PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Afghanistan - 20 April 2021 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
I served in Afghanistan on two tours—the first, to Kabul in 2005; and the second, to Sangin, in 2009. My battalion lost 13 men on that second tour, with many more killed in our wider battlegroup. I have friends who will walk on prosthetic limbs for the rest of their lives, and I know people who suffered severe mental pain that tragically caused them to subsequently take their own lives. Like every other Afghanistan veteran, when I heard NATO’s decision last week, I could not help but ask myself whether it was all worth it.
We went into Afghanistan to disrupt a global terrorist threat and to deny al-Qaeda the opportunity to use that nation as a base for mounting further international attacks. In that mission, we were successful. By fighting the insurgency in its heartlands in the south and east of the country, NATO created space for the machinery of the Afghan government to be established and strengthened. Afghan civil society flourished. Schools reopened and girls enjoyed education just as boys did. There is a vibrant and free media. Women are not only valued and respected but are working in Afghan academia, healthcare and politics. Over 20 years we have developed and then partnered the brave men and women of the Afghan national security forces. They are now a proud army with the capacity to keep the peace in Afghanistan if empowered to do so by future Governments in Kabul.
Those of us who have served very rarely get to reflect on an absolute victory; only in the most binary of state-on-state wars can the military instrument alone be decisive. But two generations of Afghan children have now grown up with access to education. The Afghan people have tasted freedom and democracy, and they have an expectation of what life in their country should be like in the future. The Taliban, apparently, have no appetite to be an international pariah like they were in the late ‘90s. Our endeavours over the past two decades have created those conditions and have given Afghanistan every chance of maintaining peace within its own borders. We will continue to support the Afghan Government in delivering that, but our military could not stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, and so we will leave, in line with NATO allies, by September. Nothing in the future of Afghanistan is guaranteed, but the bravery, determination and sacrifice of so many British soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen has given Afghanistan every possible chance of success.
Our nation and our military deserve answers. I request a Chilcot-style inquiry so that we can learn the lessons of what went wrong. How did we squander the relative peace of the first four years? Why were the Taliban excluded from the peace talks in 2001—a fundamental error that could have brought stability early on? Why did we adopt an over-centralised western model of governance? Why were we too slow in building up Afghan security forces, up to a paltry 26,000 five years after the invasion? Why was Pakistan allowed to harbour and train the Taliban for so long? More widely, did the ease of the initial Afghan invasion lead to an over-confidence by the US for it to then invade Iraq, meaning that we had to fight on two fronts? Should we take responsibility for the Taliban’s emergence in the first place after the US abandoned Afghanistan once the Soviets had left? Where was the British thought leadership—our situational awareness that might have influenced US strategic thinking? As we have learned in Northern Ireland, you cannot defeat the enemy by military means alone.
If we depart completely, a dangerous part of the world becomes more dangerous as the Taliban assumes control of the bulk of the country and once again gives sanctuary to extremist groups. Our brave military served with honour, but they were let down by poor strategic judgments that if politicians today do not understand and learn from, will impede our confidence to step forward and stand up to extremism and authoritarianism in the future. There are so many questions and it is the Government’s duty to respond.
My right hon. Friend asks some great questions about the route to being in Afghanistan and the prosecution of the campaign thereafter. I think that those of us who have served, as he has done, take some solace from the way that these things are considered deliberately after the event. It is not for me to agree to such an inquiry right now, but one would hope that the lessons would be learned. I do not necessarily accept all of his analysis of how the campaign has played out, but obviously we have reached the point where the military mission has effectively culminated and what remains is a requirement for politics. To keep our people there indefinitely with 1 May approaching does not seem to me to be the right use of the military instrument.
There certainly have been some gains in governance, economic development, rights for women, education for girls and in ending Afghanistan as a base for terrorism abroad, but Afghanistan is more failure than success for the British military. Now, with the full withdrawal of NATO troops, it is hard to see a future without bloodier conflict, wider Taliban control, and greater jeopardy for those Afghanis who worked with the west and for the women now in political, judicial, academic and business roles. The Chief of the Defence Staff has said that this was
“not a decision we hoped for”.
Did the UK Government argue against full withdrawal? What steps will NATO allies take now to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a breeding ground for terrorism directed towards our western democracies again? There is US talk of over-the-horizon operations and of building anti-terrorist infrastructure on the periphery of Afghanistan. Will Britain play any part in this, and where?
The Minister said that Britain’s remaining 750 troops will be out by September. When will their withdrawal begin? How many UK contractors helping Afghan forces to maintain equipment are in Afghanistan? Will they withdraw at the same time as UK troops? How many Afghanis who helped British troops are still in Afghanistan, in danger and in need of the special scheme to settle in the UK? Ending military deployment should mean expanding diplomatic and development support, yet Britain cut direct aid to Afghanistan last year by a quarter. This year, will the Government reverse that cut?
Finally, where does this withdrawal leave the Government’s strategy of forward deployment in a region that sits between the three main state threats identified in the integrated review? Does this cause the Secretary of State to reconsider his decision to cut Army numbers by another 10,000?
The shadow Secretary of State picks up on what the Chief of the Defence Staff said in his interview on the “Today” programme last week, and I do not think that anybody in the UK Government would shy away from his very honest assessment of what happened. I think we should be clear that the disagreement, to the extent that there was one, was over a matter of months, rather than over staying there for four years more.
As I said, there is a logic to this, because we were at a decision point no matter what. On 1 May, the accommodation would run out and we would be preparing for a fighting season; or we would need a new political accommodation with the Taliban, and that would remove the political imperative altogether; or we would take the decision, as the President did, and with which NATO subsequently agreed unanimously, to leave and, in doing so, to force the pace of the political process. I think that is the right thing. The opportunity to prosecute counter-terrorism missions from the wider region into Afghanistan is something that we are working up with our NATO allies and the Americans at the moment. I am sure that the UK will have a role in that.
The exact withdrawal timeline is not one that I intend to share publicly—I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will understand the operational security reasons why that is the case—but a withdrawal from Afghanistan this year is not unexpected. It was completely within our planning last year and over the winter. We can achieve the timeline that is required without any cost to our other planned military activities this summer. I can reassure him that my right hon. Friends the Defence Secretary and the Home Secretary are working with all appropriate haste to make sure that those who have served alongside us in Afghanistan are looked after in the future.
All of us want the Government to get this right. I accept that there are no easy, clearcut, black and white ways forward, but I share some of the concern at the somewhat over-optimistic assessment that the Minister comes to the House with today. There is no absolute victory, of course—there is victory of sorts—but the peace is unstable. Governance is better, but it is still unstable, and the Taliban are not the outfit they once were, but they still pose a threat. The Chair of the Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), made some excellent points on how lessons are learned about what went wrong, because some things did. I return to the question he asked, which the Minister was not quite clear on: what is the Government’s view of a Chilcot-style inquiry? If we are all committed to getting this right, that is the kind of thing that surely needs to happen.
This might be the end of one of America’s forever wars, as it is sometimes known, but for Afghanistan, it remains immensely uncertain. What does the post-September relationship look like with the Afghan Government? I say this to the Minister on foreign aid. We can either have peace and stability in countries such as Afghanistan, or we can have foreign aid cuts; we cannot have both. If the Government are committed to a stable future for Afghanistan—which, in fairness, I believe they are—they need to reverse not just the cut that the shadow Secretary of State mentioned but the cut in its entirety across the foreign aid field.
I do not mean to sound over-optimistic. My eyes are wide open. I said in my answer that the future for Afghanistan is uncertain—of course it is. But there is a set of Afghan national security forces in place now that are capable of maintaining the peace, and I genuinely believe that there is a political will to achieve that and an expectation within the Afghan public that their politicians will achieve that.
How the lessons are learned from this campaign, as they were with Iraq, is for my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary to decide in due course. Of course, in everything we do in the Ministry of Defence, we look at what we have done, and where it worked, we reinforce, and where it did not work, we change. Within the integrated review, there is already a recognition that the way we have done our business in the last two decades may not be the way that we do it in the next.
On the hon. Gentleman’s final point about the relationship with the Afghan Government and the need to financially support them, as the Secretary-General of NATO said, this is not the end of our involvement in Afghanistan; it is just the start of a new chapter. That new chapter is one that remains every bit as committed to supporting the Afghan national Government, and this year alone the UK will spend up to £70 million on supporting the Afghan security forces. Such support—both diplomatic and financial—is key to ensuring the future that we envisage for Afghanistan in the absence of a military contribution.
“not a decision we hoped for”.
Will the Minister confirm whether the MOD feels confident in the ability of the Afghan national security forces to defend the Afghan Government and their people without the current NATO presence in Afghanistan?
The Minister mentioned those who are living with life-changing injuries, including some of those he served with. Of course, those injuries are not just physical; tragically, there are mental health consequences for many, and there are also issues with housing, access to public services and so on. Will he give a cast-iron guarantee that we will continue to meet our debt of obligation to all those who served in Afghanistan, whether it is with respect to their physical health, their mental health, their housing or other needs, for as long as that is necessary?
“I have seen first-hand the importance of foreign aid. But the prime minister has announced a £4 billion cut in UK aid – money that is vital not only to the wellbeing of vulnerable people worldwide, but also British national security”.
He is not wrong, is he?
Beyond that, I hope that Afghanistan veterans such as myself and six other Members of the House will reflect on their personal experiences in that country and on the good that they know they did and that they saw with their own eyes. Cumulatively across the whole country over 20 years that amounted to an environment in which the Afghan Government could establish itself and grow and in which civil society could flourish. We have set the conditions within which Afghanistan has the chance of a peaceful and secure future.
As for the hon. Gentleman’s earlier point, it would be impractical in the extreme for all operational decisions, some of which have to be taken with some haste, to be a matter for a vote in this House. The detail that underpins those decisions often cannot be fully shared at the Dispatch Box, for obvious reasons. The Government have, throughout, made every effort to be transparent about the way the Afghanistan campaign has been progressing. I remember there being regular updates to the House on it and the opportunity for Ministers to be held to account, but I am not sure that military planning by parliamentary vote is necessarily the way to show the coherence of the military instrument to our adversaries overseas.
Actually, the mission has gone far further, as we have explored in our exchanges on the urgent question: in the 20 years that we have been there, we have given the opportunity for the Afghan Government to establish and strengthen and for an Afghan civil society to flourish. I truly believe that we have set the conditions within which a political process now has the best chances of success.
When the Minister says that the military process is over, does he not realise that the only thing that will prevent the Taliban from going back to the position they were in before we intervened 20 years will be the threat that if they try to overthrow the Government, they themselves will face a military consequence—if necessary, from outside the borders of the country? If he rules that out, he is basically giving them carte blanche.
We are now going to suspend for a short while.
Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0.