PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Pension Schemes Bill (Fourth sitting) - 4 September 2025 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

I am happy for the Committee to proceed.

Sir Christopher, I am happy to proceed in order to get things moving.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

As we have heard, the amendment authorises the use of surplus pension funds to contribute to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services to scheme members. The age of 40 is very important, and I hope that the Minister, on his 42nd birthday—

Forty-third.

Forty-third! He looks 28. None the less, I hope he is getting plenty of pension advice; who knows when he may need it?

This is a very good provision. The more informed people are about their retirement opportunities, the better. I suppose I have to declare a bit of an interest, inasmuch as I will retire in five years’ time, hopefully. It is incredibly important that people are well prepared for their retirement, and the more information a member of a pension fund has, the better it is. If the amendment is pressed to a vote, we will support it wholeheartedly.

I am in massive agreement with putting more investment into the provision of advice. On Tuesday, we heard the terrible stats that only 9% of people actually get advice on their pension from a financial adviser. Yet this amendment is the wrong vehicle to achieve that, given that it is looking purely at DB surpluses.

My understanding is that people who have DC pensions are much more likely to need advice than those who are on DB pensions, because that someone with a DC pension cannot tell how much they will get before they actually apply for the annuities when they retire. Their life circumstances may change between the age of 40 and hitting retirement. My understanding is that those on DB pensions have a pretty clear idea of what they are getting on a weekly, monthly or annual basis, in addition to a lump sum that they may be awarded as part of that DB pension scheme. Using the surplus created in DB schemes to fund advice for DC scheme participants would not be in the best interests of the scheme members.

I agree that we need more advice; I think that the proposal made in new clause 1 for earlier advice is incredibly important, because by the time someone gets to the age of 50-plus or very close to retirement, they do not have time to fix any issues. I would love to see people, when they are first auto-enrolled, getting advice on how much pension they are likely to get from whatever percentage of pay is put in, what a top-up looks like and how putting money into their pension as early as possible gives them the best possible outcomes in retirement, rather than panicking at the last possible moment to try to increase it.

On the mid-life MOT, free advice is already available for people at the age of 50, but it is drastically under-utilised. The Government could move in the direction of ensuring that when people get their bowel cancer check pack through the post, they also get a date and a time for an appointment with the Pensions Advisory Service, so that they do not have to proactively make it themselves. That would make a massive difference.

Successive Governments have believed that doing that would cause too much uptake and there would not be capacity to provide that service, but as we come to the generation of people who have been auto-enrolled hitting 50, when they are due that mid-life MOT, the benefits would be so great and would provide prospective pensioners with clarity about how much they could get. They could be told that taking the entire thing in cash and putting a chunk of it into a bank account is a truly terrible idea—we know that far too many people do that. I am in favour of anything that the Government can do to expand the free advice service that is there already, but I think that the funding vehicle proposed in amendment 3 is not the right way to go about it. I would like the Government to put more money into it, and many more people getting the advice that they need.

The guidance and targeted support mentioned on Tuesday are incredibly important, increasingly so as we see the trend away from DB schemes towards DC schemes. I was looking at my family’s personal pension the other day, and the amount of money in the DC pot. I do not have the faintest clue what it means. I know something about pensions, but being able to translate that large figure into a monthly amount is simply impossible until it is time to apply for the annuity, when we get the understanding of what our life circumstances look like.

I would like changes to be made to the advice given. I do not think that we are in the right position. I wonder if the review will take some of this into account. On pension sufficiency, as the hon. Member for Mid Leicestershire said, people being better informed and more engaged with their pensions is an incredibly positive thing, but we are not there yet. More needs to be done to encourage people down that route.

I want to reiterate a lot of the points mentioned by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Financial education is key to unlocking many of the challenges that we face in adulthood, whether budgeting, debt management, saving or planning for retirement. I introduced a ten-minute rule Bill, the Financial Education Bill, earlier this year; I know we already have an element of it in secondary schools, but we need to go further as a country and ensure that everyone, from the very young upwards, has that education to inform the key decisions in our lives.

I take the hon. Member’s point on DB schemes funding those seeking advice for DC schemes, but it is often the case that members have pensions in both DB and DC schemes: people move quite fluidly from a job in the public sector to one in the private sector, and will inevitably have membership in both DB and DC schemes. The Bill would benefit from the amendment proposed by the Liberal Democrats.

I also take the hon. Member’s point on the need for better engagement by employers. I know some large companies offer employees mid-life MOTs on financial education and management. Certainly, FTSE 100 companies that I have worked for offer employees that kind of support as they approach retirement. I am sympathetic to new clause 1, which amendment 3 is connected to, because it is essential that as we get older and plan for retirement, we are fully informed on those decisions. I will support the Liberal Democrat amendment.

In line with what has been said already, my thought is that plenty of financial education is a good thing; to say that some is worth pursuing and some is not seems a bit at odds with what we have been debating. I echo what colleagues have said about workers who come from a DC scheme into a DB scheme and need that education. I am sure there are many new Members who are in that position—I cannot be the only person who is—and, while I am fortunate enough to have taken pension advice throughout my career, I know many people have not.

For me, this is not something that is mandated, but a suggestion for something that could be done. Providing another alternative and another opportunity for people to receive financial education—particularly people in their 20s, 30s and 40s who have not had it at school, because it was not part of the curriculum at that point—is something we should welcome and not restrict.

The amendment seems to me perfectly sensible. I appreciate why some people might think it does not go far enough, or that the matter will be addressed later in the reporting back that the Government will do on pensions in general, but the emphasis on people around the age of 40 is particularly important, because they still have a good 20 years—or 30 years, potentially; who knows what will come forward from the Government?—to work and to ensure that they maximise returns to achieve adequacy. Having an additional vehicle to do that seems to me a sensible thing, and I put on record my support in the same way that my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Leicestershire has.

I should start by saying that I do not recognise the purist approach that we have heard from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. This is an issue close to my heart, because my father, having seen the poverty that his father was in, saved significantly in his private pension scheme as a lorry driver. Sadly, however, he was extremely poorly advised, and as he approached retirement he put thousands and thousands of pounds into equities; then, in the late 1980s, there was a stock market crash. He might as well have burned half of his money. The further we drive the health of the pension industry, the better, and particularly knowledge for those who may not be very much in the financial world.

We heard in evidence from NEST that only 40% of people have even registered online to know what their pension is doing. For people for whom the financial world is a complete challenge—and even for many of us in this room, getting our head around it totally is a bit of a challenge—it is essential that we use every possible lever to make sure that quality advice is available. As Liberal Democrats, we will unashamedly use every opportunity in the Bill to provide high levels of education for those who are in receipt of pensions and to give them as much wind in their sails as possible.

I shall give a short speech, because there is a worrying habit developing of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North giving the Government Front-Bench speech for me. I should encourage that as we go on—she might be slightly traumatised by that, but we are where we are. Everybody in this room will agree on the importance of the principle that has been highlighted, and we have just heard a powerful point exactly along those lines.

Although the Government understand the intent behind amendment 3, there are two reasons why we will not support it. The first is a point of principle, which I have already set out: it is for trustees, not the Government, to decide how surpluses that benefit members should take place. We discussed the issue of discretionary benefits just now.

The second reason is less a point of principle and more a matter of reality. The amendment would provide advice only to existing members of specific schemes. I think we all agree, particularly in the light of the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, that the main problems are about the defined-contribution space and people coming up towards retirement. Lots of the people who are in schemes who would be coming forward for surplus release are already drawing down a very well-defined pension income.

It is not the ideal way to focus on the particular problem that we all agree exists, but we completely agree that robust guidance that assures that everyone has access to free and impartial advice is very important. That is the job of the Money and Pensions Service, but I completely hear what has been said about how it needs to go further. I am grateful for hon. Members’ contributions, but I urge the hon. Member for Horsham to withdraw his amendment.

I beg to move amendment 264, in clause 9, page 9, line 4, at end insert—

“(e) Where regulations under subsection (2A) lower the funding threshold for a surplus payment to below the full buy-out funding level, the Secretary of State must—

(i) conduct an assessment setting out—

(A) prescribed stress scenarios and their impact on funding,

(B) a maximum permissible extraction percentage for each scenario, and

(C) contingencies to restore funding;

(ii) consult the Pensions Regulator, the FCA, and such actuarial bodies as may be prescribed; and

(iii) lay a report of the assessment before Parliament.”

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to conduct an assessment when the DWP calibrates any extraction threshold below buy-out.

Amendment 264 would provide a backstop and a check where there are potential extractions and buy-outs. It would give an opportunity for the Secretary of State to cast an eye over the process when the DWP does an assessment. It goes back to safeguarding: as I am sure this Committee will discuss repeatedly, we need to ensure that we have investors’ and beneficiaries’ best interests at heart. I hope that the Secretary of State will take the proposal at face value, as an appropriate guardrail, and I look forward to its endorsement.

Conservative amendment 258 would ensure that all regulations made under proposed new section 37(2A) of the Pensions Act 1995, which governs surplus payments from defined-benefit pension schemes, are subject to the affirmative procedure always, not just the first time that they are made. That would give Parliament ongoing oversight and scrutiny of any future regulations in the area. Without the amendment, regulations on defined-benefit surplus extraction would not consistently require parliamentary approval. That would potentially lead to insufficient scrutiny.

The amendment aims to provide better parliamentary control over regulations as they are introduced. The key worry is the risk that the Secretary of State, whoever he or she may be, might use these powers to allow the payment of a surplus at funding levels below buy-out standards at some point in future, which could jeopardise scheme security and could happen without parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment is about improving the transparency and accountability of surplus extraction regulations for DB pension schemes, ensuring that Parliament maintains consistent oversight and guarding against premature surplus extractions that might undermine scheme funding security.

The Liberal Democrat and Conservative amendments are very different methods to achieve a similar outcome. Conservative amendment 258 is a bit wider, in the sense that it would require the affirmative procedure for a wider range of things, but both parties are concerned about the possibility of regulations allowing a surplus below the buy-out threshold level.

I think the amendments are reasonable asks. I am generally in the habit of supporting more scrutiny of regulations; upgrading the requirements for regulations from the negative to the affirmative procedure is very much in my wheelhouse, given that it is so difficult for Parliament to oppose regulations made under the negative procedure unless the Leader of the Opposition puts their name to a motion praying against them. In practice, that very, very rarely happens. Given that both amendments are asking for relatively small changes to ensure increased parliamentary scrutiny, particularly where the threshold drops below the buy-out level, I think that they are not unreasonable. I am happy to support them both.

I thank the hon. Members for Torbay and for Wyre Forest for their amendments. On amendment 264, I hope that I have already reassured hon. Members that there are many safeguards built into the policy for surplus release, both at an individual scheme level and at a wider policy level, including the ultimate control of trustees, the need for prudent funding to be maintained and the actuarial certification.

The Government’s view is that it is not for the Secretary of State to assess every single scheme in the way that the amendment intends. To offer some more reassurance, however, TPR and the PPF have carried out scenario testing in this area; we heard the PPF chief executive’s reassurance in oral evidence on Tuesday. In that regard, I do not think the amendment is necessary. It would also involve the Secretary of State holding a lot of evidence about every single DB scheme in the country, which I do not think is a good use of resources.

The point is about the regulations on the surplus and the times at which schemes can pay it. It is not about looking at each individual scheme; it is about looking at the level that is set in the regulations. Much as I am sure that the Minister is having a lovely birthday, he would probably admit that he is not going to be the Pensions Minister in perpetuity. It is unlikely that he will still be the Pensions Minister in 50 years’ time. He may therefore not have control of these regulations. This is about putting guardrails in place so that, no matter who is in government, the level cannot be reduced below the full buy-out funding level.

I think I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her attempt to fire me. To clarify, carrying out the kind of prescribed stress scenarios and assessments set out in the amendment would require the Department for Work and Pensions to examine the DB landscape. In this specific area, that is the role of TPR and the PPF.

I turn to amendment 258. The first regulations on surplus will be subject to the affirmative procedure, for exactly the reasons that have been set out, and exactly because at that point they will be new but also comprehensive. As with every other pensions Bill, what we do not want to see is the affirmative procedure being used for small, technical changes that come to those regulations in the years that follow. However, our approach does allow for the necessary debate when those regulations are made. On that basis, I urge hon. Members to support the Bill as drafted.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 258, in clause 9, page 9, line 21, leave out

“in subsection (2A), after ‘section’ insert ‘37(2A),’”

and insert

“in subsection (2), after ‘virtue of’ insert ‘(za) section 37(2A)’”.—(Mark Garnier.)

This amendment would make all regulations on DB surplus extraction subject to the affirmative procedure all times they were made rather than just after first use.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Clause 9 will amend the safeguards on the sharing of surplus. The details will be set out in regulations, the parliamentary procedures of which we have just discussed. These safeguards will place the safety of members’ benefits at the heart of the policy.

Proposed new subsection (2B) of section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995 sets out the requirements, which are there to protect members, that must be set out in regulations before trustees can pay a surplus to the employer—namely that before a trustee can agree to release a surplus, they will first be required to receive an actuarial certification that the scheme meets a prudent funding threshold, and that members must be notified before surplus is released.

The funding threshold will be set out in regulations, which we will consult on, as discussed. We expect that release of the surplus will be permitted only when a scheme is fully funded on a low-dependency basis. Trustees are already required, through existing legislation, to set a long-term funding and investment strategy that targets exactly this funding level. These funding conditions will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure and debated when first introduced.

Proposed new subsection (2C) will provide the ability to introduce additional regulations aimed at further enhancing member protections, where considered appropriate. Superfunds will be subject to their own regime for profit extraction; I am spelling this out, because we will come to it later in the Bill. The proposed new subsection will allow regulations to be made that are consistent with those provisions. Regulations may prevent payments from superfunds for a period, if surplus regulations come into force earlier than the superfund legislation, which we will debate later in the Bill. Crucially, decisions to release any surplus will remain subject to trustee discretion. I also note the removal of the statutory test in section 37(3)(d) of the Pensions Act, on the grounds that it does no more than reflect trustees’ existing duties.

The technical and consequential amendments at subsections (4) to (7) of clause 9 are to ensure that the new measures sit correctly in existing legislation but do not affect the overall policy. In summary, the clause will ensure that the release of a surplus is subject to strict safeguards. I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Relevant schemes: value for money

I beg to move amendment 269, in clause 10, page 10, line 10, at end insert—

“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the consistency of—

(i) regulated VFM schemes, or

(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,

with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy;”.

This amendment, with Amendment 270, would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.

In tabling these amendments, we wanted to make sure that we calibrated them carefully. It is not about giving a clear instruction that says, “You must do this”; it is about ensuring that investors are alive to the Paris agreement on climate change and clean energy and that our water companies are complying with cleaning up our rivers and seas. Introducing a duty to report on how funds are having an impact on that would ensure a level of awareness without dictating to investors and thereby having an impact on the fiduciary duties that trustees should clearly have.

Throughout the Bill, the Government have quite rightly highlighted how pensions can be a force for good for our economy and for those who invest in it. The amendments would reinforce that approach. On climate change, clean energy and cleaning up our seas and rivers, the amendments are writ much larger, without interfering in where the money should be invested.

These are not amendments that we feel particularly inclined to support. They would require pension fund managers to make, publish and keep under review data to show that their portfolio investments are consistent with the goals of the Paris agreement on climate change and clean energy. That would include publishing prescribed information relating to climate change alignment and sewage discharge. Those are immensely important and worthy ambitions and intentions; we share their spirit, as we want a cleaner planet, cleaner waterways and improvements to our climate, but I do not think that this is the place to do it. Pension funds should be allowed to look at the best interests of their members, irrespective of wider public and social aspirations, so this is not a proposal that we feel we can support.

I think this is the place to do it. In fact, I think every place is the place to do it. When we debated the Advanced Research and Invention Agency Act 2022, for example, I proposed that the organisation should be created on a net zero basis. I have tabled many amendments to whatever Bill I have been faced with that have included trying to meet our Paris agreement targets. I have served on Bill Committees quite a lot in the past few years—something my party keeps putting me up to do, for some reason.

The Paris agreement is the biggest issue. I have spoken already about how trustees are required to act in the interests of scheme members’ pensions rather than the interests of scheme members themselves. The Labour Government have tried to overcome that more generally, in terms of decision-making powers. They have tried to do that in Wales with the Future Generations Commissioner, who has the ability to judicially review decisions taken by public bodies in Wales. They can be called in for judicial review, and the Future Generations Commissioner can say, “This decision will cause a problem for future generations. It should be reviewed.” The Government are failing in their ambition to do the same thing in this Parliament. It is bizarre that I am about the only person in this place shouting about how great the Welsh Labour Government’s Future Generations Commissioner is—it is a really good idea.

When people out there are asked what the major issues currently facing the world are, many—particularly younger people—say that climate change is the biggest crisis we face. Scientists tell us that too, so it is completely reasonable that we ask everybody involved with anything to consider the impact of their decision making on our net zero target and on climate change. We ask all sorts of organisations to consider environmental, social and governance impacts. This is another time to do that, because we are creating a value for money framework anyway. We want value for money, but we want the best value—value for future generations. There is no point in everybody having great pensions if they do not live to see them because the planet is not here for them.

If we ask scheme members what they want, I think a significant number would say, “I would like more investment in things that make the planet a better place. I would like more investment in renewable energy and insulation for houses.” They would say that those are some of their priorities. They would obviously still like a guaranteed return too, but it is completely reasonable, in terms of the value for money framework and the best interests of people out there, that we consider the Paris climate change agreement. Sewage is important too, but it is not quite the existential crisis that climate change is.

A value for money framework must look at value for money in a wider sense. One of the things we have spoken about in Scotland a significant number of times is population wellbeing. The Scottish Government are finally members of the Wellbeing Economy Alliance. That is not necessarily about saying that GDP is not important; it is about saying that gross domestic wellbeing is important, and that sometimes we must take decisions that are slightly more expensive but will have a significantly less negative, or more positive, impact on the planet or the wellbeing of the population.

When we think about a value for money framework, it is completely reasonable to talk about the Paris agreement. It is completely reasonable to ask about it in respect of any Government decision. I have written to the Chancellor in the past to ask for a carbon assessment to be published alongside the Budget—what is the impact on the Paris climate change agreement of the tax and spending decisions taken in the Budget, and how do they get us closer to our target?

I am happy to support all the amendments. As the hon. Member for Torbay said, they are not about forcing people to take decisions that are net zero in nature; they are about forcing them to consider the Paris agreement, or the regulatory targets for sewage discharges, when taking decisions. I do not think it is too much for us to ask trustees to be mindful of the impact on the planet of the decisions they are taking.

The vast majority of people in my constituency do not have significant savings. If we look at the general population, we see that about 50% of people have less than 100 quid in savings. They have very little money and are not able to invest in renewables projects. They are not able to direct their money because they do not have any money to invest. What a lot of them do have, following auto-enrolment, is pots of money invested in pensions, but they have very little ability to influence how that money is spent. Scheme trustees have a significant amount of ability to influence where money is invested, but scheme members do not, in the main, have that ability. If we asked people where they would like to see their pensions invested, many of them would pick things that might offer slightly less of a return but are significantly better for the planet. The aims in the amendments are admirable and I am happy to support them.

My support for the Welsh Government’s Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 is on the record, so I get to disagree with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North on something, which will be a relief for everybody.

I thank the hon. Member for Torbay for tabling the amendments. Clearly, addressing climate change is absolutely central to this Government’s agenda. It needs to be done in the right way. Pension funds hold significant capital, and I am pleased to say that at every conference and every session I hold with people involved in the industry I see that investors and pension schemes do now use their influence on companies to encourage them to take responsible action. That has been a big change over the course of the last decade. It can lead to better risk management and potentially also improve returns on investments, as well as helping companies to perform better in relation to environmental targets.

My overall argument, though, is that trustees must already consider financially material risks, including ESG factors. The statement of investment principles and the implementation statement are key tools that are already in place for disclosing a scheme’s approach to ESG issues, including climate change. Ultimately, the amendment is about disclosures; that is what it aims to achieve. Additionally, large schemes with assets above £1 billion, which in future will be the majority of schemes because of the scale measures that we will come back to, must also report on climate-related risks and opportunities, in line with the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures.

We are looking to strengthen sustainability reporting, exactly as the hon. Member for Torbay wishes to see, through new UK sustainability reporting standards and our transition plan’s commitment, which the Government consulted on this summer. Taken together, our policy initiatives will modernise the UK’s framework for corporate reporting, giving pension schemes vital information about companies’ decarbonisation plans and about whether to escalate their engagement efforts with investee companies on environmental issues. The DWP is contributing to that work and will review the effectiveness of climate reporting requirements later this year, as part of our post-implementation review of the requirements of the Taskforce on Inequality and Social-related Financial Disclosures.

Given the existing reporting requirements, the Government’s position is that we will gently resist the amendments, to avoid duplication.

Climate change is an existential threat to humanity, and although sewage may not be such a threat, it is still a significant issue; indeed, it is a wicked issue that needs to be tackled by our society as a whole. I wish to press the amendment to a vote, to show the Committee’s intent ahead of the Bill’s next stage.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

I beg to move amendment 254, in clause 10, page 10, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) Value for money regulations must require responsible trustees and managers to make an assessment of, benchmark and regularly report the—

(a) net benefit outcomes,

(b) investment performance,

(c) quality of service, and

(d) long term members outcomes

of regulated VFM schemes.”

This amendment broadens the definition of value for money to require assessment of net benefit outcome, investment performance, quality of service, and long-term member outcomes, and require schemes to report on these.

On the wider point about value for money, we broadly support the introduction of a robust value for money framework as set out in clause 10. The framework, which was initially introduced under the previous Government, is essential to promoting transparency and accountability in the management of defined-contribution pension schemes, and it mandates responsible trustees or managers to assess and publish reports on the performance of their schemes. Ultimately, that should mean improved performance. It is worth bearing in mind, though, that there are potentially perverse outcomes —as we have seen, for example, with the Phoenix Group—as the consequences of an intermediate rating could drive less growth. I suppose it could be a less risky approach, but greater risk can lead to greater growth. None the less, we need to be careful as there could be perverse outcomes.

I tabled the amendment as we are worried that the current value for money framework for defined-contribution pensions risks focusing too narrowly on costs and charges as the primary determinant of value for members. By contrast, the Australian superannuation system adopts a more holistic definition of value for money, including a net benefit outcome metric, which is defined as the sum of contributions and investment earnings minus all costs, fees, taxes and insurance premiums. Australian trustees are required not only to consider costs, but to act in members’ best financial interests, broadly encompassing factors beyond merely minimising fees. The Australian framework incorporates additional core metrics including service quality, investment performance and member outcomes. This broader approach reflects a more comprehensive assessment of value for money delivered to members.

Will the hon. Gentleman clarify what “long term members outcomes” means? Does it mean people that have been members of the scheme for a long time, or does it mean members’ outcomes over the long term? The amendment is ambiguous.

That is a very good question. Ultimately it means, “What is the performance of the fund?” Members’ best interests can include a lot of different things, but ultimately we need to see the fund grow with the best performance it possibly can, given all things brought together. When members start to receive their pensions, they will therefore get the best terms they possibly can.

We run the risk of trying to look at the wrong definition. For example, there has been an argument recently about the local government pension scheme—this came up earlier this week—with the Reform party talking about the fact that the scheme is charging 50 basis points. The argument is that reducing it to 10 basis points would save money. However, as I was discussing with a Government Back Bencher the other day, one of the problems is that if fees are too low, that reduces the ability of the managers to assess more complicated financial opportunities. If fees are kept at 50 basis points, the capacity to start analysing unlisted investments is retained. If fees are reduced to 10 basis points, the ability and skill of the managers to look into more than investing in other people’s funds or into simple listed equities is reduced. If we start to look at it as a cost-based issue only, we miss out the fact that we get quite a lot of extra expertise if slightly higher management fees are paid.

The Australian framework incorporates additional core metrics including service quality, investment performance and outcomes. There is a concern that the UK value for money framework overemphasises costs and risks discouraging investment in asset classes, as I discussed, that historically produced higher returns but that might have higher shorter-term fees or complexities. This narrow focus could also dampen innovation in pension scheme design and reduce member engagement, ultimately harming long-term retirement outcomes for scheme members. It may be valuable to learn from the Australian approach by developing a value for money framework that balances cost transparency with metrics that encourage good investment strategies and quality services, aligning regulators’ and trustees’ incentives with members’ long-term financial interests.

Our amendment tries to broaden the definition of value for money using the Australian model as a template. It would require the assessment of net benefit outcome, investment performance, quality of service and long-term member outcomes, not just cost. It would introduce a requirement for schemes to report and benchmark across these holistic measures, thereby enabling a more balanced and meaningful comparison of value.

I think there is more agreement than the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, because we all agree that we want to focus not just on cost and charges. I remind everybody that we were discussing the local government pension scheme this morning—

I want to take this opportunity to thank the Minister for his remarks on the value for money scheme, which I welcome, and to put on the record that I am a member of the local government pension scheme. I did not have an opportunity to do that earlier.

We are now turning to the value for money framework, which relates to defined-contribution schemes. As I said, we are aiming for a full spectrum of value to be considered by the framework.

I do not think I would normally say this, but I am worried that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest is lacking a bit of patriotism, because the Australian scheme does not take into account some of the wider metrics, such as customer service, that he is rightly encouraging the scheme to focus on, whereas the intention in the Bill is exactly as he sets out—that we should be taking into account not only those longer-term returns, which are ultimately what we should all care about, but also customer service. I completely endorse his objectives.

The value for money clauses have been drafted in a way that allows the Secretary of State the necessary flexibility to set out in regulations the categories of information for the VFM assessments of the kind that are set out in the amendment, such that we can adapt to changes in the pension landscape and learn from operational experiences, as we are already learning from the experience in Australia. There are things to learn from Australia that have gone well, and there are certainly things to learn from that have gone less well. Although the amendment recognises the importance of assessing value across all the pillars of value, it is vital that we do not restrict the framework by embedding the exact details of the categories of information in the primary legislation.

VFM metrics, benchmarks and the assessment process will be specified through regulations, providing clarity for industry on how to report on and assess value provided by in-scope schemes—which, as I said, are basically at this stage workplace defined contribution schemes. Over time, those will be reviewed to make sure that they continue to reflect market changes and the needs of savers. For those reasons, we believe that the clauses are spot on. I urge the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the amendment.

I thank the Minister for a great effort—“spot on”, maybe, but we still feel inclined to press the amendment to a vote. That is important, even though we know that, rather depressingly, we will probably lose it—although who knows? You never know. It is important to put on the record that we feel that certain measures can be pushed forward, so we will be pressing the amendment to a vote.

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 10, page 11, leave out line 9 and insert—

“an occupational pension scheme that provides money purchase benefits.”

This amendment ensures that the value for money framework is capable of applying to hybrid schemes (that is, schemes that provide both money purchase benefits and other benefits).

Amendments 28 and 35 introduce changes into chapter 1 of part 2 of the Bill. Amendment 28 ensures that the value for money framework is capable of applying to hybrid schemes—schemes that provide both money purchase benefits and other benefits. Amendment 35 is minor and consequential to amendment 28. The amendments are of a minor and technical nature and do not alter the policy. I commend them to the Committee.

On a point of order, Sir Christopher, should I proceed to comment on the other amendments or allow those proposing other amendments to come forward before I turn to the clause stand part?

On we go! I was going to thank the hon. Member for Torbay for his words on his amendments, but I shall move on to them anyway, and to clause stand part. Ultimately, value for money is a much-needed member protection measure for savers enrolled in a defined contribution scheme. I should remind the Committee why we have it and why it is so important: because the risk of poor value for money now lies in the defined contribution market to such a large extent with individual savers. That is what the Bill is ultimately, most importantly, about.

It is important to remember that members of defined benefit pension schemes already have protections and benefit from the sponsor employer shouldering all that risk, as was mentioned earlier by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. Those employers also have greater agency to deal with the value-related issues, such as the effective administration of their pension schemes.

Clause 10 sets out that certain pension schemes and arrangements will be in scope for the value for money framework. The clause provides regulation-making powers to specify the types of schemes and arrangements that will be in scope of the value for money requirements. We envisage that those initially in scope will be default occupational pension schemes offering defined contribution benefits. That is fundamental, given that the vast majority of defined contribution savers are saving into exactly those kind of pension schemes. To spell out what that means, we are not talking about non-workplace defined contribution pensions—that is, personal pensions. There is a regulatory power to extend in future if required, but initially we are talking about workplace defined contribution pension schemes.

With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Torbay will not press his amendment, and I commend clause 10 to the Committee.

I rise to speak to clause 10 and the consultations that the Secretary of State will undertake in advance of making the value for money regulations. Subsection (7) says:

“The Secretary of State must consult with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate before— (a) making value for money regulations; (b) issuing guidance under subsection (6).”

I appreciate that that is in there—it should be in there, as it is important. However, I do not know the road map off the top of my head, although the Minister might. Will the value for money regulations be published in draft in advance of the final decisions being made? I understand that they will go through the affirmative procedure when they do come before Parliament, but, in order to consult, will the Secretary of State publish the drafted regulations so that all of us can see them?

Also, on the right people to consult, I would always recommend that the Secretary of State runs those regulations before the Select Committee in advance of publishing them, so that it can suggest any changes. It is far easier for the changes to be made in advance of the statutory instrument being laid, when it is in draft form, than for there to be an argument in a Delegated Legislation Committee—I am sure that nobody on either side of the House wants there to be arguments in a Delegated Legislation Committee. We would all, I am sure, hope that there would be widespread agreement in advance.

The value for money regulations are really important, and it is important that they are got right. I am pleased that there is to be a consultation, but I push the Minister to agree that it will be significant—not just a couple of people in advance—so that potential problems with the value for money regulations are ironed out, and we do not see 273 amendments to them down the line.

That had eluded me, Sir Christopher, so thank you for drawing me out on this one. Amendments 1 and 2 ensure that there is consistency and that there are no gaps where schemes could perhaps fall between the cracks of legislation. We feel that the amendments would give that continuity of support to schemes.

In response to the hon. Member for Torbay, I should say that I have already set out the case for the value for money framework not covering defined benefit pension schemes, which is what the effect of the amendment would be.

To the questions raised by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North, broadly, the answer is yes: the regulations will be published in detail as part of the consultation. Significant consultations have already gone on with a very wide range of stakeholders, both by the TPR and by the Financial Conduct Authority. There are further consultations, and then draft regulations, to come. It is worth thinking about how a lot of the changes in the Bill reinforce each other. It is important that we make reasonably swift progress on the value for money regulations, because the value for money regime is a requirement for us to be able to then make progress on some of the other bits that we will come to discuss, such as contract override and, indeed, small pots.

Amendment 28 agreed to.

Clause 10, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

Publication etc of metric data

I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 11, page 11, line 34, after “publication” insert “or sharing”.

This amendment ensures that information on the database mentioned in clause 11(2)(d) can be made available to (for example) the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions for the purpose of internal review, as well as made available for publication.

Thank you, Sir Christopher. A central part of assessing whether a pension scheme or arrangement is providing value to the saver is how it performs in terms of investment, the quality of the service provided and costs. Having standardised performance metrics and a consistent measure of value will allow for easy and better comparisons across arrangements, which in turn will drive schemes to address poor value.

That is why clause 11 provides the powers necessary to ensure that schemes disclose value for money data on areas such as investment performance, including the types of assets being invested in, the quality of the service provided and charges on members. This information will have to be submitted within specified timescales. It is crucial that the metric data is open to public scrutiny, so clause 11 provides powers to require that the metrics are published and available on an electronic database. To ensure standardisation, regulations may also require the Pensions Regulator to set out the format that information should be submitted in. The powers taken in this clause will enable the creation of consistent, transparent and comparable VFM data to allow us to better understand which schemes are providing best possible value.

I turn to new clause 11, which will be inserted into chapter 1 of part 2. It provides clarity on the use of the electronic database mentioned at clause 11. Where the Financial Conduct Authority has made rules for contract-based schemes that correspond to VFM regulations, it will be permitted to use the electronic database. The new clause therefore facilitates the work of the FCA by facilitating schemes to provide that data to the electronic database. It provides for regulations to permit the use of the electronic database for the publication or sharing of information relating to contract-based schemes. The regulations will be subject to the negative procedure.

The context is that we have been clear from the outset that, for the value for money framework to work effectively, it must apply consistently across both trust-based and contract-based sides of the market. The new clause enables that to happen. It is purely technical in nature and will ensure that value for money data is treated consistently across both those two parts of the market. It does not alter the policy. I commend it to the Committee.

I turn to Government amendment 29, which introduces a change to chapter 1 of part 2. The amendment ensures that information on the database can be made available to, for example, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions for the purpose of internal review. A large amount of high-quality data is being collected via that process, and it will be able to be made available to the Secretary of State or others, as well as being used for its main purpose under the Bill, which is obviously publication. The amendment is of a minor and technical nature and does not alter the policy. I commend clause 11 and the amendment to the Committee.

This seems like a very technical clause, and we certainly have no objections to it. I also have no doubt that we will not be voting against the Government amendment. I think we are very happy with it.

I have a similar question to the one I had earlier. We need to ensure that those responsible for generating the data are kept in the loop and that they have enough of a timeline to create the correct data. The Government must listen if they say, “We’re very sorry, but we can’t this bit of data in the way that the Government want.” I seek reassurance from the Government that this would be a conversation, so that the Government get the data they want, but that an unreasonable burden will not be placed on the trustees or managers who have to provide that data. That conversation needs to continue as time goes on.

The answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that that conversation is going on to a huge degree. Because there are so many lessons to be learned from abroad and so many technical questions to be worked through, including about the provision of data—these are important technical questions for the scheme to work and be operationalised—there is a high level of consultation on the value for money framework. It is absolutely an ongoing conversation. It was happening for some time under the previous Government, and it is continuing now. Another phase of that discussion will be launched in the near future and will continue as we move to the operational phase.

Amendment 29 agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

VFM assessments

To ensure effective comparability across arrangements, it is necessary to have a clear and standardised assessment of how value is determined. Clause 12 will enable those undertaking the assessment to be clear about the method that they should follow and the criteria to be used. It will allow regulations to detail how a VFM assessment is to be made, the factors that need to be taken into account when making comparisons, the metrics to be used and, importantly, how such comparisons should be made. The clause also gives the flexibility for VFM regulations to introduce benchmarks that schemes should compare their arrangements against. That is necessary to improve comparability and transparency, and to help drive competition among schemes. That will help improve returns for members.

I turn to new clause 42, tabled by the Liberal Democrats; I am grateful to them for their contributions to the debate. Measuring the quality of services provided to members is an important aspect of the VFM framework—I support that entirely. It ensures that we assess not only the quantitative value provided by pension schemes, but the qualitative. Under the VFM framework, the Secretary of State will have the power to require schemes in scope to report on and assess the quality of the services provided to their members; I just made the point about the absence of that in Australia but the fact that it will have a role within our framework. Clause 11 provides for categories of information that schemes may be required to disclose to include

“the quality of services provided to members of the scheme”.

Further detail on the metrics for measuring quality of services will be set out in regulations. It is crucial that metrics are set out in the regulations so that we have flexibility to respond to changes in the pensions market and to learn from operational delivery—again, that is something we have seen in Australia. For that reason, we believe that the current legislative framework is sufficient. I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the new clause.

Clause 12 seems fairly reasonable in its approach. Liberal Democrat new clause 42 seems in the broadest sense to follow our amendment 254 in respect of the Australian model; should it be pressed to a vote, we would be happy to support it. I have nothing more to add.

As I stated earlier, one of our key drivers is making sure that people are able to make quality, informed decisions about their financial long-term future. The debate on the new clause drives that agenda. I am sure that the Minister has the best intentions, but what we are discussing is still within regulations that have yet to break cover. We would be more comfortable if it was in the Bill rather than tucked away in regulations. We will seek to press the new clause to a vote when the time comes.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Member satisfaction surveys

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It will be a great relief to everybody to hear that clause 13, although vital, is relatively small. Importantly, it enables requirements relating to member satisfaction surveys, of a kind that I know hon. Members are supportive of, to be set out in the value for money regulations. As I have just argued, quality of service is one of the key pillars of the value for money assessment, and member satisfaction is a key aspect within that pillar. These surveys will allow schemes to better understand their members’ experience and to gauge just how good a service they are providing for scheme members. Members’ experiences and views on the quality of service will provide inputs to the holistic assessment of value that this entire part of the Bill aims to offer.

We are very happy with this measure. One of the important points, which has been made on a number of occasions, is to do with the wider financial education piece. One would hope that the satisfaction surveys would ask not only whether members of pension schemes are being given sufficient information, but whether they are being taught how to understand what that information means. That is quite important. It is more of a cultural thing than something that should go into the Bill. When we start talking about the complexities of pension funds, it does not necessarily mean a huge amount to the vast majority of people out there, and customer satisfaction surveys should be constructed on that basis. We need to ensure action on that financial education piece, but aside from that, we are very happy to support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

VFM ratings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Central to the value for money framework is the assignment of value for money ratings. We discussed that briefly during the evidence session on Tuesday, and some hard questions were asked of me by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest; this clause will help to explain more about it. Rating or scoring a scheme’s value is a major cornerstone of the VFM policy. It is essential to helping savers and employers make informed decisions; they would otherwise have to analyse a very large amount of data. The finer details behind the ratings, such as the conditions under which each rating will apply and when they should be used, will be provided in full in regulations. That will provide clarity and allow the framework to evolve with the market.

After a VFM assessment, trustees or a manager will be required to assign a VFM rating. The clause describes the three categories of ratings that will be used in the VFM regime: fully delivering, intermediate and not delivering. As I pointed out on Tuesday, there are multiple levels available within intermediate—it is not a one-size-fits-all box.

Arrangements rated as fully delivering are those deemed to be providing best value for their members. At the opposite end of the scale, we have the “not delivering” grade. For those arrangements rated as not delivering, trustees will have to draw up an action plan of next steps to move pension savers to an arrangement that is providing value, thus avoiding persistent underperformance affecting members for long periods of time.

Arrangements given an intermediate rating will be those that require more work to improve their value to members. They may be required to inform employers of a “not delivering” rating and to produce an improvement plan that outlines the steps they plan to take towards improvement. That, in turn, will help employers to be better informed of the status of the schemes or arrangements that their staff are enrolled in and allow businesses to make better informed choices when it comes to workplace pensions.

The clause provides flexibility for multiple subcategories of the intermediate rating, meaning that the rating system is not limited to three ratings. To help tackle potential gaming of the VFM regime, we will tighten the rules on how some schemes choose comparators, so that schemes are not able to self-select the comparators they are able to use. That will be done by defining what a scheme should be comparing itself against and detailing the metrics that will determine whether a scheme is providing value. We will of course consult on the draft regulations.

In a broad sense, we are very happy to support the clause. There are, though, a number of issues, and the point about benchmarking and what performance is being valued against can be rather complicated. We heard from the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, a little earlier about his father’s experience of putting money aside and finding himself wanting to take it out in October 1987—I remember it well; I had been a dealer on the floor of the London stock exchange, so a stock market crash was a pretty hideous thing. However, if we look at a chart of the FTSE 100 from the early 1980s up to now and the 1987 crash, although I think it was down 37% at one point, looks like the smallest of blips in what was otherwise a very long-term bull market that continues to this day.

The one thing we do know for sure is that those wanting better performance are likely to be investing in slightly more volatile assets. That can come from investing in equities or higher-growth businesses. There is no doubt that some higher-growth businesses will go bust, because they are taking risks, but ultimately, how many of us wish we had put more money into Amazon, Google or Apple back in the late 1990s? At the time it was not necessarily seen as a brilliant thing, but some of these businesses have done unbelievably well. That said, how can anybody understand how a company like Tesla, which is really a battery manufacturer, is worth more than General Motors, Ford and Chrysler? It does not necessarily make a huge amount of sense, and yet people are still investing in it.

We can find ourselves looking at the value for money framework and come up with a load of benchmarks, which brings us to the point about the intermediate rating. We could find that an intermediate rating is done at a time when there are particular problems in the stock market, yet, looking at the long term, we could have what could turn out to be a stunning performance. We have to be very careful and not find ourselves throwing out the good in favour of the perfect. This will be something quite complicated; I do not necessarily think it is something for the Bill to worry about, but, as we continue the discourse of pensions performance and adequacy, we need to be very careful that we do not become obsessed with ruling out risk.

There is a big argument about risk in our economy at the moment, which, again, is not for this place, but we could find ourselves ruling out risk. The other thing worth bearing in mind is that, by ruling out risk, we could stop money being invested into businesses that may look absolutely bonkers today, but turn out to be the next Apple, Amazon or Google. We just have to be careful about that.

I suspect we shall have lots of debates over this. The Pensions Minister is on such a meteoric career progression at the moment that I am sure he will find himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer before very long—probably quicker than he imagines—but this is something that we need to keep an eye on. As I say, it is about making sure that we do not rule out the good in pursuit of the perfect.

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech with a very good historical analysis of what has happened over the last 30 or 40 years. It is worth reflecting on the risk point, particularly for the wide age range of people who hold pensions. This came up during the evidence session: if we end up avoiding risk, the people who are just starting out in their careers and might only be in their early 20s or 30s could end up with a pension that does not deliver anywhere near what it could have delivered, if we apply those same factors. A thought that came to me in the evidence session was how we can ensure that our system allows for risk at the bottom end, but with a tapering out of risk as people get older. The Minister is the expert in this area, and I am interested to know what might be possible in the future. Ultimately, we want to ensure that value for money is based on the right level of risk for the right stage in people’s careers and the right stage in their pensions journey.

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. The story that the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Torbay, told about his father is the most important point here. As we come to the point where we want to cash in the defined-contribution pension, we could find ourselves cashing in at completely the wrong moment. In a stock market crash, although it could be just a blip in a long-term bull market, none the less the hon. Member’s father would have seen a 37% drop in the value of his equities if he was benchmarked to the FTSE 100. If he was in higher growth businesses, he could, as the hon. Member said, have seen a 50% drop. So we have to be very careful.

We can be as risky as we like when we are 21 years old. I cannot remember whether it was Adam Smith or Einstein who said that the eighth great wonder of the world is compound interest. Obviously we want to take risk early but, as we come up to that day when we finally turn our papers in and go home on the last day of work, we need to make sure we have got as much money out of our pension fund as we possibly can. That is why it is important to ensure that the VFM framework does not cause problems.

This is a very interesting debate as lives continue to lengthen. In terms of people’s capabilities at different ages, 70 is probably the new 60. The reality is that someone might want to take out a proportion of their pension and hope for growth into their 80s, and then crystallise it at that stage of their life. Not that long ago, we had to buy an annuity, and there was not much choice, so we hit a hard wall. There is greater flexibility in the system now.

I want to talk about chickens. We heard talk in the evidence earlier this week of herding chickens, and of people not wanting to be the only white chicken in brown chicken world. It is about allowing the risk that drives growth. We know that allowing that risk can also drive a more vibrant economy. I welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how this framework can avoid that herding and how he would do that. I fear that the answer will be, “It will all be in the regulations and secondary legislation”, but some words of wisdom from the Minister would be welcome.

I always aim to provide words of wisdom—say one in 100. Let me engage directly with the points about the nature of the arrangement. The honest answer is that lots of it will be in regulations, but the exact issues raised by both main Opposition parties are ones that we have thought a significant amount about.

The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is right to say that risk aversion generally can be dangerous within the system, in just the same way that excessive risk-taking can be dangerous. He raised two specific issues. One was how short-term market developments affect ratings—that is why the benchmarking is a relative process. Relative benchmarking deals with the ups and downs of the stock market or other asset valuations—we are assessing the relative performance, not the absolute performance.

The hon. Gentleman raises a separate question on the nature of the investment we want to look at, where there may be returns over different timescales. That is why we need to look at different measures and metrics, some of which are backward looking—for example, more standard measures of value for money—and some of which might be forward looking—for example, looking at the costs and asset allocation strategy to come to a view about what forward-looking returns might look like relatively. We have thought about that in some detail.

We then had a useful discussion about life stages—when someone moves from higher risk, because they are confident that they will not be retiring in the middle of a 1987-style downturn. That is exactly what we should be thinking about. One of the objectives of the Bill as a whole is to drive higher returns on average. Later lifestyling, as it is called, into safe assets means that someone can be exposed to some growth potential for longer over their life. When we come to discuss the default pension solutions, that is exactly why, on average, that approach will drive safer outcomes.

At the moment, defined-contribution pension schemes often put people into very safe assets—almost entirely bonds—in the run-up to their retirement. That would not be necessary if we knew that they were heading for a default solution with annuitisation or lifetime income coming in their 70s or 80s. That is exactly the benefit of the changes that we will discuss later. I hope that was a useful discussion of the important points that hon. Members have raised.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Consequences of an intermediate rating

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 details the actions that may be required when an arrangement falls into an intermediate rating. That could be an arrangement that is at risk of not delivering value, or one that provides a certain level of value, but needs more work to improve the value it offers. It allows for regulations to detail the actions required of trustees and managers for schemes or arrangements rated intermediate. That could include producing an improvement or action plan, outlining their planned steps towards improved value for members or informing the employers currently paying into the arrangement of its value for money rating and ensuring that the arrangement does not take on new employers until it improves the value rating. That last point was raised at the evidence session on Tuesday.

As clause 14 provides the ability to set a number of sub-categories of rating within the intermediate category, clause 15 enables different consequences to be attached to those sub-categories depending on the value being provided. We are proposing to give schemes in the intermediate rating a period of up to two value for money assessment cycles to make the improvement needed to provide value to their savers.

It is important to differentiate between the intermediate and the “not delivering” rating. Schemes rated as not delivering are essentially not providing value to savers, with no identifiable improvements within a reasonable amount of time. Those schemes will be required to make an assessment of their next steps, which will most likely be to transfer the savers to a scheme that is providing value. That is the ultimate sanction within this framework.

Schemes that are rated intermediate will have identified where improvements can be made and will be required to complete an improvement plan. This would outline the proposed changes to improve their VFM rating within two years. As well as providing definitions of employer and participating employer in the context of the clause, it also allows for the content of an improvement plan to be included in secondary legislation.

When questioned on Tuesday, the Minister talked about the issues that had been raised about intermediate ratings, and the possibility of intermediate points within intermediate ratings. It would be helpful if he could confirm from the Front Bench that he will take action to ensure that the negative consequences that were raised, with people being so keen to avoid falling out of that, do not happen. The Minister will be aware that confirmation from the Front Bench is helpful in clarifying the intent of the legislation and would put some of our minds at rest.

Let me directly address that point, and then I will turn to the Government amendments. The answer is yes. I did not respond, but I should have, to the related point raised by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest in the previous grouping. The experience in Australia was that there was a binary cut-off, but with a very high-stakes outcome if people fell on the wrong side of it. That did lead to herding behaviour. That is one of the most well-established lessons from the Australian experience, and it is certainly central to the evidence that we have heard in the consultations. I can absolutely provide the confirmation that we will be avoiding that outcome, not least via these multiple levels of intermediate ratings.

Government amendments 30 to 34 introduce other changes. These amendments are of a minor and technical nature and clarify the policy intent. Amendments 30, 31 and 33 make drafting corrections. Amendment 32 clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan. Finally, amendment 34 removes a power that we no longer need.

Clause 16 details the actions that must be undertaken when schemes or arrangements are rated as not delivering value for money. This is necessary to help protect pension savers from lingering in arrangements that are “not value” and allow them to be moved into arrangements that do provide value. These actions may include submitting an action plan to regulators, informing employers currently contributing to the arrangement of its “not value” rating and closing the arrangement entirely to new employers.

Clause 16 also enables regulations to set out further actions that will be required of trustees or managers, including the conditions under which a “not value” arrangement may not have to be closed to new members. The clause also allows the Pensions Regulator to require trustees or managers to initiate the transfer of members from the “not value” arrangement into another that does offer value. It outlines the conditions when this would apply.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16

Consequences of a “not delivering” rating

Amendments made: 30, in clause 16, page 16, line 20, leave out

“the responsible trustees or managers to transfer”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 31: in clause 16, page 16, line 21, leave out “(all or” and insert “all (or”.

This amendment corrects an error.

Amendment 32: in clause 16, page 16, line 31, leave out sub-paragraph (i) and insert—

“(i) based on the assessment carried out by the responsible trustees or managers under section 14(6)(a) in the action plan of the scheme or arrangement, transferring the benefits of all (or a subset of) the members of the scheme or arrangement to another pension scheme (or arrangement under a pension scheme) could reasonably be expected to result in the generality of the members of the scheme or arrangement receiving improved long-term value for money, and”

This amendment clarifies that the Pensions Regulator’s assessment of a transfer solution is to be based on the trustees or managers’ assessment carried out for the purposes of the action plan.

Amendment 33: in clause 16, page 16, line 34, leave out “the measures” and insert “any other measures”.

This amendment makes a minor clarification.

Amendment 34: in clause 16, page 17, line 8, leave out subsection (5).—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment removes a power which is no longer needed.

Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Compliance and oversight

Question proposed, that the clause stand part of the Bill.

To ensure consistency, comparability and transparency of the value that arrangements provide, it is essential that all arrangements undertake the same process in the same way and that there is sufficient oversight of the process by the regulator. That is why clause 17 sets out the range of ways in which the regulations may make provision for ensuring compliance with the value for money framework.

The Pensions Regulator will be able to issue compliance and penalty notices to trustees, managers and third parties in breach of their VFM obligations. These notices enable the regulator to set out the steps that must be taken to ensure compliance with the VFM requirements. Financial penalties can be imposed, to a maximum of £10,000 in the case of an individual and up to £100,000 in other cases. Those figures align with other powers we have taken in part 2. There is also provision for the withdrawal of a penalty notice and for the Pensions Regulator to challenge an incorrect VFM rating.

Clause 18 makes it clear that the provisions in this chapter apply equally to pension schemes run by or on behalf of the Crown and to Crown employees. This is the standard approach in legislation to ensure that Crown-operated schemes are covered by the same rules, unless explicitly excluded. Clause 19 is the interpretation clause, which sets out the meaning of the terms used in the VFM clauses 10 to 17. I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19

Interpretation of Chapter

Amendment made: 35, in clause 19, page 20, leave out lines 13 and 14.—(Torsten Bell.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 28.

Clause 19, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Small pots regulations

Broadly, we welcome clause 20, which builds on important work that was started under the previous Government to address the issue of small, dormant pension pots. This is a critical step forward to consolidate small pots, which can otherwise be costly and inefficient both for pension schemes and, importantly, for their members. However, we have some concerns about certain aspects of the measure that require further scrutiny.

Notably, the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to change the monetary value that defines a small pot at a later date. Although that is a logical measure that will probably need to be exercised as the small pots regime becomes more established, there is a risk that drastic changes to the minimum pot size could significantly alter the defined-contribution market in unintended ways. In particular, the potential market impact on schemes serving members with lower average account balances needs to be carefully considered. Automatically consolidating larger pots could reshape the market landscape, affecting members and schemes differently across the spectrum. Pensions UK has suggested that any future increases in the monetary value of the definition of a small pot should be subject to robust consultation with industry stakeholders, alongside an independent market impact assessment, to understand fully the ramifications of such changes.

The Liberal Democrat point is extremely important. I hope that the Minister will verify how the small pot size was set at £1,000. The amendment seeks to increase that to £2,000, but why not £5,000 or lower it to £500? It is very difficult.

The other problem with the clause is that a small pot defined as inactive could be inactively invested—for example, sitting in an index fund for 10 years without anybody worrying about it—and have crept up or down in value. It could be £1,005 one day and £995 the next. Does that change it from being an okay pot to a small pot, and therefore due for consolidation? This is a very difficult measure. Inevitably, it comes to the point of where it is defined. Similarly, will the amount be indexed against inflation, or against the stock market indices? How will the Secretary of State decide to increase it?

There are so many questions about this. My gut feeling is that £1,000 is too small, but equally that it is incredibly difficult to determine what the right size is. I look forward to the Minister extensively discussing with the Committee exactly how he came to £1,000 and not £1,001, £999 or indeed any other number.

There is possibly cross-party consensus that there is no perfect answer to this problem, but there are lots of wrong answers. If the value had been set at £100,000 or at £1, those would have been very wrong answers. I applaud the way the Liberal Democrats have approached this, by looking at the responses they have received and being willing to flex on the basis of them. I hope the Minister has approached the numbers in the same way.

This amendment is a test of change. It is asking, “Does this work? Does this make a difference?” Whatever value the Government chooses to set the limit at, we will see if it works. At that stage, the Government can assess whether it was the right level or not. This comes back to the point that I made during the evidence sessions about monitoring and evaluation of whether this has worked and how the Government will measure whether it has worked as intended. At what stage will the Government look at that?

At what stage after implementation will the Government make a call about whether the measure has achieved their aims, or whether the number needs to be flexed to meet the aims not just of the Government, but of savers, active and inactive, in their pensions, who would quite like to get a decent return when they hit pension age but perhaps do not have the capacity, the ability, or the time to be involved in actually making the decisions about moving and consolidating the pots.

It would be helpful if the Minister gave us some clarity about what monitoring and evaluation will look like, and about why £1,000 was chosen, so that we can understand the rationale. As I said, there is probably wide agreement that there are quite a few wrong answers but no perfect answer, and this is possibly the best that we are going to get at this moment.

The hon. Lady is not only telling me I am going to be fired, but then clearly angling for the job by again giving the speech I was going to give. I agree that there is broad consensus across the room that there is no perfect answer, but there is a balance of risks. We are attempting to introduce a large change to the pension system that will affect millions of people, and we need to do that in a steady and gradual way—yes, with the intention of considering going further in the future, but not in a rushed way.

Let me talk through a few of the issues and points that were raised. As I am sure those proposing the amendment know, our view is that we should stick with the £1,000 limit at this point and then come back to consider future increases once the system has been put in place. We want all hon. Members to have it in their heads that the implementation of this aspect of the Bill is on a slightly slower timeline than some of the other bits we have discussed—for example, because we need the value for money regime to be in place before we move to the small pots part of the picture.

Directly on the question of where the £1,000 limit came from, it came from extensive engagement and formal consultation with industry stakeholders over quite a large number of years. There is no academic answer to why it is £1,000 and not £900 or £1,100, but it does strike a balance between the pressures on a competitive industry and the level of administrative hassle, and the number of people who will be affected. We need to build a system that can manage the flows.

To give Members some idea of quantity, the evidence gathered from pension schemes last year showed that the £1,000 threshold would bring approximately 13 million pots into scope. I appreciate the logic behind calling for a higher threshold, but this one would mean a significant 13 million pots. The hon. Member for Wyre Forest is looking aghast at that number. I am just providing it as a bit of context. For further context, it already represents more than half of all deferred small pots, so it is not that we are trying to affect hardly any to start with; it is a significant number. That is in 2024 terms; the picture will look different in 2030 or so when the measure comes in, but that helps Members to have a sense of it.

On how to change the threshold, I can absolutely provide the reassurance that was asked for: that will be done in a public-facing way. An affirmative resolution is always required to change it. Unlike some other aspects of the Bill, where the first regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure but later changes can be made through the negative procedure, any change to the pot size requirement will always require the affirmative procedure, for exactly the reasons that have been discussed, which are that this would be a material change that affected the industry and individuals as they go through. Certainly, we would consult on that in the future.

For those reasons, I am glad that this is a probing amendment. I hope I have been probed, and we would like the clause to stand part.

On that point, perhaps I am reading the clause completely wrongly, but it says:

“Small pots regulations…are subject to the affirmative procedure if they…are the first such regulations…otherwise, are subject to the negative procedure.”

I am confused.

That is for all regulations except for the setting of the threshold number.

To being probed.

I beg to move amendment 259, clause 20, page 21, line 23, leave out from “procedure” to end of line 29

This amendment would make all regulations on consolidation of small dormant pots in DC schemes to the affirmative procedure all times they were made rather than just after first use.

The hon. Member for Aberdeen North asked an interesting question about the application of the affirmative procedure to regulations on the pot size. Our amendment seeks to address the use of the affirmative procedure in the wider legislation that goes with this.

As we continue to table amendments urging extra parliamentary scrutiny, I feel myself becoming slightly depressed at the prospect of having to see too much of the Minister, even though he is undoubtedly a lovely chap, in Delegated Legislation Committees as we consider every single change. It is important though, because at the end of the day Parliament needs to scrutinise what is going on, so it is a good thing that the size of the pot is subject to the affirmative procedure.

It is okay, but not ideal that for anything that could be to do with the wider legislation, the negative procedure applies. Members having to look for a very material change going through in a written ministerial statement or whatever and then raise it is not necessarily such a good thing, given that this is fixing 13 million of these pots. That is an awful lot of them. If we increased the threshold to £2,000, would that number be 26 million? A lot of people that could be affected by this.

This was largely a probing amendment to see what the Minister has to say. We are unlikely to divide the Committee on it. None the less, I am very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the affirmative procedure.

I understand why the hon. Member tabled the amendment. I think amendments like this one should be tabled in most Bill Committees by all Oppositions, as they have been over the years.

Let me make one general point and one specific point about the Bill. The general point is that there is always a trade-off between maximum scrutiny of every single part of any change that comes through secondary legislation and the risk of putting undue pressure on parliamentary time for what will be quite minor changes. In the case of the Bill, the pot size requirement is crucial. Lots of what the rest of the regulations deal with will, in fact, be very practical and detailed.

I am not sure that the Committee’s concern that we will be spending our lives together would be allayed by having our time clogged up by all of that detail coming through whenever anything is amended, but I understand the good, democratic reasons why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment. I hope that he accepts that as reassurance.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause, as we have just discussed, will ensure that the Government have the power to introduce regulations to secure the consolidation of eligible small pots into an authorised consolidator scheme. The Bill enables us to address the growing problem of pension fragmentation, where individuals accumulate multiple small pension pots as they move between jobs. Fragmentation can lead to inefficiencies, higher costs for providers and savers, and poor retirement outcomes.

As we have just discussed, the clause creates the eligibility conditions for small pots to be consolidated, including the £1,000 limit. The pot must be classed as dormant, which means that contributions have not been paid into it for at least 12 months, so the individual is not actively saving into the scheme. In addition, there is a requirement that the individual has not, subject to any prescribed exceptions, actively expressed how the pension pot is to be invested. The prescribed exceptions are in part to ensure that the scope specifically targets those who are unengaged savers in default funds, but this will enable us to broaden the scope to include individuals such as those in sharia-compliant funds, who would otherwise be excluded from the automatic consolidation process.

We estimate that these eligibility criteria will bring into scope 13 million dormant pots. This multiple default consolidator approach will support improved retirement outcomes for savers, not least by lowering the charges that they pay on those pots over time, as well as reduce the administrative hassle for pension providers, alongside supporting our vision for a pensions market with fewer, larger schemes that provide greater value. Our impact assessment demonstrates that this solution is estimated to generate greater overall net benefits over the period than other options, including pot follows member.

I have a question on the definition of “dormant”. The clause states that a pension pot is “dormant” if no contributions have been made for 12 months and if

“the individual has, subject to any prescribed exceptions, taken no step to confirm or alter the way in which the pension pot is invested.”

I am concerned that that definition is too wide.

If somebody has just said, “How much is in my pot?” and is confirming what is invested in it, are they considered to be somebody who is actively involved in their pot and who may not want consolidation? There is obviously a requirement to tell people anyway that it is going to be consolidated. What if they were actively involved, but only to the level that they checked the numbers?

For example, I have a small pension pot. I have tried to amalgamate it with another one, but it did not work because I have changed my name. I would love for it to be amalgamated; I cannot work out how to do it, but I have engaged with that pension pot in recent times and therefore it may not be considered a dormant pot.

Can the Minister give us some clarity or promise future clarity about what “dormant” means? If there has been a rough engagement with it, is that dormant? If people are very keen on their pension pot and have spent a lot of time saying, “Actually, it should be invested like this,” that is definitely not dormant, no matter how small it is. A lot of people will have had only a passing interest and would be delighted for it to be consolidated.

The hon. Lady’s last point is basically the right one. The policy objective is that where someone is not actively engaging in their pot, that is available for consolidation. The kind of minor administrative engagement—trying to access the website—is not what is envisaged by the clause. It is to make sure that somebody who has taken active choices about how their pot is invested is not treated as being disengaged when they have done something that is, it turns out, very unusual.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Small pots data platform

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I beg the Committee’s patience, as a number of clauses are grouped here—Members can thank the powers that be for that—and I will run through them all.

Clause 21 enables the Government to introduce a small pots data platform. This platform will be responsible for determining where each small dormant pot should be consolidated. It will ensure that decisions about where pots should go are made consistently, transparently and with the members’ best interests in mind.

International evidence from other countries, such as Australia, with similar pension systems to the UK has shown that a central platform improves consolidation outcomes, rather than just putting duties on schemes to sort it out. This clause establishes the framework to allow for the necessary infrastructure to be built to support data matching and pot consolidation. The Government believe that the infrastructure will be required to support pension schemes to deal with the volume of small pots that left the hon. Member for Wyre Forest aghast five seconds ago, effectively and efficiently.

As Members may know, we recently worked with Pensions UK, who have undertaken a feasibility review to examine and assess the technical requirements of the small pots data platform. The Government will consider that work as part of our next stages in developing the necessary infrastructure and the underpinning legislation. However, before committing to how best to deliver this infrastructure, we must undertake that full and proper assessment of capabilities.

Clause 22 enables the Government to ensure that members are properly informed about any action that is taken to consolidate their small dormant pension pot. Transfer notices will be the key point of communication between the scheme and the member. We have not had the time to make this point yet, but obviously it will be up to members to opt out of consolidation should they so wish.

How will members know that they have that opt-out? Will that be clear enough, given all the comments we have been making on financial education? People have got to be pretty engaged, and we know from the history that they are not always that engaged in their future.

That is an important question. The communication to members will be standardised, by providing the key information that has to be provided and the option of an opt-out—so it will be explicit that they have the option to opt out of the consolidation process—as well as their alternative options, for example moving their fund into another consolidator. I hope that that answers the question.

The notice is of high importance, because receiving that key information is basically the only point at which the member is informed about what is happening to the financial transaction—the Government are not generally in the business of legislating to change people’s financial arrangements without their consent. Clause 22 will ensure that schemes are bound by regulations to send prescribed information that will enable a member to make the decisions, for exactly the reasons that the hon. Lady set out.

Clause 23 will introduce an important safeguard in the broader framework for consolidating small dormant pension pots. It recognises that although automatic consolidation will benefit the majority, it may not be right for everyone and in all circumstances. The Bill aims to streamline pension savings and reduce fragmentation across the industry, but the clause ensures that members’ interests remain at the heart of the process.

Under the clause, a small dormant pension pot may be designated as exempt from automatic transfer if two key conditions are met. First, the pot must satisfy certain prescribed conditions, which will be set out in regulations. Secondly, the trustees or managers of the scheme must determine that it is in the best interests of the individual or a class of individuals in their scheme for the pot to remain where it is.

That is a vital member protection and safeguard. It recognises that although consolidation is generally beneficial, because it reduces administrative costs, there will be circumstances in which transferring a pot may not be in the member’s best interest. The clause provides the ability for the scheme to make that clear and not to transfer in those circumstances.

Does the Minister have any hypothetical examples? I am not asking him to commit to anything being a prescribed condition, but just to give us some examples so that we have an idea.

That is a fair question. The most prevalent example will be people whose existing pot, although small, has unusual and valuable guarantees attached to it, or benefits that they would lose if they transferred into the default fund of another provider. That is likely to be the most common use of the clause. The clause will provide for transparency by allowing regulations to be made to set out in more detail how those decisions and others will take place.

Given the admin costs and unprofitability of small dormant pots, we do not expect schemes to abuse this exemption. For the benefit of people who do not spend lots of time looking at these matters, I should say that lots of schemes are happy to see small pots go, because they are expensive for them to operate; they are neither in the provider’s interest nor in the saver’s. This clause strikes a careful balance.

Clause 24 will ensure that pension savings are not left idle, requiring all eligible pots to be held by a default consolidator. As Members will know, millions of workers accumulate small pension pots as they move between jobs. Specifically, the clause will allow for the transfer of those dormant pots without requiring active consent—again, that is something that Governments do not do lightly, but it is required by the best interests of savers in these cases—where a transfer notice has been issued and no objection received from the member, as I set out in relation to clause 22.

If a member does not opt out, the trustees and managers of the scheme are required to act on the transfer notice and transfer the pot to the designated consolidator. Clause 24 also provides legal certainty, because it will empower schemes to consolidate pots even if doing so breaches existing scheme rules. That removes administrative barriers and places the member’s interest at the heart of the system.

Clause 25 plays a role in providing legal clarity and continuity for individuals whose small dormant pots are transferred. The clause sets out what happens when a pension pot is moved to a different pension scheme or a different arrangement within the current scheme. This ensures that an individual’s membership status, rights and obligations are automatically and seamlessly updated at the point of transfer—so it is not just that a member’s pot has been transferred, but that they have become a member of the scheme that they are entering, even though they have not signed up to a contract explicitly in so doing. This means that they automatically acquire all the rights and responsibilities that come with that membership. In schemes where membership results in a new contractual relationship, the clause will deem that a new contract is formed at the point of transfer.

Clause 26 will play a critical role in ensuring that the transfer of small pots to consolidating schemes is undertaken in a legally robust and administratively efficient manner. By establishing clear timeframes for transfers, it will allow for the safe and effective consolidation of small dormant pension pots.

This clause introduces two key timing rules. First, it mandates the minimum 30-day notice period before any transfer or change of arrangement can take place. That gives individuals the opportunity to review the proposal and respond. That time period is aligned to the approach taken for members who wish to opt out of automatic enrolment.

Secondly, the clause sets out a maximum one-year deadline for completion of the transfer or change of arrangement. It provides clarity and operational certainty for pension schemes and savers. That also enables schemes to maximise the use of bulk transfers, supporting a lower-cost and more efficient transfer process, rather than having shorter deadlines that force them to move individuals in small batches. It also ensures that the small pots consolidation framework remains responsive and co-ordinated. If trustees and scheme managers are waiting for proposals from the small pots data platform, the transfer period can be extended. This clause strikes the right balance by protecting savers and making sure they have time to act, while also providing an impetus for timely action in the consolidation process.

I am grateful to members of the Committee for listening to all those points, and I commend clauses 21 to 26.

I have a couple of questions on the small pots data platform. On Second Reading, I raised issues about the pensions dashboard and the fact that after a significant length of time, it has not yet appeared. I appreciate that lots of people have been doing lots of work on it, but we do not have it yet.

It is vital that the small pots data platform exists and works in order for small pots consolidation to happen. Can the Minister give us some comfort that it will materialise and work? If there is a possibility of any errors in the system or the data is not correct—if the platform is not absolutely spot on—there is the risk of significant problems being created. Is he convinced that enough investment will be made in the data platform for it to work, and that it will be incredibly safe, given that it will potentially have—like the pensions dashboard—significant amounts of data relating to individuals and money? It therefore needs to be as safe from cyber-attack as possible, if it is presumably in the cloud or another such system. I would appreciate any reassurance about that, and lastly, that it will have the required resources to work and that the Government will push to create the resources if they are not there and the timeline is beginning to lag.

I thank the hon. Member for those questions. She is right to mention the dashboard, and I will say two things about that. First, although these are different systems, there are lots of learnings from the process—as we heard from Chris Curry on Tuesday—not least the impetus that it has provided to schemes to make sure they have put all their record keeping in order. For them to be able to engage with the dashboard, they now have a legal requirement to have that data in a standard format. It is also about how the central system works, but it will be a different system, so the hon. Member is right to raise those questions.

I do not want to offer her total certainty because that is not available to me for a scheme that is looking to be operational in the next decade. We have intentionally left that longer timeline for exactly the reasons that the hon. Member has outlined. I can reassure her that very extensive engagement has been going on with industry about this. I mentioned the feasibility study, but there has also been heavy engagement, including on the security element that she mentioned. That is absolutely key, and lessons definitely have gone through from the dashboard approach to make sure that we are happy with how that will take place. I hope that provides her with some—if not perfect—reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 22 to 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned—(Gerald Jones.)