PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Proposed Chinese Embassy - 19 January 2026 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
I appreciate that there has been significant interest in our engagement with allies and partners on this matter. As my hon. Friend knows, we never comment on conversations with allies regarding intelligence matters. I can nevertheless reassure her and the House that we continue to work closely with our Five Eyes partners and other like-minded countries on a wide range of issues, including those pertaining to domestic security. These partnerships are essential for our shared security.
We have been consistently clear that national security is the first duty of Government, and it has been our core priority throughout the embassy process, with the close involvement of the security and intelligence agencies. Our intelligence services have been involved throughout, and a range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect national security. The Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary also publicly identified two issues: the consolidation of China’s diplomatic estate in London and public access. Those require resolution before a decision could be made. In November, they wrote to confirm that appropriate resolutions to those issues had been reached. As the director general of MI5 commented last month, our security services have over a century of experience of managing the risks that arise from foreign embassies on UK soil, and I have full confidence in their ability to do so effectively.
“no sensitive government data is transmitted through cables”.
Would the Minister confirm that? Surely, that line is a tacit admission that financial services based in London could be affected by Chinese proximity.
Minister, what were the mitigations that MI5 and MI6 suggested to avoid espionage risks, and will their implementation be conditional for planning approval? I remind the House that the US has confirmed three major infrastructure hacks in the past 18 months, while we have faced hacks on the Electoral Commission, the Foreign Office and parliamentarians, to name just a few. A Chinese mega-embassy in the heart of London is an issue of national significance, not purely a planning issue as the Government try to present it. Combined with the heightened risk to dissidents, campaigners and the wider public, is this really a risk we should be taking? Can the Minister offer reassurance to my British Hong Kong constituents that transnational repression will not increase if this mega-embassy is approved? Once planning permission is given, we cannot take it back; we will have lost control. I know I speak for colleagues across the House and the wider country, because they have contacted me, when I say that this is not a risk we can afford to take and the Government should refuse this disastrous plan tomorrow.
It is also important to recognise that we have set clear red lines through this process. That has included, for example, the consolidation of the diplomatic presence of China from seven buildings to one, which will have security benefits. It is also important to say that we do routinely engage with our allies, including the US, which is our closest ally, on a range of issues, including security and intelligence in relation to China. It is important to recognise that we do that routinely and that it is important to discuss national security factors that we may consider.
My hon. Friend referred to transnational repression. She will know that the UK Government will not tolerate any attempts by foreign Governments to coerce, intimidate, harass or harm their critics overseas, especially in the UK. We continually assess potential threats in the UK, and we take the protection of individuals’ rights, freedoms and safety very seriously.
The Chinese Communist party’s plans are not normal diplomatic renovations, and it would be laughable to suggest that they are, given the location. Did the Minister see the unredacted plans before their publication, and can she genuinely say that she would have no concerns about her Government approving this shadowy network of 208 secret rooms? Given the claims that the Government and Ministers had not seen these plans until last week, surely the Government need time to review them. Would the Minister confirm that there will be a delay to the decision, which is due tomorrow? No one would seriously suggest that, in the week that has passed, the Government have identified all the mitigations needed to protect our cables and militate against these secret rooms.
The Government have so far shielded themselves behind the mundane language of planning policy, but this is not a normal application. Can the Minister confirm whether our allies have been consulted on the unredacted plans, and if so, who? Can she confirm whether UK Government officials previously denied the existence of these cables to the United States in discussions?
Last week, I asked whether the Chinese Communist party’s ambassador had been démarched and forced to explain his party’s duplicity in the application. The Minister declined to answer. It has now been a week. Has the Minister—not officials—finally found time to prioritise national security and haul in the Chinese ambassador? If not, why not, and what message does that send to China? Not once have this Labour Government démarched the Chinese ambassador since they came to power, despite cyber-attacks, spies in this place and bounties on the heads of Hongkongers. What does the Chinese Communist party have to do for this Government to defend us and act to deter future hostile acts? The Government tell us that security concerns have been addressed, including ones that they only knew about a week ago. Tell us how.
Finally, the Prime Minister has not yet publicly confirmed his vanity visit to Beijing. Has the Chinese Communist party made approval of the new embassy contingent on the visit going ahead? The Government have a duty to protect our country. Without national security, there is no economic security. This House clearly speaks with one voice on this issue and that voice says no, so will the Government join us or will they choose a dereliction of their duties?
It is important to recognise that national security is the first duty of Government—the shadow Minister will understand that more than anyone, given her own background—and we will always act to protect it. It is taken extremely seriously by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. It will be important that we continue to ensure that we have conversations, as we do routinely, with our allies and with the US, and that we take into account any security and intelligence, which we also share on a routine basis, in relation to China. As I have already mentioned, where there are concerns about national security, it is important that our intelligence services are involved throughout, and a range of measures have been developed and are being implemented.
I am sure that these matters will continue to be part of the debate, and that the Minister for Security, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), will address them further. It is also important that we continue to ensure that there is a focus on security and, in relation to concerns about those who may experience attempts under transnational repression, that we continue to stand up for the safety and security of all our people in the United Kingdom.
On the specifics of the application, in a 2018 letter the then Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson granted diplomatic status to Royal Mint Court. That letter made no mention of a condition relating to planning permission and, under section 1 of the Diplomatic and Consular Premises Act 1987, represents a fulfilment of the condition to provide express consent. Eight years later, we are now being told that consent was somehow conditional on planning permission, based on a secret note verbale from May 2018 that has not been published. Will the Government release that note verbale, which is the only evidence that diplomatic status was provided conditional on planning permission and, therefore, that the application was not prejudged by the Government?
The UK has a broad suite of powers available to counter foreign interference, including acts that amount to transnational repression. We continue to implement measures in the National Security Act 2023, which strengthens our legal powers and makes the UK a harder target for states that seek to conduct hostile acts. The Security Minister announced last year that counter-terrorism policing is offering training and guidance on state-threats activity to all 45 territorial police forces across the UK. This will enhance the ability of frontline police officers and staff in the identification of state-directed crimes and the actions that can, and must, be taken to escalate matters and mitigate such activity.
“I’m concerned about it…But if it were me, I would be very cautious about that.”
The Minister has heard the caution in this House and from the US Speaker, the White House and many others about the proposed Chinese embassy, which would give China a much greater ability to undertake transnational repression and espionage and to attack our critical national infrastructure. I ask the Minister again: are she and the Government listening to all the voices before making this decision? Once Pandora’s box is open, it cannot be put back.
The director general of the Security Service gave a speech some time ago in which he spoke about China using a “whole-of-system” approach. I encourage the Government to do the same when it comes to our own national security and deliberately juxtapose planning with national security, to ensure that our nation is kept safe. One easy way for the Government to act to ensure that we are safe from the malign influence of Chinese spies operating in this country is to ensure that the number of diplomats at the new embassy, which will be the largest Chinese mission in Europe, is commensurate with the number of UK diplomats in China.
We have talked extensively about our serious, clear-eyed approach to a relationship with China that is in our long-term interests—one in which we co-operate, challenge where we must, and compete. This is not just about balancing that; it is about being strong on security and on the economy, through engagement. The hon. Gentleman will also know that China is the world’s second largest economy and the UK’s third largest trading partner, so not engaging is no choice at all.
I do not know how up to speed the Minister is on her Greek mythology, but before the Trojan horse was pulled into Troy after a 10-year siege, one priest, Laocoön, said that the horse should not be pulled in because it would spell the end of the city. That is the role that this House is playing today. Does the Minister think that the decision about whether to pull the Trojan horse into Troy should have been treated as a veterinary issue?
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