PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Idlib - 10 September 2018 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
It is vital that a humanitarian catastrophe is avoided. The UN has been clear that a worst-case scenario in Idlib would
“overwhelm capacities and…create a humanitarian emergency at a scale not yet seen through”
the conflict, with up to 900,000 people displaced. We have therefore been supporting the urgent diplomatic efforts being made by Turkey and the UN. I spoke to my Turkish counterpart on 4 September, and the Prime Minister spoke to President Erdoğan on 27 August to discuss the situation. Of course, the situation is considered by the UN Security Council very frequently.
It is deeply disappointing that Russia and Iran rejected President Erdoğan’s calls for a renewed ceasefire at the Tehran summit last Friday. Russia and the Syrian regime also rejected similar calls by ourselves and others at the UN Security Council on the same day. We urge them to reconsider and instead to find a negotiated way forward to avoid an entirely man-made disaster.
The UK has pledged additional humanitarian assistance and medical support. We are also backing innovative early-warning technology to save lives in communities threatened by airstrikes. Finally, along with the United States and France, we have been clear that we will respond swiftly and appropriately if the Assad regime repeats its appalling use of chemical weapons.
As the Minister said, this weekend has sadly seen a further grim descent into violence in and around Idlib, which many of us predicted. Russian and Syrian jets have resumed intensive airstrikes after the failure to agree a ceasefire. It is alleged that on Saturday regime forces carried out attacks with artillery and rocket shelling for over three hours. Yesterday, Syrian army helicopters and Russian air forces conducted 60 strikes for over four hours, including with barrel bombs, typically filled with high explosives and shrapnel, on Habeet, Abdin, Hasraya, Al Zakat and many other villages around Hama and Idlib. It is therefore crucial that we understand what the UK Government’s political, humanitarian and military strategy is, given the breakdown of the talks and the horrific scenes.
The Minister mentioned the work of the White Helmets. In the past few hours, I have seen video footage showing horrific attacks on their brave workers, who are under fire from indiscriminate artillery and cluster bombs. We cannot and must not simply wring our hands and say, “It’s all very difficult.” Millions of civilians are trapped in the province, including people who have been displaced from other parts of Syria by the Assad regime. Hospitals have been targeted, in violation of international law. Schools have been hit, and children have been injured and killed. Barrel bombs have been used, in violation of UN Security Council resolution 2139 and others. We led an international fight against cluster munitions, yet we have seen them used in Syria and Yemen.
With a staggering 5.3 million children in need of assistance across Syria, Save the Children and other agencies have warned that hundreds of thousands of people will be displaced in this initial offensive, piling pressure on an already overstretched humanitarian response. This has been echoed by the UN Secretary General and many of the humanitarian agencies responding to 3.9 million people already living in and around Idlib, with many of the population having fled places such as eastern Ghouta with almost nothing.
I know that the Minister takes these issues very seriously, and he has already set out a number of the steps that the UK Government are taking, but could he answer a few questions? Is he tracking, and will he publish details of, air attacks on civilians from wherever they come? What UK military support could be used to support the maintenance of humanitarian corridors, or to prevent the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and the use of chemical weapons? What will be the consequences for Assad, Putin and other belligerents if these violations of international humanitarian law continue, whether through the use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs or cluster munitions, all of which are equally wrong? What assessment has the Minister made of the potential for such attacks to be carried out? What sanctions have been issued against individual Russians and others who command responsibility for operations in Syria? Will the Minister say a little more about his discussions with the Turkish Government? What discussions have there been about the permissions for NGOs to operate in Turkish-held areas? Many are not registered in Turkey and may need assistance to be able to carry out operations in those areas with one of our allies.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. These are incredibly serious issues. I hope that the whole House and the country will be looking at them very closely.
The hon. Gentleman accurately describes the situation, which has become desperately familiar, regarding the conduct of events in Syria, where civilian populations have been put at risk. We estimate that the Idlib region now has some 3 million inhabitants, many of whom have been displaced from other parts of Syria. The number of extremist fighters is reckoned to be quite small—perhaps 15,000, with maybe a further 25,000 to 35,000 opposition fighters—and that number is dwarfed by the number of people in Idlib itself. As our excellent permanent representative said at the UN last week, there are more babies in Idlib than there are terrorists. That is why we need to concentrate our efforts on humanitarian relief and assistance, and to try to find a negotiated way out of the situation.
To answer the hon. Gentleman’s questions, I am not sure it is technically possible to track every air strike. Certainly we know when they have happened, but I am not sure how we would be able to find out from where they are being directed or anything like that. The obvious nature of the air strikes is very clear: they are from the Russian and the Syrian regimes. No one else is up in the air, so we all know where they are coming from.
The UN is actively considering any measure that might assist civilians. If there are corridors, there are questions to be asked about such things as how they would be made secure and policed, and we will give every consideration to that. No suggestion has been made for any military intervention in relation to that. If it were to be done with United Kingdom involvement, that would be a military intervention on Syrian soil, which would have obvious consequences. That has not yet been contemplated.
In terms of consequences and accountability, sanctions are already in place against Russian entities and that will continue to be the case. Last week at the Security Council, the permanent representative read through details of the units of the Syrian army that were involved in the Idlib operation, together with the names of their commanders, and made it very clear that accountability would follow. I think that that was a bold and necessary step. [Official Report, 12 September 2018, Vol. 646, c. 4MC.]
On the hon. Gentleman’s question about the potential of chemical warfare, the truth is, of course, that we have seen it elsewhere. The permanent representative spoke about the failure to deal with chemical weapons usage, saying last week:
“As of March 2018, the OPCW”—
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons—
“fact finding mission had confirmed 13 cases of likely chemical weapons use in Syria since it was established in 2014. And in terms of allegations, the fact finding mission have recorded at least 390 allegations. After more than four years of work by the declaration assessment team, the OPCW still is unable to verify that the Syrian declaration is accurate.”
She continued:
“And we’ve heard many times that there are ‘gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies’ in Syria’s account of its declaration under the CWC.”
We can be fairly clear that those weapons still exist and are available in Syria. Of course, we have seen instances when conventional military action has been followed towards the end by chemical weapons usage. We have made it very clear through the UN and partners that appropriate action would be taken if that were the case. We are all also aware of disinformation campaigns being launched to say that such a chemical weapons attack is being prepared by other sources. There is no credibility to those accounts, they will not be used as a smokescreen should chemical weapons be used, and people will be properly held accountable.
The determination was increased last week. On 17 August, I announced a further £10 million in additional emergency and medical support for Idlib. My right hon. Friend’s point about health centres is well made—we have more documented evidence of recent attacks on health centres. This is unacceptable. The deliberate targeting of health centres is against international humanitarian law, as he said, and that should be spelt out every single time.
I want to press the Government specifically on how they intend to respond if there are any reports over the coming weeks, accompanied by horrifying, Douma-style images, suggesting a use of chemical weapons, particularly because of how the Government responded after Douma without seeking the approval of the House and without waiting for independent verification of those reports from the OPCW. If that scenario does arise, it may do so over the next month when the House is in recess.
We know from Bob Woodward’s book that what President Trump wants to do in the event of a further reported chemical attack is to commit to a strategy of regime change in Syria—and, indeed, that he had to be prevented from doing so after Douma. That would be a gravely serious step for the UK to take part in, with vast and very dangerous implications not just for the future of Syria, but for wider geopolitical stability.
In light of that, I hope that the Minister will give us two assurances today. First, will he assure us that if there are any reports of chemical weapons attacks, particularly in areas of Idlib controlled by HTS, the Government will not take part in any military action in response until the OPCW has visited those sites, under the protection of the Turkish Government, independently verified those reports and attributed responsibility for any chemical weapons used? Relying on so-called open source intelligence provided by proscribed terrorist groups is not an acceptable alternative. Secondly, if the Government intend to take such action, thus escalating Britain’s military involvement in Syria and risking clashes with Russian and Iranian forces, will the Minister of State guarantee the House that we will be given a vote to approve such action before it takes place, even if that means recalling Parliament?
May I press the right hon. Gentleman on something about which I asked the Minister for Europe and the Americas on 24 July? When the House voted in December 2015 for military action in Syria, it was in expectation that that would help in the establishment of an interim Government in about six months. Clearly that prediction went badly wrong, and it is not enough for the Government to say, as they did last time, that these predictions are difficult. Will the Minister for the Middle East say what lessons we learning about the reliability, or otherwise, of such predictions, especially if, as now seems might be the case, we are heading towards a scenario where the House is once again asked to give its consent to military action?
Secondly, I welcome the Minister’s mention of something else that I asked about in July: the UK following the lead of others in establishing a national mechanism for the prevention and prediction of, and the rapid response to, mass atrocities, chemical weapons attacks and so on? Will he give us more detail about, or at least an indication of, what he intends to do to keep Members updated and to improve on the response so far?
Finally, given the very clear evidence of the commission of war crimes, does the Minister agree that if there is an all-out, indiscriminate offensive in Idlib, the terrorists there will be able to get away, but the babies—as the Minister said, they outnumber the terrorists—will not? They are the ones who will be left behind to die. In those circumstances, should not such an all-out, indiscriminate offensive be classified as a crime against humanity, because it is clearly designed to cause civilian casualties? Will the Minister give an assurance that the pursuit of all those responsible for war crimes in Syria will also apply to members of the Russian military who are involved, including, if necessary, the commander-in- chief who has given the orders for these atrocities to take place?
As for the prediction of events and military attacks, what the United Kingdom has been able to supply—the House will understand that I do not want to go into too much detail—is effectively an early warning system, which can be activated by electronic awareness of potential attacks. It can provide information through social media as well as by more conventional means, which enables people to take evasive action and to hide to the extent that they can. Of course, the best way to avoid civilian casualties is not to employ an early warning system, but to stop the bombing.
That leads me to the issue of war crimes. The designation of a war crime is not a political act, but a judicial act. Certain criteria are clearly laid out through international humanitarian law. There is an independent accountability mechanism—the so-called IIIM—that the United Kingdom is supporting in Syria. It is essential that, at some stage, the world is able to see accountability measures working. If there is impunity, there is injustice, and if there is no accountability, there is impunity. We will work with those systems. Whoever may be liable for war crimes, the United Kingdom will seek to ensure—through international and judicial means—that they are appropriately pursued.
Seven or eight weeks ago, the hon. Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern) and I met 20 Syrian doctors, some of whom had been in hospitals that were bombed 30 times by the regime and its Russian backers. The Minister talked of naming and shaming Syrian military units, but he said nothing about shaming Russian and Iranian units that are involved in the same flagrant breach of the Geneva conventions, along with their command chains. Will he confirm that as well as naming and shaming those Syrian military units, he will name and shame individual Russian and Iranian units, pilots and chains of command?
Russia must change tack. It must end its destructive support for the regime’s military campaign and instead support de-escalation and a political settlement. Of course, when information is available about those who may have taken part in war crimes, the accountability mechanisms that I have mentioned should, and must, come into play.
The possibility remains for those groups to surrender, either to Turkish or UN authorities, but for those who continue to hold out against any peaceful or negotiated end, if that proves impossible, there is little doubt that military action or special operations may become part of the future. It is essential to civilians that that does not happen, because they will inevitably be caught up in such activity if it takes place, so the determination is to try to find a way to negotiate an outcome.
My hon. Friend said that people could go elsewhere, but the problem is that Idlib is the end of the line. It is where people have been brought to now. Whatever the solution, it must be an Idlib solution, and we are pressing all the authorities to do all they can for a negotiated surrender solution, if that is possible, to spare lives. However, the most important thing is that those who have had no contact with extremist groups and the civilians who have been caught up in this should be safe and free from the risk of indiscriminate attacks, which should stop now.
“There has been a manifest failure to protect civilians and to prevent mass atrocity crimes in Syria.”
It calls for an independent inquiry to investigate the processes that lead to and the consequences of the Government’s decision not to intervene in Syria. We could have intervened in 2011, with humanitarian corridors and no-fly zones, and the Minister referred to the 2013 debate and others. However, why are we quite happy to hold inquiries when we do intervene, such as with Iraq, but not when we do not intervene? As the Committee points out, the consequences of non-intervention by the international community can be worse than those of intervention.
We now know that there have been consequences of that non-intervention. I do not know what the right forum is to learn still more of that, and I am not sure about the process, but now that the potential damage from non-intervention is established fact, the hon. Gentleman is right that the House needs to consider the consequences of non-intervention as well as intervention. I should add of course that there has been intervention since 2013, just not by the United Kingdom and its allies.
We looked at the Burma fact-finding mission last week, and it is a scar on the world community that it can attribute blame, that it can demonstrate what has happened but that the processes of accountability are incredibly slow. We have done all we can at present to give people the tools they need to collect evidence. The United Kingdom has worked hard to explain to people how they can collect evidence and keep it safe to record crimes, but, ultimately, an accountability mechanism is still needed to bring that forward.
All I was able to say at the United Nations last year, when we moved the resolution on the creation of the accountability mechanism, was that the wheels of justice may grind slow but they grind exceeding small, and they get there. I wish I could say how much quicker it will be, but that tends to be the truth.
I have a specific question for the Minister. Will he update us on the possibility of safe exit and assessment points on the border with Turkey and on assistance with triaging people who have to flee so that we can provide more resettlement, possibly in this country?
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