PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting) - 14 April 2026 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Chair(s) † Dawn Butler, Sir John Hayes, Dr Rupa Huq, Christine Jardine
Members† Berry, Siân (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
† Bishop, Matt (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
† Brown-Fuller, Jess (Chichester) (LD)
† Farnsworth, Linsey (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Hack, Amanda (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
† Hamilton, Paulette (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
† Kohler, Mr Paul (Wimbledon) (LD)
† McIntyre, Alex (Gloucester) (Lab)
† Morgan, Stephen (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)
† Mullan, Dr Kieran (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
† Osborne, Tristan (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
† Paul, Rebecca (Reigate) (Con)
† Qureshi, Yasmin (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
† Sackman, Sarah (Minister for Courts and Legal Services)
† Slinger, John (Rugby) (Lab)
† Ward, Melanie (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
ClerksRobert Cope, Dominic Stockbridge, Francis Morse, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeTuesday 14 April 2026
[Dawn Butler in the Chair]
Courts and Tribunals BillAmendment proposed (this day): 38, in clause 1, page 3, line 20, at end insert—
Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.
In essence, the approach taken is an objective one, and it adheres to the principle of equality of treatment when it comes to the mode of trial, because it is driven by the seriousness of the crime. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion made a point about freedom of expression and the right to protest, and they of course make up a cornerstone of our democracy, but some public order offences, depending on their seriousness, are currently heard in the magistrates court and some will be heard with a jury trial. That will remain the case, although of course some, depending on their seriousness and the likely sentence, might be heard by the Crown court bench division.
The point is that the seriousness of the offence and the likely sentence make up the applicable test under the Bill, rather than who the defendant happens to be, their past history or the particular type of offence. The objective test is the same, regardless of whether the defendant is a young person from a working-class background, a young person of colour from a particular marginalised community, a practising solicitor or an environmental campaigner. Under the processes, they will all be treated equally. We are not creating carve-outs for particular types of offences or particular kinds of defendants; the seriousness of the case is determined by the court through the application of the test, and that is what determines the mode of trial.
We need to ensure not only that we have the right safeguards, monitoring and data collection, but that the reforms in the Bill do not entrench a status quo that has sometimes fallen short of our collective aspirations for justice and equality, so that they can command the confidence of all communities as we implement, monitor and refine them in future, if needed.
In the scenario the hon. Lady described in respect of the person of good character, it is right that at the plea and trial preparation hearing—the mode of trial allocation phase—the likely sentence depending on the seriousness will be looked at. In that process, the likely sentence would no doubt take into account—albeit it is a high-level assessment, in line with the sort of assessment that magistrates courts make every day—the mitigating factors, which might include the person’s good character. In bringing forward the reforms, I believe that that person will get a fair trial wherever they get it: in a magistrates court, in the Crown court bench division or, indeed, at a full jury trial if the crime is likely to get a sentence of three years or more. It is not about the person who has done the more serious crime enjoying greater rights. It is because it is a more serious crime that it gets a jury trial. That is a proportionate use of the resources in our system.
As a society, we have for centuries made a threshold choice about who can access a jury trial. We are having a debate now about where that threshold should be drawn. Our proposals strike the right balance between the rights of the different participants in the system. We think they secure fairness because of the other safeguards in the system—the giving of reasons by a judge in the Crown court bench division and the transparency measures we are bringing in—but we also think they are proportionate use of court resources. The hon. Members for Reigate and for Bexhill and Battle both made the point that somebody getting a criminal conviction in the magistrates court, which may attract a six-month custodial sentence or less, is a pretty serious thing in itself. For some people, that may mean, reputationally, that they can no longer pursue their career. These things are serious.
I do not think any of us is saying that the status quo, whereby magistrates and district judges hear those cases, is not inherently fair. It is fair. What is not fair is the status quo whereby the scale of the delays is detrimental to the quality of justice we are able to provide to the public, whether in jury trials, judge-only trials or magistrates trials. The delays are such that they are undermining law enforcement, the quality and recency of the evidence, and people’s memories. It is undermining the calibre of the justice that the system is able to mete out. Dealing with the delays is not just an efficiency question; it is inherent to the question of fairness itself.
We keep repeating the old adage that justice delayed is justice denied. It is a powerful one because there is truth in it: the older the vintage of the cases, the less fair they become. That is not fair on anybody. It is not fair on the defendant on remand or fair on the complainant. It is not fair on the witness, who may have just had the misfortune of passing by a criminal incident, and is being asked to recall what happened a year or two years ago, when they would like to move on with their lives. When it comes to fairness, timeliness is critical.
Let me turn to the detail of clause 1. Part of its function is to ensure consistency across the statute book. To ensure consistency in that way, the clause makes a series of consequential amendments to remove references to a defendant electing for a Crown court trial. That includes amendments to the uncommenced written plea and allocations provision inserted by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Those uncommenced written procedures would allow defendants to indicate a plea without attending court. Their inclusion does not signify that the Government are intending to commence them. The clause ensures that if those provisions were brought into force in future, they would operate consistently with the removal of the defendant’s ability to choose the mode of trial. Defendants will still be able to indicate a plea in writing, and both parties may still make representations on venue. That decision on mode of trial would rest with the court.
The clause also updates the remittal power in section 46ZA of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Currently, where a case is already in the court, a judge may remit to the magistrates court only with a defendant’s consent. Clause 1 removes the requirement to obtain that consent, ensuring that remittal decisions, like allocation decisions, are made on the basis of the court’s assessment of suitability.
On the one hand, the Minister says that she agrees with that to some extent, that these are weighing exercises and that there is a preference. But when she is pointed to a specific element of unfairness that that creates, she reverts to saying, “Well, all these things are equal and there is no difference between the two.” That is an inconsistency in her position that we do not have on the Opposition Benches. We are very clear: our preference would be for the superior jury trial in every circumstance, but we accept that that is not always practical; we are fighting the curtailment of that and the further shifting of the dial in the other direction.
What is the Minister’s view? Are these things absolutely equal? Is a magistrates trial just the same as a jury trial? Does she have no issues with that? If so, why not go further, as the Secretary of State wanted to, in respect of five years, for example? Or does the Minister accept that a magistrates court is, in some respects, inferior and less fair, and that there is therefore a rational argument for people to say that they would rather be in the Crown court?
Since the Crown court was created in 1971, there has been no substantial criminal justice reform, despite broad societal changes, technological changes and the fact that, as the independent review of the criminal courts pointed out, the profile of crime and criminal evidence in this country has changed, which means that Crown court trials now take twice as long as they did in 2000, just because forensic and CCTV evidence makes them more complex. We would expect a public service to evolve with that societal change. We have always made that threshold decision; it is a decision that is taken in other common-law jurisdictions as well. The idea that we will talk in hypotheticals about being absolutist, and about having all jury trials or not—
We have to make decisions about the system as we find it, not as we might dream it to be in some academic seminar. The fact is that we have all made a choice, because 90% of trials in this country are already undertaken by magistrates. As I said, I do not think anyone is seriously suggesting that those are not fair. The state’s obligation is to guarantee a fair trial. Whether those trials are heard by lay magistrates or by a district judge, they uphold principles of natural justice. I do not understand why anyone would say that the trials that take place day in, day out in our magistrates courts do not uphold principles of natural justice and article 6 of the European convention on human rights—which, by the way, includes the obligation to conduct criminal trials within a reasonable time. The importance of timeliness, and the inherent importance of timeliness to a fair hearing, is enshrined explicitly in article 6.
The state’s obligation is to ensure that fair trial—it is not a jury trial in every case—and we have always made that threshold decision. The removal of a defendant’s ability to insist on their choice of trial venue does not change that. The right to elect does not exist under the Scottish legal system, for example, and no one would seriously suggest that the Scottish legal system offends the principles of natural justice. Our justice system is rightly respected around the world, irrespective of where a case is heard.
The point is that our magistrates court, trials before district judges and the Crown court bench division will continue to uphold those principles of natural justice. Both the prosecution and defence will continue to be able to make representations on whether a case should be heard in the Crown court, and the court must take into account those representations in reaching its decision. As with all cases heard in the magistrates court, defendants retain the right of appeal to the High Court and the Crown court against conviction or sentence. Even with a permission stage for certain appeals, those safeguards remain in place.
On amendment 38, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, principles of natural justice are preserved in our reforms. We heard evidence from victims of crime and former judges alike about the detrimental effect that delays are having not just on people’s lives but on the quality of justice that can be administered. It is difficult to argue that the current system is consistently meeting our obligation to ensure a fair trial where, as I have said, justice delayed is justice denied. That reflects a structural failing and one that points to a system in urgent need of investment and modernisation. That is why clause 1 as drafted is focused on delivering swifter justice for all participants in the system.
The right to a fair trial is, as I have said, protected under article 6 of the European convention on human rights and reflected in long established common-law principles. Removing the defendant’s choice of venue does not change the procedural fairness of proceedings, nor the defendant’s ability to participate effectively in their case. Defendants will continue to receive fair and impartial justice, regardless of where their case is heard.
As I said, decisions on mode of trial will be taken by judges and magistrates, who are independent office holders who take a formal judicial oath to act impartially and fairly. That oath is binding and accords with natural justice. Mode of trial decisions continue to be guided by the independent Sentencing Council’s allocation guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework for allocation decisions. Further to that, magistrates courts are already required to give brief reasons for their allocation decisions, reflecting a long established common-law duty. That requirement will extend to the Crown court in relation to the mode of trial allocation decisions, so someone will know why they were allocated to a venue. That understanding is important for litigants and the transparency they require.
Amendment 38 does not add further protections beyond the safeguards that already exist. A defendant’s trial in the magistrates court does not breach those principles of natural justice and the existing legal protections already ensure procedural fairness in summary proceedings. The Committee will remember well the powerful testaments we heard from many, but in particular the victims who gave their evidence at a public session and their view that the system is weighted heavily towards the defendant. Not only do our reforms restore some of that balance, placing decisions over allocations in the hands of the court rather than those of defendants, but they make a material difference in addressing the backlogs. I am afraid that amendment 38, by contrast, is a defence of a failing status quo. For these reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the amendment.
When we talk about the challenges in the courts and what was inherited, the Government would do themselves a much greater service and reflect accurately the debate and the challenges if they more regularly sought to speak fairly and freely about what actually happened in relation to Crown court backlogs, and the reason why the amendment was tabled. Prior to the pandemic, Crown court backlogs were lower under the Conservative Government than they were under the previous Labour Government.
Every time the Government highlight the real challenges with the Crown court backlogs and omit to recognise that the historically unprecedented level of the backlogs was almost entirely driven by the covid pandemic, they do a disservice to the complexity and reality of what went on in our court service. Every time they talk in isolation about a lack of investment in the period of 14 years, they fail to understand that Members on Labour’s side, who have been highly critical of the Conservative party, actually recognise that over many decades, prior to the Conservative Government, as other Labour Members said on Second Reading, there has been a lack of investment—an investment lower than I would want—in our court service.
I have been clear since taking up the position of shadow Justice Minister that I would have wanted a higher degree of protection for the justice system than that in the decisions taken at the time. The Opposition have not been afraid to say that or to own the responsibility for it, as we have in a number of other areas where we wish things had been done differently. I have explained that, for me, courts and the criminal justice system is one of the reasons—if not the main reason—why I sought election to Parliament, so I am always going to say that we should invest more strongly in the justice system.
Just last week, I did an interview on Times Radio about our work on whole-life orders, after I successfully appealed a case in which someone had not got a whole-life order; the Court of Appeal gave them a whole-life order. The presenter asked me why we do not have more whole-life orders, and why more is not done about it. I explained that, in reality, as a politician I might have my priorities, and other individual MPs might have their own priorities, but inevitably the decisions of the Treasury, what goes into the manifesto and what the Government commit to are a matter of the public’s priorities. As someone who campaigns strongly on behalf of victims of crime, I understand the enormous impact that crime has. I also must accept that most people, most of the time, are not victims of any crime, let alone serious crimes, so convincing the public at large to vote for parties that will invest seriously in and improve our criminal justice system is difficult. In polling, the criminal justice system is not at the top of the list of the public’s priorities, as much as I might wish it were.
The Government and Labour Members would do better to more accurately reflect the history of what has happened in the criminal justice system, and particularly in relation to Crown court backlogs. I do not recall that when Labour were last in government—I have looked through Hansard for this—Labour MPs got up and complained about Crown court backlogs that were higher than those we delivered in Government, prior to the pandemic. That is the reality of what happened: the pandemic had an unprecedented impact on our criminal justice system. The vast majority of the historically unprecedented situation that we are dealing with is directly related to the pandemic. If, every time they talked about this, hon. Members made that point, the Opposition would be able to take their criticisms of our record more seriously.
To pick up on some remarks, I welcome those of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, who drew attention to the issue that we considered in the evidence hearings about the not guilty pleas that some of us are uncomfortable with. As I said, I strongly objected to some of those. On the Colston statue, behind the scenes I was one of the MPs lobbying for the Attorney General to do as she did—to seek clarification from the Court of Appeal to stop that from happening again.
I very much resent some of those things—but is that not the point? We have a system that allows for that, that allows for MPs to have a view, to be unhappy or to criticise something that a judge sitting on their own would say, “Look, this is obvious. This is absolutely a guilty—no question”, but a jury might find a different outcome for reasons of their own. I have to admit that, before this debate and the Bill coming before the House, I had only ever viewed this issue through the prism of frustration, wanting to understand how it works and how we might even curtail this, supporting the Court of Appeal declaratory ruling on that judgment. This whole process, however, has made me reflect on the broader role of juries in civil liberties and in curtailing the power of the state.
Even if Parliament wants something done in a particular way, a jury of ordinary people retains the right—as frustrating as that might be, but it has been clarified repeatedly in case law—to say, “Look, we understand all the facts, and we might even agree privately that the law has been broken, but for this reason or that we are going to offer that as not guilty.” Our system has been asked explicitly whether that is something that should happen, and we have been told explicitly that that is something that our system deliberately holds on to. On the balancing, every time we shift more cases into the magistrates court, again we are minimising that, reducing it as an important part of what we might call an informal constitutional settlement.
I welcome the remarks by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, who helpfully drew our attention to the gaps between what Sir Brian recommended and what the Government are doing. That is another major hole in the Government’s argument. The example that the hon. Member articulated was about his suggestion of two years going back to magistrates ending up as the Government’s three years. We will also discuss the issue of a Crown court bench without any magistrates, so in two major ways, the Government are not doing what Sir Brian recommended.
In evidence, the Minister even put to some of the witnesses from the Bar Council:
“What do you know that Sir Brian…does not?”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 43, Q81.]
That question, I am afraid, can be turned right back around to the Minister, who is also not doing what Sir Brian recommended. What does she know that Sir Brian does not? If it is so important that we listen carefully to Sir Brian, because he has done such an exhaustive piece of work and put so much time into developing detailed, specific and concrete proposals, why are the Government happy just to disregard the elements of that that they do not agree with?
We cannot do the same. We cannot say, “Actually, we don’t think the evidence is there. We don’t think the case has been made”, but the Government can. They want to say that about a fundamental element—this is not a minor element—which is whether a judge sits on their own or with two magistrates. That is a major difference. In fact, the most radical element of the proposals is the judge sitting on their own in those types of cases, but the Government do not agree with what Sir Brian said about it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating the nature and seriousness of so many of the offences we are considering. She also sought a firm answer on, for example, the modelling of the increases in guilty pleas that we might expect owing to the increase in the length of suspended sentences.
We had a debate about, “Well, it’s in the explanatory notes, not in the impact assessment,” as if that was just immaterial. The Minister and her officials will know very well that there is a big difference between what goes into an impact assessment, given the statutory nature of that document and everything that the Government have to do before they put things into it, and what a Government can put out in what is effectively a non-statutory document. They could really put anything in there that they wanted to.
Of course we would expect the Government to be fair, frank and honest, but the reason why we have impact assessments—and the reason why, when Labour Members were in opposition, they hammered the Conservatives repeatedly about what did or did not go into an impact assessment in particular, as opposed to broader documents—is that it has a statutory footing and is important in its own way. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating what was absent from that impact assessment.
We talked about the Crown Prosecution Service, and there was an attempt to say that what a senior member of the management said, one would assume—
Of course, we would assume that they had done that in consultation with other leadership figures, so we might reasonably say that they speak on behalf of the senior leadership team of the CPS, but there was an attempt to say that their views can somehow be taken to represent the views of the many people who work across the CPS—
As my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford pointed out, the CPS is a very big organisation, with a lot of people.
The hon. Lady is very welcome to intervene and talk about how the CPS formulated its position in the way that she sought to talk about it, covering all the different people who work for the CPS. As I explained to her, I know there are people who work for the CPS who do not agree. She may well know people who do agree, but some do not agree. I took the liberty of re-contacting one of the people who works for the CPS over the Committee’s lunch break. Their—quite rightly—anonymous and private view, which they are entitled to hold and express to me is that, as a prosecutor, we should all be very worried when a state prosecutor wants to do something that further curtails the rights of defendants. I might not express it in those terms, but that is how someone from the CPS expressed it.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to say that the formal policy position of the organisation of the CPS is as she described, but she was not right to refer to it as being meaningful because it covers lots and lots of people who have had no formal engagement whatsoever in helping the CPS to come to that conclusion. It is a bit like the Minister getting up and saying, “The Ministry of Justice is a big organisation and we all think this is what should happen.” The Minister knows that her civil servants are asked to produce policy; what they actually think about it and whether they agree with it is totally irrelevant, and she would never use the size of the organisation to add weight to the strength of her argument, because it is nonsense. As I pointed out when His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service gave evidence, people are not allowed to give their individual views; it is a policy position that the organisation has to hold.
We also talked this morning about public confidence among members of minority communities, as was raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington. The group JUSTICE has put forward its views and concerns about this. It notes that the equality statement for the Bill also notes that black, older and female defendants historically elect for a Crown court trial at higher rates. In 2022, 26% of black defendants elected for a Crown court trial, compared with 15% of white defendants—a very significant gap. In 2017, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) also concluded that many individuals from ethnic minorities opted for trial in the Crown court whenever possible, as they had more confidence in the fairness of jury trials compared with magistrates.
As the Bill is written by the person advocating for those changes, we should consider what the right hon. Member said very carefully. He said:
“Juries are a success story of our justice system. Rigorous analysis shows that, on average, juries— including all white juries—do not deliver different results for BAME and White defendants. The lesson is that juries are representative of local populations—and must deliberate as a group, leaving no hiding place for bias or discrimination.”
Would Government Members put it to the right hon. Member for Tottenham that he was in any way denigrating magistrates in making that point, or that he was saying magistrate trials were not fair? I do not recall any Labour MP making that point at the time that his report was published. The review found that BAME defendants often had lower confidence in the fairness of magistrates courts and, as I have said, therefore opted for a trial in the Crown courts. Because of that lack of trust, BAME defendants were also thought to be more likely to plead not guilty in magistrates court and push for a Crown court trial, which resulted in them missing out on the one-third sentencing reduction offered by early guilty pleas. These things have real-world consequences for the individuals concerned.
While the report found that BAME defendants were not disadvantaged compared with white counterparts at the jury trial stage, they faced harsher outcomes elsewhere in the system. I want to quote again from the Lammy review:
“The way that juries make decisions is key to this. Juries comprise 12 people, representative of the local population. When a jury retires to make a decision, its members must consider the evidence, discuss the case and seek to persuade one another if necessary. This debate and deliberation acts as a filter for prejudice—to persuade other jurors, people must justify their position. In the final decision, power is also never concentrated in the hands of one individual.”
What did the right hon. Member have to say about magistrates courts? He said:
“This positive story about the jury system is not matched by such a clear-cut story for magistrates’ verdicts. The relative rate analysis…commissioned for this review found that decisions were broadly proportionate for BAME boys and girls. However, there were some disparities for adult verdicts that require further analysis and investigation. In particular, there were some worrying disparities for BAME women.”
As a table in the report showed,
“of those women tried at Magistrates’ Court, Black women, Asian women, Mixed ethnic women and Chinese/Other women were all more likely to be convicted than White women.”
Again, would Government Members say that the right hon. Member was therefore advocating for the abolition of magistrates hearings? Of course not, and neither are we. We are simply making clear the trade-offs for such an unprecedented shift in their use—for such a significant curtailment of the use of the system of juries that is so well regarded and trusted by our constituents—and are arguing that the case has not been made.
JUSTICE also raised concerns about unrepresented defendants. My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate made that point in relation to legal aid. The equality statement for the Bill acknowledges that if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates court, a greater proportion of defendants may be ineligible for legal aid compared than if their case were heard in the Crown court. That is because the income eligibility threshold in the magistrates court of £22,325 is significantly lower than that in the Crown court, where it is £37,500.
An increase in unrepresented defendants risks undermining fairness. For example, defendants may receive harsher sentences if they do not know how to effectively offer mitigation. This is especially concerning where expanded magistrates’ sentencing powers will leave defendants facing trials for offences carrying a sentence of up to two years unrepresented.
Additionally, the Institute for Government has highlighted that unrepresented defendants in magistrates courts are also likely to prolong hearings and therefore erode any of the anticipated efficiency gains. It estimates that, for every additional hour in the average length of a trial, estimated savings will fall by more than one percentage point.
I also want to address the issue of youth courts, which was debated this morning. Government Members posited the fact that these courts hear more serious cases such as rape as some form of proof that curtailing jury trials in a similar adult case could be acceptable. That ignores the fact that each court and each setting has its own balances and goals and its own weighing exercise, with different considerations, where different conclusions will be reached.
Youth court trials generally do not have a jury because they are designed to be less formal and more focused on rehabilitation than punishment, with cases heard by specially trained youth magistrates rather than ordinary magistrates alongside district judges. These courts prioritise specialist knowledge and child-friendly proceedings over public proceedings, and aim to ensure that a child understands what is happening, with less intimidating atmospheres than adult Crown courts. Youth courts are closed to the public, which is not possible with a jury trial.
This is the trade-off we make, but these are trade-offs that, for decades and decades, we have not considered suitable in adult courts. We have considered the extra, additional vulnerabilities and the need to focus on rehabilitation in youth courts, so we carry out a different balancing exercise and make a different trade-off. That does not mean that we can read that across to an adult court without considering the benefits, the conclusions and the additional factors that we seek to mitigate—that we can just say, “Well you can just do the same for adults as you do in a youth court.” Different scenarios have different tests.
We also know that the choice of trial by jury is not the only reason some defendants elect for trial by jury. In fact, there are important procedural differences in the two courts. An application to dismiss is a legal request made by the defence to have some or all of the charges thrown out before the trial begins. This application is available only in Crown court cases and applies to indictable offences or cases that have been sent from the magistrates court to the Crown court.
An application to dismiss in the Crown court is a pre-trial request to throw out charges, according to rule 3.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, and earlier versions. It must be made in writing after the prosecution serves evidence but before arraignment, arguing that a reasonable jury could not convict.
It is true that formal applications to dismiss are relatively rare compared with other ways in which a case might end, mainly because the legal bar for success is very high. While specific numbers for rule 3.2 applications are not always separated in basic reports, wider court data gives a clear picture of how often cases are dropped or stopped before a full trial. In recent quarters, up to late 2025, the figures available to me show that approximately 17% to 18% of defendants in for-trial cases had their cases dropped by the prosecution or stopped by the court before a verdict.
Why are formal dismissals that are available in the Crown court less common? The Crown Prosecution Service knows it is legally required to keep cases under constant review. If the evidence is truly weak enough to be dismissed by a judge, the CPS will usually discontinue the case or offer no evidence to avoid a wasted hearing. We know that is a very common occurrence. Are we confident that we know how much of that happens because of the availability of that legal test? The CPS knows that if it does not do that and if it does proceed in an inappropriate manner, it will face the legal test that it does not face in the magistrates court. If the Government have access to evidence that can reassure us, they should present it, but I could not find anything that leads me to be confident that cases dropped in the Crown court might proceed in the magistrates court, and perhaps they should not.
The provision of disclosure in the Crown court is much more robust. We have all seen cases where trials collapse because of exchanges related to disclosure. Crown court disclosure is strictly governed by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which requires formal staged disclosure. In magistrates courts, disclosure is often more streamlined, focusing on the initial details of the prosecution case. In the Crown court, a defence statement is mandatory. In the magistrates court, a defence statement is generally voluntary, although recommended. Once the prosecution discloses unused material, the defence has 28 days in the Crown court to serve a defence statement. In the magistrates court, the time limit is 14 days.
Crown court prosecutors must provide schedules of all unused material. Magistrates courts typically use, as I have said, streamlined disclosure certificates, which are not as extensive. We know there are problems with disclosure at times. The independent review of disclosure and fraud offences was officially announced by the UK Government on 23 October. Led by Jonathan Fisher KC, the review was commissioned as part of the fraud strategy launched in May 2023 to address the digital age challenges in criminal cases. It is the first of its kind since the 1986 Roskill report. Jonathan is a leading King’s counsel in financial crime, proceeds of crime, fraud and tax cases. He has been a visiting professor in practice at the London School of Economics and he holds a PhD, which was awarded by the LSE following his research into money laundering cases and the relationship between the obligation to report suspicious activity and corporate rights. Clearly, this is someone who speaks with a great deal of authority and experience in relation to the operation of criminal law.
Part one of the review, on disclosure, was published on 21 March 2025. It is helpful for us to reflect on it, given some of the exchanges we have had during debates. As I have said, Government Members sought to dismiss any suggestion that the magistrates courts were less fair or a less appropriate place to hold a hearing and suggested that everything is rosy in the magistrates court, so there is no possible reason why someone might not want to go to a magistrates court. They wanted to frame this as a purely binary choice between fair and unfair.
As I pointed out to the Minister, every time we point out some of the unfairnesses, the Minister says that everything is fair and it is all fine. But then when we ask the Minister to articulate why, if everything in the magistrates courts is just fine and dandy, we therefore keep jury trials for more serious cases, there is literally no rational or logical conclusion. The Minister says this is not a debating chamber, but the Minister is presenting a Bill with underlying political and legal principles, and if she cannot come up with a consistent set of those principles as a basis on which to articulate the arguments she is making, that is not a great advert for the Bill.
I can happily say that I think Scotland’s legal system is less fair, and I think the magistrates courts are less fair. I am perfectly happy to say that, but that does not mean that I want to get rid of them or curtail them. It is just part of the reality, and I am consistent in that regard. So let us talk about what Jonathan Fisher can do to assist us.
But again, that is no answer to the public about what the Government are doing now. They are in charge. There is a constant harking back to decisions we took, but the Government have to stand on their own merits. The point we have made again and again is not that we should not do something. It is not that there is not a problem. Our argument is purely that we do not think this is the way to do it, and we do not think the trade-offs that the Government are setting out and what they are asking us to lose will translate into those benefits.
People who follow these issues will know that Crown court cases also collapse because of disclosure issues, but Jonathan Fisher is clear that there is a particular problem with magistrates courts. He said:
He went on to say that there are
We have to be clear eyed about exactly what we are doing. The issue is relevant because every time Opposition Members say, “Things are not the same in the magistrates court. You do not get quite as fair a trial; it is not comparable to a jury trial”, Government Members say, “That’s nonsense—they are all the same. If you believe that, get rid of magistrates courts.” It is important to understand this clear example of where the magistrates courts are delivering a less fair service than the Crown courts. I will carry on.
HMCTS data suggests that in 2023, a total of 311 magistrates court cases were ineffective because the prosecution explicitly failed to disclose unused material. In the same year, 746 magistrates court cases were deemed ineffective due to defence disclosure problems. Between October 2014 and September 2023, disclosure accounted for almost 7% of all ineffective trials in magistrates courts.
The issue is also extremely important from a victims’ perspective. The debate today has been about the defendants, but if we take the argument that in some of these cases the defendant would have been found guilty, who loses out the most if we send a case to the magistrates court and it collapses because of particular challenges with disclosure? The victim loses out, because it is over and done with and they do not have the opportunity to recorrect.
I finish this particular point with something else Jonathan Fisher said:
“Notwithstanding the vital need for further quantitative analysis, I am not convinced that, regarding the Crown’s duties, the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates’ courts.”
That is an extremely serious consideration. He is not convinced that the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates courts; he did not make that point about the Crown courts. I ask Government Members to reflect on that and then say there is no rational reason why some people might be concerned about more cases—and more complex, serious cases—being heard in the magistrates court. What that report alone says about our magistrates courts gives plenty of people a rational and reasonable basis to say that what happens in magistrates courts is less fair and potentially less effective than what happens in the Crown court. Government Members would do well to concede that important point.
I finish with a pretty extraordinary exchange with the Minister about the figures on the backlogs themselves. Let us remind ourselves of the central premise and argument: we all agree that the backlogs are too high. The Government say that they cannot be brought down to historic levels without the erosion of our jury trial rights. Opponents of the Bill are varied in their views, but perhaps most common is the view that other things can, and should, be done instead. What is happening right now with the backlogs is extremely important to this debate. If the backlogs are coming down in some places without these changes being introduced, it is vital to know and understand that.
I might speak to some Government Members and say, “Look, we have this poll that shows you’re going to smash it at the next election. You’re under no threat from Reform or the Lib Dems.” However, I might also say, “As part of that poll, we have assumed that 99.9% of the people who intend to vote Labour are going to come out and vote Labour.” Would Government Members then say, “Oh, great news! Absolutely, I’m going to smash the next election.” No. They would say, “Well, that assumption is fundamentally flawed.” The model may be correct, including the factors being considered, but inserting the assumptions into a model is what actually counts. That is what actually determines the outcomes, and the IFG is very clear about that.
Again, the Government are asking us to erode the important right to a jury trial, based on assumptions that the IFG says are highly uncertain. The Opposition’s position is quite clear. What is not uncertain is the fact that improving prisoner transport will help deliver improvements; that improving case management will deliver outcomes, which nobody disputes; or that improving access to early legal advice by reforming legal aid will help reduce the backlogs.
There is a whole slew of things that are not uncertain. Surely, the sensible and balanced thing to do is to get those things done first. Then, if the Government show that they really have done everything they possibly can, there could be a different discussion with MPs and the public about why they had chosen to erode and curtail an historic right that we have had for hundreds of years.
The reason why the data from the CBA is so important—the Minister accepts this—is that it is showing an improvement into the input. If the input is improving, then in theory the output will improve; I have not heard the Minister say that we will not get an improvement in the outlook at some point. If fewer cases are coming in, then surely there will be less of a backlog down the line. That is happening already—prior to the changes on jury trials and, more importantly, prior to all the other things having embedded in, as the Minister has herself admitted.
We have not even touched prison transport and we are getting an improvement; we have not even touched legal aid and we are getting an improvement—I could go on and on. The point was powerfully illustrated, in terms of priorities, by the representative from the HMCTS. I asked him about his priorities for reducing the backlogs and improving the situation. Jury trials did not even come close to the list of things that he thought were important. Surely we need to deliver on those elements successfully and consistently, but we all know that that is going to be extremely hard work.
I made the point to the Minister this morning. I do not doubt her sincerity on this, but being a Minister is about driving through major reform and change while having to manage day-to-day improvement in the system. She might think this an unfair comment, but I asked her this morning about what was happening with the inputs into the Crown courts. She is the Minister in charge of our backlogs, but when I asked for a clear answer about some of the statistics in regional variation, the Minister did not have them, did not know or was not able to answer. She had to go away at lunch time to answer a question about those key statistics. That is a bit like me asking the Health Secretary what is happening with regional variation in waiting times and the Health Secretary saying, “Well, I know overall waiting times are going down, but I don’t know the answer to that. I will have to go away and look and see what is happening in different parts of the country.” It is a giveaway.
One of the thrusts of the argument of the very many people who oppose the Bill is that if the good things happening in some areas were replicated everywhere, we would not have this issue. At the heart of some of the criticisms of the Government’s approach is the idea that we must understand that some places are getting this right. For the Minister not to know whether things are already getting better reflects poorly on the credibility of the case that this is the only way to do things. If it were me, I would want to know on a daily basis whether we were delivering this downward trend in some places. I would want to visit every single one of those places and drive forward that change.
The modelling is also important. The Government will already have modelled the period that we are in right now. I have to assume that the Government modelling gave some view as to whether there would be ups and downs in particular places. If we now know there are downward trends in particular places and the Government modelling did not account for that, that adds further reinforcement to the idea that we cannot rely on the Government modelling to make these decisions. It may well have got wrong the period that we are in right now, which makes things very uncertain when we want to look further in the future.
We are going to revisit these issues. As I said this morning, it is extremely important for the Government to be absolutely transparent at later stages about what is going on in the places getting lower receipts, as the Minister now accepts is happening. Why is that happening only in some places? What can be done to make sure it happens in other places? What does the Government expect would happen to the backlog if that was replicated across the country? As I have said, and as I will keep repeating, we are clear that the status quo is absolutely unacceptable for victims. We are clear about the role we played in that, and some Labour Members in the wider debate have accepted the role that Labour Governments, over the decades, have played in getting us to this place.
We want something to be done about the situation, but we also care about jury trial rights. I remind Government Members that there are victims’ representative groups that also do not want jury trial rights to be eroded. The idea that the issue is all about victims on the one side and opponents on the other is completely untrue—a point that the Minister accepted. To go down this particular road and erode our jury trial rights, the Government need a watertight case for why it is absolutely necessary, but they have completely failed to articulate, in any credible way, why this is the only thing they could possibly do and that there is nothing else they could do.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 amends section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which governs the procedure following a written indication of a guilty plea. Although those provisions have not been commenced, it is important that they are amended now, so that when they are brought into force, they operate consistently with the new allocation framework. Section 17ZB allows the defendant or the prosecution to object to the case being sent to the Crown court for conviction and sentencing where the magistrates court considers that its sentencing powers would be insufficient. Such an objection would prevent the court from sending the case unless the objection is withdrawn or a guilty plea is entered at an in-person hearing in the usual way.
Clause 2 will remove that ability to object. Instead, the magistrates court will have to invite written representations from both parties on whether its sentencing powers would be adequate and, having considered those representations, decide whether to send the case to the Crown court under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. That means that when a defendant engages with allocation in writing, the magistrates court will determine venue in the same way as it would at an in-person hearing.
As with clause 1, clause 2 does not remove existing safeguards. Both the prosecution and the defence will continue to be able to make representations, ensuring that the court has all the relevant information before making its decision. That will preserve fairness and ensure that all relevant factors, including seriousness, complexity and sentencing powers, are properly considered by the court before determining venue.
Taken together, clauses 1 and 2 will ensure that cases that are suitable for summary trial or sentence can be retained in the magistrates court, while cases that require Crown court sentencing are sent there efficiently, without unnecessary hearings. I commend clause 2 to the Committee.
The obvious thing to ask is this. If this measure is purely about sentencing, why would anyone who has pleaded guilty ever elect to have a sentencing hearing in the Crown court, where they know there could be a higher sentence, rather than in the magistrates court, where they know there will be a cap on what sentence can be passed? Our arguments have been about the process of the trial itself, and I have touched on some of the elements other than sentencing. That is not to say that there may not be perfectly reasonable grounds for someone to object if they think the decision made was wrong. Again, these are people who have admitted guilt, so we can clearly say they are criminals. Some of them may have spurious reasons for wanting to approach the system in that way, by seeking not to go to the Crown court, but they may also legitimately think that the decision was wrong or not fair. They may well have legal advice that the decision was not consistent with the sentencing guidelines, and that they would have been expected to have stayed in the magistrates court. As we discussed this morning, a significant number of the appeals in the magistrates court are successful, although I accept that those who seek an appeal are in the minority. We all accept that the magistrates courts make mistakes.
It is important that we understand how this measure will work in practice. Can the Minister tell us how many people are objecting and using the mechanism at the moment? That is also confusing, because the explanatory note says that these provisions are not yet in place, but what is her projection of the difference this will make? What will be its material impact? The provisions have not been commenced, but the Government and civil servants must have a view about how objections would have operated and what they would have achieved, versus the right to make representations. What is the difference between those two mechanisms? A guilty person cannot insist on being sentenced in a magistrates court. If the magistrates think that someone is going to hit a higher tariff and should go to Crown court, the person can, in theory, object, as I understand it, but they cannot stop it. Before we vote on the clause, I want the Minister to explain in detail exactly how this will be different from what the Government envisioned was going to happen.
Is there a risk in theory that more things will go to the Crown court? If the Government are saying, “You can’t object,” they must think that at the minute, in theory—if the provisions were to be commenced—some people would be kept in the magistrates court inappropriately. The Government must want more of those people to go the Crown court. If they thought everyone was just going to stick in the magistrates court anyway, why would they be doing it?
“only around 30% of sentences of 6-12 months were handed out by magistrates”
since their sentencing powers increased from six months to 12 months. That indicates a hesitation in the magistrates courts to award higher sentences. If the Government have the objective of sending these cases to the Crown court, but there is evidence to suggest that magistrates hesitate when it comes to higher sentences, ultimately this measure will not change that.
I want to be clear, because I think that there is some confusion about what is written in the Bill and the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes say:
“The amendments remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”.
We are talking about sentencing, but that is not exactly what the Minister said or what the Bill seems to say. Before we are asked to vote in support of the clause, the Government need to clear this up, so that we can all understand what exactly this change will achieve that is different in theory from what was going to happen.
I appreciate that this is challenging because we are discussing changes that have never been put into operation, but that is not really an excuse. The Government should have a view of how things were going to operate, and therefore must have formed a view about how they want them to operate differently as a result of this change.
If there are any further technical questions, those can be addressed, but these are uncommenced provisions, and they are not going to be commenced. The envisaged impact of said uncommenced provisions would have been assessed when they were legislated for in 2022, but obviously for a different system. We are not bringing them forward, but the clause is needed so that there is consistency across the statute book. Without it, supposing that clause 1 becomes section 1 of an eventual Act, other provisions in the statute book dating back to 2022 that refer to a right to elect, which we are suggesting should be removed, could still be commenced. Clause 2 is a consequential amendment and an important drafting exercise, but I am not going to purport to address issues of impacts of provisions that have yet to be commenced and we do not intend to commence.
Clauses 1 and 2 amend the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 so that a defendant charged with an either-way offence is no longer able to elect trial by jury. As was clearly established earlier today, that right to elect is entirely abolished by clause 1. Instead, it will be for the magistrates court alone to decide where the case should be tried; it can either remain in the magistrates court or go up to the Crown court. Clause 2 deals specifically with situations where there is a written indication of a guilty plea.
Section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, as inserted by section 6 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, sets out that the court can, on the material before it, without any hearing or representations, be satisfied that it is highly likely that, were the accused to plead guilty at summary trial of the offence in question and be convicted, the court would commit the accused to the Crown court for sentencing. Section 17ZB(5) then provides the accused with the opportunity to object to being sent to the Crown court for trial for the offence. Clause 2 amends that so that the accused and the prosecutor do not have the option to object and can instead only make representations as to whether the sentencing powers of the court would be adequate.
I note that “Crown Court” in the original section 17ZB is replaced with “court”. I assume that that refers to either the magistrates court or the Crown court, but I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation and explanation of that quite technical point, and of how it works with the Crown court bench division in the mix. The Bill’s explanatory notes suggest that it just means the magistrates court, but I went through the law— I should say that I am not a lawyer, but I dug it all out and read it—and, like a lot of Committee members, I am thoroughly confused. Normally, if something is logical and makes sense, I can follow it, so I am worried that it does not quite tie together. I am worried, even though I cannot quite articulate why, that the fact that the section will now just say “court” introduces some ambiguity. How is that defined? Quite often, these little bits of detail can be the speck of sand in the eye that can cause more problems than we realise.
This is a very technical issue, and I appreciate that it is difficult to go into it here and that the Minister is very good on the technical side of things—we have worked together on other things with very technical points, so I know that she is very thorough—but I think it is worth going through it again and making sure that the whole thing hangs together, so that we do not end up in a situation where the wrong place is doing sentencing or the wrong estimate of a sentence is made, and there is no way to unwind it. I am just a bit worried that there is potential for some problems to come out of this.
I appreciate the Minister’s helpful clarification that section 17ZB has not yet been commenced. However, if it had been, or if it were to be in future, it would, in a similar way to clause 1, remove powers and rights from defendants and give them less choice in how justice is dispensed in their case—essentially, a roll-back of rights. As I mentioned, I think we need to look at what will happen if the sentence estimate is wrong and how that will work its way through.
I thank the Minister for explaining that the provision is procedural, but it still strips people of the right to object and replaces it with the much weaker right merely to make representations. The explanatory notes are really clear on that point, even if they are not clear on a lot of others. They say that the changes made in clause 2
“remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”,
and instead create
“a process for each to make representations about whether the magistrates’ court’s sentencing powers would be adequate.”
That might have no impact if the section is never commenced, but if it ever is commenced, and we do not make sure that we have got clause 2 right, it may cause a problem and prioritise convenience over procedural protection.
When someone’s liberty, livelihood and reputation are at stake, it is a serious thing indeed to say that they may no longer object and may only make representations. Once again, the defendant is being moved further from the centre of the process, and the state closer to it. That is not right. Earlier in today’s proceedings, the Minister was reminded from the Opposition Benches that the legal system is balanced in favour of the defendant. That is not the spirit in which this change is being made. Indeed, that is the common thread running through clauses 1 and 2: at every stage, the defendant’s agency is reduced and the system’s convenience is elevated. The Government call that reform and improvement, but it is not; it is a distortion of our centuries-old legal protections.
There is a broader point here about confidence in the justice system. If the Government’s answer, again and again, is that defendants should simply trust the state’s estimate of seriousness, trust the allocation decision, trust the sentencing forum and trust that everything will work out in the end, that is not a strengthening of justice. It is a narrowing of the safeguards that make justice legitimate in the first place and will do nothing to address the backlog, which I recall was supposed to be the rationale for making these changes in the first place. Clauses 1 and 2 in combination are not what is required to address the Crown court backlog.
It appears that the backlog may be starting to come down already, as a consequence of uncapped sitting days and other changes that have been implemented, so why are the Government not taking a more cautious approach and exhausting all the good ideas that we have heard from expert witnesses before taking a sledgehammer to jury trials? Obviously, the first problem to address is the fact that up to 24% of Crown courts are not sitting on any given day, and getting the many defendants who arrive late to court there on time would be transformational. Why are we not solving those much more straightforward issues before pressing ahead with exceptional structural reform? We need to get the basics right, address inefficiencies and, most importantly, listen to those who know how to do it, such as the Bar Council and circuit leaders, and learn from the courts that are already making progress, such as Liverpool.
The Government are absolutely right to take the backlog issue seriously, but it is wrong to think that limiting jury trials will improve the situation. It could make the whole situation worse by creating years of transition and uncertainty and by moving one backlog from the Crown courts over to the magistrates. Furthermore, the cases moving over will be more complex, more technical and more sensitive. The Government are about to create a massive backlog in the magistrates court, which will then start to impact on low-level cases such as speeding offences.
I say that the Government should be more cautious because they have already accepted that there are other levers available. Ministers have announced that there will be no cap on Crown court sitting days next year, and that both the Crown court and magistrates courts will be funded at their highest ever operational level. That is much welcomed, but if the Government say that investment and capacity matter, why on earth would they not wait to see the full effect of those changes before pushing ahead with exceptional constitutional reform?
The Opposition position on that has been perfectly clear. On Second Reading, the Opposition’s reasoned amendment did not deny that the backlog is serious, but argued that the right answer is to improve case management, encourage earlier pleas, increase sitting days, increase the hours per day that courts are able to sit through better use of technology and improve the efficiency of prisoner transport. Those are practical, common-sense reforms; they go with the grain of the system, rather than taking a sledgehammer to jury trials and then hoping for the best.
The Government’s own impact assessment rather proves the point that this issue is as much about shifting pressure as solving it. It estimates that removing the defendant’s right to elect for jury trial would reduce crown Court demand by around 16,000 sitting days, but at the same time increase magistrates court demand by around 8,500 sitting days. The same document expressly recognises that reallocating cases to the magistrates courts is expected to increase the open caseload there and is likely to extend waiting times for hearing and sentencing in that jurisdiction. Even on the Government’s own figures, it is not some clean efficiency saving. It is a transfer of burden into a part of the system that is already under strain.
That is why clause 2 is more important than it first appears. Clause 1 removes the right to elect. Clause 2 then narrows the ability to resist where a written guilty plea is involved. Piece by piece, the Bill is building a system in which more serious, either-way cases are kept down, defendants have less say and the magistrates courts are expected to absorb ever more complexity. Ministers may present each provision as a small adjustment in isolation, but taken together, they amount to a very significant constitutional and practical change.
That change also carries transition risk. The Government are assuming that work currently taking place in the Crown court can be absorbed more quickly elsewhere. I know I am not telling the Minister anything that she does not already know, but the magistrates courts are not just a spare room in the system waiting to be filled. They will have to take more serious, more technical and more sensitive cases while continuing to deal with the huge volume of everyday criminal business that only they can process.
If the Government get this wrong, they will not have solved the backlog. They will simply have displaced it and degraded the quality of justice in the process. My plea is a simple one: “Proceed with caution. Let the effect of unlimited sitting days bed in. Fix the operational failings that everybody in the system can already see. Get defendants to court on time. Keep courtrooms sitting. Use technology better. Learn from the parts of the estate that are already improving, but do not dress up the removal of long-standing protections as if it were the only grown-up response to backlog. It is not. It is simply the most drastic one.”
That is why I cannot support clause 2. On its own, it may look technical, but in context it is part of a broader attempt to reduce rights, safeguards and the defendant’s role in how justice is administered. That is the wrong direction of travel.
I hope the Minister will bear with me: as I understand it, the procedures in the magistrates court are as follows: If it is a summary case, then the case stays in the magistrates court—the sentencing, trials and so on—and nobody has any right to go anywhere else. If it is an indictable offence, it has to be heard in the Crown court. There is no discretion and it is nothing to do with the magistrates court. If a defendant is charged with an either-way offence—this is the whole point of a jury trial—it has always been the case that he or she can turn up in court and say, “I plead guilty.”
I am genuinely confused about what the clause is trying to do. As I have explained what I think the set-up is, I hope that the Minister will be able to explain it to me as well. It almost seems that the clause is redundant. It talks about written guilty pleas, where the decisions are ultimately made by the magistrate or the district judge. The defendant has no right to ask to go up to the Crown court. The prosecutor has no right to ask for the case to go up to the Crown court. They can make a representation, which is then considered with the whole case. I would like clarification on that.
As a general point, much as it pains me, I agree with some things that the Opposition have said. That is not something I often do, but, for example, there have been points made about the Lammy review. As a shadow Justice Minister, I remember asking, from the Dispatch Box, the then Conservative Lord Chancellor why we were not implementing the Lammy review, and I even met Justice Ministers to ask why we were not dealing with it.
Moreover, according to a recent assessment from the Institute for Government, there will be only a 2% difference. Abolishing a historical right in order to make a 2% difference is far too hard for me to comprehend. I will not repeat everything I have said before, but I really think that we should reconsider the abolition of jury trials for either-way offences—sorry, I will use the word “restriction”; that is probably the correct terminology to use. I would like clarification on clause 2.
The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail.
Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny.
The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final.
The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made.
Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve.
We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.
One of the points the Secretary of State made in support of this measure at the Dispatch Box was that the changing nature of our criminal justice system and the added demand that will flow through the system in the future, added to the increasing complexity of cases, mean that jury trials are taking longer through the very nature of the additional evidence that is being gathered. That means that even if the immediate backlog is brought under control, there will still be a need for system reform in the long term, because otherwise we will not be able to keep it under control in perpetuity. Why does the hon. Member disagree with that?
I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.
I visited courts and spoke to judges when I was on the Justice Committee. They themselves admit that they are not exactly whizz-kids when it comes to things like artificial intelligence or IT and the sort of things that might be over-complicating cases now. They are not going to be able to just whizz through stuff. They are going to need the same level of detail, explanation and time that a jury would need. Do we think defendants will be satisfied with a prosecution case that does not go through the same level of detail with a judge that it would have to go through with a jury?
We will end up with a whole new world of criminal appeals based on the idea that the judge did not adequately hear the evidence and that his summing up did not adequately address the reasons for his decisions. That could end up taking more time for judges. I am open to the idea that, potentially, we may possibly get some savings, but the case is so flimsy and weak that we cannot be expected to move forward on that basis when there are other things we could do.
That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose. My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have.
In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.
The Institute for Government, in its March 2026 report, “Beyond reasonable doubt?”, said that—the Government, I think, acknowledge this, although perhaps not the exact figures—the reforms will address only 1% to 2% of Crown court working time and only a small minority of cases.
I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one. It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration.
Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon. Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it.
Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts. It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment. I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience.
Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background. I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury.
I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable. We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented.
The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population. The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do.
I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court. Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice.
There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue. Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.
I will now take a moment to set out the range and weight of expert opposition to these provisions, because the Committee should understand what it is putting to one side if it orders clause 2 to stand part of the Bill. The Criminal Bar Association, as we have heard, represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers, and it is opposed to the provisions here when it comes to the role of a jury and the right to elect. As we have heard, its snap survey found that approximately 90% of its members are against the proposal.
Meanwhile, more than 3,200 legal professionals, including 300 KCs and 22 retired judges, have signed a letter describing the reforms as sacrificing the
These are practitioners, not a mathematical mirage or a fringe movement.
The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.
The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions.
I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.
Let us bear in mind that the changes before us today will result in a 50% reduction in jury trials. According to the Home Office statistics bulletin, which provides a summary of the effect of those changes for comparison, that legislation resulted in a 5% decline. The Government are asking us to support something that will lead to a 50% decline, yet the hon. Gentleman says that we are being hyperbolic in comparing the two and saying that one is insignificant and the other is significant. I think the difference between 5% and 50% is pretty significant.
I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—
Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage. When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point.
The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal. They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it.
The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2.
As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.
“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]
Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.
The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?
“written indication of a guilty plea”.
The legislation says that a written plea is not actually a guilty plea, so there could still be a trial—someone might change their mind. The difference that the legislation talks about is that if someone gives an in-person plea, that is their plea. This reform introduces the idea of a written plea, and, probably quite sensibly, it was decided that that should not be seen as the final example. Decisions are being made at that point, but then the plea could be changed and there could be a trial. It could have a real-world impact; it is not a technical change.
If the Government are clear that they are not enacting this measure, why not? There must have been a reason why they thought that written guilty pleas were of use. I suspect it probably was an efficiency measure at the time and they thought, “If we allow people to more easily give an early indication, that might encourage them to do so, and we can get all the benefits that flow from that.” If the Government are on an efficiency drive, why are they not enacting the measure? I would have asked the same of my Government if they had the ability to enact it. I do not know what the timeline was—was there a natural lag or a deliberate decision not to enact it?
We need it laid out in black and white: will this change have any real-world impact—yes or no? What exactly will that impact be? Because of the quite open possibility that it will have a real-world impact in terms of reducing someone’s ability to go to the Crown court—that is what we are talking about—all the concerns that Members have about clause 1 apply to clause 2.
I want to pick up on some of the changes. The Minister mentioned how we have listened to Canada. The point I made quite clearly in our evidence session with the Attorney General of Ontario was that they brought their backlog down without making any changes to jury trials whatsoever, so I am not sure how helpful that is as an example of why we need to change the system.
Members mentioned a sunset clause. If the Bill were just about bringing the backlog down, there would be a sunset clause in it. That again demonstrates that the Government actually think this is a better way of doing things. If that is the case, they should make that argument. They should just say, “We are making these reforms because they are the better way to do things. There will be an additional benefit in terms of bringing down the backlog,” but they have not said that.
I certainly would not use the language that the Minister used, but I am absolutely clear that we need to improve judicial accountability. We had a whole panel in the evidence sessions in relation to the family courts, for example, and whether they are making the right sorts of judgments about the interests of the child. We heard quite clearly that judges should not place too much weight on the idea that there is a good relationship with both parents when making decisions. The reason the Government are proposing changes on this issue is that they clearly do not think that judicial decisions are consistently doing the right thing.
My first encounter with this lack of accountability in judicial decision making—this is very important if people will be subject to individual judicial decisions—was the case of a constituent who had fostered a young girl in difficult circumstances. The young girl was physically fit and healthy, but struggling. The family—the original parents—had applied to get custody back. The foster mother did not want the girl to go back to the family, and nor did the local authority or the wider family, but the judge decided—again, we are giving more power to judges by removing the power to elect—that the girl should go back.
That girl is now in an almost vegetative state—it is not quite like that, but she is extremely disabled. The wonderful lady who fostered that young girl, even though the girl was then in a very difficult physical state and was going to be extremely dependent for the rest of her life, adopted her, which was an extraordinary thing to do. She approached me to say, “Social services have to account for what has happened. The police, if they had been involved, would have had to account for what happened. Can you tell me what happens to the judge who made that decision, which led to these consequences?” I wrote the Lady Chief Justice asking whether she could explain to my constituent what the consequences were. If there is a legal matter, it goes to the Court of Appeal; other than that, there is no issue for the judge. That has really driven my view about a need for more judicial accountability. I recognise the Minister’s right to say that we have to be careful about the language we use when talking about these things, but there is nothing wrong with saying that we need a more accountable judiciary.
On the need to increase sitting days, the Government like to claim that there are record levels of sitting days. I do not know whether the Minister knows that that is not a fair reflection of what is going on, but we changed the way in which we measure sitting days. There used to be two separate counts of sitting days—trial days and judge days—and we then combined them. If we look at the figures fairly, the counts are at some points pretty similar, if not higher previously. The figure is higher now because there is just one figure. I am not seeking to take away from the Government’s efforts in that regard, but we should be fair and accurate in how we describe the historical record.
We discussed whether it was fair to use the term “abolition”, which has come up repeatedly. I am very careful about the language I use, and I do not say that, but I will not take any lectures on the issue from a party that, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) was Prime Minister, put out a Facebook campaign saying that he did not think that paedophiles should go to prison—a disgusting misrepresentation of the reality. The Labour party was happy to do that, so I will not take any lectures from Labour Members.
Clause 2 changes uncommenced provisions in section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 so that appropriate guilty pleas are sent to the Crown court for sentencing. To answer the question that the hon. Member for Reigate asked about the meaning of the word “court”, in this context, it refers to the magistrates court, which is where the first hearing takes place. I hope I have clarified that. It was before my time but, as I understand it, the measures aimed to provide the defendant with the chance to indicate a plea at the earliest possible opportunity and to enable allocation decisions to be made without the need for an initial in-person hearing. They will not change anything around the allocations procedures moving forward.
On the shadow Minister’s question about why we do not just do that, it is not a priority for the now, as we have a lot of other priorities. System readiness is essential for the commencement of an online plea and allocation procedure and we do not have a date for that commencement, so there is an air of the hypothetical here. However, clause 2 aligns with what we spoke about in the debate on clause 1 so that, should this or a future Parliament choose to implement the online plea and allocation procedures, the measure is clear.
To answer the question asked by the hon. Member for Chichester, no, the Government do not think that the measure would alter behaviour around early guilty pleas, although she is absolutely right that one thing we are striving to do—through not just these legislative reforms, but our approach to the reform of legal aid fees—is to change behaviour in the criminal justice system to achieve the early guilty plea rates that we saw before the backlog raced out of control, at the very least. The sooner we get those early guilty pleas, the more efficient the process is, for the system and for people’s ability to move on.
Currently, when a defendant has indicated a guilty plea and the magistrates court considers its sentencing powers to be inadequate, the court cannot commit the case to the Crown court for sentencing without the consent of both the defence and prosecution. Clause 2 removes both parties’ ability to object. Instead, the magistrates court must invite written representations from both parties on whether its sentencing powers would be adequate, and then, having considered those representations, decide whether to send the case to the Crown court under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Under the process as amended by the clause, should the provisions be commenced, defendants would continue to indicate their plea in writing, but decisions about the appropriate venue for trial would, as a consequence of the changes under clause 1, be made by the court alone. The Committee debated the merits of those changes in our significant and lengthy discussion on clause 1, but the policy decision in the clause is that the court rather than the defendant should make the decision on the venue of trial.
The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East commented on the impact of the current system, and of any reformed system, on minorities, which, as I indicated earlier, is really important. That topic is an important aspect of the Committee’s work and, as we reflected on earlier, it will be an important part of our future discussions. I genuinely look forward to the debate we will have on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, which will no doubt lead to important discussions across both sides.
I want to pick up on a figure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East cited. I heard him say—I wrote it down—that someone is 40% more likely to be convicted if they are an ethnic minority defendant in the magistrates court than in the Crown court. That is not a figure that I recognise and it is not one reflected in the equality impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, which cites the Ministry of Justice’s data. What our data shows is that someone is not more likely to be convicted if they are an ethnic minority defendant in the magistrates court. In general, conviction rates are 15% higher in the magistrates court compared with the Crown court for triable either-way offences or equivalent offences, but that is consistent across ethnicities.
I do not take issue with the hon. Member’s point that many who currently elect for a jury trial, including those from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, may well do so because they think they will get a fairer hearing or some other advantage by going before a jury. There is also no doubt that juries command a higher degree of confidence in those communities. I am sure that that will be teased out in the debate that we will have, but it is important that we are as careful as we can be. I am not suggesting that he was not being careful, but I do not recognise that 40% figure.
A statutory review mechanism for the ongoing monitoring of and response to racial disparities, whether in relation to sentencing outcomes, conviction rates or disproportionality in the CPS, is important. It is also important that where we see improvement and get things right, we talk about that, too. How will we command the confidence of our diverse communities unless we also talk about the improvements that are being made? I think sunlight is the best disinfectant. We need to be candid about the issues that exist in our current system and the status quo, and how that in many regards fails some of our communities. But if we seek to improve it, we have to be really clear on the data. I just wanted to clarify the statistic on conviction rates, which, as I said, is higher across all ethnicities, but of course that will include black, minority ethnic and mixed race defendants as well.
I want to say something about the efficiencies. Everyone agrees, not least as the backlogs have raced out of control, that the system has become more and more inefficient. It becomes a vicious cycle. Common themes have been raised and I agree that there are areas that need focus, such as prisoner transfers. Members will have heard about initiatives that the Government have already set in train in terms of opening up bus lanes. The Prisons Minister in the other place and I have established a prisoner escort and custody services prisoner transfer oversight board. I was at Wandsworth prison the other day. I got in a Serco van and talked to some of the prison officers and Serco people about how it operates and where there is grit, as it were, in the system. We are looking at it from end to end, as we must, including by engaging—this might come as a surprise—with the likes of the Bar Council. I have regular constructive engagement with it because it has lots of first-hand evidence of prisoners failing to turn up on time in court, sometimes because they have not left the prison and sometimes because they are in the cells in the court and there is no one available to bring them up. Getting to grips with those problems is really important.
I must bring Members back to the very clear evidence of Sir Brian Leveson’s review team. Although we must deal with the recommendations—indeed, we are doing so in real time, even before this Bill makes it on to the statute book—they will not be sufficient to reduce the backlog. One of the challenges consistently put to me stings pretty hard: “Even with everything you’re doing, Minister—even with the 20% savings that you say this will realise, even with the efficiency drive, and even with uncapping sitting days—you only begin to get the backlog down at the end of this Parliament. In the meantime, all the defendants on remand, all those complainants and all those actual victims of crime have their lives on hold. It is not happening nearly fast enough.” That is why we are choosing to pull every lever, including the levers in this Bill, which, by the way, includes clause 2. I commend clause 2 to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
“one or more of the conditions”.
Amendment 39, in clause 3, page 5, line 26, at end insert—
“or,
(c) the defendant demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried without a jury would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
This amendment would ensure that trials by jury continue for indictable offences carrying a sentence of less than three years in prison if the defendant can demonstrate that it would be in the interests of natural justice.
Amendment 24, in clause 3, page 5, line 28, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) The conditions in this subsection are met in relation to a defendant if—
(a) the defendant, if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years for the offence or offences (taken together);
(b) the defendant is of good character;
(c) the defendant has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence;
(d) the defendant would be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974;
(e) if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected;
(f) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity of the case may increase; or
(g) other exceptional circumstances pertain to the case.”
Amendment 24 sets out the conditions that I wish the Committee and the Minister to consider: when there is discussion or consideration about whether a case should be sent to the Crown court, they should look at whether
“the defendant, if convicted of the offence…for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment…of more than three years”,
which is what the Government have initially proposed. I also say that whether the defendant is of good character is a completely relevant consideration, along with the considerations in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the amendment.
I will explain the rationale behind that proposal. We have spoken about the fact that there are people of previous good character, who may be in a different position from people who have convictions, who could go to the Crown court. That is one good argument to make but, for me, when we are trying to restrict an either-way right of trial, the fact that someone is of good character is a relevant consideration. All the conditions I have set out should also be included in the Bill so that they are considered by the court when determining where the case should be heard.
I have referred already to the Post Office Horizon cases. I remember having a constituent who had a post office come to see me. They talked about all the problems they were having and said that there was something going on with the computer system—a glitch. They felt they were being unfairly treated. Although I tried to deal with the case to the best of my ability, I did not find out whether that person was subsequently prosecuted, or what happened to them—but we know from what we have heard since then that quite a few postmasters and postmistresses were convicted, and many of them were from the black, Asian and minority ethnic community. Many of them were prosecuted, then acquitted when it came to light that there was a glitch in the system. I believe that that was only possible because they were able to explain the situation to a jury and that jury, composed of 12 good people who understand the complexities of life, was able to come to that conclusion.
I mean no disrespect—I think our judiciary system, especially at the top, is very good and many people come across the world for adjudication here—but I can imagine a case where somebody has been listening to criminal cases all along will say, “Oh, God, I’ve heard that excuse before—oh, yeah, I’ve heard that one before,” and be less likely to give somebody the full benefit of the doubt. Juries, who tend to comprise ordinary members of the public, who are not specialists and are not hardened about things, will listen, look and think. That does not mean to say that people who have committed crimes should be able to get away with it. That is not what this is about. The golden thread that runs through our criminal justice system is that people are innocent until proven guilty.
There have been discussions about other countries that do not have a jury system, but that is because they have a very different jurisprudence. For example, in other European countries, like Scotland, there are no jury trials because they have an inquisitorial system. Their system is about getting to the truth of what happened. They do not have an adversarial system, as we have had for centuries. I think our system is still the best in the world—no disrespect to people in Scotland or anywhere else—but one of the reasons our criminal justice system is considered the best is that we have a jury involvement in cases, with ordinary members of the public.
I bet that, hand on heart, everybody here would elect a Crown court trial if charged with a criminal offence. Not one Member would say: “I am okay; I will have a hearing by a judge”. Why not? Not because they thought that would to get away with it, but because they would feel that at the Crown court, the jury is going to be able to listen properly to what they had to say, without any prejudices.
The Committee has agreed that clauses 1 and 2 should stand part of the Bill, but we can perhaps make things a bit better and make some differences to the law by at least making an exception for people who are of previous good character or are of good character because of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. That Act means that if someone is convicted of certain offences and gets a certain sentence, then after a number of years, those convictions will be called “spent” convictions and it is not necessary to declare them when applying for jobs. If those rules apply to that person, then they should be dealt with in the same category as somebody who has no conviction.
There is also the issue of reputational damage. For the two Members of the House who are still around and whom I spoke to, the consequences of a conviction would have been absolutely devastating—they would not be in this place. In fact, Lord Hain actually became a Secretary of State as well as a Cabinet Minister under a previous Labour Government, so we are not talking about somebody at a very junior level—although Back Bench MPs are not juniors and are just as important a part of our political process as anybody else. In fact, Lord Hain recently made an intervention on this and said, “Please, please don’t abolish the jury trial,” as did my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse. I can give many other examples of people who would say that. Again, these amendments for the Government to consider whether making such changes could at least reduce the impact of the restriction of jury trial for either-way offences. I will leave it at that.
Amendment 24 states that the relevant conditions would be met in relation to a defendant if:
“the defendant, if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years”
or if
“the defendant is of good character”.
It was helpful for the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden to use her expertise to explain that that is not just an idea of someone’s character; good character has a very specific meaning in law and exists for a reason. It exists because the judicial system, in various ways, thinks that that is important and it has a material impact on how someone should be treated within the legal system. Amendment 24 also specifies that the conditions would be met if
“the defendant has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence”,
or if
“the defendant would be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974”.
Again, we go out of our way to put those provisions in place to say that rehabilitated offenders, as defined by the 1974 Act, should be treated differently from other types of offenders. We are building on the already established idea that we do not all experience the judicial system in the same way in relation to our previous convictions and offences—in both directions, because if someone has convictions, but they have moved past those convictions, we would seek to treat them differently again.
Amendment 24 would also apply to a defendant who,
“if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected”.
I talked about that issue this morning, and I welcome the hon. Lady’s references to Members of Parliament. Surely we can relate to that in a very profound way when we face a conviction. MPs are one such example, but there are many others. I gave the example of a solicitor this morning, and there are also doctors—my professional background—and police officers; there are a whole range of people who would suffer a very particular and specific set of consequences because of their job.
That would perhaps not be universal, and we would have to tease out whether someone might want the magistrates’ sentencing restrictions or the Crown court’s route to guilty—we will probably have to separate those two things. Some people might prefer a magistrates court, not because of the plea but, as they are likely to be found guilty, because of the sentencing restrictions. However, I agree with the hon. Lady that—if not universally, certainly overwhelmingly—people would want their guilt to be determined by a jury, even if they might prefer a magistrate’s restricted sentencing powers.
Finally, amendment 24 would apply to defendants where
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity of the case may increase; or…other exceptional circumstances pertain to the case.”
Those examples fit neatly with the aims of Opposition amendment 39.
As I said earlier, of all the provisions in the Bill, clause 3, which these amendments would alter, probably represents the profoundest and most unprecedented change to our legal system. We had a debate this morning about other changes that have been made, such as changes to which offences are summary, triable either way or indictable. Although it is true to say that there have been variations, and there has been that narrowing, I was very clear that the scale and unprecedented nature of these changes stand apart.
What we are talking about here is a completely different approach to determining guilt for adults in criminal cases, entirely removing the lay element. Again, we debated this morning about the fact that we cannot fairly describe magistrates as being entirely distinct from the local population; we very clearly heard all the reasons why they are not the same as having 12 ordinary members of the public on a jury, but they are not professionals. What we are talking about here, with the introduction of this new bench division, is removing every possible element of lay involvement.
On Second Reading, when we had a broader debate about the Bill, Government Members criticised the fact that the debate was dominated by white, older male barristers—maybe they did not say older, but certainly white and male. The criticism was, “This debate is being dominated by white, male barristers. This isn’t fair. This isn’t reflective of all the voices and different views we need to hear.”
But what will these changes do? They will give more power and influence to people who are white and male and who, historically, have almost certainly been barristers. We are doing the exact opposite of addressing those Government Members’ concerns, including their concerns about who has a say in all these issues compared with ordinary members of the public. Clause 3 removes those ordinary members of the public.
Under proposed new section 74A to the Senior Courts Act 1981, any case sent to the Crown court must be tried without a jury unless one of two things applies: either an indictable-only offence is involved, or the court considers that, if convicted, the defendant would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. In all other cases, the default becomes a judge-alone trial.
We are introducing a whole new idea that an individual person—a magistrate, not a jury—can sentence someone to six to 12 months. We are introducing the idea that a single person, on their own, can sentence someone to three years’ imprisonment, without any involvement of the wider public. The question for the Committee is not whether the jury trial remains available in some cases, as we have discussed—we absolutely accept that it should. Instead, the question is whether Parliament is content to create a new statutory presumption that, for a wide range of classes of Crown court cases, the citizen will no longer be tried by a jury of their peers, but by a judge sitting on their own.
Again, as we talked about this morning, this is not what Sir Brian recommended—he was specific in his recommendation. This morning, the Minister talked about going further, which I would interpret as referring to what offences and timelines are used. I am not sure that we can extend that suggestion of going further to creating an entirely new set-up that Sir Brian did not recommend. He did not recommend that a judge sit on their own and sentence someone to up to three years in prison.
The Bill makes clear that in all cases falling below the threshold sentence of more than three years, a trial must take place without a jury. That is not at individual discretion, but a hard and fast rule. The Committee should note that the threshold is assessed prospectively, on a likely sentence basis. That means that at an early stage, the court is being asked to make an evaluative judgment about the likely sentence before a trial, and to use that judgment to determine whether the oldest safeguards in our system are available at all.
The Minister may, quite rightly, say that making estimates or anticipating likely sentencing outcomes is part of our system—but never in this way, and never with the consequences that will flow in terms of who determines an individual’s guilt as a result of that estimation. The consequences are profound.
Yet for all the Government’s reliance on the three-year threshold, proposed new section 74D makes clear that a judge sitting alone retains the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose a sentence of more than three years where appropriate. That will allow a judge to determine guilt on their own, and potentially to sentence someone for many years—more than three—for an offence. Those two issues interact. The Minister was right to call me out for blending the two measures, but they are linked in the real world, and they certainly will be linked in the minds of defendants and the wider public. That relates back to the confidence issue. If a defendant sees that the person whom they think was inappropriately asked to determine their guilt is also then allowed to give them a sentence beyond what they were expecting to get, and beyond the thresholds that were designed for the imposition of a sentence, that creates real challenges for public confidence.
There is a tension in the Government’s remarks around this issue, because they have emphasised throughout that all these reforms will not be used for the most serious cases. That is how they have described it. That is largely determined by taking into account the sentencing length that is available—it is not a direct read-across, but more serious offences inevitably have longer sentence lengths, so someone will potentially be directly affected by these reforms around the same sentence lengths that the Government say are not appropriate for different types of offences. The Government might say that they are not choosing certain types of offences with very long sentences, but someone could end up with exactly the sort of sentence that someone else might receive for something like a rape offence. The Government think that that is acceptable but, again, it is inherently contradictory.
The Committee should also be concerned by the structure of the reallocation under proposed new section 74B. Cases can move from jury to judge alone and then from judge alone to jury following changes of circumstance or the emergence of new evidence. Such decisions may profoundly affect how justice is perceived, yet the Bill provides no right of appeal against them. What the Government are doing here is not simply adjusting or tinkering; they are creating a new mode of criminal trial in the Crown court by allowing a single judge to determine guilt in a substantial class of cases, allowing that decision to be revisited during proceedings, permitting it in some circumstances without a hearing and then insulating those decisions from appeal.
The Government’s case for doing all that relies heavily on efficiency, but this is precisely where the clause remains weak. The wider criticism of the Bill has always been that the backlog is being treated as if it were caused by jury trials rather than case management failures, workforce pressures, poor productivity and court capacity. We talked a lot about the IFG’s criticisms of the modelling and the data that the Government put forward to justify their clauses, but the IFG is not alone in thinking that the Government’s claims around the benefits are unsubstantiated. The London School of Economics submitted in written evidence what it thought about the Government’s approach to modelling. It said:
“Sir Brian Leveson stated that the modelling on which his recommendations were based is ‘uncertain and should be viewed as indicative’ and that the MoJ should ‘carry out more detailed modelling on the operational and financial impact of the recommendations’.”
I brought that up in the evidence session with Sir Brian and put it to him that he had said that further work should be done; he did not feel that it was for him to comment any further than that. The LSE says:
“Given the range of reforms suggested by the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, their complex interrelation, and the lack of rigorous modelling by independent research groups, we are not confident that the evidential basis for curtailing jury trial has been established.”
Both the IFG and the LSE think that the modelling case has not been successfully made, so there are a number of different questions on that. This is important because Parliament is being asked to accept the removal of a fundamental safeguard, not because the Government have shown that jury trials are causing the delay, but because it has chosen to pursue structural reform before exhausting operational solutions.
The real constitutional innovation here is not only that some cases may be tried without a jury, but that Parliament is being asked to enact a statutory presumption in favour of a judge-only trial for a broad range of Crown court cases, with very limited, if any, safeguards once that allocation has been made.
The Committee should also consider the wider context in which these proposals are brought forward. Sir Brian Leveson’s review did not present the removal of jury trials as a stand-alone solution; it sets out a broader programme of reforms aimed at improving efficiency, capacity and case management across the system, and yet the Government have chosen to bring forward the most constitutionally significant elements of that review, those that limit access to jury trials, while leaving much of the operational reform agenda unimplemented.
We have visited this point a number of times today: the Government have not done the things they say they will do that will make a difference. They cannot realistically claim that those things will not have the necessary impact if they have not tried to implement them.
I was on the Justice Committee in the previous Parliament, and we discussed in detail the challenges around the criminal Bar strike action and so on, and they were very clear that these people had not gone anywhere—they were the same people, but they were choosing not to practise criminal law. I would lean heavily on their view that these people want to come back.
If the Government want to put forward an analysis and tell us the figures for all the people who are out there who could be practising criminal law and are choosing not to, and if they produced a gap analysis showing how many they think they need on top of that, then we would have a different discussion. However, I do not know that the Government have produced any analysis or figures for how many practitioners are due to come back, or likely to come back, or what we need to get them to come back and so on. The Minister may well be right to just say, “They’re not there, we can’t do it,” but we keep coming back to the same point: where is the basis for making such strong decisions?
Again, I would welcome the Government publishing an analysis seeking to interrogate in detail how many people are out there who could and would come back, and what it would take. The Minister could then get up and say confidently, “We have looked at this and we know that there are this many people who previously practised criminal law, or could come back to criminal law, and this is what we expect them to do over the next few years. We think we need this many people. We think we will train x number, and that still leaves us with a gap.”
As with so many of these issues, the Minster has a case with her argument and interpretation of things, but if we are going to do something as profound as introducing a whole new way of determining guilt by way of a single judge on their own—something that has never been done in this country—then the evidence threshold on which the Government need to deliver their arguments is so much higher than what we are getting. That is the case on this and so many other issues.
The hon. Member for Gloucester, the Minister and I are all missing a proper attempt to study, define and measure these things. Without that, the Government cannot expect us to move forward with a massive erosion of jury trial rights, in a way that has never been done before. We are not talking about triable either-way offences going from magistrates to Crown, which has been done, but not on this scale; rather, we are introducing a whole new way of determining guilt in this country, which will have profound implications, and we are supposed to decide it on the basis that the hon. Member and the Minister think it will take too long to do otherwise—nor, conversely, should we just take the barristers’ word for it. What we really need is a proper, exhaustive study of the issue, as we do with many other issues that we will come to where the same things apply.
The hon. Member for Gloucester did a good job—from his perspective—of pointing out that the Criminal Bar Association of course has its own interests and angle. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, the Opposition are not saying that the Criminal Bar Association is sacrosanct and cannot be questioned or grilled. However, it is also in the camp of those who want to see more information and more details. When the Minister put it to the Criminal Bar Association in Committee that it had not put forward its modelling or proposals, it was made very clear that it had sought the same data and analyses that would allow it to demonstrate these things, and the Government had not allowed it to do so. We cannot on the one hand say that it is a loaded jury, in the American sense, and we cannot take its word for it, but at the same time criticise it for not having alternative opinions, when we will not help it to further elucidate those measures that might make a difference.
We have no idea whatever about the consequences for ethnic minority communities, which, as we have said, favour a jury trial. We know the disparity that exists in relation to juries and magistrates, and we are going to narrow down even more—[Interruption.] I accept that the Minister might dispute the question, but the Deputy Prime Minister is clear that there is a disparity between the likelihood of being found guilty. We know that that disparity exists. If we accept that that disparity exists because a jury is a broader selection of people who are less likely to be subject to prejudice, and that magistrates are a more narrow group, then we are introducing a measure that will narrow that down even further.
In relation to sentencing in the youth estate, where we have over-representation of BME individuals, I have made the point that we have to look at offending patterns and so on, which vary among different ethnic minority groups, but we cannot rule the explanation out. However, having failed to rule it out, as the Deputy Prime Minister said we should, he is going to shift more of the weight towards those risks. Again, if we accept as a possibility the premise that this is about a narrowing of individuals’ backgrounds and life experiences versus the experiences of those they are judging, then that becomes a very reasonable hypothesis for what is happening.
If that is a reasonable hypothesis and we have not been able to exclude it, and if it is then correct, then we are doing something that supercharges that effect. If that hypothesis is correct, and this is to do with background and diversity of opinion, then we are narrowing that down even further, to the view of one individual—to the life history and life experience of just one person. What the Government are proposing could not be further from what the jury trial system delivers, and this at a point when we cannot say with confidence that it will not have an adverse impact on BAME individuals.
The Government accept that individual judges sitting in a particular way do not always make the right decisions for the welfare of a child. Those judges are trained and have all the things that the Minister mentioned, but that does not mean that the Government do not think that they sometimes make the wrong decisions. Those safeguards will be helpful and will hopefully hedge things back in the other direction if this is related to prejudice; the point we keep making is that we do not think that the proposition that the Government are putting forward is sufficiently weighted to get the outcome they want.
If we were confident that this would deliver the outcome that the Government claim it will, then things would be different, but we question whether it will achieve the result they want, whether the safeguards are in place and whether the alternative options have been sufficiently secured. We are also highlighting the gravity of the consequences for individuals and the gravity of the change to our judicial system. Again, we need a little more than just, “We’re going to try these safeguards,” when we cannot be confident that they will guard against this issue, especially when we know—if it is prejudice—how difficult and recalcitrant it has been.
This is not a new discussion or a new debate. The Minister will probably want to make the criticism that it was not sorted during our period in office, but equally I would not expect her get up and say that she is confident that she will get to the bottom of it in the next few years, sort it all out, and make sure there is no prejudice in our judicial system, in the magistrates court or among the judges who she is asking to sit and determine these cases on their own. I am pretty confident that the Government will not give us that guarantee, so again, the thresholds for these decisions are not being met.
Did the Minister want to intervene? I do not know if the moment has passed.
I do not know whether this is something that I have to declare as an interest, but I have served on a jury. Serving on a jury gives those who do it an amazing insight, which those who have not done it might not have, and helps them to understand the importance of the discussion, deliberation and exchange of views that simply cannot happen with an individual judge sitting on their own.
As I said, I get frustrated with those sorts of decisions. I was very frustrated when a jury did not convict the Colston four. I did not get to know why they did not do that, but the system is deliberately designed that way. The Minister has to accept that. That is almost proving the point that others have made—in particular, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East has said this both publicly and privately. Judges are forced to be much more constricted in their decision making. If the facts are a, b and c, they just have to go along with those facts.
The Justice Committee visited the Supreme Court and got to sit with Supreme Court judges. The portrayal is sometimes that they would be absolutely appalled by MPs criticising their judgments and not thinking they had made the right decision, but they were perfectly relaxed about that. They said it is absolutely the role of politicians and MPs to have criticisms and be concerned about the decisions that they make.
We are talking about issues like the credibility of witnesses. The Minister is trying to suggest that the determination of guilt is purely based on, for example, forensic evidence. Is a judge more or less likely than a magistrate or a jury to accept whether or not a fingerprint was the defendant’s on a windowsill in a burglary? Of course not. There are elements of fact, but guilt decisions are much more subtle than that. They relate to the credibility of witnesses and of evidence, and to whether we believe somebody’s account of things. Those things can, as the Lammy review supposits and campaigners highlight, be subject to bias and prejudice.
The Minister talks about the progress that the Government want to make in this area, but I come back to my point that progress has not yet been made. The Government are not saying, “We have now created a representative and balanced judiciary, and we are therefore confident in giving them a greater role in an unprecedented way, sitting on their own and determining guilt in a way we have never done before.” Instead, they are saying, “There is more work to do.”
If the Minister thinks there is more work to do, she must therefore accept that the status quo is not acceptable. If the status quo is not acceptable, and the Government proceed in an unprecedented direction, issues such as prejudice among the judiciary, if they exist, will exacerbate the adverse consequences for BME individuals. I have said in the past that we cannot be certain that those prejudices exist, and sometimes there is an overclaim by campaigners in that regard. Saying that I am not convinced, however, is a world away from saying, “There isn’t an issue here. Let’s proceed and potentially make the situation even worse.”
I draw the Committee’s attention to the question of who we should listen to on these issues. Who are the people out there making their views known, and who should we give weight to? The Minister is keen for us to listen to Sir Brian Leveson, except when the Minister does not agree with him on what we should do. Still, that is the central premise. This morning, I gave examples of how the Prime Minister himself made the exact same arguments that we were making—that jury trials are preferable, even though various Government Members refuse to accept that point. Every time we make that point, they say, “Magistrates are just as fair. Are you saying that magistrates are unfair?” The Prime Minister certainly thought there was a material difference in the value and benefits of a jury trial system versus the magistrates system.
I have talked about how the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards), made the same point, saying that we should stretch every sinew before undertaking any erosion of our jury trial rights. We are clear, and so are the Government, that they have not yet stretched every sinew. They have delivered some changes—
There are other individuals to whom one might think the Prime Minister gives a lot of credibility and weight. Geoffrey Robertson, the founder of the Prime Minister’s barristers’ chambers, condemned the plans to restrict jury trials in England and Wales as
“a betrayal of the values for which Labour purports to stand.”
It was not just the Prime Minister who practised with that individual. Maybe they were working with him under the cosh or they had the view that the chambers they chose to work in were founded by someone they did not give weight and credibility to.
The Deputy Prime Minister also worked in the chambers of this individual. Who else, Ms Butler? Richard Hermer, the current Attorney General, also practised in the chambers founded by this individual, who said that
“attacking juries must be regarded as a betrayal of the values for which Labour purports to stand…How have they come to betray a principle that has been so important over the centuries for those who have dissented or stood for progress?”
He adds that, given the Labour party’s
“record of support for progressive causes, for free speech and peaceful political protests, the Bill does seem a betrayal of Labour traditions…MPs who vote in favour will be on the wrong side of their party’s own history.”
That is from the person with whom the Prime Minister, the Attorney General and the Deputy Prime Minister all enjoyed practising the law for many years in the chambers on which they sought to rely.
This morning we covered the right to appeal. As we discussed, the rate of successful appeal in the magistrates court is higher than might be expected. We do not know how that figure and the difference in respect of jury trials will translate if cases are taken down to a single judge. The Minister stated that reasonings will be laid out and that that will make the system more transparent; of course it will to some degree, but the drawbacks do not make that trade-off worth while.
We are also going to see, with the new Crown court bench division, a whole new series of ways in which defendants seek to appeal sentences. The Minister talked about the fact that there are not enough barristers; how do we know that some of those trials and appeals are not going to draw from barristers’ time? We do not.
I return to the central argument about the value and weight of jury trials in the public perception. The issue is not just about how the public perceive jury trials. Jury trials are the most important way in which the public are part of our judicial system: the public are part of the process; it is not a process separate from us. We have talked about magistrates as a halfway house for representation and diversity of opinion, but the same arguments apply in relation to the participation of the citizenry from their point of view. That is not the point of view of the defendant and the decisions that they might take, but that of the individual citizen participating in the judiciary, versus that of the magistrates.
All the same arguments that I made in relation to the perception of potential prejudices apply to the question of introducing the new division, which will even more greatly extract the citizen from our judicial system. That extraction is important because it goes back to the original question of whether we feel that the judicial system is ours and we have a role to play in it, or that it is what would have been, in the old days, the King’s judicial system. It was the King’s system: justice was in his name, for him, or—as I talked about this morning—in God’s name, for God, with individual citizens excluded from the process.
Although the Opposition oppose clause 3, our amendment 39 at least attempts to curtail some of the issues with it. I note that when we discussed it this morning, the Minister would not engage on the direct, specific question of whether, looking at the examples in isolation, she thinks it is fair that somebody of good character who stands to lose an enormous amount—their job and their reputation—is going to lose access to a jury trial whereas a repeat, recalcitrant, more serious offender will not. We are clear that that is not fair, so we have attempted, with a similar aim but in a manner different from the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, to introduce some safeguards, but we are opposed to the proposal in clause 3 in its entirety.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)
CTB 18 Clive Dolphin
CTB 19 Drs Brown, Hart, Clack, McKelvey, Maggie Faye and Ali Rowe
CTB 20 Teresa P
CTB 21 The Law Society
CTB 22 The Family Services Foundation
CTB 23 Professor Penney Lewis, Criminal Law Commissioner, The Law Commission
CTB 24 Bar Council
CTB 25 London School of Economics
CTB 26 Victim Not Suspect
CTB 27 Aftab Ali
Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0.