PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill - 14 November 2017 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
Considered in Committee
[Mr Lindsay Hoyle in the Chair]
Brought up, and read the First time.
“(2) Regulations under section 19(2) bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Prime Minister is satisfied that resolutions have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly signifying consent to the commencement of subsection (1).”
This amendment would make the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister gaining consent from the devolved legislatures.
Clause 1 stand part.
Government amendments 383 and 381.
Amendment 386, in clause 14, page 10, line 25, leave out from “means” to “(and” in line 26 and insert
“the time specified by an Act of Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.
This amendment would require ‘exit day’ to be specified, for all purposes, in a separate bill seeking approval for the final terms of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. It would therefore have the effect of requiring a statute on the withdrawal terms - whatever they might be - to be passed by Parliament before ‘exit day’.
Amendment 43, page 10, line 25, leave out
“a Minister of the Crown may by regulations”
and insert
“Parliament may by a majority approval in both Houses”.
This amendment together with Amendments 44 and 45 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
Amendment 6, page 10, line 26, at end insert
“but exit day must be the same day for the purposes of every provision of this Act.”
To prevent the creation of different exit days for different parts of the Act by SI.
Government amendment 382.
Amendment 387, page 11, line 24, leave out from “Act” to end of line 32 and insert
“references to before, after or on exit day, or to beginning with exit day, are to be read as references to before, after or at the time specified by an Act of Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 386 and ensures that references to exit day in the Bill and other legislation operate correctly in relation to the time as well as the date of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 44, page 11, line 25, leave out
“a Minister of the Crown”
and insert “Parliament”.
This amendment together with Amendments 43 and 45 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
Amendment 45, page 11, line 30, leave out
“a Minister of the Crown”
and insert “Parliament”.
This amendment together with Amendments 43 and 44 would empower Parliament to control the length and basic terms of transitional arrangements, and would allow Parliament to start the clock on the sunset clauses within the Bill.
Amendment 81, in clause 19, page 14, line 32, at end insert—
“(a) section 1(2);”.
This amendment is a consequential amendment resulting from Amendments 78, 79 and 80 to Clause 1 requiring the Prime Minister to reach an agreement on EEA and Customs Union membership, to gain the consent of the devolved legislatures and to report on the effect leaving the EU will have on the block grant before implementing section 1 of this Act.
I wish to begin by declaring my sentiments in tabling this new clause and supporting the new clauses that are umbilically attached to it. I am a reluctant Brexiteer. I am too old to feel that I was born to bring us out of Europe, and I have not had one of those evangelical revivals in thinking that somehow life began again once we entered the Common Market and that my aim, purpose, being, and everything I breathed was towards getting us out of that organisation. That is not so.
In my own constituency and in the small amount of work I did nationally, I stressed that things were on a balance: we had to make a decision about Europe. We did not need more facts about Europe, but had to draw on our very natures—all that we had been taught in our culture and where, in our very being, we felt we stood in this country—to make the decision about whether we wished to leave or not.
I fought the referendum campaign, as much as I could, as a reluctant Brexiteer. On balance, I thought that our country’s future would increasingly thrive outside rather than inside the European Union. I have always wanted to make a deal, although it is immensely sensible, in any negotiations, to make sure that the other side knows that one may be banking on and planning for no deal.
The next factor—I will touch on this again when we think of what the House of Lords might do to a Bill of this size—is that it has been very difficult for most of us to come to terms with what our role has been as MPs in a representative democracy, and with how we digest the fact that a referendum has taken place and the British people have spoken. How do we react in those circumstances, which I believe are unique and in no way comparable with any other parliamentary procedure that we deal with in this House?
As I said at the beginning, before I was helpfully interrupted, this new clause stands with three other new clauses. Together they present the Government with a clean, small, slimline Brexit Bill. By the time we get to the end of this process, they will thank the Lord that this life raft is in the Bill and they are able to get on it. In the new clause, we decide on the date—by British time, not European time—when we actually leave. That is our choice. It is about the beginnings of the freedom that we hope will flow—with difficulties, of course—from setting us on the course of leaving the European Union.
The second new clause simply ensures that all the laws and regulations come on to our statute book at that point in time—British time, not European time.
The third new clause is on how Parliament reviews those laws—those we wish to keep fully, those we wish to amend, those we wish to add to, and those we wish to kick out. It says that this House will decide how that process is done. I am sure that before we have finished our debate on this Bill in Committee, the Government will be agreeing with me on that. The Henry VIII stuff is an absurd way of going about this business, although as we get down to the mega-task of reviewing this, we may beg the Government for a touch of Henry VIII to get through a task of the size that will be before us.
Finally, given that we have real difficulties in completing a negotiation—
I wish to express disappointment with the Government’s strategy and their handling of the situation. I do not think it has the sense of importance, drive or coherence that the issue merits. I have argued, publicly and privately, that anyone who seriously compares this historic event to our fight for survival in world war two would follow the move that Churchill made on taking over from Chamberlain, when he established a war Cabinet in place of the existing ramshackle institutions. As I will explain in a moment, the new clause represents the beginning of a new negotiating hand, and I think we need a Brexit Cabinet. It should be small, and the Opposition should be offered places in it. The Opposition were offered places in the war Cabinet, and Mr Attlee and Mr Greenwood accepted those places. We should try to act in the national interest—[Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh—
I have a sense of disappointment. We have ceased the aerial bombardment of this Bill, and we are now engaged in hand-to-hand fighting over the nature of our leaving. The sentiments of my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern), my constituency neighbour, about our trying to steer this debate in the national interest are crucial.
The second reason why I feel disappointment at the Government’s stance is that they are misreading the other side with whom we are negotiating. A British assumption is always to allow give and take, but we now have the Barnier rule of all take and no give. I will in a moment comment on how we should respond to that. Anybody who is serious, as all of us in the Committee have been, about wishing to award equal status and citizenship to EU citizens in this country know that those negotiations could have been over in half an hour. It was never ever the intention but for the other side to tick that off and say it was very good. Millions of people could have been put at their ease about their lives—both Britons living in the European Union and European citizens, as they will become, living in Britain—and we should consider that very carefully in our negotiations from now on.
The third disappointment is that the Government have produced such a Bill. When we were campaigning to leave, I thought we would have a Bill with two, three or four clauses to get us out. I know that the Government have been beguiled by its first title—the great repeal Bill—with some group of clever people thinking it can be great only if it is large, rather than aiming to be effective. I do not believe that a Bill of this size, timetabled as it will be to deliver it for the Government, actually stands much chance of getting through the House of Lords. Hence, my emphasis on the rescue launch waiting in the form of my four new clauses, including this new clause, which I have had such pleasure in moving.
This is a different ball game. As I tried to say at the beginning, it is difficult for us all to come to terms with the role we have as MPs and the role we have in a post-referendum debate. I think their lordships should know that if they try to wreck the Bill, many of us will push the nuclear button. Labour wants to see the House of Lords go—I am surprised there was not a cheer at that point—but their lordships will sound their own death knell. Not one of them is elected, and none of them has any standing whatsoever in preventing the Government from inviting the House of Commons to implement the referendum decision, as we are doing today.
I think new clause 49 should be the start of a new negotiating position. Mr Barnier has told us that we have to put our money on the table and get serious within two weeks, and I think we should jump at this opportunity. In two weeks’ time, the Government should lay the outline of our agreement. I believe they should say over which decades they are prepared to meet our commitments, and at the end of the two weeks, we should say that at that point we will cease to pay any contributions to the European Union. I want the balance of power to move swiftly from their boot to our boot. From that date, two weeks hence, at the invitation of Mr Barnier, we should say, “Fine. Here’s the outline of the agreement. Here’s the beginning of the money settlement”—paid over a period of time, because there are pensions contributions and so on—“but from this day, until you start seriously negotiating with us”, which they have not, “there will in fact be no more money.”
It is wrong to think that all the £17 billion a year will be coming back to us. The £5 billion that Mrs Thatcher negotiated from the unfair formula is already coming back to us. That was watered down—by whom I will not say, but there is only so much one can say from the Labour Benches—but, nevertheless, £5 billion is coming back. There is also £4 billion coming back to promote anti-poverty programmes in this country. I wish to tell the Committee that I applied for money from those funds to feed people who are hungry and may be starving, but what did Mr Barnier and his group do? Nothing. We supposedly have huge sums of money coming back—spent at their direction—but that does not actually feed people who are hungry.
I want to end by saying that I shall push the new clause to a Division for a number of reasons. One is that it always seems to me better to gain an advantage when one can, rather than later: a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. The Government are introducing their own timetable, as set by the European bureaucrats— whoever they are—instructing us when we might take leave of them, but I think we should decide today to leave on our terms and at a time of our choosing.
As I have said, the new clause should not be read in isolation, because it and the other three new clauses provide us with an alternative way of exiting without all the claptrap the Government have put in the Bill. I believe that, before the end of the negotiations, something like such a four-clause Bill will be adopted.
On the first and civilised intervention—the point of order—about timing, it is perhaps a fallacy to think of terms for oneself applying to terms for the nation, but I have never bought a house without having in the contract the date when it will be mine and on which I can actually move in. When I was elected to the House of Commons I knew that I would have a contract of up to five years, and I have never had a job without being given a starting date.
In conclusion, I am grateful for being allowed to move the second reading of this new clause, to remind people that it is part of a short exit Bill.
I thought that what I had to say was so uncontentious that my speech would last only five minutes. I apologise to the Committee for the time I have taken. All the proposed new clause does is put on the statute book the actual timing of article 50, which we voted for in overwhelming numbers almost a year ago. I move the new clause in my name and the names of those on the amendment paper.
I rise to support clause 1 stand part and to speak to Government amendments 381, 382 and 383. It may help the House and members of the public if I say that the decisions on those amendments will be taken on days seven and eight.
Clause 1 reads:
“The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed on exit day.”
It is a simple clause, but it could scarcely be more significant. In repealing the European Communities Act 1972, the clause will be a historic step in delivering our exit from the European Union, in accordance with last year’s referendum. I hope that all people on all sides of this issue can agree that the repeal of the Act is a necessary step as we leave the European Union.
If we were not to repeal the European Communities Act, we would still, from the perspective of EU law, exit the European Union at the end of the article 50 process, but there would be confusion and uncertainty about the law on our own statute book. For example, it would be unclear whether UK or EU law would take precedence if there was a conflict between them. The status of new EU law would also be unclear once the UK left the EU.
I intend first to set out briefly the effect of the European Communities Act on our legal system and the implications of its repeal. The UK is a “dualist” state, meaning that a treaty, even when ratified, does not alter our laws unless it is incorporated into domestic law by legislation. Parliament must pass legislation before the rights and obligations in a treaty have effect in our law. The European Communities Act gave EU law supremacy over UK law. Without it, EU law would not apply in the UK. The 1972 Act has two main provisions. Section 2(1) ensures rights and obligations in the EU treaties and regulations are directly applicable in the UK legal system. They apply directly without the need for Parliament to pass specific domestic implementing legislation. This bears repeating in the context of the clauses to follow.
UK Ministers and Ministers in the devolved Administrations have made nearly 6,000 domestic regulations under section 2(2) on topics as disparate as air fares, public contracts and preserved sardines. The House, of course, has not remained supine in absorbing all this legislation. We have benefited from the tireless work of the European Scrutiny Committee, chaired so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). It has scrutinised a vast number of EU documents, supporting this House in holding Ministers to account when representing our interests in the EU. Its work has been of paramount importance in holding Ministers to account and maximising the voice of this House on EU matters. On occasions, deliberations in this House have influenced the laws adopted by the EU, but ultimately this House was, on every occasion, obliged to implement our EU obligations. We could not refuse new EU law because of our obligations to the EU.
I think what has been established in this sequence of interventions is that clause 1 could scarcely be of greater constitutional significance. It will repeal the 1972 Act on exit day, removing the mechanism that allows EU law to flow automatically into UK law, and remove one of the widest-ranging powers ever placed on the statute book of the United Kingdom. The repeal makes it clear and unarguable that sovereignty lies here in this Parliament.
How we exercise this restored power in the future will be a choice for this place. The Government are clear that we want a smooth and orderly exit, achieved through continuity in the law at the point of exit, as we shall discuss at later stages. For now, I hope that all Members can agree that it is essential that clause 1 stand part of the Bill.
I now turn to today’s amendments. It is fitting that the first amendment debated in Committee is from the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). He has got to the heart of the matter of when we leave the EU.
I listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman’s speech, and I have great sympathy for the case he makes. I will just pick up on two points. First, on using our time, he has not of course given a time of day in his new clause. One thing I learned during my service in the Royal Air Force is the ambiguity that arises when one implies or deliberately specifies midnight, which of course can be taken as the beginning or end of a day. For that reason, his amendment is technically deficient. I hope that in due course he will choose not to press it to a Division, but will instead accept the Government’s set of amendments, including the consequentials.
The Government have, however, listened carefully to the debate about the setting of exit day for the statutory purposes of the Bill. There has been some uncertainty about whether the exit day appointed in the Bill would correspond to the day the UK leaves the EU at the end of the article 50 process. The Government sympathise with this uncertainty. This is also an issue on which the Lords Constitution Committee opined in its report in September. It stated:
“We are concerned that the power to define ‘exit day’—a matter that is pivotal to the operation of the Bill—is unduly broad in its scope and flexibility, and that it is not subject to any parliamentary scrutiny procedure.”
Such concerns were further voiced by the hon. Members for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) and for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) on Second Reading, not least regarding the breadth of the power potentially to set numerous exit days. In fact, there has been a notable disconnect, as we perhaps saw earlier, between Labour Front and Back Benchers on this issue. While several of its Back Benchers have submitted amendments and raised concerns about exit day, its Front-Bench team seem to have refused to acknowledge the need to establish clarity.
We would like to put this issue to rest. We recognise the importance of being crystal clear on the setting of exit day and are keen to provide the certainty that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead and others are seeking. In the light of this, the Government have tabled amendment 381 to clause 14, along with the consequential amendments 382 and 383, which will set exit day at 11 pm on 29 March 2019. Of course, this is slightly different to his amendment, in that it sets a time as well as a date for exit.
We said on Second Reading that we would listen to the concerns of the House, and our amendment delivers on that promise. Ultimately, the Government want the Bill to provide as much certainty as possible, and we are happy to consider amendments that share that goal. I hope that in the light of this the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) will be willing to withdraw his new clause, and hon. and right hon. Members with related amendments will withdraw them, too.
That is why the Prime Minister said in her speech in Florence that the United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019.
The Government have always been clear that the purpose of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is to ensure that the UK exits the EU with certainty, continuity and control. This is an essential Bill in the national interest, which will ensure that, whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the statute book can continue to function. The right hon. Lady’s amendments would destroy the Bill’s capacity to function if a withdrawal agreement was not concluded. As a consequence of these amendments, the Bill’s crucial provisions could not come into effect until a second Act was passed; the consequence would be legal chaos if the second Act was not passed before 29 March 2019.
Furthermore, no one should fall into the trap of thinking that these amendments would keep us in the EU if no withdrawal agreement were concluded. We would leave under article 50, and the treaties would no longer apply, but our domestic law would be in an unfit state and we could have legal chaos. As a responsible Government, we must be ready to exit without a deal even though we expect to conclude a deep and special partnership.
However, this Bill cannot pre-empt the negotiations by putting things into statute before they have been agreed. The Government intend the UK to leave the EU on 29 March 2019, and that is why we intend to put that on the face of the Bill, but we have always been clear that we will bring forward whatever legislation is necessary to implement the agreement we strike with the EU, which is why yesterday my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State announced the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill, which we will introduce once Parliament has had a chance to vote on the final deal.
This Government take their responsibilities seriously and are committed to ensuring that the UK exits the EU with certainty, continuity and control. It makes no sense to legislate for one piece of legislation on the face of another, and I therefore ask the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford not to press her amendment to a vote. With that, I recommend that clause 1 stand part of the Bill.
Until last Thursday, the debate on clause 1 looked fairly straightforward. The article 50 notification made our exit from the European Union in March 2019 a legal certainty, so, for the purposes of the Bill, exit day could be left in the hands of Parliament. But then the Government did something needless: they tabled amendments 381 and 382, putting a specified exit date—and, indeed, a specified exit time: 11 pm, or midnight Brussels time—into the Bill. Their consequential amendment 383 seems to contradict the other amendments in some regards, which underlines the chaotic way in which the Government have approached the Bill, but taken together, the intention of the three amendments is clear.
I said that the intention of the three amendments is clear despite the confusion caused by amendment 383. It is clear, but it is needless because article 50, triggered on 29 March 2017, provides for a two-year exit timetable.
There is therefore no question about whether the UK will leave the EU at the end of that period in accordance with the article 50 notification. So what is the purpose of the Government’s three amendments? Is it simply to appease extreme elements within the Conservative party, not thinking of the consequences for the country, or is it a deliberate decision to unpick the Florence speech, demonstrating that the freelancers in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet are actually in charge of policy?
Whatever the reason for the Government’s decision, it is reckless and represents an extraordinary U-turn. The Minister said a few moments ago that it was important to give clarity on the issue of departure and that it was the Government’s fixed view, but that is not the view they held before last Thursday. In fact, for the past four months their position was represented by clause 14(1)—page 10, lines 25 and 26—which says that
“‘exit day’ means such day as a Minister of the Crown may by regulations appoint”
and by clause 19(1)—page 14, lines 41 to 42—which states that
“different days may be appointed for different purposes.”
Now, the Opposition thought that that was a sensible principle. We wanted Parliament, not Ministers, to agree the dates, which is why we have tabled amendments 43, 44 and 45. That principle makes sense, and I will outline why.
As I have said, our departure from the European Union is a settled matter. However, the Bill deals with three different issues: the date that the 1972 Act will cease to have effect; the cut-off point for the use of delegated powers; and the ending of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union. On that last point, there is a fundamental impact on the transitional arrangements. Labour has been clear about the need for a transitional period in order to prevent a cliff edge and to ensure that businesses do not have to adapt to two new customs and regulatory arrangements in quick succession. We need a transitional period on the same basic terms that we currently have in the single market and in the customs union.
Businesses and trade unions support that transitional period, and we were pleased when the Government caught up with us on that in September. In her Florence speech, the Prime Minister finally recognised its importance and said that
“people and businesses—both in the UK and in the EU—would benefit from a period to adjust to the new arrangements in a smooth and orderly way.”
She went on to say:
“Clearly people, businesses and public services should only have to plan for one set of changes in the relationship between the UK and the EU. So during the implementation period access to one another’s markets should continue on current terms and Britain also should continue to take part in existing security measures. And I know businesses, in particular, would welcome the certainty this would provide.”
Her spokesperson reiterated just yesterday that she gave businesses reassurance on agreeing a time-limited transitional or, as she prefers to describe it, implementation period as soon as possible. However, amendment 383 blows the prospect of a transitional deal on current terms out of the water. Put simply, if there is no role for the Court of Justice of the European Union, we will not be operating on current terms and the Prime Minister will be unable to secure an agreement with the EU27 for the transitional arrangements that she set out in her Florence speech.
I commend the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), and I seek his opinion on new clause 49. The new clause is linked to other new clauses, but if it is agreed there is no guarantee that the other new clauses will be agreed. Passing new clause 49 would therefore do a grave disservice to this country. Will he make clear the Opposition Front Bench’s position on new clause 49?
Whether in relation to new clause 49 or to the Government’s amendments, closing down the opportunity for effective transitional arrangements is deeply self-harming.
“Neither is the European Union legally able to conclude an agreement with the UK as an external partner while it is itself still part of the European Union.”
My point is that we need to become a third country before we can conclude the kind of future relationship that I think the hon. Gentleman would like us to have.
I was at the point of talking about why closing down the opportunity for effective transitional arrangements would be deeply self-harming. As the director general of the CBI, Carolyn Fairbairn, said just last week,
“The message from us, from business, is more certainty quickly particularly around transition, particularly in the next four weeks”.
The Government amendments undermine the prospect of a transitional deal and create more uncertainty. The CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce, the EEF, the Institute of Directors and the Federation of Small Businesses came together to call for a transitional deal, saying:
“We need agreement of transitional arrangements as soon as possible, as without urgent agreement many companies have serious decisions about investment and contingency plans to take at the start of 2018”.
They continued:
“Failure to agree a transition period of at least two years could have wide-reaching and damaging consequences for investment and trade”.
It will also mean lorries backing up at Dover, because the adjustments necessary to avoid that cannot be physically put in place within 15 months, as I am sure everyone would agree. For the same reason, it will mean a hard border in Northern Ireland, with all the problems that that would create.
The Government’s approach is simply not in the national interest, and it closes down the flexibility that we might need. If negotiations go to the wire, both we and the EU 27 might recognise the need for an extra week, an extra day, an extra hour, an extra minute or even an extra second, as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) pointed out, in order to secure a final deal. But that agreement would be thwarted by the Government’s having made it unlawful for themselves to do what they would want to do at that point.
The Prime Minister has consistently talked about parties working together in the national interest, and we are up for that—we have tried to be constructive; we have scrutinised and identified gaps; we have offered solutions; and on this crucial issue we seem to be in the same place as at least some members of the Government on the need for an effective transitional period. So let me make an offer to the Government. If they withdraw amendments 381, 382 and 383, and work with us on an alternative that affirms a departure date in line with the article 50 process but without destroying the chances of transitional arrangements, we are happy to look at that and work with them on it. If they do not—
If the Government cannot withdraw their amendments and engage in that process with us we cannot support them, because of the impact on the economy, jobs and livelihoods, as we would plunge over the cliff edge. I should also say that we cannot support amendment 79. We believe the Bill should operate on the presumption of devolution. My hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Jenny Chapman) will set out our position in greater detail in subsequent days.
The Government have had months to repair this deeply flawed Bill. They could have come forward with amendments on workers’ rights, environmental protection, the charter of fundamental rights and limiting the scope of delegated powers, but instead they have chosen to come to this House with a gimmick on the departure date. This gimmick is about the Prime Minister negotiating with her own party, rather than trying to get a Brexit deal that prioritises jobs, the economy and the livelihoods of our people. The Government’s amendments are a product of the divisions at the heart of this Government on their approach to Brexit—divisions that are causing chaos, and this chaos is threatening our economy. We have a Prime Minister so weak that she is trying to tie her own hands behind her back to appease the extremists within her party.
Rather, I should say that the Prime Minister is letting the Foreign Secretary and the Environment Secretary tie her hands for her. She is putting internal party management before the national interest. This country deserves better, and we are offering it.
I wish to touch briefly on two features of this debate, the first of which is the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. There are only two Members left in the House of Commons who were here when the European Communities Act was passed, and I am glad to say that we are both consistent. The hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr Skinner) and I continue to vote against each other on all matters European, and we always have done. I always assure the Conservative Whips that they can look forward to the hon. Gentleman supporting them on most of the issues on which I vote against them, and I am sure that that will continue to be case.
On a serious note, the European Communities Act was passed on a bipartisan basis, which I helped to negotiate as a Government Whip—that is, Labour rebels supported the majority of the Conservative party to get us in. Before everyone deplores it, let me say that I do not think it has turned out to be a harmful piece of legislation at all. Apart from the predictable people—my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Back Benches—no one has ever sought to repeal it. The idea, which is very popularly put forward by the UK Independence party and others, that the Act has led faceless grey Eurocrats to produce vast quantities of awful legislation and red tape, is one of the biggest myths of our time. I pay tribute to Nigel Farage’s campaigning abilities. There is absolutely no doubt that he is the most successful politician of my generation, because he has persuaded a high proportion of the population that that is exactly how it runs. No doubt they are all looking forward to having bent bananas again once we have repealed all these pieces of legislation. I once fought an election in which quite a lot of my constituents had been persuaded that the Eurocrats were about to abolish double-decker buses. It took some considerable time to try to refute that rather worrying belief.
During the highly successful 45 years in which we have been one of the leading influential players in the European Union, the British Government have been the advocates of more regulation and higher standards. No British Government have ever taken up the cause of deregulating in Europe. The Barroso Commission, which was very sensitive to what appeared to be public feeling, was very keen to be a deregulatory commission. It gave it up. As one of the commissioners explained to me, it could not get any European Government, including the British Government, to come forward with any deregulatory proposals. Vice-President Tindemans, who was a very keen deregulator, was extremely anxious to get proposals. We tried to get some deregulatory proposals when we were in coalition. Not one Department could produce any that it was anxious to repeal. The joy that some people feel over the repeal of the European Communities Act is splendidly symbolic.
The fact is that most British Governments made it clear what they opposed and what they did not. If a regulation was passed in their presence, they had to come back here to explain why they had gone along with it. Now, that is enough on the European Communities Act.
I made this point once in an intervention, but it is an extremely serious matter. When the Government produced this technical Bill to stop the legal hiatus, they saw no reason to put any reference in it to our departure date from the Union. They had reason: there was no reason to put it in. Article 50, supported—despite my vote against—by a large majority of the House of Commons, sets the date of 29 March 2019, and the whole Bill proceeded on that basis. But in the past few days, partly in response to the new clause of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field), the Government have suddenly produced the most precise amendments, tying down our departure to the second.
With great respect to the right hon. Gentleman, his new clause could easily have been defeated: the Labour party would have voted against it; I would have voted against it, for what it is worth; and the Scot nats and the Liberals would have voted against it. Even the Government trying to apply their Whips to get it carried—if they had been foolish enough to do so—would have had a job getting a majority for his new clause. So I do not think that it was fear of the right hon. Gentleman, despite his formidable oratory, that caused the Government to table their amendments. What has happened is that they tried to make a concession to the pro-Europeans—the more moderate Government Back Benchers—by conceding the obvious common sense that, when we get there, we will have to have a meaningful, lawful vote on whatever deal is produced and that we will have to have legislation to move to the final period. It is not a great concession.
With great respect, the Government have not quite got it right yet, as we discovered the other day. All these great processes could take place after we have already left, particularly if the Government’s amendments are passed, which increase that risk. But they made what might have been seen by some as a dreadful concession to—of all people—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry). Shock! Horror! What kind of press would that produce; what kind of reaction from the fourth row below the Gangway behind me? So somebody was urged to bring something that could be thrown as a sop to the Foreign Secretary and the Environment Secretary, and produced this ridiculous Government amendment. But it is not just ridiculous and unnecessary; it could be positively harmful to the national interest.
It is quite unnecessary to close down our options as severely as we are with this amendment, when we do not know yet what will happen. It is perfectly possible, on all precedents, that there is a mutually beneficial European and British need to keep the negotiations going for a time longer to get them settled and not to fall into the problems this Bill was designed to address.
Other things that have come up in this debate are extremely important and need to be returned to—and will be returned to—many times in the Bill’s Committee stage. The whole question of the obvious need for a transition stage, and the obvious need for a transition stage to continue with our relationship on its present terms, until the new terms have been clarified and so business can run smoothly, must be reflected in every word of this Bill, and we must not seek to put obstacles in the way.
The Florence speech was a most significant step forward—indeed, it was the only significant step forward that the British have so far taken in the whole negotiating process. I do not know—I suspect, but I do not know—whether there are amendments to the Bill whose main efforts are devoted to trying to step back again from the Florence speech, but just in case, I hope that the Government will welcome all efforts to put the spirit of the Florence speech, and indeed its content, into the Bill.
I hope that we will not have these necessary and detailed discussions, of which this debate is just our first, somehow interfered with or shot down when the criticisms get difficult by people saying, “Oh, you’re remoaners. You’re trying to reverse democracy. You have been instructed by the people to leave Euratom. You have been instructed by the people to reject the European Court of Justice.” The referendum—I have no time for referendums personally—certainly settled that the majority wanted to leave the European Union. It settled nothing else. As nobody expected leave to win—including the leave campaigners, who would have taken no notice of the referendum had they lost it—nobody paid any attention to what leaving actually meant in practical, legal, economic policy and business terms, which it is the duty of this House to debate. We had no instructions.
When anybody mentioned problems of trade, investment and jobs, which are only part of the problem, although a hugely important part, they were waved away by leave campaigners, including the leading leave campaigners. The present Foreign Secretary dismissed all that—it was the politics of fear. Trade would carry on just as before. Investment would flow just as before. That was what the public were assured and what most of them believed, whichever way they eventually voted.
Well, even the Foreign Secretary is going to have to read his brief and study the basis upon which international trade is conducted in the modern, globalised economy. We are going to have to avoid a House of Commons, which universally expresses a belief in free trade, quite needlessly putting protectionist barriers, by way of tariffs, customs procedures and regulatory conditions, between ourselves and our biggest and most important market in the world.
I look forward to hearing my hon. Friend the Member for Stone as the debate continues. I have listened to him, and greatly enjoyed listening to him and debating with him, for many years on this subject. He now represents orthodoxy and party loyalty. He now argues there is too much parliamentary debate and that we should not have votes on this—it has all been settled by the voice of people. I am the rebel. I espoused the policies that the Conservative party has followed for the 50 years of my membership of it until we had a referendum 18 months ago, and I regret that I have not yet seen the light. He and I, like the hon. Member for Bolsover, remain consistent; we are probably each of us wrong. In the course of this, there are some very, very serious issues to be settled in this Bill. I ask the Government to reconsider silly amendments that were thrown out because they got a good article in The Daily Telegraph but might eventually actually do harm. [Applause.]
Over the weekend, we passed the halfway mark between the EU referendum and actually leaving the European Union. It is difficult to argue that over those 500-plus days we have spent that time well, that the Government have a clearer idea of where we are, or that the promises made by the Minister and his colleagues in Vote Leave have come to pass or are any closer to reality than they were when they made them. We are certainly no closer to the post-Brexit utopia that we have been promised.
Those looking back on these debates in years to come will, as well as admiring the speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe, do so with a sense of bewilderment. Not only is this Parliament set to approve a Bill, if it goes through, that most Members seem to think is a bad idea—most Members think that leaving the EU is a bad idea—but we are being asked to make significant changes with an extraordinary paucity of information. No other piece of legislation may have been forced through on the basis of such a small amount of information. It is astonishing that 500 days on the Government remain clueless about the impact of their plans. We have still not seen the impact assessments that this Parliament voted for and that we were promised. That would have been quite useful ahead of this debate, had this Government been listening to Parliament.
All this is coming from Conservative Members who wanted to bring back decision making, power and so-called sovereignty to the House of Commons. Clearly, after all this time, either the impact assessments are being hurriedly rushed together right now or the Government are too feart to share them—that means too scared to share them, for the benefit of those on the Front Bench. Last night’s botched efforts to try to win support illustrate the desperate situation in which the Government—and, frankly, this Parliament—find themselves. We have been given a choice between approving a really bad deal or a really, really bad deal. That is no choice at all and one that we should avoid at all costs.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe raised an important point about promises that were made. There is a point here about accountability. Good governance in any Parliament—any legislature—relies on being accountable. The whole idea of why those of us from Scotland travel down here while those from elsewhere have to make their way here every single week is to hold the Government to account. One of the principles laid out in the Parliamentary Control of the Executive Bill brought forward in 1999 by the Secretary of State for Leaving the EU, who is not in his place at the moment, was that Government could not sideline this place. I wonder whether this Government would be in their current pickle had the Secretary of State’s Bill been passed in 1999. Accountability is sadly lacking. Parliamentary control should go deeper than even beyond June 2016. All of us here should be accountable for the commitments that we make ahead of any election or any referendum. All of us should do our best to implement the manifesto on which we were elected. Regardless of how much we may disagree with each other, we have a responsibility to our electorates and we are accountable to them.
I am left in a quandary. I will happily take an intervention from a Government Member if they can tell me this: if this place is accountable—if only!—who is accountable for providing £350 million a week to the NHS? The Government deny that they are. Who is accountable for giving Scotland lots of new powers, including powers over immigration? And who is accountable for the full access to the single market that many in Vote Leave promised? If only the EU had been successful in getting rid of double-decker buses, it would not have been so easy to splash promises across the sides of them. I would happily take an intervention about accountability for those things.
The right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) made a good point about compromise. In a Parliament of minorities, we need to have compromise. It is almost a year since the Scottish Government published their compromise, under which we would have remained part of the single market—the single market was mentioned by the hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). Leaving the European Union is not something I want or wanted, and it is not something for which my constituents or my nation voted, but the nature of compromise is one of give and take.
Remaining part of the single market is a compromise suggested not just by the SNP but by experts—on these Benches, we still listen to experts—and by members of other political parties, and it was pushed for by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the leader of the Scottish Conservatives as well. I urge Members to look at that suggested deal. Under our amendment 69, instead of our crashing out of the European Union, we would retain membership of the EU until we can sort this out. We will also be backing amendment 79, from our Plaid Cymru colleagues, because it is important that democracy does not begin and end in this place, and the devolved Administrations should have a key role as we go through this process. We are now in the situation where no deal is becoming more and more of a reality, as I will mention in my concluding remarks.
A no deal would mean 80,000 jobs gone in Scotland. A city such as Aberdeen would lose £3.8 billion, and Edinburgh would lose £5.5 million, while there would also be an impact on rural areas. I welcome what the Prime Minister has said on security issues—that we should pull together—but with no deal we would lose access to EU security databases in combating cross-border crime, which would be grossly irresponsible.
I will conclude by saying that we may disagree on many issues, but we come to this place hoping—I respect Members as they do this—that we will leave our constituencies, our respective nations and the UK a little bit better off. By backing the Bill with such a lack of preparedness, we will be doing no such thing: we will not be leaving future generations better off. So weak are the arguments of those who back leaving the EU—I have heard this not so much from SNP Members, because Scotland voted to remain, but from Labour, Conservative and other colleagues—that they question why we are tabling amendments rather than challenge us on their substance. We will seek to amend this Bill as it goes through the House and to find common cause with colleagues from across the House. However, we know that what we are trying to achieve, even if we do get common ground, is to make this situation not better, but less bad. That is not a situation in which any Member should ever find themselves in this House.
I urge Members to reconsider and I urge the Government to press the reset button. There is far more at stake than the future of this Government or, indeed, that of any Member of this House.
I repeat what I have said: we have just had Remembrance Day. I simply want people to reflect for one moment on the fact that those millions of people who died in both world wars died for a reason. It was to do with sustaining the freedom and democracy of this House.
The proposal in the European Communities Act 1972, which we are now repealing, was the greatest power grab since Oliver Cromwell. It was done in 1972 with good intentions. I voted yes in 1975 and I did it for the reason the hon. Gentleman mentions: I believed it would create stability in Europe. The problem is that it has done exactly the opposite. Look, throughout the countries of the European Union, at the grassroots movements and the rise of the far right, which I deeply abhor and have opposed ever since I set about the Maastricht rebellion in 1990. I set out then why I was so opposed to the Maastricht treaty: it was creating European Government and making this country ever more subservient to the rulemaking of the European Union. As I said in response to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), that has been conducted behind closed doors. We have been shackled by European laws. He asked at one point if we could give one example. The ports regulation is a very good example. We fought that in the European Scrutiny Committee and in the House of Commons, but we were not allowed to make any difference to it. It was opposed by the Government, it was opposed by the Opposition, it was opposed by all the port employers and it was opposed by the trade unions. What could we do about it? Absolutely nothing!
I proceed now to the important question of the European Court of Justice. I made this point to the Prime Minister about 10 days ago and again to the Brexit Secretary last week. I wish to mention three pieces of case law that we inherited when the treaties that had accumulated after 1956 came upon us through section 2 of the 1972 Act. The first two are Van Gend en Loos in 1963 and Costa v. ENEL in 1964. In its judgment in the first case, the European Court asserted that
“the Community constitutes a new legal order in international law for whose benefit the states have limited their sovereign rights”.
In Costa v. ENEL, the Court ruled:
“The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights”.
In 1970, in the Handelsgesellschaft case, the Court said that community law should take precedence even over the constitutional laws of member states, including basic entrenched laws relating to fundamental rights. It does not get more profound than that. Those decisions are mere assertions by the Court, yet under section 3 of the 1972 Act, we agree to abide by them.
Let me now touch on some of the issues that arise from this continuous emphasis on the virtues of the European Court of Justice. There is the constitutional principle, which I have already explained, and there is the case law, which I have also already explained. But it goes further than that. The very great Lord Justice Bingham, in chapter 12 of his book “The Rule of Law”, describes the relationship between the courts and Parliament. He comes down unequivocally in favour of Parliament. He makes it clear that when Parliament passes a Bill such as the one that we are to enact, it will override all the laws in the European system that have shackled us so far, and also all the Court judgments, save only that we have agreed, by virtue of the retained law, to transpose some aspects of the process to which we have become used, and which we can decide what to do with at a future date.
I have to say that there are serious questions about the nature of the European Court. The problem is that the European Court is essentially not an impartial court at all. It has never discharged the function impartially, and from the early 1960s it developed a range of principles, such as those of the uniform application and effectiveness of EU law, that it then expanded of its own volition into the general principles of the supremacy and direct effect of EU law over national law. These judge-made principles had no basis in the EU treaties until the Lisbon treaty, which my right hon. and learned Friend, who was then Attorney General, opposed. The fact is that until Lisbon—
None of these judge-made principles had any basis in the EU treaties, and the principle of the primacy of EU law is a judicial creation recently codified, and no more than that. However, because we have accepted judgments of the European Court under section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, which we are going to repeal, we are saddled with this, and that is one of the things we are going to unshackle.
Interpretation is done in the European Court by what is known as the purposive approach. In fact, as has been well said, there are many different purposes that can be in conflict with one another, and the methods of interpretation applied are anything but satisfactory. I therefore say to those who want to advocate the European Court, whether in the transitional period or in general, “Beware of what you wish for,” because the European Court can create havoc in relation to our trading arrangements.
We are now embarked upon a massive restoration of self-government in this country. This Bill is essential to achieve that, and should be passed without any of the obstacles and frustrating tactics being put in its way.
The amendment would require Parliament to vote on the terms of withdrawal through primary legislation before Brexit day. That would mean that exit day would be set in UK law not in this Bill but in a future Bill, either in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that the Government announced yesterday or, if there is no deal at all, through an alternative Bill setting out the terms of departure and presumably whatever implementation plan would be needed in those circumstances.
The purpose of the amendment is not to dispute the Government’s intentions about the timing of exit day; it is simply to ensure that there is a proper parliamentary and democratic process before we get to that date. The central focus is not the date itself but a requirement on the Government to do as they have promised and set out a meaningful vote for Parliament in advance of that date. The amendment would also ensure that Parliament could properly respond, whatever the outcome of the Government’s negotiations, rather than being inadvertently timed out if things were to go badly wrong.
Yesterday, we learned from the Government that there would be a second Bill to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that is welcome. That was the subject of other amendments that the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and I had tabled because we were concerned that Parliament should not give the Executive a blank cheque through this Bill on the implementation of a withdrawal Bill that had not yet happened. Rather less welcome was the Government’s admission that the legislation might not actually happen before Brexit day. Even less welcome was the Brexit Secretary’s admission that the vote on the withdrawal agreement would simply be a take-it-or-leave-it vote, and that therefore if the Government negotiate a bad deal, if they have no implementation plan in place or if other things go wrong along the way, Parliament would simply have to accept that or choose to have no deal at all.
Under the Government’s proposals, Brexit day would be embedded in primary legislation through this Bill, and it would therefore become legally and constitutionally possible for Ministers simply to let us drift towards exit day without Parliament being able to insist on any kind of implementation preparations or any kind of plan at all. Such a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive would be unacceptable. No legislature should ever accept that: certainly not this legislature right now when we were given a hung Parliament by the electorate less than six months ago; and certainly not our Parliament, whose sovereignty has been such a key issue throughout the debates on the referendum.
The amendment would strengthen the democratic process around Brexit and ensure that Parliament could vote on the terms of withdrawal, whether there was a deal or not, before exit day. It would implement the Government’s commitment to a meaningful parliamentary vote. If everything goes according to the Government’s plans and promises, if they get the timetable they want for the transition agreements being agreed in the early part of next year and the withdrawal plans agreed by the autumn, and if we get the kind of deal that the Government have promised, with all the benefits that it will bring, all that the amendment would do would hold the Government to that by implementing their intentions and their timetable. It would hold the Government to what the Brexit Secretary said yesterday was his primary plan for the timetable. It would hold Ministers to that plan on the face of the Bill. It would also prevent the Government from delaying the withdrawal agreement legislation beyond the withdrawal date. It links the timing of exit to the terms of exit in the parliamentary process. It would prevent Parliament from being timed out because it would give Parliament the final say. If the Government’s plans go wrong—I hope they will not—it also gives Parliament a say in how the country should respond. For example, if we end up with no deal at all, if we run out of time—I hope that will not happen—or if the whole thing goes belly up, it gives Parliament a role. It allows for a debate on whether the Government should go back to the negotiating table or just walk away. It allows for a debate about the timing of Brexit day. It allows Parliament to debate and decide, rather than just throwing up our hands and leaving it to Ministers—rather than just drifting along.
What if we get some kind of deal that does not include a security deal? Is Parliament really going to bind its hands now and let the UK crash out on 29 March 2019 without any kind of arrangements for security co-operation, meaning that people would literally have to be released from police custody because we could not use the arrest warrant? Would we leave without an aviation deal, meaning that planes would be stuck on the ground? I do not expect that to happen, but I also know that it is not impossible. If it does happen, as Chair of the Select Committee on Home Affairs I want to be able to argue for urgent action to ensure that we have a contingency plan, to protect our security and to keep our country safe.
Right now, with the Government’s amendments made and without my amendment, it would theoretically be possible for us to just drift towards exit day without any substantive opportunity for Parliament to step in perhaps to amend the withdrawal terms in the Bill or maybe to require the Government to change their plan or to go back and negotiate some more. That would be up to us in Parliament to decide, but we will not get the chance to decide under the Government’s current plans.
There is a con in what the Minister said earlier, because the Government actually do recognise that there may be circumstances in which exit day has to be changed. The Minister said that clause 17 will not apply and that somehow it will not allow the Government to change the exit day through regulations after it has been agreed in the Bill, but that is not the advice I have had—it is not the advice the House of Commons Library gave me this afternoon, for example. In fact, the combination of clause 9 and amendment 383 will still allow Ministers to change exit day, if they so choose and if they think it appropriate. That is the impact of the Henry VIII powers throughout the Bill.
We understand why Ministers might want a provision to be able to come back and say that exit day needs to change because we have reached the 11th hour, because the negotiations need to be extended by an extra month or because the process needs to be changed. Ministers have kept that power in the Bill for themselves, but why should the power be reserved just for Ministers? Why cannot Parliament have that power, too? That is the flaw at the heart of the Bill. If in unforeseen or difficult circumstances Ministers need to change the timetable, they can, but Parliament will have no choice, no say and no ability to do so.
Ministers have to stop infantilising Parliament and treating Parliament as if it is the enemy. The truth is that the sky did not fall in because Parliament had a vote on article 50. The Government told us that it would, and they told us that the whole process would be stopped, but it was not stopped because each and every one of us understands that we have obligations and responsibilities towards the referendum result, just as we have obligations and responsibilities towards the negotiation process that the Government have to conduct on our behalf, and that we cannot directly conduct for them. We know that we have those different responsibilities, and we know that we have to take mature and responsible decisions given the complexity of the situation that faces every single one of us. We just do not think that those decisions should be entirely in the hands of Ministers; we think that the whole of Parliament should have a say on something so important.
I want to draw my remarks to a close. My amendment gives Parliament the opportunity to indeed take back control. The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) said he wants us to debate in this House how we are governed. Well, then he should vote for my amendment, rather than concentrate power in the hands of Ministers. At a time when we have seen democratic values and democratic institutions undermined and under threat right across the world, we have an even greater responsibility to ensure that there is a proper democratic process and that we follow our obligations that come with the parliamentary Oath we took. So much of the debate we had during the referendum was about parliamentary sovereignty. What my amendment does is make that real.
I hope that the House will forgive me if I start by dealing briefly with the opening remarks of the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). I am sorry he is not in his place, but I hope that he will forgive me if I say that the words he articulated were ones that I could fully understand and appreciate—heaven knows I have heard them often enough from constituents and from right-thinking people who want the best for our country—but that contained simplicities. Those simplicities simply do not match the problems this House faces in disentangling us from our relationship with the European Union. This issue has bedevilled the entire debate on Brexit and remain, and it is one reason why we find ourselves where we are today.
I happen to believe that what we did last year was a great and historic error. I cannot help it, and nothing that has happened since is going to alter my view. I recognise my responsibility as a Member of Parliament to try to give effect to what the public asked for in their response to that referendum. But in doing so, I am certainly not willing to suspend my own judgment, particularly when I have to witness what I see as an extraordinarily painful process of national self-mutilation, which I am required to facilitate. I cannot escape that; that is what I feel, and I am not going to abandon it because I am ordered to do so by anybody else.
With that in mind, I have to say what the right hon. Gentleman is asking for is the desire perhaps of many people in this country, which is to go to bed at night and wake up to find that the whole thing is over and done with. Unfortunately, it is not going to be over and done with for a very long time. The problem we have in this Bill, and on which we have to focus, is how we try to take this risky, dangerous—for our economy, our national security and our national wellbeing—and difficult process to a reasonable outcome. That is the challenge we have got. In doing that, Parliament cannot simply abdicate its responsibility to the Executive. Of course the Executive have to get on with the business of the complex negotiations, but Parliament is entitled to take a check on this at every conceivable stage.
I have to say to my colleagues on the Treasury Bench that the problem is that as the difficulties have piled up—in my view, they were inevitable, predictable and predicted—the tendency has been for everybody to get more and more brittle, more and more unwilling to listen, and more and more persuaded that every suggestion that is being made is in some way a form of treason. I have to say, with the deepest regret, that this culminated last Friday with a mad amendment, which I shall come back to in a moment. It was tabled, I believe, without any collective decision making in government at all and it was accompanied by bloodcurdling threats that anybody who might stand in its way was in some way betraying the country’s destiny and mission. I am afraid that I am just not prepared to go along with that.
I have tabled a number of amendments. As with all amendments, some are multiple choice—we have to do this in this House, because it is how we go about looking at and examining legislation—and some are probing amendments. Some are, in my view, more important than others. I tabled the one that hon. Gentleman highlights because the Government did not really explain that they wanted multiple exit dates. I wanted to tease out why and to suggest that one exit date might be better because of the consequences for the use of Henry VIII powers thereafter, but there might actually be a justification for what the Government are doing. All that needs to be worked through in the legislation, and that is what I have sought to do.
I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that over past weeks we have had some really sensible, constructive discussions on some of the areas covered by the amendments that I have tabled. I hope very much indeed that we can achieve some degree of consensus, in which case some of the amendments, whether on triage or the way we treat retained EU law, might not be required. I do not wish to get diverted into all that; I shall come back to it in later debates. The trouble is—I repeat this—that it all gets marred by events such as those last Friday, when extraordinary amendments are suddenly magicked out of the blue that simply do not make any sense at all.
When I read the amendments and those consequential on them, which I must say I saw only this morning, I saw another problem: as has already been highlighted, one of the consequentials seemed to me to totally undermine the purpose of the main amendment, to the point where the conspiracy theorist in me made me think it was a sort of double deceit or double bluff—that it was intended in some way to give the impression to some of my right hon. and hon. Friends who really worry about this that they were being offered this tablet of stone on our departure, but it was in fact teasingly capable of being shifted. My hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General sent me a text earlier that said that I was mistaken and that that was not the intention—that it was the very reverse.
I am not a parliamentary draftsman, and I know that there are always different ways in which an amendment to a statute can be read. I remain of the view, though, that the wording is very peculiar indeed if the intention is to exclude the possibility of playing around with the exit date, which is being offered as a talisman. I must say to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that I did naughtily begin to wonder whether in fact the parliamentary draftsman was so appalled at the folly of what the Government were doing that he had sneakily altered amendment 383 to try to offer them a lifeline in case they came to regret what they had done. I am sure that that is being very unfair to the parliamentary draftsman, whom I know always does what is requested of him or her.
Of course there are the hypothetical questions, such as “Well, there might be nothing to reject because we might be falling out of the European Union with no agreement.” Indeed, yes, but we will discover that when the time comes. In the meantime, the Government must get on with their negotiation, and we can carry on scrutinising them on that. At the end, we want a statute. That statute—I think that this has been acknowledged by the Secretary of State—has got to come before we leave.
That then brings us to a critical issue in this debate. The best point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State yesterday was that, whereas moving into transition is a qualified majority decision, getting an extension to article 50 requires unanimity. Therefore, the Government may be living with legitimate anxiety that there could be circumstances in which, running up to the wire, there could be difficulty implementing the whole thing by statute. I personally think that that seems inherently improbable, because, on the face of it, if our partners agree a deal with us, why would they then decide to pull the rug from under our feet in such an extraordinary fashion—I know that they talk about “perfidious Albion”, and we probably think that they are all garlic eaters—to tell us that we cannot have an extension to article 50 for the necessary two or three months to take through our statutory processes while they have to take their processes through the EU Parliament?
Amendment 381 was sprung on the House, sprung on the Conservative party and certainly sprung on me—after weeks of talking gently to my ministerial colleagues and trying to find a sensible way through, which I continue to want to do—and suddenly landed on us as a diktat. It is quite simply unacceptable because it fetters the Government’s ability to carry out this negotiation, which makes me seriously question their competence, and it disenfranchises the House from properly exercising its scrutiny role, with the potential that, in fact, is almost an invitation to running into the buffers. Although I do not happen to believe that this is what the Government want to do, it certainly appears to play into the hands of those who seem to be so eager that we should leave the EU with absolutely no agreement whatever.
I seriously worry that I go to audiences of the kind that seem to extol the virtues of some of my colleagues on this side of the House, and I am told that only a departure from the EU without any agreement at all can detoxify us of the taint of our participation. Those were the very words used to me at the Conservative party conference. All I can say is that the individuals who are saying these things are utterly misguided, do not understand how a parliamentary democracy works and do not understand how an international community operates. But, whatever their grievances may be, they are the people to whom we have to sensibly articulate an alternative approach.
I am really pleased that amendment 381 cannot be put to the vote this afternoon, because I have to say to my right hon. and hon. Friends that I will vote against it. There are absolutely no ifs, no buts and no maybes about this—no arm-twisting and nothing that can be done to me in the intervening period. It is unacceptable and I will not vote for it. I will not vote for it if I am the only person to go through the Lobby to vote against it. The sensible thing for Ministers to do is to go away, have several cups of tea, think again, continue talking to me about all the other sensible things we have been talking about and on which we are likely to reach agreement, and just focus for a moment on where there is unanimity in this House about how we should proceed.
While in each of the devolution statutes the UK Parliament retains the power to legislate in relation to devolved matters, the Sewel convention requires that it should not normally do so without the consent of the relevant devolved legislature. The Supreme Court, in the Miller case on triggering article 50, found that the Sewel convention is no more than that—just a political convention without legal standing. However, to proceed without the available agreement of at least two parts of the UK—Scotland and Wales—and with the agreement of the other parts ascertained only in ways that are obscure to me, and even in ways that are not normal, as the Government appear to intend, would be foolhardy and, indeed, outrageous.
As far as I can see—I hope the Minister can correct me—the Government have launched into this process without properly considering how the views of the four parts of the UK could be ascertained; without proper consideration of the views of the Scottish and Welsh Governments; with the means of ascertaining the views of Northern Ireland unavailable; and with the elephant in the room, of course, being the need to explain precisely who speaks for England—something that is always unconsidered or unspoken in this place.
What we do know, however, following the publication of the EU withdrawal Bill, is that the Scottish SNP and Welsh Labour Governments issued a joint statement calling it “a naked power-grab”. They have since made it clear that the Bill as it stands would be rejected by the respective devolved Governments. Given the continued lack of an elected Assembly in Northern Ireland, given that the Government here in Westminster are being compelled unwillingly to take powers to themselves, and given that the dispute between the parties in Northern Ireland appears to be no closer to resolution, it is also unclear how opinion in Northern Ireland is to be gauged.
The principle of our amendments is that the democratically elected Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland and the Parliament in Scotland should have their say.
As I said, the elephant in the room is the question of who speaks for England. This is the last constitutional conundrum—the constitutional exceptionalism that successive Governments have failed to address in this place. Who speaks for England? Clearly on this matter, it appears that this Conservative Government do so. Are the Labour Opposition sanguine about that? I hope to press this amendment to a vote. I do not know how Labour will vote on it, but I remind them that their Labour colleagues in Cardiff are certainly not sanguine.
The Minister may point to the resurrected Joint Ministerial Committee as a cover for—
The Government might wish to use the Joint Ministerial Committee as a cover for proceeding with this matter, but so far that Committee has not proved itself to be a substitute for proper agreement obtained directly with the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament. The JMC—as obscure to many Members in this place as it is to the press and the population at large—met in February and did not meet again until October, during which period the most important and momentous events were taking place and fundamental decisions being taken. Following the October meeting, the Government sought to gloss over the real concerns of the Scottish and Welsh Governments, but as I said earlier, these have now been made clear.
In the Brexit Committee on 25 October, I asked the Brexit Secretary what the formal relationship was between himself and the First Secretary of State, who is handling the JMC. I asked:
“What is the formal relationship between your Department and his on this specific issue?”
He replied,
“there is none at all. He is one of my oldest friends”,
to which I replied:
“He is a very fine man, I am sure.”
I have been in this place for long enough—though not in government—to know the ways of Whitehall working. There are two conditions: where there is a formal relationship between Departments and there is accountability, and where there is no formal relationship and there is no accountability. In the case of the JMC, there is no formal reporting back but perhaps a chat between old friends. I have a large number of old friends—fine people whom I respect—but I certainly would not base my decision about the future of my children and my grandchildren on an informal fireside chat.
Plaid Cymru has warned of the problems for quite some time. We wrote to the Welsh Secretary over the summer outlining our opposition to the withdrawal Bill and asking for answers about what would happen if the Welsh Assembly withheld consent. The response that we received in September was an aspiration, and it was wholly inadequate. It merely replayed the mantra: “We want all parts of the UK to back the Bill.” It was no response at all.
We raised the matter during a general debate on Brexit and foreign affairs on 26 June, during Brexit ministerial drop-in sessions on 19 July, during the debate on the Queen’s Speech on 26 July, in Welsh questions on 6 September, on Second Reading of this Bill on 11 September and during oral evidence sessions in the Brexit Committee on 17 October. Not once has a Minister told us how the Government plan to proceed if the devolved legislatures do not support the Bill. The only conclusion that we can draw, therefore, is that the Government will press ahead regardless. It is, after all, their legal right to do so, for the time being.
If the UK Government are deadly serious about having all four nations on board, and if they are determined to respect the Respect agenda, they will accept the amendment. If not, we must assume that the Prime Minister intends to ignore the clearly expressed will of the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish Parliament, breaking her promise of working closely with the devolved Administrations to deliver an approach that works for the whole UK. I urge everyone in this House to support amendment 79.
That was a long time ago. Over the years, what appeared to be a modest measure to form a common market has transformed itself into a mighty set of treaties and become, through endless amendment and new treaty provision, a very large and complex legal machine that is the true sovereign of our country. It has exercised its sovereignty through the European Court of Justice, the one supreme body in our country during all the time we have remained in the EEC and, now, the EU. We have seen how that body can now strike down Acts of Parliament, prevent Ministers from taking the action they wish to take and prevent this Parliament from expressing a view and turning it into action.
We have been unable all the time we have been in the EU to have our own migration policy or to decide who we wish to welcome into our country. We cannot have our own fishing policy and we cannot have our own farming policy. We have moved into massive deficits on both fishing and on farming, whereas we used to have a good trading surplus on fish before we joined the European Economic Community and we used to produce most of the temperate food we needed before the common agricultural policy started to bite.
The British people decided in their wisdom that we should take back control, and we will take back control by the passage of this very important piece of legislation. Above all, clause 1 will take back that control. The great news for colleagues on both sides of the House who had different views on whether we should leave or remain is that their genuine passion for democracy, which many on both sides of the argument have expressed today, can be satisfied by agreeing to clause 1, which repeals the original Act. Once that has happened and the repeal has taken place, this Parliament will once again listen to the wishes of the British people and be able to change VAT, our fishing policy, our agricultural policy, our borders policy and our welfare policies in the ways we wish.
I just hope that right hon. and hon. Members on the Opposition Benches will recognise that, far from this being a denial of democracy as some fear—they seem to think it is some kind of ministerial power grab—this legislation will be the complete opposite. Once it has gone through, no Minister of the Crown, however grand, will be able to use the excuse that they had to do something to satisfy the European Court of Justice or the European Union. They will have to answer to this House of Commons, and if they cannot command a majority for what they wish to do, it will be changed. That is the system that I and many Opposition Members believe in, and that is the system we are seeking to reintroduce into our country, after many years’ absence, by the passage of this legislation.
There are concerns about whether the date of exit should be included in the Bill. I think it is good parliamentary practice to put something of such importance on the face of the Bill, and to allow us extensive debate—as we are having today, and doubtless will have more of before the completion of the passage of the legislation through both Houses—so that the public can see that we have considered it fully and come to a view.
I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) and I have a lot of sympathy with what he was trying to do, but I will take the advice of Ministers and support their particular version of the amendment. I will do so for the reasons that were set out very well by the Minister: we need complete certainty, and that requires a precise time of transfer. People need to know which law they are obeying and to which court they are ultimately answerable, minute by minute, as they approach the transfer of power on the day in question, and that is a very important part of the process.
I hope those who have genuine fears that we will not have enough time to negotiate are wrong. I think 16 months is a very long time to allow us to see whether we can reach a really good agreement. Of course, we all hope that we can reach a good agreement. Some of us know that if there is no agreement, it will be fine. We can trade under World Trade Organisation terms and put in place, over the next 16 months, all the things we need to do, on a contingency basis, to make sure that if we just leave without an agreement, things will work.
I appeal to all Members to understand that, although most of them may not want that contingency, it is a possible outcome. We cannot make the EU offer a sensible agreement that is in our mutual interests, so surely this House has a duty to the public to plan intelligently and to scrutinise Ministers as they go about putting in place the necessary devices to ensure that it all works.
The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee should relax. She is talented and quite capable of leading her Committee, and I am sure that it can make a valuable contribution. Nobody is stopping her or her Committee scrutinising, asking questions, producing ideas or helping the Government make sure that there is a smooth transition. She and I both believe in parliamentary democracy. She has an important position in this House and I wish her every success in pursuing it, in the national interest, so that Ministers can be held to account.
The task before us should be one that brings Parliament together. We should not still be disputing whether or not we are leaving. We let the British people decide that and then this House voted overwhelmingly to send in our notice. I explained at the time that that would be the decision point—most Members took it relatively willingly, others very willingly—and we now need to make sure that it works in the best interests of the British people.
I urge the House to come together to work on all those details, to make sure that we can have a successful Brexit, even if a really good agreement is not on offer after a suitable time for negotiation; and I urge the European Union to understand that it is greatly in its interests to discuss as soon as possible a future relationship. If it does not do so soon, we will simply have to plan for no agreement, because it is our duty to make sure that everything works very smoothly at the end of March 2019.
I rise to speak in favour of the helpful amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and that tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), to which I am also a signatory.
Before I move on to those amendments, I would like to say a word about the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field). He is a good friend of mine: I have known him for many years and have always respected him. He compared this process to that of buying a house. That is a seductive way of looking at it, but he neglected to mention that the process of buying a house includes something called sold subject to contract. Article 50 might represent “sold subject to contract”, but we have yet to see what the contract is. My right hon. Friend’s analogy is perhaps more apposite than he realised, because perhaps we are in such a process but at a completely different stage from that which he suggested.
I will return directly to the argument by the right hon. Member for Wokingham about why the House should come together. Many of us believe that while that might be possible at some point, we are not at that point yet. I have two yardsticks to apply before I decide—if I am given the opportunity, provided by the two amendments I referred to—whether it is the right thing to do.
Everybody has rightly said that the people voted to leave. That is true. They did so by a smallish margin, but they did. In my constituency, they voted in exactly the same way as the national result. There is an obligation on us to recognise, acknowledge and deal with the implications of the referendum vote. What the people did not vote for, however, was an agreement the dimensions of which we do not even understand. That is where we are at the moment.
The first yardstick I will use to judge the question is the points my constituents raised with me on the doorstep. First, they said they would vote to leave because they did not like the amount of immigration. I argued with them, but that was the point they put to me. Secondly, they argued for parliamentary sovereignty. I tried to explore that more fully, but it did not often end up in a productive conversation. Thirdly, they argued for greater economic freedom. Other arguments were made and will no doubt be debated, but they were the three main issues raised with me on the doorstep.
I come back directly to the question put by the right hon. Member for Wokingham. What are we as a House supposed to unite on? At this stage, I do not know whether any of the reasons for my constituents to vote the way they did will be addressed—they certainly will not be addressed by the Bill—by the Government’s final deal. I do not know, the Government do not know, my constituents do not know and the House does not know, yet we are somehow being asked to take it on trust that at some point all will be revealed and there will be nothing to worry about. Forgive me, but I have been in this House for a number of years, in opposition and in government, and I know there is always something to worry about, particularly when the Government do not even know what the end of the process is likely to bring.
The second test to apply is fairly straightforward: are we heading into economic disaster? At this stage, we are unable to say. We do not know what the trade terms will be and we do not know how they will affect businesses and workforces. All of that is to be negotiated. If, at the end of the process, all those questions have been answered to my satisfaction and that of my constituents, I could vote, provided I am given the opportunity, to leave the European Union. At this stage, however, there is such a lack of clarity about where we stand and where we will get to that I am not prepared to give that commitment. I cannot say to my constituents that everything they voted for will not happen, on top of which it will be economically disastrous for us.
I say to the Government: get on with the negotiations, but we want the opportunity to say this is not right for our constituents. I will vote for the amendments tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield and my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford to make sure that we have exactly that opportunity.
I wish to speak in favour of clause 1 standing part of the Bill. I agree so much with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). This is the most important Bill since we joined—more important, in fact, because after 45 years of membership it is so much more significant than it was. The principle of democracy is that Parliament legislates and Ministers obey and implement the law. The problem with the EU is that it turned our Ministers into legislators. They go to Brussels, sit in council, legislate and then bring back fait accompli legislation that is then imposed on this House. The 1972 Act is the greatest Henry VIII clause that has ever existed, and there is something a bit inconsistent —I understand why they are saying it—in complaining about Parliament not being treated properly, given that the whole principle of our membership of the EU requires the removal of the House’s right to make the laws of this country.
I turn to the date of our exit. The referendum said leave. We were all told that we had to use article 50. Article 50 says on the tin that it takes two years maximum. The date is already fixed. There is no choice about the date. The date has to be in the Bill, otherwise we will weaken our negotiating position.
The point is that we cannot go into the negotiations saying, “We have signed up to article 50, but we do not accept that we might have to leave after two years. We might come to you begging for a bit more time.” That will not put us in a very strong negotiating position.
The fact is that article 50 was passed by an Act of Parliament, the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, by 498 votes to 114 on Second Reading of the Bill that became that Act. All that these three amendments do is align this Bill with what the House voted for so overwhelmingly.
Any Members who intend to vote against this date must be really confident that they can change a date that has already been set by the European Union treaties. The whole point about the deal/no deal scenario is that—as I have already said to the right hon. Member for Knowsley—either we accept the deal, and the House votes on it, or there is no deal. That is the choice that is available to the House. The House cannot veto Brexit—[Interruption.] I wish to conclude my speech.
Any Members who voted for the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill are obliged to support the amendment, because that is the date for which they implicitly voted when they voted for the Bill, and for a two-year period. Any Members who voted for article 50 but now do not wish to fix the date are open to the charge that they do not actually want us to leave the European Union—[Interruption.] Let me say this to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. He has suggested that if we do not have a deal we will be jumping into “a void”, and that fixing the date will constrain our negotiations and disenfranchise Parliament. I respect the sincerity of my right hon. and learned Friend’s passion, but he calls the cut-off date barmy when he voted for that date by voting for the article 50 Bill. This amendment rumbles those who have not really accepted that we are leaving the EU.
The debate has inevitably been peppered from the Government Benches—the fourth row, referred to frequently—with the usual clichés from the usual suspects about the impact of the European Union: comments about EU bureaucrats plundering our fish and the secrecy that applies. The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is no longer in his place; I do not know whether he has ever participated in a Cabinet committee meeting, but if he is worried about secrecy, he could, perhaps, do so—he will then see how clear that decision-making process is.
There have also been many references to the importance of the sovereignty of this Parliament, which is of course important, and unfavourable comparisons have been drawn with the EU, along with a complete disregard of how that body conducts itself through the Council of Ministers and the role of Members of the European Parliament. The only thing that has been missing from the debate has been a reference to the EU stopping children from blowing up balloons. No doubt if the Foreign Secretary had been here, he would have been able to add to that list of clichés about the impact of the EU, and it is a shame that he is not here to reheat that particular canard.
I make no apologies for seeking to amend the Bill and supporting a large number of amendments tabled by Members on both sides of the House, although I do not have much confidence that the Bill can be knocked into shape.
I do not know whether the new clause tabled by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Frank Field) was politically inspired, but it is clear that the amendment tabled by the Secretary of State, which we have heard a lot about over the past 72 hours, was very much a political initiative.
We are debating what is without a doubt the most serious issue that the United Kingdom has faced in the past 50 years, but I am afraid that the Government are not conducting themselves terribly efficiently. The Prime Minister’s amendment secured one or two newspaper headlines, but I was pleased that it did not succeed in stemming the Tory resistance. I would like to encourage the use of the word “resistance”. I do not know whether many Members have read Matthew Parris’s article, in which he suggests that we should use the term “resistance” in relation to ourselves when some Conservative Members prefer to describe us as remoaners—or, indeed, traitors.
The Liberal Democrats will clearly oppose new clause 49, but one thing I learned during the debate is that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead is apparently not an ardent Brexiteer. I was surprised to learn that, but I welcome the fact that things are evenly balanced for him. However, I was a bit worried to hear him say that we did not need more facts; it is actually quite important to have facts and not necessarily always to act on one’s gut feelings.
I will not be supporting new clause 49, as tabled by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead. The difficulty with his new clause and with the Government amendment is that our negotiating position would be made much worse by having a fixed deadline and not leaving scope to allow the article 50 process to be extended if the negotiations were close to a conclusion but not there. That would constrain us unnecessarily.
As for the Government’s position, their amendments have been comprehensively demolished by others during the debate. My concern is that the Government still seem to be arguing that there being no deal is something that they will happily pursue or are considering as an option notwithstanding the huge level of concern expressed by all sectors—certainly by all the businesses that I have met—about the impact of no deal.
If Members have not already been, I recommend that they go to the port of Dover to watch the process of trucks arriving at the port and getting on a ferry, the ferry leaving, another ferry arriving from the other direction, trucks getting off and then trucks leaving the port. It is a seamless process that does not stop. The lorries barely slow down as they approach Dover, get on to the ferry and then leave. Anything that gets in the way of that process, even if it means an extra minute’s processing time, will lock the port down. Members who think that no deal is a happy, easy option need to talk to people at the port to hear what the impact would be.
I am happy to support Plaid Cymru’s amendment 79 about ensuring that the devolved Assemblies have some say in the process, which has been significantly denied so far.
If we have a vote on clause 1 stand part, I will certainly be ensuring—
In conclusion, the debate has unfortunately again revealed the obsession that Europe holds in the hearts of some Government Members. When it comes to Europe and our membership of the European Union, I am afraid that they have left their rationality at the door of the Chamber. If we do leave the European Union, they will be leading the country down a path that will, in my view and in the views of many Cabinet members, many Conservative Members and many Opposition Members, do long-lasting damage to our country.
The key point on timing is that, rightly or wrongly—probably wrongly—we have dropped our initial insistence that the terms of withdrawal, or what is known as phase 1, should be negotiated at the same time as the terms of our future relationship, which is known as phase 2. As things stand, the EU is saying that we should sort out phase 1—Northern Ireland, citizens’ rights and the amount of money—before we start scoping discussions on phase 2. The Government have said that the scoping of phase 2 should start in December, but the EU has threatened delay if we do not move forward significantly on phase 1 within the next couple of weeks.
Clearly, from the EU Commission’s perspective, and I believe from the perspective of British and continental business, the timelines are moving from tight to critical in terms of the need for a transitional agreement and a phase 2 outline. I separate the two because, of course, the transitional period is legally derived from and relates to the phase 1 exit date set out in article 50, providing time, for instance, to change over regulators and to allow companies’ systems to be changed over, too. Incidentally, it will also be used as a standstill period during which the Government can conduct their negotiations on phase 2.
Having heard the debate so far today, both in Committee and elsewhere, I am still unsure as to why we should fix an exit date that will thereby fix the date of the transition agreement. I can see only downside, with the Government losing control of one of the levers they could use to control the negotiations. Briefings I have just received also indicate that removing the flexibility of having different exit dates for different issues could undermine the ability of the banking and insurance sectors to amend their systems in time, risking financial instability.
The proposal to fix a date also possibly pushes us into a corner and unnecessarily increases the EU team’s leverage. Indeed, as has been said, when the Ministers came to the Brexit Committee, the flexibility to set multiple exit dates was described to us as a tool for setting different commencement dates for different provisions and for providing for possible transitional arrangements. What has changed in the Government’s approach over the past few weeks? That is something Ministers have to address.
It is now seemingly the Government’s intention to follow the Bill with further primary legislation to provide for an implementation period and the terms of the withdrawal agreement, along the lines of amendment 7 tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), which he says he will now update. The amendment has received a lot of cross-party support, and we will debate it at a later date. The Government initiative is welcome, but it will not in itself protect us from the dead-end option of fixing the exit date, which seems to pander to those who would welcome a no-deal Brexit.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) tabled new clause 54, which provides for securing a transition period of at least two years. Although the amendment will be substantially debated later, I think it is conservatively worded. When the Brexit Committee went to Brussels recently, Monsieur Barnier talked of the adequacy of two years for negotiations, as has our Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. However, nearly everyone else, including the European Parliament representative and the representatives of MEDEF—the French CBI—thought that three years, and possibly up to five years, will be needed.
Two years from the exit date may be enough time to settle the provisions of phase 1, but most experts are saying that two years is widely over-optimistic for negotiating an FTA. We need to consider what will happen if the Government do not reach certain targets by certain dates. For the Brexiteers, it may simply be that we go into hard Brexit mode. I personally think that would be extremely damaging to British business, but it is of course the default position under article 50. For those of us who want to have a negotiated phase 2 settlement, more Government attention is needed in this area.
The hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) tabled new clause 69, a thoughtful amendment that asks what should happen if the Government do not secure a withdrawal agreement by 31 October 2018 or if Parliament does not approve the withdrawal agreement by 28 February 2019. Rather than jump off the proverbial no deal, hard Brexit cliff, there is a suggestion of ending the two-year period or agreeing a new transitional period. For that approach to work, we would have to ensure that we do not have a fixed exit date. It would, in effect, involve taking up the offer previously made by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) and the Government starting to talk to the Opposition. Given where we are, that is going to have to happen one way or another, and we should face up to it now.
My hon. Friend rightly spoke about how the Bill was about continuity, certainty and control, and that matters to every part of the UK. The hon. Member for Arfon and those who signed his amendment know that we are committed to securing a deal that works for the entire UK—for Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and all parts of England. There is considerable common ground between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations on what we want to get out of this process, and we expect the outcome to be a significant increase in the decision-making power of each devolved Administration. But we are clear that no part of the UK has a veto over leaving the EU; we voted in a referendum as one United Kingdom and we will leave as one United Kingdom. This Government have already shown their commitment to the Sewel convention—
Crucial to understanding this Bill is the ongoing work on common frameworks, which has been mentioned, determining areas where they will and will not be required, which will reduce the scope and effect of clause 11. We acknowledge that that work on common frameworks will be crucial to the consideration of legislative consent.
In the meantime, we are pressing on with our engagement with the Scottish and Welsh Governments. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union has been in contact with the Scottish and Welsh Governments on several occasions, and the First Secretary of State has met the Deputy First Minister of Scotland and the First Minister of Wales to progress discussions between Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. In addition, at the recent JMC (EN) on 16 October, the principles that underpin where frameworks will be needed and where they will not be needed were agreed with the Welsh and Scottish Governments. We are now moving into the next phase of this work, with detailed analysis of the policy areas with those Governments. This is a clear sign of progress, but I reiterate the point I made to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon): we would like to see a Northern Ireland Executive in place, with power sharing back in place, so that they can engage further on the official engagement that has taken place. In tandem, officials met officials met yesterday for technical discussions on the amendments proposed by the Scottish and Welsh Governments. In the past week, I have spoken to no fewer than four committees of devolved legislatures with colleagues from across Government, so I welcome their detailed scrutiny.
We will continue this engagement, and we hope to make the case for the Bill in every part of the United Kingdom, but amendment 79 would provide scope for individual vetoes on our exit from the European Union. We have already held a referendum that gave us a clear answer on the question of leaving the EU, which was subsequently endorsed by Parliament through the passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017. The amendment goes against the grain of both our constitutional settlement and the referendum result, so I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) accused me of simplicity. I hold his abilities in higher esteem than he holds them himself. Sometimes, though, choices are clear. There is a clear choice about how we negotiate with the group we are facing in Europe. Amendments are necessary, but because the Government, without the fingerprints of anybody else, have tabled an amendment stronger than my new clause, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Four hours having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings, the proceedings were interrupted (Programme Order, 11 September).
The Chair put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Clause 1
Repeal of the European Communities Act 1972
Amendment proposed: 79, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(2) Regulations under section 19(2) bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Prime Minister is satisfied that resolutions have been passed by the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly signifying consent to the commencement of subsection (1).”—(Hywel Williams.)
This amendment would make the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972 on exit day conditional on the Prime Minister gaining consent from the devolved legislatures.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Amendment 357, in clause 6, page 3, line 29, at end insert—
“(A1) Retained EU law is to be interpreted in accordance with subsections (A3) to (A7), unless otherwise provided for by regulations under this Act.
(A2) Subsections (A3) to (A7) do not affect the application of section 7 to retained EU law where, but for the operation of those subsections, the retained EU law would fall within that section.
(A3) Retained EU law does not allow, prevent, require or otherwise apply to acts or omissions outside the United Kingdom.
(A4) An EU reference is not to be treated, by reason of the UK having ceased to be a member State, as preventing or restricting the application of retained EU law within the United Kingdom or to persons or things associated with the United Kingdom.
(A5) Functions conferred on the EU or an EU entity are to be treated as functions of the Secretary of State.
(A6) Any provision which requires or would, apart from subsection (A5), require a UK body to—
(a) consult, notify, co-operate with, or perform any other act in relation to an EU body, or
(b) take account of an EU interest,
is to be treated as empowering the UK body to do so in such manner and to such extent as it considers appropriate.
(A7) In subsection (A6)—
‘a UK body’ means the United Kingdom or a public authority in the United Kingdom;
‘an EU body’ means the EU, an EU entity (other than the European Court), a member State or a public authority in a member State;
‘an EU interest’ means an interest of an EU body or any other interest principally arising in or connected with the EU (including that of consistency between the United Kingdom and the EU);
‘requires’ includes reference to a pre-condition to the exercise of any power, right or function.”
This amendment provides a scheme for interpretation of EU law and to provide a backstop where necessary transposition has not been effected by regulations made under Clause 7.
Amendment 279, page 3, line 32, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Amendment 303, page 3, line 32, after “Court” insert—
“except in relation to anything that happened before that day”.
This amendment would bind UK courts to European Court principles laid down or decisions made after exit day if they related to an act before exit day.
Amendment 202, page 3, line 33, after “matter” insert—
“(other than a pending matter)”.
Amendment 280, page 3, line 33, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Amendment 304, page 3, line 33, at end insert—
“except in relation to anything that happened before that day.”
This amendment would enable UK courts to refer matters to the European Court on or after exit day if those matters related to an act before exit day.
Amendment 137, page 3, line 34, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.”
Amendment 281, page 3, line 34, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
Amendment 306, page 3, line 35, leave out from “but” to end of line 36 and insert “a court or tribunal has a duty to take account of anything done by the European Court in relation to—
(a) employment entitlement, rights and protections;
(b) equality entitlements, rights and protections;
(c) health and safety entitlement, rights and protections.”
This amendment would help to ensure that Britain continues to have harmonious social standards with the EU.
Amendment 358, page 3, line 36, at end insert—
“( ) In addressing any question as to the meaning or effect of retained EU law, a court or tribunal must have regard to—
(a) any material produced in the preparation of that law, or
(b) any action taken or material produced in relation to that law before exit day by an EU entity or the EU, to the same extent as it would have had regard to such material or action immediately before exit day.”
The amendment would make clear that non-binding aids to the interpretation of EU law, such as background materials and official guidance produced before exit day, should continue to be taken into account by the courts when interpreting retained EU law to the same extent as at present.
Amendment 278, page 4, line 19, at end insert—
“(6A) The exit day appointed (in accordance with section 14 and paragraph 13 of Schedule 7) for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) must not be before the end of any transitional period agreed under Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”
This paving amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Amendment 203, page 4, line 20, leave out subsection (7).
Amendment 282, page 4, line 26, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Amendment 283, page 4, line 33, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Amendment 284, page 4, line 44, after “exit day” insert—
“as appointed in accordance with subsection (6A)”.
This consequential Amendment is intended to allow for transitional arrangements within the existing structure of rules and regulations.
Clause 6 stand part.
Amendment 384, in clause 14, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“‘pending matter’ means any litigation which has been commenced in any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom and which is not finally determined at exit day”.
This amendment provides a definition of pending cases for the purposes of Clause 6.
Amendment 353, page 10, line 48, at end insert—
“‘retained case law’ means—
(a) retained domestic case law, and
(b) retained EU case law;”.
Amendment 354, page 11, line 2, at end insert—
“‘retained domestic case law’ means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom, as they have effect immediately before exit day and so far as they—
(a) relate to anything to which section 2, 3 or 4 applies, and
(b) are not excluded by section 5 or Schedule 1,
(as those principles and decisions are modified by or under this Act or by other domestic law from time to time);
‘retained EU case law’ means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, the European Court, as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day and so far as they—
(a) relate to anything to which section 2, 3 or 4 applies, and
(b) are not excluded by section 5 or Schedule 1,
(as those principles and decisions are modified by or under this Act or by other domestic law from time to time);
‘retained EU law’ means anything which, on or after exit day, continues to be, or forms part of, domestic law by virtue of section 2, 3 or 4 or subsection (3) or (6) above (as that body of law is added to or otherwise modified by or under this Act or by other domestic law from time to time);
‘retained general principles of EU law’ means the general principles of EU law, as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day and so far as they—
(a) relate to anything to which section 2, 3 or 4 applies, and
(b) are not excluded by section 5 or Schedule 1,
(as those principles are modified by or under this Act or by other domestic law from time to time).”
New clause 14 seeks clarification from the Government about how a transition will be put in place and operate. It simply calls for a report to be made by Ministers one month after the Bill has received Royal Assent to clarify a number of things. Principally, the report would clarify the question how retained EU law will be interpreted during the transitional period, and by extension, how the relationship with the European Court of Justice and many other aspects will operate during that period.
I have been talking to businesses and I know many hon. Members have done so, and we are hearing that if they do not have some clarity by January or February, they will have no choice but to put in place contingency plans for a no deal and the fabled cliff edge that we would reach at the end of March 2019. This goes beyond the financial services issues, because it applies to a number of sectors of the economy. We need to make sure that we have some certainty. That is why so much is on the shoulders of the Prime Minister in the December European Council meeting, when we are told that we might get some movement from the European Union on this issue.
The Prime Minister pointed out after her Florence speech that the European Court of Justice will
“still govern the rules we are part of”
during a transition. The Prime Minister is right. The European Union has said in terms that the entirety of the acquis communautaire needs to apply during a transitional period and that it is the equivalent of the single market, the customs union and the four pillars—the freedoms—within them. That has to include the European Court of Justice, if we are going to sign up to that set of arrangements. That is also the Labour Front Benchers’ policy for the transitional period. Indeed, they will want to speak to their own amendments detailing how they envisage the transition needs to take place.
It is worth reminding ourselves why it is that, during a transition, we will still need a resolution mechanism through the European Court of Justice. The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) mentioned in an earlier intervention that the UK took the European Central Bank to the European Court when there was a question whether the euro clearing arrangements might not be feasible in the City of London. From time to time, therefore, we have benefited from that dispute resolution arrangement.
What would happen if other circumstances arose during a transition? For instance, if UK citizens living abroad wanted to get their pension payments but there was an obstacle to them doing so, they would need to be able to seek redress, and that could be provided by the European Court. If a breach of competition rules adversely affected a UK firm, it might seek to get redress through the European Court of Justice. If the European Union started passing rules in conflict with the transition agreement, we would want the Court to resolve the situation in our favour. If UK firms were denied market access in the European Union, we would need resolution arrangements during a transition period. The application of the European Court of Justice is integral to such issues—the Prime Minister was right to accept that—but the Bill presents a problem.
I invite hon. Members to turn to page 3 and read clause 5(1), which states:
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”
Therefore, under the Bill as framed, the ECJ arrangements will not apply beyond exit day. Further down on page 3, clause 6(1) and (2) similarly state that no regard will be made to the European Court after exit day.
The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union yesterday floated the idea of an Act of Parliament that would also include details about implementation at some indeterminate point, potentially after exit day. New clause 14 seeks clarity from Ministers. They must set out in more detail precisely what would happen to the legal framework in that transitional period.
The Bill, though, cannot adequately deal with the transition, and not just because of the contradictions in clauses 5 and 6. Even if one stands on one leg and squints a little bit at the order-making powers in clauses 7 or 9, none seems capable of dealing with the implementation of a transition period. It is clear, then, that we need answers from Ministers. They have said that they will bring forward a Bill, but they have to ensure certainty for business during the transition period. It could be a two-year-plus period. I do not think that two years is long enough, but if it is to be two years, that is still a long time for businesses to operate without a framework of legal certainty. New clause 14 simply says that Ministers must give details within one month of Royal Assent as to how the ECJ arrangement will apply during the transition.
We must not forget, moreover, that the 57 existing free trade arrangements with non-EU countries from which the UK benefits by virtue of our EU membership will have to be grandfathered—copied and pasted into UK arrangements. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) talked about the 759 different international treaties. We do not know quite how those will apply. We have to think about the legal framework not just after but during the transition. We have a massively complex set of legal steps to take, yet we have no clarity from Ministers, apart from this concession yesterday that there might be a Bill at some point, possibly after exit day, perhaps with a vacuum—
The clock is ticking much more swiftly than Ministers may have appreciated. We need to know that they are rolling up their sleeves ahead of the European Council, which begins on 14 December. We may just complete the Committee stage during that week, but it is vital for businesses to have certainty, and it is also vital for Ministers to explain how aspects of the transition will take place. In a way, it would be disloyal to the Prime Minister for them not to do so.
As we know, the Bill transfers all EU law into UK law. That will become effective on the day of exit, ensuring that all the rights enjoyed by British citizens today will be available to them after Brexit. Owing to some practical difficulties, however, some rights cannot be transferred easily because they are entirely reliant on the European Court. The right of the individual to sue a member state for damages when the law has been incorrectly applied and has caused them harm is ultimately reliant on the rulings of the European Court, and on a legal precedent that I think many of the lawyers who surround me in the Chamber know as Francovich.
Although the UK courts will deal with such cases, they must refer questions about the interpretation or application of EU law or EU legal principles to the European Court, particularly when the interpretation is unclear and applies to every member state. Such a reference to the Court will occur, for example, when the interpretation of rules pertaining to the application of VAT across the EU is required. After Brexit the UK courts will determine all law, and there will be no references to the European Court.
I want to give the Government an opportunity to ensure that the principle underlying Francovich—the protection of individuals against malfeasance by the state—will develop within the British legal system. In the meantime, however, there is a transitional issue arising from changes in the law that impacts individuals who have already commenced such legal action prior to Brexit, or who might wish to commence such an action after Brexit in relation to an issue that occurred in the period prior to Brexit.
Essentially, this principle ensures that the rules cannot be changed halfway through the game if an individual had a reasonable expectation that they would continue. Changes to UK law can only happen prospectively—in other words, they can only apply from a point in the future onwards—and cannot be applied to the past. This means that anyone lodging court proceedings can do so knowing that the rules that applied at the time they lodged those proceedings will apply to their case. If that was not so, the law could be retrospectively changed in favour of the state.
In fact, the repeal Bill already states in paragraph 27(3) of schedule 8 that actions begun prior to Brexit, including Francovich, can continue and can rely on EU legal principles. However, I think there is an error in the Bill, in that it does not allow anyone who has commenced an action prior to the day of exit the right of a reference to the European Court, which they could have reasonably expected when lodging their claim in the court prior to Brexit.
A retrospective removal of rights breaches the principle of legitimate expectation, because individuals have a reasonable expectation that their grievances should be heard under the rules as they stood at the time they were affected. For this reason, I am proposing these minor amendments to the Bill. I do not believe that they would undermine the overall effect of the Bill; rather, they would give legal certainty to those who were caught in the transitionary period. Anyone who has a claim originating in the period prior to Brexit should be able to have their claim heard under the rules as they stood prior to Brexit, including a right to a reference to the European Court. That is only fair and just. The British people voted for Brexit to improve their rights and the rights of their fellow citizens. They did not vote to cause legal confusion or harm, or to frustrate the rights of those relying on the courts during the transitionary phase.
As the Bill already states that cases occurring during the transitionary period can continue, my amendments would do nothing other than ensure that that happens fairly. I really hope that the Government will respond positively to these amendments, and remember that justice delayed is justice denied.
Amendment 278 follows on from our earlier debate on clause 1. It brings into even sharper focus the issue of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s jurisdiction during a transitional period. As I said in the previous debate, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said earlier in this one, there can be no transitional period on current terms, as the Prime Minister wishes, without that jurisdiction. The Florence speech has been much quoted already, and I am sure that that will continue. Let me refer briefly to it one more time. The Prime Minister obviously made the speech after the Bill had been published, but perhaps its early drafting did not have the opportunity to accommodate the emphasis that she has placed on the
“two important steps, which have added a new impetus”
to the process.
She said of the second of those steps:
“I proposed a time-limited implementation period based on current terms, which is in the interest of both the UK and the EU.”
She was accepting the case made by business and trade unions for an effective transitional period and, crucially, again making the point that this should be on current terms.
As I said in the earlier debate, we were pleased that the Prime Minister had caught up with Labour on that position. However, seven weeks on from the Florence speech, the Government have failed to reflect the ambition that the Prime Minister had at that time in any of the amendments to the Bill. They came up with the bizarre amendments that we debated in relation to clause 1, but they failed to address that ambition, so we have helpfully stepped in to fill that gap with amendments 278 to 284. The amendments would mean that, in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, exit day should come at the end of the transitional period. The reason is simple: without acceptance of the continuing role of the Court of Justice during the transition, the idea that the implementation period, based on current terms, could happen in the way that the Prime Minister described is frankly delusional.
The Government have a choice to make today—[Interruption.] I wish hon. Members would stop chuntering. The Government have a choice to make, and they have to make it in relation to our amendment 278.
As I was saying, the Government have a choice to make today—a choice about amendment 278. Are they serious about pursuing a transitional period and ensuring that the economy does not fall off a cliff in March 2019 when we leave the EU, or does their ideological red line on the Court of Justice take greater priority than the jobs and livelihoods of people in this country?
Other issues relating to clause 6 also need addressing, and amendment 306 would provide for UK courts to take account of Court of Justice decisions on entitlements, rights and protections on employment, equality and health and safety. The intention of this amendment is to help to ensure that we maintain and keep up with social standards within the EU and do not simply hold workers’ rights and equality in stasis as the EU27 moves forward. Indeed, the EU has made it clear that it will want a level playing field in all those areas if we are to strike an effective trade deal. We are regularly told that the Government do not want to erode rights and protections, but we have a Prime Minister who has repeatedly criticised the social chapter and a Foreign Secretary who has decried the “back-breaking” weight of EU employment regulation, so we need to ensure that we secure clear guarantees in the Bill.
Amendment 306 also addresses the concerns of the former President of the UK Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger. On 8 August, he raised concerns about clause 6(2) and the position in which it will leave the judiciary on the interpretation of EU retained law. Clause 6(2) states:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so.”
On which Lord Neuberger said that if the Government
“doesn’t express clearly what the judges should do about decisions of the ECJ after Brexit, or indeed any other topic after Brexit, then the judges will simply have to do their best. But to blame the judges for making the law when parliament has failed to do so would be unfair.”
Amendment 306 would address those concerns by removing the vague reference to
“if it considers it appropriate to do so”
and by requiring UK courts simply to take account of CJEU decisions in relation to employment, equality and health and safety rights. Lord Neuberger was right to flag that deficiency in the Bill, which we need to resolve.
The difficulty for the judiciary is that they will be asked to continue interpreting this law—this is the nub of it—without real political guidance as to what emphasis they should attribute to it in future in light of the emphasis it has been given in the past. It is not just any old law but something rather more complex and, for that reason, it is more sensitive to the judiciary’s interpretation.
I will briefly address some of the other amendments in the group. We support new clause 14, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), as it sensibly calls for a report to be laid before Parliament on the interpretation of EU law during a transitional period.
We also support amendment 137, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and others, as it seeks to have UK courts pay due regard to any relevant decision of the ECJ when interpreting the new category of retained EU law.
Amendments 202 and 384, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford), would allow matters pending on exit day to be referred to the ECJ, which is clearly common sense, and we are pleased to support the amendments. We also support amendments 203, 353 and 354, in the right hon. Gentleman’s name, on the definitions of EU retained law. Amendment 357, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), raises important issues, and I look forward to the Minister’s clarification. We support amendment 358, which would help with the interpretation of EU retained law.
I end on the same note on which I began by urging the Government to accept amendment 278 and its consequential amendments and, in doing so, to put aside their obsession with the ECJ so that we can secure the effective transitional deal with the EU that they, we, business and trade unions want to achieve.
The first is that we are delivering on the referendum by taking back control over our laws, which is a major opportunity; that was the No. 1 reason why people voted to leave the EU in the referendum. The second thing that the Bill does is make sure there is legal certainty, with a smooth transition for citizens and businesses, mitigating one of the key risks of Brexit, which I believe is felt by people whether they voted leave or remain.
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court”.
Why then have the Government included the following phrase at the end of the provision:
“but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so”?
I think Lord Neuberger has a point, and I give the Minister an opportunity to make the Government’s position clear.
Clause 6 serves both objectives. It sets out how, once we have taken back control over EU law, retained EU law should be interpreted on and after exit day. It makes it clear that once the UK leaves the EU, domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the European Court—an affirmation of the supremacy of our own courts and our own legal order.
The point I was making before my right hon. Friend’s intervention was that once the UK leaves the EU, the domestic courts will not be able to refer cases to the ECJ. Clause 6 also provides that domestic courts and tribunals will not be bound by or required to have regard to ECJ decisions made after Brexit.
I return to clause 6. For as long as retained EU law remains in force in the UK, it is essential that there is a common understanding of what that law means. That is critical for legal certainty and, in real terms, for the very predictability of law that businesses and individuals rely on every day as they go about their lives. We want to provide the greatest possible certainty—I suspect that, for all the thunder and lightning in this debate, that is a shared objective underpinning it all—and the question is how we achieve that. Clause 6 will ensure that UK courts must continue to interpret retained EU law using the Court of Justice of the European Union’s pre-exit case law and retained general principles of EU law. Any other starting point would be to change the law. That is certainly recognised by the Government.
The crucial point reflected in clause 6 is that the intention is not to fossilise past decisions of the ECJ for ever and a day. The clause provides that our Supreme Court—and, indeed, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland—will be able to depart from pre-exit case law. In doing so, they will of course apply the same tests as they do when departing from their own case law in the ordinary way.
We have, in my view at least, the finest judiciary in the world. Our courts are fiercely independent of Government, as they have already proved during the Brexit process. The clause will provide them with clarity about how they should interpret retained EU law after exit. As we take back control over our laws, it must be right that the UK Supreme Court, not the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg, has the last word on the laws of the land. It is therefore of paramount importance that the clause stands part of the Bill.
We are aiming to agree the detailed arrangements for this implementation period as early as possible to provide that certainty for citizens and businesses. However, this must not mean some form of indefinite transitional status, which would not be good for Britain or the EU. We need some finality in the interests of legal certainty. The new clause will, procedurally, oblige the Government to set out how retained EU law might be interpreted during the implementation period in light of the provisions in clause 6, which specifically deal with the role of the European Court of Justice and its case law. Such a report would have to be laid within one month of the Bill’s receiving Royal Assent.
The House is rightly concerned to understand the details of any implementation period and how it would function. However, the points of detail are a matter for diplomacy and for the negotiations. Imposing a fixed timescale for sharing such information in this area would be unnecessary and also arbitrary. It risks running out of sync with the actual progress of the negotiations and puts, if I may say, the cart before the horse.
I hope that the hon. Member for Nottingham East will agree; I sensed during his speech that he recognised that his new clause has now been rendered redundant by the statement made to the House yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who made it clear that the Government will introduce primary legislation and implement the withdrawal agreement and the terms of any implementation period.
Therefore there will be full transparency and accountability to this House on the issue that the hon. Gentleman feels so strongly about. I urge him to withdraw his new clause, but I will give him one further crack at it.
I now turn to amendment 357, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), Chair of the Justice Committee.
I understand the point of amendment 357, which is to provide a default mechanism for transposing EU law where regulations have not been made under clause 7. I can equally see that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is seeking to make default provision for any gaps that may exist in the law to avoid creating not just legal uncertainty, but any legal potholes that may strew the road that lies ahead. I hope that he does not mind me saying that he is, perhaps inadvertently, reinforcing the case for clause 7 because his concern appears to be with the risk that it might not being used comprehensively enough. I certainly share his concern to avoid legal cliff edges and legal potholes, for which I think he is trying to cater.
If my hon. Friend will forgive me, I will now turn to some of the other amendments in order that I give them due consideration in this important debate. In particular, I want to turn to amendment 278 and linked amendments 279 to 284 concerning exit day, which are from the Leader of the Opposition and other hon. Members.
The Prime Minister made it clear in her Florence speech that
“The United Kingdom will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019.”
It is clear that the UK will leave the EU at the end of the article 50 process—some of the suggestions around the caveat are wildly unrealistic. The Government have tabled an amendment to make sure the drafting of the Bill is crystal clear on this point and to give the country—businesses and citizens alike—additional certainty and a measure of finality on it.
These amendments would replace that clarity and finality with uncertainty and confusion. They would alter the meaning of the term “exit day” in the Bill, but only for the purposes of the provisions of clause 6. For those purposes, but for those purposes alone, the UK would not leave the EU until the end of the transitional period. I am afraid that that would create damaging legal uncertainty, and the amendments are flawed. They would have the effect that, for the duration of any implementation period that might be agreed—and we hope one will be, sooner rather than later—all the important provisions on the interpretation of retained EU law set out in this clause could not apply; they could take effect, if I have understood correctly, only from the end of that period. Since we have not yet agreed an implementation period with our EU partners, the effect of the amendments would be to create an indefinite and indeterminate transitional period, which rather raises the question of whether the Labour party is really serious about facilitating the process of a smooth Brexit at all.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union made it clear yesterday that there will be separate primary legislation for the withdrawal agreement and any implementation phase, so these amendments are entirely unnecessary in any event. We have also been clear—I think this addresses the hon. Gentleman’s point—that, in leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court in the UK.
Our priority must be getting the right arrangements for Britain’s relationship with the EU for the long term.
That priority means getting a close economic partnership, but out of the single market, out of the customs union and without the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. We want to get to that endgame in a smooth and orderly way, with the minimum of disruption.
That is why we want early agreement on the implementation period—on that much, we are agreed. That may mean we start off with the European Court still governing some of the rules we are part of for that period, but the Government are also clear that if we can bring forward a new dispute resolution mechanism at an earlier stage, we shall do so. These amendments do not allow for that. They prejudge and pre-empt the outcome of negotiations, and they introduce legislative inflexibility by saying that we must keep rules in domestic law that would bind us to the jurisdiction of the European Court after we leave, for the full duration of any implementation period, without our knowing for a second how long that might be. The Government are making the case for legal certainty. The Labour party is proposing legal limbo. We cannot accept that.
I now turn to amendment 202, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and also relates to amendment 384. In leaving the EU, we will bring about an end to the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and this Bill is essential to ensuring the sovereignty of our Parliament as we take back democratic control. We understand, of course, the desire to ensure a smooth and orderly exit and continuity for those who have commenced matters before the courts before exit. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) also made this point.
That is why we set out in our July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, that we believe that UK cases before the ECJ on exit day should not be interrupted but should be able to continue to a binding judgment. We recognise that parties involved in such cases before the ECJ will have already gone through various stages of the process, potentially including making oral and/or written submissions. We do not think that they should have to repeat those stages before the UK courts, as this would not provide certainty but undermine it. The amendment would add further uncertainty rather than mitigate it. Pending matters before the UK courts will be able to reach a final judgment post exit without needing referral to the European Court. The Bill will convert directly applicable EU law into domestic law, so our domestic courts will then apply to those matters. In this way, we will have certainty about how the jurisdiction of the ECJ in the UK will be brought to an end.
Permitting the European Court to continue ruling on cases that were not before it procedurally on the day of withdrawal, as the amendment proposes, would give rise to considerable uncertainty. It would extend the period under which the European Court would continue to issue judgments in respect of the UK, and it is absolutely impossible to predict how long that may last. Furthermore, after exit day the UK will no longer be a member state of the EU. Under the EU treaties, the European Court itself can rule only on questions referred to it by member state courts, so it follows that without a new and separate international agreement, the references envisaged by the amendment would not, in any event, be possible.
I turn to amendment 203, tabled by the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber, and to the related amendments 353 and 354. They would remove clause 6(7) and partially reinsert it into clause 14. Clause 6(7) provides key definitions of terms in the Bill that are crucial for the proper interpretation and full understanding of its content. Subsection (7) aims to alleviate any potential confusion and ensure that there is no vagueness or ambiguity about the different types of retained law mentioned in the Bill. That is vital for those who read, implement and interpret the Bill, because of the different effects of each type of retained law. The placement of the definitions in clause 6 is specifically designed to make the Bill easier to navigate and more user-friendly, by placing the definitions close to where they are used and deployed in the text.
Without statutory definitions of the different types of retained law, we would undermine the stability of our domestic legal regime after exit and exacerbate the burdens on the court system. Reinserting the definition of “retained domestic case law” into clause 14 would not alleviate that, because it would give rise to the question why that definition had been included, while others had not. Its placement in the body of clause 14, away from its original use in clause 4, would make the text far less easy to navigate—something that we are keen to avoid.
I turn to amendment 137, which is a joint SNP and Liberal Democrat amendment, in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). Clause 6(2) will allow our domestic courts and tribunals to take into account any decisions made by the European Court, an EU entity or the EU itself on or after exit day, if they consider it appropriate to do so. That will ensure that our courts are not bound by the decisions of the European Court, while enabling them to consider its subsequent case law if they believe it is appropriate to do so. It is widespread practice in our domestic courts to carry out a similar exercise with the judgments of courts in other jurisdictions—I am thinking particularly of Commonwealth and common law jurisdictions—so, in principle, there is nothing new or particularly different here.
The UK has always been an open and outward-looking country, and our legal traditions reflect that. We pay attention to developments in other jurisdictions, including common law jurisdictions, and we embrace the best that the world has to offer, but we do so on our terms and under our control. That is decided by our courts and, ultimately, it is subject to the legislative will and sovereignty of this House. Amendment 137 is therefore unnecessary, as the Bill already provides that post-exit decisions of the European Court can be considered by the domestic courts.
Amendment 137 would go further, however, in that it would require our courts and tribunals to pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court. What does “due regard” mean? It is not defined and, indeed, it is far from clear. It is evidently intended to go further than clause 6, and tacitly urges our courts to heed, follow or shadow the Luxembourg Court, but there is no clarity about what would count as due consideration. The amendment would alter the inherent discretion the UK courts already have to consider, without fetters, the case law in other jurisdictions, and it seeks to apply to the European Court a procedural requirement that is stronger but so vague that it is liable to create more, not less, confusion. I hope that I have tackled, or at least addressed the concerns that the hon. and learned Lady has expressed in her amendment, and I urge her not to press it.
I will now turn to amendment 303 in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham. I thank her for tabling this amendment and for explaining it, as she did, in a very constructive spirit. I recognise that she is representing the interests of her constituents with her customary tenacity, but I will take a few moments to set out why we have taken our approach to the issues and my difficulties with her amendment.
Clause 6 supports the Bill’s core aim of maximising certainty. It is in no one’s interests for there to be a legal cliff edge. The Bill means that the laws and rules we have now will, as far as possible, continue to apply. It seeks to take a snapshot of EU law immediately before exit day. The Government have been clear that in leaving the EU, we will be bringing to an end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the UK. To maximise certainty, any question about the meaning of retained EU law will be determined in UK courts by reference to ECJ case law as it existed before our exit. Using any other starting point would be to change the law, which is not our objective. Our domestic courts and tribunals will no longer be bound by or required to have regard to any decisions of the European Court after that point, but they can do so if they consider it appropriate. These clear rules of interpretation are set out in clause 6.
“the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law”.
It seems to us that he can have it one way or the other, so which is the governing clause—the one saying that the courts are bound to judge in accordance with the previous judgments of the ECJ, or the one saying that the Supreme Court is not bound by such a rule?
The amendment is at odds with the clear and certain position set out in the Bill, because it would continue to bind UK courts to some post-exit ECJ decisions and case law where the matters giving rise to the case have occurred before our exit. Those judgments would continue to be binding even after an implementation period. Strictly interpreted, the amendment would go further still. It would apply to anything happening before exit day and so would also include ECJ judgments on cases referred from outside the UK. For example, a preliminary reference made by another EU member state in relation to the interpretation of EU law might also fall within the scope of the amendment, if the facts of the case arose before exit day. The consequences would be far-reaching and risk creating considerable uncertainty and practical difficulties for the administration of justice.
UK courts and tribunals would continue to be bound by some new ECJ judgments for an indeterminate period. Those binding judgments could continue to be issued long after we have left the EU as cases continue to progress to the European Court from across the EU. Yet those judgments would not have formed part of the snapshot of retained EU case law that, under clause 6(3), will be binding on our courts, so far as is relevant, and subject to the rule in clause 6(4). By contrast, such post-exit judgments would bind our courts in all circumstances, including where the retained version of an EU regulation had since been modified by this Parliament or a devolved Administration. That would create foreseeable and entirely avoidable uncertainty, and it would not be necessary, because individuals whose cause of action predates our exit would, of course, continue to be able to take their case to the domestic courts, even if after exit they cannot reach the European Court. That is the fundamental point in relation to the procedural framework.
I now turn to amendment 304, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham, in relation to retaining ECJ referrals and jurisdiction for anything that happened before exit day. In leaving the EU, we will bring an end to the jurisdiction of the ECJ—we have made that clear. The proposed amendment would frustrate that objective, because our courts could continue to make references to the ECJ in relation to cases where relevant matters have occurred before our withdrawal from the EU. As a result, different rules and processes would apply for those cases, compared with those where the relevant circumstances arose after exit day. That would, I fear, give rise to more not less uncertainty, because it would be impossible to predict for how long UK courts would continue to be subject to binding judgments from Luxembourg.
When we exit the EU, we will know exactly how many pending UK cases are registered with the European Court, awaiting a preliminary reference and thus covered by any proposed agreement we have with the EU on the treatment of pending cases. That is important to deliver certainty about how and when the Court’s jurisdiction in the UK will be brought to an end. The amendment would remove that certainty. Like amendment 303, it is not necessary. Individuals will not lose their ability to vindicate their rights in court after exit. They will be able to take such cases to our domestic courts.
Forgive me, Sir David, but I thought it necessary to address my right hon. Friend’s amendments in detail. Equally, I want to say that I recognise the eloquence and the force with which she champions her constituents. Ministers will take away the underlying issue that she has brought and powerfully moved for consideration. I hope that on that basis she will not feel she needs to press the amendment.
I will now rattle through the final amendments, so I have done them all justice and given them due consideration. I will turn next to amendment 306, tabled by the Opposition. Clause 6(2) states that our courts are no longer bound by decisions of the European Court after our departure or required to consider in future cases, although they may do so if they believe it to be appropriate. Clause 6 is a vote of confidence in our judiciary: its independence and its expertise. Using similar exercises currently undertaken with court judgments in other jurisdictions, our courts are best placed to decide to what extent, if any, they pay regard to EU law in any case before them.
The intention of amendment 306 is to remove that discretion from clause 6 and replace it with a duty that sets fetters on which aspects of EU case law our judges must consider, although only in certain areas. In practice, that would create a presumption that EU decisions should be followed in those areas. That is the clear intention, but it is inappropriate. It would undermine the purpose of clause 6 in both its fundamental objectives. It would frustrate the return of control to this House and the UK Supreme Court and expose the UK to substantial additional and unnecessary legal uncertainty.
The singling out of these areas of law appears somewhat arbitrary, given other fields the amendment might equally apply to. It would lead to a splintered approach to interpretation of the law and a fragmented UK jurisprudence—more uncertainty, not less. In any case, it is totally unnecessary. The UK has a proud history of ensuring the rights and protections of individuals in this country. The UK has high standards of protection domestically in relation to workers’ rights and human rights. We are recognised as a world leader in delivering robust, rigorous health and safety protections. That record and that commitment is not dependent on our membership of the EU; it is dependent on hon. Members in this House and their eternal vigilance. It will continue to be dependent on that after we leave. I hope that the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and his colleagues in the Labour party will not press amendment 306.
Finally, I turn to amendment 358 tabled by the Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), which sets out the ability of UK courts to have regard to material used in the preparation of retained EU law. I hope that this is the point at which I give some reassurance to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin). Currently, when interpreting EU law domestically, our courts will look at the language used, as well as considering the legislation’s recitals, legal basis and other language versions to inform their interpretation. We do not want to change how this law is interpreted or to create any fresh uncertainty about its meaning, so the Bill provides for the courts to continue that approach. Clause 6 provides that questions on the validity, meaning or effect of retained EU law will be decided in accordance with retained case law and general principles of EU law. This requires taking a purposive approach to interpretation where the meaning of the provision is unclear, considering relevant documents such as the legislation’s treaty legal base, working papers that may have led to the adoption of the measure and the general principles of EU law. I hope that reassures my hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee and that he will not press his amendment.
To sum up, I hope that I have at least sought to address all the underlying concerns in each of the amendments and, given the need to maximise legal certainty, minimise confusion and ensure a smooth transition, that all hon. Members will make sure that clause 6 stands part of the Bill unamended.
I will endeavour to explain in detail why amendment 137 is necessary. In essence, we have tabled it because it is necessary to create legal certainty for individuals and businesses by giving a clear instruction to the courts about how to treat decisions of the European Court of Justice after exit day. I am afraid that the Bill does not give that degree of clarity. The purpose of the amendment is also to protect the judiciary from having to make decisions open to political criticism. We saw some pretty heinous political criticism of judges on the Supreme Court earlier this year, and we have heard judges on that Court express concern about the possibility of not being given proper direction in the Bill. My amendment seeks to address that issue. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our constituents, the amendment will encourage UK rights protections to keep pace with EU rights after Brexit.
Amendment 202 is also about giving certainty to individuals and businesses with cases pending before the domestic courts on exit day. I listened carefully to what the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) said about her amendments, with which I have great sympathy. Amendments 202 and 203 have a similar purpose. I also listened with care to what the Minister said, but I regret that he has not given me any comfort that anything in the Bill will give the certainty required for people in the midst of litigation on exit day. That is why we seek to define a “pending matter” in amendment 384 as
“any litigation which has been commenced in any court or tribunal in the United Kingdom and which is not finally determined at exit day”.
We need clarity. It is not just me who says so, or those who support the amendment; these amendments were drafted with some care by the Law Society of Scotland, and I submit that they are necessary to protect litigants’ legitimate expectations, but I will return to that in a moment.
The underlying theme of all these amendments is the need to create the legal certainty that hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to today. It is, of course, an absolute requirement of the rule of law that there should be legal certainty. I regret to say, however, that clause 6 does not give that degree of legal certainty. In accordance with our mandate the Scottish National party opposes Brexit, but we understand the need for withdrawal legislation, and we want to reach agreement on it if possible. We also want to ensure that the legislation is properly framed. Clause 6 is not properly framed, because it does not give the certainty that is required.
As I said in an intervention, it seems to me that the Government’s amendments which purport to set exit day are mere window-dressing and mere politics. As others have pointed out, perhaps more eloquently than me—particularly the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—the amendments are barmy. They will not achieve what they set out to achieve.
The Prime Minister is very keen on a transition period: that is what the Florence speech was all about. When I and other Members were in Brussels last week, we asked senior EU officials what their understanding was of the legal basis for any transitional deal, and they said that it was article 50. That did not come as a surprise to me because I asked the Prime Minister the same question a couple of weeks ago, and she said that her understanding was that it was article 50, based on the EU’s April guidelines.
What the senior EU officials told us last week was that if a transition took place under article 50, we would stay in the customs union and the single market and would remain subject to the Court of Justice of the European Union. If there is a transitional deal, all the courts in the United Kingdom will continue to be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU, which means that clause 6 will not work if there is a transition period. If the Government do not agree with me about that, will they please tell us why they do not agree, what their alternative legal basis is for any transitional deal, and on what basis they say—if they do—that we will not be under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice during the transition period?
That said, if we ever do leave the European Union—which I hope we do not—in reality rather than in name only, or if, God forbid, we crash out without a deal, which must be a serious possibility, clause 6 will be very important indeed, so we need to get it right. That is the reason for amendments 137, 202 and 203.
At present, the Court of Justice of the European Union is the ultimate arbiter when it comes to the meaning of EU law under the EU treaties. At present, courts in the UK are bound to determine issues of EU law in accordance with the CJEU’s interpretation. When an issue is not clear, the national court has a duty to make a “preliminary reference” to the CJEU to ask for a definitive interpretation. That is how it works. It is wrong to describe the Court of Justice as having jurisdiction in the UK; it simply has jurisdiction to answer questions about EU law that are put to it by the UK courts. I fear that much of the antipathy that is directed at the Court of Justice is based on a fundamental misapprehension about what it actually does and what it is actually there for. It does not dictate our laws. As others more eloquent than me explained earlier today, the laws come from many sources. What the Court of Justice does is interpret the laws and create some consistency.
I accept that if we leave the European Union, the duty to refer issues to the CJEU will no longer apply, but I also know, because the Bill tells me so, that “retained EU law” will still have to be interpreted by our courts, north and south of the border.
Under clause 6, after exit day our courts will not be under a duty to follow the interpretation of the Court of Justice, but even though that is the case, the Court of Justice will continue giving judgments on references from other member states, and these will deal with the meaning of what law we have retained. The case law of the Court of Justice may therefore still offer useful guidance for our courts. I think the Government accept that, because they have attempted to frame some guidance on that in clause 6, but the only guidance they have given is that the UK courts are not bound by the Court of Justice after Brexit, but they may have regard to anything the court says if they consider it “appropriate to do so.” The word “appropriate” causes concern to many across this House and outwith it, because it gives the judges an extraordinarily wide discretion, but no guidance on the circumstances in which it is proper for them to look at Court of Justice decisions.
This is important because no less a figure than Lord Neuberger, outgoing President of the Supreme Court, has expressed concern that judges will need clarity about how to treat decisions of the Court of Justice after Brexit. He has said that if the Government do not express clearly what the judges should do about Court of Justice decisions after Brexit, the judges will simply have to do their best, and if they are left just to do their best, it would be unfair to blame them for making law which Parliament has failed to make.
To returning to the issue of legal certainty, the Institute for Government looked carefully at different tests that might be put on this Bill to direct the courts, and expressed the view that if Parliament passes the buck on this question to the judges, it will leave the judges open to fierce political criticism. We have already seen the sort of fierce political criticism that the judges got earlier this year, and regardless of the different views we might have about the British constitution, all of us can probably accept that the independence of the judiciary is a fundamental part of any constitution that recognises the rule of law. We perhaps do not have to look too far from home in the EU at present to see a judiciary that is not independent, but I digress.
We need an independent judiciary in this country, and we have one, but it has to be protected from criticism because judges cannot go into print to defend themselves when criticised. We must provide the courts with a specific legal test on the face of the Bill governing the treatment of Court of Justice case law after Brexit, and that is what my amendment 137 seeks to achieve.
“When interpreting retained EU law after exit day a court or tribunal shall pay due regard to any relevant decision of the European Court.”
The Minister questioned the term “due regard”, but it is not unknown to international law. The Lugano Convention on the mutual recognition on enforcement of judgments, to which EU and non-EU states are signatories, talks about paying “due account”, but I have followed the recommendation of the organisation Justice that it is clearer and better English to talk about paying “due regard”. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, we have a duty to take account of decisions of the Court of Justice, so paying “due regard” to taking account of such decisions is not a phrase unknown.
This amendment is not a Trojan horse designed to continue references after Brexit, and I say that as someone who does not want Brexit to happen. It is designed to create certainty for individuals, businesses and litigants, and also for the judiciary. It would leave it open to British courts to disagree with the Court of Justice’s interpretation, even if its case law was relevant to the case. It would not—as the Government’s current draft does—give an unfettered, politically controversial discretion to consider or ignore Court of Justice decisions as our courts saw fit.
The test set out in my amendment has three advantages. First, it would create legal certainty for individuals and businesses. Secondly, it would provide political cover for the courts. Thirdly, it seems to fit with the preference of the judiciary, who want a clear instruction. In recent evidence to the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Lady Hale, the new President of the Supreme Court, said:
“It should be made plain in statute what authority or lack of authority, or weight or lack of weight, is to be given to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union after we have left, in relation both to matters that arose before we left and, more importantly, to matters after we leave. That is not something we”—
she means “we, the judges”—
“would like to have to make up for ourselves, obviously, because it is very much a political question, and we would like statute to tell us the answer.”
In my submission, under my amendment, statute would tell the judges the answer.
That is not just my view. The Institute for Government looked at the various options and concluded that the wording that I now propose would license courts in the UK to refer to the Court of Justice’s reasoning in future judgments without making those Court of Justice judgments binding on the UK courts—
The Institute for Government took the view that that approach was compatible with the objectives set out in the Government’s White Paper on Brexit and in the repeal Bill.
As I said earlier, this amendment is not a Trojan horse. It is the result of careful consideration by the organisation Justice and by the Institute for Government. It also has the support of the TUC and, I am delighted to say, the Labour party, as well as the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Fawcett Society. One reason the Equality and Human Rights Commission is so keen on this amendment is because it is also important for rights protections. It is important to remember that EU law is largely about the rights of individuals. The Government’s position paper, published in the summer, seemed to imagine that EU law was all about disputes between the United Kingdom and the EU, but it is not. Most people who make references to the Court of Justice do so in the determination of their individual rights or their rights as a business.
Anyway, as well as creating legal certainty and protecting the judiciary, amendment 137 is also important for protecting individuals’ rights. If the UK’s courts do not pay due regard to decisions of the Court of Justice, there will be no provision to ensure that rights in the United Kingdom keep pace with EU rights after Brexit or even to encourage that to happen. That could lead to rights upheld domestically lagging behind international standards, which I am sure we would want to avoid.
To keep rights up to similar international standards is particularly desirable in areas that require a degree of co-operation and reciprocity, such as consumer rights, equality protections and environmental standards. The Exiting the European Union Committee, of which I am a member, has heard much evidence recently about the importance of preserving rights protections after Brexit. EU case law has had an important impact on equality rights in the UK, and my amendment seeks to ensure that British courts will continue to pay due regard to that jurisprudence as our law develops. I urge all hon. Members to give amendment 137 their support in the interests of achieving legal certainty, protecting the rule of law, protecting the judiciary from political attacks and protecting our constituents’ rights.
I turn now to pending cases and amendments 202 and 203, which I am grateful to the Law Society of Scotland for drafting. There is currently nothing on the face of the Bill about what will happen to litigation pending at the time of exit day. There just is not anything. If there is, I am sure a Minister will point me to it later.
As the right hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham said, this is all about legitimate expectations. As I said when I intervened on her, if the Government do not move in the Bill to protect the legitimate expectations of litigants, they could find themselves being litigated against for failing to provide an effective remedy.
Of course, it would be objectionable on the ground of retrospectivity if a simple cut-off happens on exit day and if no consideration is given to pending cases, as other hon. Members have said. Such a situation is not without precedent. As I said in my intervention on the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), one precedent is the way in which the transition from the Privy Council to the New Zealand Supreme Court was dealt with, and I urge the Government to look at that. I urge all hon. Members carefully to consider the amendments designed to protect pending cases and pending litigation on exit day.
Twenty-five years ago, I stood in almost the same place, during the House’s consideration of the Maastricht treaty, to make the point that the Court of Justice is more political than courts in the UK, even by its appointments and by the nature of its judgments. Judicial activism is a process that came directly from the Court of Justice, and it eventually percolated, to a much lesser extent, into the UK courts.
It is through those judgments that the Court of Justice has widened the concept of where the Commission is able to rule. A good example is that, through Court reference, whole areas of social security that were never in the original treaties were widened dramatically. Rulings have been made on the application of social security payments to individuals from countries that were never referenced in the original treaties, which is a good point about the Court’s power.
This is so critical because, after the referendum, the Centre for Social Justice, the Legatum Institute and others came together to do a lot of polling asking the public why they supported the vote to leave the European Union. The single most powerful reason—more than money and more than migration—was to take back control of our laws. I was slightly surprised because I thought it was an esoteric point for most members of the public, but they said it was their most powerful reason for voting. Some people said that, even if it meant they would be worse off for a period, it was still the overriding principle behind their vote to take back control and leave the European Union.
With that as the key, the Government are right to drive this policy. It is absolutely right for them to make it clear that, on the day we leave, the European Court of Justice will cease to have direct effect in the United Kingdom. I will return to the drafting on how long some of the other principles will continue.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) is not here at the moment but, in line with the earlier statement by the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), it would be wrong to support new clause 14 and amendment 278. There is a simple principle behind the Bill, and the Government have now accepted that there will be primary legislation on the agreement, or lack of agreement, as we leave the European Union with regard to our trade and other arrangements. The new clause and the amendment are wrong because they would seek to bind the hand of the Government as they sought to negotiate, and that is not the purpose of this.
Let me give an example. Not so long ago, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union said clearly that his view was that during the implementation period—at the beginning, we hope—we would want to have those elements of the eventual agreement in place. One of those would be a process of arbitration between the UK and the EU. If that was agreed and was part of the process, and then became part of the implementation period, the new clause and the amendment would prevent our being able to make that arrangement—they would be bound into law and we would not be allowed to go into the implementation period with these arrangements. That would immediately knock out any opportunity we have to accelerate the process of where we would eventually be by getting into the implementation period and applying an arbitration process agreed between the EU and the UK for those areas of disagreement on areas of law and other interpretations. That is why these proposals are wrong and would damage the prospects of the negotiations that are likely to take place.
If we seek a free trade arrangement, the way to have that governed is through such an arbitration process, where differences—when things cannot be agreed between the two—are taken for a final process of examination and some kind of judgment about the matter. That would not be done by the Court of Justice sitting in the European Union, or by a UK court; it would be outwith both of those, but in the agreement.
The point I am making is that if such an arrangement was agreed in a free trade arrangement, we would want to start it as soon as possible, because if there is an implementation period, we would want to start implementing what we have agreed as soon as possible. The hon. Lady needs to look up most of the other trade arrangements to see what I am saying. We want to give the greatest flexibility to the Government. It is crucial that as we leave, we leave the Court of Justice in that sense.
I want now to deal with some of the arrangements in clause 6. I say to Ministers that there is a certain amount of confusion over where the courts are meant to reference the ECJ, including in respect of its previous judgments. As has been mentioned by some of my colleagues, including my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), there remains a confusion as to where the courts will reference judgments from the ECJ, both past and existing. I come back to the point of clause 6(2), where they are told not to have regard to anything. However, the Bill later goes on to modify that quite a lot. I am particularly concerned—this has been raised elsewhere—by the definition that
“’retained EU case law’ means any principles laid down by, and any decisions of, the European Court, as they have effect in EU law immediately before exit day and so far as they”.
The Bill goes on to reference exactly how that will work.
My point is that those principles will themselves be modified by the European Court of Justice as it goes forward. My question really is: as they are modified, at what point will UK courts consider those principles to be no longer relevant to their judgments as they refer to them? I do not expect an answer right now, but I hope to get one as we go forward. Lord Neuberger has made the point that it is unclear to the courts how strong their reference should be—whether they should reference the principles or not. The point about the principles is the more powerful point, because I have no idea when the cut-off comes or whether it ever comes—whether we will ever break free, as it were, from continuing judgments and changes to the European Court principles.
I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Government to make that point very clear in the course of this process, and I look forward to their response. I think the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, said that he would return to this issue in the discussions on clause 5, and I would certainly appreciate that.
I know that other Members wish to speak, so I shall conclude. I applaud and support the Government on this part of the Bill. For me, and I think for most of our colleagues, it is the most important element. We can debate money and all these other issues, but who ultimately decides on our laws is the most important element of the vote to leave. I made this point earlier, and I conclude by making it again: the single issue on which the British public voted most was to take back control of their laws. I want that to happen as we leave the European Union.
When I consider the Bill, my overriding concern is the impact on the economic wellbeing of my constituents. Members know that the north-east is a successful exporting region. Part of the reason why we have been so successful is that we have had a stable legal framework over the past 40 years. The Bill’s purpose is obviously to provide continuing legal certainty, but it seems to me that the combination of the Government’s proposal to set the exit date before the transition period is over, and their red line on the ECJ, will have the rather remarkable effect of minimising the flexibility for negotiation and maximising the legal uncertainty.
I very much support amendments 278 and 306, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) spoke, and new clause 14, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie).
Earlier, I asked the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker): if the 1972 Act is repealed before the end of the transition or implementation period, what will be the legal basis of our relations with the EU in that period and of the 57 free trade agreements that the EU negotiated with third countries? He said, “Don’t worry, it will all be set out in the next Bill, which will come in perhaps a year or 18 months.” I am sorry to say that I do not find that very reassuring. I am conscious that businesses want an element of legal certainty about the transition period as soon as possible. Waiting for another 12 months, or another 18 months, does not give them that legal certainty, which means that they can continue to close plants and divest. We are already beginning to see that. Frequently, it is not being flagged up as being about Brexit, but it is happening rather too often.
I just want to stress this point about the impact on exporters. In the Minister’s description of how the transition period and the future might pan out, there seemed to be no acknowledgement that, in addition to some of these disputes and rights that citizens will be claiming, whether they are under competition law or in the single market, there will also be citizens in this country making claims in the other European countries, or the other 57 third-party countries. In order to export, these countries need to have more certainty about their data protection—we will come on to that another day—about professional recognition, particularly the services, about licensing and about passporting. If those rights are not enforceable, they will be losing that certainty.
At the moment, we have a situation in which half the exports of this country go to the European Union, and 30% go to the other 57 countries in which the EU has negotiated the legal framework. We are talking about 80% of this country’s trade and this Government are not able to tell us what the legally enforceable base will be during the transition period.
The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith) said that it would be very nice if we could have a new arbitration system. Well, I am sorry, but that does not seem to be on offer. At the moment, there are three possibilities. One possibility is continuing with the ECJ, but the Government have set their face against that. Another possibility is to join the European economic area, but the Government have set their face against that. The third possibility is to crash out. The option of the bespoke arbitration system with the European Union will be extremely difficult to negotiate in the 15 months that we have left before the transition period begins.
The Government are being irresponsible in wanting to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, which is the basis of our membership, and in setting the date at the beginning of the transition period, before they can tell us how they are going to handle that period. It would be great if they could give us a proper explanation because we have not had one yet. Ministers say that the whole purpose of the Bill—the very thing that the Bill is driving at—is legal certainty, but they cannot tell us what the legal position will be in 18 months’ time. The Bill is flawed and I urge Ministers to look constructively at the amendments tabled by the Opposition Front Bench.
The City of London is the financial hub of the whole of Europe, and we want it to stay that way, but it requires legal continuity and certainty to do so. Now, I accept that the Bill seeks to do this—I have no problem with the intentions behind the Bill—but it is worth stressing the importance of the sector and, therefore, the importance of the detail. Bear in mind that euro clearing involves transactions being processed every day through London to a value which exceeds our annual contribution to the European Union by a significant sum, and which significantly exceeds any likely divorce bill figure that has been bandied about.
The fact is that we are the basis for the euro bond market and we clear a great deal of euro business, and that generates and supports thousands of jobs. Some 36% of the population of my constituency are employed in financial and professional services. I am not going to do anything that puts their jobs at risk or reduces their standard of living. Those who voted to leave did not vote to make us poorer for the sake of a bit of ideology. We now have to find a practical means forward to ensure that we have, as the chair of the City of London’s policy and resources committee put it, an orderly Brexit as opposed to a disorderly one. Therefore, the test of the Bill’s contents is whether they achieve the Bill’s stated objective of trying to assist in that orderly Brexit and withdrawal. Well, it does up to a point, but my contention is that it only goes so far. There are number of areas where the Bill is lacking, which is why it needs improvement, and this set of amendments deals with precisely one of those areas.
The incorporation of the acquis into UK domestic law is accepted all round as being necessary, but the debate has highlighted a number of significant areas where there is still uncertainty and where the current wording may not achieve its objective. I want to see a deal on the basis of the Florence speech. I hope that all Government Members will stand behind the Florence speech and will not attempt to rewrite it, refine it, add to it or subtract from it. If we do that constructively, we can make good progress. I am sure that the Ministers on the Treasury Bench wish to achieve that too—well, almost all of them. But to do that we must ensure that we give the courts and contracting parties the certainty that they need.
My final example is that derivative contracts are generally written over a three to five-year period. Unless there is certainty as to the enforceability of those contracts, people will not contract with counterparties in the European Union. Crashing out without a deal would not give them that certainty any more than going on to WTO terms will give the financial services any certainty. It would not give the London legal services sector any certainty, doing nothing to address the establishment directive or the recognition of professional rights that currently enable British lawyers to gain and earn millions of pounds for this country annually in the work that they sell into the European Union.
All those things need to be done. I doubt whether we could get the detail done by the end of March 2019, and that is why a significant and proper transition, in which we can work out the details, is absolutely necessary. Let us make sure, then, that we enable the Bill to achieve that through some additions and changes to what is in it.
Let me move on to the specific points here. We do need to pick up on certain areas. We have to have greater clarity on the interpretation of retained EU law. With every respect to Ministers, I do not think that the Bill will achieve that in its current form, although I think that it can, with further work.
Let me just say what these two amendments, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), seek to do. They seek to give a general interpretive tool to assist the transposition process. We all accept that that has to happen in that domestication into the statute book. They would interfere with the powers to make regulations conferred by clause 7, but they would reduce the need for regulations. I should have thought that it was preferable not to have to operate by regulation if we could avoid it. If we have a known and established interpretive code, that will save the need to make lots of regulations under clause 7. However, it would also, as the Minister rightly observed, provide a backstop, and that would deal with gaps that are identified but that are not picked up in the transposition process. That is what subsections (A1) and (A2) of amendment 357 would achieve.
These changes draw on rules of interpretation that, as I indicated in my intervention earlier, were proposed by the International Regulatory Strategy Group. That body is co-sponsored by the City of London corporation and TheCityUK, and I am indebted to the Remembrancer’s Office of the City of London corporation for the drafting of these amendments—it takes the credit for the ingenuity.
Let me explain why this is important. The first of the rules, in subsection (A3), would confine the territorial scope of the retained EU law to the UK. That would put it on the same territorial footing as domestic law, therefore ensuring that as a general principle, retained EU law would no longer enable or require people or businesses in the UK to do, or to stop doing, something in an EU country. It is perfectly logical from that point of view.
The second rule would ensure that reference to a member state in an EU law that has been domesticated was taken, post Brexit, as a reference to the UK. That would ensure that domesticated EU law would in fact fully apply in the domestic sphere, removing any ambiguity on that point. That will be necessary in a large number of instances to avoid the situation in which the UK will, in effect, be treated as a third country for the purposes of its own laws where retained EU law is currently framed by reference to the whole EU. That would be an absurdity, and we are seeking to remove that risk.
The third rule, in subsection (A5), would transfer all the functions exercised by EU bodies to the Secretary of State. I take the Minister’s point that not all those will necessarily be exercised by the Secretary of State. It is not prescriptive in that way—it need not be, and we can talk about that—but it would deal with the many instances where such functions are transferred to an appropriate Secretary of State as well as providing, again, a legislative backstop to cater for circumstances where the alternative arrangements had not been put in place in time, so that there is no cliff edge in that regard.
The fourth rule deals with the many situations where domestic authorities are required, either outright or as a precondition, to exercise their own functions to deal with EU bodies or authorities in member states. What does that mean in practice? It covers, for instance, cases where the UK body has to notify, consult or get the approval of an EU body before taking a particular course of action.
I am not suggesting that the answer to everything is in this amendment. It is tabled in the spirit of wanting to work with the Government as we move forward, but it does go a long way towards delivering, in a relatively simple manner, the objective of having a functioning statute book on exit day.
Amendment 358 deals with what those who worked on this perceive as a potential gap concerning the interpretation of domesticated EU law. Clause 6(3), as has already been observed, will preserve the effect of case law laid down before exit day. Clause (6)(2) will provide discretion, and we have talked a lot about taking that into account. I listened with interest to the speech by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) regarding her amendment on that point. Again, this amendment does not provide the whole answer, but it raises serious issues that need to be looked at, and I hope that Ministers will do so.
Why is that important to the International Regulatory Strategy Group, and why is the group central to this? Its membership includes virtually all the significant representative institutions of the London financial community: the stock exchange, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, the Association of British Insurers, the British Bankers Association, the City of London corporation and major commercial organisations such as Credit Suisse, Aviva, Allen & Overy, Allianz, Fidelity, HSBC and Lloyds. The list includes all the key underpinners of the City’s operation.
We need to take those important matters into account, and I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his willingness to meet and discuss them. I commend to him and other Ministers the observation made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) about the Francovich cases. It clearly cannot be the Government’s intention to remove people’s opportunity to seek remedies for wrongs that were done prior to our departure. My right hon. Friend raises a critical issue, and it is important to get this right.
I hope that Ministers will observe that the guidance in clause 6(2) is clearly not sufficient to meet the concerns of our senior judiciary and that they have said as much. When Lord Neuberger, a distinguished President of the Supreme Court, says that, ironically, the discretion is so wide that it puts judges at a degree of risk of political attack, he has to be taken seriously. Several right hon. and hon. Members have praised the quality of our judiciary, and I totally agree with them. We ought to listen very carefully when our judiciary say that, as a matter of protection against malicious attack of the sort that they have suffered in the past, they look to Parliament to safeguard their ability to function independently in cases that are quite politicised.
I know that the Solicitor General will be aware of the problem, because it was referred to in the Justice Committee’s report in the last Parliament. I also draw his attention to the concerns raised by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the recently retired Lord Chief Justice, in the evidence that he gave only a couple of days before he retired from that post. He gave a pretty clear steer on the sort of thing that could be helpful and posited various types of language. I hope that the Solicitor General accepts that we need to look further at the matter, and I hope that we can do that constructively as we take the Bill forward.
The negotiation of a new future relationship is a process separate from the article 50 negotiations, and at present there is no indication that a new long-term agreement on trade and services will be in place at the point of exit. Businesses in the UK and the EU face three unknowns: what the future will look like, when the arrangement will be in place and what will happen in the period between the end of the current EU framework and the start of the future framework. That is why transitional arrangements are essential to avoid a damaging cliff-edge effect at the point of exit.
Businesses, customers and regulators will need time to adapt and settle into a new framework. A transition period would reduce the risk of businesses making potentially premature decisions about the structure of their operations. This is why negotiating and embedding transitional arrangements in a withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU would give both sides a greater degree of visibility and certainty in planning for the future. Clause 6 of the Bill makes it clear that the UK courts will not need to keep even half an eye on the case law of the ECJ. In legislative terms, this is as clear a statement as we can get that the UK courts will not have to follow ECJ decisions, directly or indirectly, post-Brexit.
This is important because the Government have set out very clearly that they do not want any backsliding on our equalities agenda or, indeed, our equalities law when we leave the EU. With the sort of amendment that my hon. Friend mentioned, we will have more of a guarantee that that will actually happen. The EU White Paper published in February says very clearly that the Government want to ensure that
“the same rules and laws will apply on the day after we leave the EU as they did before.”
This approach will preserve the rights and obligations that already exist in the UK under EU law and provide a secure basis for the future.
Certainty is needed in relation not only to the laws themselves, but to the frameworks within which those laws will operate. The Select Committee’s inquiry into exit from the EU found that things will change for individuals after we leave the EU because the UK courts will no longer be able to disapply law that is found to be incompatible with equality laws, as is currently the case with the CJEU. The UK will lose the particular function of the CJEU as an arbiter of incompatibility with the principles of equality. For the Government to achieve the important objective that they have set out of protecting equality rights as they are now, we will have to do more than simply transpose the legislation; we must also provide such additional functionality.
This really matters to our constituents. It really matters to women such as Carole Webb, who was fired by her employer for being pregnant. She had her case heard in the CJEU, and her rights were enforced. It really matters to mothers such as Sharon Coleman, who just wanted to be able to work more flexibly to care for her disabled son. She had her case heard by the CJEU, and her rights were enforced. We need to make sure that this continues in the future.
The very sensible and practical recommendation put forward by the Women and Equalities Committee proposed a simple solution for the Government. It is that a statement of compatibility should be published by Ministers when any statutory instrument or Bill related to EU withdrawal is published to explain why the proposals are or are not compliant with the Equality Act. That would mirror the provisions set out in sections 19 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. This would make it clear to the courts that they must take account of the Equality Act, and that if legislation was incompatible, the courts could indeed make a declaration of incompatibility, which would have to be rectified by the Government, as is now the case.
This recommendation is important because, as I have said, it will enable the Government to adhere to what they have set out as their policy. It will fill a missing gap that currently is filled by the Court of Justice of the EU, and it will give the courts in the UK the potential power to make declarations of incompatibility. For those looking to the public sector equality duty to partially fill that gap, I would point out that we set out very clearly in our report that this duty does not apply to primary legislation, and that is why such a change is needed.
I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for taking the issue very seriously indeed. I know that he has a lot on his plate, but he has taken the time to look at the issue in detail. He should be applauded for that. I look forward to seeing the fruits of his labour on Report.
If, utterly regrettably from my point of view, the UK is to leave the EU, it is important not only that there is a functioning statute book on exit day, but that it is as accessible and comprehensible as possible. The ordinary citizen must be able to understand their rights and obligations; businesses need to have clarity about the rules under which they will be trading and competing; and our courts require clear guidance about Parliament’s intentions. The rule of law and our economic interest require that. As it stands, however, there is still much work to do to achieve those aims, and that includes rectifying the lack of clarity in clause 6.
My starting point is clause 6(3), about which I do not think there is any dispute. Clearly, unmodified retained EU law should be interpreted in accordance with retained case law and principles of EU law. That is necessary to ensure that the statute book applies in the same way after exit as it did before. Immediately after that, however, we get into sticky territory, namely the status of post-exit European case law.
In the first months and years after exit, few cases in the CJEU will concern new EU rules that have nothing to do with the UK. Most will continue to relate to rules that existed before exit and that will in fact have been incorporated into the UK statute book by this Bill. In essence, such decisions by the CJEU are about how the law always was and should have been applied, including immediately prior to exit.
With apologies for moving away from highbrow discussions about the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament, I want to talk about the hypothetical EU widget regulations. If the EU widget regulations come into effect prior to exit, and a decision of the CJEU shortly after exit clarifies that the regulations do indeed apply to a new and cutting-edge form of six-sided widget, that decision would actually tell us and clarify what retained EU law was on Brexit day—the point at which it was incorporated into our laws. Yet the Bill appears to fudge or dodge the issue of whether such a ruling should be followed or even whether it should be given any consideration at all. Parliament is in danger of passing the buck to judges on what is actually a political decision.
Unlike his German counterpart, the UK manufacturer of a six-sided widget is unclear about where he stands and, importantly, so are our judges. Given that the widget directive is part of retained law, there is a strong argument that this Parliament should say that if the CJEU confirms in its judgement—despite it being handed down after exit—that when we incorporated the regulations they did apply to a six-sided widget, that should also be part of retained law in the United Kingdom, unless there is good reason to the contrary. That would seem sensible and desirable from a legal theory point of view and, much more importantly, from a practical point of view. If we are to make trade and competition with the EU as simple as possible, surely it makes sense for exactly the same rule, one still found in an EU regulation and one incorporated by the Bill into domestic law, to be interpreted in the same way unless there are very good reasons to the contrary. However, all clause 6(1) says is that a court or a tribunal is not bound by post-Brexit CJEU decisions, and clause 6(2) merely says it can “have regard to” such case law
“if it considers it appropriate to do so.”
Lord Neuberger says that that is not very helpful guidance for judges. Neither is it helpful for the six-sided widget manufacturer, who needs to know whether he must comply with the widget regulations and is not sure if domestic courts will follow the CJEU in deciding whether it does. Indeed, we might even find that courts in different parts of the United Kingdom could come to different decisions about whether to follow the CJEU’s decision on the widget regulations. Parliament has to do much better.
Amendment 137 provides alternative options. If there are reasons why domestic courts should not want to follow a CJEU ruling, the court could quite simply have regard to and then decline to follow the Court’s judgment. There could be very good reasons for that to happen, for example if Parliament had already decided to put in place its own separate statutory regime for six-sided widgets. Ultimately, if Parliament decides after a particular judgment by the CJEU that it wants to change retained law to take a different course, it can of course do that. However, there are many more rules where it would surely be sensible for this Parliament to leave them in place as they are and to seek to ensure consistency of application between the United Kingdom and the European Union so far as that is possible.
We need a clear expression of intention that by leaving the rules unmodified and retaining the same rules in place on exit day, we are seeking for them to be applied in the same way here as across the EU. That is a much more political decision than I think the Minister accepts, which is why it should not be left to judges; it should be expressed clearly by this Parliament that that is what we want, if that is indeed what we want to happen. That will help judges, it will be good for the six-sided widget manufacturers who will understand the rules under which they have to operate, and, most importantly, it will be good for all citizens who will benefit from clarity about their rights. It is therefore imperative that Parliament makes this happen, through amendment 137 or otherwise.
It is clear, from clause 5(2), that the Government accept that, in relation to the retained law, the interpretative powers of the ECJ are extremely wide. It states:
“the principle of the supremacy of EU law continues to apply…so far as relevant to the interpretation, disapplication or quashing of any enactment”.
As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) rightly pointed out, the supreme power that can be given to a court in this land is being attributed in the Bill to the ECJ in respect of existing legislation—namely, the power to quash an Act of Parliament. It does not get higher than that.
Together with clause 5(2), that means that the courts as a whole are being adjured by an Act of Parliament to observe the supremacy of the ECJ in respect of retained law, including where it requires the quashing of an Act of Parliament, and there is no hesitation in clause 6(3)(a) about the courts’ scope of discretion in that respect.
That seems a perfectly clear position. It is not one that I would wish to sponsor, as it defeats a large part of the very reason for Brexit—for example, almost the entirety of our benefits system has been warped by interpretations of the ECJ that go way beyond the treaties and create constraints on the award of benefits that no British Government would wish to see—but nevertheless it is a clear position. My only purpose this evening is to ensure that we do not create a frightful legal muddle. I would even settle for clause 6(3)(a) as the principle of the thing, if it were clear and it applied to all UK courts.
The problem, however, is that clause 6(4)(a) makes it perfectly clear that
My hon. Friend the Minister said that this was fine, because after the snapshot the Supreme Court could make adjustments and the law could move on, but let us follow that process a bit: a lower court—or perhaps a sequence of lower courts up to but not including the Supreme Court—has before it a case to which it must apply the principles in clause 6(3)(a) and in which therefore it must judge that the possibly very expansive and teleological judgments of the ECJ, going way beyond the plain words of any text of any treaty, directive or regulation, apply in respect of the retained law. The same case now reaches the Supreme Court, which is given no guidance on which principles to apply, but is simply told that it is not bound by any retained EU case law.
Let us suppose that in this instance, for some very good reason, such as the principle of equity, natural justice or some such thing, the Supreme Court judges in the opposite direction from that of the lower courts—it has now created a precedent. The next case of a similar variety appears in a lower court, which is adjured by the statute, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision, to follow clause 6(3)(a) and to apply the rulings of the ECJ, however expansive and contrary to the plain text of the treaties they might have been, and notwithstanding whatever the Supreme Court has said. Or is it? Should the lower court instead apply the principle applied by the Supreme Court when, in relying on clause 6(4)(a), it departed from retained case law?
“in accordance with any retained case law”
in clause 6(3)(a), but I do not understand the words
“any retained general principles of EU law”.
That suggests that the court must adopt a methodology which has been retained. What we want our courts to do is revert to what they used to do, which was interpreting statute without reference to the jurisprudential and teleological techniques adopted by the European Court.
I feel sure that the reason clause 6(3)(a) says that the court should judge
“in accordance with…any retained general principles”
is exactly the reason that was cited by the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). As we see in clause 5(2), the purposive and teleological nature of the judgments, and the ability of those judgments to be used to quash even Acts of Parliament, should apply to the way in which our courts continue to interpret retained law. That, I think, is the intent of clause 6(3)(a).
This leaves us with the wide-open, yawning question of whether the Supreme Court should be making judgments when it is, we are told in clause 6(4)(a),
“not bound by any retained EU case law”,
but should nevertheless apply the general principles, and try to use the same purpose and teleological reasoning that the ECJ uses. We are not told, and the judges are not told. Far from creating legal certainty, clause 6 seems to me to create the largest possible degree of legal uncertainty. That is not a tolerable position. It is not one that the Government wish to achieve, and not one that the Opposition wish to achieve. I do not believe that anyone in the House of Commons wishes to achieve it. However, it is what the clause, as currently drafted, achieves.
“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day,”
and that must include this Bill.
Furthermore, my right hon. Friend has not quite taken on board what the Solicitor General said with respect to our application of the stare decisis method of interpretation, which the Supreme Court will be obliged to apply after exit day. So he is asking some interesting questions, but I do not think we can necessarily draw conclusions from them.
My point remains, however, and it is a simple one: that if the Bill is trying to achieve a hierarchy here, it needs to state what the hierarchy is, and in stating that hierarchy, it needs to make it clear who governs whom. At the moment, the Bill does not do that.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) asked the Minister very clearly whether the jurisdiction of the ECJ will apply during the transition period. I do not believe the Minister has addressed that, but I am happy to give way if he would like to do so now.
If the Government want to reassure those sectors of the economy—manufacturing businesses with supply chains in the European Union, for example, or financial and professional services worried about whether contracts will still be honoured and upheld or whether jobs and activity can be relocated—they could give those industries the central message that during the transitional period, the existing structure of EU rules and regulations will apply.
The Government have a fundamental problem. This is not about whether it is the will of the House that the ECJ should have jurisdiction during the transitional period. I think that most Members, whether they voted leave or remain, understand the central importance of giving business certainty right at this moment about what will happen when we leave the European Union. The Prime Minister understood that when she made her speech in Florence, in which she said that, during the transition period,
“the existing structure of EU rules and regulations”
would apply. She also said that we could agree
“to bring forward aspects of that future framework such as new dispute resolution mechanisms more quickly if this can be done smoothly.”
The implications are clear. It was the Prime Minister’s view in Florence that, to provide business with the certainty that it needs now about jobs and economic activity, we would remain in the single market and the customs union and, necessarily, under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice for a time-limited transition period.
Actually, as my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) mentioned, the real Brexit mutineers are not people such as the right hon. Member for Broxtowe because, ironically, the Members on that front page are upholding the principles of the Florence speech. The real Brexit mutineers are members of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, and they are in the Department for Exiting the European Union and in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Those people are the real Brexit mutineers, and they should be explaining why they are not prepared to back the clear positon set out by their own Prime Minister.
That brings me to the central challenge at this point in the Brexit negotiations. Manufacturing firms with supply chains in the European Union are having to make decisions now, before Christmas, about jobs and activity and about whether to renew contracts or sign new ones. The clear message from financial services and professional services, the concerns of which the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has attempted to address through his amendments, and from other leading sectors of our economy is that unless there is a clear sense of direction and some reassurance about the rules of the transition period and how it will operate, they will be forced to activate contingency plans as early as now and before Christmas, but certainly into the first quarter of 2018. The clock is ticking, and time is running out. In muddying the waters during the course of today’s debate, Ministers have done nothing at all to reassure businesses that are hovering over activating their contingency plans.
I would like to hear an intervention from anyone on the Government or Opposition Benches who can explain how crashing out of the European Union over a cliff edge with no deal—meaning an immediate end to all existing contractual and legal obligations and to all the frameworks and protections, a hard border in Ireland, and the end of our trading agreements not only with the European Union, but through the European Union to countries across the world—could be worse than any kind of transitional deal. No deal would be the very worst deal, and it is astonishing that there are Government Members who not only entertain the possibility of no deal, but are enthusiastically encouraging it with the views that they put forward.
There have been many problems with the Prime Minister’s approach to Brexit, but in the Florence speech she tried to set out a practical and flexible framework through which we could now give certainty to business about the transition period and, crucially, through which there would be only one set of changes from our membership of the European Union to our future relationship with it once we leave.
This evening, the Government Front-Bench team have driven a coach and horses through the Florence speech. They cannot provide business with the clarity it needs on how the European Court of Justice will operate during transition. They ought to support our position, which is to remain in the single market and the customs union for the time-limited period of transition, because that would give business the certainty it desperately needs.
For Conservative Members to put their ideological vanity against the best interests of the British economy is selfish, reckless and irresponsible, and people should have no truck with it.
I appreciate what the Government have been trying to do with clauses 5 and 6 on the way in which retained EU law should be interpreted. I agree with my right hon. Friend that the wording is opaque, although I think that I understand the Government’s intention on the role and supremacy of the Supreme Court in developing law, but that still does not get us away from the fundamental problem that EU law is different from our law. Its rules of interpretation are different and its purpose is different.
We will come back to that problem right through this Bill, whether on the charter of fundamental rights or the general principles of EU law. We cannot just take EU law and drop it into our law without leaving guidance on what the Government expect that law to be used for. I worry that the lack of explanation is most peculiar. It is not a question of wanting to keep EU law—I assume that it will all ultimately go away, anyway—but in the meantime there is a lack of clarity, and I can well understand why the judiciary, particularly the senior judiciary, are troubled by the lack of guidance. It is almost as though the Government have found it too embarrassing to want to grapple with it. They want to maintain continuity, but they do not want to maintain the implication of continuity because that is a difficult message to sell to some Conservative Members.
We will really have to look at this as we go through the Bill, and I am quite prepared to try to help the Government to find a way through. It is not that I want to keep its aura, and there are many Conservative Members who do not like it at all, but the simple fact is that we need to look at it.
The other issues that have been raised are absolutely right, but they are not relevant to this debate. We do not have the slightest clue what the transitional arrangements will be. We will have to have a completely separate piece of legislation to sort that out, and I suspect it will take a long time to go through this House. Ultimately, if we have a long-term agreement, there will be an interesting issue about whether we will be instructing our courts to mirror EU law so as to maintain comity with the Court of Justice of the European Union or risk constantly having to readjust our legal frameworks for the sake of that deep and special relationship.
I do not want to disappoint some of my right hon. and hon. Friends too much, but the harsh reality is that our geographical location and our desire to have a close trading relationship with the European Union will inevitably mean that decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union continue to have a major influence on our law here—I am afraid that was rather disregarded in last year’s referendum. I think that it is called globalisation, and we will have to return to that as we go along.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Amendment proposed: 137, page 3, line 34, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Amendment proposed: 278, in clause 6, page 4, line 19, at end insert—
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair to report progress and ask leave to sit again (Programme Order, 11 September).
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.
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