PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill - 12 February 2020 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
[Dame Eleanor Laing in the Chair]
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Amendment 4, in page 1, line 12, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 34, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.
Amendment 2, page 2, line 37, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.
Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.
Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 4, line 2, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Amendment 6, page 4, line 6, after “force”, insert
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.
Clause 3 and 4 to 10 stand part.
That schedules 1 and 2 be the First and Second schedules to the Bill.
New clause 1—Review of prison deradicalisation programme—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to review the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(2) The person appointed under subsection (1) may enter any prison premises in order to scrutinise the operation of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must make a report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme before the end of the period of 6 months after the date on which this Act is passed.
(4) The person appointed must make further reports at intervals of not more than three months to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.
(5) The person appointed under subsection (1) may include in any review or report under this section consideration of the adequacy of resources made available to the prison deradicalisation programme, including resources made available for the supervision of probation and rehabilitation work.
(6) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must make arrangements to lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied that doing so will not prejudice any criminal proceedings.
(7) The Secretary of State may, out of money provided by Parliament, pay a person appointed under subsection (1), such expenses and allowances as the Secretary of State determines.”
This new clause would require the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison deradicalisation programme.
New clause 3—Review—
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 9 to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.
(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to the imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.
(3) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.
(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—
(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and
(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.
(6) The Secretary of State may—
(a) make such payments as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review, and
(b) make such other arrangements as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review (including arrangements for the provision of staff, other resources and facilities).
(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day when this Act comes into force.”
There are occasions on which the question of interpretation may merely be about a modification of policy; this is actually about saving human life. I repeat that: saving human life. Where it is possible for the House to ensure that human life cannot be unreasonably and wilfully disposed of by people who are intent on murdering for no reason at all, we need to take seriously the question whether or not we can exclude the courts —because this is Parliament, not the judiciary—from making wrong decisions when matters come before them.
I heard with interest the Chairman of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and the various cases he mentioned, and I have just heard the Minister refer to the Uttley case. There is also the Hogben case, which was of course in 1985, before the Human Rights Act 1998. Reference was also made to the del Río Prada case. As a matter of fact, the legislation does not depend on an interpretation of those individual cases by way of precedent, and that is not what we should be worried about; we should be thinking about the purpose and scope of the Bill and its objective, which is to do everything that we can to ensure that human life and public safety come first. I do not want this to become an argument about the interpretation of law, which is why I tabled amendment 3 to clause 1.
I am interested to hear the views of the House of Lords on the question of my proposal to amend clause 1. The wording of clause 1 currently refers to an offence “within subsection (2)” and a sentence imposed
“whether before or after this section comes into force”,
at which point I propose to insert the words
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The effect of that would be to put a complete bar on the use of the Human Rights Act, by interpretation of the courts, in any attempt, whether it is regarded as misguided or is a matter of culture—there is currently a load of culture in the courts relating to human rights questions that have built up over the whole of my lifetime in the law.
I am deeply concerned that we could allow legislation to go through that could be interpreted in a way that would result in human life being lost and public safety being infringed. That is my concern. [Interruption.] I see the Minister looking at me either apprehensively or with anticipation; I am not sure which it is and I do not really care. What I am saying is that I want certainty. I know that if the words “notwithstanding the Human Rights Act” are brought into the Bill, the effect will be to exclude completely, for reasons that I am about to give, any attempt by the courts to modify the effect that the Bill otherwise would have.
I have other concerns about the Bill that I have already made clear. I do not think that offenders should be considered for release after half or two thirds of their sentence. I have a lot of sympathy for what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) proposes in amendment 1; he says it should be nine tenths. I do not know whether he will address that point later.
The bottom line is that we should not allow this situation if we can avoid it—and we can avoid it, because we are the Houses of Parliament, and as a result of Brexit, we have just regained an awful lot of our sovereignty. This is more a matter of the European convention on human rights than of the charter of fundamental rights—or, for that matter, of Brexit—but the amendment is an indication of the House’s determination to use our sovereignty to make law that will guarantee that we do not face people losing their life, or public safety being undermined.
If we do not include in the Bill the words that I propose in my amendment 3, I believe—as I said before with respect to the Lee Rigby case—that it is not a matter of if such a thing happens again; it is a matter of when. I concede that this is emergency legislation; that is why I support it, but it requires a full, thorough review, perhaps by the Justice Committee, to ensure that we deal with the issue properly and fully.
I applaud the Government for bringing in this Bill on an emergency basis, but I criticise the fact that the Bill does not go far enough. The Minister is, if I might say so, not a lawyer; he can only have received his information from others who are. He is taking a bit of a punt in saying that the words
“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”
are not needed. He does not know that. I say that with not only respect, but knowledge and certainty. It is very difficult even for lawyers to be sure what the impact would be of allowing the Bill through without excluding the Human Rights Act 1998 from it.
The risk to human life is serious; we have to take every step to ensure no repetition of the instances of murder and terrorism that we have witnessed, and which, in recent times, from Lee Rigby onwards, have become more and more prevalent. We know that people are prepared to take such steps; it may be that some of them are mentally disturbed. Perhaps people do not think that these things will happen again, but as I said in debate on another counter-terrorism Bill four or five years ago, the question is not whether we have another Lee Rigby, but when. We have had one after another, at regular intervals. They are becoming more and more imminent, and more and more serious. I doubt whether this Bill, however worthy its objectives, will deal with the problem in the manner in which I am setting out and which is necessary.
That is supported by page 56 of Bradley and Ewing’s “Constitutional and Administrative Law”, which is the greatest constitutional authority that we have in this country and is into its 15th edition. Bradley and Ewing are quite clear that if the words are express in particular, and/or by necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature, there is no argument. The courts, quite rightly, will interpret that law in the light of those express words. This is why I propose the insertion of the words
We could add “or the European convention on human rights”, for that matter—to answer the Minister’s point directly. I do not mind. I am not doing this as an exercise in academic analysis; I am doing it because I do not want people to be killed and I do not want people to be released in circumstances where they might kill people. There is too much at stake.
For practical purposes, I believe that we need to have legislative clarity and the avoidance of doubt in relation to the power of Parliament to legislate retrospectively. I am not interested in the possible interpretation of leading counsel, academics, bloggers, senior Treasury counsel or, for that matter—with the greatest respect, and I really mean that—either the Chair of the Justice Committee or the Lord Chancellor himself. In this House, we make decisions about the legislation that we are going to pass. On the basis of what Willes J said in Phillips v. Eyre—and other cases—it is crystal clear that by using words that are explicit and express, we can have the effect of ensuring that human life is saved, and that is the main intention behind my amendment.
It is not for me to go into all the criticisms of the Human Rights Act 1998 that I have had over the years, but I can assure the House that an awful lot of distinguished lawyers, including the Foreign Secretary, have had a lot to say about this matter over the years, including Martin Howe QC. There is a huge body of legal opinion on both sides of the debate, and there are those who are inclined to take the view that the Human Rights Act has a lot of merit in it—and the charter of fundamental rights, for that matter, which we have now excluded by virtue of the withdrawal agreement Bill, which became the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 only about 10 days ago.
I am not pretending that I have all the answers to every question in matters of this kind, but I do think it is our duty, in the context of what we are seeking to prevent, to ensure that we are as crystal clear as we can be in our direction to the courts that they should not and must not allow human rights considerations to allow murder to take place. That is the problem and that is why I am so emphatic about it. I have noted from the Minister’s remarks and from other conversations I have had with senior Ministers that they are perhaps more interested in questions of interpretation than I am. I do not want any interpretation in this context.
The sole purpose of this Bill is to deal with people who are going to commit murder. Let us be under no misapprehension: this Bill has not been brought forward to deal with some questions relating to the whole generality of human rights law; it is specifically emergency legislation to deal specifically with preventing people who, for a variety of reasons or without reasons, intend to perpetrate murder from doing so. Human life is at risk. That is why this is such a good move on the part of the Government. There is nothing negative in my approach; it is entirely belt and braces. If the opportunity is to be given to Parliament to make sure that we have both the belt and the braces, then for heaven’s sake let us take it and not leave it to the vagaries and the uncertainties of judicial interpretation.
I have already referred to the Hogben case. I am not going to go through the analysis, because this is not something that depends on compiling a judgment about the interpretation of law based on precedents. I do not think that any case we put forward, coming back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie) said, could generate an upside or a downside. I just want clarity; that is the whole point. The words that I have used adopt the notwithstanding formula in section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, relating to the sovereignty of Parliament. I argued this in No. 10, and the Prime Minister, to his enormous credit, completely backed me. I said, “You have to include the words ‘notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972’.” By doing this in a certain manner, one ensures that one achieves one’s objective, without the uncertainty that can arise in the circumstances that I have described.
We need to bear in mind that the del Rio Prada case was a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. The Minister referred to the other cases. In the case of Uttley, there was an appeal on which the House of Lords concluded that article 7 would be infringed only if a sentence was imposed on a defendant that constituted a heavier penalty than that which would have been imposed at the time the offence was committed. The ECHR then declared that his application was inadmissible. The del Rio Prada case was to do with Spanish policy, but there is no doubt that part of the argument put forward by the Government today has depended on administration, rather than the object of the Bill. That is another area that needs to be carefully considered, because the question of administration should not be the basis on which we make these decisions.
There we are—I have made my case. The Government could review the situation when the Bill goes to the House of Lords, and I will be interested to see how people develop this argument from now on.
I made it clear to the Minister previously that it is not my intention to divide the Committee on new clause 1, but scrutiny of the deradicalisation programme and giving Parliament confidence that the programme is being monitored is very important, and I hope he will address that when he responds.
The new clause specifically requires the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison deradicalisation programme. On Second Reading, the Minister mentioned some figures with regard to resources, including £90 million on counter-terror policing and an uplift in the prison budget from £2.55 billion to £2.9 billion, but that does not tell us specifically how much is being spent on the deradicalisation programme. That is the sort of information that an independent reviewer would be able to discover and then put in a format that the House could consider.
We have already discussed Mr Ian Acheson’s review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. One of his recommendations was to have an independent adviser on counter-terrorism in prisons who is accountable to the Secretary of State. My new clause goes slightly further than that recommendation. It would require the Secretary of State for Justice to appoint a person to review the operation of the prison deradicalisation programme, with the power to enter prison premises both to gather evidence and provide scrutiny. There would be a statutory requirement for a report to be laid before Parliament every three months on the programme. That could be regarded as too often, but the general point stands—this House would be in a position to properly judge the effectiveness of rehabilitation work in our prisons.
Subsection (5) of the new clause would give the independent reviewer the power to look into the resources available to the programme, including for probation and rehabilitation work. That proposal of an independent reviewer would give the opportunity for proper scrutiny of this very important programme. The Minister will be aware of the healthy identity intervention and other such programmes that currently exist. Through new clause 1, we seek to build on that and give real confidence in the Government’s work in the rehabilitation and deradicalisation space. I am not absolutely clear of the extent to which those who have perpetrated these awful atrocities in recent months took part in deradicalisation programmes, but I hope that will be considered and that the Minister will learn the lessons from that. It is vital that we use the time in prison of whatever length—I had a debate about that earlier with the right hon. Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne)—in a constructive way to protect the public.
I do not support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. First, the point made by the Minister is correct, and even if we put this into the legislation, the right to go to Strasbourg would still exist. The second reason why I am uncomfortable with what the hon. Gentleman is saying—I am quite happy to give way to him again if I am wrong in my interpretation—is that he, as I understand it, wants the House to pass legislation and then somehow prevent courts from being able to adjudicate on it, which surely is not what is meant by having a sovereign Parliament that is accountable to judges.
With respect to the European convention on human rights, I would simply make the point that I made just now, which is that I could have included such words—yet again, that is another part of my probing amendment—and they could have been “notwithstanding the charter of fundamental rights” as a matter of fact, but that would have been destroyed by the existence at that time of the European Communities Act 1972, which was binding on us by Act of Parliament.
The second point is that I firmly believe we can tackle this issue of terrorism and remain signatories to the European convention on human rights. That is essentially the Government’s position here today, and I really do not think that we need to get into this debate because the Government have clearly stated that the Act—or the Bill, as it currently is—is compliant with article 7. If people wish to challenge that in the courts, that is a matter for them, but the Government must be confident in their legal position.
Under the Human Rights Act, each Bill that comes before the House contains a sentence on its front page to show that Ministers have considered whether it is compatible with that Act. If they had wished, the Government could have stated in the Bill that they did not think it compatible with the Human Rights Act, but they wanted us to proceed regardless. They did not do that, however, and they clearly state on the Bill their belief that it is compatible with the Act. We have heard a case law of history from the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), and others, but that is the Government’s position, and for those reasons I cannot support the amendment. I understand that he will not push it to a vote, and the debate will continue in the other place, but this is not an amendment that would have found favour on the Labour Benches.
Let me return to new clause 1. I will not push the idea of an independent reviewer to the vote—I will not frustrate the passage of the Bill in that way. However, it would assist the Committee if the Minister set out how Members will be able to scrutinise the programme of deradicalisation over the next few years, and how we can have the information before us—whether from the Ministry of Justice directly or in another way—to assess how it is working.
The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), intervened on the Justice Secretary during his opening speech and said that she felt there had been a lack of success in the deradicalisation programmes. She is right, and we need to see some success in the years ahead. I will not push new clause 1 to the vote, but I hope the Minister will provide some assurances about how such scrutiny could take place.
The purpose of my amendments is stunningly obvious. At lines 34 and 37, I wish to remove “two-thirds”, and insert the words “nine-tenths”. In reality, many sentences, even for acts of terrorism such as the possession of terrorist promotional material with intent, give rise to a surprisingly short sentence, such as four years. In such a case, the difference between half the sentence, as currently served, and two-thirds, is a mere six months. Admittedly, extending that to nine-tenths of the sentence does not address the nature of the problem—that is why this is a prodding amendment—but the fact is that sentences are too short.
There is a general problem of honesty in sentencing. When a judge hands down a sentence in court, all those in the know work out on the back of a fag packet what it means in terms of imprisonment, but the public, who are generally not in the know, do not understand that the sentence is not that at all. They would be scandalised if they knew.
In my earlier remarks, I made the point that fast law can be bad law. In the absence of an opportunity for thorough prelegislative scrutiny, we absolutely must have post-legislative scrutiny. There are relevant examples of where this has happened: the Immigration Act 2014 was controversial, so it contained the same requirement as exists in new clause 3; and the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which was rushed in in response to a court ruling, included a sunset clause of 18 months. I am not asking for a sunset clause, but new clause 3 sets out clearly that we would like the opportunity for a statutory review after one year. The person conducting that review should be appointed after consultation with the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and they should have professional experience relating to imprisonment for offences of terrorism.
New clause 3 does not seek to outline the scope of such a statutory review, but I would like to give the Committee some examples of the kind of matters that could be covered by it. Such a statutory review could ask whether the extra time the terrorists spend in prison is being used to deradicalise them. Are they actually receiving an effective deradicalisation programme or, on the contrary, are they potentially becoming more dangerous? It could look at whether the Parole Board has the resources to cope with the extra demands put on it. It could look at whether terrorist prisoners are being failed by the Parole Board and whether they are being released at the end of their sentence without any supervision on licence. It could look at whether the Probation Service has the staff and resources it needs to ensure effective supervision during the shorter period that offenders spend on licence. It could also perhaps look at whether the change in the release point affects the sentencing decisions made by judges.
As I said earlier, there is a risk that because of the lack of opportunity for prelegislative scrutiny there is the possibility that this becomes a law of unintended consequences. I know there are proposals for legislation down the line, but we also know that legislation can get delayed. It would be absolutely right for the House to insist on post-legislative scrutiny by virtue of a one-year statutory review. Who knows, the review might even identify things that could be included in future legislation.
On the specifics of the amendment, my hon. Friend makes a belt-and-braces case, as I said, for a “notwithstanding” clause. The shadow Minister made the point that that was fundamentally disagreeable and made a constitutional argument against the “notwithstanding” clause per se. However, he also went on to say that he believed the Government were right, or were likely to be right, in asserting that they were clear that, in any case, this legislation did not contradict any existing rights legislation. We heard that today from the Secretary of State and again subsequently in the debate: the Government do not feel that the proposed legislation is likely to be successfully challenged, as my hon. Friend suggested it might. We have to assume that the Government have taken legal advice to make that claim.
The second amendment is the one proposed by the shadow Minister. Again, I have great sympathy with it. All legislation relating to such matters benefits from pre and post-legislative scrutiny, both because we need to get it right, for the obvious reasons we have debated—its salience, its significance, its importance—and because, to build the consensus necessary across the House to proceed in a way that maintains public faith, pre and post-legislative scrutiny is important. As recognised by all the contributors to this debate, the emergency we face is such that that has not been possible on this occasion. I would resist the shadow Minister’s amendment, not because I do not believe in the principle or the sentiments behind it but because there is a very good case for the Select Committees—notably the Home Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee—to look at this matter once the Bill has become an Act. I would be surprised if they did not. I know the Minister in his winding-up speech will—I will not say “invite that kind of scrutiny”, as I am not sure it is appropriate for a Minister to ask a Select Committee to investigate or scrutinise the Government—want to say that he would be surprised if they did not. That kind of reassurance would give great comfort to the House in measuring the effect of this important legislation.
The third and final amendment that we have heard ably articulated during our considerations this afternoon is the one in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne). Again, I am extremely sympathetic to the purpose of the amendment. Indeed, I might even go further, and say that “nine-tenths” is too modest. However, while my right hon. Friend’s amendment is welcome and adds pressure, if I might put it that way—he said “prodding” rather than “probing”, and I have added a third “p”, “pressure”, because I know that alliteration is dear to his heart—given that the Government have made crystal clear that in forthcoming legislation they will look at three matters, minimum sentences, maximum sentences and mandatory sentences, much of what he desires should form part of that further Government policy and practice. I hope that we can increase minimum sentences, that we can increase maximum sentences and that we can tie to that—as the Government have said they will, as I note from comments made in the statement by the Secretary of State following the recent terrorist outrage—
The Government have said, and the Secretary of State was clear about it in the statement a few days ago, that tied to those three provisions will be the end of early release for certain kinds of prisoner. I now happily give way to my right hon. Friend before I move to my exciting peroration.
My hon. Friend said that nothing less than certainty would do in cases of public safety, and I entirely understand that sentiment. Perhaps this would best be debated at another time, but I wonder whether his amendment as written would have the effect that he intends, because I do not think that simply writing a notwithstanding clause into a piece of primary legislation would abrogate our obligations under a treaty that we have entered into or preclude an applicant or litigant going directly to the European Court of Human Rights—they might go straight to Strasbourg—even if we could somehow prevent the use of the English and Welsh courts. I do not think the amendment as drafted would actually have the legal effect intended. However, my hon. Friend has, as always, raised some interesting constitutional questions, and I am sure they will be debated in the other place in due course. In our manifesto, we said that we would have a think about the operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and some of the issues that he referred to in his speech. There will be plenty of opportunities in due course to consider at greater length the issues that he raised. I am grateful for his undertaking not to press his amendment to a vote today, but the whole Committee has certainly heard what he had to say and will carefully reflect on it.
My right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) gave me, in his words, a prod. Let me confirm that I am duly prodded on the questions of longer sentences for serious terrorist offenders and of their serving more of their sentence in prison. As a number of Members have said, it is our intention to bring forward a counter-terrorism, sentencing and release Bill in the relatively near future. It is also the Government’s intention to define a cohort of the most serious terrorist offenders and to seek a minimum sentence of 14 years for those serious offenders and ensure that all the sentence handed down by the judge is served in prison. I think that that will respond to the point that my right hon. Friend was making.
Turning to the severity of offending, as I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), we will review all types of offending, so the whole spectrum will be in scope. As for how we define that “most serious” cohort, the Government are currently thinking quite carefully about the definition. I do not want to give my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) a definition today, because that will be a matter for the counter-terrorism Bill, but we are thinking about question extremely carefully, and the House will be able to debate it fully in due course.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), asked about a review of the effectiveness of the deradicalisation agenda. I agree that the review is critical, and several Members raised it on Second Reading. We are setting up a new counter-terrorism programmes and interventions centre within the Prisons and Probation Service that will look specifically at the deradicalisation problem. We intend to publish further research and reports in the usual way, and I expect full scrutiny from Members. As my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings said in his speech, we will fully embrace scrutiny of that description, and I would be surprised—my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) is not in his place—if the Justice Committee did not look at this area in due course. I accept the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings that proper and deep scrutiny of this area is needed, because the deradicalisation question is so important.
The hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper), in the same vein as the hon. Member for Torfaen, talked about the need to scrutinise the effect of this legislation after it has passed. Once again, I accept the thrust of what she says. It is important that we keep the effect of legislation under review, particularly where it is passed in such a necessarily expeditious fashion. I would expect the Justice Committee to take an interest in this, and the House will have a chance to take a great interest when we come to debate the counter-terrorism Bill in a few months’ time. There will then be a lot more time available for us to debate these matters and, indeed, to review the operation of this Bill, which by then will have been in effect for a few months.
In terms of an independent review that goes beyond Parliament’s Committees and, indeed, this House—as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings said in reply to an intervention by the hon. Member for St Albans—I expect that Jonathan Hall QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, will be conducting independent reviews of exactly the kind the hon. Member for St Albans described.
I think that covers many of the points raised on the various amendments and new clauses. On the substance of the Bill, it is worth briefly highlighting that clause 1 specifies the release provisions we have been talking about and the two-thirds release point for prisoners in England and Wales, at which point the Parole Board’s discretion will be applied.
Clause 1 also references schedule 1, which specifies the kinds of offences that are in scope. Part 1 of proposed new schedule 19ZA to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 defines the terrorist offences that are in scope, and part 2 defines the offences that may be determined to have a terrorist connection.
Clause 2 disapplies some historical transitional provisions dating back to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those are essentially technical amendments to make sure this legislation works in a way that is consistent with the Act.
Clauses 3 and 4 apply these provisions to Scotland. We are keen to make sure that the public in Scotland are protected as much as the public in England and Wales. In that context, I am grateful to the hon. Member for East Lothian (Kenny MacAskill) for his supportive remarks. I hope I can infer from his remarks that our colleagues in the Scottish Government in Holyrood are supportive of the proposals.
Clause 5 relates to the setting of licence conditions. Clause 6 makes further consequential amendments relating to transitional cases. Clause 7 makes further consequential amendments that apply to England and Wales. Clause 8 makes transitional provisions in relation to offenders in Scotland and, again, clause 9 makes further consequential amendments that apply to Scotland.
Finally, clause 10 specifies the Bill’s territorial extent and commencement. It is worth saying that commencement will be upon Royal Assent, and we therefore hope the Bill takes effect from 27 February, which is important from the perspective of the release of certain dangerous offenders.
I hope that covers the clauses and schedules, and that they will stand part of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 1 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 1 and 2 agreed to.
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Bill reported, without amendment.
Third Reading
May I thank all Members for taking part in this important debate, on a Bill that, as Members on both sides of the House have demonstrated comprehensively, was timely and necessary? We have a proud history of coming together in times of adversity against people who seek to divide us. Together, we can make sure that the terrorists who seek to threaten our way of life will never win.
I readily acknowledge that we are passing this Bill to a very tight timescale, but the appalling attacks we witnessed at Streatham and at Fishmongers’ Hall made it plain that the time for action was now, which is why I welcome the sense of urgency that has been shared in all parts of the House. That has necessarily shortened the time available to debate these issues, but I will of course continue to engage with Members across the House on these matters. There will be further opportunities to legislate on these issues, both in our forthcoming counter-terrorism, sentencing and release Bill and, more broadly, in the sentencing Bill that we will introduce following our sentencing White Paper later this year.
We will also review the current maximum penalties and sentencing framework for terrorist offences to ensure that they are sufficient and comprehensive. Our underlying principle is this: terrorist offenders should no longer be released before the end of their custodial sentence unless the Parole Board is satisfied that they are no longer a risk to the public.
I take this opportunity to thank all the officials, not only those who have assisted us in the Box today, but all the team at the Ministry of Justice, who have worked at pace and in great detail on complex issues of national importance, to a timescale that is perhaps unusual and almost unprecedented. We do owe them a deep debt of gratitude, and I am honoured to place that formally on the record.
For now, passing this Bill will take a significant step to ensuring that the British public, whom we serve, are being given the protection they need, by ensuring that terrorist offenders spend longer in prison in all cases and are not automatically released without being fully and properly assessed.
Clearly, we will need to address an issue of investment in deradicalisation programmes and proper mechanisms to be able to assess how effective they are. We will be holding the Government to account on those issues in the months and years ahead. There is also a wider issue to address on sentencing. As I indicated in my earlier remarks, this of course became an emergency because of the incidents we have seen in recent months, but there does need to be greater long-term planning, which I hope the Secretary of State will be able to provide to the Department in the years ahead.
I also echo what the Secretary of State said about the officials, who obviously had to produce this Bill very quickly. I would like to thank him for his work with me on this over the past week. I also thank the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), and all those right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed to the debate today.
I should also put on record in Hansard my thanks to Robert Keenan in my office: he has had very quickly to turn around work on the Bill on a very short-term basis since it was first published.
On that basis, I hope that the Bill will pass its Third Reading without a Division.
With those tributes appropriately made, I simply concur with the thanks to all involved.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
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