PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
China: Foreign Interference Arrests - 4 March 2026 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement regarding three arrests that took place this morning as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act 2023. I can confirm that this relates to China. I can also confirm that this relates to foreign interference targeting UK democracy.

Mr Speaker, for reasons that you will understand, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on any aspect of what is now a live investigation. It is absolutely critical that we do not hamper the work of the police or prejudice any future legal processes by what we say in this House today.

I would, however, point the House to what Counter Terrorism Policing has just said in its own statement, which is that, this morning, its officers arrested three men as part of an investigation into suspected offences under the National Security Act. All three men were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to section 3 of that Act. Any decision as to whether to proceed with a prosecution would be a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service.

The Government stand resolute in our resolve to counter foreign interference activity targeting the UK from any state actor. The Government have been consistent and unambiguous in our assessment that China presents a series of threats to the United Kingdom. We remain deeply concerned by an increasing pattern of covert activity from Chinese state-linked actors targeting UK democracy. This involves attempts to obtain information on UK policymaking and interfere with our sovereign affairs.

From the November MI5 espionage alert warning about Chinese intelligence officers targeting individuals with access to sensitive information on Parliament and Government to the attempted interference activities of Christine Lee in 2022, this Government will not tolerate it. I can confirm to the House that British officials have formally démarched Chinese counterparts in London and Beijing about these allegations to raise our strong concerns. However, as this is a live investigation, it would not be appropriate to comment further. But let me be clear: if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, we will impose severe consequences and hold all actors involved to account.

In the meantime, the Government are taking robust action to ensure that the UK’s democratic institutions and processes are a hard target for this activity. The National Security Act 2023 provides our intelligence agencies and law enforcement with the modern legal tools they need to deter, detect, and disrupt the full range of state threats. The action that Counter Terrorism Policing has been able to take this morning is an example that shows that the legislation working well. The political influence tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act also provides an essential framework for ensuring that those who seek to undermine our democracy are held to account.

I continue to drive across Government the delivery of our counter-political interference and espionage action plan, which I announced to Parliament on 18 November. This is being co-ordinated in strong partnership with the parliamentary security authorities.

Our aim is to forge a cross-party and whole-of-society shield to safeguard UK democracy. This includes strengthening our legal defences, cutting off channels for interference, and supporting those on the frontline of UK politics to recognise, resist and report the threat.

Members should have seen the guidance that the National Protective Security Authority and the National Cyber Security Centre published last year, which included what to look out for in terms of malicious foreign targeting and some basic steps that Members can take to protect themselves. I urge all Members to read carefully through the guidance that was issued. If hon. Members do experience any suspicious or out-of-the-ordinary interactions, whether in person or online, they should report it to the Parliamentary Security Department. The Government will continue to work in collaboration with the Parliament Security Department to set up a range of more tailored, bespoke briefings for those at greatest risk.

In January, I joined the director general of MI5 and the chief executive of the NCSC to brief the chief executives of the UK political parties on the developing threat picture. I can confirm that officials are now focused on developing a programme of work to engage with the UK’s think-tanks and non-profit sector to discuss the threats that they face from foreign interference. Our intent is to work with them to strengthen their resilience, ensuring that their hard-won reputations and networks are not exploited by our adversaries as platforms for covertly influencing UK public discourse and policymaking.

In February, we introduced the Representation of the People Bill, which will further strengthen safeguards against foreign interference through political funding. Our proposed Bill includes introducing tougher rules for donor recipients to conduct risk assessments before accepting donations, as well as increasing the powers of the Electoral Commission to ensure that it has the tools necessary to fulfil its duties.

The Government eagerly await the report of Philip Rycroft, following his independent review of regulations and safeguards against foreign financial interference in UK politics. The review was commissioned to rigorously test the financial safeguards we currently have in place and will specifically consider safeguards against illicit funding streams, including the use of crypto-assets. The review’s findings will be delivered to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and me by the end of the month. I confirm that recommendations, where appropriate, will inform the Representation of the People Bill. We are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.

It continues to be in our long-term strategic interest to engage with China. We are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically on areas where engagement is in the UK’s national interest, including climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration and serious organised crime—to name just a few. But let me be crystal clear: this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations. We do not trade off security for economic access. Instead, by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas.

We will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere with or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will always prioritise UK national security. That is why the Prime Minister’s visit opened up a direct channel of communication to deliver in the national interest, enabling us to raise frank concerns about activities that impact our national security, including domestic security issues, at the most senior levels of the Chinese system.

I assure Members of the House and the public that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to defend our democracy. The Government are steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and deterring China’s interference activity wherever it takes place. I commend this statement to the House.

Order. I am sure we appreciate the fact that the Minister has come to the House at the earliest opportunity to provide an update on these serious issues. As there is now a live police investigation, Members should exercise caution in saying anything that risks prejudicing that investigation. I thought it important that the House got to this at the earliest possible time, and I must thank the Minister for that. I call the shadow Minister.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and I appreciate the speed with which he has come to the House today.

Here we are again: another year, another Chinese spy scandal, and the backdrop is the Government’s failed policy of appeasement. The Government must surely be coming to the realisation that unless the United Kingdom stands up to these threats, our country will continue to be treated with disdain. We watched how the Government allowed the Chinese spy case involving Members of this House to collapse. We watched as—despite the interference in our democracy—the Government approved the Chinese mega-embassy in London, and we watched as the Prime Minister went to Beijing, cap in hand, begging for trade deals to mitigate the costs of his own disastrous economic policy. We in the House watched as those things happened; the Chinese state watched, too, and saw that it could act with impunity. The Minister said that there is no trade-off between our economic interests and our democratic and national security interests, but I am afraid that is exactly what has happened.

I understand that the Minister will be unable to say much about the new case, but we all know what we are dealing with here, so I hope he will be clear about the Government’s response. I hope that he will talk a little bit about whether this case touches on Members of the House, because while we have been in the Chamber the BBC and The Guardian have reported that one of those arrested is the spouse of a sitting Labour MP and that another is the spouse of a former Labour MP. Given that that is being reported in the press, will the Minister confirm whether that is true?

Will the Minister also give a cast-iron guarantee to the House that the Government will do everything in their power to prevent this case from collapsing? We have seen this show before. Will he promise that, unlike last time, the Chinese ambassador will be summoned by Ministers and told that aggressive interference in our country and its democracy will no longer be tolerated? Mr Speaker, I should say how right you were to deny that ambassador access to this House.

Will the Minister now commit to placing China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? The Minister said that China presents a series of threats, but during the last spy scandal the Government refused to say the crucial words—that China posed a risk to our national security—and they would not publicly accept that China was opposed or hostile to the interests of the United Kingdom. Will he now accept that that position is no longer tenable?

The Minister said that if there is proven evidence of attempts by China to interfere with UK sovereign affairs, the Government will impose severe consequences and hold all actors involved to account. We sincerely hope that is true, but it was not true last time, so here we are again. Unless the Government finally step up, we will be back here time and again.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response. I am grateful to him for acknowledging the speed at which the Government have sought to make a statement. I know that he and right hon. and hon. Members will understand that there are strict limitations on what I can say about what is obviously now a live police investigation, but I hope that I speak for both sides of the House when I say that these are the most serious matters, which require us as a House to put the protection of our democracy above any political point scoring. That is how we should approach these proceedings.

The hon. Member, for reasons that I understand, sought to critique the Government’s position. I understand why he did that, but I am confident in the Government’s response to this incident and to our wider agenda on countering political interference. Of course, it is right that Members across the House have the opportunity to scrutinise Government policy and ask questions. That is precisely why we have moved at pace to provide an opportunity for them to do so.

I want to give the hon. Member and other right hon. and hon. Members a guarantee that, given the sensitivity of these issues and the obvious need to protect the operational activity of our police and the security services, we will look for other opportunities to provide appropriate briefings to relevant Members across the House by the relevant experts, to ensure that they can be updated in a way that simply cannot be done on the Floor of the House.

The hon. Member asked a number of questions. He will understand that there are strict limits on what I can say, but let me assure him about the seriousness with which we take these matters. I have always believed that the work that takes place across the House, led by Government, to defend our democracy should be a shared endeavour. The defending democracy taskforce was an initiative brought forward by the previous Government, and this Government have invested in it. It is the fulcrum at which we co-ordinate activity across Government and with law enforcement partners, working closely with Mr Speaker and the parliamentary security authorities here in the House, to ensure that our elected representatives are properly protected against the threats that we face. I assure him of the Government’s determination to stand with all Members to ensure that they are properly protected.

The hon. Member knows, because we have had such exchanges on numerous occasions, that matters relating to prosecutions are specifically matters for the Crown Prosecution Service. It is not for Ministers to opine and make judgments from the Dispatch Box, because the CPS is rightly independent of Government. But he does know—as do other hon. Members—how extremely disappointed the Government were that the trial last autumn did not proceed. Clearly, as he will understand, there is a crucial difference in that the charges in that case had been brought under the Official Secrets Act 1911. I am confident that the National Security Act 2023 provides the robust legislation we need to address the threats that we undoubtedly face.

The hon. Member mentioned FIRS, and I understand why he decided to do so. FIRS is an important capability that comes from the National Security Act. It is still a relatively new tool, and we are seeking to ensure that we can derive the maximum operational capability from it. We have not made any final decisions as to whether we will place other countries on the enhanced tier, but we keep that under very close review. As I have made clear, this Government will simply not tolerate attempts to interfere in our democracy. We have already taken tough action to strengthen our defences against foreign interference, and we will not hesitate to take further steps where they are necessary.

I call the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy.

I thank the Minister for his immediate update to the House, given the recency of this breaking news. He will know that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy did its report on the case of Cash and Berry, in which it made certain recommendations. The National Security Act 2023 is now fully in place. That is post the original Official Secrets Act 1911, which related to what was undertaken, allegedly, by Cash and Berry. Would the Minister agree that, given the essence of the grain of rice strategy pursued by China, we could see many more cases such as this, involving intelligence gathering by the Chinese as they seek to undermine our democracy and political system?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend and his Committee for the important work that they do, and I am grateful for their report. He will have seen the comprehensive response from the Government. We want to ensure—and we are doing this—that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible target for those who would seek to interfere in our democracy. That is why we are investing in the processes of the defending democracy taskforce, why we commissioned the Rycroft review and why I announced the counter-political espionage action plan. There is a lot of work taking place across Government, working with law enforcement to ensure that we are protecting our institutions and our elected representatives. I hope that I can convey to my hon. Friend and the House the seriousness with which we take these matters, but I want this to be a shared endeavour, working with parliamentarians of all colours. This affects us all, and the Government are working at pace to stand against the threat.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the Minister for giving me advance sight of the statement, even if at this stage he is rather limited in what he can say. He is entirely right to say that we must continue to allow the police to do their job and to do it well. We remain grateful to all those who are working to keep our country safe, both here in the UK and abroad. It is essential we defend our country and our democracy, including through a robust response by counter-terrorist police.

The arrests this morning highlight the continued reach of foreign interference in the UK, whether it involves spying in its raw sense or the pervasive and persuasive influence of foreign money in our politics. The Government could be doing more to put an end to the clout of foreign money in our democracy, and there is an opportunity to limit the influence of foreign money through the Representation of the People Bill, but as Spotlight on Corruption has made clear, the provisions in the Bill as it stands—looking at company revenue rather than profit—can be easily exploited and far too easily gamed to allow foreign money in. This must stop.

The Security Minister mentioned the foreign influence registration scheme in his statement, but he was unable, not for the first time, to mention any plans to add China to the enhanced tier. How many times must we all come to this House to hear a report of further rounds of arrests under counter-terrorism legislation before this Government take this action? Do the Government plan to review their decision to allow the building of the Chinese mega-embassy, and will they go further to stop foreign money being funnelled into our democracy, including through an absolute donation cap and a ban on those who have worked for foreign regimes from making any donations at all?

Let me take this opportunity—on behalf, I am sure, of all Members in this House—to thank those whose vital work keeps our country safe. They are the best of us, and our national security is underpinned by their endeavours. The hon. Lady makes several important points. She is right to raise concerns about foreign money in our politics. The Government take these concerns incredibly seriously. That is precisely why we have commissioned Philip Rycroft to conduct an independent review into this issue at pace. She might be aware that we debated these matters in Westminster Hall just a couple of weeks ago, when I encouraged her colleague, the hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young), to make formal representations to Mr Rycroft. I am grateful for her confirmation that they have done so. That is very much appreciated, because this is an important body of work that will provide recommendations to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and myself in the next couple of weeks, in time to inform the Representation of the People Bill. This is a timely piece of work and a good opportunity to ensure that that Bill provides the protections that we—I think, collectively—want it to.

The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) mentioned FIRS, and I understand why. FIRS is a useful tool, but it is still a new tool and we are working to ensure that it provides the maximum operational capability. We are looking carefully at how we can use it to best effect. She also mentioned the embassy; again, I understand why she did so. She knows the Government’s position with regard to the embassy. Again, I am a bit limited in what I can say about that because of ongoing legal proceedings, but I refer her to the remarks that I have made previously. There is a strong national security case for the embassy. She will have noted the letter that was sent to the Government from the directors general of MI5 and GCHQ, and I am confident that this is the right thing to be doing.

I thank the Minister for his statement and for all the work he does on the defending democracy taskforce. I also put on record my thanks to the law enforcement authorities and national security agencies. From what I have read online, I understand that one of today’s arrests took place in my constituency. My constituents will obviously be concerned to hear that, and I wonder what the Security Minister can say to reassure me and my constituents that the police and all the relevant authorities have the resources needed to keep us safe and to keep our democracy safe. If I am right to assume that what I have read online is correct, will he meet me at the earliest opportunity to discuss this further?

My hon. Friend has raised important points with regard to our democracy on countless occasions, and I am grateful to him for doing so again today. I can assure him that the police have the resources they need to do a difficult and complicated job, and of course I would be happy to meet him at the earliest available opportunity.

I call the Father of the House.

The Chinese only represent strength, and for them everything is transactional, so I think the country would rejoice if the Government were to summon the Chinese ambassador and say to him, “This sort of behaviour is intolerable. You cannot build this mega-embassy in just about the most sensitive site in London while you behave like this.” I am not asking about what MI5 and MI6 have said. This is transactional. We must say, “Treat British nationals like Jimmy Lai properly, and don’t spy on us; otherwise, we’re going to pause this embassy until you learn to behave.”

The Father of the House will have heard my introductory remarks, where I made it clear that Chinese officials have been démarched, both here in London and in Beijing. He talks about the transactional nature of the relationship. I hope he will accept that this Government have to, and do, act in the national interest. There are absolutely areas where we need to co-operate with China. I have referenced some, but they also include some areas within the law enforcement space, such as illegal migration, serious organised crime and narcotics trafficking. I honestly think it would be naive of anyone—although I am certainly not saying that the Father of the House was putting forward this view—to say that we should not have some kind of functional working relationship with China, but I was crystal clear in my opening remarks that national security is the first priority of this Government and we will do everything we need to do to safeguard our country and our democracy.

The conflict in Iran is deeply concerning, and I was glad to see that the Government’s flights are set to leave the middle east tonight. What more can my colleagues and I do to protect those stuck in the region from bad faith actors?

I am not quite sure that is relevant. I call the Karen Bradley.

Given the vulnerabilities of Members of Parliament, can I urge the Security Minister to work with the parliamentary authorities not just to pass information to Members but to work proactively with us to ensure that we are all aware of the risks that are posed to us and the steps we need to take to ensure that we are not exposed to interference from foreign states?

The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee is absolutely right. I hope she understands the seriousness with which we take these matters. I spend a lot of time working with the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that we have in place the protections we need. That is not just about elections; it is about our democracy on an enduring basis. The relationship with this House and with Mr Speaker—hon. Members know how seriously Mr Speaker takes these matters—is a close working relationship. I will always make myself available to talk to colleagues about any matter of concern. A significant amount of guidance has been issued over the last few months. I encourage Members of this and the other House to engage with the materials that have been published, and, where they have further concerns, to raise them through the Parliamentary Security Department and with myself.

I thank the Minister for his update on this difficult case. In his statement, he confirmed that the Government are working on a

“proscription-style tool to disrupt proxy organisations undermining our security.”

When will this tool be ready and does it include the recommendations set out by Jonathan Hall?

My hon. Friend raised this matter with the Foreign Secretary just yesterday, and he is right to do so. He will know that the Government commissioned Jonathan Hall to look at the legislative framework given the concerns we had that there was not an appropriate legislative tool to proscribe a state-backed organisation. Mr Hall has made a number of recommendations, all of which have been accepted by the Government. I am conscious that the Leader of the House is sitting here and will not expect me to talk about matters relating to parliamentary business, but I can give my hon. Friend the assurances he seeks that the Government are seeking to deliver this tool and will seek to bring forward legislation at the earliest available opportunity.

As I hope the Minister would accept, the last trial of those accused of alleged espionage on behalf of China foundered—to put it at its mildest—because of a lack of shared understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government about the evidence that the Government could properly submit in support of that prosecution. I do not expect him to comment about the specifics of this case, but would he accept that it would be sensible for the Government now to ensure that as this matter develops, no such misunderstanding occurs, and that the relationship between the CPS and the Government is in the right place to ensure that evidential conversations are held early rather than late? Finally, would he accept that it would be sensible for the Intelligence and Security Committee to be kept up to date as this matter develops, given that we meet in private and the risks of prejudicing future prosecutions are lower in our case?

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member and share in much of the analysis that he has brought forward. Misunderstandings are never helpful and, under these circumstances, above all else we will ensure that there are no misunderstandings. He knows the disappointment that is felt across Government, and within the agencies and law enforcement, about where we got to back in the autumn. Of course, I give him an absolute assurance and commitment that we will do everything we need to do to ensure that the CPS is able to make a judgment; but, as he will understand, that has to be independent of Government. His point about the ISC is absolutely right. He will understand that events have moved incredibly quickly this morning and that we will want to take a moment later today to reflect on what needs to happen next, but I give him an absolute assurance that we want to work closely with the ISC as part of the process.

I thank the Minister for the update, and I welcome progress made on the counter-political interference and espionage plan. Would the Minister return to the House as appropriate to further update us on that plan?

The counter-political espionage and interference plan draws together numerous important strands of activity across Government and ensures that all that work is properly co-ordinated, and we take that very seriously. I absolutely give my hon. Friend the assurance that he seeks. We will provide updates at the earliest available opportunity, but should he or any other Members have concerns in the meantime, I would be very happy to speak to them.

I praise the work of our police and our security and intelligence services in this case. I thank the Minister for his statement. Like him, I look forward to the publication of the Rycroft report. The Foreign Affairs Committee heard evidence from the Electoral Commission, as did the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Would the Government consider new clauses to the Representation of the People Bill to widen and strengthen the powers of the Electoral Commission and, importantly, provide it with the necessary funding to properly defend our democracy?

All the points that the hon. Gentleman makes are entirely sound and reasonable. He will understand that we need to wait for the Rycroft review to report; I expect that to be in just a couple of weeks. We very deliberately sequenced it so that it can make recommendations that inform proceedings on the Representation of the People Bill. He knows from contact we have had through the Joint Committee that we take these matters very seriously, and we will want to ensure that we have all the safeguards we need. I am grateful for the confirmation from his Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), that his party has engaged with that process, and I would be happy to discuss this further with them.

I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for the work he does—and did, in his previous career—to ensure that our country and democracy stay safe. Mr Speaker, you will be aware that democracy only happens in this place because of House staff and MPs’ staff, who make a huge difference to us and ensure that we can do our job. How will the Minister protect MPs’ staff and House staff, and ensure their security as well?

I thank my hon. Friend for his question. He has developed something of a knack for finding a good question that most people will have in their mind. I can give him the assurances that he seeks. It is important that we ensure that protections are in place, not only for our elected representatives—those who step forward to serve in this House and in other places—but for their staff, who work so hard and diligently to serve them. We still have a lot of work to do—that work will be led here by Mr Speaker and the Parliamentary Security Department —but the Government will work very closely alongside them, to ensure that they have the support that they need.

The Minister spoke of “severe consequences”. Will he outline what those severe consequences might be? Does he understand that Beijing is unlikely to take that terribly seriously, given what has happened in the recent past? Will the severe consequences include putting on hold plans for the Chinese super-embassy and spy centre, pending the outcome of the Met’s investigation?

The right hon. Gentleman, who is a very experienced Member of this House, will know that, given that we are referring to events that took place just a couple of hours ago, it would be unwise of me to get into further detail. On our response to the threats that we have faced over the last months, I point him to a number of measures that I have referred to. He knows, I hope, how seriously we take these matters. He and I do not agree on the embassy, but I say to him, as I have said to other hon. Members, that there is a clear national security case for the embassy proposal. The directors general of two of the security services have been clear about the national security advantages, as have I. This Government will do everything we need to do to protect our country, our national security and this place. He knows that there is a lot that I cannot say about what we intend to do, but let me be crystal clear: where malign actors—whoever they may be—seek to undermine our democracy, there will be consequences.

I recently visited the Defence Intelligence Academy with the armed forces parliamentary scheme and saw at first hand that our intelligence services are the best in the business. The Government should be praised for increasing the single intelligence account in real terms. Will he commit to keeping the SIA under review, given the increasing threats around political interference, and the threat of state-sponsored terrorism from Iran?

My hon. Friend makes an important point about the SIA. He is right that this Government have ensured that our intelligence services have access to the resources they need in a difficult and challenging world. I give him and the House an assurance that should there be a requirement for additional support, this Government will always ensure that both our police and our intelligence services have the resources they need to do the very difficult job that we ask them to do.

The Government will be well aware that, through the united front, the Chinese Communist party has created a global network of individuals and organisations that act as a political weapon to isolate, neutralise or counter Beijing’s critics. Indeed, a Jamestown Foundation report published this month shows that the UK is one of the four most exposed countries, with over 400 united front-linked organisations identified here. Why do the Government continue to refuse to take the necessary action to protect the nations of these islands by placing China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme? That scheme may be new, but if it is going to be useful, it needs to be used.

The hon. Gentleman makes some important points. He will have heard what I said about FIRS. It is an important capability, and we need ensure that it is deployed in the right way, but we have introduced a number of measures in recent months to ensure that the United Kingdom is the hardest possible operating environment for those who seek to undermine our democracy. We are doing lots of things that I am unable to talk about, but I give him the assurance that we are taking these matters incredibly seriously, and will do everything that we need to do.

I have raised my concerns about foreign interference by Russia and China on many occasions, and today’s events underline why the issue is so important. I welcome the Rycroft review; it is fundamental that we get to the bottom of foreign interference in our politics. My only concern is that because the review will consider financial interference specifically, it may not have the scope to get the full facts. If that proves to be the case, will the Minister do everything in his power to ensure that we have further such work, so that we know the full extent of foreign interference in our democracy, in our elections and in this place?

My hon. Friend is right to raise that point, and he has done so consistently. The Rycroft review provides a very important opportunity to take stock of the threats and challenges, and to work out how best to respond. However, I absolutely give him the assurance that he seeks; I would not want to prejudge the review, but if there are measures that are not included in it, we will of course keep an open mind about what more we need to do. We already have a number of powers, and we need to make sure that we use them to maximum effect, but where there is a requirement for new legislation, new powers or additional resources, we will not hesitate to bring them forward.

As the Minister said, at the heart of this is the question of whether our enemies and malign actors fear the consequences of hostile acts against us. That question is why many of us say that the embassy should be paused. Why would the Chinese be worried about consequences of spying, when this week, another malign actor attempted to kill British armed forces personnel and attacked sovereign territory, but suffered no consequences? What lesson does the Minister think China will take from our failure to defend our own territory from military attack?

The hon. Gentleman raises his concerns, as he is entitled to. It was important—many would not agree—that the Prime Minister went to China to have frank conversations relating to our national security. People should understand that if they seek to commit criminal acts, attack our country or undermine our democracy, there will be consequences. This Government will ensure that this is the hardest operating environment for those people.

I recently made a submission to the Rycroft review relating my concerns about Chinese communist regime influence on the Labour party. Given that we now understand that the partners of a sitting Labour MP and of a former Labour MP have been arrested today, the Minister will understand why I shall be updating that submission ahead of my meeting with the Rycroft review next week. Will the Minister confirm whether the Rycroft review can take account of these arrests, or will it need to be extended until a decision is made on whether charges are brought?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for contributing to the Rycroft review, not least because he and a number of his colleagues have expert insight into the consequences of foreign interference. I hope that he has taken the opportunity to reflect on that and fed it into the review. Of course, the review is being conducted independently by Philip Rycroft and will report by the end of this month, so he will absolutely have the time and space to reflect on recent events. It is an important piece of work that will inform Government policy, not least on cracking down on all the foreign money that should not be in our politics—another matter that Reform Members know quite a bit about.

China is a risk—we have so much evidence of that—yet the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero has signed an energy deal with China for co-operation on batteries, offshore wind, cables and inverters. It effectively gives China access to our energy grid—that is a massive risk. Was the Security Minister consulted by the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero before the deal was signed?

The hon. Lady raises an important point. I can give her and the House the assurance that we have checks and balances in place to ensure that decisions such as the one that she refers to are made in a way that enables our continued national security. We work collaboratively across Government; it is a system that we inherited from the previous Government. We will do everything we can to ensure that we are making informed judgments. Of course, where appropriate, we will make judgments that will aid economic advantage, but underpinning all that will be decisions to ensure that nothing undermines our national security.

I join all colleagues in the Chamber in expressing my shock about the news this morning. I am also disgusted that the Chinese state has targeted the partners of sitting and former MPs. From a personal perspective, may I ask the Government and the Minister to ensure that those affected are supported, following this utterly outrageous targeting of those closest to them?

On the practicalities of what this may imply, can the Minister reassure us all that if the inquiry suggests that any information accessed through a sitting or former MP affected the Government’s decision on the Chinese embassy, that decision will be paused, reviewed and potentially reversed?

The hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot comment on specifics relating to individuals. Along with the director-general of MI5, I recently briefed the chief executives of UK political parties, including the Liberal Democrats. One point made at that briefing was that people who are involved in politics should not take the view that only those who serve in Government or in particular positions of authority and responsibility are targeted. All those involved in the wider political ecosystem are in play here, and that is an important message for people inside and outside this place to understand.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his other point. He knows the Government’s position on the embassy. There is nothing more I can say about that now.

I know how seriously the Minister takes national security; he will feel keenly any interference with our democracy. However, the news that officials being are démarched will be cold comfort for the 4,500 Hongkongers who live in the borough of Solihull. Can the Minister guarantee that the Chinese ambassador to the UK will be summoned by the Foreign Secretary for an interview without coffee?

The hon. Gentleman is right: I do take these things incredibly seriously. I am grateful for his point about Hongkongers in his constituency. I have personally raised our concerns about arrest warrants and bounties directly with Chinese authorities, and he will have heard what I said earlier about officials being démarched. The Hongkongers make an important contribution to our country. He knows the Government’s position on transnational repression. A lot of work has taken place through the defending democracy taskforce to ensure that people are, and feel, protected, but if he thinks that we should be doing more, I would always be very happy to discuss it with him.

It is a source of concern that two of the three men were arrested in Wales, and that they have close associations with the Labour party. Given that the Senedd goes to the polls in just over two months—in the shadow, of course, of the Nathan Gill scandal—what support will be given to the Electoral Commission to ensure that there are sufficient resources to safeguard those elections against the growing threat of foreign interference?

The right hon. Member is right to raise the importance of the work done by the Electoral Commission. It is a key member of the defending democracy taskforce, and we work closely to ensure that it has the powers it needs to do the difficult job asked of it. She will obviously understand that the Rycroft review and the Representation of the People Bill will not provide legislative change in advance of elections that are taking place in May. That is precisely why we are working closely with the devolved institutions, and we will be having further contact with them over the coming weeks, to ensure that the important elections that are taking place around the country in May do so in a fair and free environment. That is what we all want to see.

I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman did not ask me about FIRS, because he has consistently done so and I always enjoy our exchanges. He will understand that I have come here at extremely short notice to provide an update to the House, and I cannot get into the operational details of matters that took place just a few hours ago.

Just to reassure the hon. Gentleman, the answer is no.

The Minister has said numerous times that the Government always prioritise UK national security, but those words ring hollow whenever we think of the Chinese embassy, and the fact that this Government have granted a mega-embassy close to underground cables carrying highly sensitive data. In the light of these highly concerning developments, surely the Government should show courage, strength and leadership, and with immediate effect revoke that decision in the interest of national security.

With great respect to the hon. Lady—I always listen carefully to what she has to say, because she represents a part of the United Kingdom that I have a long-standing interest in—she is not right in what she says about the embassy. I refer her to comments made by the Intelligence and Security Committee and the director generals of our security services. The arrangement that underpins the Chinese embassy involves the reduction of the diplomatic estate in London from seven sites down to one. I hope that when she looks at it in those terms, she will understand that there are national security advantages from that proposal.

A Member of Parliament’s partner has been accused of spying for China. The Minister has been asked this several times: have the Foreign Secretary or the Home Secretary specifically asked and summoned the ambassador to come to explain themselves, and if not, why not?

The hon. Member will have heard from my opening remarks that Chinese officials have been démarched in both London and Beijing. I hope he will also understand that we are referencing events that happened earlier this morning.

As Home Secretary, I delivered the National Security Act 2023, largely because of the threat posed by China. If media reports are true, does the Minister agree that the perception of conflict of interest, compromise and bias are just as damaging as actual conflict of interest, compromise and bias? Will he reassure the House today that the Labour party will do everything and take appropriate measures to protect the probity of the investigation and maintain public confidence?

Of course the Government will do everything to ensure that the counter-terrorism police and intelligence agencies have whatever they need to conduct this investigation. As the right hon. and learned Lady will understand from her time as Home Secretary, that is conducted independently of Government, and it is not for the Security Minister, the Home Secretary or any Minister to get involved in the business of an investigation. That would not be appropriate, and I hope she would acknowledge that. Let me also say something positive to her. She was Home Secretary when the National Security Act 2023 was introduced, and that vital piece of legislation is making a real difference to our ability to counter those who would seek to do us harm. It is a valuable tool in our armoury, but where there is a view that we need to add more tools to that armoury, we will definitely do so.

The name of the Labour Member of Parliament whose husband has been arrested is circulating widely via the media. I do not intend to name that Member of Parliament, but if the reports are true, that Member of Parliament sits on a Select Committee that would have sensitive, maybe even secret, information and, through totally legitimate means, has visited a number of our defence sites across the country. Has there been, or will there be, an urgent review of what sensitive information that Member of Parliament might have been party to and, at the appropriate juncture, will the Minister release any correspondence between his Department and that Member of Parliament on things such as the Chinese embassy and other matters relating to China?

On the hon. Gentleman’s first point, he will understand that membership of a Select Committee is not a matter for the Government, but Mr Speaker will have heard the point he raised, as have I. On his second point, he will understand that we are dealing with events that took place a couple of hours ago. I have not seen what is being reported online, because I have obviously been here, but I will give consideration to the matter he has raised.

I thank the Minister very much for his answers. Nobody in this House doubts his commitment to finding answers to ensure that the truth is out and justice is done—I thank him for that; everybody respects it. I highlighted when my constituents raised surveillance by the Chinese Communist party in my constituency, and when the website of the all-party group for international freedom of religion or belief, which I chair, was hacked, and information that highlighted human rights abuses and persecution in China was removed. The Minister has outlined clearly what will happen on the mainland, but Northern Ireland has a porous border with the Republic of Ireland. CCP authorities regularly cross the border going north and south with little or no checks, and its activities in the Republic of Ireland must be watched. What discussions has the Minister had to ensure that the Government of the Republic of Ireland, and the Garda Síochána, work collectively to thwart the CCP wherever it is, especially in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland?

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for his words about our commitment to these matters. I know he shares that commitment, and he has been a tireless champion for the freedom of people to practise their religion. He has raised some important points, and he will understand if I want to reflect on them more closely. We have a close working relationship with the Republic of Ireland, but I will look carefully at what he said and get back to him.