PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Employment Rights Bill (Tenth sitting) - 10 December 2024 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this afternoon, Mr Stringer. I welcome the Bill, and this clause is a really important part of it. We are introducing the clause to improve the workplace treatment of individuals who suffer harassment. Before the lunch break, we heard an interesting interpretation of the legislation, but sadly, it was not correct in all places, and I would like to go through some points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire. As part of that, I will reflect from the beginning that the Fawcett Society has found that 40% of women have experienced workplace harassment, and women who are marginalised for other reasons, such as race or disability, face an increased risk of and different forms of harassment, including sexual harassment in the workplace.

This clause is a vital part of the legislation, because we know—we heard this in evidence a few weeks ago—that harassment does not always come from a fellow employee or an employer. Quite often, it can come from third parties, particularly in some of the sectors that the Opposition seek to exclude with their amendment. We heard particularly from UKHospitality about the impact of third-party harassment in the hospitality sector, and I have shared my experience of being harassed in the workplace while working in the hospitality sector as a 15-year-old. This is really important. My example was only one—frankly, there will be thousands of examples—and I know that my experience as a young man will be very different from the experiences of women working in hospitality up and down the country.

As we enter the Christmas party season, we will see a massive increase in workplace harassment—not just sexual harassment, but other forms of harassment. This is perhaps where we got into some confusion this morning. There are different types of harassment, and the type that we talked about in particular this morning was harassment under the Equality Act 2010. That has a very specific definition, which will not be changed by the proposed legislation, despite what the shadow Minister said. A different test will be applied to that definition in terms of when it might come into play, but the definition of harassment will not change. Therefore, for something to be harassment, it must be unwanted conduct relating to somebody’s protected characteristic and create an offensive environment, or one that degrades, humiliates or embarrasses individuals.

The hon. Member for West Suffolk tried to introduce a few examples around the free speech argument, but those did not support the argument that he tried to make. The Independent Press Standards Organisation found that there was no harassment in the Gareth Roberts case. It found that there was a lower form of conduct in relation to clause 12(i) of the IPSO code of practice, but there was no harassment.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I will, if the hon. Gentleman wants to correct the record.

I have absolutely no intention of correcting the record, because the record will be correct. I think the hon. Member misunderstands my point, which was not to say that in that case the conduct was an example of harassment; I am fully aware that the IPSO ruling said that it was not harassment. My point was about the laws of unintended consequences. When IPSO was established, I do not think anybody thought that there would be cases such as this, where a journalist would be penalised by IPSO for saying something that IPSO acknowledges was a statement of fact on the grounds that it may be offensive.

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but the fact is that in these circumstances, the definition in the Equality Act is clear. There is already an abundance of case law on what constitutes harassment, particularly in relation to the Equality Act, the different types of protected characteristics and the actions required to reach that threshold. The threshold is not just that there is unwanted conduct or that it relates to a protected characteristic; it is about the environment that is created. There is an abundance of case law on that point.

The second example was about my right hon. Friend the Health Secretary, but again it missed the point entirely. We all enjoy comedy, which is a staple of our culture. Jokes are fine unless they start to become unwanted and are aimed at protected characteristics, such as someone’s gender, gender identity or sexual orientation. The other point that that example missed—we spoke at length about comedy clubs, and I hate to raise them again—is that the Bill is not about punters at a comedy club being offended by what they hear on stage; it is about protecting the employees. For somebody to trigger this legislation, the comedian would have to make a joke directed at one of the employee’s protected characteristics. If the club employs a member of bar staff who has a protected characteristic and the comedian on stage consistently and absolutely humiliates them because of it, one might expect the employer to take some reasonable steps, such as not booking that comedian again, so that the individual is not consistently humiliated on a regular basis because of one of their protected characteristics. That is what the Bill is intended to do.

We are not saying that employers are required to stop all harassment in the workplace; that would not be possible. As the shadow Minister rightly said, there will be cases when somebody comes into a bar during a Christmas party, inebriated, having enjoyed far too much free wine, and says something that is offensive and horrifically wrong, and with which we all across this House would disagree. The Bill requires employers to have policies in place to deal with that. We cannot legislate for the unknown. We cannot legislate for serious circumstances that we cannot predict or for every individual who walks into a bar, but we can have policies in place to deal with those things.

Surely one of the unintended consequences of this proposal is that small businesses risk lawsuits from employees who perceive that they have been harassed, perhaps by a third party. The inevitable lawsuit then follows, and it is not so much the offence for the employer that is the problem; it is the legal fees, the time, the effort and the distraction. What I find most concerning about this proposal is that the Minister says that the impact assessment will follow. Our amendment says that this provision should not be introduced before an impact assessment has been carried out. Does the hon. Member for Gloucester not think, given the doubt and uncertainties about the effect of this Bill, that it would be more sensible to have the impact assessment first before exposing small businesses to unintended consequences?

If the hon. Gentleman is inviting me to agree that there should be a two-tier system, whereby employees at small businesses are entitled to be harassed by third parties but employees at larger businesses are not, I have to disagree.

The hon. Gentleman knows I am not saying that.

Well, a great deal of things are protected under law. Employees who work for businesses of all sizes are entitled to protection from harassment under the law, and I do not think that we in this House disagree with that principle.

I come back to the reasonableness test. A small business can have a claim brought against it for a whole host of reasons under employment legislation. Claims can be brought for discrimination or for whistleblowing, and that comes at a cost to employers. There is a separate discussion to be had about how to ensure that employment tribunals work for businesses of all sizes, but the point that we are debating is about harassment in the workplace under the Equality Act.

One of the key points that we must keep coming back to is that it does not really matter to the victim whether they are harassed by a third party, a fellow employee or their employer; the impact on them is exactly the same. Disregarding people who work for small businesses and not giving them the protections that are afforded to everybody else is just not acceptable.

It clearly does make a great deal of difference to both the employee and the employer where the harassment comes from. If an employer is harassing an employee, they are directly responsible for those actions and they should rightly be held accountable. If the harassment comes from a third party—the drunk person who comes into the pub or into A&E—there is surely a complete difference. The hon. Member is asking for the employer to be responsible for that unless they take all reasonable steps. This clause then exposes that businessman—that small employer—to legal action on something he cannot control.

I thank the hon. Member for setting out the difference. The difference is the “all reasonable steps” test. If an employer harasses someone in the workplace, there is no “all reasonable steps” test that they can take; for a third party, there is.

In tribunals, “reasonable” takes into account, for example, the circumstances of the case, the size of the business, the sector it operates in, the policies it has in place and the training it provides for employees. These points of reasonableness are taken into consideration in tribunals every single day in other areas. For example, there is already a test in section 109 of the Equality Act that deals with a defence that employers have. They cannot be held liable for the actions of their employees if they have taken all reasonable steps to train their employees to avoid issues such as discrimination in the workplace.

The hon. Member mentions reasonable steps being taken by small businesses. Does he accept that an impact assessment on the consequences of bringing in this kind of legislation for these businesses should be conducted up front, so that businesses can at least understand how much time and money it will cost them and how much additional bureaucracy it will create for them?

The Minister will answer about what the Government are doing on impact assessments, but the impact on small businesses is that they have to think a little bit about harassment in their industry. That will vary from business to business. Some small businesses are not public facing. The impact in a small café will be different from that in a small office, because of interactions with the general public, but I do not think it is unreasonable to ask a small café or a small bar to think about what they can put in place to deal with someone coming in and abusing or harassing staff.

Again, if somebody comes in and is abusive, these provisions will not necessarily be triggered, because the abuse and unwanted conduct has to be related to their protected characteristic. I know from closing up a number of Christmas parties when I worked in hospitality that people get a bit out of hand. That was not harassment under the Equality Act; it was because people were drunk and disorderly, which is a separate antisocial behaviour issue. There are different channels to deal with that. We are talking here about specific cases where there is abuse of people because of a protected characteristic. Those are very narrow circumstances where people have to think about what kind of policies they have in place.

The hon. Member for Chippenham spoke about how MPs would not operate in similar circumstances. We would not, for example, be alone with individuals in a private room. It is appropriate to have policies in place where we try to think about some of the circumstances.

This proposal does not use the word “requires”, and it does not say that every single step has to be taken—it mentions “all reasonable steps”. That is part of the tribunal, and there will be guidance to set out some examples of things that employers can do to take reasonable steps. It is really important that we do not create a two-tier system where we say that small employers do not have to deal with these issues, because actually it is often in small and medium-sized enterprises that some of this bad behaviour takes place.

I gave an example last week. I went to my boss and said, “I have just been groped by a midwife and was told, ‘I’m going to show you a thing or two’”. When I said that I was only 15 years old, my boss said I should enjoy it: “You are a bloke. Go back in there. Toughen up.” That is not acceptable. Actually, a reasonable step in those circumstances would be the manager saying, “Alex, why don’t you go and work in another part of the business for the rest of the week? Work on the bar this evening, rather than in the function.” It is about having a policy that deals with those kinds of incidents in the workplace. There are different steps that businesses can take.

Let me move on to the argument around free speech, which the Minister talked about at great length. I have set out how some of his arguments do not apply in this instance as this provision is about specific incidents of harassment under the Equality Act. A point that the shadow Minister might have raised that would perhaps have been more legitimate is cases where two protected characteristics are in play. A lot of the free speech cases that have made the press have engaged with two. For example, in some cases someone has expressed their religion, but that might be opposed to someone expressing their sexual orientation; or people have expressed protected views on gender-critical theory, but others have a protected characteristic of a different gender identity.

Those are difficult cases, which can go all the way to the Supreme Court. What is important to note, however—this is where the shadow Minister could have gone, to give us a stronger discussion—is that if we are at the stage where the Supreme Court has to give an opinion on these things, no tribunal in the land will say, “Well, an employer should reasonably have seen that and therefore taken reasonable steps to avoid such scenarios happening.” No, this is the exact example of where tribunals will take “reasonable steps” and say, “What is reasonable in these circumstances for these employers?”

Having represented the NHS for a number of years as an employment lawyer, I should point out that the A&E example that was given unfortunately did not make any sense. First, the NHS operates a zero-tolerance approach. In several instances, policies are in place where individuals can withdraw their support for someone if they are being abused in the workplace. Scenarios and planning are in place to make sure that everyone is looked after, without people being subjected to harassment in the workplace.

To sum up, “all reasonable steps” does not mean that an employer has a duty to stop something altogether. We have to be sensible. There is no point scaremongering so that individuals think this will have a broader impact, closing all comedy clubs and stopping people making jokes in the workplace. That is not the case. This is about specific examples of harassment under the Equality Act—that has to be unwanted conduct related to a protected characteristic, creating an offensive, hostile, degrading or humiliating environment. These are specific examples. It is important that we extend this to third parties, given all the evidence we have heard, and I encourage everyone in the Committee to support the legislation.

It is a privilege to serve under you, Mr Stringer. Broadly, I welcome—[Interruption.]

My reflection on the Opposition amendments is that on this occasion my colleagues may be in danger of throwing the champagne out with the cork. The reality is that the challenges for people who face harassment in the workplace are very serious. As Government Members have highlighted, the comedy club example is relatively bogus, as the Bill would actually affect protection for employees rather than for punters.

On Friday, I am due to visit Torquay Girls’ grammar school in my constituency. I invite the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire to join me and hear directly from young women there about their experiences in the workplace. Strangely enough, apart from universities, the sectors that Opposition amendment 131 would exclude from clause 16 are almost all in the hospitality industry, in which those young women would be working. When I visited the school some time ago, one student shared with me how they dreaded a certain day of the week because they knew that a certain individual would be in, who would make them feel physically sick because of their approach to them, and the sexual harassment that occurred within the workplace.

As much as I would love to join the hon. Gentleman in Torbay and it sounds like a delightful day out, I have a pretty full diary. I was not making a point against trying to stop sexual harassment; I was very clear that we need to use every power, every law and every mechanism available to clamp down hard on anybody who engages in the sexual harassment of anybody. My point was about the unintended consequences, including to free speech. By no definition, in my world, does sexual harassment count as free speech; that is something totally different. I invite the hon. Gentleman to reflect on my arguments, which were not in any way, shape or form about trying to remove powers to deal with sexual harassment.

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman and I will have to agree to differ on that point. I am sure that the Government’s proposals will support those who are facing sexual harassment from third parties. As colleagues on the Committee have highlighted, the reality is that the legislation is about taking all reasonable steps. It is not saying that when somebody walks in and abuses an employee it is an immediate red line. The reality is that the employer needs to have taken all reasonable steps. I am very comfortable with the proposals. The Liberal Democrats will vote against the amendment.

I promise to keep my comments brief. Clause 15 will amend section 40A of the Equality Act 2010 to provide that an employer must take all reasonable steps to prevent the sexual harassment of employees in the course of their employment.

The concept of “all reasonable steps” has been part of the Equality Act 2010 since its inception, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester referred to. Section 109 of the Act provides a defence for the employer in respect of the discriminatory acts of the employee. It is about vicarious liability: in effect, if the employer can show that it has taken all reasonable steps, it will not be liable for the acts of the employee.

Exactly the same “all reasonable steps” test is being applied here. In my experience as an employment lawyer, employment tribunals are very well-versed in it and have a huge amount of experience with it. It would be a matter of fact for them to determine. It is important to understand that it will be, and always has been, a proportionate test that looks at the size and resources of the employer and the context of the employment situation.

There will inevitably be guidance from the Equality and Human Rights Commission on how employers should take all reasonable steps and what those steps might be, but it will be fact-specific. It may well include steps to mitigate, such as some form of risk assessment, policies, training or means by which an employee who is at risk of or has suffered third-party harassment can report it and action can be taken. All those things are fairly standard. They happen already as a result of the vicarious liability element of the Equality Act; the clause would just extend them to third parties.

All third-party harassment cases and issues arise from a case called Burton v. De Vere Hotels, in which Bernard Manning made racist comments to a waitress at a De Vere hotel and the waitress brought a claim. Both the original employment tribunal and the employment appeal tribunal held that it was harassment, but it was overturned on appeal because the right did not extend to protection from third-party harassment. That was the start of the process of trying to protect employees in such circumstances.

The employment tribunal and the employment appeal tribunal said that the employer knew what was likely to be in Bernard Manning’s act—we can all imagine what might be in Bernard Manning’s act—but did not take the necessary steps to protect the employee in the circumstances. These are exactly the scenarios that the shadow Minister raised, in which we would expect the employer to consider very carefully who was staffing the event, what policies should be in place and how any issues should be managed—including, for example, by warning Bernard Manning that he might not wish to make racist remarks to members of staff.

When we talk about risk assessments, we must remember that the biggest risk is that third-party harassment will continue. That is the most fundamental issue. I emphasise a point that the shadow Minister will find relevant: a 2023 Buckinghamshire healthcare NHS trust staff survey showed that there had been nearly 400 incidents of sexual harassment by third parties. Many of those incidents will have affected his constituents. It is vital that we make this legislation, because employee representatives at the trust have said that one thing that would help is a protection against third-party harassment. If we do not include this provision in the Bill, we will continue to leave his constituents exposed. I encourage the shadow Minister, who I genuinely believe cares about harassment, seriously to reconsider his opposition to the clause.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. I rise to speak in support of new clauses 39 and 40, which stand in the name of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts).

The new clauses follow the publication of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Amendment) Bill, a presentation Bill that the right hon. Member introduced in co-operation with the Suzy Lamplugh Trust and Rights of Women. They would address a critical gap in workplace safety by mandating proactive employer responsibilities to prevent all forms of violence and harassment, including gender-based violence.

The Health and Safety Executive does not currently accept domestic abuse within its remit. That might come as a surprise to some Members, but the reason is that domestic abuse and other forms of gender-based violence are not explicitly covered in the 1974 Act, even though the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 underlines the fact that employers owe their employees a duty of care that covers protection from domestic abuse.

Discrimination law inadequately protects workers from gender-based violence beyond sexual harassment, especially when such violence is not physical. The UK’s ratification in 2022 of the International Labour Organisation’s convention 190 means that the UK should take a comprehensive approach that addresses all forms and threats of gender-based violence in the workplace, psychological and emotional abuse, physical abuse and stalking, including with respect to people commuting to and from the workplace.

New clauses 39 and 40 would address those issues. They would go further than the Bill’s provisions on protection from harassment, because new clause 39 would introduce clear, actionable duties for employers to safeguard employees from gender-based harm through risk assessments, policy development and training. New clause 40 would mandate that the Health and Safety Executive create an enforceable framework that holds employers accountable and fosters inclusive, violence-free work environments for workers.

I understand that this may have been the Minister’s first opportunity to hear these points. I hope he will consider them, perhaps on Report.

Prior to entering this place, I spent 25 years working in the television production industry, both as a writer and as a producer. I co-own an independent production company—I refer the Committee to my declaration of interests—that has made children’s drama for the BBC, including the hit science fiction series “The Sparticle Mystery”, in which a cut-price British version of the large hadron collider at CERN sends all the adults into a parallel universe, a situation with which I have had some sympathy since arriving as a new Member. I mention that not to burnish my CV in the hope of a writing credit on the next James Bond film, but to make a point about clause 15.

The television industry is full of creative, inventive and hard-working people who wish to make the most of their talents and contribute to making the programmes with which the UK is a world leader and for which it is rightly admired. Unfortunately, the nature of a fast-moving and pressurised industry based on freelancers is that it is left open to abusive practices. Freelancers move between productions, often with no HR departments, with no formal recruitment processes and with a lack of the checks and balances that we all want to see in good workplaces. It is also an industry in which the talent is protected, which has led to a culture of exceptionalism in which appalling behaviour has been allowed to continue for years.

This is not just about sexual harassment and inappropriate behaviour. It is also about power, or rather the imbalance of it. When I was in the green room at the start of a production, someone came up to me—I was on my own with him—and put his arm around me. He said, “Make me a cup of coffee, love.” I said, “Make your own, and then start looking for a new job,” because I was the executive producer on the show. Unfortunately, far too many women endure sexually explicit comments, inappropriate touching and offensive jokes as part of their everyday experience at work.

A few years ago, a survey found that 39% of women working in film and television had been subjected to sexual harassment at work; freelancers, members of the LGBTQ+ community and disabled people are also most at risk. Women are too scared to speak out: they fear that if they do, they will simply not work in the industry again. It is hardly surprising that last year two thirds of women aged between 25 and 59 thought about leaving the industry.

I say to the shadow Minister that clauses 15 to 17 will mean that companies have to proactively take all reasonable steps to close the vacuum of responsibility that currently exists between senior and middle management. They will need to ensure that staff have the training to call out challenging behaviour, support colleagues and prevent future abuse rather than focusing solely on damage limitation, as sadly we have seen time and again.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I refer the Committee to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and my membership of the GMB and Unite.

I want to bring this debate into reality—after all, the Bill seeks to affect real people’s lives and make their life at work better—and talk about my personal experience as a young woman. I was working a couple of jobs to get by, one of them as a silver service waitress on a zero-hours contract and minimum wage. The employer hired only young women, and we worked mostly at high-profile sporting events. To be sexually harassed was seen as normal. We were told to expect it, and we were told that we were expected to accept it—it was part of the job. The employer would also over-hire, so too many of us would turn up and many of us would be sent away, because it was decided that our face or figure did not fit the event that day. Those of us who got to the service were groped, propositioned, reprimanded if we talked back, and threatened with the sack. Travelling home from work together, we would feel completely humiliated and degraded, and we would exchange tales of what had happened to us that day. We took solace in the fact that we were not alone.

That behaviour is not something we should accept, but we know it still happens. That is why this part of the Bill is so important. No one should go to work dreading being harassed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester pointed out, the Fawcett Society has said that

“40% of women experience sexual harassment throughout their career.”

The Bill is intended to prevent workers from being subject to that vile behaviour, and it will ensure that people can get on with their jobs without being filled with fear, dread or humiliation, or feeling unsafe and degraded.

I did so this morning, but I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests as a member of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, as it pertains to some what I will say.

First, I want to take us right back to the beginning of the debate, if we can remember that long ago. The shadow Minister referenced the Regulatory Policy Committee’s assessment, in particular on the need for clauses 15 and 16. I strongly welcome what the Bill is doing in this space, in particular on third-party harassment. I do not profess to be an expert in the procedures and mechanisms of the RPC, but if we look broadly at society and at surveys and analysis of the state of work and what workers go through in this country, I think there is ample proper evidence of the need for these clauses.

I draw the Committee’s attention to this year’s “Freedom from Fear” survey released by USDAW, which surveyed retail workers in this country. It is an annual survey and the figures were released as part of Respect for Shopworkers Week in November. It featured responses from 4,000 participants, and the interim results showed that 69% of respondents—69% of a sample of 4,000 retail workers—had been verbally abused while at work, not by colleagues but by customers: a third party. Forty-five per cent had been threatened at work while simply going about their job. That is just one survey of one sample of one sector in our country that demonstrates the need for clauses 15 and 16.

On Opposition amendment 131, I must admit that I was slightly confused, but I was listening closely and I gathered that its thrust was primarily around free speech. We have talked a lot about unintended consequences in this Committee. I suggest that, whether it is intended or unintended, the consequence of the amendment, which would remove two entire sectors from the scope of the Bill, would be far too broad given the protections that are needed. That is particularly the case in the hospitality sector, and we have heard my hon Friends’ experiences of that sector. I question whether the amendment is at all proportionate, considering the overall aims of the Bill, as well as the experiences and evidence that we have heard from my hon. Friends and witnesses.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the fact that the Government have not undertaken an impact assessment on these measures makes it very difficult to know whether the amendment is proportionate, and that in fact our amendment 135, which states that these provisions should not take effect until after the impact assessment has taken place, is an entirely sensible proposition?

If I may make a second point, Mr Stringer, on the issue of harassment at higher and further education colleges, one can quite imagine a situation where students put forward a point of view—perhaps on gender critical subjects, on which a lecturer or employee has particular strong views and students have other strong views—that could easily result in a charge of harassment by a third party. That is not what should be happening at our higher education establishments. We should encourage free speech. We should encourage students to express themselves forcefully but respectfully, and we should not see that resulting in what I would regard as spurious legal cases.

As I said, I listened closely to the points that Opposition Members made. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester, I will allow the Minister to come back on the specifics of impact assessments. The point I am trying to make is that we are all looking at the same Bill and the same information. We might desire more information at this point, but we are exercising our judgment. Regardless of the specifics of any impact assessment, I think it is patently obvious that it is a disproportionate response to the concerns raised by Opposition Members to exclude entire sectors from the protections that we are discussing.

On hospitality, we heard in oral evidence from the trade union Unite—of which I am not a member—that it had surveyed its hospitality workers and found that 56% of them had considered leaving the sector entirely as a result of the sexual harassment they were experiencing. We have heard throughout the debate about the desire to support businesses. We heard from UKHospitality about struggles with retention and how measures in the Bill, outside of this one, will aid with that. I hope we can all agree that, beyond edge cases that might raise concerns, the significant protections for workers that we are discussing would be not only good for those workers, but fundamentally good for business.

We have had a full and thorough debate, and I thank my hon. Friends—in particular my learned hon. Friends the Members for High Peak and for Gloucester—for making many valuable arguments, and everybody for contributing their personal experiences.

I remind the Committee that clause 15 requires employers to take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of their employees. Including “all” emphasises the thorough approach that employers must take; at the same time, the requirement remains limited to steps that are “reasonable”. The concept of “all reasonable steps” has the advantage of being well established and familiar to employers and employment tribunals. That is a really important point, because the clause clarifies and makes things easier and more straightforward, rather than complicated and burdensome, which is the implication of some of the amendments.

I thank the hon. Member for Dundee Central for speaking to new clauses 39 and 40 tabled by the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd. I pay tribute to the right hon. Lady for her work on violence against women and on stalking, and indeed to the work of her predecessor on stalking. I reassure the hon. Gentleman and the right hon. Lady that the Government entirely support the importance of ensuring that workers, including women and girls, are protected from workplace violence and harassment. There is already in place a strong and appropriate regulatory regime that provides protection to workers from violence and harassment. If the hon. Gentleman so desires, I will ask the Health and Safety Executive to write to him on that point.

I thank the Minister. I would appreciate that.

I will ensure that that happens.

The hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire questioned the necessity of this new legislation, so let me explain again. Often, harassment legislation, including the criminal law, allows an individual to take legal action against a perpetrator. However, that does not go far enough in tackling the wider issues and root causes. The burden of holding perpetrators to account and driving change is too great to be shouldered purely by employees who have experienced harassment. This measure therefore sends a clear signal to all employers that they must take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment.

I think the hon. Member is also concerned that the clauses that we are discussing risk being unworkable or burdensome. It is important to remember that they simply require employers to do what is reasonable for their specific circumstances. That means that employers will not be penalised for failing to take unworkable or impractical steps. The clauses will not require employers to foresee the wholly unforeseeable or to police all customers’ private conversations. On one hand, the hon. Member acknowledges that good businesses already accept the need to take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment, but on the other, he wants to make exceptions for a large number of businesses.

I would be very happy to discuss with the Minister and her colleagues in Government the specific points I made about sectors such as higher education and concerns about the no-platforming of perfectly moderate speakers such as Tony Blair. Would she be willing to engage in that dialogue on safeguards in higher education around no-platforming, so that free speech can be protected?

Free speech is absolutely a cornerstone of British values, but I remind the hon. Member that harassment is not free speech. They are two different things. The Bill concerns employer liability for workplace harassment, which is a serious issue, not to be underplayed. As with all cases of harassment under the Equality Act 2010, courts and tribunals will continue to be required to balance rights on the facts of a particular case, including the right to freedom of expression. Harassment is a serious matter that involves being subjected to unwanted conduct of various types that, as set out in the Equality Act,

“has the purpose or effect of violating”

the employee’s

“dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”

for the employee. Those who seek to harass people at work will not be tolerated.

The hon. Member raised a number of potential scenarios relating to potentially offensive or upsetting speech. It is important to note that in employment tribunal claims for harassment, if certain conduct has a humiliating or degrading effect on the recipient but that was not its intended purpose, the tribunal must consider whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have had that effect. It is not a purely subjective test based on the view of the recipient. The reasonableness and the facts of the individual situation must be considered. On that note, I ask the Committee to accept the clauses unamended.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Harassment by third parties

I beg to move amendment 163, in clause 18, page 31, line 24, at end insert—

“(4) In section 14K, in subsection (1), after paragraph (cb) insert—

‘(cc) works or worked as a self-employed contractor;

(cd) works or worked as a sub-postmaster;

(ce) is member of the judiciary, non-executive director or a trustee, including a pension trustee;

(cf) is a trade union representatives;

(cg) has applied for a vacant role as an external applicant and makes a protected disclosure about information obtained during the application process;’”.

This amendment extends protections for whistleblowers to other categories.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. Before I make my case, I must make a small correction: the reference to section 14K in the text of amendment 163 should be to section 43K. My apologies for the error.

The Liberal Democrats tabled amendment 163 because although we strongly welcome the Bill’s proposals on whistleblowing, we do not feel that it goes far enough to support all workers: it is not extended to additional workers. We feel that whistleblowing protections should be extended to all those in the workplace who may see wrongdoing and may suffer for raising public interests and concerns. After our long debate about harassment, we must all agree that harassment can often be brought to light only by whistleblowers, so this part of the legislation is incredibly important. As the definition of “worker” in section 43K of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is already slightly different for whistleblowers than for other areas of employment law, there is a sound public policy reason to extend it even further.

In our diverse and complex labour market, many people who wish to blow the whistle do not necessarily qualify as a worker and are therefore not protected either by the existing legislation or under the Bill. The Secretary of State already has the power to make these changes through secondary legislation, but until the Government act on that, we are pushing for Parliament to extend protections to workers such as contractors.

In the modern economy, the boundaries between a self-employed contractor and a worker have never been more blurred. Many people classified as self-employed workers are inside a company, yet do not enjoy whistleblowing rights. That is true in my constituency of Chippenham, where a large number of people working in the care industry are technically subcontracted to the employer for whom they are working. In a large part of Corsham, many people work for the Government in one form or another, through the military or Ministry of Defence, but they are often either self-employed or subcontracted and therefore not entitled to these protections.

This issue is part of a wider problem with our modern economy, particularly the gig economy. It is welcome that the Government have made fighting the insecurities created by bogus self-employment a core plank of their employment reforms, but adopting this amendment would immediately plug the gap in workplace rights and protections for those who are self-employed.

I want to highlight a few cases. If the sub-postmasters, who were effectively contractors, had been afforded whistleblower rights, they might have been able to raise their concerns about the Horizon IT system much faster, and some of the issues would have been resolved faster.

Non-executives and trustees are subject to duties and liabilities under laws such as the Companies Act 2006 and the Trustee Act 2000, but they are not covered by whistleblower legal protections. Not only is blowing the whistle without protection a risk to someone’s employment, but for trustees of charities it could cause reputational damage, yet the law on that is currently unclear.

I do not need to remind Labour Members that the role of trade unions in the workplace is recognised in the Bill. A whistleblower is likely to go to their trade union representative for advice on whistleblowing, but if I have understood correctly, when representatives raise that concern to the employer on behalf of a colleague, there is currently no protection. The amendment would be an important extension to the clause.

If someone is rejected for a job because they blew the whistle in a previous role, they are unlikely to have a remedy in an employment tribunal against a prospective employer for the loss of that job opportunity. That puts them at a significant disadvantage. It leads to whistleblowers being blacklisted and unable to work in the sector in which they have raised concerns. The law is inconsistent; job applicants must not be discriminated against under equality law, and job applicants in the NHS do have whistleblowing protections.

The amendment would ensure that job applicants receive the whistleblowing protections that they deserve, and that extend whistleblowing rights to people working in various other forms who are not strictly considered to be workers. I ask the Committee to support our amendment.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. As always, I draw the Committee’s attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests and my membership of the GMB and Unite trade unions.

I thank the hon. Member for Chippenham for raising these important issues, which we need to explore. She is coming from a good place. We all know that whistleblowers play an important role in shining a light on wrongdoing. The fear, and often the reality, of retaliation is a barrier to people coming forward with concerns.

Before I turn to the substance of amendment 163, I will recap the existing protections for whistleblowers. Workers have the right not to be subject to detriment on the grounds of making a protected disclosure and not to be dismissed for making a protected disclosure: that would be treated as an automatically unfair reason for dismissal. These are day one rights for workers and employees who have recourse to an employment tribunal. The standard employment law definition of “worker” has been extended in recent years to whistleblowing protections. It includes a range of employment relationships, such as agency workers, individuals undertaking training or work experience, certain self-employed staff in the NHS, police officers and student nurses and midwives.

Amendment 163, as the hon. Lady says, would extend the scope of whistleblowing protections to a huge range of other groups, including the self-employed, contractors, office holders including members of the judiciary, non-executive directors, trustees—including personal trustees—and trade union representatives and job applicants, as well as those who acquire information during a recruitment process.

I can see the hon. Lady’s intentions and what she is trying to achieve. However, there are questions that the amendment does not address, particularly given how our current employment law framework is structured, because a lot of the people it covers are not in an employment relationship or a worker relationship. The remedies are based on detrimental treatment and on dismissal, but a lot of those to whom she seeks to extend protection are people who by definition cannot be dismissed, because they are not employees or workers.

It is quite a job to understand exactly where to take the issue of people who acquire information during a recruitment process, which is the final limb of the amendment, paragraph (cg). That is potentially extremely broad in application. In legislation like this, it would be difficult to pin down exactly who it would apply to. Would it apply to someone casually undertaking a job search on the internet? Where do we draw the line?

On the point about job applicants, I take the point that blowing the whistle can have a huge impact on a person’s career prospects. I have represented many people who have found that to be an issue, and there are already blacklisting laws for certain types of protection. However, the tribunal can award compensation and take into account the difficulty that an individual might have in finding suitable employment at a similar level as a result of having blown the whistle. There is a wider question about how we treat people who blow the whistle, which is not necessarily going to be resolved by the amendment.

I agree that we should protect those who speak up and that we should ensure that our legal framework takes account of modern working relationships. I recognise that, particularly for trade unions, there is a benefit to having these groups within scope, and there are issues here that I think bear further scrutiny. Because of the plethora of unintended consequences and knock-on effects, some of which I have touched on, we cannot accept the amendment as drafted, but I assure the hon. Lady that I intend to meet Protect next month to discuss the issues on which it is campaigning. We are aware of the long-overdue requirement to look at whistleblowing law. The previous Government undertook a small exercise and we need to understand its findings, but we will be taking into account some of the issues that the hon. Lady has raised.

We cannot pretend that such an amendment would not bring very large numbers of additional people into scope, so we would want to work with stakeholders to understand what that would mean for them. It is also possible to imagine people becoming professional whistleblowers by having something that they could rely on in perpetuity; again, we have to balance that against the need to ensure that people are properly protected. I am happy to work with colleagues across the House to ensure that if we introduce any legislation in this area, we get it right and recognise modern relationships. The hon. Lady is also right to refer to worker status: we are keen to look at that in our “Next Steps” document, because we know that a whole range of issues arise.

We are happy not to press either amendment 163 or new clause 41, but I ask the Minister to meet us before Report so that we can introduce some, if not all, of the measures in them, and particularly those in amendment 163. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 will strengthen the protections for whistleblowers by making it explicit that sexual harassment can be the basis for a protected whistleblowing disclosure. It will do so by amending part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 1996, adding sexual harassment to the list of relevant failures about which a worker can blow the whistle.

For context, to qualify for whistleblowing protection, a worker needs to have a reasonable belief that their disclosure tends to show one of the relevant failures and that the disclosure is in the public interest. A worker who blows the whistle by making a protected disclosure has the right not to suffer a detriment or, if they are an employee, not to be unfairly dismissed.

This measure will provide welcome clarity that sexual harassment can form the subject of a qualifying disclosure. This is because, as a result of the measure, a worker will not need to identify an existing legal obligation, criminal offence or breach of health and safety in order to make a qualifying disclosure about sexual harassment.

We anticipate that the measure will have wider benefits, including enabling more workers to use whistleblowing routes to speak up about sexual harassment, and sending a clear signal to employers that workers who make disclosures must be treated fairly. Workers will have legal recourse if their employer subjects them to detriment for speaking up.

This is one of the steps that we are taking to tackle sexual harassment at work. According to data from the Office for National Statistics, more than a quarter of those who have experienced sexual harassment in England and Wales said they had experienced it at their place of work. That must change. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Right not to be unfairly dismissed: removal of qualifying period, etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I will not speak for long on clause 19, because it is a fairly straightforward clause and there are more detailed clauses and amendments that may generate further debate. Clause 19 introduces schedule 2, which will repeal section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, thereby removing the two-year qualifying period for protection against unfair dismissal.

An estimated 9 million employees have been working for their employer for less than two years and therefore have very limited protection against unfair dismissal. By removing the qualifying period, the Government will make basic protection against unfair dismissal a day one right for all employees, ensuring a baseline of security and predictability. It is about tackling insecurity. Unless there are automatically unfair grounds, an employer can lawfully sack a worker just by giving them their statutory or contractual notice pay and telling them not to come back to work. There is no entitlement to a fair process, nor even a right to a written statement explaining why they have been sacked.

Think about what you can do with two years in your life, Mr Stringer—well, maybe we should not think too much about it. Someone can make an awful lot of commitments, including financial commitments. They can get married, buy a house, start a family and take out loans of all descriptions, but they have no protection at work and nothing to stop them being arbitrarily dismissed in that two-year period. We think that that is wrong: it creates a great deal of insecurity in the workplace, and it has to change.

Our changes will not prevent fair dismissal. We will ensure that businesses can hire with confidence. We will ensure that employers can operate contractual probation periods, which are separate from the new statutory probationary periods. During the statutory probationary periods, employers will have a lighter-touch standard to meet when they need to dismiss an employee who is not suitable for the job.

Our changes will ensure that newly hired workers are not arbitrarily dismissed. We believe that that will help to drive up standards in the workplace. It will ensure that there is greater fairness and greater understanding between employees and businesses. It will drive up standards, quality and security—all things that we believe will improve our economy. We do not intend to bring in these measures in until autumn 2026 at the earliest. I commend the clause to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I accept the Minister’s point that clause 19 essentially just introduces schedule 2. Several amendments in my name and in the name of my hon. Friends will explore schedule 2 in detail over the coming days and potentially even weeks.

However, as we discuss clause 19, I think it is important gently to challenge what is actually quite a big leap, from two years down to day one. It is incumbent on the Government to come up with a rationale and a reason for such a considerable change. This is not a taper or a gradual decrease from two years to a year or six months; we can have a debate about what the right number is.

It is clear that the Government wish to move down from two years, but what we heard in our public evidence sessions shows the very real risk that introducing these day one rights for all employees will mean that employers are reticent, are more risk-averse and do not hire as readily, freely or easily as we might want in order to create jobs in our economy. I remind the Minister what Jane Gratton of the British Chambers of Commerce said about her members:

“Members say that there would be a reduced hiring appetite were this legislation to come in, and that they would be less likely to recruit new employees due to the risk and difficulty, particularly under the day one rights”.––[Official Report, Employment Rights Public Bill Committee, 26 November 2024; c. 8, Q2.]

She went on to argue for a nine-month probationary period—a period to which it would potentially be feasible to reduce this timeframe.

Whenever a new law comes in and makes a significant change, be it to business, regulation or whatever sector, I gently ask the Minister to reflect on the time period. Is it really necessary to make such a giant leap in one go? Even if in years to come the Government get what they want in terms of day one rights, would it not be better to face this now, listen to industry, listen to the evidence that this very Committee heard a couple of weeks ago and be more measured, proportionate and risk-averse as to what these measures might end up doing to the overall jobs market in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland? If the Government did that, it would help with some of the stark and staggering business confidence numbers in the economy at the moment. Businesses are worried about where the future lies, and real people out there looking for work are worried that jobs might not be as readily available after the Bill comes into effect.

I declare an interest as a member of a trade union. We have seen a change in the labour market over recent decades. Previously, people used to stay in work for much longer; currently, the average tenure is 4.5 years—there has been a slight increase, because it has been bang on four years for the past five or six years. That means that people nowadays spend half their time in a job without any rights, because of the two-year threshold. The proposals in this legislation are updating the labour market to the realities of today’s jobs. People spending half their time without rights leads to a lack of confidence and security. The way to address business confidence and worker security is by bringing these rights in from day one, as this legislation proposes; sticking with the status quo is what leaves people more insecure.

Thank you, Mr. Stringer. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his points. He is right that the labour market has changed significantly in recent decades. In fact, it is constantly evolving and has been since time immemorial, and certainly since the industrial revolution, although I suspect I will be trying the Committee’s patience if we go through all that history—the hon. Member for Birmingham Northfield might be keen to do so, but that is perhaps one for the bar some time, rather than the Committee.

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, and I will keep my intervention short, Mr Stringer. We are hearing a lot of grandiose threats when it comes to the economy, and I would like to drag us back to the specifics. This measure is not a ban on dismissal; it is not even a protection from dismissal. It is a protection from unfair dismissal, so it is quite narrow. It still allows for dismissal, disciplinary procedures and all of that. Does the shadow Minister have a timeframe in which he thinks it would be acceptable for workers to be unfairly dismissed?

The hon. Gentleman is right about the unfair dismissal point. Nobody wants to see anybody unfairly dismissed, but it is impossible to see each measure in the Bill in its own silo or its own column; each is part of the cumulative impact of many measures reverting to day one rights. So, too, is the measure before us, and the Committee has heard direct evidence from representatives of real businesses out there that it could have a damaging effect.

I am not arguing against the principle of what the Government are trying to do here—to protect workers against unfair dismissal. I am trying to test the waters on the operability of the Bill, and on the unintended consequence that it may have in terms of overall numbers in the job market and the rate at which companies out there make new hires, or indeed choose not to. It is a worthwhile exercise for the Committee to really test these things to see how this measure will work out in practice.

Throughout these proceedings, we have talked a lot about evidence bases and the likely impact of particular measures on business. The clause might be short and to the point—I do take the points made by the shadow Minister that we will come on to more detailed discussions, and it is right to debate the general principles here—but it does have precedents. In terms of the dilemma or decision over whether the qualifying period should be two years, one year or, as in the Bill, day one—but with that important provision for a probationary period—the issue has been road-tested.

The period was set at two years for many years. Then it was reduced to one year in the late 1990s, and economic growth continued. When the qualifying period was raised from one year to two years in 2012, the impact analysis that the then Government produced said that one year was easily sufficient in the overwhelming number of cases. On this aspect of the Bill, the businesses I have spoken to in my constituency and in the general Birmingham area have told me that, in almost all roles, employers are not still talking about whether someone is suitable for the job 12 months in; it is usually apparent within weeks. That circumstance is still covered by the initial period of employment provided for in the Bill.

According to the impact assessment, the estimated saving to business across the entire the economy, after the familiarisation cost period, was relatively small—I believe it was around £2 million to £3 million in 2011 prices, so probably somewhere around double that today. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles used the word “grandiose”. We are really not talking about that, but about a relatively small number of cases that could fall under that initial period of employment provision.

Let me return to an argument that has been made previously in the Committee, but that is relevant here. One undesirable effect of that change in the qualifying period was that because a worker who faced detriment and unfair treatment in the workplace had no recourse to an unfair dismissal claim through the employment tribunal system until they reached their two years, they found themselves relying on equalities arguments instead—a day one right in law as it stands. The effect—another perverse outcome—has been to overload that part of the employment tribunal system.

This change is sensible. It will help with the undesirable effects in the court system as it stands. The Chartered Management Institute, which we heard evidence from, surveyed its members and found that 83% of managers agreed that improvements in family-friendly policies and day one rights, including in respect of unfair dismissal, would positively impact workplace productivity.

In some of the related provisions in the Bill, particularly around the initial period of employment, there is promise that we will see a light-touch regime, and we are all looking to see what the details will be. I know that the Government are due to come back on that.

I promise that I will make a short intervention this time, Mr Stringer. The statistics show that one in 10 workers never spend more than a year in a job, so they are particularly affected by the lack of provision on day one. At any one time, one in five workers are within the first two years of their employment. Does my hon. Friend agree that we are talking about a group of people who need the security of these rights to improve their productivity, but who are currently completely excluded from them?

My hon. Friend makes an important and relevant point. The people who are most adversely affected are those who have the least and who are on the lowest incomes in the economy, and the social care sector is a good example of that. In the city of Birmingham, the average turnover rate for care workers is around 30% every year. An enormous number of people are concentrated in particular sectors. One of the difficulties in Committee is that we use overall, aggregate numbers when weighing the impact of policies, but they are felt particularly in certain sectors—that is a common point of agreement among Members on both sides. If we get this change right, the benefits will be felt most keenly in the parts of the economy, and by the people, that need these protections most.

Again, it is worth reflecting on what we heard in the evidence sessions. We heard from Professor Bogg, from the University of Bristol, that

“if you look at the OECD countries, we are the fifth least regulated on dismissal protection out of 38 countries, and we are the third least regulated on hiring on temporary contracts”,

and that the change

“just pushes the UK back into the mainstream of other…OECD countries with employment regulation that works effectively.”––[Official Report, Employment Rights Public Bill Committee, 28 November 2024; c. 143, Q147.]

There can be a lot of sound and fury about the individual measures that we are debating, but I want to reinforce the point that all the evidence we have had, whether that is written evidence from interested parties, evidence the Committee has heard or historical evidence—maybe not going quite back to the industrial revolution, but at least over the past 30 years of changes in the qualifying period—shows that the effect on the overall economy will be sensible and limited. However, it will be the lowest-income workers, whose living standards, rights and dignity of work we all want to improve, who will benefit most. The clause is extremely welcome, and I commend it to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Stringer. I do not believe that unfair dismissal should be a day one right. I think this is a fundamental error by the Government. It is interesting that during the previous Labour Governments, under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the qualifying period was one year. There was a reason for that: by reducing it—by making it a day one right—we introduce an aspect of procedural unfairness to all small businesses. Small businesses might decide after a week that they do not want to keep someone in employment. They might not follow the letter of the law, and it might be procedurally unfair because not every t was crossed and not every i was dotted, and that will lead to an unfair dismissal case.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Let me just make this point. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Buckinghamshire asked what the rationale was behind the day one qualifying period. I think the answer is that it is a demand from the trade unions; it is one of a long list of demands from the trade unions. This Bill is payback for the trade unions’ support for the Labour party. Those demands continue to come in, and we know that because the Bill is not even properly written. It is half-written—

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

No. It is half-written and, with each week that goes by, we have more amendments as more demands come in.

My concern is that small businesses are less likely to employ people, because of these costs. Take a look at the Government’s impact assessment: table A7 says that these day one unfair dismissal rights will cost businesses £372 million. That will fall disproportionately on small businesses. They will be afraid of legal action; they will be wary of the costs. It will make them less likely to take people on—to employ that marginal employee. The cumulative effect of this proposal, taken with the many other proposals in the Bill, is to make our labour market less flexible, which is precisely what the trade unions want. They do not want a flexible labour market. This measure will make our economy more like France’s and will, in the long term, lead to higher unemployment. I think that is a great pity.

We are told that there will be a probationary period, but that it will be set out in regulations. This is another reason to think that the Bill is half-baked: the Government have not decided what should be a reasonable period. I suggest that two years is reasonable; if not, then the one year under Blair and Brown certainly seemed to work. However, the Government will find that introducing more and more day one rights will lead to higher unemployment. We all know that every period of Labour government ends with unemployment higher than when it began, and I suspect that this Bill will help to maintain that record.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. Protection from unfair dismissal is already a day one right in respect of certain carve-outs from the two-year qualifying period, including for dismissal relating to a protected disclosure—whistleblowing—refusal to allow somebody to undertake jury service, or refusal to allow somebody to take family leave. That protection, and the principle of unfair dismissal, is already in statute as a day one right.

Let us look at other day one rights, which are worth exploring a bit further. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield said, employees have a whole raft of day one rights, including most of the discrimination acts under the Equality Act and protections for whistleblowing. I want to continue my hon. Friend’s argument in order to try to give employees reassurance, which I think will come with guidance and the statutory probation period.

Certainty on this issue would help many employers. What I found in practice was that there would be a probation period in the contractual relationship, but smaller employers that I advised often did not have a policy; they just had a shortened notice period—often a month, rather than the three months after the probation period. There would be no structure in place. All too often, I found that many of those employers got themselves into difficulty because they believed that they did not have to follow any process whatsoever, due to the two-year qualifying period.

More often than not, those employers were dismissing people for reasons of capability: the employee had not got up to the necessary standard, and there was an issue with their work. In those circumstances, the employer often did not have much of a structure or procedure in place, and would eventually get to the point at which it would, in effect, give up and decide that the employee was never going to get to the standard that it wanted within the probationary period. The employer would dismiss people without any process or meeting—even without speaking to the employee at all—and without taking any evidence.

All too often in the cases that I dealt with, it would come to light that there was a reason for an employee’s lack of capability, which related to an impairment. Many of those impairments were protected under the Equality Act, and those employees had protections against discrimination on the basis of disability. They had a right to reasonable adjustments that the employer had not considered because it did not ask the question, and which had not been implemented. In those circumstances, the employer is exposed to uncapped discrimination claims, which are very serious and very difficult to respond to, because no process has been followed.

It is really important that we seek to reassure small, medium and large employers that having a light-touch, clear structure will mean that no employer falls into that trap again, and that we will save a lot of employers unnecessary litigation.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, in those cases where someone has ended up taking the equalities route because that is the only route available to them, it can be particularly reputationally damaging to the employer? Does he also agree that, because by the nature of those claims—particularly where they relate to disability discrimination—the system requires the claimants to stress an impairment of some kind, that process is also distressing for the claimant in a way that is wholly unnecessary? Making these changes would at least avoid those circumstances for both employer and employee.

I absolutely agree. Often, in those circumstances, it is extremely distressing for the employee, who, had the reasonable adjustment been in place to assist them with disability or to enable them to get to the required standard, would still be employed. They have to face the extra hurdle of declaring their particular impairment to the world.

Reputationally, these claims can often be hugely damaging for employers that had never intended to discriminate and would never have discriminated against an employee, but for the lack of process. As I say, there is nothing new in day one rights—protection from unfair dismissal is already, in certain circumstances, a day one right; Equality Act claims are a day one right; whistleblowing is a day one right—but the Bill will help employers not to fall foul of those day one rights that already exist and give a far clearer structure to the employment sphere. With those reassurances and with guidance, there is nothing for employers to fear from this legislation.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. About a year ago, one of my constituents in Knowsley was told that she needed IVF. She went to her employer to let them know that she was going to start treatment, and a few days later she was sacked. She was a few weeks short of having worked two years for her employer. She had previously passed probation and had no previous complaints or warnings on her work. Hon. Members will be happy to know that she did get pregnant and she had that baby a month ago, but while trying to get pregnant and in the early stages of her pregnancy she could not find another steady job. No employer wanted to take her on and being unemployed obviously caused immense stress.

My constituent did not qualify for maternity pay. She has worked hard all her life; she has studied and has a doctorate. She is now with a small baby on a statutory maternity allowance of £184 and is still not in a job. One in nine women are forced out of the labour market every year due to pregnancy and maternity discrimination. The two-year period in which someone can be dismissed was used unfairly against my constituent. The Bill will protect women across the UK, allowing them the right to a secure job and a family. I am sure we can all agree that the current situation for workers is unacceptable.

I start by aligning myself with the very good arguments that my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak made from his professional experience. I saw many of the same circumstances in my professional career.

There are a couple of points that I want to add. To the extent that there are people who want to bring claims in bad faith, there are already avenues for them to do so. If they wanted to bring a claim against their employer vexatiously they could, as my hon. Friend said, bring a claim under the Equality Act or on the basis of whistleblowing. Part of the concern here is some of the—quite frankly—scaremongering going on about what some of these processes might entail. If the hon. Member for Bridgwater would like to intervene and say exactly which part of the capability process he thinks small businesses will be concerned by, and would be disproportionate for a small business to undertake, I will happily take that intervention.

Most employers—and nearly every MP in this room is a new employer, although there are some returning colleagues—get an idea pretty quickly whether someone is going to be a fit or not. If there are concerns about their performance, there is a very straightforward process that can be followed. It is not particularly onerous. There is often a disproportionate concern about what that process might look like. Part of the issue, as my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak said, is that, by not following a simple process, employers end up tying themselves in more knots and potentially discriminating against individuals because they have not followed what could have been a fair process from the start. That is the point that the Bill seeks to address.

The Bill will not prevent individuals from being dismissed for fair reasons, which include capability, performance and redundancy. We are saying that a fair process should be followed. We have already made provision for the fact that there will be a slightly different process, and rightly so, for individuals in their probation period. It is important that we recognise that and do not scaremonger, because that will put businesses off employing, when there is a simple procedure that they can follow.

We seem to have lost a few colleagues during the votes; hopefully, they are coming back. It seems a while since they were made, but I will pick up on comments and questions of—[Interruption.]

Let me sum up the debate. The shadow Minister asked some questions, and there were other contributions to the debate, which I hope to come on to. I think that the shadow Minister’s general position was that he accepted that there should be a reduction in the qualifying period. I am not entirely clear whether that was the case, but certainly his colleague, the hon. Member for Bridgwater, threw out a number of proposals. The question that the shadow Minister asked was, “Why day one?” I will come to that shortly, but I think the other main thrust of his argument was that we are not listening to businesses. Of course we are, and that is why we came up with the concept of a statutory probationary period.

For the information of the Committee, about 140 stakeholders have engaged with us about the Bill since we came into office in July. One of the many issues that have come up is the question of day one rights, and how we balance the risk for employers—giving them the confidence to hire but ensuring that we deliver our policy aim of giving people more certainty and security at work. That is where the statutory probationary period comes in. We believe that that will help businesses focus on their hiring practices, but it should also increase the dialogue between employer and employee in those early days of the employment relationship.

My hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester said that an employer can work out pretty quickly whether someone will be suitable for the workplace. At this point, I quote Professor Dominic Regan, an eminent professor of employment law, who used to quip somewhat tongue in cheek that he could decide whether he liked someone within 10 minutes of meeting them on a train. That was his way of arguing that the two-year time limit for unfair dismissal was set far too high. It is certainly a sentiment that I agree with, although we will not be going as far as to introduce a 10-minutes-on-a-train test.

We are seeking to give employees the security of knowing that they will not be arbitrarily dismissed in the early days of their employment, but to give employers the confidence to hire and the opportunity to use a light-touch process to deal with issues of performance and capability. We believe that will be a positive for employees. Research quoted in the impact assessment suggests that having a job is significant to physical health and personal relationships, as a determinant of one’s wellbeing. The quality of that job and how secure it is are clearly a key part of that.

The point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield, and by my hon. Friends the Members for High Peak and for Gloucester, about employees who get dismissed before the qualifying period sometimes looking for a protected characteristic to base a claim on is an interesting one. I do not think that is something that we can model, because we do not know exactly how many claims would have continued anyway, but it is a fair point that when people are dismissed before two years, without any discussion or explanation, they seek answers, and sometimes they might seek those answers by hanging their hat on a statutory peg that may not always fit the case. My hon. Friends all spoke eloquently about how that can be counterproductive not just for the businesses, but for the employees’ general wellbeing.

Business in the Community surveyed 4,000 employees, of whom 66% said that their mental health and wellbeing was affected by their personal job insecurity. In written evidence presented to the Committee, USDAW noted that

“Being dismissed on spurious…grounds, without a fair investigation can have devastating consequences for an employee”

in terms of morale, confidence and living standards. Having worked for employers that had quite a gung-ho approach to employment rights, I welcomed the security of a qualifying period for unfair dismissal. Before that, it really did feel that you were one wrong conversation away from seeing your job go.

Of course, there is significant evidence to suggest that there are advantages for the wider economy. I think there is an acceptance that job insecurity can have a cooling effect on job mobility. The Resolution Foundation noted that the job mobility rate in 2019 was 25% lower than in 2000. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield said, there is an international context to this: the UK is the fifth least regulated of the 38 OECD countries in terms of the dismissal of individual workers. We should look to correct that, and the Bill will go a long way towards doing so.

The shadow Minister asked about the risk to jobs. The impact assessment states:

“There is limited evidence to suggest that protecting employees from unfair dismissal is associated with lower employment rates.”

Evidence from our OECD counterparts across Europe supports that. The Resolution Foundation gave evidence to the effect that the measure is unlikely to have an impact on employment rates. Professor Deakin’s historical context was important. He said that, over the sweep of history in the past 50 years, increased employment protections have not led to increased unemployment. Of course, all Members will be aware of the messages of doom that we heard during the national minimum wage debate about what implementing that measure would mean for employment rates.

History demonstrates that there is nothing to fear in this legislation, and nothing to fear in giving people greater job security from day one. By providing for a statutory probationary period, we are getting the balance right between security at work and giving employers the opportunity to take a chance on new hires. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Anna McMorrin.)