PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting) - 15 September 2026 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

Q56 Dr Sumption, looking at the evidence rather than at the Government’s intentions, which provisions in the Bill are likely to reduce arrivals or increase removals, and which have the weakest evidence base behind them?

Dr Sumption: I will take those separately, starting with removals and then talking about arrivals. The two measures most relevant to removals are the appeals reform and the article 8 restrictions. It is very reasonable to assume that the article 8 restrictions will increase returns, but not as much as they will increase refusals, so some people will remain in the UK having been refused. It is very difficult to predict exactly how many people will be refused as a result of the measures, or how many of them will be returned. The Home Office modelling for the impact assessment seems broadly reasonable to me. It suggested just under 12,000 additional refusals as a result of the restrictions, and that some of those people—about 14%—would leave with no involvement of immigration enforcement at all, but the modelling also suggests that just over half would remain in the UK despite the refusal. It is one thing to restrict the legal challenges and the ability of people to get grants of status, but it is another thing actually to remove them from the UK.

I am not going to get into the details of how much appeals reform will actually speed up the process; I am sure you have lots of other people to talk about that and the legal complexities. If the reform has the intended effect of speeding up final refusals, I think it is reasonable to assume that that would increase returns, because that means, in effect, that the immigration enforcement budget can be used more efficiently and that there is less chance of losing track of people during the lengthy period when an appeal is ongoing, but I do not have a view on precisely how effective it will be at speeding things up.

It is quite reasonable to assume that there would be an increase in returns as a result of the measures in the Bill. The deterrence aspect—whether that would feed through into fewer people arriving—is harder to assess, and the evidence is not as good as I would like it to be. A few studies suggest that one of the things that makes a country less attractive is a lower probability of receiving a grant of status, particularly if combined with swift return. To the extent that the measures in the Bill make returns faster, there is some evidence that, particularly for low grant-rate nationalities—people who are relatively unlikely to get asylum—there could be a knock-on effect, so long as the refusals actually lead to a return. For people in the UK who have been refused but are not returned, the available evidence—I should stress that it is quite limited—suggests that there would be less impact.

Q Mr Mehmet, if the objective is fewer illegal arrivals and more removals, what is the single biggest measure that should be in the Bill but is not?

Alp Mehmet: First, can I say the Bill is a step in the right direction? I commend the Home Secretary for having the courage to introduce a Bill with measures that are going to have some sort of impact. I am not sure what that impact is going to be; some bits of the Bill, frankly, are going to have the opposite effect to the one intended, and are more likely to attract people. I will come back to that later, if I may.

If we are talking about the boats, the only thing that will deter both those coming in the boats and the smugglers themselves—the gangs—will be detention on arrival and speedy action to deal with and remove them. Only that will work; I have no doubt about that. There is nothing in the Bill that will allow that to happen.

Have any measures of the sort that are being proposed worked? Nothing in the Bill reflects the sort of measures that, in certain countries, have had the desired effect of deterring people and keeping them away. The sorts of measures introduced in Australia, Denmark or—dare I mention it?—America, as well as even Greece, that have had an impact on the numbers applying for asylum bear no resemblance to what is in the Bill. Will the Bill have any major impact or deter? Sadly, I do not think it will do either.

I am afraid that the Bill is a bit of a wasted opportunity, as was the last Bill, on which I also gave evidence with Tony Smith, who is appearing after me. That Bill also, in effect, cancelled out all the deterrent factors that were already in place. While this Bill has little things here and there, it is essentially all about process as well.

I welcome the introduction of the new appeals authority, but I will add that it seems to be going back to the system that was in place 45 years ago, when I was an immigration officer in Dover and appeals first appeared on the scene. That may have an impact on gaming the system, for example, as the Home Secretary argues, but significant impact? I do not think so.

Q Thank you both for coming to give evidence to us today. You both emphasise the importance of evidence and evaluation. Can you give us some idea of what metrics you think we should use to judge whether our reforms have been successful?

Dr Sumption: Obviously, there are several different goals of the Bill, and the metric used would depend on that. For the deterrence stuff that we have just been discussing, small boat arrivals and asylum applications are the most relevant ones. Some things that cannot be tracked now—at least, not in the published data—could potentially be tracked in future.

For example, we actually have remarkably few statistics on human rights grants, including how many people are granted and what happens to refusals over time, or how many refusals are overturned in court. All those things could be tracked, but the data does not currently exist. My understanding is that it does not exist internally either, because the impact assessment used a sample of around 3,000 cases, rather than just using full statistics for many of them. I think there is probably some statistical work that could be done to try to track the impacts of the human rights measures a bit more.

Also, the data on returns could be linked to the data on what happens to people before that return. For example, one of the potentially very important outcomes that the impact assessment looks at is how many people are refused as a result of the changes, but never actually removed from the country. I think most people would qualify that as an undesirable outcome in the sense that you have people who are still in the UK. and there may be costs associated with them. If they are destitute, the local authority will have to support them, and it increases the unauthorised population. Using the current statistics, we would never know to what extent that is happening, but in theory it would be possible to track all that stuff using the data.

The other major metric on the impact of the changes to the appeals system would be how the backlog changes over time. Of course, you can then look at the numbers of onward appeals to the extent that that becomes a problem, which I am sure other witnesses here will discuss. It is about having data on people’s journeys through the asylum system and appeals system. How long does it take? What are the metrics on the accuracy of the decisions? How many decisions are overturned? I think all those would be important metrics.

Q I was asking for your view on potential metrics we could use in future, after the Bill has been implemented, to measure whether it has successfully achieved its aims.

Alp Mehmet: I suppose the principal metric will be the extent to which it has sped up how long it actually takes to deal with someone who arrives, claims asylum, goes through the system and then has a decision made. It will also be the extent to which, having made that decision, appropriate action can then be taken—that is, the person is either removed or permitted to stay.

It is going to take a couple of years, which is another problem I find with the Bill. Here we are again, proposing fresh measures, and however welcome or not they are, the fact is that it will be three years down the road before we know what their impact is. I do not think that matches the urgency the problem requires. If it does indeed discourage people from coming and from making repeat appeals, one after the other, I think that is a metric that can also be used to determine whether or not what was intended is being achieved, but it is going to be at least a couple of years, if not longer, before we know.

Q Good afternoon and thank you for joining us. A question to both of you: given that you have mentioned the urgency of addressing the challenge the country faces, and remembering the strict international legal frameworks that constrain some of the legislation we can enter into, which single policy would you like to see in the Bill that is not there now, but that you would think would have the biggest impact on reducing illegal migration? I know it is a difficult question, it is the golden question, but I would be interested to know from two experts, given the urgency and the legal frameworks we are working within, what you think would have the biggest impact on preventing the illegal migration we are being challenged with.

Dr Sumption: If your goal is to reduce unauthorised arrivals, I think most of the measures for which there is evidence that they are effective do not actually require legislation. There is evidence from other countries that physical enforcement—measures like intercepting boats, where it can be done safely—can have a large impact. There is also evidence that a lower grant rate, which the UK already has, will have an impact in reducing the number of people who apply, and that returns agreements—a much larger version of the one in, one out deal with France, for example—would have an impact. Those things are difficult for their own reasons, but none of them would require legislation.

Alp Mehmet: Needless to say, I agree with all that. I start by saying that I believe that the biggest flaw in the Bill is the further opening up of the border, effectively, with the safe and legal routes, which will allow approved organisations, institutions and employers to act as sponsors. That, if it actually works, may attract some of those who would otherwise have crossed in boats or got into the backs of lorries or crossed by other means, but I do not think it will do that. I suspect that if the number of boats coming across slows down, it will not be because of the Bill; none the less, it might have the effect of making fewer people attempt the crossing. You could argue that in itself is a success because it means that fewer people are putting their lives at risk. Nevertheless, opening up in the way that is being proposed, so that universities, employers, non-governmental organisations, and communities can act as sponsors, potentially gives an opportunity to some 120 million people around the world.

Some figures I saw from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees suggested that at the end of 2025 something like 118 million people were displaced globally. Potentially, any one of them can take advantage of this new route the Bill opens up—in effect, anyone who has a friend who can persuade an employer to take them on. Employers go out looking for these people, or universities; presumably somebody will pay for those who are going to be studying there.

My fear is that this will put the Boriswave in the shade. The numbers the measure attracts may become a serious problem, in the same way that those who arrived over the preceding five years became a problem. It is probably too late to do anything about that, but I have a feeling that, three years down the road, we will be talking about legislation to end that process. That is unfortunate, to say the least.

Q My question is for you, Alp, picking up on some of the earlier commentary. You made reference to Australia, Denmark, the USA and Greece, which have reduced numbers applying for asylum through measures that bear no resemblance to the Bill. What should we put in the Bill to replicate the success of those countries?

Alp Mehmet: We could start by declaring our intention to come out of the ECHR. Human rights can be dealt with perfectly well by a country like ours without our having to be signed up to the ECHR. We could also pull out of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. We should announce that the Human Rights Act 1998 will be repealed. All of that would allow us to deal with the sort of people who are, understandably, looking for a better life. I have no problem with that, but are we really saying that anyone and everyone of 118 million will be able to come here?

This may sound relatively minor, but the other thing I would do is put the onus on arrivals—we used to call them passengers in the old days. We should put the onus on the migrants arriving to satisfy the immigration official dealing with them of their bona fides. That is what used to happen. Our courts have pushed us in the opposite direction: we now have to disprove. If we do not have any evidence to back that up, we are effectively saying, “Okay, we can’t prove it otherwise. We don’t know who you are. You haven’t got a passport, but we’re going to give you the benefit of the doubt, because the Home Office can’t provide the evidence to do otherwise.” That is absurd. It is also dangerous.

Those are the things that I would include in the Bill. Perhaps you would expect me to say a lot of that. Look at what the Americans have done. Whatever anyone feels about some politicians in the United States, they have nevertheless been successful in closing the southern border to illegal immigration. We should put in place effective measures to stop those coming across the channel not just in boats, but in other ways. If the French were sensible and serious enough to stop the whole thing, they should volunteer to take the migrants who make their way to us from there, as should the EU. That is not going to happen anytime soon, I suspect. All in all, I am a little disheartened by the Bill, the measures in it and what is likely to happen.

Q Mr Mehmet, you made some initial commentary about welcoming the Bill but suggested that it is not sufficient to reduce the small boat crossings. Why, then, are small boat crossings already down 41% even before the Bill has been enacted? Where does this legislation intersect with the need for further law enforcement across borders? Does it intersect with the fact that small boat crossings rose after we left the European Union and we have had less of an armoury and less flexibility to deal with them? You highlighted the American experience of reducing immigration and returns, but presumably you are not advocating a model with the level of aggressive behaviour of ICE agents. American citizens are being shot dead in the streets.

Alp Mehmet: I am not quite sure how you link what is going on at the border and Americans being shot in the street.

Q You are suggesting that the Americans have been very successful, and I am politely retorting that the overall model being used there does not seem very British.

Alp Mehmet: Well, I think securing your borders is totally British, frankly. We have been doing it for millennia. We seem to have forgotten that we are a sovereign state and can decide who can enter our country and who cannot. That aside, the Americans have certainly locked the border. Anyone who makes their way into the United States via the southern border is returned. I am not suggesting that we put a massive wall on the south coast and just let them get on with it. However, I believe that detaining people on arrival, dealing with them quickly and returning them to France or wherever they have come from is doing something similar—in other words, stopping people from entering the country illegally.

The Danes have also introduced measures that I do not think we ever will. For example, if people arrive with money or luxury goods, those are confiscated. The Greeks are not admitting to it, but we know from reports that they are pushing boats back to Turkey. If we were to do all those things, I have no doubt that we would stop the boats coming over. The only reason the people arriving on them increased from 299 in 2018 to 41,000 last year and 18,000 so far this year—which is still massive, frankly—with over 210,000 arriving since 2018, is that they can and that, having arrived here, they get to stay. That is what we have to address, and that is what the Bill does not address.

Q Something else has changed since 2018, which was part of my first question. How do you reconcile our reduced flexibility to deal with European nations outside the European Union in relation to this issue?

Alp Mehmet: I am sorry, Dr Ahmed, but that is just not so. I dealt with the European Union and worked in it many years ago before I retired, and I also monitored the exchanges on the Dublin agreement and the various incarnations of it: it did not work. Very few people went in either direction, and it took aeons—months and months—to arrange everything. It was no deterrent.

Q From your experience of running Border Force, what actually deters an illegal channel crossing? Will anything in the Bill materially strengthen that deterrent?

Tony Smith: I served in the Home Office from 1972 until 2013, at all levels, from immigration officer up to director general, when I retired. I saw lots of pressures on lots of Governments of lots of different colours about the issue of how to stop illegal immigration and remove those who should not be here. So I have a lot of experience there.

Also, a couple of years ago, I went back into the Home Office as a consultant to advise on the implementation of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 and the setting up of the illegal migration operations command, which gave me experience with the boats issue. Fortunately for me, that was not happening during my service; people were coming in differently, in the backs of lorries or through the common travel area. The boats phenomenon is relatively recent, but I do have some knowledge and experience of it.

In my view, the only way to tackle this is to stop illegal intake—in other words, you need to stop people getting to the UK in the first place. That is what we did with the carriers’ liability legislation. That is also why we put the Border Force in France, and why we stopped people getting on ships or aircraft to come here illegally—I think that one of the reasons smugglers shifted to the beaches is that we cannot do that there. Your first priority ought to be to try to reduce asylum intake wherever you can. The second point is to swiftly remove the people who do make it through into the territory. That will then send a deterrent message to those waiting in France, or wherever it may be, to come over. Those are the two metrics.

On the issue of asylum intake, it is not just about the boats. Last time I checked, asylum intake was between 80,000 and 90,000, which is too high. People are coming with visas. You should be able to stop a lot of that, because they are all fingerprinted when they are given a visa and when they claim asylum. When I was in post, on a Monday morning, we would have a read of who had got visas and was now claiming asylum. The post would then be challenged and asked, “Why are you issuing visas to people who are then coming for asylum?”

There are lots of things in all that, but basically the answer to your question is that you have to try to reduce the intake overseas as best you can and, when people do make it here, get that removals rate up.

Q What is the single biggest border control measure missing from the Bill?

Tony Smith: It is more what it does not do, which is exclude people coming from safe third countries, such as France, from claiming protection. That was the intention of the Illegal Migration Act. There is also provision in the 2002 legislation where someone has come from a safe country and, under article 31 of the convention relating to the status of refugees, they are not in immediate fear of persecution. We interpreted that as saying, “If you come from France on a small boat, you could have claimed asylum there—you did not have to—ergo you will not be granted asylum in this country.” The previous Government relied on that for the Rwanda plan, and this Government rely on it for the one in, one out scheme. There is now provision to exclude people from claiming asylum if they come via that route. There is no provision to exclude them from claiming protection under human rights or modern slavery.

There are some things in the Bill that I applaud. There are attempts to tighten up on article 8 of the ECHR to stop some claims under human rights and under modern slavery provisions as well, which is to be applauded. But while you continue to run a system where somebody simply needs to get within the 12-mile zone and then make a claim for protection, and you bring them ashore and process that claim in the UK, I am afraid that that is always going to send a message back, particularly to the high-intake nationalities we are talking about, from Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and Iran, that all you need to do is get within the 12-mile zone and claim protection, and it is very unlikely—only about 4% have ever been removed—that you will be removed. I am afraid that that still creates a factor for migrants who are unsettled in the Schengen zone, who do not want to stay in France and who are determined to come here. It also still fuels the smugglers’ business model—there is profit in this; this is international organised crime—and they will continue to exploit that market.

Q I would like to focus on the measures in the Bill—you made some reference to the ones on modern slavery. Could you expand on how those provisions might make it harder for individuals who have fictitious claims to stop themselves being removed?

Tony Smith: The Bill is really about the asylum process, rather than law enforcement. I think the Bill last year was more about the law enforcement; this is about the asylum process. There are some good things in here. As I say, I applaud the article 8 reforms, because article 8 is often used as a lever quite late in the process. After someone has been here for quite a while and has been through the process, you suddenly get an article 8 claim because they have developed a connection in the UK. So I think that that reform is right and will help to reduce the pull factor.

I like the idea of the tighter protection arrangements—the 30 months at a time. My only counsel against that is that the Home Office, in my experience, tends to automatically grant and grant and grant, because it is a lot easier than refusing, and that might just become an automatic turnover of grants for however long you allow people to stay.

I think you ought to look at who is going home. If people go back to their own country on holiday when they have a claim for refugee status, we can establish that. We have the passenger information and can cross-match that to their asylum records. If people go back to their own country once they have been given some kind of protection status here, they should not be allowed back in, because they are clearly not in fear of persecution.

The faster appeals process is absolutely essential. The problem with the appeals process is that it went over to the Ministry of Justice years ago, when the Home Office and MOJ were split up. The MOJ does not seem to have been really bothered about it—it has other things on its plate. The backlog is over a year now, so you have to try and get a grip of that. I do not know how you get that in the Home Office and how you persuade them, but I think it is a good idea. You really have to get that end-to-end process going right.

I like the idea of recouping public funds from people, a bit like in the student loan scheme. If people have come here and been a draw on public funds, and they then get into the workplace, why would you not claw back some of that money into the public purse?

I think that all those things might reduce pull factors. They are really good reforms. I am not saying they are not good measures; what I am saying is that, in my opinion, they are not good enough to stop the boats.

Q As we have just heard, you were director general of Border Force. You talk about the importance of stopping people coming in the first place. But Border Force has only five ocean-going cutters and six coastal patrol vessels. Is there a fundamental issue here of not having the assets for agencies of the state to do their job? Is that something that is not addressed in the Bill, but that would make a meaningful difference?

Tony Smith: The Border Force will enact whatever its operational instructions are, and its operational instructions are drawn from legislation, powers and authorities, so it does not matter how many boats you have out there in the channel. Currently, if someone comes within the 12-mile zone, under the law of the sea you are obliged—quite rightly, because saving lives is paramount—to bring them on board your vessel. The problem is that once they are within the jurisdiction, they accrue all of these rights to asylum applications, ECHR and modern slavery applications. I do not think it is a question of resource. I am a bit worried about resources, given what we saw in Portsmouth last week, because I do not think we have the bandwidth to cover the entire coastline any more. We have been focusing what resources we have on the short straits. Clearly, the smugglers are moving along the coast, so we need to be adaptable to be able to deal with that.

They would always take more resources if they were on offer, but for me it is more about how you get the people coming off the boats properly screened, not cleared within 24 or 48 hours—that is not long enough. Whatever your views on immigration, you have to properly and thoroughly screen people. A passport tells a story—it will tell you all sorts of things. We do not know their dates of birth or their nationalities; the biometric checks are pretty useless. All I am saying is that I think we need to be detaining people for at least longer than 24 hours at Manston if we are going to reduce the risk in any case.

Thank you, Ms Jardine. I have taken the opportunity while the ex-director general of Border Force is in front of us. The wider point made by the Government is that the Bill has a deterrent effect, but there have been crossings without any Border Force personnel or boats being in the vicinity. A lifesaving charity, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, is being relied on to provide a quasi-policing collection service. How does the Bill help with any of that?

I am just asking whether the Bill could help with any of that, given that the witness in front of us notes on his CV, in the formal papers, that he used to be in charge of Border Force.

My wider critique is that the Bill does not do enough.

Q Does the witness agree with me that the Bill does not do enough to tackle the fundamental issues of illegal migration and processing and deportation?

Tony Smith: Yes, I agree with you.

Thank you.

Q In your view, what is the single biggest reason why the UK fails to remove more people who have no right to remain? Does the Bill actually address the issue?

Guy Dampier: The fundamental issue that we face, as we do in this entire crisis, is human rights legislation—whether international or domestic. It means that we have the extremely lengthy process of going through the asylum claim. It makes it very difficult to establish some of the facts and very difficult to remove people, even in cases where we have refused to grant them asylum.

Tony Smith mentioned earlier that something like 4% of all small-boat migrants who have come since 2018 have been removed. Of those, the largest number have been Albanians because we essentially had a way to send them home without breaching human rights. That is unfortunately not true for the vast majority of other nationalities coming here. Until that human rights issue is tackled, the rate of returns will always be relatively low.

Q If you could make one amendment to the Bill to increase the distinction between people coming to Britain legally and those entering illegally, what would that be?

Guy Dampier: That is a very difficult one, because one of the big problems that the Bill does not tackle is the fact that an increased number of people are coming legally and then claiming asylum. Since 2019, I think, the number of those coming on the study route has gone up by four times and the number of those coming on the work route has gone up by 22 times. A lot of people are abusing the legal way of getting into the country and then claiming asylum, often suspiciously close to the end of their visa. Nothing in the Bill would really tackle that; that area is really missing.

Q Could you say a little more about the article 8 provisions and how you think they might affect strung-out appeals and deterrence?

Guy Dampier: On the strung-out appeals, the new immigration appeal authority is supposed to help tackle that. The difficulty there, which will touch on article 8, is that potentially the people being used will not be fully legally trained as adjudicators. There are examples of countries that have such a system, including Denmark, Canada and, I think, Norway, but all those have relatively high bars for people to become adjudicators—and in a lot of cases, I think that they end up being lawyers anyway.

The Australians had a similar system. I believe that they cancelled it precisely because the paperwork was being done so badly that they had to redo things or the wrong decisions were being made. Although bad decisions are being made now, the new authority could potentially lead to worse decisions, depending on the quality of the people who come in. We cannot know that quality, but at the moment the lack of qualifications in the legislation is a potential danger.

On article 8, we are seeing restrictions and a narrowing down of things, which is good and will reduce the number of people able to use it. But that will apply only to a minority of cases—even when we are dealing with people who have come here illegally. The majority of people claiming under article 8 now will not be affected. I believe that the Home Office estimates that something like 50% of those who will be refused if this legislation passes will remain in the country illegally; obviously, that is something of a problem.

Q What effective measure would the IRC support to deter people from paying smugglers to cross the channel? Should deliberately entering illegally from a safe country carry any immigration consequence?

Angela Afzal: We would say that we do not want people to be making dangerous journeys in order to receive refugee protection. That is why we advocate for a range of different safe routes: so that refugees have an option that does not involve risking their lives to get to the UK. We acknowledge, however, that at the moment, other than the one in, one out scheme, there is not an alternative for people to claim asylum from outside UK territory. If people claim asylum having made an irregular journey, gone through the asylum process and gained refugee protection, the entitlements they have should not be dependent on the method by which they entered the UK.

Q Is there any evidence that expanding safe and legal routes would reduce the number of small boat crossings, rather than simply increase the overall number of people coming to the UK?

Angela Afzal: To reduce small boat crossings, there will be a range of interventions. Our position would be that the safe routes need to be part of that, because if refugees do not have an alternative, they will use people smugglers. Under the Biden Administration in the US, for example, there was a mixture of a change of internal policy on the border and an extensive offer of safe routes for people. The evidence showed that when there was an alternative, people chose it, and it reduced irregular arrivals significantly.

Q Thank you for joining us this afternoon. You mentioned in your earlier answer that there are not sufficient routes to claim asylum, but a lot of the people who come here, particularly on small boats, have come through another safe country. I think your organisation has said that individuals bypassing safe routes is a secondary issue. How do you think that that enables us to support a fair, rules-based international framework?

Angela Afzal: Sorry; I did not catch the second part of your question.

Do you think it is fair for people to be able to circumvent an international rules-based framework by going through a safe country already before coming to claim asylum in the UK, or do you think that should have no effect at all on their asylum claim here?

Angela Afzal: We have to acknowledge that the majority of refugees claim asylum and receive protection in countries neighbouring where they had to flee. Secondly, we need to acknowledge that the UK is about 14th in the ranking of EU-plus countries in how many asylum applications we have per capita—we are quite far down the list.

The nature of our geography means that people need to be able to cross the channel in some way to reach the UK for protection. At the moment, there are not significant safe routes for people to get to the UK; we are talking about hundreds of them at the moment. In the absence of safe routes for people to get here, people who arrive here and have their claims processed should be granted the full entitlement to refugee status, so that the UK plays its part according to the obligations of the UN refugee convention.

Ideally, we would want people to have the opportunity to travel here on a safe route from the region of displacement, so that they would not have to make the dangerous journeys to Europe in the first place. As things are at the moment, there is little alternative.

Q In the view of the International Rescue Committee, what safe routes should be opened up today to deal with the issue that you have just described?

Angela Afzal: We welcome the safe routes that the Home Secretary has recently announced. We think that they are a positive development. There has been a wide consultation with communities and stakeholders, and the approach has allowed communities to offer consent for the refugees who come to them. There can be planning for people arriving so that services are ready. Our experience shows that that is when you get good refugee integration and good social cohesion.

We welcome the offer of complementary safe routes, so that people who want to come here to study and work, but are not able to access the usual immigration rules—

Q May I just stop you? I appreciate what you are saying, but you are not answering my question. If you do not think that the Bill will be adequate to stop people from crossing the channel in an unsafe way, how many legal routes would your organisation want to open up?

Angela Afzal: I am starting by saying that we welcome the three new safe routes; that development has gone alongside this. Our main concern with the Bill is clause 21 and the impact on refugee integration. Ultimately, we would like to see safe routes so that people can arrive here from regions and do not have to travel to Europe—

Q But from where and how many?

Angela Afzal: The opportunity of having safe routes means that the Government can control the numbers and where people come from. That would provide a controlled route. The Government would know where people are coming from and who they are, and could control the numbers. That is why we would advocate that.

Q To achieve that, do you need changes in the Bill?

Angela Afzal: Our focus in the Bill is the impact of the core protection framework, which is in clause 21.

Q What changes would you like to see to clause 21? Just to make sure that I do not go off track, what changes does your organisation want to see to clause 21 and why? What would the implication be for the potential number of asylum seekers claiming in the UK compared with today?

Angela Afzal: Clause 21 seeks to introduce the core protection framework. Our concern is that the clause gives the Home Office very broad powers to introduce changes of entitlements for refugees.

The core protection framework, set out in the “Restoring Order and Control” statement last year, indicates that there is an intention to reduce entitlements for refugees. Our concern is that the core protection framework would have a detrimental impact on refugee integration, rather than deterring people from arriving.

I can explain in more detail why we feel that the temporary protection, removing the right to family reunion and having the work and study pathway would impact refugee integration from our experience of delivering integration in the UK.

Q I have some questions about family reunion. In your submission, you said that the measure will have a negative impact on integration. You also expressed concern that what you consider to be a right to family reunion is being made conditional, in clause 19, on socioeconomic factors—the ability of someone to support themselves. Can you tell us more about why you think family reunion should remain a right?

Angela Afzal: The core protection framework sets out that refugees would not be granted family reunion as a protection right. Our experience is that the family framework is the best basis for a refugee to integrate. It is the best support network that there can be. Our experience is that refugees have a much better integration outcome when they have their families with them.

For example, family reunion has been suspended since September last year. For a whole year, many clients have not been able to reunite with their families or apply for that, and that has really impacted their ability to focus on accessing language and employment. They are deeply concerned about their families—often a spouse and young children in places of danger. We are concerned that that could cause those families to resort to smugglers to reunite, when they do not see another option.

The proposal is that people would get family reunion on transitioning to a work and study pathway. We have questions about the eligibility criteria for that and the support that there will be for refugees so that they can access the pathway, given that it gives them those entitlements. To what extent will people be able to access family reunion through that pathway? Those are our main concerns.

Q As a practising immigration lawyer, where in the Bill do you anticipate the greatest volume of new litigation? Could any of those challenges actually increase delays to removal?

Jacqui McKenzie: Sorry, I cannot actually hear the question.

Professor Singer: Which aspects of the Bill do you anticipate would lead to the greatest number of litigation cases?

Jacqui McKenzie: It is difficult to say, but one of our major concerns—this is purely as a practitioner, not a researcher—is about the removal of the current tribunal system and the establishment of the independent immigration appeals mechanism. We think there is considerable risk there, for a number of reasons.

The first reason relates to the separation of powers, and it is one that the Committee should be very concerned about. The whole point of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 was that it was a constitutional device set up by Parliament to have a separation of powers. However, what we will see instead is a system where the Home Secretary appoints the chair and the chief executive officer of this new authority, and that person in turn will appoint the adjudicators, which gives rise to some concern. We are very concerned about whether there is scope to challenge that. The whole idea of the tribunal system is that we have highly trained judges with lots of experience presiding over it. However, it is not clear, and there may not be a problem, because we do not know where the adjudicators are going to come from. Our major concern at the moment is their independence.

I just want to add that the whole of this is predicated on there being a backlog in the system, but it is not clear that just changing from one system to another will really address that. We saw the Home Office bring in large numbers of people to try to fast-track immigration decisions, but what we saw with those decisions was a number of errors, which have now caused problems in the immigrations appellate system. We do not envisage that that is going to change. In my practice, for instance, we regularly see decisions going into the appellate system that should not be there in the first place. The evidence of that is the fact that the tribunals are now awarding costs against the Home Office, and we had two cases recently where it was clear that the Home Office had failed to follow directions on the need to review the whole case or assess the evidence before it; it just failed to do that. If you are going to replace one system with another, but you still have very poor decision making in the first instance, you are not really going to clear the backlog.

I could go on forever, but just recently I accidentally sat in on the wrong hearing at a tribunal. I was only meant to be an observer; a younger member of my team was doing a hearing, and I thought I would like to observe it. I was sent the wrong link by the tribunal, and it took me about half an hour before I suddenly realised that I was on the wrong link—I thought this other matter was just being heard first, and mine was going to follow. I sat through half an hour, and it was a man from Iraq with no representation and no bundle. The interpreter did not really understand him, and it was a waste of time. It took about 30 minutes for the immigration judge to say, “We have to abandon this.”

That brings me to the fact that the other cause of the backlog is the large number of people who are not represented, and that is partly because of the problems in the legal aid system. I know we have recently had an increase, but if we want to get rid of the backlog, we are going to have to address the larger numbers of people coming into the system with no representation at all because they cannot find a lawyer. Most legal aid lawyers cannot make this work on the rates, so they are giving up. My own practice is currently considering giving up legal aid work, and we are one of the few that is still around doing it.

You are going to have people coming into the tribunal system requiring adjournments, and the tribunal system will have to deal with not only that, but very poor decision making coming from the Home Office. I have other concerns about the Bill, but that is my biggest concern. The thing I am exercised about at the moment is whether there is a way of legally challenging this, but I do not know yet.

Q In your experience, how often does article 8 make the decisive difference between somebody being allowed to remain or being removed? Do you think that the provisions in the Bill will materially and effectively change that situation?

Jacqui McKenzie: We are worried about the provisions in the Bill around article 8, particularly as they relate to the best interests of children and the redefinition of the family, at a time when we are recognising that families come in all different types and colours—I do not mean colours in terms of race; that is probably not the best word. There is not a straightforward definition of a family. The Bill seeks almost to narrow it down to who lives in the house and who does not. That is the sort of language we are getting from the Home Office in trying to describe what it means, because we do not know yet. All we have is a template of an idea.

We have section 55 on the best interests of the child, which most of us base our work on. That enables families using article 8 to remain together in the country. In the impact assessment accompanying the Bill, I saw that fewer than 12,000 families were likely to be refused. We are going for such a draconian measure to deal with a very small number of people. It almost reminds me of Rwanda again. We spent £700 million and we got four volunteers out. Even if we had got some people out through enforcement, it would have been a very small number.

I cannot quite understand why we are targeting families. A lot of those families are actually the third and fourth generation of people who settled here and then brought over their children. In Windrush families, south Asian families and west African families, we have this concept of leaving children behind. The first came when they were over the age of 18, and now large numbers of their children are the ones caught up in the system and using article 8 to remain. Those are the sorts of people we would be targeting. This is their home. They are settled here. The numbers are small. It is not yet clear to me why we need to be doing this.

Q Thank you both for joining us. I want to refer back to the example you gave of the online case that you joined by mistake, where something had got to a judge that was a result of poor decision making. Does that not make the case for the IIAA, in that it was a waste of a judge’s time to have gone through that process? Having a quicker appeals process would have enabled that to be seen quickly and dealt with much more effectively. Building on that point, we have seen a 21% increase in the amount of investment and judges dealing with tribunal appeals, yet the rate of appeals and the waiting time are still going up. Surely, you must admit that there is an issue with the backlog, the time it takes and the small pool of people we have to draw from.

Jacqui McKenzie: I think I might have confused the point. There are two separate things. The point I was making about the man from Iraq was about the lack of representation. That lack of representation, and people coming unprepared to do their appeals, causes judges’ time and the entire tribunal’s time to be wasted. That goes out of the system and it comes back in. The poor decision making is a separate thing. I do not know whether the refusal of that man, which brought him into the appellate system, was a good decision or not. We did not get round to that bit, but we see considerable poor decision making.

I work quite a lot with the Windrush community. We keep seeing in the news, “They’re waiting for the Windrush generation to die.” I do not think that is true at all—I do not think the Home Office is that sinister—but we are seeing very straightforward cases taking two or three years to come to conclusion. The whole reason for that is the poor decision making. You get cases where the first decision is a zero, and then it goes up to six figures after two or three reviews. We are dealing with an elderly cohort, and these reviews go on for years and retraumatise the victims.

I see the same sort of thing across my practice: poor decision making on a number of things, including human rights applications and asylum claims. I do not know how, unless things are improved in the first instance, we will reduce the backlog in either the existing tribunal system or the new appellate authority.

Professor Singer: Just to clarify, that is bad quality initial Home Office decision making, as opposed to adjudicator decisions.

Jacqui McKenzie: Home Office decisions, yes, absolutely.

Q My point was, would it not be better to go to an intermediate tier, rather than take up the time of the courts? That is where we are seeing the backlog—the delay—because of the lack of available judges we have—

Jacqui McKenzie: We have that; we have a review mechanism. The Home Office is meant to review; once you load something up on the tribunal portal, the Home Office is meant to review the decision. That is why we are getting costs in these cases, which is almost unheard of. I have been doing this work as a lawyer for 18 years—it is two years for training—and I have never seen anything like it. We are getting costs in these cases because of the poor decision making at the Home Office, even when there is a built-in review mechanism. A formal part of the process is that things go back to the Home Office for it to review.

Professor Singer: I would add that if the problem this new mechanism is seeking to address is the lack of sufficient capacity among decision makers, the way that that could be most expediently addressed is simply by expanding the eligibility criteria for the existing tribunal system, to increase the pool of decision makers, rather than by having to staff an entirely new body, which the impact assessment itself says would be incredibly challenging.

Q I will address my question to Professor Singer. We heard in previous evidence about some of the novel or unusual drafting and wording in the Bill. For example clause 19(4) says:

“No weight should be given to a private or family life”,

rather than that those issues should be “disregarded”, which I think is the normal phrase you would find in law, rather than “no weight”—it is hard to understand what “no weight” means. Also, the ouster provision in clause 1(8) seeking to try to oust the jurisdiction of the court in certain circumstances is drafted in a very loose way, when we know from case law that courts want very specific ousters if they are going to accept them. Does that not run the risk that this entire Bill is actually going to increase litigation just so that the courts can try to define and understand what some of this novel and peculiar wording actually means?

Professor Singer: I have to say that I have questions about the drafting of the Bill in its entirety. I do not think that the Committee can appropriately scrutinise the Bill, because there is a significant lack of detail in so many of the provisions, in addition to very odd drafting. With due respect, a lot of it is back-of-the-envelope-type stuff, which has clearly been rushed through the legislative drafting process.

For example, in the previous panel, I heard the Committee questioning the clause on the introduction of a core protection status. The clause does not actually set out the eligibility or content, in terms of what a core protection status is; it gives the Secretary of State significant powers to make regulations in respect of what eligibility for a protection status would be and what the content of that status would be.

Similarly, in the provision on asylum support, we do not have any details about the actual operation or functioning of that system. The provision gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations in respect of this scheme. In relation to the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority, we do not have the rules of procedure to scrutinise, to be able to ascertain whether there will be due process, which will be appropriately followed, and fairness.

I agree with you that there are strange inconsistencies in the drafting, but, additionally, I think the whole content of the Bill is quite lacking in many respects.

Q You have both been heavily and quite vocally critical of the Home Office—more than any of the other witnesses today. One issue we have is that there is a lot of political pressure, and the country is not happy with the current system and with what is happening, particularly with legal migration—some would say that the lawyers are perhaps partly responsible for that, but that is a separate debate. You have also acknowledged that there is a huge backlog in the appeals process and that, a lot of the time, that is the Home Office’s fault. The Government are trying to propose an alternative process for that, which you are also criticising. We cannot continue with the status quo, so what would you both advise doing to speed up the process for both the United Kingdom Government and the individuals seeking asylum?

Professor Singer: There are a lot of much more financially effective ways to address the backlog. As was already intimated, a lot of the current tribunal backlog is caused by the fact that initial decision making was paused for a significant amount of time when the Rwanda scheme was being pursued. Once that was opened, there was a huge investment in making a large number of initial decisions on a very quick basis. That was roundly criticised on a number of counts as leading to speed over quality. A number of very poor-quality decisions then went through to the appeal system, leading to the backlog at the initial tribunal system.

That can be addressed by not having inconsistencies in the rate of initial decision making in the first place; improving the quality of initial decision making within the Home Office, hopefully leading to fewer appeals; making sure that there is legal aid provision for those who are entitled to it, so that they are not wasting time in the tribunal system; and ensuring that the Home Office uses its review mechanism appropriately. I am sure my colleague can speak to this at much more length than I can, but at the moment initial rejection decisions tend to include a large number of copy-and-paste grounds for refusal. When it gets to tribunal, the decision maker has to go through every single one of those grounds, which is incredibly lengthy. If a Home Office official reviewed that in advance and conceded the grounds that were not arguable, it would speed up the decision-making process within the tribunal system.

As I have already intimated, if there really is concern that there are not enough sitting judges in the first-tier tribunal, there is provision to expand the eligibility criteria within the initial system. Surely that would be a much more effective and speedy way to address the backlog than creating a whole new body and system, with its own mechanisms and staffing requirements. Although the stated intention of creating this new body is to address the asylum backlog, in reality, as we can see from the terms of the Bill, the true intention is to give the Home Secretary much more control over the operation of the tribunal system than she currently has.

Jacqui McKenzie: I will just add, in defence of lawyers, that we see stories every now and again of a dodgy practitioner here and there, but the vast majority of lawyers are helping. I have a small team of immigration and asylum lawyers. We do about 20 appeals a year, and 18 or 19 are won in the tribunal. None of them should have been anywhere near the tribunal. We work to a very high standard of putting in the evidence—the subjective evidence, the objective evidence, expert evidence, all that sort of thing. We do not take cases where we do not think there is a case. We are not bucking the system in any way. It is so frustrating to see those cases get refused by the Home Office, when they ought not to be. There is then the period of scrutiny called the review, and they get rejected there again. Then people spend another year or two in the asylum system before their appeals are ultimately allowed.

Lawyers are actually helping. They are trying to work with the Home Office. There is the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, which works with the Home Office. There are Windrush groups that work with the Home Office. I have been part of it. I worked with former Home Secretaries Sajid Javid and Priti Patel on trying to get things right. It is wrong to blame lawyers. We are doing our job, a job we train for many years to do, and we are trying to help the system. But it is a fact that poor decision making and structural problems around legal aid, which mean that we do not have enough practitioners, or enough high-quality practitioners, are causing a backlog.

Q Can I just be clear: I did not say that I blame lawyers. I said there is a view in the country at times, as you are explaining.

Jacqui McKenzie: I understood—I was just defending lawyers.

Q Would you both concede, though, that there is an issue, because the claims are not being dealt with quickly enough and there are a number of appeals, and that it is only right and proper that the Government try to do something about it, and so they have introduced the Bill?

Jacqui McKenzie: I do not know that the Bill does that. That is the point I am making. I think Professor Singer is making the same point, and others are also making it: the networks, the immigration organisations and associations, a lot of academics, immigration judges and a lot of people up and down the country in organisations representing children and representing refugees. There is no end of evidence of people saying it is not going to achieve that.

I accept that there is an issue: even if the Home Office was to get every application right—and that will never be possible, because nobody gets everything right—there are still large numbers of people in a system that is not designed well. It needs to be better designed. The Home Office probably needs more resources. When I sat on the Windrush lessons learned review independent advisory group, one thing that came out—you are hearing evidence from Daniel Hobbs later—was that the Home Office is a large organisation that is very unwieldy. It deals with the nice things, such as granting visas and so on, but also with law and order and so forth. Maybe it needs breaking up. Maybe it needs more resources.

Overall, my view, and you may not agree with me, is that the UK gets very few people coming here, and certainly very few people coming in small boats. It gets very few people coming as asylum seekers. One of the witnesses earlier talked about 118 million people being displaced, but we have the data—I do not need to keep repeating it, but we see that very poor countries have the burden of asylum seekers and refugees. There are 1 million Rohingyas in Bangladesh and 2 million Venezuelans in Colombia. A small Caribbean island next door to an island where my parents were from, which has a population of just over 1 million, has 200,000 refugees in it. We really do not get that many people coming here, either through legal routes or in small boats. Because those numbers are static—in fact, they are declining—we need to resource the Home Office properly with more skilled or highly skilled people. I am not having a go at the people who are there, but something is very wrong there. That is what is causing the major problems that we see at the higher levels, such as the appellate courts.

Professor Singer: Even aside from questions surrounding the number of arrivals that we have, setting up an entirely new body would be a huge waste of public resources. The Home Office’s own impact assessment for the Bill states:

“The set up of the IIAA will require the recruitment and/or redeployment of an executive board, adjudicators, and supporting staff. This represents a significant operational undertaking and is expected to incur substantial recruitment and onboarding costs.”

It then states that the recruitment will be

“challenging and may not be achievable, increasing the likelihood of operational pressure and higher than expected costs.”

There is the additional factor of transitioning the first-tier tribunal judges over to the new board and/or the financial costs of the obligations that are owed to judges if they are retired. It is a huge waste of public resources to set up an entirely new board. Those resources would be much better spent on properly staffing and resourcing the Home Office and the first-tier tribunal system that we currently have. There is a lot that can be done within the structure of the existing system to make it better. That would be a much more effective use of public funds.

Q Jacqueline, you mentioned the poor quality of decision making. The evidence from the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association offers multiple casework examples, and offers more such examples to the Committee if we wish to get them—and I think we should. Obviously, as an MP, I see many such decisions in person. What more can be done to improve that decision making? I know that the National Audit Office has looked at it. One thing I have noticed in my constituency is that some migrant groups have tried to get migrants themselves, successful asylum seekers, to give evidence on the process, but they are scared to do that, because they worry about their next visa decision. Is there more than we can do to bring people in to improving the process and the accessibility of it? As I understand it, the first decision is usually when people are without lawyer representation, so that is where these kinds of issues can arise. Can you say more about that? Sorry, that is a very long question.

Jacqui McKenzie: That first instance that you are talking about is asylum claims, where people go in themselves, claim asylum and they have a screening interview and a longer, more elaborate and substantive interview and then lawyers tend to get involved in putting together all the evidence that is available to support the claim— [Interruption.] Sorry—there is an awful fly. It has kind of made me lose my thoughts. The other day I was here it was a mouse; now it is a fly. What is going on in this building?

The issue is about training. Very rudimentary errors that you see—the wrong country, the wrong gender and the wrong names of people—are partly to do with what Professor Singer picked up on: very often, it is a cut-and-paste approach. I almost know the decisions off by heart, because you see the same paragraphs. When you have been doing it for as long as I have, you know what you are going to get.

I am not casting any aspersions on people who are probably working very hard in their jobs, probably not for the best of pay, but I suppose there are some perks—it is a career and there is a pension at the end of it and all that sort of thing. It is difficult. I understand that they have targets; somebody in the criminal casework department told me they even had a star sheet on the wall, and each time they got someone deported, they got a little star. I do not know what sort of place that is, but I think it needs more people—it needs expansion—and better training. I do not think the numbers of people who are coming through the system are going to increase exponentially—in fact, we are seeing a decrease.

Q Sarah, you talked about the initial review process that should happen when an appeal is lodged. What more do you think could be done to improve that process?

Professor Singer: I will defer to my colleague on that front, if that is okay.

Jacqui McKenzie: What more could be done to improve—

Q The initial review. According to Sarah, it simply does not happen.

Jacqui McKenzie: It does not. I do not know whether that is a target in the Home Office—I do not know how the internal operations work—but it seems to me that the Home Office want everything to go through the tribunal. They refuse almost everything that they can, and then it goes through the tribunal, and there is the review mechanism, which they ignore. Even when they are directed to do things like reviewing the evidence or reviewing the decision, they do not do it. This is mainly in deport cases, which I suppose are difficult in terms of how they play out in the public and so forth, but even when you win a case in the tribunal that has been allowed on very strong grounds and very strong evidence, they appeal again to the upper tribunal. Sometimes, these things are in the system for three or four years, so it does need a root-and-branch change in how it all works.

Can I ask one final question, Ms Jardine? Are there more Members waiting?

Q Jacqui, you also raised something that I like, because it is Green party policy—though I should not be bringing that up here—which is breaking up the Home Office. In the discussions and the evidence we have heard, other people have said that it is a huge amount of work to set up the new tribunal service. Would it be easier to just start again with the Home Office and create a new branch of it that does immigration versus and police and enforcement, or is that for the future?

Jacqui McKenzie: Maybe for the future, because I totally accept Professor Singer’s point: one of the issues about the new authority—I keep getting its name wrong, because it has changed its name three times—is that it is going to be expensive and unwieldy. For much less money, we could probably make the current system work. I know that these are difficult times for the country with budgets and so forth, so I do not necessarily want to propose something that is going to be very expensive. However, in the long term, the bit of the Home Office that makes these sorts of decisions probably needs to be a separate entity.

Q Good afternoon. I just wanted to pick up on the point about those invocating article 8 of the European convention on human rights. You said that the number was small, but I understand that around 77,000 people end up caught in those crosshairs. From your experience and perspective, what guidance do judges need, if you do not believe that a change in the law on article 8 is necessary? More widely, where do you believe the country is? The prerequisite of a functional asylum system is that it needs to command the confidence of the vast majority of the public, but in relation to article 8, do you think that criterion is met currently?

Jacqui McKenzie: Sorry, can you just repeat the first part of the question?

I think it was either yourself or Professor Singer—

Jacqui McKenzie: Oh, the numbers—sorry. The number that I referred to as being small is the number of cases that the Home Office say will be refused under this new system, which I think is 11,700.

Professor Singer: It is 11,700, and the Home Office impact assessment estimates that 55% of those will, in any case, remain in the UK, because it is not possible to remove them back to their home country due to legal or logistical challenges. It is anticipated to have quite minimal impact in practice, so it is quite a significant legislative change to make for quite a limited impact overall.

Most of the public attention is focused on the issue of foreign criminals, for example, but the House of Commons Library briefing for the Bill indicates that, at present, only 3% of foreign criminal appeals are allowed on a human rights basis, whether under article 8 or otherwise. Again, the impact is quite minimal. The most significant impact that the changes to article 8 will have is on children and families. We will see more children without their parents and more separated families, and I think in quite unconscionable ways that will actually be quite upsetting for the public.

For me, setting out an interpretation of article 8 in domestic legislation does not change the meaning of article 8 as a matter of international law, and it does not change what the UK’s obligations are. Decisions are either in line with the UK’s obligations, in which case the legislation is not necessary, because the courts are already doing article 8 determinations themselves and doing their own balancing exercise on the basis of the existing legislation that we have, or they are more restrictive than the UK’s current legislation, which puts the UK at risk of not complying with its obligations under the European convention on human rights and the convention on the rights of the child.

Jacqui McKenzie: I agree with that. I think you are aware that the figure I referred to as being small was not the overall 77,000. What we think of the 77,000 is another matter; some of us might say even that is not a huge number of people, especially when we look at how long some of those families have been settled in the UK, and the reasons why some of them are still in the immigration system, when their parents and grandparents may well have been settled. It is this point about redefining what a family is and breaking families up that concerns me more than anything.

Q On that point, this morning, the Committee heard evidence from a KC, whose name I cannot recall, who said that the Strasbourg court has indicated that it thinks that the UK is not applying article 8 correctly, and is applying it too liberally—that was not his language; that is just the language I am using. He said Strasbourg thinks that the UK courts have gone too far with their application of article 8. You can see how confusing the issue is. Do you agree that there is great confusion around the application of article 8, and recognise that Strasbourg has indicated that the UK courts might not be doing so correctly?

Jacqui McKenzie: I have not heard the Strasbourg courts say that; I have no idea why they would be saying that.

Professor Singer: I have not heard that either.

It was mentioned in the Committee’s evidence session this morning.

Professor Singer: You can look at the most recent decisions from the Court of Appeal; for example, the decision on IA and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department a few months ago was a very restrictive interpretation of article 8 being applied to deny those appellants the right to family life. I do not see the courts taking a particularly liberal approach to article 8. As I mentioned, we already have a domestic framework in place.

Q I am just asking for your view on some of the evidence the Committee heard this morning. This is not Paul Foster’s view; it is the view of our witnesses.

Professor Singer: I have not come across that myself.

Jacqui McKenzie: I do not think that is right.

Q You have focused a great deal on Home Office decision making as the primary reason why the process takes a long time and there are a number of appeals, but is the reality not that appeal is the default? Virtually all refusals are appealed; it is nothing to do with the decision making, and as long as that is going to be the case, we have to find a way to speed up the system.

Jacqui McKenzie: What I am referring to are those decisions that are badly made that end up in the appellant system. Those are the ones that I see and that go on, after two or three years, to be allowed, and the person gets to remain in the UK.

Those are not the initiatives where people coming from particular countries have been granted asylum, and there has been a whole discussion on whether that is due process or not. Generally speaking, of the appeals that we see in my practice—my practice is limited; I am not sitting here trying to extrapolate across the jurisdiction—the vast majority, if not nearly all of them, could have had a different decision in the first instance, and did not need to go into the system. Of course, if people’s lives are dependent on them fleeing persecution or maintaining their family ties in the UK and they get a negative decision, they are going to appeal. That is just the way things are.

Q I think my point was that, if appealing is the default and virtually all refusals are appealed, your argument that if there was better decision making at the Home Office, that would speed things up—

Jacqui McKenzie: Then there would not be appeals. If there was better decision making, there would be far fewer appeals. What I am saying to you is that from my practice, most of what I deal with as appeals should not be appeals.

Professor Singer: In the asylum system at the moment, 66% of cases are either accepted on appeal or they are withdrawn—the implication being that the Home Office had withdrawn that case. That is 66% of asylum appeals that could be effectively wiped out if the initial decision was better made.

The fact that initial decisions by the Home Office are bad is a fact—you can look at the National Audit Office review of Home Office decision making or the Home Office’s own assessment of the quality of its decisions. That is a fact. If you have a better standard of initial decision making and, in effect, fewer refusals where there should not have been refusals, those cases will not go on to appeal, so there will be fewer appeals.

There are going to be appeals anyway; there are always going to be appeals, so we want to have the most efficient and effective system that we can, while making sure that it is fair and follows due process standards that have to be applied when you are making very serious decisions, such as potentially removing people to somewhere where they will be at risk of very serious harm or their life will be threatened. You need to have due process in that place, so what is the best way we can do that?

Is it by establishing an entirely new body that is going to need to be staffed and resourced and will need to work out what its rules of procedure are—we do not know what they are; we have no idea how it is going to be—using decision makers who are not legally qualified to decide decisions on some of the most complex areas of domestic law that we have? Do we really think that that is going to speed up decision making?

Q The point you made there is that your solution to the process is for the Home Office to grant more applications in the first instance. Do you think that will have the impact of getting confidence back into the system with the public?

Professor Singer: No, my solution is that the Home Office not reject cases that should not be rejected, plus better resourcing the Home Office in order to do that, and better resourcing and making adjustments in our initial tribunal system, rather than handing the whole process to a Home Secretary-governed independent body that is not independent of the Home Office, despite its name.

Could I finish on one final note that I wanted to make sure that I got across to the Committee? As I mentioned, there are provisions in the Bill relating to a new core protection status and also around asylum support. I do not feel the Committee can scrutinise that without having the regulations that the Secretary of State plans to adopt before it. My recommendation is that the Secretary of State should be forced to publish those regulations before the Committee can make its determination on those areas.

Q As it stands, do you believe that the modern slavery supply chain provisions in the Bill will identify more victims and perpetrators, or is there a risk that they will create additional corporate reporting and compliance costs? Do you think the measures could be improved in any way?

Dr Buttle: I think that the provisions as they currently stand ask businesses to report on what they are doing. It has now mandated particular areas, but there is a difference between reporting and performance. There is still an opportunity for companies to just take a tick-box approach, complying with the letter of the Bill and the clauses rather than actually taking action. So there is an opportunity for companies still to not do the human rights due diligence in the way that this Bill is currently drafted.

Q Are there any particular specifics on how you would improve the measures that have been put forward?

Dr Buttle: At CCLA we have been advocating, in addition to reporting requirements, for a smart mix of legislation that would include a mandatory human rights due diligence Bill and potentially a forced labour ban for the UK.

Q What impact do you expect the financial penalties for companies that fail to comply with the reporting requirements to have on company compliance?

Dr Buttle: As I say, we have been evaluating companies’ modern slavery statements for three or four years now. There is also another investor coalition that we are part of, which is Rathbones’ Votes Against Slavery initiative. That has identified 194 instances of companies in the FTSE 350 not complying with section 54 over the past six years. That is quite widespread and companies are not actually complying. In our benchmarking work, we have identified some of the largest companies in the world that have exposure to modern slavery. They operate in high-risk geographies. They have supply chains that reach into high-risk geographies and they are in sectors that we deem high risk that are not currently complying with section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act. So we do think there is a risk at the moment, and we think that financial penalties would mean there is a risk of not complying with the legislation. On the way that the Bill introduces penalties of £1 million or up to 1% of turnover, that should be sufficient to make businesses consider this more seriously.

Q That was the question I wanted to ask: will this have the intended effect? Where businesses are not complying with transparency in supply chains, do you think the financial penalty will encourage greater compliance?

Dr Buttle: I think it will, but the other thing to note is that there has not been very much enforcement by the Home Office of the Modern Slavery Act in the past. In addition to the penalties, we need some enforcement by a body; we would consider that in future that may not be the Home Office, and that the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade might be a better place to enforce this. If there is no enforcement, companies may still consider not complying with the regulations.

Q The Government argue that introducing the new appeal authority will reduce delays. What are the Ministry of Justice’s views on that, and what evidence have you relied on to conclude that the appeals system will improve performance?

Neal Barcoe: Thank you for that question. It is important to start by recognising that judges and the court system have responded very strongly to the significant increase in demand coming through the system. They have increased capacity and improved productivity, but demand is growing considerably faster. On receipts, back in 2023 we had about 58,000 cases coming into the system. In 2025-26, that was up to 118,000. The outstanding caseload has risen in that same period from about 50,000 to 150,000 cases.

The courts have tried to look at every available option and opportunity to improve productivity in the system. They have increased the number of legal officers in the system by 70%, and have expanded things such as the virtual region to make sure that more cases are being heard on any given day. They have looked at case progression and how you can speed up cases, so that cases are ready for court more quickly. They are looking at all forms of technology to improve productivity and have improved their listing practices, too.

We have sought to grow the judicial workforce as quickly as possible. Since last year, we have seen a net increase of about 21% in the number of judges. We are up to just over 300 now, with 65 fee-paid and 25 salaried judges starting earlier this year, and more recruitment in train.

While we have had that recruitment success, it has demonstrated an upper ceiling and a real challenge to going further and faster. The pool of candidates is relatively constrained: if you want to come in as a fee-paid judge, you need five years post-qualification experience in a relevant field; and, traditionally, if you come in as a salaried judge, you need to have had previous judicial experience, too. Taking on a salaried role also means giving up your practice, so on immigration and asylum matters, we have struggled to go further and as fast as we would like.

The process is not quick—it takes 12 to 18 months to recruit judges—so I think that the proposition for the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority is that, if we are able to recruit trained adjudicators from a broader range of professional backgrounds, it should be possible to increase capacity and add more flexibility, while retaining their legal support, and ensuring that there are proper assurances on quality and that we have the upper-tier oversight. That is the thinking on where we are.

Q We have heard quite a bit of evidence today from people who have suggested that if the Home Office were to sort out how it goes about dealing with the backlog and its decision making in the first instance, we would not need this new authority. What are your views on whether setting up this IIAA is just a complete waste of public money, a distraction causing more complexity in the system? Do you have any views on that as a Ministry?

Neal Barcoe: That might be better addressed to MOJ Ministers, but as a civil servant, I do not think that this is a waste of public money. It is vital that we address the cases that are in the system, and that we look at all ways to do that properly while retaining quality. That is what we are trying to do, to manage that process as well as possible, but with 150,000 cases in the system, it is taking much longer than anyone would like for those cases to be disposed. Something that increases capacity in this way—if we can protect the quality—has to be a good thing. It is about being flexible as well, and I think that that is what the new body brings—we can flex that capacity.

Q A final question, if I may. Will the Bill make the life of immigration lawyers and practitioners more or less complicated? On the whole, will it improve our immigration system, or is it a retrograde step?

Neal Barcoe: Again, as an official, I think that it does and can improve the system—

Can or does? Is it an objective or a political assessment?

Neal Barcoe: If done well, it can absolutely improve. If we can ensure that the quality is there, that it is staffed up properly and that we have the right levels of independence, as set out in the Bill, I think it would be an improvement on the current system. I recognise what underlies your question—we have had a lot of immigration and asylum bills, and that change of perspective is difficult for people in the system, which it undoubtedly is—but I think there are very sensible things in the Bill that seek to improve the current situation. One of the things—the Public Accounts Committee has spoken on this, and the NAO—is about how Departments come together and co-operate more effectively in this space, looking at the whole system. I think that that is what the Bill is about; it is about trying to look at the whole system as one. As I say, at an official level, we are doing that much more than we were before.

Q I must declare that I was once involved in a first-tier tribunal. Obviously, as parliamentarians, we are sometimes heavily involved in such matters on behalf of constituents. In the case I was involved in, it could be seen from space that there was going to be only one decision, yet it took a long time to get there. The persons present in that case seemed to be, let us say, overqualified. From your perspective, how will the IIAA affect the workload of the first-tier tribunal?

Daniel Flury: Clearly, as the IIAA grows, the expectation is that the work of the first-tier tribunal will decline. I am the senior responsible officer for a programme that is essentially managing that decommissioning process—that decline. As Neal says, there is still a pretty significant backlog of just under 152,000 appeals sitting in the system. There is still quite a bit of work to be done. The current approach in HMCTS and the judiciary is simply business as usual until further notice. We are striving to sit more and be more productive. We are striving for output, and I feel that we are partially succeeding this year. Over time, in the years ahead, that work will decline and we will eventually wind up the operations.

Q By what order of magnitude do you think that could happen, and in what timeframe?

Daniel Flury: In terms of how quickly it could happen, I think the expectation is that this should all happen as quickly as possible. We are working with the Home Office on a number of assumptions around its expansion and our contraction. It is quite difficult to put a timescale on it just yet, but I think the expectation, certainly from the Home Office, is that it should happen pretty quickly. Our overall planning assumption is that we expect it to be somewhere between one and three years.

Q On the spectrum of complexity in these cases, clearly, many of them are straightforward—like the one I was involved in—but there are others that have elements of complexity that are sometimes apparent, sometimes not. For the benefit of the Committee, could you lay out some of the safeguards that are in place to manage that complexity?

Daniel Flury: It is principally the judge’s role to manage the complexity of a case, obviously supported by legal representatives. In terms of the support that HMCTS can offer, we have a programme, which applies to all courts and tribunals, of reasonable adjustments that we offer appellants, claimants, defendants and so on. The rest is primarily provided through legal aid, legal representation and the judge safeguarding them in that case.

Q The Government say that the reforms will make the system go faster. What is the current average time from an unsuccessful claim, through appeal to final resolution, and what do the Government expect the average to be once these changes have been implemented?

Daniel Flury: It currently takes about 56 weeks for an appeal to clear the system in the first-tier tribunal, which is only going to worsen in the years ahead as more of the claims that have been sitting in the backlog for some time are concluded. It is even longer for appeals —that 56 weeks is all appeals. As to where we think it could get to, I do not think any of us could say yet, unless the Home Office wants to offer something. I think we can all agree that it needs to improve substantially, because 56 weeks is unacceptable in any jurisdiction.

Q Is there a quantifiable target for how many additional removals we forecast as a result of the changes?

Daniel Flury: I could not say from an HMCTS perspective.

Alison Hewett: Not at this stage. We are undertaking quite a lot of detailed modelling, but that is very much a work in progress. It would be inappropriate to get into that level of detail at this point.

Q The sole test for the Bill is whether it will reduce illegal arrivals and increase removals. What is the single biggest amendment you would put forward to make that difference?

Stephen Webb: In a sense, the Bill seems mainly to look at the stock rather than the flow, looking at people already in the country. I know the Government have legislated previously on the actual crossings. I suppose the question is, within the way the Bill is structured at the moment, what would make the biggest difference in deterring people from starting the journey in the first place? That is quite hard to say, because there are lots of changes around making it more difficult to make claims, particularly under article 8.

My main point is that I feel, as I have written before, that it is not just article 8, but article 3 that gives asylum seekers an extremely high chance of staying in the country. Although the Government have chosen to toughen, somewhat, the way that article 8 will be treated, the Bill is silent on article 3. That is slightly disappointing, given that the Chişinău declaration, back in May, talked about reforming both and suggested areas where the courts—both domestically and in Strasbourg—could potentially tighten things up. I would see that as the main area.

Q Do you think there will be any significant effect from the proposed article 8 changes, or do you think we will just see everything coming back on different legal grounds?

Stephen Webb: You obviously have a combination of both the article 8 definitions and the decision-making body, with a new appeals structure. The appeals structure could be very helpful. There is a significant problem of public confidence in the immigration tribunals as they stand, so I welcome the Government’s measures essentially to phase that out.

It is very hard to say how decision makers and people on appeal are going to interpret this. There clearly is a toughening-up here, certainly on article 8. There is nothing at the moment that does much on article 3 claims, which, as the Committee knows, have been broadened very widely by the courts over the last 20 years into things like whether there is an equivalent health system in the host country and the receiving country, and into areas that are really quite surprising for something that is supposed to be an unqualified right.

Q Could you say a little more about where you think the IIAA will have an impact on improving public confidence in the appeals process?

Stephen Webb: The problem with the immigration tribunals at the moment is that the reporting on judgments, in some cases, has been pretty shocking. The judiciary have not helped themselves in the way that most first-tier judgments are not routinely available. The only time you really hear about them is when they go up on appeal and are quite often turned down. The point about the famous chicken nuggets case is that it was not actually upheld on appeal. It was turned down, but it gave people a taste of the sort of things that might be happening in the tribunals. Obviously, there are recorded cases of tribunal judges coming from quite an activist background, which again seems very odd—I think the public would not expect that.

From that point of view, there is an opportunity to reset and to have clear rules about impartiality. There is also considerable scope to speed things up, which will definitely be helpful. Certainly, a lot of cases are lost because of the time it takes to get to a hearing, so people can build a case. Maybe they will get involved, rightly or wrongly, genuinely or not, in making a political case. Maybe they will create it. They might start developing religious reasons or, indeed, article 8 reasons related to relationships formed in the country. The quicker a decision is made, the more likely it is that it will be rapidly upheld at that first stage. Those are all positives. It is going to be a big process to find these people—identifying them, training them and getting them ready—but in principle, I think it is a good idea.

Q Minister, the independent Regulatory Policy Committee has rated the Government’s impact assessment of the Bill as not fit for purpose. It says:

“Little of the appraisal is quantified and most impacts are…uncertain.”

What measurable difference do the Government expect the Bill to make? How many additional removals will it deliver? How much faster will cases finally be resolved?

Anna Turley: The Bill is a really important part of our armoury for dealing with illegal immigration and securing our borders in this country. In introducing it, we have tried to be clear that this country has fundamental values of decency, fairness and tolerance that we hold dear. We have an historic role in providing safety to those fleeing war and persecution but, as we have heard today from lots of witnesses, we must recognise that the world is changing.

The current system was not designed to cope with a world that is so volatile and insecure, or with people travelling through multiple safe countries before crossing the channel, particularly by boat. We have to confront the situation facing our asylum system, which is one of the most permissive, compared with other countries in Europe. Unfortunately, it is acting as a pull factor, providing a perverse incentive for people who have arrived illegally to switch to the asylum system once here. The Bill, as part of our wider process, tries to tackle that.

The Bill is part of a range of measures we have in place to tackle issues raised by the shadow Minister, such as removals. I just want to set it in its context, because we have had a lot of conversation today about whether the Bill will be the silver bullet to stop the boats. I think it is really important to see it in the broader context of all the other measures that we are bringing in.

As you know, we have established the Border Security Command, which has been part of the reason why—together with our one in, one out deal with France—we have already seen small boats down by over 40% this year. We have stopped 38,000 channel crossings, and the number of asylum claimants we have awaiting their initial decision is at its lowest since 2019. We are now down to fewer than half the hotels that asylum seekers had been placed in, and we have seen 80,000 removals since the last election, including 11,000 foreign national offenders. As I said, the Bill is one part of the armoury that we want to use.

The problems we want to tackle are clear. Some 41% of asylum claims are from people who are already here and hold visas from another form of entering the country. As colleagues have heard, the first-tier tribunals have 156,000 appeals outstanding, with 72 weeks being the current average for asylum appeals. We have a number of late claims mechanisms that people use to threaten removals, and at the moment 95% of asylum decisions get appealed. That is the context we are trying to deal with through the course of the Bill’s passage.

We have obviously talked about the Bill’s measures today, and we are confident that they will start to address, as part of that broader armoury, some of the pull factors that are leading to us being seen as having one of the most permissive processes in Europe.

Q We do not know how many more removals we are expecting as a result, and we do not know how much faster it is going to go. What would you see as the benchmark for measuring whether the Bill has succeeded?

Anna Turley: I do not want to put a specific figure on it. I am pleased with the statistics we have seen, and I want people to judge us on the outcomes of the measures we have introduced so far, which have seen 60,000 removals and 48,000 crossings stopped. We will have our metrics to measure this, but I do not want to put a specific figure on the impact at this stage of the Bill’s progress. We know the measures are specifically designed to tackle the blockages in the system and the reasons why people are able to frustrate and string out appeals. The Bill is targeted at the specific issues that mean people can string out the process, which are why the system is not functioning.

Q With regards to the article 8 changes, can you give us one concrete example of a category of case where someone could successfully resist removal today on article 8 grounds, but where the Bill would prevent them from doing so in future?

Anna Turley: Bas, you have an example—we discussed this earlier today.

Bas Javid: With all the measures in the Bill, we want to address what potentially gives people the opportunity to frustrate removals, either in bad faith or just by being late, whether that is article 8 appeals or national referral mechanism issues. I would highlight two things that frustrate operational removal. One is the successive number of issues that people raise, but not necessarily all together, and there is also the fact that it is done very late, often on the steps of the plane, particularly on charter flights.

To give an example, in 2025, on all the charter flights that my teams ran, over a third of the people frustrated their claims through late NRM referrals. That is just an example of the kind of things that happen, and that obviously also puts a lot of extra cost and wasted resource into the system, where I would otherwise use that resource to remove people legitimately.

Q There has been much discussion about the challenge posed by the article 8 issue, but can you give me an example of a category of case that today might be frustrated by article 8 that would not be frustrated once the Bill is implemented?

Anna Turley: I have one example that we saw in the past. We had an Albanian man who become a British citizen but falsely claimed to be the father of eight children between 2022 and 2024. He was sentenced to six years in jail in October 2025, but having a British father on the birth certificate meant that the children could be registered as British citizens, meaning that they could then be an anchor for the Albanian father and Albanian mother. That is an example of where it is currently being used to thwart a fair process. That is the kind of example that we would seek to use.

Q And within that category of claims, how many cases would we estimate to be relevant?

Anna Turley: Of those who have been granted leave to stay here on the basis of article 8, 71% had entered illegally or overstayed. That gives you a sense of how often this provision is used by people who have thwarted other means to be in this country. This is meant to be a safeguard, but we had 77,000 applicants for article 8 in 2025, which again gives a sense of the scale at which it is being used. As my colleague said, that is really affecting our ability to enforce our rules and protect those in genuine need.

Q How many people are currently in the UK who have exhausted their appeal rights and have no lawful right to remain, and what is the single biggest barrier preventing immigration enforcement from removing more of them?

Bas Javid: I do not have an exact number on the total. When we look at it in individual categories, such as people in the appeal system where the appeals right is exhausted, that is in the thousands—tens of thousands in many cases. In terms of individuals in particular cohorts or groups, we can break that down. I can get those figures for you—I do not have them to hand—but it is several thousand.

Anna Turley: I have one figure to add to the point on article 8. For those who were granted an article 8 right to remain in 2025, the cost to the taxpayer is £4.9 billion. That again shows the scale and the impact on the British taxpayer.

Q I have a couple of questions. The IIAA is a big change. It is causing a lot of anxiety, understandably, because of the spectre of the complexity of cases. From your perspective, what insurance policies are there to make sure that the complexity is matched by the level of adjudication?

Bas Javid: Everything we do within my team and the wider system, we do with compassion, respect and dignity. For every person we come across, whether that is a voluntary return or an enforced return or a foreign national offender, we follow the rules of policy and law. Our strapline is stop, manage, remove and protect; safeguarding and vulnerability form a huge component part of what we do, day to day, and how we run and manage our operations.

On the benefits that the IIAA will bring in terms of speeding up and discontinuing successive claims, it will obviously allow us to manage and process people much quicker, and it will certainly separate the people who have legitimate claims from those who potentially do not.

Q Minister, you heard me earlier mentioning my home city of Glasgow and my constituency of Glasgow South West, which has the highest number of asylum seekers. There is real pressure on local infrastructure and housing, compounded by some ill-advised housing policies from the Scottish Government. Can you provide some reflection on why the measures in the Bill are necessary, and what impact it will have, not only on restoring trust and public confidence in the immigration and asylum system, but on social cohesion more widely?

Anna Turley: I think you are absolutely right. This is such an important issue to all of our constituents across the country; it is one of the biggest things that comes up on the doorsteps in all the conversations we have. Everything is seen through the prism of fairness in this country, and rightly so. That is what the Bill is aiming for, through a number of measures, such as repayment of support and so on.

This is about fairness; if people come here, we want them to integrate and to settle. If they have a genuine right to be here, we will always provide that, but we also have to be conscious that, in a country where our resources are not infinite, we have to have a managed system, where we remove those who have no right to be here and ensure that we support people in a way that is compliant with our international obligations, but does not go over and above them, which perhaps in the past we have done too much.

In 2024-25, for example, the entire cost of asylum was £4 billion. At a time when our public purse is under strain, that is a challenge. We are working hard to do everything we can, all the way up to the source, to prevent the illegal movement of people across this country—the people trafficking that we have seen—and to disrupt the industrial network of gangs that exploit desperate people who wish to come to this country. We are doing that through doubling our investment in the National Crime Agency, working with the French to reduce the number of boat crossings, and processing and removing people.

The key part of the Bill is the speeding up of appeals. That is one of the most important ways that we can accelerate the process. Nobody should have to wait 72 weeks for an asylum appeal. No one should be able draw things out and exploit the system through last-minute loopholes, using provisions that are designed genuinely to protect people but that are being exploited to draw out cases.

This is a matter of fairness and due process, and of making a system that is fair and well managed so that it is fair both on the taxpayer and on those who are here genuinely fleeing persecution.

Q Minister, I am sure you want to tackle the immigration issues and asylum problem that we have. However, are you concerned that the provisions in the Bill, to the extent that they are beneficial at all, could be quite limited, as balanced against the potential upheaval of institutional changes in the way that asylum applications are dealt with, or that they have the potential to create all sorts of unintended consequences and issues due to the way the Bill is drafted? Given the evidence you have heard in this session, does any of that cause you concern?

Anna Turley: I think my biggest cause of concern is that things cannot go on the way that they are. We want to make sure that we introduce legislation that deals with that. Of course there will be things that we will, with the due process of Parliament, continue to work on as the Bill progresses. But the reality, particularly when it comes to the appeals process, is that the system as it stands is falling over and not serving anyone.

It is important that we build a new structure, which I believe is more flexible and swift, and which has all the right safeguards. We have not had a chance to discuss some of those safeguards. Some of the witnesses were critical of the process, but we are talking about building into the system a high degree of training and legal support, high professional standards, numerous levels of oversight, and the opportunity to go on to a tribunal appeal. We have great civil servants, who are not legally trained, but who manage the process. We want to build a body, and do it carefully and do it right, in a way that means that we no longer rely on the judicial capacity, which is falling over. We can then make those decisions swiftly, but with a properly, professionally trained body. That will enable us to make good, swift decisions on those appeals and then refer to tribunals as and when that is needed.

Q I get that the system we have is not good enough, but that does not mean that what you are proposing is. We have heard lots of evidence in this session that the problems lie not necessarily with the law, but with the way the Home Office deals with applications. Are you absolutely sure that this is the best Bill you can introduce? I think we can agree that the public are tired of Governments saying, “A system is not good enough; let’s have a trial and experiment with this idea.”

Anna Turley: I take the challenge about the quality of decision making in the Home Office, but I think 95% of decisions are appealed. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool flagged earlier, we are in a situation where people know that by appealing they can lengthen their stay and draw out the process. Of course, we are always looking to improve the quality of initial decision making—we will look to do that—but we are in a world where we are going from the decision making to a hugely bureaucratic, expensive, slow, burdensome system that is just not working. Introducing the appeals tier is about getting a better quality of decision making at a swifter rate, although it is always incumbent on us to improve the quality of decision making at the Home Office.

We have invested a lot in the judicial capacity. We have increased the amount that we spend by 21%. The number of sitting days is up 19%. We have done a lot to try to tackle that, but the number of appeals is still going up. The outcome of appeals has stayed constant, but the number of appeals is going up. That says to me that people are recognising that this is a way to thwart and draw out the system.

Dan Hobbs: As the Minister said, we are tackling a number of issues. Some of this is groundbreaking, in terms of asylum cost recovery. We are defining article 8 and bringing it back much closer to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, in terms of qualifying family members and setting out clear stipulations for both decision makers and the courts as regards the definition around family life. Again, that is a big area of attrition. As the Minister set out, 77% of people using article 8 had either arrived illegally or overstayed. A large number of foreign national offenders use article 8 as a means to either delay or avoid removal from the country. The Bill seeks to ensure that that is interpreted in line with how ECHR article 8 is due to be interpreted.

With the appeals authority, it is about having all the safeguards—the regulatory training, the procedural training and the professional ability to deal with these cases, backed by senior adjudicators who have legal training. It is also about having a fair and efficient system, because part of the challenge we see at appeal now is that there is a long gap between someone’s initial decision by the Home Office and when that comes before a judge. During that time, a whole series of events can happen, which means the case before a judge is often different from the one the Home Office made its initial decision on.

Q It is right, is it not, that the Home Office has a pretty poor record of success? When its initial decisions are tested on appeal, it loses at an incredibly high rate, suggesting there is something wrong with the original decision making at the Home Office. That has nothing to do with replacing the judicial system in the Bill.

Dan Hobbs: I think the overturn rate is actually declining, so the Home Office is getting more successful overall with those decisions that go before a judge. But, to my point earlier, what the judge decides can often be very different on the facts, compared with what was presented to the Home Office at the beginning, because of the passage of time. The Minister talked about upwards of 68 weeks between someone’s appeal being lodged and concluded, which means that a whole different series of facts come before the judge. So the evidence can change in that time, but our overturn rate is broadly coming down.

Q From a pretty bad place. That is factually the case, isn’t it?

Dan Hobbs: Broadly, about 50% of the refusals are then overturned. That is coming down, but equally the refusal rate has gone up. As the Minister said, we are refusing more cases, but the overturn rate is broadly similar.

Q Thank you for your answers so far. It is good to hear that the overturn rate is reducing from the highs we have seen; certainly, the statistics you gave us right at the beginning, Minister, about the reduction we have seen since the general election are really welcome.

I want to speak to that point because that is what comes up most in Stafford, Eccleshall and the villages. It is not just one side of the political spectrum that has concerns about our immigration system; it is across the board. It is interesting when we hear consistently from both sides that there is a lack of faith and confidence in the system, because that does speak to a fundamental issue. I hope you can explain how setting up the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority will help to address that across the board.

Anna Turley: We are in a situation where there is a crisis in confidence and a crisis in outcome. That is why it is really important for us to restore that faith by building a professional, reliable and independent appeals process.

We have talked about some of the ways in which the authority is independent, and those are on the face of the Bill. It is a statutory body in its own right; it is not a Crown body. Ministers have a statutory duty to uphold its independence, and it is really important to us that we maintain that independence. As we have heard, the adjudicators will be appointed by a chief executive, and these will be merit-based appointments. Importantly, there will be external annual reporting to Parliament, and there is still that right of appeal to the upper tribunal.

However, it is important to recognise that the authority cannot operate in isolation—I think that that is part of the reason why there has been a bit of a crisis in public confidence. It is really important that it is part of the wider immigration and asylum process. It is going to be accountable for its performance through statutory reporting, scrutiny and oversight, which is not the case at the moment, with the separation of the judiciary. By making it accountable to Parliament, we are providing another mechanism to make it accountable to the British people, and to try to rebuild the trust and faith that they should have in their asylum process and in their Government to manage our borders.

Does anyone else on the panel want to come in on that question?

Dan Hobbs and Bas Javid indicated dissent.

Q I was pleased to hear you talk about fairness, which is a fundamental British value. Concern is sometimes raised about article 8, which I encounter in my role as a Council of Europe delegate. What protections will there be to prevent the wrongful separation of families when children are involved? That is a major concern for a lot of people who hear about what we are proposing in the Bill.

Anna Turley: An important thing to clarify, and that we have not heard today, is that it will be up to the family to decide what they want to do. If somebody is removed, the family can go with them if that is what they want to do. We will always put the rights of the child at the forefront of everything. It is important for us to say that.

It is also important that we set out our aims in doing this with article 8. There have been a variety of interpretations of article 8—it has been applied very loosely and inconsistently—so defining and codifying the concept of family life in primary legislation is important for fairness and consistency. We are bringing it in line with existing immigration regulations codifying and clarifying family life, and trying to ensure that it is fair, consistent and written on the face of the Bill. On safeguards, it is important to reiterate that our priority is always the welfare of the children.

Q That is a nice bridge for me to ask about article 8. We have heard that the tightening up of article 8 may drive article 3 claims. Does the Bill not take the Government to a place of playing whack-a-mole with the ECHR yet again?

Dan Hobbs: We are really clear about article 8, as we have set out in the impact assessment and elsewhere. Article 3 is used much less, and would normally be tested through the asylum claim. An article 3 breach would normally fall within the asylum and protection angle. Article 8 is already a qualified right, so I do not immediately follow the logic that people would then make article 3 claims, because that would already be considered under their asylum claim. If people had article 3 rights, they would be raised and are raised. We get article 3 challenges in various elements, so it is used now, but I am not clear how an article 8 right, which is a qualified right, can transpose into article 3, which is an absolute right.

Q In which case you are not concerned that, by tightening up article 8, you will end up with article 3 claims.

Dan Hobbs: With the immigration system, we always have to think about displacement and human behaviour, which is not entirely predictable. We will go away and review that point with the Minister, but I cannot not immediately see how someone could use a subsisting relationship under article 8 as an article 3 barrier.

Q Okay. I am sure we will pick that up in line-by-line scrutiny. We spoke earlier about the general drafting of the Bill, and there was quite a lot of criticism from witnesses of the legal drafting and—no offence if any of you were involved—of its general sloppiness. I have some questions relating to judicial review. Clause 1(8) is the ouster provision. For my clarity, could you please describe what you are trying to achieve with that clause so that we can give it some thought as we move to the next stage?

Anna Turley: Sorry, which clause was that again?

Clause 1(8).

Dan Hobbs: This provision is about decisions on errors in law going to the upper tribunal. That is the case now: first-tier tribunal challenges on errors in law go to the upper tribunal. What we are setting out there is the procedure. Appeals against decisions of the new authority on the basis of law go to the upper tribunal.

Q Okay. The third witness panel—I think it was the KC who joined us, Professor Ekins—described it as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Given what you have described as your intent, you presumably disagree with that and think the provision is well drafted.

Dan Hobbs: On the basis of today, I think we will take that away and verify it. As I say, I do not think we intended that. I will go away and check.

Q Just stepping back for a moment, do you expect the result of the Bill will be that the numbers arriving on small boats will decrease and the numbers removed from the UK will increase?

Anna Turley: As I said at the beginning, it is an important part of our armoury for reducing the numbers in small boats. We have evidence clearly showing that people who come to the country think we have, essentially, a more liberal system than many other countries in Europe. Of course, there are other reasons why people want to come to the UK, but people generally think that we have a looser interpretation of some of our responsibilities than other countries. It is important to us that we are clear, through the Bill, that we will fulfil our obligations, but also that we will ensure people cannot exploit the system or find loopholes, and that we will have a system that is fair, efficient and effective. This is one part of our armoury that, alongside all the other measures we are putting in place, will see our trajectory of reducing small boats continue.

I am convinced that the Bill will certainly speed up the time it takes to undertake removals and deal with some of the last-minute claims. You have heard from my colleague about people finding yet another opportunity to thwart the system when they are literally on their way to the planes.

Bas Javid: I would add that the very act of removal, when it is done properly and legitimately, acts as a deterrent in itself. For people who are looking to come to the UK or to remain illegally after a legal arrival, the very act of removal, done in the right way, is a deterrent.

Q Minister, you are a neighbouring MP of mine, so you understand only too well the anger about illegal migrants in your constituency and my Hartlepool constituency, particularly given that the previous Government’s decision to outsource asylum accommodation led to our communities being unfairly targeted. The test for many of my constituents will come down to whether the Bill will result in a reduction in the number of illegal migrants in our communities. What modelling has been carried out to look at the effect of the Bill on reducing the number of illegal immigrants?

Anna Turley: As I said, it is part of our armoury. I recognise very deeply, as you do, the sense of fairness that people feel in communities such as ours, which are struggling on all kinds of levels, whether access to public services, employment opportunities, levels of poverty or the broader social fabric and community cohesion challenges that we face in this country—those are important issues. As a Labour Government, we always want fairness to be at the heart of everything we do.

Although it is part of a broader armoury, the priority for the Bill is to move to a system in which British people do not feel that their sanctuary is being exploited or that others have the opportunity to access what they might not be able to access. Where we do extend a hand and help people to find a life of safety and sanctuary in this country, and they are able to integrate and become part of our communities, they will be responsible for repaying that support. Fairness, responsibility and contribution are at the heart of everything we should do in this country, as we uphold our international obligations, of which we are rightly proud.

Q I have a couple of questions that seek more information, so I will fire through those two to begin with. Madeleine Sumption and the Refugee Council told us that there is not full data on which human rights claims grounds are currently accepted, refused, appealed and then accepted, or refused on appeal. Is there any way the Department could get more of that information to us before our line-by-line consideration of the Bill?

The Refugee Council said there was no information on the proportion of people claiming asylum support as opposed to living off their own means while they are here, or not living off any means and being exploited. That is important information to know about in the context of the repayments clauses. Could you try to get that information for us before our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill? The Government need a baseline for the outcome that they are seeking.

Anna Turley: I appreciate that. We may have that information, but I do not have it to hand today—apologies. I am more than happy to have a look internally, have discussions and see if we can get that information to the Committee, if we have access to it.

Q A few witnesses asked—as does some of the written evidence—for more information on the regulations that will follow the legislation to be published before we consider the relevant clauses of the Bill. I think that relates mainly to the definitions and criteria of protection status under clause 21, and to how destitution will be defined under clause 23 and where the threshold for making contributions will be set in order to avoid hardship. Will those regulations be published in draft form for the Committee before we consider those clauses?

Anna Turley: I take your point on the core protection point and on destitution. Our intention was always to set out that detail in due course. On any legislative changes, we want to ensure that we lay that out properly for proper scrutiny, so I will endeavour to do that for the Committee.

Q I have a quick question on engagement. One thing that has come out of my own constituency work is that people making asylum applications are mainly successful in the end—sometimes when they get my help—but there are a lot of criticisms of the process, particularly in relation to access and the way that the forms are presented, and in understanding what they need to do, being able to provide the right information and being asked for it in a clear way. All those different things might cause discrimination in the process or cause claims not to be approved when they should be.

We have established that claims that should have been approved in the first place are a burden on the courts. There is also human error in the Home Office. Have you managed to engage with any asylum seekers on solving their problems, or about their views on the Bill? We have heard from witnesses representing asylum seekers, but engagement with the people who are affected would be useful, so I wonder what the Department has done.

Anna Turley: I am always a believer in service user feedback, including from people who have been through the process and have lived experience, to help us develop better policymaking. This Bill process notwithstanding, I would be keen to look at that more broadly. In terms of the Bill process, there was a consultation after the Home Secretary’s statement—before my time, I believe—which everybody would have had the opportunity to feed into.

I reflect on the point about perhaps looking at specific users’ experience that they might not have been able to share during the process for fear of compromising their situation. On whether there is another means by which we can talk to people who have been through the process, we are always trying to improve our processes.

Dan Hobbs: Most of our consultation is done through the advocacy group. There is a national framework of stakeholder engagement with various different aspects—children, accommodation and elements like that—that the asylum group runs. Much of that lived experience is expressed through those groups. That is done in partnership with organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Refugee Council. Bas also has a community engagement team that gets a lot of information from people who use our services.

Bas Javid: We have two very distinct elements of engagement. I have a national community engagement team, which links with local authorities, charity groups, churches and other places of worship, and communities more generally—just on immigration, not necessarily on enforcement. Only this week, I have set up a new command, called the returns assistance and engagement operations. The primary focus of that command is people who are failed asylum seekers, still in the UK, and would need some returns assistance. Part of that is engagement and communication, as there are often language barriers and other communication challenges, and part is building up a level of trust. The focus of the command is entirely on trying to increase the voluntary returns, which is my primary focus. I would much rather do a voluntary return than an enforced one—it is safer, cheaper and quicker, and it is more dignified.

Q Do you have routes through to the people affected so that you could ask about the Bill’s provisions?

Bas Javid: Yes. On when we pick up feedback from people, particularly around the system, for example, one of the things that we recently rolled out is different apps and communication systems that we did not have before. We are much more on the front foot about contacting people at an early stage of a removals process, rather than later. When we do that, we feed back to our asylum colleagues any information or feedback relevant to assisting them to improve the process.

Q I have a quite technical question. I sit on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and when we were dealing with the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, one of the issues I asked the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Leeds South (Hilary Benn), about was its compatibility with the EU victims’ directive. As part of the Windsor framework, which was negotiated by the previous Conservative Government, there was a requirement for Northern Ireland to maintain compatibility with EU law. Does the Bill have any issues with compatibility in Northern Ireland?

My other question is about the Good Friday agreement requiring the European convention on human rights to be embedded in Northern Ireland. Are there any concerns about the applicability of those issues and how they have been engaged in the Bill, or how it could be challenged in the courts in Northern Ireland? The last thing anyone wants is more Bills being dragged through the courts.

Dan Hobbs: This has been the subject of litigation already, which I think has concluded that it does not relate in respect of people who do not have lawful status in the United Kingdom; it related to citizens of the Republic of Ireland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As I say, I think there is case law on this, as a case was brought against previous legislation. The courts found that it was consistent and that the alignment issues you talked about did not directly relate to immigration law. We can write to you with full details, but the immigration legislation applies right across the United Kingdom.

Q The effectiveness of the measures around article 8 will play a large part in determining the success or otherwise of the Bill. The Government say that 77,000 applications were granted on article 8 grounds last year. How many of those would have been refused under the measures being put forward in this Bill?

Anna Turley: We can certainly get back to you on that figure. As I said, we know that there were 77,000 applicants in 2025. We also know that 70% of our foreign national deportation appeals were allowed on article 8 grounds. We can probably do the maths and get back to the Committee.

Q Do you have a rough proportion?

Anna Turley: I would not want to give incorrect figures. If it is okay, I will reply to the Committee in writing with that information.

Dan Hobbs: There is data in the Bill’s impact assessment on the loss that we see, both on the national referral mechanism and the removals, and where it would be our intention to reduce that attrition as much as possible from them both. There are a number of elements to this: the late claims process, the new procedures under the IIAA and the changes in terms of treatment of credibility under the national referral mechanism. Bas can probably talk more to that, but you will see people using multiple channels. The intention of the Bill is partly to ensure that there is an appeal that deals with all those issues and that, if they are brought late or after the notifications, they are treated as bad faith—that is the intention here. There are a number of elements, so isolating just the individual bits relating to the article 8 clauses will be quite difficult to assess.

Anna Turley: To build on that, the impact assessment says that article 8 reforms will result in an additional 3,600 people per year being removed. That is on the basis of our analysis finding that 31% of people who were refused article 8 applications were removed from the UK or claimed asylum. The 3,600 figure is estimated by applying the 31% proportion to the 11,700 total number of people estimated to be refused an article 8 claim due to the measures in the Bill. Hopefully that gives a little more clarity, but I am happy to write to the Committee.

Okay.