to the House straight away to make a statement.

Finally, on whether it might still have been possible to argue successfully in court that China was a threat regardless of the previous Government’s position not to do so, that was a judgment for the Crown Prosecution Service. However, the deputy National Security Adviser provided evidence reflecting the threats posed by China as the CPS built its case. On the comments, referenced by the right hon. Lady, made by two former Cabinet Secretaries, I note that they have both remarked that the Official Secrets Act was not fit for purpose. Of course, if the Conservatives had been swift in replacing it, we would not be here today.

Safeguarding our national security is the most fundamental responsibility of this Government. In 14 years of rule, the Conservative party was slow both to update our national security laws and to adapt to the national security realities that we face today. If we followed the Conservatives’ approach—to ignore and refuse to engage with China—that would undermine our national security. On this side of the House, we will always defend our national interest.

I call the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

May I begin by expressing solidarity with the two previous Conservative Chairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who would seem to have suffered from having Chinese spies in their offices? That must have been very distressing, upsetting and threatening.

The DPP’s claim of needing further evidence from the Government and decision not to publish the China audit has, I think, become conflated and resulted in a great deal of muddle and confusion, and allegations that the Government are soft-pedalling on China. Before we disappear down that rabbit hole, may I take us back to basics? As I understand it, these men were charged with an offence under section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act: to pass on information that

“might be…directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”.

When the Crown Prosecution Service was building its case, presumably it had a witness and presumably that witness was the deputy National Security Adviser, who was there to answer this question: is China an enemy? Without that evidence, there was no point in charging the men in 2024. What has changed since 2024? We are told that what has changed is that the enemy is now—[Interruption.]

Order. This House will listen to the right hon. Member with respect.

It seems that there is now case law saying that an enemy is a threat to national security. Frankly, that seems to be a lower test not a higher test. But if, in 2024, there was evidence that China was an enemy and the Crown Prosecution Service had made a decision to prosecute on that basis, I cannot understand why there has been a change now. The only other answer is that the Crown Prosecution Service did not properly assess the evidence before making those charges. Moving away from all the light, heat and fury, it seems to me that those are the central points.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. She talked about muddle and confusion: she is right that there has been a lot of ill-informed commentary in previous days. That is precisely why the Government have proactively brought a statement to the House to set out the facts of the trial, and I am very happy to be able to do that.

Let me do that again for my right hon. Friend. The DPP has set out the reasons at the heart of his decision not to take this case to trial. He believed that the evidential test was not met. The DPP took an independent decision on the evidence, as was set out in his letter of 7 October. The DNSA did not materially change his evidence and was under no pressure from anyone to do so. As the Prime Minister, her constituency neighbour, has explained very clearly, the current Government’s policy position was immaterial to this assessment. It is only the Government’s policy at the time that the alleged offences were committed that is relevant.

My right hon. Friend will understand that the CPS decision to drop the case was not influenced by any member of this Government, special adviser or senior official. I have been crystal clear about that today. The Director of Public Prosecutions has given his assurance that the CPS was not influenced by any external party. As the Government have already stated, the suggestions that the Government concealed evidence or withdrew or leant on witnesses are all untrue.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement. Over the weekend, Sir John Sawers became the latest former intelligence chief to express disbelief at the collapse of this espionage case, and our intelligence allies are now also questioning whether the UK can be trusted to counter China’s growing threat. It is vital that we have a clear answer about who in Government is responsible for the failure to bring this case to trial. Sadly, instead of clear answers, over the weekend we have heard Ministers delivering vague and cryptic lines to take.

The nation has a right to understand which figures within Government were involved in the process not to proceed with a prosecution. Given the Minister’s statement that the Government have not concealed the evidence or suppressed anything, will the Minister commit to publishing a timeline showing who knew what and when, and who said what and when? Will he publish correspondence between all officials, politicians and advisers involved with the CPS? If he will do that, we can gain the clarity that we and the British public need.

Will the Minister confirm again, with full confidence, that the Prime Minister, or any individuals who act on his behalf, played no role in any decision to prevent the supply of relevant evidence to the CPS, which might or might not include words of gentle encouragement either way? We must learn the lessons from this appalling episode so that we can have confidence in the ability of our national security laws to protect our interests and protect our democracy. That is our job in this House. This is the only way to provide the British public with the answers that they deserve and demand, and to rebuild the UK’s credibility with Five Eyes allies.

Will the Government commit today to holding a statutory independent inquiry into the China spying case? We know that China poses a clear threat to this country’s interests and values, a view that is shared by Liberal Democrat Members, as well as by our intelligence chiefs. Yet the Government’s approach to this case is only the latest example of their unwillingness to challenge Beijing’s efforts to expand its espionage capabilities in the UK and export transnational repression to our shores.

It is time for the Government to take the steps necessary to protect our interests and those of our citizens. Working with the CPS, will the Government look at all legislative options to prosecute the two individuals involved? Those options are still available. Will the Government block the application for the Chinese mega-embassy? And will the Minister add China to the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?

I welcome the hon. Gentleman to his new role. As he may know, I am a regular visitor to his constituency and I pay tribute to the important national security work that takes place there. He asked me a number of questions and, with great respect to him, I hope that he will concede that I have responded to a number of them already.

On his point about releasing information, which is an entirely reasonable question, it is not for me to make decisions about the publication of evidence that may be used in any further ongoing legal processes, so I hope he understands the reason that I am unable to commit to doing that at the moment.

I take issue with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis of the Government’s relationship with China, particularly on transnational repression. I hope that he will accept that the Government take that very seriously. We have done a lot of work through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that we have the right resources in the right place to protect all those who live here in the UK from the impact of transnational repression, but I am happy to discuss that with him further.

The hon. Gentleman specifically raised the importance of our Five Eyes alliance, about which I agree with him. That is precisely why the UK recently hosted the ministerial gathering of the five countries in London, where we cemented our excellent relationship with our Five Eyes partners. As he will know, we share intelligence with them on a very regular basis. That relationship is in good health and has in no way been undermined by recent events.

I call the Chair of the Justice Committee.

The Government have made it clear that they regret the fact that this case is not going ahead. The Minister rightly says that the CPS acts independently when making charging decisions, but will he go further than regret and say that, as a matter of law and evidence, this prosecution should have gone ahead and that the issue of innocence or guilt should have been determined by a judge and jury?

I have a huge amount of time for my hon. Friend. The expression that I used both on 15 September and again today, on behalf of the Government, was that we are “extremely disappointed”. I hope that he will understand, not least given the Select Committee that he chairs, that it is not appropriate for Ministers to give advice to the Director of Public Prosecutions or the CPS on matters of law. The CPS and the DPP are rightly independent of Government. Frankly, we go down quite a dangerous road if we get into a situation of politicians and Ministers seeking to advise them and to influence their decisions. That is not the approach that this Government will take.

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

There is a real threat at the moment to public trust in the criminal justice system following the collapse of this trial. Will the Minister make a commitment that he, ministerial colleagues and other advisers will co-operate fully with any scrutiny work done by my Committee or other Committees of the House?

I can give the right hon. Lady that absolute assurance. The Government and both the Departments in which I serve take the importance of parliamentary scrutiny very seriously. As Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Lady conducts herself with great gravitas and, of course, I give her an assurance, on behalf of Government, that we will work closely with her and her colleagues to provide any information that they seek.

Following on from the point made by the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, it is vital that Parliament is able to examine what has happened here. The Government have made a commitment to transparency. We have a wrinkle, in that the National Security Adviser has been appointed as a special adviser rather than as an official, which means that he has to appear in front of a Committee of the House in camera. That is far from adequate. Will the Minister commit to engaging fully with the Committee corridor to ensure that the relevant Committees get access to information, as is normal, in a reading room, in camera or in a Cobra situation, in order to ensure that Parliament can satisfy itself of the comments that he has made so clearly at the Dispatch Box today?

I am genuinely grateful to my hon. Friend for her suggestion. I hope that she, the House and Opposition Front Benchers know that my approach will always be to make as much information as possible available to colleagues, whether through the Privy Council process or through other means.

I welcome the fact that the National Security Adviser will shortly be giving evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, but I am happy to look more closely at my hon. Friend’s suggestion and to give her an assurance that we will want to work very carefully with this House and its Committees to make sure they are able to do their important job of holding this Government to account.

As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, the 2021 and 2023 integrated reviews were very clear. All the officials and security services said that China was a significant threat. That was sufficient not only for Ministers but for officials to give to the CPS. The question is why they did not.

The question I really want to ask is about the absurdity of the role, or lack of role, of the National Security Adviser. The Government say that he was not involved in any matters of substance, but is it not the role of the National Security Adviser to be involved in all matters of substance when it comes to national security? What is the point of a National Security Adviser who does not involve themselves in matters of national security, as in this case? Instead, are we meant to believe that the deputy National Security Adviser was allowed to involve themselves in substantial matters of national security in this case, but apparently not to discuss these substantial matters of national security with the National Security Adviser? This seems to me to be a matter of substantial absurdity.

The right hon. Gentleman has been consistent in expressing those concerns over many years. I would gently point out to him that the situation he describes as absurd is the same situation that we inherited from the previous Government.

The right hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, so let me say something to him about the National Security Adviser. Over the past year, this Government have rebuilt our international relationships, led on the global stage and signed new agreements with multiple countries to safeguard our security and to grow our economy. The National Security Adviser is doing an excellent job and, if the right hon. Gentleman does not believe me, perhaps he should speak to Steve Witkoff.

I share Mr Speaker’s fury about the collapse of this trial, as I am sure all Members do. It is a huge disappointment that this former Conservative party researcher has escaped justice.

I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Minister has been able to be so unequivocal about the facts of this case. It is extraordinary that, having listened to him, the Leader of the Opposition should carry on almost as though his statement had not happened, because he had answered many of the questions that she posed.

On the changes that have happened since, can my hon. Friend be sure that we would be more able to pursue a criminal conviction if this offence had taken place under the current legislation? If not, can he tell us what he is doing to make sure it does not happen again?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who asks such a very useful question that parliamentarians should be asking themselves. Yes, I can give him that assurance, and I have made clear from this Dispatch Box on many occasions the importance that this Government attach, as I am sure the previous Government did, to the National Security Act 2023. It was a groundbreaking piece of legislation, and as my predecessor, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), would acknowledge, I have paid tribute on numerous occasions to those who were involved.

My hon. Friend asks the right question. The NSA closed the loopholes that we are essentially debating today, so I can assure him that our legislative framework is in a much better place than it was a couple of years ago. That said, because this Government take these matters incredibly seriously, we constantly look at the legislative framework to assure ourselves that it is appropriate. We work very closely with Jonathan Hall KC, who has made recommendations, at the Government’s request, on our legislative framework, and we have made a commitment that wherever there is a requirement for more legislation, we will bring it forward.

The integrated review refresh, which stated that the Chinese Communist party posed a threat to our people and our security, was in fact published the very day that these two men were arrested. But that in itself is a red herring, because the Bulgaria case proved that it is for a jury to decide whether a country is or could be a threat, and it is not for the Government alone to prove that. The Minister told the House in response to our urgent question that the Government demanded that the Chinese chargé d’affaires come in for the démarche. Did a Minister do that, or did an official do it?

Secondly, given that the House has been told how disappointed the Government are with this outcome and that they seem to be quite clear about the evidence of guilt, what repercussions are they choosing to put on the Chinese Communist party? Will they be cancelling the joint economic and trade commission? Will they be putting in place sanctions? Will they be banning the embassy? If they will not act, why not?

Of course, the hon. Lady has a very close personal interest in this case, and it will be well understood by Members across the House why she has expressed concerns today and previously. I am sorry that she does not feel that the Government’s response is adequate, but I assure her that I will endeavour to ensure that this Government do as much as we possibly can to work with her and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on this issue, so that she can have confidence that these matters are not able to happen again.

The hon. Lady specifically asked about the démarche I referenced in my statement—it was not an urgent question—on 15 September. As she will know, that was done through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, but I will come back to her with more details should she wish.

I thank the Minister for his statement and for introducing some facts to the debate—I can see that some alternative realities have come crashing down.

I want to focus on the future and the Minister’s commitment to protecting democratic life in the UK, particularly through the cyber-security measures. He knows that this will rely, at least in part, on the Computer Misuse Act 1990—if my memory serves me right, the 386 Amstrad was then the best computer we could get. As he knows, many people think that that Act fails to distinguish between malicious actors, state or otherwise, and cyber-security professionals working in the public interest, and perhaps the democratic interest. Will he commit to looking at that anomaly?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, not least for saying that facts matter—they really do. That is why I have come to the House today, to set out facts so that Members can make a judgment on how they wish to proceed.

My hon. Friend also makes an important point about cyber-security and the ongoing review of the Computer Misuse Act. I can assure him that we take these matters incredibly seriously. In fact, I will have more to say about it shortly.

The Minister and I have been friends for many years, so it gives me no pleasure to say this. The statement that he read out today, no doubt under instruction, has thrown out more chaff and set up more straw men than a Russian disinformation campaign. It is pure fabrication to claim that those are the relevant points and, sadly, he knows it.

The Minister knows it, because we discussed many of these issues when he was in opposition and I was in his place. He knows it, because the various security and defence reviews that have been updated in the past four years have set out the clear position of the threat. He knows it, because I stood at the Dispatch Box, as he now does, on 15 April 2024 and made clear the position of China being a threat.

And the Minister knows it, I am afraid, because the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, set out how the DPP has asked a very clear question: why have we not had the information in time for these cases to proceed? That is exactly the right question. The DPP did not say that the evidential threshold was not met. If it had not been met, the arrests should never have happened and the Minister should rightly be hauling the head of MI5, the head of counter-terror policing and the Treasury solicitor before him for abuse of power. He is not doing that because he knows the threshold was met.

Instead, the Minister should read the words of the DPP—the threshold is “no longer met”. That means there has been a change, and there has been a change because something has changed. That change could either be a commission or an omission, and from what we have heard today—from the way in which the Government have very carefully used language—it sounds much more likely that something has not been done than that it has.

As my friend the Minister knows, simply ignoring an order is not the same thing as not receiving one. I am afraid that what this has done, and what this statement does, is advertise that the UK is not willing to defend itself against threats from hostile states. I know that that is not a position he wishes to advocate.

As the House knows well, the right hon. Gentleman is personally invested in this issue. Members will understand the history and the reasons for the concerns he has expressed, and I understand why he has taken the opportunity to express them today and on other occasions. The Government fundamentally agree with some of his concerns, though clearly not with his subsequent analysis. He will have noted the point I have made today about the issuing of guidance from the NPSA. We have published that guidance today, and I hope he will acknowledge the determination that exists—from myself as the Minister and from colleagues right across Government—to provide assurances and satisfy his concerns.

One of the ways in which we will do that is through the defending democracy taskforce, of which the right hon. Gentleman was a founding member. I can say to him and to the House that that taskforce provides the fulcrum point for dealing with many of these matters right across Government. It has had its mandate refreshed by the Prime Minister, and we invest a lot in that mechanism. It will seek to provide us with some of the answers we need in order to give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance he seeks. I hope he will understand that I stand ready to meet him and the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) to further discuss any concerns they might have. The right hon. Gentleman may not be satisfied today, but I will do what I can to provide that satisfaction and assurance as we go forward.

My constituents will welcome the Minister’s clarity that China is indeed a threat. [Interruption.] Let me finish. Those threats to our national security take place not just here, but overseas, and I am increasingly troubled by the actions of the Chinese Government in former British colonies across the world, not least in Africa. They are looting minerals, destroying nature and damaging democracy. That impacts us in this country too, and for far too long, Britain has been missing in action. We have let China run riot, and enough is enough. What engagement has the Minister had with the Soft Power Council to ensure it keeps national security in mind as it carries out its work, and can I urge him to work with colleagues across Government, particularly in the Foreign Office? We need to get serious with China and fast, which requires a cross-Government approach.

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that these matters require a cross-Government approach, and that is precisely the way in which this Government seek to proceed with them. I think it is fair to say that the Government have referenced concerns about the issues he has raised on a number of occasions, but I would be very happy to discuss them further with him, should he wish to do so.

The Minister used the Roussev case in his own defence. In that case, the Court of Appeal set the clear precedent that the appropriate definition of an enemy state is not based on what the Government say—it is a state that behaves like an enemy. The judge stated plainly that

“There is no reason in our view why the term ‘an enemy’ should not include a country which represents a current threat to the national security of the UK.”

Throughout the duration of this case, there has been ample evidence—including from the Intelligence and Security Committee and the current director of MI5—that China represents a threat to our national security, including at the time when Mr Berry and Mr Cash were acting as spies. The Prime Minister’s comments on this case were frankly nonsense, and it is time that we stop kowtowing and take a stand against China. If the Minister means what he said about future dealings, will he start by doing what a number of people have called for and refusing to approve the espionage centre masquerading as an embassy at the Royal Mint? Will he reject it and tell the Chinese, effectively, that enough is enough?

I always listen to what the right hon. Gentleman has to say, but that does not mean that I always agree with it. I do not agree with it today, and I am not sure it is especially helpful to refer to China’s application for an embassy in the way he has done. I can give him the assurance that I have given the House previously about the importance we attach to national security in the context of that issue. I hope the right hon. Gentleman understands that the issue of the embassy is not a matter for me—there is a quasi-judicial process in place, and it is a matter for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government—but the previous Home Secretary and the previous Foreign Secretary have been crystal clear about the national security implications that underpin that decision.

All of us across this House have an interest in protecting and preserving our democracy. Clearly, we have threats to our democracy, internally as well as externally. The Minister said a little bit about the elections Bill, but can he set out in more detail what the safeguards and protections will be for our democratic institutions and, indeed, for this place?

My hon. Friend asks a really important question. In July, the Government published a policy paper outlining their proposals for an elections and democracy Bill, which we will introduce as the “Elections Bill” as soon as parliamentary time allows. Our intent is to modernise our democracy so that it is fit for the 21st century, including reinforcing safeguards against foreign influence in our elections.

In relation to political finance—hon. Members may want to listen very carefully to this—tough new rules will require parties to assess companies from which they are receiving donations against a series of tests, proving their connections to the UK and Ireland. This will end the status quo whereby a new company registered today, owned by anyone, funded from anywhere and without even a single day of trade, can donate and have influence in UK politics. The introduction of “know your donor” checks will increase scrutiny of donations, requiring recipients to conduct enhanced checks to decrease the risk of illegitimate donations entering our system. This will guard against foreign interference. It will be very interesting to see whether or not Opposition Members vote for that Bill.

The Minister said categorically and very carefully that the National Security Adviser took no decisions as to the contents of the evidence provided to the CPS. Will he clarify for the House whether the NSA had any influence at all—direct or indirect, and whether about provision or omission—over the contents of that evidence, provided by his own deputy, which led to the collapse of the trial?

I can give the right hon. Gentleman that assurance.

I thank the Minister for his absolute clarity today. Will he provide further details of the measures he has announced today and how they will protect parliamentarians, councillors and those in public life across the UK from foreign interference?

The proposals contained in the elections Bill will hopefully go a long way towards providing that kind of reassurance, but again, I reference the importance of the work being done by the defending democracy taskforce. It is a mechanism that we inherited from the previous Government, which brings together Ministers, law enforcement and senior officials to look very carefully at these issues and make sure that we have the right resources in the right places. I hope very much that this will be a shared endeavour across this House, to ensure that wherever there are attempts to interfere with our democracy and harass or intimidate elected representatives, we can stand together as a House against those threats.

The Minister says that it is for another Department to decide whether the Chinese Government should have a new embassy. That is certainly true, but the proposed new embassy is so large that it would be the biggest embassy in any country anywhere in Europe. That has national security implications, and if the Minister wants to encourage people to believe that the Government are not cosying up to communist China, he should make recommendations accordingly.

May I just ask the Minister about the extract he read from the 1911 Act? I will read a slightly fuller one, though still one with ellipses:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State…obtains or communicates to any other person any…document or information which…might be…directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of felony”.

My reading of that extract from the Act is that the felony lies in the disclosure to anyone at all—it does not have to be directly to an enemy. Whether or not China was regarded as an enemy at the time, the nature of the sensitive material disclosed meant it was a felony, even if it was disclosed to a China that was not regarded as an enemy. Surely the trial should have gone ahead.

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I always value his sage advice and listen carefully to what he has to say. [Interruption.] It is true. He asked about the embassy. So that we can dispel some of the nonsense that has been spouted about the embassy, we need to provide a Privy Council briefing for him and for other Privy Counsellors, and I am happy to take that away. On his second point, he knows that these are points of law and matters for the CPS and the DPP; they are not matters for Ministers.

I welcome the Minister’s clarity on tackling the threats that China poses, including the transnational repression of Hongkongers in the UK. That will be a real reassurance to the many British nationals overseas who live in Milton Keynes. I would like him to go into further detail, particularly in the context of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia’s interference in Brexit and the Nathan Gill case that has just completed, with eight counts of bribery coming from Russia. At the time of taking those bribes, he was a close colleague of some MPs on the other side of the House. How will the new elections Bill stop interference through political funding, which we are seeing gaining more and more ground here in the UK, creating a real threat to our democracy?

I ask the Minister to be brief and on point regarding what this statement is actually about.

The safety and security of Hongkongers in the UK is of the utmost importance, and any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the UK will not be tolerated. On my hon. Friend’s second point, and not wanting to get in trouble with Madam Deputy Speaker, I just say that using a position of public office to effectively further Russia’s malign interests while benefiting financially will not stand. It is a betrayal of our democratic values and of our electorate.

The Minister has told us that his Government’s assessment of China is a mixture of national security threats and opportunities for engagement, including economically, but does he accept that that is exactly the assessment made by the last Government? That combination, with reference to the Act and the offence we are concerned with, does not require a country only to present a national security threat, simply that it does so, perhaps in combination with other things. That is the key point, and the Minister has been clear about that, so can we be clear about what happened with the Government’s evidence? Was it the case that the Government could find no evidence of China presenting a national security threat? Was it the case that the Government internally decided that the evidence it could find would not meet the CPS’s requirements? If so, who made that determination? Was it the case that the Government did supply evidence to the CPS on that specific point, and the CPS decided it was not significant enough? If it is the latter, will the Minister publish the evidence to the House? If he does not think that is appropriate—it may not be—will he give authority to the deputy National Security Adviser to share that evidence in full with the Intelligence and Security Committee?

I have a lot of time for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, not least because he brings an almost unique perspective from his understanding of the law and of matters relating to intelligence. He correctly made the observation that ultimately, any Government strategy on China has to take consideration of national security issues. At the same time, any fair-minded, reasonable Government have to understand the economic opportunities that exist. As a former Attorney General, he would not recommend that I get into the business of second-guessing judgments and decisions taken by the DPP. On his point about publishing the evidence, he hopefully will have heard the response I gave a moment ago. [Interruption.] I am responding to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s serious question about publishing the evidence. I hope that he will have heard the response I gave a moment ago.

The Minister states:

“we will take all necessary action to deter those who seek to do us harm,”

and that includes threats “emanating from China”. Despite ongoing transnational repression of Tibetans, Uyghurs and Hongkongers, continued cyber-security attacks on this country, and Members of this Parliament being sanctioned and spied upon, there appear to be no consequences for China. Instead, the UK Government give in to its coercive, bullying behaviour. I have a straightforward question: if the Minister is serious about deterring this behaviour and these threats, will he take the necessary action and include China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme—yes or no?

Any decision about the enhanced tier of FIRS will be brought forward to Parliament in the normal way. I can say to the hon. Member that any attempt by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities here in the UK will not be tolerated.

We know the very basic facts, which is that the Director of Public Prosecutions asked for a statement from the Government to clarify that, at the time of the offence, China was a threat to national security. He says in his letter that such an assurance, or evidence, or a statement from the Government were not forthcoming. We know that the Government withheld that vital element of the case. The Minister is shaking his head, but who decided that, in the words of the DPP, it would “not be forthcoming”? Somebody decided that. He seems to be saying that it was the deputy National Security Adviser who is somehow accountable for making those decisions, but I question that point. To whom are they accountable, if not to the National Security Adviser?

Let me seek to clarify. The deputy National Security Adviser, who is a senior and highly regarded official with extensive experience in matters relating to national security, provided a witness statement in December 2023. That was under the previous Government, and I made that point earlier. Further witness statements were requested and provided, as I said earlier, in February and July this year. All the evidence provided by the deputy National Security Adviser was based on the law at the time of the offence and the policy position of the Government at the time. I can give the hon. Member an assurance that every effort was made to provide evidence to support this case within the constraints that I have just outlined. The decision about whether to proceed with the prosecution was ultimately taken by the DPP and the CPS, which were hamstrung by antiquated legislation.

There is, I am afraid, a fundamental flaw in the hon. Gentleman’s question. These activities took place under the previous Government and under the legislation that was in place at the time. This is not about seeking to blame the previous Government, but it is a statement of fact to say that those activities, about which there is concern across the House, took place in the previous Parliament and under the previous legislative framework. That is just a statement of truth.

I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman, whom I respect very much indeed, that his answer to the question put by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), the former Attorney General, raised more questions than he gave answers. Is he seriously suggesting that the National Security Adviser, with all his links to the 48 Group and to the Grandview Institution, had no involvement whatsoever in the advice that went to the Crown Prosecution Service? While he is about it, will he clarify that apparent conflation of this country’s economic ties with China, which he appeared to give in mitigation for the mess that the Government appear to have got themselves into?

I respect the right hon. Gentleman too, and I hope that he will understand that any Government will seek to balance issues relating to national security as well as issues relating to economic prosperity. That, I think, is not an unreasonable way in which to proceed. I do, however, want to pick him up on one point: the National Security Adviser does not have any links to the 48 Group.

Foreign interference in our democracies is, of course, deeply concerning, and transparency from Governments and, indeed, all legislators is essential. That includes transparency in relation to past elected representatives, such as Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, who has pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from Russia. To uphold public accountability, will the Minister commit to working with the Attorney General to publish the names of all individuals interviewed by counter-terrorism police in connection with the Nathan Gill bribery cases? The people of Wales are rightly concerned.

The right hon. Lady is right; transparency is important. If she will forgive me, I will look carefully at the point that she has made and take it away, but I hope this also means that she will be seeking to support our elections Bill.

I am going to keep this quite basic, because I think this is where a lot of the public will come from. The Government should always want to do everything they can, and more, to keep the British public and our institutions safe, so I do not understand why they will not do everything they possibly can at least to try to bring this to trial—at least to try to give a jury an opportunity to take matters into its hands and consider this case. I do not understand why they are willing to accept advice, and not actually put this matter to trial when they have the opportunity to do so. Will the Minister please commit to publishing all minutes from any meetings at which matters discussed with the CPS, or what the CPS had requested, were asked for?

I will keep it basic as well. This Government will do everything that we can to keep the public safe, and the hon. Lady will have heard the response that I gave earlier with regard to publishing issues.

The stench emanating from the collapse of this Chinese spy case makes a manure heap seem positively floral. The bottom line is that everyone is disappointed, everyone thinks there is enough evidence and everyone seems to agree that China is a security threat, yet the case has collapsed and China has been given, essentially, carte blanche to carry on spying in the United Kingdom. I have it on good authority that senior figures in Washington now fear that Five Eyes has become Six Eyes.

The one thing that has changed since charges were made in April 2024 is the National Security Adviser. Will the Minister give a commitment that the National Security Adviser will appear, and answer questions in person, before any parliamentary Committee that wishes to have those questions answered?

The hon. Member talks about a stench. He has some brass neck, given what has gone on in his party recently. The National Security Adviser is a special adviser, and, given the reference to the United States, I would point the hon. Member in the direction of President Trump’s policy adviser, who just this morning praised the contribution made by the NSA.

The problem that the Government have is that the story keeps changing, either each day or within a day. The right hon. Gentleman, who is obviously stating the Government’s position now, is giving us a view that completely contradicts the messages given by Ministers over the weekend. He has clearly referred to a huge number of meetings at which—I say this with the greatest respect—he was not present. Can he agree now that the content of all those meetings, and the minutes of those meetings, will be published, so that everyone in the House can understand what has happened? If that has to be done under certain rules so that the public do not have access to the information, fair enough; but the reality is that until such time as the Government come clean, the stench of this will continue.

Let me assure the hon. Member that I take very seriously the points that he has made. Clearly there will be a legal dimension to all this, but I am happy to go away, look at his point and then come back to him.

In 2023 the Intelligence and Security Committee published a report on China in which it wrote that China was a “whole-of-state threat”. In their 2023 public response to the ISC report, the Government wrote that they recognised

“the committee’s concerns about the long-term strategic challenge”.

The ISC had used the word “threat” rather than “challenge”. Does the Minister regret that in 2023 the Government’s response did not use the word “threat”?

With respect to the hon. Member, I am not going to become involved in a critique about whether the Government should have responded in a different way, because that is a matter for them. However, he mentioned the important work of the ISC. The Government consider that the ISC has a very important role to play in Parliament. It is obviously independent of Government, and it will clearly be for the Chair, the deputy Chair and the wider Committee to take a view on how they wish to proceed. As for the specific report to which the hon. Member referred, all that material would have been available to be considered by the CPS.

The right hon. Gentleman is the Minister for Security. I have been here for almost an hour and a half, and I have not heard him answer this question: was China spying on Parliament, or is it even a consideration that it is spying on Parliament?

I have been crystal clear—[Interruption.] If hon. Members will allow me, let me say that China poses a series of threats to the United Kingdom, and I was very clear about what they were. I referred specifically to a number of particular issues. I could not have been clearer about that.

I thank the Minister for coming forward. As he knows, this topical issue lies heavy in the hearts of many people in constituencies throughout the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as we consider whether national security has been at threat owing to the semantics of language, and the general public are asking for openness and transparency. I have been contacted on a number of occasions by concerned constituents of Chinese descent who believe that they are being shadowed by the Chinese secret service, and the decision not to prosecute means that they are feeling even more insecure and even more fearful. That must be addressed. Will the Minister tell us exactly when the decision was made to classify China as non-threatening, and how will I tell that to my constituents who are living in fear right now as a result of this so-called non-threat?

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always. I think he is referring to activity that took place under the previous Government, but let me agree with his basic point: the public do want to know what has happened. That is why the Government have put forward a statement today, to provide that transparency. What I think the public do not want, however, is Ministers, or politicians, interfering in the legal process, and seeking to influence, persuade or cajole senior figures in the CPS, including the Director of Public Prosecutions. I do not think that is the right way to proceed, and I think that hopefully, if Opposition Members, and indeed Members throughout the House, step back for a moment, we can reach a consensus that it is not right for Ministers to second-guess legal decisions made by the Crown Prosecution Service.

The Minister has comprehensively taken on several strawman arguments, answered questions that have not been asked, and stuck to his carefully constructed sentences. One example was: “Ministers and special advisers did not take decisions about that evidence, and they were not sighted on the contents.” But was any Minister, the National Security Adviser, any other special adviser or any senior official other than the deputy National Security Adviser, such as the Cabinet Secretary, sighted on the decision regarding the evidence sent to the CPS?

Fundamentally, the decision was one for the DPP and the CPS. I could not have been clearer about the fact that this Government have not sought to interfere with the process.

I listened carefully to the Minister’s statement, but questions remain. The Minister says that China poses threats. Will the Government now publish in full the China audit, so that we can know the scale of those threats? The Minister says that the Government will act against transnational repression of Hongkongers here in the UK, so will the Government now implement targeted sanctions against the officials in Hong Kong and Beijing who are responsible for the bounties? The Minister says that the Government will legislate against foreign influence. Will he ensure that the new elections Bill tackles not only covert foreign political funding, but all foreign political funding, by shutting down the opportunity for foreign actors to influence our politics through corporate donations?

The hon. Member referenced the China audit; I am sure that he will acknowledge that the then Foreign Secretary came to the House to give a statement specifically on the China audit. The reason why the China audit has not been published is that it is at a higher classification than documents that would normally be published.

I hope that the hon. Member’s second point was at least a tacit welcome of the Government’s elections Bill. There will be a number of measures in there, which I hope that he and his colleagues will be able to support. It is important that we seek to work together to transform the political landscape to make it much, much harder for those who seek to interfere in our democracy to do so.

The Minister has made great play of the need to work cross-party on this issue. May I gently suggest to him that the time to do that was before the case collapsed, not afterwards?

The Minister has leant heavily on what officials are willing to say about the threat or otherwise that China poses, but officials do not make Government policy and do not state the position of the UK Government; Ministers do. If the Government were struggling to find an official who would say in a witness statement that China was a threat, is there any good reason why they could not have asked the former Security Minister to do so, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), who was happy to give a statement at the Dispatch Box? I am sure that many other former Government Ministers would have happily given evidence that China was a threat, enabling the case to proceed. What possible reason was there for not doing that?

The hon. Member talks about my making great play of the need to work cross-party, but that is because I genuinely believe that on important matters of national security, we should proceed in a certain way, and where possible, we seek to work across the political divide to establish consensus. I thought there was a slight irony in the point that he went on to make. I agree with him that Ministers are accountable, and if Opposition Members want to hold Ministers to account, that is absolutely a matter for them. What I think is most unfortunate—I am not saying that he was responsible for doing this, but others have done it—is when Members seek to blame officials or imply criticism of them. I do not think that is the right way to proceed.

It seems to me that the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, put her finger on the nub of this matter. We know that in April 2024, the CPS decided that the evidential test was met. The evidential test was that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction for the offence of passing useful information to an enemy. We know that in September ’25, the DPP maintained that the evidential test was not met, so what changed? Who changed it? How did we move from the evidential test being met to the evidential test not being met? Was the evidence before the DPP withdrawn? Was it found to be unreliable, or did the Government fail to substantiate the evidence that enabled the evidential test to be met back in April 2024?

With great respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, that is what I was at great pains to explain in my opening remarks.

Does the Minister agree that the Government have now set a perverse incentive for British officials, in that admitting to espionage problems with China is seen as rocking the boat?

No, I do not agree.

The Government have not had a great record in the courts recently. Kneecap’s case was thrown out because the paperwork was not correct, and now we have the spy case not proceeding because evidence was not provided. The fact of the matter is that China now controls many of our supply chains, holds a lot of our national debt, and is an important part of the economic framework in the United Kingdom because of its investment in strategic industries. The general public may not understand the intricacies of how a case is built up and who is involved in it, but can the Minister understand that despite his excuse-ridden statement today, many members of the public might be coming to the conclusion that national security is being sacrificed because the Government are not prepared to deal with our increasing economic dependency on China?

No, I do not agree. There will be those, including in this House, who will seek to simplify the nature of the relationship to a single word. More sensible and fair-minded colleagues, and certainly the public, will understand that difficult choices have to be made. Fundamentally, this Government’s approach will always be to put our national security first. I have been crystal clear about that today and previously, but that does not mean that we should not look for opportunities to trade with a country where there will be some economic advantage to doing so. That seems to me entirely reasonable and completely pragmatic, but we will proceed on the basis that our national security absolutely comes first.

Last month, the Security Minister came before the House and stated that he was not happy with the decision not to prosecute. I asked him why the Government were dithering over formally challenging China, having excluded it from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, and he suggested that they were not doing so. Subsequent revelations have suggested that the Government have yielded to Chinese threats to withhold investment, and to offers to waive the outstanding debt owed to Jingye. Would the Minister like to correct the record and explain why China is not in the enhanced tier, given that we are discussing spying for China? Can he clarify what role the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has played in deciding that China should not be classified in the enhanced tier alongside Russia and Iran?

“Extremely disappointed” was the way that I described our reaction, both on 15 September and again today. I gently say to the hon. Member that he should not believe everything that he reads in the papers. He asked me about FIRS. I hope he heard the response that I gave some moments ago; I said that we look very carefully at any question of whether to place a particular country on the enhanced tier of FIRS. FIRS is an important part of the National Security Act 2023. There were those, including on the hon. Gentleman’s side of the House, who said that we were not going to roll it out, but we rolled it out on 1 July. I said that we were going to roll it out on 1 July, and we did. We looked very carefully at how we can most effectively use that tool, and we will continue to look closely at that, but any decisions about the enhanced tier will be brought forward in the normal way.

The Government say that they want to take a long-term and strategic approach to China, but that is exactly what China does, whether we are talking about it increasing control over supply chains to gain leverage over the west, the belt and road programme, or the debt-trap diplomacy with which it is associated abroad. This is nothing less than a concession to an authoritarian regime, and it plays into China’s hands, as it wants to continue gaining economic and military leverage over the west. The head of the CPS said that he requested evidence from the Government to allow the case to proceed, but the Government did not provide that evidence. Why not, and is it still the Government’s view that it is impossible to argue in court that China is a threat?

On the hon. Gentleman’s final question, I have taken every opportunity to try to provide the Government’s response. I was not entirely clear about his critique of taking a long-term strategic approach and whether he thinks that is a good thing to do or not. I think it is a good thing that Governments think carefully and strategically about their role in the world and the nature of their relationships with countries like China. Yes, we have to be clear-eyed, and have to always defend our national security, but we also have to look for opportunities for economic growth as well.

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Is it to do with this statement?

Yes, Madam Deputy Speaker. Like you, I am one of the parliamentarians sanctioned by China. Like many Members of this House, I am left wondering whether it was not just our offices that were spied on, but our families, our homes and our children, and in the absence of a trial, I have no way of finding out what happened.

The Minister has been asked multiple times whether he will publish the minutes of the meetings in which this case was discussed. We know from the DPP that, over months and months, the CPS asked again and again for evidence that was not forthcoming. However, without the minutes of those meetings, we are not able to find out what was asked for, why it was refused or who made that decision. What means are available to this House to get hold of the minutes of those meetings, which the Government do not want to publish? What parliamentary means do we have to get hold of the minutes of meetings in which this issue was discussed and these decisions were made, so that we can find out the truth?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving some notice of that point of order. He is absolutely correct that he and I are two of the four sitting MPs who are sanctioned by China. I have been advised to say that he should seek advice from the Table Office as a first step to see how these documents can be published. The Minister has said repeatedly in responses to Members from across the House that some material may or could be made public at some point. I am not sure what that material will be, or what format it would be in, but I have no doubt that the hon. Gentleman will seek advice from the Table Office, to make sure that the information is made available, if it can be. Unless the Minister wishes to respond to that point of order, I will let the matter fall.