PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Third sitting) - 5 June 2025 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Chair(s) Dawn Butler, Esther McVey, †Karl Turner, Sir Jeremy Wright
Members† Betts, Mr Clive (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
† Bonavia, Kevin (Stevenage) (Lab)
Dewhirst, Charlie (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)
† Dickson, Jim (Dartford) (Lab)
† Dillon, Mr Lee (Newbury) (LD)
† Foxcroft, Vicky (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury)
† French, Mr Louie (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
† Jopp, Lincoln (Spelthorne) (Con)
† Martin, Amanda (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
† Naish, James (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
† Onn, Melanie (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
† Patrick, Matthew (Wirral West) (Lab)
† Peacock, Stephanie (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport)
† Pearce, Jon (High Peak) (Lab)
† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
† Shanker, Baggy (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
† Wilkinson, Max (Cheltenham) (LD)
ClerksAaron Kulakiewicz, Kevin Maddison, Robert Cope Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 5 June 2025
(Morning)
[Karl Turner in the Chair]
Football Governance Bill [Lords]
Clause 7
The IFR’s general duties etc
“(d) conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies, including FIFA and UEFA.”
This amendment requires the IFR to exercise its functions so as to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner, and to open day 2 of the Committee’s consideration of the Bill. On day 1 there was extensive debate about an issue that I am sure we will also get into today. We Opposition Members were keen to ensure that the Government’s new football regulator will improve transparency, help reduce costs to clubs and fans and stop political interference in football. It was disappointing that Government Members did not support those objectives.
Amendment 97 seeks to ensure that there are no conflicts with any of the regulations and rules of international footballing governing bodies, including FIFA and UEFA. It clearly requires the Independent Football Regulator
“to exercise its functions so as to avoid conflicts with the regulations and rules of international footballing bodies.”
As we know, UEFA has written to the Secretary of State to set out its concerns with the Bill. The letter came after the Government introduced the expanded version of the Bill. It is disappointing that the Government continue to refuse to publish it so that all Members can have an informed debate about the risks that UEFA outlined. I will not go over that debate again—I might get a yellow card if I do. The amendment would require the Government’s regulator to exercise its functions in a way that avoids conflicts with the rules, statutes and regulations of international football governing authorities, especially FIFA and UEFA.
The amendment is designed to protect the regulator’s ability to carry out the functions that the Government have assigned to it without inadvertently triggering consequences that could seriously damage English football’s standing in the international game and, in the worst-case scenario, lead to English clubs being removed from the Champions League and—perhaps more seriously—the national team being banned from competitions such as the European championship and the World cup. Let us make no mistake: if the Government’s regulator were to exercise its powers in ways that contravene the established framework of global football governance, the ramifications would be swift and severe.
A particular area of concern stems from one of UEFA’s fundamental requirements, which is that there should be no Government interference in the running of football. As hon. Members might know, under FIFA’s rules, any form of what is deemed undue third-party interference in the affairs of a national football association can result in disciplinary action. That can include suspension of the football association itself, exclusion of clubs from European competitions or the ineligibility of players to represent England in FIFA-sanctioned tournaments such as the World cup.
UEFA’s ultimate sanction would be excluding the federation from UEFA and teams from competitions. That risk is very real: it has happened before and can happen again. In 2006, the Greek football federation was banned from European competition. People might argue that I am trying to scaremonger, but I am trying to highlight that this is a real risk.
It is important to clarify what FIFA and UEFA mean by “third-party interference”. It is not a casual term; it is clearly defined in their statutes. It refers to instances where public authorities, including Governments or regulators created by Government legislation, exert influence over how football is run in a way that compromises the independence of football associations and clubs. Examples include dictating the appointment or removal of club directors—which the Bill does—influencing the outcome of football disciplinary procedures and imposing governance models that conflict with internationally recognised standards.
Any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and national frameworks. It is therefore important that the IFR’s licensing criteria are complementary to football and created in full consultation with clubs and any other affected parties. Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a full voice in the development and implementation of those requirements? What consultation are the Government or their regulator currently undertaking on these regulations?
Let me be clear: I understand that the creation of the IFR in and of itself is on the borderline of what constitutes third-party interference. We are taking great care to help the Government to redesign a regulator that is fully independent of Ministers and professionally competent. However, in the absence of clear statutory guidelines to avoid conflicts with international rules, there is a risk, or perhaps even an inevitability, that the Government’s regulator may, at some point in the future, cross a line drawn by UEFA or FIFA.
We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep and that the Government’s regulator may expand its mandate beyond its loosely defined current competences. That expansion, intentional or otherwise, into broader aspects of football governance could undermine established structures and processes of the sport and amount to Government interference.
That is why my amendment is needed. It would place a duty on the regulator to abide by long pre-existing international frameworks within which English football exists. It requires the Government’s regulator to ensure that, in pursuing its objectives, it does not create legal or procedural clashes with the statutes of FIFA and UEFA. Legislation that compromises the FA’s autonomy as the primary regulator of football in England would be non-compliant with those international statutes, which are upheld and enforced rigorously across Europe and globally.
Some may ask why Parliament should concern itself with the rules of unelected international bodies. Why not simply legislate as we see fit and allow the regulator to act as robustly as necessary? On the surface, that is a fair political question, but we must recognise the reality of football governance. FIFA and UEFA are not advisory bodies; they are the organisations through which our clubs gain access to international competitions, including European competitions. They are custodians of the World cup, the European championship and the Champions League, to name just a few. Their statutes form part of the accepted legal architecture of the global game and all member associations, including the FA, are bound by them.
English football does not exist in a vacuum, but the Bill acts as if it does. The global football ecosystem is fantastically complex, but the Bill is simple, clunky and—I am afraid to say—full of holes, which would potentially leave English football to drown among its international competition. I also fear that it will create even more legal cases, whereby clubs end up spending more time in courts than they do focusing on the football matches themselves.
To act as if we can disregard those international rules, or to suggest that a domestic regulator can impose conditions without reference to them, would be to invite precisely the sort of jurisdictional collision that could see English football punished because of the good intentions of Members of this House. We cannot just pander to the politics; we must be practical about the potential havoc that the Bill will wreak across the English football pyramid.
If FIFA or UEFA were to exclude English clubs or the national team from international competitions as a result of perceived third-party interference, the consequences would be nothing short of catastrophic. As hon. Members will know, the Premier League generates more than £6 billion in revenue annually, with over £1.8 billion coming from overseas broadcasting rights alone. In fact, I understand that the Premier League is the first sporting competition in Europe to generate more from its international broadcasting rights than it does from its domestic rights.
I appreciate some of the what-aboutery and counter-arguments that are made, but, as I have said, I will defend the right of Committee members to have full access to information. It is so important, in particular given the Committee’s function in respect of this legislation, that its members should have full and frank information. It is disappointing that that has not been disclosed so that we can fully understand all the risks.
The Premier League’s broadcasting rights are in no small part predicated on English clubs’ participation in the Champions League and the Europa League. Exclusion from those competitions would make our top clubs less attractive to global audiences and sponsors, shrinking the broadcast value of the league and undermining its international appeal.
Without wishing to confuse my sporting metaphors, that would have a knock-on effect further down the pyramid. If the Premier League makes less money, there is less money to distribute to the English Football League or the National League, which we will come on to when we consider other parts of the Bill. The Champions League alone contributes more than £300 million each season to English clubs, not including the knock-on commercial benefits. For top clubs, it accounts for up to 20% of their total revenue. Stripping that away would lead to cost-cutting, player sales and job losses, not just in clubs themselves but across the local economies that depend on matchday trade and revenue.
The FA also receives critical funding linked to England’s participation in international tournaments, as I know a number of pubs do; for example, when we are in the Euros in the summer, that normally means that the economy receives a boost. A ban from the World cup or the European championship would not only harm national pride but cut investment in grassroots football, which is often funded in part through FIFA’s global redistribution programmes or revenues generated by the national team.
More broadly, the football industry supports around 100,000 jobs in the United Kingdom, contributes more than £7.6 billion to GDP and delivers £3.6 billion in tax revenues annually. A major disruption to international participation because of this Government’s regulator would clearly put a serious dent in all that. In short, any move that risks our relationship with UEFA and FIFA is not just a sporting gamble but an economic one, and a profoundly reckless move for any Government to take.
We must also consider the practical impact on clubs and fans. Imagine a scenario in which the Government’s regulator intervenes in the ownership model of a particular club in UEFA competitions and in doing so breaches UEFA’s licensing criteria. That club could find itself barred from the Champions League, the Europa League or other leagues through no fault of its own. Fans, players and club employees would suffer, and the club’s value and viability undermined, all as a result of a conflict that could and should have been avoided through foresight and careful drafting of this legislation.
There is precedent for this kind of statutory provision. In sectors such as financial services, we have long recognised the need for domestic regulators to align their actions with international frameworks that they are part of. The Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority operate in a global regulatory environment and Parliament has provided them with duties and powers that reflect that reality. This is not a novel concept; it is standard practice where cross-border frameworks exist. As the Government have chosen to model their regulator on those in financial services, perhaps the Minister can tell us why they have not done so in this regard.
Football is different. It is more internationally integrated than most sectors. Rules are more intertwined and clubs more interdependent on foreign clubs for competition, particularly at elite level. English clubs compete weekly in cross-border tournaments—for example, when Arsenal sadly lost to Paris Saint-Germain, who went on to win the Champions League. What a final that was. Players move freely between jurisdictions. Broadcasting rights are sold and consumed around the globe, as we have heard. Football’s regulatory framework must reflect that international dimension, not wilfully ignore it.
Some will say that the amendment is unnecessary because the regulator can use its discretion to avoid conflict, but without a statutory duty, it could operate without full regard to the consequences abroad. The amendment would place a clear and proportionate duty on the Government’s regulator—something that its leadership would be required to consider in every decision they take.
Importantly, the amendment would not hand international bodies a blank cheque. It would not bind the regulator to follow their rules blindly or to give up domestic responsibilities. What it would do is make sure that the Government’s regulator takes those rules into account and, wherever possible, avoids direct conflict. That is entirely reasonable and, in my view, essential to the credibility and effectiveness of the Government’s regulator.
We do not want to create a regulator that acts in splendid isolation. We want a regulator that defends English football’s integrity but also safeguards its place in the global game. It would be the height of irony if, in the process of attempting to strengthen our domestic football pyramid, we inadvertently isolated it from the wider footballing world, solving one problem only to create a much worse one. The amendment would act as a safeguard and send a signal to fans, clubs and international partners alike that we in Parliament understand the integrated nature of modern football and legislate accordingly.
There is a genuine risk that the football regulator may conflict with FIFA and UEFA rules, not least in the political appointment of its chair. I know that the Government do not think that it is political to appoint a chair who, in the current circumstances, donated to the Prime Minister’s leadership campaign, but FIFA may take a different view. If FIFA takes a different view and seeks to ban our national sides, the Government will not be able to do anything about it. This is the moment to enshrine in law that the regulator must comply with FIFA and UEFA rules.
We can delve briefly into what we think FIFA might deem political. In 2016, FIFA fined domestic teams, including England, for wearing an armband with an Armistice Day poppy because, in FIFA’s view, the poppy is a political symbol. I think that is madness, and pretty much everyone in this country thinks it is madness, but that was FIFA’s view, and it levied a fine. I think that, after negotiation, FIFA has since changed its mind—but if that was its view of the poppy and all sorts of symbols that most ordinary people would not think of as political, I am concerned about what it will think about a football regulator that has a chair appointed by Government, who in this instance also donated to the leadership campaign of the Prime Minister of the day, and who may then exercise a decision over ownership of a particular club in this country. I suspect FIFA may think that is political and conflicts with the ability of England and other home nations to compete in international events. The Government can deal with that very simply.
I would much prefer that there was a provision in the Bill that clearly stated that the football regulator—that is more than just the chair; it is the entire body—must not do anything that
“conflicts with any regulations or rules of international football governing bodies”.
By the way, this is about far more than just politics; I use the political issue as an example, but there are many other ways in which the regulator could conflict with FIFA and UEFA. I am sure that nobody here intends that it does, so let us build that into the Bill.
I assure the Committee that the amendment is not necessary. UEFA and FIFA statutes require that the FA manages its affairs without undue influence from third parties and remains independent of political interference. The regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game.
The shadow Minister asked about consultation. Through the observer role on the regulator board, there is an explicit requirement to consult the FA. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will not allow it to undermine FIFA’s or UEFA’s statutes. That is why—to answer the question from the hon. Member for Spelthorne—UEFA has confirmed in writing to the Secretary of State that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. The FA has also confirmed that directly to Members of both Houses, and it is of course publicly supportive of the Bill.
Rather than protect English football, I am afraid that the amendment would have serious unintended consequences. It would put the regulator in a position of deference to a private international organisation—a point the hon. Member for Cheltenham made eloquently a number of times. That would not only undermine the sovereignty of Parliament, but leave English football in a very weak position. UEFA has confirmed that the amendment is not needed, and it would undermine parliamentary sovereignty; for those very straightforward reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.
I note that the Minister was very careful in her wording when she talked about what was said in the letter from UEFA. She talked about the Bill “as drafted”. The Opposition are extremely concerned about scope creep from the regulator, and much of our contributions have focused on the fact that the future regulator may take a decision that is not in conformity with the rules of FIFA and UEFA, which this House would then have few means to change. That would put at risk clubs, investment and jobs in clubs up and down the country. That is why I will press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
“(3A) The IFR may not redistribute revenue, income or any monies from one regulated club to another regulated club.”
This amendment prevents the IFR from redistributing any funds from one club to another.
Again, it is a privilege to speak under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I promise that this speech will be slightly shorter than the last one—people will be pleased to know that.
Amendment 98 would make it explicit that the Government’s regulator should not engage in the practice of redistributing income or revenue from one club to another. This is a necessary and prudent safeguard and goes to the heart of how we preserve competitive integrity, protect private investment and ensure that the scope of the regulation does not veer into a form of creeping central planning in our national game. Nowhere in the Bill as it stands is it clearly ruled out that this new public body—run by an appointee of the Secretary of State, as we have heard—could compel the transfer of funds between clubs in the name of sustainability, redistribution or solidarity.
That is why the amendment is so important. It would place a clear statutory limit on the power of the Government’s regulator. It would ensure that the regulator could not, in any circumstances, divert resources from one privately owned club to help to subsidise another. It would preserve the principle that the money earned by clubs—through good management, fan support, on-field success or commercial acumen—belongs to those clubs, not to a central authority acting as some sort of financial equaliser. Although I am sure that hon. Members will say that that will never happen, it is important that we, as Members of this House, make sure that it never does. If Members believe that it will never happen, making this amendment to the Bill will not affect the operation of the Government’s regulator. There is no reason to oppose the amendment, other than political goal scoring.
This issue goes far beyond football; it touches on the fundamental principles of ownership, competition and economic freedom. As we have heard, private investment in English football has helped to transform the game. Whether in the Premier League or lower leagues we have seen owners, both domestic and international, commit hundreds of millions of pounds to develop stadiums, invest in training grounds, nurture local talent and grow their clubs responsibly. That investment has come in the expectation of fair competition and the ability to retain the fruits of one’s success. We all know that it has not always been done with the best intentions, but the Government have decided to bring in a regulatory sledgehammer to crack this particular nut. A small minority of owners should not be responsible for upending the entire English football system, which has stood and evolved over more than 100 years.
If the Government’s regulator is granted the power to override that and to redistribute revenues forcibly between specific clubs, that risks undermining the very conditions that made English football the most watched and commercially successful league system in the world. It sends a chilling message to investors that success may be penalised, ambition discouraged and financial reward diluted in the name of a central diktat. It would also, as I said when I moved amendment 97, demonstrate a total violation of the independence of English football from a Government regulator, which would assuredly constitute a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules, in turn leading to the expulsion of our clubs from competitions, as we have just discussed. UEFA states that mandating redistribution that affects
“the competitive balance in the game and wider European competition would be of concern to us. We also fear that having a third party intervene in redistribution would likely prevent amicable solutions being found.”
It is not difficult to imagine where that could lead. A well-run League One club, generating income from smart ticketing and loyal fan engagement, could find its revenues skimmed off to support a rival that has been less prudent or less entrepreneurial with its fan engagement. A Championship club breaking even through hard decisions and local investment could be told that its television share will be trimmed to subsidise losses made elsewhere by a less prudent board or chairman. That is not regulation, but redistribution by bureaucratic diktat.
Let me be clear: I am not opposed to the redistribution of moneys in English football. Voluntary redistribution negotiated by clubs, leagues and the FA is a long-standing and respected feature of the game, but there is a profound difference between clubs choosing to support one another and the Government’s regulator imposing that from above, using statutory powers to shift money between private enterprises without consent.
I do not believe that this is a theoretical concern. The regulator’s objectives include financial sustainability. One can easily imagine a future regulator interpreting this objective to mean that it should balance resources across the pyramid, effectively redistributing funds to prop up weaker clubs. Without this amendment, nothing in legislation explicitly prevents such a scenario.
Some may argue that redistribution is needed to make the game fairer—I understand that point—but fairness in football has always been earned through competition, not imposed through central control. We must be very cautious about importing the language and logic of equalisation into a sport that depends for its vitality on aspiration, competition and merit. Sporting competition is a hill that I am willing to die on.
It is also worth noting that forced redistribution between clubs would create perverse incentives. It would reward financial mismanagement and punish prudence, and it would create a moral hazard where clubs are less motivated to balance their books if they believe that the regulator will require others to bail them out. That is not a path to sustainability; it is a recipe for mediocrity, or worse, disaster.
The principle at stake is clear: the role of the regulator is to set standards, ensure compliance and uphold integrity, and not to act as a central accountant deciding who deserves what. If clubs wish to strike revenue-sharing deals through their leagues, they may do so. The amendment draws a line: it protects club autonomy and supports continued investment in the game, and it ensures that the Government’s regulator—whatever its remit ends up being—respects the rights of clubs to manage and retain their own finances.
The amendment would cast doubt on the regulator’s ability to effectively deploy the backstop, even where requested to do so as a last resort by the leagues. For the reasons that I have set out, I am unable to accept it.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The regulator must consider some key outcomes in the football market, beyond its primary objectives. Specifically, where possible, it should have due regard to the desirability of avoiding indirect impacts on: the sporting outcomes of regulated clubs; the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, which includes overseas competitors; and investment into, and growth of, English football. That recognises that there are other features of the market that should be protected. We want a sustainable football pyramid, but not at the expense of the exciting, competitive product that continues to attract so many viewers and investors. We have explicitly added growth to this provision. The regulator will not actively pursue these outcomes, but it will be mindful of unduly harming them while it advances its statutory objectives.
The regulator must also have regard to five further things when exercising its functions. They include its regulatory principles, which guide how it should operate, its own guidance and the guidance from the Secretary of State, the most recent state of the game report, and the most recent football governance statement from the Secretary of State. We will discuss some of those points later today. I commend the clause to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
The IFR’s regulatory principles
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The third principle encourages the regulator to consider, before acting, whether the intervention is necessary, and if the same outcome could be achieved in a less burdensome way. That steers the regulator to take a light-touch approach to regulation where appropriate. The fourth principle encourages proportionality. The regulator should always look to choose the least restrictive action that still delivers the intended outcome, and be able to justify why any burden is worth it for the benefits expected. The fifth principle encourages the regulator to acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating. For example, it should consider the existing rules and burdens that clubs are subject to, and that market features such as transfer windows impose unique constraints on clubs.
The sixth principle encourages the regulator to apply regulation consistently, while still ensuring that requirements are appropriately tailored to a club’s specific circumstances. A Premier League club and a National League club operate in very different ways and face very different risks, and the regulator should and will take that into account when regulating, as I heard when meeting representatives of the Premier League, the EFL and the National League. The seventh principle encourages the regulator to hold the individuals responsible for making decisions at a club accountable for the actions and compliance of the club. For too long, clubs and fans have suffered the consequences of bad actors and mismanagement by the individuals calling the shots.
The eighth and final principle encourages the regulator to be transparent in its actions. It is important that the regulator and its regime are open and accessible to the industry, fans and the general public. I commend the clause to the House.
As the Minister described, clause 8 outlines the eight operating principles that guide the regulator’s approach. First, the Government’s regulator should be on time and cost-efficient, which is why I have tabled amendment 101 to clause 16. Secondly, the Government’s regulator should take a participative approach to regulation, helping to co-ordinate and co-operating with clubs and competition organisations, as well as engaging with players, fans and others. That relates to an amendment that we will come to shortly.
Thirdly, the Government’s regulator should be light touch in its approach to regulation, wherever possible. Sadly, we Opposition Members believe that that is now highly questionable due to some of the new parts of the Bill, which we raised concerns about in the first day’s sitting. Fourthly, the Government’s regulator should be proportionate in everything it does. Again, we have concerns about that and we have outlined some of those already.
Fifthly, the Government’s regulator should acknowledge the unique sporting context in which it is regulating, aiming to minimise any potential disruption to sporting competitions. I will not go through the debate we just had around UEFA international competitions, but I again highlight some of my earlier questions that I put to the Government on Tuesday about how this regulator is benchmarked against other regulators, because, in a sporting context, it is the first of its kind. It is very difficult for us to understand where the Government are moving towards, whether that is about resources, the size of the regulator, or the future direction, and we would like some clarity on that.
Sixthly, the Government’s regulator should apply the regulation consistently. We all hope that the regulator will do that in the future. Seventhly, the Government’s regulator should, where appropriate, hold individuals responsible for the actions of the club. That is absolutely right. There are clauses that seek to do that, and, as we have heard, to identify the appropriate officers and senior directors for different components of the club.
Eighthly, the Government’s regulator should be as transparent as possible in everything it does. Disappointingly, Government Members voted against the transparency amendments that we tabled, which, again, were not political; they were aimed to future-proof the transparency regarding how the regulator operates. I fundamentally believe that Members, regardless of what party they belong to, should be able to have all the information to make informed decisions on the benefits to their constituents.
Many of the principles in this clause are generally welcome, but I seek clarity from the Minister on a few matters. Does she think that these principles are strong enough to prevent the regulator from jeopardising the future participation of English clubs, particularly abroad? The fifth principle states that the regulator “should” aim to minimise disruption. Surely—we believe—it “must” avoid disruption, because of the risks that I outlined in previous amendments.
Lastly, none of the principles reference or reinforce the regulator’s independence. Why is there no principle regarding the regulator’s independence from the Government and politics at large, for the reasons we have outlined?
The principles that we are debating are the same as they were under the previous Bill, with one exception: the third principle has been added, which is about making this less burdensome and which steers towards a light-touch regulator. I think that Members across the House would welcome that.
I will not rehearse the conversations we had on the make-up of the regulator—on staffing and so on, which we spoke about that the other day—but the shadow Minister touched again on UEFA. I gently remind him that we removed the need for the regulator to have regard to Government’s foreign and trade policy when considering club takeovers. We took that out of the previous Bill, and that is clearly welcome in the context of that UEFA debate. We are therefore confident that these are the right principles to guide the regulator to do a good job.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill
Clause 9
Transfer schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The shadow football regulator has started work to develop the regulator’s policy and guidance, engage with stakeholders, and undertake the necessary corporate activity to build an organisation, such as recruitment and procurement. That will enable the regulator to hit the ground running once it is legally established. The shadow regulator, of course, was established by the previous Government, as they clearly also recognised the importance of the regulator being ready to operate as soon as possible once the Bill receives Royal Assent.
On the creation of the regulator, it will be necessary for the property, rights, liabilities and staff held by the shadow regulator within DCMS to be transferred to the regulator. The most appropriate vehicle for effecting these transfers will be a statutory transfer scheme, as has been used in similar situations involving the transfer of assets following the transfer of functions between public bodies. The details of such transfers will be determined at the point of transfer.
We did seek to put an employee cap into the Bill to help to maintain value for money for taxpayers. I think that was a fair proposal, but Members did not agree with it or with the number of 50 that we put forward. However, the principle of trying to cap the size of the regulator is fair, especially given the size of some of the regulators that were described in comparison—I believe one had 900 members of staff. Most members of the public would be alarmed if the football regulator ended up anywhere near that, let alone a tenth of it. We are concerned, so I ask the Minister again, given the impact on costs to football clubs linked to the regulator, how big the Government expect it to grow. Can she also answer the questions that were raised about what will be transferred on day one?
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clause 10
State of the game report
“(d) an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in section 62(2);”
This amendment would require the state of the game report to make an assessment of any existing and effective financial distribution agreement against the principles set out in distribution orders for the resolution process.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. We are finally starting to get on to the football issues in the Bill. The state of the game report is obviously a key element. It will shape how the regulator operates, and eventually, the financial distribution, which we will come to later in the Bill. So the report is really important.
Amendment 2, without undermining what is already in the Bill in any way, simply ensures that the financial distribution as it exists, and as it might exist according to the principles laid out in further clauses of the Bill, is taken into account when developing the state of the game report. It brings a symmetry to the whole process, so that the state of the game report looks at the financial distribution, and when we come to the financial distribution, it goes back to look at the state of the game report. It is a simple amendment that makes the Bill coherent as a whole. I hope that the Minister might at least consider it when looking at how the Bill might be improved.
The amendment would require the state of the game report to assess existing and effective financial distribution agreements against the principles. My understanding is that the amendment would therefore require the Independent Football Regulator to assess existing agreements against the principles in clause 62(2)—namely that they
“(a) should advance the IFR’s objectives,
(b) should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and
(c) should not, if a distribution order were made in accordance with the final proposal, result in a lower amount of relegation revenue”—
also known as parachute payments—
“being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to a club during that period had such a distribution order not been made.”
There are a lot of words there.
Secondly, what does the hon. Member expect the regulator to do if it discovers that an existing agreement violates one of those principles? What is the point of the amendment? That is what we are trying to understand.
We are not sure that the new regulator should have any role in trying to seek to change existing commercial agreements that have been entered into in good faith at that point in time.
We support the amendment. We believe it is in the interests of the game to redistribute money further from the top to the Football League and further down the pyramid. We believe the only way that will be achieved is if, via the mechanism of the football regulator, there is regular reporting that then demonstrates what we know is true—that an increasing amount of money is being hoarded by the Premier League, while those lower down tend to miss out.
We know that over the past few years or decades, since the inception of the Premier League, more and more money floating around in football is being retained by the Premier League as a proportion of the amount of money that is available. That is not a good thing for football. It is not a good thing for the sustainability of the game. We believe that this simple reporting mechanism will give further oxygen to the discussion about why that is harmful, and will hopefully, over time, result in further redistribution. That is why we support and welcome the amendment.
In general, we have not taken the approach of being overly prescriptive and listing every issue the regulator could and should look at here in the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
“(d) an assessment of the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets.”
This amendment would require the IFR to include in its state of the game report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.
“(aa) the impact that the IFR’s activities have had on the price of match tickets, and”
This amendment would require the IFR to include in its annual report the impact that its regulatory activities have had on ticket prices.
Amendment 123 would require the state of the game report to include an assessment of the impact that the regulator’s activities have had on ticket prices. Amendment 122 is tabled in a similar vein, and would require that same assessment to appear in the regulator’s annual report as well. These are modest and reasonable proposals, but they are also very important.
The cost of attending football in this country has risen markedly in recent years. For millions of supporters, particularly those attending with children or travelling away from home, football is no longer the affordable pastime it once was—we have seen those protests in the stands and outside grounds on a number of occasions this season. While the causes are complex, it is certain that increased regulatory costs, compliance burdens and mandated structural changes may be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the supporter at the turnstile. If we are to create a regulator with statutory powers over finance, governance, and club operations, surely it is not too much to ask that we track the real-world consequences of those interventions.
I understand the hon. Member’s point, and I did say that the causes of price increases are complex. I will not read out all the figures, but clubs’ costs have increased just this year, whether because of energy bills, national insurance or wages. We are concerned about the burdens and requirements that the regulator will impose on clubs increasing their costs and about those being passed on to the end fan, who is already under significant pressure.
Ticket prices are not an incidental issue; they are a barometer of whether the game remains accessible to its core community. We know that regulation drives up prices, through compliance costs, as I have said, and by reducing investment and squeezing margins even further. The Government must have the courage to recognise that and to adjust course if necessary by ensuring greater transparency about costs. Requiring the regulator to report on that, in its general state of the game report and its annual report, would embed an essential feedback loop in statue. It would ensure that the impact on fans was not an afterthought, but a standing obligation for the regulator.
It is not enough for the Government’s regulator to simply say, “We have improved governance and we ensure sustainability,” if we then learn, in the same breath, that the average family can no longer afford to attend any more games. Football cannot become financially sustainable by pricing out its own supporters: I suspect all Members would agree on that point. I would add that ticket affordability is a deeply traditional concern. It goes to the very heart of football’s place in English lives. Fans must not be priced out of their favourite club in the name of regulation. If we forget that, we forget the point of the Bill, which is the fans.
Let me also stress that the amendment does not restrict the regulator. It does not tie its hands; it simply requires transparency. It says to the Government’s regulator: “If your actions are driving up the cost of entry to the game, tell us, tell the fans and tell Parliament.” Then, we can at least have an honest discussion in this House about whether those actions are justified or proportionate. That is especially important when we consider that many of the regulator’s decisions, whether on licensing, financial rules or ownership models, will almost certainly have financial consequences. Clubs will find ways to balance their books, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham just intervened to say, and if the regulation increases their fixed costs, the easiest lever to pull is ticket price. That is not conjecture; it is basic economics—although we know that some members of the Labour party struggle with that.
In the end, these two amendments ask only that we shine a light on the question that supporters ask every season: “Why is it getting more expensive to watch my club?” If relegation is part of the answer—[Interruption]—or rather if regulation is; relegation is definitely part of the answer—then we have a duty in this House to know and to ensure that we make laws that shine a light and ensure transparency for everyone to understand.
The amendment should not be seen as counter to the regulator. There was significant pushback from the Government Benches when we tried to amend the regulator in terms of size and pay, and we also discussed the budget. If, in a regulated environment, the ticket price went up from £950 to, say, £980, then this amendment would ensure that fans were made aware that that 30 quid had gone on being part of a regulated industry. That is a perfectly reasonable thing for us to want to communicate with the viewing public. Equally, it would create a relationship between the fan and the regulator that might not otherwise be there, so I support the amendment.
Ticket pricing is fundamentally a commercial decision, and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with the commercial decisions of a private company. That is why the regulator will not intervene on this issue, aside from ensuring that clubs consult their fans on ticket pricing. It may well be that the regulator chooses to look at ticket pricing as part of the state of the game report, but mandating that it reviews the effect of its regulatory activities on ticket pricing as part of the report would be unnecessarily prescriptive.
Ticket pricing is ultimately a matter for clubs and is driven by many factors, but we do think it vital that fans are consulted and can have their voices heard. That is exactly why this Government amended the previous Government’s Bill to add an explicit requirement that clubs must consult their fans on ticket pricing and take their views into account as part of fan engagement. That is the way to ensure that fans can have their voices heard on such an impactful issue.
The amendment seems to assume that the cost will be passed on to fans in the form of higher ticket pricing. I want to be clear, as I was on Second Reading, that that would not be a proportionate response by clubs. If clubs increase ticket pricing, it will not be because they cannot otherwise afford to pay the regulator’s levy. As mentioned before, the cost of the regulator will be tiny compared with the vast revenue of the game, and the cost of the levy will not be among any club’s top area of expenditure.
Every measure has been taken to ensure affordability. No club will be charged to the point of needing to increase ticket pricing, and no fan will be subject to price rises without having their voice heard—I associate myself with the comments of the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to withdraw his amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.
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