PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
UK-France Nuclear Partnership - 10 July 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the UK-France nuclear partnership.

The UK and France have a proud history of co-operation on defence nuclear matters. Alongside our conventional warfighting capability, the independent strategic nuclear forces of the UK and France contribute significantly to the overall security of the NATO alliance and the Euro-Atlantic. Since 1995, we have stated that we do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of one could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened. In 2010, both nations agreed to share research facilities and co-operate on nuclear technology under the Lancaster House treaties. In 2022, at Chatham House, the Defence Secretary set out the importance of rebooting Lancaster House and our defence relationship with France. That was reaffirmed in our 2024 manifesto.

Today, the Prime Minister and President Emmanuel Macron will agree to deepen their nuclear co-operation and work more closely than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is an important step forward for the UK-France nuclear partnership, and reflects the significant improvement in the relationship between our two countries that this Government have driven. A soon-to-be-signed declaration will state for the first time that the respective deterrents of both countries are independent but can be co-ordinated. The declaration will also affirm that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations. As such, any adversary threatening the vital interests of Britain or France could be confronted by the strength of the nuclear forces of both nations. Co-operation between our countries on nuclear research will also deepen, while we work together to uphold the international non-proliferation architecture. Further details will follow today’s agreement.

In an increasingly volatile and complex global security environment, exemplified by Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—a war on the European continent—the UK and France, as Europe’s two nuclear powers, are united in our determination to work closer than ever before on nuclear deterrence. That is a manifesto commitment, a promise made and a promise kept, and yet another example of how the Government are delivering for defence.

Thank you for granting this urgent question, Mr Speaker. I do think it is incredible that we have had to find out about such substantive matters overnight from the press and without a statement from the Government.

We Conservatives back our nuclear deterrent 100% and have never wavered on that. We support steps that boost the resilience of our nuclear enterprise, diversify delivery and, above all, help our core continuous at-sea deterrence to remain the cornerstone of our homeland defence against the most extreme threats. We also welcome steps to genuinely strengthen UK-French co-operation on defence, building on Lancaster House. In particular, having been the Government who first authorised provision of long-range Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine, we recognise the urgent need to replenish our own Storm Shadow stocks, which is in the press release. Can the Minister confirm whether we are placing orders for new Storm Shadow missiles from MBDA or simply reconditioning existing stocks?

The nuclear aspect of this is by far the most significant. Can the Minister confirm where this will leave the operationally independent and sovereign nature of our existing Trident nuclear deterrent? The Telegraph quotes the declaration—which, of course, we have not seen—as saying that both nuclear arsenals

“remain independent but can be co-ordinated and that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations”.

Does this mean that our respective national deterrence will now be jointly operationally delivered, and how will that co-ordination take place in practice? Crucially, how does this new nuclear doctrine affect NATO and our very close co-operation on nuclear deterrence with the United States? Will France now be offering its nuclear deterrent to NATO, as we do? Perhaps most importantly, will France be joining the NATO Nuclear Planning Group?

On the matter of tactical nuclear weapons, I have previously asked about options other than US-controlled gravity bombs, with no reply. Given the announcement on Storm Shadow and MBDA, will the UK and France now be looking at co-operation on tactical nuclear delivery options via our shared complex weapons industrial base? A particular concern of the Opposition is that there appears to be a deep paradox at play here: talk of closer co-operation with France, but in the background, the Government still getting nowhere on access to hard cash from the European rearmament fund, despite having given up our sovereign fishing grounds.

To conclude, it is truly extraordinary that such significant defence developments do not warrant a Government statement, so the Minister must now be as transparent as possible in answering our questions—not least after weeks dominated by smoke and mirrors on defence spending and chaotic U-turns on welfare that raise the most profound question of all: where is the money going to come from?

There has not been a statement yet because the agreement has not been signed yet. In fact—

You’re briefing it to the press.

If the right hon. Gentleman would like to listen to the reply, the agreement has not been signed yet. I am sure that as soon as it is signed—

But it has been briefed to the press.

I am sure that as soon as it is signed—[Interruption.] The shadow Minister has asked his questions. I would like to try to answer them without him heckling me too much, although it is up to him how he behaves.

No, it will be up to me.

Indeed.

The shadow Minister asked whether the idea that we should work more closely with France has any implications for the independence of Trident, and he referred to the phrase

“independent but can be co-ordinated”.

The answer is no. Our CASD operations are entirely unaffected. This is not a new nuclear doctrine on behalf of the UK. Our nuclear doctrine is the same as it ever has been. The use of our nuclear deterrent in any circumstances can only be authorised by the Prime Minister, and that remains the case. The French have their own arrangements for how they authorise theirs; it is a matter for them. This agreement implies no co-ordination in that respect.

The agreement says that there is an opportunity, when vital interests are affected, for co-ordination between both nations in the way in which they respond. That just strengthens the power of the deterrent across Europe. When two nations that are nuclear powers can co-ordinate their responses, it strengthens the deterrent against our potential enemies by making it clear that the two nations will act in co-ordination rather than entirely separately.

The shadow Minister asked whether the agreement has any implications for our deterrent still being dedicated to NATO. It does not; our deterrent is, of course, still dedicated to the defence of NATO. He referred again to tactical nuclear delivery options. I do not know whether he meant tactical nuclear weapons development. This Government do not see any use of any kind of nuclear weapon as tactical, and we are not proposing in this agreement to develop any new kinds of nuclear weapons. It is about co-ordinating the options that we have together to make Europe and the north Atlantic stronger.

I welcome today’s agreement that is in train, as a powerful signal that Britain is once again stepping up to be a reliable European ally, with deeper UK-France co-ordination on nuclear deterrence marking a step change in how we engage with our closest partners. This is not just a diplomatic milestone; it has real potential to reset relations, strengthening European security and driving long-term investment into our industrial base. As the keenest champion of our sovereign capability and resilient supply chains, particularly in my constituency, may I ask the Minister how this partnership will be used to maximise opportunities for UK industry, ensuring that we can build the skills, infrastructure and capacity that is needed to keep our deterrent credible for decades to come?

The effort on co-ordinating our nuclear deterrence, between the UK and France, is in the context of a refresh of the Lancaster House treaties, which also include provisions about co-ordinating our conventional forces and co-ordinating efforts through our industries to ensure that we can manufacture new and future-proofed complex weapons that will assist in deterring potential adversaries who would threaten Europe. This is in the context of an entire, refreshed agreement that should strengthen our conventional forces as well as our capacity for co-ordination between our militaries and of our nuclear deterrence.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

The Liberal Democrats have consistently said that the UK’s security depends on deeper defence co-operation with our European allies, so we welcome progress but urge the Government to go further. Nuclear co-ordination between the UK and France can help to deter Putin and support Europe’s collective security. That is particularly critical as Donald Trump has shown that our security is no longer his concern. France cherishes the independence of its nuclear system, as the Minister confirmed, so will she provide further details on exactly how the new system of co-ordinating nuclear deterrence will work? The Government must now go further, so will the Minister update the House on whether the Government have secured full access for UK defence firms to the EU Security Action for Europe fund? As Putin escalates his attacks against civilian targets in Kyiv and other cities, we must work with our allies to support Ukraine. Will the Government use today’s coalition of the willing talks to agree on how the UK and France can seize Russia’s frozen assets that are held in our two countries?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for deeper defence co-operation. On the co-ordination of our nuclear deterrence—there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations, but France and the UK remain two sovereign nuclear weapon states, and their respective nuclear forces and decision-making processes are independent. There will be increased co-ordination of research and development, and of the co-operation that we have been engaging in since the Chequers announcement of 1995. That will be deepened, and a co-ordinating committee between the Élysée and the Cabinet Office will be the joint arrangement for deciding precisely how and what extra research or training we might do. There will be increasing co-ordination of that effort, but I stress that our decision-making arrangements remain completely independent. Both nations recognise that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations—our vital interests are the same in that respect.

On Security Action for Europe and access to EU funds, negotiations are ongoing but not complete. One would hope that progress can be made. I cannot recall the hon. Gentleman’s third point—

The coalition of the willing.

I have nothing further to say on that today, as the hon. Gentleman would probably expect in a response to an urgent question on nuclear co-ordination.

Is the Minister as surprised as I was to find that the shadow Secretary of State only half quoted that sentence from the report in Navy Lookout, about making it clearer that “no extreme threat” to European security would go unanswered by both countries, but failed to look at the real purpose here—that it signals a strengthened deterrence posture, as Russia has repeated its threats to use nuclear weapons? Does my hon. Friend agree that this shows that the relationship, which was damaged by Brexit, is now being recreated by this Government? The AUKUS pact and defence co-operation is now a clear priority for this Government, with the European Union, and that is embodied in this new relationship with France.

I suppose I should say that I am surprised that the shadow Secretary of State for Defence only quoted half the sentence—if indeed that is the case—but he is probably not the first Opposition spokesperson to do that in the history of Oppositions in this House. I agree with my hon. Friend that what we have here is a strengthening of the deterrent across Europe, which will help to deter potential adversaries from conducting themselves in a way that might threaten the future of our nations.

I welcome the announcement of strengthened collaboration with France, although reading between the lines, it sounds like “co-ordination” is actually submarine patrol deconfliction. Our aerial participation in the NATO nuclear mission is still a decade away, with the completion of F-35A delivery not scheduled until 2033, according to the Government, but both the French air force and marine nationale are armed with the air-sol moyenne portée amélioré—ASMPA—medium-range supersonic nuclear-tip missile as part of their force de dissuasion. Is that nuclear strike capability within the scope of this agreement? If so, how will it be incorporated into our own nuclear doctrine? Will it be an escalation step prior to the use of Trident? Does this form an interim solution while we await the capability to fully participate in the NATO nuclear mission? How will command of it work?

The hon. Gentleman complains about the amount of time it has taken this Government to do things in respect of defence, but we had to pick up the mess that was left by his Government, who were in office for 14 years. It is a bit of a cheek for him to complain about delay, when the reality is that his own Government did nothing for 14 years. I have made it quite clear that our defence nuclear posture is not changing, and that we are not seeking to acquire new and different nuclear weapons, but if the vital interests of the UK and France are engaged and threatened, we will co-ordinate our nuclear response as a result of this agreement, and that provides a greater deterrent.

A much stronger relationship between the UK and France in this area will require a deepening of our commercial collaborations in our respective industrial bases, particularly in the supply chain. Will the Minister comment on how the Government’s own procurement policies will help to support this collaboration, particularly as it might benefit companies in the Teesside defence and innovation cluster?

My hon. Friend is correct. The refresh of the Lancaster House treaties is about not just nuclear co-operation, but co-operation between our conventional forces and greater co-operation and effort between our industries bilaterally to provide us with things like complex weapons in a way that will deter and enable us to defend ourselves at thresholds well below any nuclear threshold. Any increase in defence spending, as we are seeing, does give more opportunities for our own industries. Whether those companies are offering novel or dual-use technology, or are our traditional big primes, any increase offers more opportunity for all of them to help us in our rearmament.

Our respective national authorities will remain responsible for planning and conducting operations. A UK-France nuclear steering group will be established to provide political direction for increased co-ordination across nuclear policy capabilities and operations. That will be joint between the Élysée, which has authority over nuclear matters in France, and the Cabinet Office, which will co-ordinate with it—obviously with input from the Ministry of Defence.

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s response and greater collaboration between the UK and France with this nuclear partnership. It not only enhances our nation’s security, but has the potential to deliver highly skilled and highly paid jobs to every nation and region across our country. Will she say a little more about how those benefits will be realised in Scotland?

My hon. Friend is correct. The strategic defence review and our ongoing commitment to increasing defence spending in this country give opportunity for our industry to benefit, obtain contracts and assist us in ensuring that we can defend our nation and NATO more fully and in a better way going forward. There will be jobs, skilled opportunities and growth in all parts of the nations and regions of the UK.

The threats and nuclear sabre-rattling that we have heard from President Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is utterly unacceptable, and the response from the British and French Governments has been robust. For me, defence co-operation between the UK and France is always welcome. Will our Governments also seek to get a reaffirmation from other P5 countries, including Russia, of the Reagan-Gorbachev formula that

“a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his support for this extra co-ordination. The aim of all this is to make sure that NATO and Europe are safe from the threats that may come from Putin and his nuclear sabre-rattling, as the hon. Gentleman referred to. We believe that deterring those threats is the best way to ensure that we do not end up having to fight a war that would be catastrophic. That is where we are at present. I am not sure that President Putin is in the mood to agree that nuclear wars cannot be won, because he does issue nuclear threats every now and then. We need to ensure that he is deterred in his approach.

The two bedrocks of our national defence are our own sovereign capability and our membership of NATO. The United Kingdom and France are both members of NATO, but, as the shadow Secretary of State pointed out, the paradox is that we and every other NATO member bar one are members of the NATO nuclear planning group. Of course, that “bar one” is France. As part of these discussions, is France going to join the NATO nuclear planning group? If not, how on earth will this co-ordination work within that partnership?

I am not here to speak for the French Government. As far as I am concerned, our nuclear posture has not changed; their nuclear posture is a matter for them. What this agreement says is that there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations, and although we both independently look after and are responsible for our deterrence, we believe that co-ordinating potential responses in this way provides a greater deterrent for Europe and NATO. That is the basis of this agreement.

Clearly, our deepest and closest relationship on nuclear deterrence is with the United States of America. Can the Minister confirm how this agreement will affect that relationship, which is crucial for our security?

The agreement does not change our very close relationship with the Americans. In line with the NATO strategic concept, the strategic forces of the US, the UK and France all contribute significantly to the overall security of the alliance. There is no reason why that should not continue to be the case.

I call Jim Shannon.

Thank you very much, Mr Speaker— I always expect to be called last, but I have just jumped in ahead of my colleague and friend, the hon. Member for South Antrim (Robin Swann).

I thank the Minister for her answers today. We very much welcome the news that we are to enhance our nuclear programme—that security can only be good for our whole nation. However, the estimates I have read still put our nuclear capability well below the threat posed by Russia, so how can we continue to build our nuclear capability, and how can Northern Ireland play a part in that work? The Minister is always committed to helping Northern Ireland, so I am very keen to hear how that will work.

The hon. Gentleman is usually last, but never least, and he is not even last on this occasion.

I agree that it is important that we strengthen the credibility of our deterrence, which is why we are committed to building the four replacement boats that will carry our continuous at-sea deterrent and up to 12 SSNs through SSN-AUKUS. We are doubling the drumbeat of our construction of submarines over time, which I think sends a pretty powerful signal to potential adversaries that our CASD, and our capacity to defend and to use it, is going to be significantly strengthened over the coming period. I am glad to say that I have found general support for that in this House, which I welcome.

The Minister referenced the political steering group that will be set up between the two nations. Are there any concerns—either within Government or within the Ministry of Defence—about sharing intelligence with a separate political steering group that will sit outside of, or adjacent to, NATO?

The steering group is about political policymaking rather than intelligence. I am sure that appropriate arrangements will be established if there is any such issue, but I do not anticipate that there will be a problem.

On a point of order, Mr Speaker.

A point of order relevant to this debate?

Indeed. May I seek your guidance on how to set the record straight? Following the question from the hon. Member for Brent West (Barry Gardiner), the Minister criticised the fact that I only partially referred to a quote from the declaration text. To be clear, I have not seen the declaration. It was leaked to the media overnight; that was all I could read from, and I am none the wiser from the answers we have just had.

Order. Please, we cannot keep the debate going. You have made the point and it is on the record—let us move on.