PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill - 13 December 2017 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
Further considered in Committee
[Dame Rosie Winterton in the Chair]
Brought up, and read the First time.
New clause 4—Arrangements for withdrawing from the EU—
“Notwithstanding any powers granted under this Act, no Minister of the Crown may agree to the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union referred to in Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union until Royal Assent is granted to an Act of Parliament—
(a) authorising the Minister to agree to an exit day to be specified in the Act,
(b) authorising the Minister to agree to those arrangements that will apply after exit day, the arrangements to be specified in the Act.”
This new clause would ensure that a separate Act of Parliament would be required for Ministers to determine exit day and to set out the arrangements that will apply after exit day.
New clause 19—Publication of the Withdrawal Agreement—
“The powers for Ministers set out in section 9 shall not come into force unless and until a final withdrawal agreement made between the United Kingdom and the European Union has been published and copies placed in the Libraries of the House of Commons and the House of Lords.”
This new clause would ensure that the wide-ranging powers for Ministers to implement the withdrawal agreement set out in Clause 9 of the Bill cannot come into force until the withdrawal agreement has been published.
New clause 38—Status of Irish citizens in the United Kingdom—
“Before making any regulations under section 9, the Minister shall commit to making available to Irish citizens lawfully resident in the United Kingdom after exit day any status, rights and entitlements available to Irish citizens before exit day, inclusive of and in addition to their status, rights and entitlements as EU citizens.”
New clause 66—Parliamentary approval for the outcome of negotiations with the European Union—
“No exit day may be appointed under this Act until the terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, including leaving the EU without an agreement, have been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause is intended to establish that Parliament has a meaningful vote on the terms of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
New clause 68—Terms of withdrawal: approval by Parliament—
“(1) The Government shall not conclude any agreement on terms of withdrawal from the European Union, or on the UK’s future relationship with the European Union, until those terms have been approved by resolution in both Houses of Parliament.
(2) Approval by resolution of both Houses of Parliament must be sought no later than three months before exit day.”
This new clause would require the Government to seek Parliamentary approval for its exit agreement with the EU at least three months before exit day.
New clause 69—United Kingdom withdrawal from the EU—
“(1) Subsection (2) applies if either of the conditions in subsection (3) or (4) is met.
(2) The Prime Minister must seek an agreement with the EU on one or more of the following—
(a) extending the negotiations beyond the two-year period specified in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union; or
(b) agreeing that negotiations over the final terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU may take place during a negotiated transitional arrangement which broadly reflect current arrangements and which begins immediately after the Article 50 notice period expires and the EU treaties cease to apply to the UK; or
(c) any other course of action in relation to the negotiations (with the EU over the withdrawal of the United Kingdom) which has been approved in accordance with this section by a resolution of the House of Commons.
(3) The condition in this subsection is that no Article 50 withdrawal agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and the EU by 31 October 2018.
(4) The condition in this subsection is that an Article 50 withdrawal agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and the EU but the proposed terms of withdrawal have not been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament by 28 February 2019.
(5) Nothing in this section may be amended by regulations made under any provision of this Act.”
The intention of this new clause, which could be amended only by primary legislation, is to specify the actions that should be taken if the Government does not secure a withdrawal agreement by 31 Oct 2018 or that Parliament does not approve a withdrawal agreement by 28 February 2019.
New clause 75—Implementing the withdrawal agreement (No. 2)—
“(1) No powers to make regulations under this Act may be used for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament detailing how implementing the withdrawal agreement will be achieved through primary legislation.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) and (2), “implementing the withdrawal agreement” may include any necessary provision for a transitional period after the exit day appointed for section 1 of this Act.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) and (2), “implementing the withdrawal agreement” must include any necessary provision to ensure that any citizens of any EU Member State who are lawfully resident in the UK on any day before exit day can continue to be lawfully resident after exit day on terms no less favorable than they currently enjoy.”
This new clause is intended to ensure that primary legislation is used to implement the withdrawal agreement, including maintaining EU citizens’ rights.
Amendment 7, in clause 9, page 6, line 45, at end insert
“, subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”
To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.
Amendment 355, page 6, line 45, at end insert “, subject to—
(a) the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament, and
(b) an affirmative resolution passed by the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly, approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”
This amendment would require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by both Parliament and by the devolved administrations.
Amendment 361, page 7, line 2, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations under this section may, notwithstanding sections 1 and 5(1), make provision to replicate, for such an implementation period as is provided for in the withdrawal agreement, any aspect of the operation of EU law in the United Kingdom.”
The amendment would make clear that aspects of EU membership, such as the automatic effect of EU law and enforcement and adjudication mechanisms, can be maintained for an implementation period if the Government agrees to do so as part of the withdrawal agreement.
Amendment 142, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(e) remove, reduce or otherwise amend the rights of any citizen of an EU Member State who was lawfully resident in the UK on any day before 30 March 2019.”
This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of EU citizens living in the UK.
Amendment 47, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section unless the terms of the withdrawal agreement have been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
Amendment 196, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Union’s Political and Security Committee after exit day.”
Amendment 197, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a signatory to all agreements signed through the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.”
Amendment 198, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Union’s Foreign Affairs Council.”
Amendment 199, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until a Minister of the Crown has submitted a formal request to the President of the European Council that the UK should continue to be a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.”
Amendment 227, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of the UK leaving the EU single market on the forecast to the UK’s public finances.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the UK public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 228, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of exiting the EU single market on levels of GDP growth.
(3B) Any assessment under subsection (3A) shall set out an assessment of the impact of exiting the EU single market on levels of GDP growth in—
(a) Scotland,
(b) Northern Ireland,
(c) England, and
(d) Wales.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom exiting the EU single market on the levels of GDP growth in the UK and in each part of the UK, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 229, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the impact of ending freedom of movement on the UK’s public finances.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the impact of the United Kingdom ending freedom of movement on the UK’s public finances, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 230, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has laid before Parliament an assessment of the broadened responsibilities of the UK Treasury following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require publication of a Government assessment of the broadened responsibilities of the UK Treasury following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, before any regulations are made under section 9.
Amendment 300, page 7, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) No regulations may be made under this section until—
(a) the Government has laid before Parliament a strategy for maintaining those protections, safeguards, programmes for participation in nuclear research and development, and trading or other arrangements which will lapse as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of, and participation in, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and
(b) the strategy has been approved by both Houses of Parliament.”
This amendment would prevent the Government using any delegated powers under Clause 9 until it had secured Parliamentary approval for its proposals to replace any provisions that cease to apply as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from membership of Euratom.
Amendment 55, page 7, line 9, at end insert
“or until the withdrawal agreement has been published and legislation proposed in the 2017 Gracious Speech in relation to customs, trade, immigration, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear safeguards and international sanctions has been published.”
This amendment would ensure that powers to Ministers to make regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement cannot be exercised until such time as the withdrawal agreement has been published along with the publication of associated legislative proposals on customs, trade, immigration, fisheries, agriculture, nuclear safeguards and international sanctions.
Amendment 19, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) Regulations under this section will lapse two years after exit day.”
Although the power conferred by this clause lapses on exit day, there is no sunset clause for the statutory instruments provided under it. This would make all such statutory instruments lapse two years after exit day and require the Government to introduce primary legislation if it wanted to keep them in force.
Amendment 74, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has signed an agreement with the EU guaranteeing that the UK will remain a permanent member of the EU Single Market.”
Amendment 75, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has signed an agreement with the EU guaranteeing that the UK will remain a permanent member of the EU Customs Union.”
Amendment 116, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until such time as the terms of the withdrawal agreement have been approved by a Ratification Referendum, giving voters the options of supporting the terms of the withdrawal agreement, or remaining in the EU.”
This amendment seeks to ensure that Ministers cannot make and use secondary legislation for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement until such time as that agreement has been approved by a Ratification Referendum.
Amendment 143, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until such time as the Government has signed an agreement with the EU that maintains and guarantees the existing rights of EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU, as of 29 March 2019.”
This amendment seeks to protect the existing rights of both EU citizens living in the UK, and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU.
Amendment 156, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section unless the requirement in section [Status of Irish citizens in the United Kingdom] has been satisfied.”
Amendment 224, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for the UK to retain access to the EU’s Emissions Trading System markets after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy to retain access to the EU’s Emissions Trading System markets after withdrawal.
Amendment 225, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for the UK’s continued participation in the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for the UK to continue participation in the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative after withdrawal from the EU.”
Amendment 231, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a statement setting out a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Bank.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Bank.
Amendment 232, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a statement setting out a strategy for retaining membership of the European Investment Fund.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for retaining access to the European Investment Fund.
Amendment 238, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking the maintenance of UK membership of the European Food Safety Authority on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Food Safety Authority.
Amendment 241, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking the preservation of reciprocal healthcare agreements on existing terms as under social security coordination regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
(6) Any changes to regulations in subsection (5) shall only be made after—
(a) the House of Commons has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5),
(b) the Scottish Parliament has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5),
(c) the National Assembly of Wales has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5), and
(d) the Northern Ireland Assembly has passed a resolution approving changes to regulations mentioned in subsection (5).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy for seeking to ensure that reciprocal healthcare arrangements continue after the UK leaves the EU.
Amendment 242, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Medicines Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Medicines Agency.
Amendment 243, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work.
Amendment 244, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Chemicals Agency after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Chemicals Agency.
Amendment 245, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Single Sky Agreement on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to publish a strategy for continuing to be a member of the European Single Sky Agreement.
Amendment 246, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain UK membership of the European Aviation Safety Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Government to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Aviation Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 247, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of the European Maritime Safety Agency on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continues to be a member of the European Maritime Safety Agency after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 248, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of ERASMUS on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of the ERASMUS scheme after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 249, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to maintain access for the UK to reciprocal roaming charge agreements on existing terms as under Regulation 2017/920, after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would seek to ensure that roaming charges do not come into effect after exit day for UK citizens in the EU and vice versa.
Amendment 250, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out a strategy for seeking to retain UK membership of Creative Europe on existing terms after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to be a member of Creative Europe after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 251, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has made a formal request to President of the European Council that the UK continues membership of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the UK to make a request to the President of the European Council for continued UK membership of the European Agency for Fundamental Rights after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 252, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has published a strategy for reaching an agreement with the EU to enable the UK to have continued access to Passenger Name Records after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for seeking to ensure that the UK continued to have access to Passenger Name Records after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 253, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Schengen Information System after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Schengen Information System after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 254, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have continued access to the European Arrest Warrant.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Arrest Warrant after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 255, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROPOL.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROPOL after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 256, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROJUST.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have membership of EUROJUST after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 257, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Criminal Records Information system with the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the European Criminal Records Information system with the EU after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 258, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Prüm Council decisions relating to fingerprint and DNA exchange with the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the Prüm Council decisions relating to fingerprint and DNA exchange with the EU, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 259, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the False and Authentic Documents Online (“FADO”) internet-based image archiving system.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the False and Authentic Documents Online (“FADO”) internet-based image archiving system after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 260, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to participate in the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs Administrations of 1997 (“Naples II Convention”).”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to participate in the Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs Administrations of 1997 (“Naples II Convention”), after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 261, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable the UK to continue to have access to the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 262, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for ensuring that lawyers registered to practise in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland shall not lose their right of audience at the European Court after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to enable British-registered lawyers to continue to appear before the Court of Justice of the European Union, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 263, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for ensuring that lawyers from England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland shall not lose their status of legal profession privilege concerning communications with regard to proceedings before the European Court, after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for reaching agreement with the EU to ensure that communications from British-registered lawyers with regard to proceedings before the European Court continue to be covered by legal profession privilege, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 275, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament an agreement with the Scottish Government for the freedom of movement of EU citizens in Scotland to continue after exit day.”
This amendment would facilitate the continuance of free movement in and out of Scotland after exit day.
Amendment 276, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before both Houses of Parliament setting out a strategy for continued participation by the United Kingdom in the common European Asylum System.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for continued participation by the United Kingdom in the common European Asylum System, after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 343, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out a strategy for a food standards framework after withdrawal from the EU, before making any regulations implementing the withdrawal agreement.
Amendment 351, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
“(5) No regulations may be made under this section until the Secretary of State has laid a report before Parliament setting out plans that seek to secure continued clinical trials agreements as under EU Regulation 536/2014 after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
This amendment would ensure harmonisation of clinical trials across the EU Member States will continue in the UK after the UK leaves the EU.
Clause 9 stand part.
New clause 7—Consultation—
“The Government shall follow the principles set out in the Cabinet Office Code of Practice in respect of public consultation in advance of regulations being made under powers granted by this Act.”
This new clause would commit Ministers to abiding by the existing Cabinet Office code of practice on consultations in respect of regulations to be made under the Bill.
New clause 12—Social, employment and environmental protection—
“Any rights, protections, liabilities, obligations, powers, remedies and procedures which exist immediately before exit day in the fields of—
(a) social and employment law, and
(b) environmental law
will not be amended through any regulations made to deal with deficiencies or withdrawal unless approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament or by Act of Parliament”
This new Clause would ensure that social, employment and environmental laws cannot be changed by the order-making powers delegated to Ministers without a vote in Parliament.
New clause 57—Citizens’ Jury on Brexit Negotiations—
“(1) A citizens’ jury shall be established to enable UK citizens to be consulted on the progress of negotiations between the UK and the EU on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, and the approach outlined in UK Government White Papers.
(2) The citizens’ jury shall in total be composed of exactly 1501 persons.
(3) Members of the citizens’ jury shall be randomly selected by means of eligibility from UK citizens on the current electoral register as registered on the date of this Act receiving Royal Assent, with allocation across the nine UK Government Regions, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland weighted by population, and a stratification plan, with the aim of securing a group of people who are broadly representative demographically of the UK electorate across characteristics including whether they voted Leave or Remain.
(4) The jury will be broken down into individual sittings for each of the nine UK Government Regions in England, as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
(5) The sittings will be for no more than 72 hours at a time, facilitated by independent facilitators, and if required, by electing fore-people from within their number.
(6) Membership of the jury will be subject to the same regulations and exceptions as a regular jury, but membership can be declined without penalty.
(7) The citizens’ jury will be able to require Ministerial and official representatives of the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations to give testimony to them to inform their work, and to have the power to invite other witnesses to give evidence as required.
(8) The citizens’ jury shall publish reports setting out their conclusions on the negotiations and UK Government White Papers.
(9) The first report from the citizens’ jury shall be published within two months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, and subsequent reports shall be published at intervals of no more than two months.
(10) Costs incurred by the citizens’ jury shall be met by the Exchequer.”
Clause 16 stand part.
Amendment 226, in schedule 7, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to the application of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive in the UK.”
This amendment would make any changes to the application of the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive in the UK subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.
Amendment 235, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning the rights of workers in the UK.”
This amendment would require that the rights of workers currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 236, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning rights for disabled people in the UK.”
This amendment would require that the rights of disabled people currently afforded by EU law that are being transposed into UK law can be changed only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 237, page 39, line 29, at end insert—
“(g) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning annual leave rights,
(h) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning agency worker rights,
(i) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning part-time worker rights,
(j) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning fixed-term worker rights,
(k) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning work-based health and safety obligations,
(l) makes changes to EU-derived legislation concerning state-guaranteed payments upon an employer’s insolvency,
(m) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning collective redundancy rights,
(n) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning terms and conditions of employment rights,
(o) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning posted worker rights,
(p) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning paternity, maternity and parental leave rights,
(q) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning protection of employment upon the transfer of a business, or
(r) makes changes to EU-derived domestic legislation concerning anti-discrimination.”
This amendment would list areas regarding workers’ rights where changes to EU-derived law could be made only through affirmative procedure.
Amendment 293, page 39, line 33, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations appointing any exit day may not be made unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require regulations appointing an exit day to be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 328, page 39, line 42, leave out sub-paragraphs (6) and (7).
This amendment, and Amendments 329 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 329, page 41, line 15, leave out sub-paragraphs (10) and (11).
This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 331, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 155, page 42, line 17, at end insert—
“(3A) A Minister cannot make a declaration under sub-paragraph (2) unless they have satisfied themselves that they have sufficiently consulted—
(a) relevant public authorities,
(b) businesses,
(c) people, and
(d) other organisations
who are likely to be affected by the instrument.”
This amendment would require that, when using the urgent cases provision in the Bill, the Minister must first consult with businesses and other relevant organisations.
Amendment 154, page 42, line 31, at end insert—
“(7) For the purposes of this paragraph “urgent” has the same meaning as “emergency” in Section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.”
This amendment would limit the circumstances in which Ministers can use procedures for urgent cases to circumstances in which there is a serious threat of damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of the United Kingdom.
Amendment 51, page 43, line 26, leave out paragraph 6
This amendment is linked to New Clause 3 to require the Government to implement the withdrawal agreement through separate primary and secondary legislation rather than through this Bill.
Amendment 294, page 44, line 37, after “section 17(5)” insert “, other than regulations to appoint an exit day,”
Consequential to amendment 293.
Amendment 295, page 45, line 5, after “section 17(5)” insert “, other than regulations to appoint an exit day,”
Consequential to amendment 293.
Amendment 344, page 45, line 11, at end insert—
The intention of this amendment is that tertiary legislation under the Act should be subject to the same parliamentary control and time-limits as are applicable to secondary legislation.
Amendment 58, page 45, line 23, leave out “urgency” and insert “emergency”
This amendment would remove the wider latitude currently allowing Ministers to make regulations without Parliamentary approval “by reason of urgency” and instead only allow such executive action “by reason of emergency”. An emergency is a situation that poses an immediate risk to human health, life, property, or environment.
Amendment 330, page 45, line 40, at end insert—
“Scrutiny of regulations made by Welsh Ministers
11A (1) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this Act of the Welsh Ministers must be made in accordance with the procedures from time to time set out in the Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales for the scrutiny of regulations under this Act.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) applies to statutory instruments made by the Welsh Ministers acting alone and to statutory instruments made by the Welsh Ministers acting jointly with a Minister of the Crown.
(3) The Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales may set out different procedures for the making of different statutory instruments or for different categories of statutory instruments under this Act and, for the avoidance of doubt, may empower the Assembly or a committee of the Assembly to decide which of those procedures is to apply to an instrument or category of instruments.
(4) For the purposes of section 11A of the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, and any other provisions of that Act referred to in that section, the provisions set out from time to time in the Standing Orders of the National Assembly for Wales for the scrutiny of regulations under this Act shall be deemed to be provisions of an Act.”
This amendment would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
Amendment 301, page 46, line 18, at end insert—
“12A Any power to make regulations under this Act may not be exercised by a Minister of the Crown until 14 days after the Minister has circulated a draft of the regulations to the citizens’ jury appointed under section [Citizens’ jury on Brexit negotiations].”
The intention of this amendment is to provide for a citizens’ jury to be consulted before regulations are made under this Act.
Amendment 223, page 46, line 29, at end insert—
“14A Any power to make regulations in this Act relating to the oil and gas sector may not be made without—
(a) consultation, and
(b) an impact assessment, a copy of which must be laid before Parliament.”
This amendment would require consultation and an impact assessment before legislation affecting the relating to the oil and gas sector is changed by regulations made under the Act.
Amendment 331, page 48, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (4).
This amendment, and Amendments 328 and 329, would remove provisions in the Bill that prescribe scrutiny procedures for the National Assembly for Wales. These amendments, coupled with Amendment 330, would allow the National Assembly for Wales to set the scrutiny procedures it considers appropriate for the control of powers proposed for the Welsh Ministers under the Bill.
That schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Amendment 29, in clause 17, page 13, line 34, leave out subsections (1) to (3)
This amendment would remove a widely drawn delegated power, which covers anything that happens as a consequence of the Act.
Amendment 99, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) Regulations under this section may not limit the scope or weaken standards of environmental protection.”
This amendment ensures that the power to make regulations in Clause 17 may not be exercised to reduce environmental protection.
Amendment 100, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.”
This amendment imposes the same restriction on the regulation making powers under Clause 17 as applies to other regulation powers in the Bill.
Amendment 296, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(8) No regulations may be made under this section after the end of the period of two years beginning with exit day.
(9) Regulations made under this section may not amend or repeal retained EU law.”
This amendment would place restrictions on the power to make consequential and transitional provision.
Clause 17 stand part.
This, on day seven in Committee, is really where we get to the crunch on this Bill. There are two big anxieties about the content of the Bill that finally come clashing together in clause 9. The first is the sweeping use of secondary legislation through Henry VIII powers, which, regardless of one’s views on the overall legislation, have caused some unease in all parts of the House because of the way in which they concentrate power in the hands of the Executive and cut deep into our historic role in Parliament to hold the Executive to account. The second anxiety is about getting the final Brexit deal right and about making sure that Parliament has a real, meaningful say on the deal, which will define our country for generations, and that we decide together what “taking back control” should mean.
Clause 9 is where those two anxieties come crashing together, because it allows a huge concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, and it does so over the final withdrawal agreement on the outcome of Brexit. Notwithstanding the commitments that the Prime Minister has made today and the written statement that we have seen, the reality is that clause 9 would allow Ministers to start to implement a withdrawal agreement entirely through secondary legislation and to do so even before Parliament has endorsed the withdrawal agreement.
New clause 3 says that Parliament will not yet give the Government permission to use secondary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement, and that instead the Government must set out their plans for primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement. If secondary legislation is needed at that time, as part of the implementation process, those powers should be taken in the withdrawal agreement Bill—the second Bill—so that Parliament is not just handing over a blank cheque, but is deciding what powers are needed and making sure that the proper scrutiny and checks and balances are in place at that time.
I do not think this is really a controversial proposal. It is basically saying that Parliament should hand over no more power to the Executive than it needs to and should not hand over power to the Executive until it needs to and until it knows what is going on. New clause 3 also has the effect of requiring a meaningful vote in primary legislation on the withdrawal agreement before it can be implemented. That is not really a controversial proposal either. It simply says that we should have a proper vote on the most important thing to pass through Parliament in a generation—and a meaningful vote in primary legislation, as is fitting for something so important—and that we should do so before and not after we give Government the powers to start implementing it.
Amendment 7, which was tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), has broadly the same effect. Rather than removing the powers from clause 9, it simply says that they cannot be used until a statute or primary legislation has been passed supporting the withdrawal agreement. Again, that means that Parliament does not blindly hand over powers to the Executive in a trusting way without knowing what the consequences will be or what the agreement looks like.
It ought to be possible for the Government to agree to my new clause 3, or to amendment 7. Let us think about the points that they have already made. First, they have recognised that there is a problem if too much power is concentrated in the hands of the Executive. They said so yesterday during the debate on clause 7, and I think that they recognise the importance of safeguards on the use of Executive powers. Secondly, they have said that there will be a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement. I welcome that, but I think there is still a difference between us on what counts as a meaningful vote. Thirdly, they have said that there will now be primary legislation on the withdrawal agreement, and I welcome that as well. If we put all those three things together in the right way—the commitment to primary legislation, the commitment to a proper vote and say for Parliament, and concern about the concentration of powers—we get amendment 7 or new clause 3. It is the same thing.
Let me explain why the Government’s words and the Prime Minister’s words—in the written ministerial statement, in various letters and so on—are not enough, and why we need to vote on either amendment 7 or my new clause 3. First, the Government’s unwillingness to put their promises on the face of the Bill is a problem. Parliament needs commitments in legislation before we can give the Executive such strong powers—such constitutional powers—and we need that commitment on the face of the Bill before and not after we do so. Secondly, there is still a difference between us on what counts as a meaningful vote. Without either new clause 3 or amendment 7, it would still be possible for Ministers to offer only a vote on a motion on the withdrawal agreement, and that indeed is the Prime Minister’s intention. The written ministerial statement published this morning says:
“This vote will take the form of a resolution in both Houses of Parliament and will cover both the Withdrawal Agreement and the terms for our future relationship.”
We are talking about a “take it or leave it” deal, and about a “take it or leave it” vote on the completed deal. That is the only thing that is there, even in the written ministerial statement; and there is no guarantee in the legislation, by the way. The Minister is not proposing to put that on the face of the Bill. Even if we take the written ministerial statement in good faith, and even if we rip up our commitment to putting things on the face of the Bill, all that the Minister has given us is the possibility of a vote on a motion, not a vote on primary legislation before the ratification of the treaty.
There is another problem with doing this through a resolution. It is not a fit and proper way to decide something so constitutional to simply do it through a resolution or motion of this House, especially when the Government have shown, in their attitude to Opposition day motions and to resolutions they have lost, that they do not give those sorts of motions and resolutions much status and significance at all, and they do not have constitutional or legal status.
It is only fitting, therefore, for us in this Parliament to say that we should do this through statute, but that is also the most important way to make sure the vote is meaningful. As several Members have said, a motion being put to Parliament that, as the Brexit Secretary has suggested, basically says, “Vote for this deal, whatever it is, or leave with no deal at all,” in the end is not a meaningful vote for Parliament. If Parliament is being given the choice of endorsing the deal the Government have come up with, whatever it is, or alternatively saying in effect that we want no transitional agreement, no security co-operation—nothing at all—and we want to just go straight off the edge of a cliff, that in the end is not proper scrutiny and not a proper meaningful vote. It also provides no incentive for Ministers to have to make sure that what they negotiate can get support in Parliament.
At present, the Government have more incentive to come up with a deal that will get the support of the European Parliament than the support of this place. That is not on; that is not acceptable. It is unacceptable that they have more incentive to focus on the interests of the European Parliament than they have to focus on the interests of, and the potential to build consensus in, this Parliament. That is why we need a vote on statute; that is why we need a statutory vote; and that is why we need either amendment 7 or new clause 3, to have a meaningful vote before, not after, the treaty is ratified.
I point out to Members who claim that somehow we cannot have a parliamentary debate on this because it is an internationally negotiated deal—because, somehow, it is a done deal—that Parliament must be able to have a say in this process and we should trust Parliament to be mature and responsible. A lot of Conservative Members said that if we let Parliament vote on article 50, the sky would fall in because it would somehow stop the Brexit process, rip up the referendum result and get in the way of democracy. But actually, the Members of this Parliament know that we have a responsibility towards democracy. We have a mature responsibility to our constituents to defend the very principles of democracy. That is exactly why many of us, including me, voted for article 50, to respect the referendum result, but we do not believe that we should then concentrate powers in the hands of Ministers to enable them do whatever they like. We have a responsibility to defend democracy and those democratic principles. It is our responsibility as Members of Parliament to have our say and to ensure that we get the best deal for the country, rather than just give our power to Ministers.
Secondly, the Government say that we cannot have a legislative process around an internationally negotiated deal, but of course we can. This is what parliamentary sovereignty is all about, and this is about us being mature. Thirdly, they have said that this would somehow stop Brexit. Again, that is rubbish. This is about how we should do this and how we can get the legislation right. Fourthly, I know that some Conservative Members have been told that if they vote for amendment 7 and do not stick with the Government’s line, it will somehow undermine the Prime Minister’s position and be a disloyal thing to do. All I would say to them is that the Prime Minister has proved to be remarkably resilient in the face of things that are considerably worse than losing one vote on one amendment in this place. Much as I would like it to be different, the fact that she is still standing at the Dispatch Box despite the result of the election and the result of a series of other things means that she really will not be knocked over by this one amendment.
If we have a Bill before Parliament, it has to be possible for Members of Parliament to table amendments to it and to vote on them. In a hung Parliament, that is even more the case. The Prime Minister asked for a mandate to do all this her own way, but she did not get it. She got a hung Parliament. That puts even more responsibility on us all to work together to find something that will build consensus across Parliament and across the country. In a hung Parliament, the Government sometimes lose votes because Parliament has to do its job to build the right kind of consensus and to get the right kind of outcome.
In the end, this is all about Parliament and democracy. Each and every one of us has a responsibility to our constituents not to hand over, share or give up our authority and our sovereignty, but to exercise our responsibility to get the very best deal. For centuries, Members of Parliament have fought tooth and nail to defend democracy and the powers of Parliament against Executive power. We cannot be the generation that just rips that up and hands over all the power to the Executive. We have a responsibility—now more than ever, given the gravity of the decisions before us—to use that power responsibly and to try to build consensus. To be honest, if the Government cannot build a broader consensus in Parliament, there is no chance of their building a broader consensus in the country, and if they cannot do that, we will end up with everybody rowing over the Brexit deal for a generation to come. For the sake of all of us who want to get back to discussing our schools, our hospitals and all the other issues that face our Parliament, I urge Ministers to accept either amendment 7 or new clause 3, and to start trying to build a consensus that can get us a sustainable Brexit deal.
I might well succeed in being reasonably brief, because I agreed with every word of the speech made by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and I will not repeat what she said. A welcome note of cross-party consensus exists across a large part of the House, and it represents the cross-party consensus that is in favour of what is lazily called a soft Brexit and of having the best possible close relationship with the European Union after we leave.
The main issue in this debate seems to turn on what we mean by a “meaningful vote”, which relates to our discussion on the role of parliamentary sovereignty in a situation of this kind. I accept that today the Prime Minister—not for the first time—promised us a meaningful vote, but she later went on to qualify that slightly by talking about the need for statutory instruments to be brought forward during the period of the Bill, within the extraordinary powers that the Bill gives Ministers to enact, by regulation, even changes to British statute law. We have to be clear what a meaningful vote is, and the key is the timing. It is quite obvious that if the British Government are to be responsible to the British Parliament, the vote must take place before the Government have committed themselves to the terms of the treaty-like agreement that is entered into with the other member states. Any other vote will not be meaningful.
That means that a meaningful vote cannot take place until a detailed agreement has been arrived at about certainly the precise nature of our trading and economic relationships with the single market of the European Union, and actually quite a lot else besides, because we still have to embark on the security discussions, the policing discussions and the discussions about which agencies we are going to remain in and which agency rules we are going to comply with. This is, we all agree, a huge and complex agreement, and it is going to determine this country’s relationships with the rest of the continent of Europe and the wider world for generations to come. Can that happen before March 2019?
We face the genuine difficulty that it is quite obvious that we will not be remotely near to reaching that agreement by March 2019, and we have to think through what that actually means. The negotiators have been very optimistic in saying that they will have first a transition deal and then a deal by 2019. I am sure that they will try, but they have not a chance. I think that what they are actually saying—certainly the continental negotiators—is that they might be able to have some heads of agreement on the eventual destination by March 2019, which we can all carefully consider. They will certainly have to agree a transition deal of at least two years within which the rest of the process will have to be completed.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford that everybody wants things to be speedy, because one of things that this country is suffering from most at the moment is the appalling uncertainty caused by the fact that we have taken a ridiculous length of time to reach three obvious conclusions on the three preliminary points that had to be determined as the basis of our withdrawal. At the moment, however, we do not quite know what the British Government are going to be seeking as their end goal in the negotiations that are about to start, because the British Government, within the Cabinet, have not yet been able to agree exactly what they are seeking.
If I may say this to my desperately paranoid Eurosceptic friends, it is not as if I am somehow trying in some surreptitious remainer way to put a spoke in the wheels of the fast progress of the United Kingdom towards our destination. The Government do not know what leave means. Nobody discussed what leave meant when we were having the referendum. Our overriding duty is not just to our political allegiances and so on; it is to provide this country with a good, responsible Government who face up to the problems of the real world and, accountable to Parliament, can produce the best new order that they can for the benefit of future generations.
The process started with the extraordinary suggestion that the royal prerogative would be invoked, that treaty making was not going to involve Parliament at all, and that leaving did not require parliamentary consent. Rather astonishingly, that matter had to be taken to court, and it came to a fairly predictable conclusion. The next idea—I will not repeat what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald) said—was that everything would be done by statutory instruments under broad powers. However, we are slowly getting to what I would have thought is the fundamental minimum that a real parliamentary democracy should be demanding: the country will not be able to enter into a binding treaty commitment until the details have received full parliamentary approval. How we get there is no doubt a matter of some difficulty, but it must be addressed.
The debates on this Bill have typified this Government’s approach to parliamentary scrutiny. I understand their difficulties when they have no majority and their Members include people like me and those who are trying to interrupt me—we are allegedly on the same side of the House—who fundamentally disagree with each other.
I have attended every day of our debates on this Bill. We spent yesterday discussing parliamentary scrutiny, but our proceedings have not been a great advertisement for such scrutiny. The Government’s reaction to each and every proposal is to say how carefully they have listened, how important it is and how they will go away and think about it, but then to explain why the drafting of the Bill will not currently be amended. I am sure that I have done that myself when taking legislation through the House, and it is always a joy to find out that one can get away with it for quite a long time. After a bit, one gets used to the fact that one can get away with it as long as one is suitably polite and flattering to those who are proposing amendments. The actual reasons that have been given for rejecting proposals have been all about administrative convenience—that they are obscure drafting amendments. I congratulate the parliamentary draftsmen on creating arguments of such extraordinary minutiae to support the amazing aspirations of civil servants who see a mountain of work before them and hope that most of it can proceed with the minimum of political scrutiny.
What we have not heard, and I will have to hear it today, is the political argument against Parliament having a meaningful say. What is the constitutional argument that says Parliament should be denied a statute before the Government enter into all these commitments? I have not so far heard a word expressed to try to explain that to me. That should be the key, dominant thought in the Government’s mind as they negotiate. Of course they will have to think about what will satisfy the Foreign Secretary and the Environment Secretary, and of course they will have to get something for which the Daily Mail, The Daily Telegraph and The Sun will criticise them least, and so on, but I do not think Parliament is an afterthought to those vital considerations; I think it is the parliamentary process that matters. The rest is a problem for some press officer.
The agreement will have to go to all the Parliaments. The Parliament of Wallonia will no doubt be allowed to have a say, which, if this Government have their way, this Parliament will not. The Parliament of Wallonia will be allowed to have a say, and I am not sure whether the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments will—that remains to be seen. European Governments will all have to take a view and defend that view to their own Parliament in each and every case.
When my right hon. and learned Friend says that leavers did not know what they were voting for, he risks sounding very condescending, because we knew exactly what we were voting for: to reclaim our laws and to reclaim our finances. Although one accepts his point that one cannot predict the future in any detail, that is as much true for the EU as it is for this country.
When the public were invited to vote in a referendum, they were invited to take back control, which was not defined. It was mainly about the borders and about the 70 million Turks and all the rest of it. They were told in the campaign that our trade with the European Union would not be affected in any way. Indeed, that is still being held out as a prospect by the Brexit Secretary and others, who seem to believe that they will get unfettered trade without any of the obligations.
The discussions we have had in Committee on previous days about the details of what “single market” and “customs union” mean, and so on, would have been a mystery to anybody whose knowledge of the subject is confined to the arguments reported in the national media on both sides. Those arguments are largely rubbish, and it is now for this House to turn to the real world and decide in detail what we will do.
Let me try to lower the temperature by going back, as I rarely do, to reminisce for a moment.
The key vote at that time was a vote in principle on the agreement that had been reached—it was different then, because we were applying for membership. The first thing was to get parliamentary approval. No one said that it was going to be non-binding or just a resolution, but there was a key resolution that determined whether we could go ahead at all. Some Conservatives voted against it, but a much bigger number of Labour Members voted in favour, giving it a very satisfactory majority. Then the whole process was subjected to debate on a Bill, at much greater length and in much greater detail than anything this House of Commons will ever be allowed, before there was the slightest prospect of the British Government thinking they would be able to ratify the agreement and commit us to European membership.
The current situation is a sad contrast with all that in many ways. It comes at a time when there is the utmost confusion about what our policy is, as we seek whatever destination we are eventually going to take when we reach agreement. Either new clause 3 or amendment 7 is the absolute minimum the Committee should be passing at this stage, in order to make it clear that binding commitments that affect future generations, changing our law in substantial ways, can be made only with the proper approval of both Houses of Parliament, following the full procedures that are necessary for statutory law.
I rise to speak to new clause 66 and amendments 30, 27 and 29, which stand in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I also intend to speak to amendment 28 and to the wider question of whether clause 9 should stand part of the Bill. In its policy impact, clause 9 is arguably the most important in the Bill and, taken together, clauses 9 and 17 give rise to a very wide range of interlocking issues. For the purposes of clarity, I intend to speak first to amendments 30, 27 and 28, which relate to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9 and whether it should stand part of the Bill. I will then turn to amendment 29, which relates to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17. I will finish by dealing with new clause 66 and the thorny issue of Parliament’s role in approving the final terms of the UK’s exit from the EU and any associated transitional arrangements that might be agreed.
I turn first to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 9. The Government have argued that the clause 9 power is necessary in order that they have sufficient flexibility to give effect to whatever is in the withdrawal agreement and to ensure that there are no holes in the statute book after exit day. The withdrawal agreement, it should be noted, is defined in clause 14 as an agreement, whether or not ratified, agreed with the EU under article 50, meaning that the powers in clause 9 could be used before a withdrawal agreement is ratified but not, as the clause makes clear, after exit day for the purposes of the Bill, because the power will expire at that point.
In the light of the Secretary of State’s announcement on 13 November that the Government intend to bring forward a withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill in order to give the agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements domestic legal effect, an announcement, it should be noted, that was confirmed in writing in the joint UK-EU report published last Friday, it is entirely unclear why the Government still require the powers provided for by clause 9.
Let me set out why we believe that to be the case. In that announcement on 13 November, the Secretary of State made it clear that the major policies set out in the withdrawal agreement, including those reached last week on citizens’ rights, Northern Ireland and the financial settlement, along with any agreement on transitional arrangements, would be implemented by means of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill and not by secondary legislation provided for by the Bill before us. So barring some unforeseen delay in the concluding of a withdrawal agreement, if the Government are not to create significant legal uncertainty following our departure with regard to the major policies covered by such an agreement, the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will have to have come into force by 29 March 2019 at the latest. My hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Chuka Umunna) covered that point.
In legal terms, any transitional arrangements agreed to could not bridge a post-exit gap, because even if some elements of the withdrawal agreement come into effect at the end of any such period, an agreement on transition itself will have had to have been given legal effect in the UK by means of the very same primary legislation, namely the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. As such, unless the Government are proposing to begin the process of implementing the withdrawal agreement and any agreed transitional arrangements immediately after the final terms of such an agreement are reached, but pre-ratification, by means of secondary legislation in this Bill—a point made earlier by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald), who is not in his place—a course of action for which there is no justification, given that the phase 1 joint report published last week sets out in black and white the intention to provide a specified period to approve the agreement and transitional arrangements in accordance with our own constitutional procedures and to prepare the statute book in accordance with that agreement, there is simply no need for the powers provided for by clause 9, including the broad power under that clause to amend the Bill itself.
As I have said, I do not think there is a need for the powers in clause 9 because secondary legislation of a similar type could be included in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Why the need for such powers? We do not think there is any justification for them. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s justification for why the clause needs to stand part of the Bill but, unless amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is passed, the Opposition will vote for the clause to be struck from the Bill.
If clause 9 remains part of the Bill at the end of the parliamentary process, its constitutional potency and scope must be highly circumscribed. I do not intend to dwell extensively on what limits should be placed on the clause 9 power because, in general, the same arguments apply as those that I set out at length in the Committee’s deliberations on clause 7 yesterday. I will say, though, that amendment 27 to clause 9, similar to our amendment 25 to clause 7, would constrain the capacity of the powers in clause 9 to reduce rights or protections.
The powers in clause 9 are different from the powers in clause 7 in a particular way: namely, the extraordinarily wide power explicitly provided for by clause 9(2) gives Ministers the power by regulation to modify—a term that clause 14 makes clear covers amendment and repeal—the Bill itself once enacted. As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) pointed out on Second Reading, there is no example throughout the history of the 20th century of a Bill that has ever sought to do that—not in time of war and not in time of civil emergency. In fact—this is a point that my hon. Friend continues to make, and should—every single emergency powers Act has specified that there should not be a power in such legislation for Ministers to alter primary legislation. We do not believe the power is justified, and amendment 30 would limit the potency of the delegated powers in clause 9 by preventing them from being used to amend or repeal the Act itself.
Let me turn briefly to the purpose, scope and limits of clause 17, which gives powers to Ministers to make any consequential provisions that they consider appropriate in consequence of the Act and to make any transitional provisions that might be needed as a result of the Bill coming into force. In contrast to our position on clause 9, we acknowledge that there is an established precedent with regard to consequential and transitional provisions, so we will not be voting against clause 17 standing part of the Bill, but it must be circumscribed.
A clause as widely drawn as clause 17—it is arguably the most widely drawn of all—set in the context of a Bill of such constitutional and legal significance that it covers almost every element of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, it could be argued, nearly every facet of our national life, means that the power to make consequential provisions under clause 17 is not as tightly limited as it might be in other pieces of legislation. As such, it inevitably throws up the possibility that the powers in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17 could be used to make changes to vast swathes of secondary and primary legislation, including legislation in this Session up to May 2019.
When he responds, the Minister will no doubt cite other statutes that provide for not dissimilar powers, but having looked closely at a fair number of them, I am not convinced that any are so widely drawn as this one, and none are contained in legislation as constitutionally significant as this Bill. The Hansard Society was right to refer to clause 17 as a “legislative blank cheque” for the Government, and the power must be restricted. Amendment 29 would achieve that aim by removing subsections (1), (2) and (3) of clause 17. If the Government believe that that is the wrong way to restrict the sweeping powers in the clause, they can of course come forward with their own suggestions, but the principle of circumscribing the powers in the clause must be accepted.
If it is concluded at all, such a deal, alongside other agreements that cover different aspects of the relationship, will have to be concluded after the UK has left the EU and the withdrawal agreement has already been ratified, as this morning’s written statement from the Secretary of State makes crystal clear. During the passage of the Bill on the triggering of article 50, the Government made a welcome concession from the Dispatch Box to the effect that both Houses would get a vote on a motion on the final draft withdrawal agreement as soon as possible after it has been reached, and before the European Parliament votes on it. The Secretary of State’s written statement, published this morning, has been spun as a further concession, but in some respects it could be read as rolling back on the earlier concession.
Will the Minister confirm that it remains the Government’s position that Parliament will get a vote on the final terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, before the European Parliament debates and votes on the final agreement? There is no reiteration of that point in the Secretary of State’s written statement. Will he also confirm that, in addition to a vote on the terms of withdrawal, Parliament will get a meaningful vote on the one or more agreements the Government hope to conclude relating to the future relationship, not merely a vote on the framework declaration as part of the article 50 process? As my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda has mentioned, the process under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would not entail a debate or vote in Parliament on the terms of the future relationship.
The Secretary of State’s written statement aside, the Government must go further and put a vote on the final terms of the UK’s withdrawal on the face of the Bill, and they must ensure that that vote is truly meaningful. We have already debated what “meaningful” means—I fear that Members are sometimes talking past each other—and there is a variety of techniques that one might use to make a vote meaningful. Nevertheless, a meaningful vote must essentially be one on whether the House approves or disapproves of the final terms or, indeed, the lack of any withdrawal agreement, and it must happen before we leave the EU. The latter is something else that today’s written statement singularly fails to mention. It cannot be a “take it or leave it” vote and, as the right hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) said, it must allow a change of approach or of drift.
That is why we tabled new clause 66, which would guarantee, by means of prescribing when exit day for the purposes of this Bill can be appointed, that both Houses have a meaningful vote on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and, just as critically, a vote in the event that no such agreement is reached and the Government are determined to take us out of the EU without a deal—a catastrophic scenario that would result in legal chaos, significant damage to our economy, the erection of a hard border in Northern Ireland and serious harm to Britain’s standing in the world. We have consistently called for the Government to make it clear that no deal is not a viable outcome.
New clause 66 would ensure that there is a vote on a motion, not just in the event of a withdrawal agreement being concluded, but, crucially, when no such deal has been concluded, should that be the case. That outcome appears less likely following the agreement the Government reached last week and the clarification that the default position in the event of no deal will be regulatory alignment, but it remains a possibility, and Parliament must have a say.
As I have said, there are many, many ways of ensuring that Parliament has a meaningful vote. Amendment 7, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), is very well drafted. I do not think that it is deficient. We would definitely support it and we would not press new clause 66 if he pressed it to a vote.
I will conclude by saying that, subject to the kind of constraint that would be put in place if amendment 7 were incorporated into the Bill, we remain of the view that the power to appoint an exit day for the purposes of the Bill should be placed in the hands of Parliament, not Ministers, and also that the flexibility inherent in clause 14 with regard to exit day should be retained, because it is essential to finalising in some scenarios a withdrawal agreement and any transitional arrangements that need to be agreed to. We need only look at the mess last week to justify the need for such flexibility. As such, we believe that amendments 381 and 382 tabled by the Government with the aim of putting a specified exit date, and indeed time, in the Bill are an ill-conceived and unnecessary gimmick and on that basis we intend to oppose them if they are pushed to a vote.
This whole debate is about whether right hon. and hon. Members are content for Parliament to be a spectator, a passive observer, of one of the most important decisions that has faced our country in generations. Parliament must have a grip on the process, which is why we have tabled our amendments and new clauses.
In speaking to amendment 7, in the name of my hon. Friends, myself and other hon. Members, I am conscious that it has taken on a life of its own. When the Committee stage of the Bill started, it was my intention—and I hope one that I have observed and honoured throughout—to try to approach the amendments that I tabled in the spirit in which they are intended, which is to try to improve difficult legislation while entirely recognising the many challenges that the Government face. Brexit is full of risk and full of complexity—legal and otherwise—and the Government are entitled to my support, wherever possible, to carry Brexit out as smoothly as they can and with the least impact on the well-being of the citizens of our country. That has been my aim throughout.
I very much regret that—as often tends to happen in these matters—while some sessions in Committee have led to sensible amendment and the Government considering matters, or going away to look again and making some helpful suggestions, in the case of amendment 7 we seem to have run out of road. What happens in those circumstances, I regret to say, is that all rational discourse starts to evaporate. The purpose of the amendment, the nature of it, is entirely lost in a confrontation in which it is suggested that the underlying purpose is the sabotage of the will of the people, which it most manifestly is not. That is then followed by a hurling of public abuse; large numbers of people telling one that one is a traitor; and, I regret to say, some of one’s hon. and right hon. Friends saying slightly startling things. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), for example, said that I am grandstanding, when I do not remember ever having suggested such a thing to him about the way that he has expressed his views on Europe at any time in his career—including, I might add, when I tried to be a loyal member of his team when he was leader of my own party.
The consequence is that we completely lose sight of what the key issues are, and if I may say so before I move on, that matters a lot, because in the course of this, we also lose sight of the fact that we are the Parliament of a deeply divided country on this issue. When I go and lecture to sixth-formers occasionally and talk to them, I point out that the parliamentary process is not just about the imposition of the will of the majority on the minority; it is the process by which we obtain consent for what the majority chooses to do.
The difficulty with this referendum is that, having invoked the public will, which, I regret to say, is not entirely tempered in its expressions of view by some of the courtesies that we extend to each other here, we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that 48% of the electorate did not wish for the policy that we are currently pursuing and have deep concerns about, not trying to reverse it, but the extent to which it will have an adverse impact on their well-being, and request us as a Parliament to pay as much attention to what they are saying as we undoubtedly have to do to those who voted in the referendum and said that they wanted to leave. The most worrying aspect of the debate, as it has progressed, is how we become polarised and so fixated on ends that we fail completely to look at means. We look at the top of the mountain, but not at where we are going to put our foot next. As a consequence, we run serious risks of badly letting them down—all of them, collectively—by enacting bad legislation and taking very foolish decisions.
Of course, when this confrontation comes along, the negotiations immediately stop, the conversation ceases, the Government’s steamroller is invoked, and the atmosphere can suddenly get really quite unpleasant; and I regret it. As a consequence—I will come back to this in a moment—I have to tell my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that I think they have lost a series of opportunities in the dialogue we have had on this to come to a sensible outcome. With that, I turn to the issue that is, in truth, under debate.
As was rightly said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), the Government had a notion when this debate started that it was possible to pull out of the European Union by use of the royal prerogative. Fortunately, time, common sense, debate and a small amount of judicial intervention has pointed out that that is not possible. As a consequence, my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench have correctly begun to understand that in fact there has to be a proper process. I appreciate the points that have been made about a meaningful vote and how we can actually get that in the context of Brexit; it is a real, live issue. Nevertheless, I greatly welcome the written ministerial statement, which sets out what appears to be a constitutionally tenable process for Parliament approving or considering the deal by motion, and then moving on to implement the deal by primary legislation.
Of course, the Government know that they must proceed by primary legislation because, in view of the comments during the Miller case, it is blindingly apparent that there must be a serious risk of legal uncertainty if anything other than a statute were to be used to take us out of the EU at the end. That is the last thing that my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench should want, because that will cause even more trouble and difficulty than they already have in the challenges they have to face.
As the Government’s position has shifted, they have come up with a written ministerial statement, which seems accurately to reflect the right direction of travel. But the difficulty is that clause 9 is entirely incompatible with what the Government have set out.
The reality is that clause 9 is incompatible with the programme that the Government have set out. At the time that clause 9 was inserted, I think that the Government had not yet fully worked out the implications of how withdrawal had to take place.
My point brings me to the specifics of clause 9, which is an extraordinary and wide power to remove us from the EU by statutory instrument, and moreover—this is the most telling point—to ask the House to give the Government effectively a blank cheque to draft statutory instruments to achieve something when at the moment we do not know what that is.
Ultimately, the centre of this point is that we are being asked to give the Government a power that can be exercised on something, but we do not know what that something is. Logically, the moment to make the statutory instruments to enact our withdrawal would come when we have this further statute—whatever it happens to be called—and have debated it in this House. We will then have structured the powers conferred by statutory instrument to achieve what Parliament wants and thinks is necessary to carry out withdrawal. That is the point, and pre-empting matters in this fashion is odd. Indeed, it is so odd that I heard one Minister—I will not reveal who—informally saying that they questioned whether the clause 9 power was in fact still needed, in view of how the Government were progressing this matter.
On my key issue and what I was trying to tease out in tabling amendment 7, I could, I suppose, have simply said that I will not support clause 9. Indeed, if my amendment is not accepted, I am afraid I shall be voting against clause 9 this evening—I have no option—but rather than do that, the purpose of my amendment is to try to explore what it is that the Government want clause 9 to do that, in fact, we should not be doing when we enact the legislation at the end.
It is for the Government, in those circumstances, to explain themselves; it is not for Parliament simply to roll over and accept something because the Government say that that is what we should do. Indeed, if we all get told that we must support the Government out of loyalty because to do otherwise would undermine the Prime Minister—I think that is cuckoo, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—we need to know why.
Last week, I engaged in a whole series of dialogues with the Government, trying to understand what was bothering them. At one point, I thought we might be getting to the point where we would reach an agreement that some power might be needed in the Bill before we came to the final Bill, although I will come back to that in a moment. It started to dawn on me that one possibility was that this power might be exercisable, but only provided it could not be used to bring anything into force—we might lay some statutory instruments, but they could not be brought into force in any way until the end statute had been passed.
That is where I thought we might be—and then everything closed down, and I am none the wiser why the Government need this power, except that I note that a journalist who seemed to have been speaking to a briefing was told it might be required to effect the registration of EU citizens. I thought to myself, “I thought we were going to have an immigration Act to do that.” So I am still at this moment—this afternoon—absolutely at sea about why this power is needed. If the Government cannot make a case for this power, it should not be here.
Even at this stage, I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, if they accept this amendment, which is absolutely central and necessary to ensuring that a power of this scope cannot be abused in a way that the House should not tolerate, and if they want to come back on Report and tidy it up because there is some adjustment or some caveat they want to put in, I will of course listen to what they want to say—my job is not to make their lives more difficult—but I am not prepared to sign away such an extensive power, when it appears to be contrary to the Government’s stated policy on how Brexit will be carried out and, in fact, surrenders without any good reason the control of this House over how the Government conduct Brexit.
I want to bring my remarks to an end, and I simply say that I do want the Government to listen. The opportunity is here for them to accept the amendment and then to come back on Report and explain themselves further or to tidy the amendment up, and I will listen and try constructively to help them if, indeed, any of this power is needed, but I am not prepared to sign off clause 9 in its present form.
The one merit of amendment 7—I tailored it very carefully and I tried quite deliberately to avoid the no-deal scenario, which is a very legitimate issue, but it is not what I went for—is that I wanted to make sure that these powers could not be used to pre-empt a statute that we should probably be considering this time next year. It is plainly wrong, and if it is to be departed from, the Government have to provide a credible reason for it.
We have heard the argument, “We’re going to run out of time in leaving the EU.” I simply repeat what I have said previously. I realise that this is hugely objected to by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends because they are so fixated on getting us out. The article 50 mechanism provides for a sensible structure to enable us to leave smoothly, yet for reasons that I do not understand, the aim of some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seems to be to mess it up as much as possible. There is the famous amendment 381, for example, which we are going to come back to next week and which I have already indicated I will not support under any circumstances whatsoever. If we actually stick to a sensible process, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), then we will get the right answers. As I say, if the Government are to justify keeping clause 9, they have to provide us with chapter and verse—and they simply have not done so. I have asked, and I have not had it.
In those circumstances, the only proper course of action—I say this with the greatest reluctance—is that I am going to have to vote for my amendment, and, if necessary, if it is not passed, I will vote against clause 9, because without my amendment, clause 9 becomes a really very worrying tool of Executive power that does not appear to have any reasonable presence in this legislation. Apart from on HS2, I do not think that I have ever rebelled against the Government in my 20 and a half years in this House. I do find it quite entertaining that some who criticise me for speaking my mind on this matter are individuals who appear to have exercised the luxury of rebellion on many, many occasions. But that said, there is a time for everybody to stand up and be counted. As Churchill said, “He is good party man—he puts the party before himself and the country before his party.” And that is what I intend to do.
We are debating the single most important question in the Bill: how the House can exercise its view on the withdrawal agreement in a way that gives us control. “Control”—there is a word we have heard before. It resonated throughout the referendum campaign, but when Members start to argue that Parliament should have some control over this process, it seems to send shivers down Ministers’ spines.
Amendment 47 arises from an exchange that I had with the Secretary of State on Second Reading. When I asked him to give us a very simple assurance that clause 9 will not be used to implement the withdrawal agreement until Parliament has had the opportunity to vote on it, he replied:
“It seems to me to be logical”.—[Official Report, 7 September 2017; Vol. 628, c. 354.]
What has been set out in today’s written ministerial statement appears to give that undertaking, but if that is what Ministers are prepared to do, why not put that into the Bill? I similarly welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement that there will be separate legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement, but if Ministers are prepared to give that commitment, we want to see that in the Bill, too, which is why I shall vote for amendment 7.
The question has been asked—I want to ask it, too, because it has exercised the Select Committee—“What is clause 9 now for?” It is a very simple question indeed. Timing and the order in which these things are done are absolutely crucial in this debate, and that point was made forensically and forcefully by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield. May I suggest a new principle? We often heard it said during reports back from the negotiations that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so I suggest that we agree that nothing should be implemented until everything is agreed.
The written ministerial statement says something interesting, and rather puzzling:
“The Bill will implement the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement in UK law…Similarly, we expect any steps taken through secondary legislation to implement any part of the Withdrawal Agreement will only be operational from the moment of exit, though preparatory provisions may be necessary in certain cases.”
My simple question for Ministers is this: secondary legislation where, and arising from what? Does this refer to clause 9, which a lot of Members think should no longer be in the Bill, or is it advance notification that there will be provision for secondary legislation under the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill that we have been promised? We need some clarification.
My hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), who spoke so ably from the Front Bench, drew attention to the statement by the Secretary of State on 13 November in which he said, in announcing that Bill:
“This confirms that the major policies set out in the withdrawal agreement will be directly implemented into UK law by primary legislation”.—[Official Report, 13 November 2017; Vol. 631, c. 37.]
That is very interesting. I must confess that I did not understand the full significance at the time, so will Ministers also enlighten us on this? What are the major policies and what are the minor policies, and in which Bill, and by what means, will those minor policies be implemented?
The next issue of timing is the idea that exit day should be set as 11 o’clock in the evening of 29 March 2019. The Government amendment to implement that proposal would cause all sorts of trouble, not least because of the way that this Bill was originally drafted, as the Select Committee heard in evidence from Ministers, who confirmed that they would be able to set different exit days for different purposes. The Committee thought that that seemed to provide a great deal of flexibility, but the amendment would bring that possibility to an end, and in the process bind the Government’s hands to an hour of the clock on a day at the very moment when they may well need maximum flexibility so that they can bring the negotiations successfully to an end. The amendment really makes no sense.
As the Committee said in its report, the proposal would cause “significant difficulties” if the negotiations went down to the wire. Of course, we had the famous evidence from the Secretary of State in which he suggested that the negotiations might go to the 59th minute of the 11th hour, although since then there has been a certain amount of rowing back, because that would not be consistent with the pledge that we have been given. That was why the Committee said that it would not be acceptable for Parliament to be asked to vote after we had actually left the European Union. The timing of all this is absolutely fundamental to making the vote meaningful. A vote may be meaningless unless at some point in the procedure the timing ensures that it is meaningful. We have to get the order right.
Michel Barnier said at the start of the process that he wanted to bring the negotiations to an end next October. We have 11 months to go to deal with a very long list of issues that we have not even started to broach. The agreement that was reached last week, which we welcome, is the easy bit of this negotiation—the really difficult bit is about to begin. Those who had thought that leaving the European Union would be about keeping all the things they liked and getting rid of all the things they did not like are now in for a rude awakening as they come to realise that choices have consequences and trade-offs will need to be made.
Another point I want to make—I am conscious, Sir David, of what you said about the time—is that Ministers need to understand why they are having such difficulty with this fundamental debate on the Bill. It has to do with the history of the Government’s handling of the whole process. At every single stage, this House has had to demand our role and our voice. I remember the answer when people first asked what the Government’s negotiating objectives were: “Brexit means Brexit.” When a follow-up question was asked, we were told—
The second answer was, “No running commentary,” but that eventually had to give way to the Lancaster House speech and a White Paper. Then we asked, “Will Parliament get a vote?” Almost exactly a year ago, when the Prime Minister last appeared before the Liaison Committee, I asked her that question. She was unwilling to give me a commitment on that occasion, but we all pressed, and in the end the Government conceded that there would be a vote.
We argued that there would need to be separate primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement, but what did the Government do? They produced this Bill, which says, “No, no. We’ll just do it all by statutory instrument.” That was until amendment 7 appeared on the horizon, at which point the Government changed their mind. If the Committee insists, as I hope it will, on amendment 7 later today, that will be because of our experience of the Government’s handling of the Bill so far. They have not acted in the spirit of seeking consensus, even though the Prime Minister said earlier that that was what she wanted to achieve.
The final point I want to make is simply this. Parliament has no intention of being a bystander in this process. We intend to be a participant, as I have said on a number of occasions, because this decision affects every part of the country, every business and every family. Today’s debate and vote are all about control, which must ultimately rest not in Ministers’ hands but in our hands. It is up to us to make sure that that happens.
I want to start by talking about the speech made by the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), who was characteristically good-humoured and articulate, and the fine speech from the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook). I will then turn to amendment 7 and the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). They all brought the cat out of the bag very well. As I will explain in a moment, I distinguish between what the Opposition are after and what my right hon. and learned Friend is after.
The right hon. Member for Leeds Central and the Opposition spokesman in effect said this. The House of Commons voted by a vast majority for a referendum, the people by a narrow majority voted to leave and the House of Commons voted by a vast majority to trigger article 50, which says:
“The Treaties shall cease to apply…from the date of…the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification”.
That has been accurately described by some on the EU side of the negotiations as an inevitable process to leaving, but the Opposition say that the House should be capable of telling the Government that they must seek to reverse the process by seeking—not necessarily by obtaining, because we cannot guarantee that they would obtain—
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless”—
I repeat, unless—
“the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”
That is exactly the point. If we are close to a deal but, for example, struggling to get the last vote through the European Parliament, the 28 countries may wish to take a little more time.
There therefore can arise circumstances in which the choice, in the end, is between accepting leaving with no deal and not accepting leaving. I continue to believe—it is important that there is honesty on this point—that Opposition Members are essentially arguing that this House should have the ability to derail the process.
We then come to the nub of what happens if there is no time anymore because the Government cannot get a renegotiation and cannot get an agreement—a further prolongation—of the kind that my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford describes. The question arises of whether Opposition Front Benchers are recommending, in those circumstances, that leaving without a deal is the possibility it needs to be for article 50 and the referendum to be respected. That is a crunch question that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich cannot avoid.
The right hon. Gentleman said that there is a possibility, on the basis of the Government’s commitment to a motion, to send them back to renegotiate, but that is not what his Secretary of State says. The Secretary of State says of the motion it is an up/down deal, and that a no vote would be the end of it—leaving without an agreement; not going back to the negotiating table.
In turning to amendment 7, let me start by saying something on a personal level. I have been in the House for exactly the same length of time as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield—I think we entered it on the same day, as it happens—and I have served with him in a number of capacities both in opposition and in government, and I have the highest personal regard for him. I have invariably found that when he says something he means it, and I have never found him to be one of those who plays games. Moreover, although I profoundly disagree with him about his amendment, for reasons that I will put forward, I think his motives in producing it are totally honourable and straightforward, and deserve the respect of everyone in the House of whatever persuasion they may be.
There is a reason, however, why I think the amendment is a very bad one. I want to expose an extremely important point about it, which began to come out in the remarks of my right hon. and learned Friend and others. It would not have the effect that the right hon. Member for Leeds Central or the Opposition spokesman seek: it would not actually make it impossible to continue the article 50 process and leave without an agreement. There may be some Members on either side of the House who are tempted to vote for amendment 7 on the basis that it would have such an effect, but it plainly would not.
What amendment 7 would prevent is the issuing of orders under this Bill until another Bill that the Government intend to bring forward has been enacted. If it was agreed and we had not been able to pass the withdrawal and implementation Bill, it might in certain circumstances create the inconvenience of our not being able to issue orders to implement a withdrawal agreement to which the Government had signed up. However, not being able to implement the provisions of an agreement in domestic law does not prevent us from signing and ratifying the agreement and does not prevent us from leaving the European Union. Anybody on either side of the House who imagines that amendment 7 would have the effect of creating what the right hon. Member for Leeds Central called a meaningful vote is under a severe logical illusion. It would do no such thing. The Opposition have tabled, I think, a new clause that would have the effect of giving that power to Parliament, but amendment 7 would not do it.
It is a very odd situation indeed to have an amendment to what will become a section of an Act that refers to another piece of primary legislation as the basis for an order-making power in the first piece of legislation. In fact I think it is virtually unprecedented.
As a matter of fact, I rather share my right hon. and learned Friend’s inclination to believe that clause 9 in its present form came forward before the Government were clear about the need for the implementation and withdrawal Bill, and that Ministers and officials have so far been quite hard pressed to identify exactly which powers are required in clause 9 under the new dispensation of that forthcoming Bill. The Government therefore have a good opportunity to promise from the Dispatch Box today that they will come back on Report with an amendment that is correctly phrased in such a way as to limit the order-making power in clause 9. That would avoid the possibility—this is the point that I want to make to my right hon. and learned Friend and other hon. Friends—of suggesting that we are in any way creating a launch pad for the efforts of the right hon. Member for Leeds Central and Opposition Front Benchers to create what they call a meaningful vote, which is in fact an ability to trigger us not leaving.
My right hon. Friend’s main point does not find favour with me, because the only way we will get something sensible on Report is by getting amendment 7 on the statute book and on the face of the Bill. I asked repeatedly for an engagement along precisely the lines that my right hon. Friend has identified, and it was consistently rejected. That is why I will vote for amendment 7, and if I may say so, I would encourage him to do likewise.
I really feel that I have come to the end of my remarks. I apologise, Sir David, that I am long past time. I hope you will accept that it is because I was answering points from other Members.
On the issue of having a vote that is meaningful, if the only option we have is the deal that comes back or no deal, frankly, that is Hobson’s choice. What should have been happening is what the Prime Minister categorically refused: a running commentary. Other Governments in Europe have sent people back to the negotiating table to try to make changes when legislation has been enacted. It is important that we remember the paucity of the debate running up to June 2016. We did not explore all the impacts. There was one debate in this Chamber on the EU and the economy. There was no debate in this Chamber on the health or social impacts, or on the loss of rights and opportunities. We did not have that. We did not air these issues—it is like having the Brexit debate now.
I want to speak to amendment 143, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), which looks for a signed agreement to protect EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU.
I also wish to speak to amendment 241, which stands in my name and those of my colleagues, and which would preserve reciprocal healthcare and social security rights under the social security co-ordination regulations 883/2004 and 987/200, and to amendments 270 and 271, which stand in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and which would prevent the Executive from using clauses 8 and 9 to reduce the rights of EU citizens in this country.
There was supposedly a breakthrough last week. The phase 1 agreement having been achieved, some level of agreement was meant to be fixed, but unfortunately it was then unpicked on “The Andrew Marr Show”. Moreover, we are still hearing the phrase, “No deal is better than a bad deal”, which completely undermines the agreement made last week. I make this plea: having reached a phase 1 agreement on citizens’ rights, this issue should now be taken out of the negotiations and a deal to give them security should be brought forward in the upcoming immigration Bill, and not left another year for the withdrawal agreement Bill.
It has been a year and a half already. Many Members know that my husband is German. There are many people here with EU spouses. We have friends who have been in extreme anxiety and uncertainty for a year and a half. This is not happening in March 2019; it is happening now. Ten thousand EU nationals have left the four NHSs because their children are being bullied and they feel insecure. They are going home “to be safe”. That is an appalling indictment of the current situation.
To exercise the right to live anywhere, access to healthcare and social security is crucial. It has made such a difference, not just to EU nationals here, but to our pensioners who have settled in the sunny uplands of the northern Mediterranean. What position will they be in if they cannot access healthcare? We must recognise that freedom of movement was not a one-way street; our young people and professionals have been able to take advantage of it for the past 40 years. We are taking that away from the next generation, which is something that I find terrible.
The Government say, and it is in the phase 1 agreement, that they accept keeping regulations 883 and 987, so let us bring that in. Let us get that down on paper and get it passed, because saying to EU nationals, “You’re welcome to stay, but there might be no deal, which means you’ll have no legal standing and you won’t be able to use the NHS,” is no use to anyone.
With an airport and the northern air traffic control in my constituency, naturally I support amendments 245 and 246, on staying in the single European sky agreement, which is the reform of airspace, and the European common aviation agreement, which is what allowed the budget airlines to literally take off and people to travel cheaply. However, the European Aviation Safety Agency is also important, and that is a body of the EU and EFTA. It is important to recognise that there are things we can be in, there are things we cannot be in, and we lose these because we seem to have negotiated with ourselves to move to a hard Brexit instead of a soft Brexit. People here are saying , “Oh yes, this was all aired in the debate.” I remember hearing leavers saying, “Of course we won’t leave the single market. Don’t be ridiculous.” Yet that is the plan and that is where we are heading at the moment.
“failing to establish in advance what questions should be asked. Of utterly disdaining an alternative, unifying vision while obsessing about trade, blue passports and colonial nostalgia.”—[Interruption.]
There are multiple agencies that are important for the nations across the UK, but my particular interest is of course health. We know that the European Medicines Agency is moving to Amsterdam, but the much bigger issue is the UK coming out of the European Medicines Agency. This is a body that has massively reduced bureaucracy, streamlined the launch of new drugs and meant that the pharmaceutical industry has to go through only one registration process for 500 million people. That is why drugs are launched in Europe at much the same time as America and about a year before Canada and Australia. Given some of what is going on in NHS England—including the budget impact assessment, which can allow expensive drugs to be delayed for three years—what I am hearing from those in the pharmaceutical industry is that they see the UK as a hostile market and that they may not come six months later or a year later. It may take longer than that because they only see the point in paying the extra cost to register when they have a chance of their drug being used in the NHS.
The EMA also leads on research, especially on rare and paediatric diseases. It simply is not possible for a single country to carry out such research. My amendment 351 is intended to ensure that we continue to participate in clinical trials under the clinical trials regulation that will come into effect in April, and maintaining standards of data protection is crucial to that. If we rush into a race to the bottom, we will end up as pariahs and we will simply not be able to co-operate with others.
I support amendment 300, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Wantage (Mr Vaizey) and which concerns Euratom, but I want to clear up one point. The issue of access to a secure supply of medical radioisotopes was raised by the Royal College of Radiologists, but was dismissed by the Government because the isotopes are non-fissile. It is true that they are non-fissile, but we had a catastrophic shortage between 2008 and 2010 as a result of which I, as a breast cancer surgeon, could not carry out my bone scans. The new technique of sentinel node biopsy which was being rolled out had to be delayed and stalled, and I would have to choose which of my patients might have access to the one dose of technetium that we had to do a bone scan. That is why the Euratom Supply Agency set up the European Observatory on the Supply of Medical Isotopes, and it managed the situation.
We face real challenges in the coming years. The reactors that produce molybdenum, from which we get technetium, are not in the UK. We do not produce any of that stuff, and we do not yet have a replacement technique as those reactors go offline. It is important for the Government to realise that, if we are not part of the observatory, if we are not participators, the Euratom Supply Agency will have no obligation to us. It might help us, but we will be at the back of the queue, and that will affect patients.
New clause 44, tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), calls for an assessment of the impact of Brexit on health and social care and on workforces, especially social care workers. The percentage of EU nationals working in social care is even higher than the percentage in the NHS, but they will not qualify for tier 2-type visas. They are often not highly paid, but we rely on them utterly.
Staying in the single market and the customs union would solve all our problems, including the problem of the Irish border, but consideration of that is still being ruled out. I call on the Government to step back from creating all these difficulties, and reconsider the possibility of our staying in the single market and the customs union. The EU is not just about trade; it is also about rights and opportunities, and about co-operation.
I am very grateful, Sir David, for the chance to speak in this important debate. It has been extraordinarily interesting and, actually, enjoyable. I want to make a brief detour on amendment 7, because the dialogue between my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) was absolutely terrific. Listening to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset took me back—to a certain extent—to meetings that I had with him when I was a Minister. You could not go in and order a cup of coffee without engaging in a two-hour debate about exactly what was meant.
In the end, however, the answer emerged, and it emerged in this exchange. Notwithstanding all the technical debate, it is extremely simple. Clause 9 was written before the Government realised that they would have to put the withdrawal agreement into a statute, and now that they have to put it into a statute, both clause 9 and, potentially, amendment 7 have reached their sell-by date. The offer from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset is serious and real: to come back, effectively, with a rewritten clause 9 which tells Parliament exactly what the Government need to do as we implement the withdrawal agreement in legislation. Do they need some powers—I could understand that—to do some things that are essential preparatory work? I thought my point was good enough to stimulate—
I shall end this section of the speech with some unashamed flattery, as I look at the triumvirate of titans on the Treasury Front Bench: three Ministers for whom I have the utmost admiration, including my constituency neighbour, the Solicitor General, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Swindon (Robert Buckland). They have heard this debate, and they are thoughtful and effective Ministers and I am sure they will have taken the mood at least from a certain part of this House about the brilliant opportunity for a solution to this Gordian knot.
The second part of my remarks, which will be as brief as possible because so much time has been taken up, is about amendment 300, standing in my name, which has the largest number of signatories of any amendment to this Bill. I am astonished that only four of them are Conservatives, but I think that reflects the standing in which I am held in my own party; I could not even persuade the leader of the rebel alliance, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, to sign my Euratom amendment, and I really do not want my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset to talk about bad law when he comes to look at it.
The point of the amendment is simply to put the issue of Euratom under parliamentary scrutiny, and I note the comments made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) in her excellent speech about the importance of Euratom in our medical life, and her own real experience at the chalkface in her extraordinary work. So Euratom is not an esoteric issue; it affects us all. It has been debated in the House before and I shall not spend a lot of time talking about how extraordinarily successful our nuclear industry is. My own personal interest comes from the fact that although Culham is not in my constituency, many of my constituents work there, and it depends on Euratom. I thank the Government for last week’s announcement of £86 million of investment in Culham for two new centres of excellence for the testing of components and for fuel storage; that is a real vote of confidence in Culham.
The point, of course, about Euratom is that nobody voted to leave it. Euratom was not in the European Union Referendum Act 2015, and was not on the ballot; it falls under a separate treaty. So the British people did not have a chance to have a referendum on our membership of Euratom.
The reason we are leaving Euratom is technical. Legal advice, which we have not seen, deems Euratom to be inextricably linked to the European Union and therefore an article 50 notice would be defective if it did not include Euratom. However, the mood of the Government and, I think, the House is that we are leaving Euratom on a technicality, not because we object to being governed by Euratom. There is no mood among the general population to leave Euratom as far as I am aware, and I think that only one hon. Member has managed to stand up and say that there is a plausible reason to leave it.
Euratom covers not only objects but the freedom of movement of people. We depend on our membership of Euratom for a nuclear power industry, for our medical industry—isotopes have been mentioned—and for the Joint European Torus at Culham, where Britain has done extraordinarily well. Huge advantages have been made in robotics and other sciences, and there are £500 million-worth of contracts already in ITER, the successor to Culham, thanks to the expertise we have built up here.
Let me make it clear that, throughout this process of our technical move to leave Euratom, Ministers have been absolutely brilliant in engaging with me and other hon. Members who share my concerns and have similar interests. They have bent over backwards to do what they can to accommodate our concerns. Looking forward, we need Ministers to give us clarity on a number of issues. We need nuclear co-operation agreements with other countries—the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan and possibly the European Union as well—and they need to be in place by March 2019. These agreements can be complex, and they can depend on the legislation in other legislatures. For example, the US Congress would have to pass a new nuclear co-operation agreement with us. We will also need a new safeguards regime, and this will come in through the Nuclear Safeguards Bill as a contingency, although I understand that the Government might want Euratom to continue to cover the safeguarding role.
We need clarity on the nuclear co-operation agreements, clarity on the safeguarding regime and who will conduct it, and clarity on whether we will reach International Atomic Energy Agency standards, which the ONR is currently aiming for as a realistic target—Euratom’s standards are higher. We also need free movement of nuclear workers in the broadest sense, and I am not talking about nuclear scientists; I mean the people who actually build nuclear power stations. For example, I think the UK has 2,700 registered steel fixers, half of which will be needed to build Hinkley Point C. That kind of specialist construction worker will come under the category of nuclear workers. As for the future of our continued international co-operation, a particularly live issue at the moment is the extension of funding for the Joint European Torus, which is currently going through the Council for the fiscal years 2019-20, and the European Union is keen to get clarity from the Government on our intentions.
The amendment’s purpose is to provide parliamentary scrutiny of the important process of replicating the effect of a treaty that nobody wanted to leave. My challenge to Ministers is to engage with the amendment, and I look forward to hearing from the Dispatch Box whether the amendment is acceptable or whether they have an alternative way of providing the House with a strategy. On that note, after 14 minutes, I will sit down.
The British way in parliamentary matters has always been that we govern by consent, not by Government fiat, so Parliament should never be conceived of by a Government as an inconvenience that has to be avoided if possible. Parliament should be seen as an essential part of how we carry the whole nation with us. The Government should have more strength in Parliament than they do if they try to circumvent Parliament.
Getting the process right, as several hon. Members have already said, is absolutely essential. We are going to be deciding what many assume will be a long-term settlement for this country for generations to come. We cannot simply try to go ahead with a railroaded version of that settlement that only carries 52% of the country, or perhaps even less by then—who knows?—because we will in the end undermine the very institutions that people have been trying to say should be sovereign. I say to the Government that no amount of jiggery-pokery will sort things out. At the end of the day, parliamentary shenanigans will do far more harm to this country’s political institutions than we should countenance.
The Government already have phenomenal power and—I have used this figure before, but it is true—this is the first time in our history that more than half of Government Members are now either Ministers, trade envoys or Parliamentary Private Secretaries and are beholden unto the Government in some way or other. We have more Ministers than Italy, France and Germany put together, so the Government’s hold on Parliament in our system is already phenomenal, yet they have introduced clause 9, which is truly exceptional. I have tabled several amendments, which I will not address because I do not think there is any great point. The honest truth is that I would prefer to see the whole clause out of the Bill.
The moment I saw clause 9, I thought, “If there is a real reason for this, surely by now the Government would have argued why they have to have these powers.” Now the Government say a Bill will be introduced on the agreement and its implementation. If there really is a need for those powers, clause 9 should be in that Bill and not in this Bill at all.
I love all four of the Ministers sitting on the Government Front Bench to death, and obviously the safest thing to do today is for one of them to stand up—they could stand up one after another, as in “Spartacus”—and say, “We will not support this. We will not urge the Committee to consider taking on this clause as part of the Bill, because we know we do not really need it.”
People might ask, “If the Government do not really need clause 9, why does it matter if the clause is in the Bill at all?” The problem is that every single Government in the history of the world have always used every power they have to the umpteenth degree. It is a temptation, and we should take temptation out of the Government’s hands if they are not prepared to take it out of their own hands. Let us bear in mind that the Bill will allow the Government to change the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts. [Interruption.] The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice is standing up! Oh, he’s not.
Admittedly, changes to the Parliament Acts and the Representation of the People Acts by secondary legislation would have to be made via the affirmative process and there would be a vote in both Houses.
“for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement”.
It is hard to see how that could change the Representation of the People Acts. The hon. Gentleman slightly overstates his case.
A doubting Thomas is a good man, but he should follow through on his doubts. I hope that means the hon. Gentleman will be joining us in the Lobby tonight, although I have a sneaking suspicion the smile that just crept across his face indicates that he has no intention of doing so.
There has been much talk about what is a meaningful vote. I read theology at university. My theology professor, John Macquarrie, was a wonderful man who had a rather strange half-American, half-Scottish accent. He was asked by a student, “What is the meaning of God?” And he answered, “You should not ask me, ‘What is the meaning of God?’ You should ask me, ‘What is the meaning of meaning?’” That is the kind of existential debate we are having today.
What does it mean to have a meaningful vote? First, I would say that the vote cannot simply be on a fait accompli. It is not meaningful to vote on something after it has already happened and it has already been decided. It cannot just be a vote on a treaty because, as I have already tried to explain, the provisions on treaties in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 state that the Government do not have to provide for a vote on treaties, because it is not an affirmative process. They merely state that, if the House says within 21 sitting days that the treaty should not be agreed, the Government have to have another go, if they want to. That is a problematic process for us.
In addition, a treaty is unamendable. One thing everybody has been arguing in this debate is that we need to be able to send the Government back to negotiate again if we think the deal is not good enough. This cannot be simply be on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. That is what Hobson, the 17th century stable owner said: “You can either take the horse closest to the door or you will not take a horse at all.” It is like Henry Ford’s saying:
“Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so long as it is black.”
My fear is that the Prime Minister will want to be a stable owner trying to persuade everybody to take the horse closest to the door, and I do not believe that will be a meaningful vote.
“God is working his purpose out, as year succeeds to year”
The Government are trying to work out what their purpose is, day by day, hour by hour. They have no idea at the moment, which is why we have to make sure we get the process right before we engage in it; otherwise there is a danger that we will be railroaded without making proper, good decisions.
All too often, the Government have urged us to accept clause 9 and the related measures on the basis of trust alone. As has already been said, it is just too difficult to see how we can put that trust in their hands. For a start, they have systematically ignored resolutions of the House over the past seven years; they have regularly refused to allow annulment debates on statutory instruments so that they could be meaningful—they have refused to do that even when they have guaranteed at the Dispatch Box that they were going to do so; and they have insisted on having majorities on all Committees. I fear that if we allow the Government to have excessive powers, they will tend to use every single one of those powers. The truth is that they seem to want a carte blanche.
I wish the Government welcomed the role of Parliament in this process, but I just do not detect that. The devil will be in the detail. The Government cannot just bamboozle the people with verbiage that has absolutely no meaning whatsoever: “Brexit means Brexit”, “a red, white and blue Brexit”, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, and all the rest of it. It is a denigration of the English language, let alone anything else.
What we actually need is a Bill, with words in it that have legal effect, because, in the end, this is an existential matter for Parliament. Are we really a sovereign Parliament if we surrender our power to the Government? Not really. Are we really a representative democracy if MPs are denied a truly meaningful role in the process? Not really. Are we really a United Kingdom Parliament if we carry only 52% of the country with us? Not really.
It may be helpful to hon. Members who want to intervene to know that I will first explain the function of clause 9 and why it is necessary, and then set out some of the illustrations that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) suggested were required. I will come on to talk about the limits, and then I will address the amendments, including amendment 7, which was tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). The key issue will come down to timing, so I will also touch on that, but first, let me set the scene.
Clause 9 highlights the interaction between diplomacy at the international level and the domestic legislative preparation for Brexit. The Government are committed to securing the best deal that we can with our EU partners for the whole United Kingdom against the very acute time pressure set out under the article 50 process imposed on us.
Clause 9 enables regulations to be made for the purposes of implementing the withdrawal agreement. It is now, as hon. Members have said, a supplementary provision to give us agility in the negotiations and the flexibility of legislative procedure to deliver the best deal under time pressure. The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union announced to this House on 13 November the Government’s intention to bring forward new primary legislation in the form of the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill to give effect to the major elements of the withdrawal agreement. That will include citizens’ rights, the implementation period, the financial settlement and the other issues wrapped up within the exit negotiations.
I am not sure whether every hon. Member has had a chance to read the written ministerial statement that was published today—it is entitled “Procedures for the Approval and Implementation of EU Exit Agreements”—but it is worth taking a look at it with regard to some of the concerns that have been expressed. We intend to introduce the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill after there has been a successful vote on the final deal in Parliament. Notwithstanding that, it remains essential that clause 9 stands part of this Bill. We do not yet know the precise shape or outcome of future negotiations, and it is important that the necessary legislative mechanisms are available to us so that we fully implement the withdrawal agreement in time for the exit date.
There will be a wide range of more technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for our exit on 29 March 2019. Some will be better suited to secondary legislation, and it would not be practical to account for the sheer volume of all these issues in primary legislation. It is of course not uncommon for the principles of an international agreement to be implemented, at least to some degree, through secondary legislation. To give just one example, the Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damage) Order 2016 implements the 2004 protocol to the convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy.
As for how we implement such secondary legislation, clause 9—this is the crux—offers a material benefit in terms of timing. We would be able to start—not complete—laying some of the statutory instruments soon after reaching agreement with our EU friends alongside the passage of new primary legislation. It is impossible to say with 100% precision at this point all the technical regulations that will be required to implement the withdrawal agreement before the full terms have been negotiated. That is obvious, and is accepted by Members on both sides of the House. However, some regulations might be required, and some will require a lead time of several months, so we need to reserve the ability to use clause 9 as soon as practically possible after a deal has been concluded. If we waited for further primary legislation to receive Royal Assent, that might be too late and we could be too squeezed for time, even in the scenario in which we reach an agreement in October, as is our current aim.
Clause 9 is not intended to be used to implement major elements of the withdrawal agreement. Its role will be to assist with making regulations to deal with the more technical separation issues that are better suited to secondary legislation. There will be a large number of such regulations and they will need to be in place in time for exit day.
I will address the point raised by the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, because I think he was on to something regarding the need to spell out and illustrate, albeit not necessarily exhaustively, the kinds of scenarios in which clause 9 remains relevant in the light of the proposed primary legislation. Let me offer a few illustrative examples.
Clause 9 may be required to legislate for the position of ongoing administrative proceedings when we leave the EU. This is a broad basket of technical issues, including the technical aspects of ongoing proceedings on competition and anti-trust issues under regulation 1/2003, for example, which sets out the co-ordination between the Commission and national competition authorities. Another example is the ongoing procedures on concentrations between undertakings in mergers under regulation 139/2004, and the allocation of jurisdiction between the EU and national authorities. These detailed and technical issues do not need to be put on the face of a Bill, but they must be legislated for in time for exit.
Another area for which clause 9 could be used relates to the privileges and immunities afforded by the UK to the EU—its institutions, bodies and staff—post exit. Privileges and immunities are a standard feature of international law, and are generally considered necessary for the proper functioning of international organisations. Privileges and immunities for the EU are currently implemented under protocol 7 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union. After exit, the EU will continue to require privileges and immunities to cover any functions it has, although the precise contours may differ according to the deal that we strike. Our agreement on privileges and immunities will need to be implemented in domestic legislation.
That is why the agility that clause 9 gives us is important. I do not mean to correct my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) in a lawyerly way, but it is not quite right to say that clause 9 can legislate for anything in the context of departing the EU. It relates only to the withdrawal agreement, and I think she said it related to withdrawing from the EU.
Another illustration of what clause 9 could be used for is the spelling out of the technical detail of how ongoing UK cases at the European Court of Justice should be handled, and how the UK courts should treat resulting judgments. Some of that might be done under this Bill, and some under the withdrawal agreement, but we will need to clarify things such as the types of cases that would be in scope and the precise procedural points in terms of whether a case could be considered to be pending, among others. Without that clarification, how such cases should be treated might not be clear. We would run the risk of legal uncertainty, as well as uncertainty for the individuals involved in those cases.
I do not want to make too much of that before my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield jumps in. He is quite right—he has made this point before, and he may want to hear me out before I take his intervention—that, in 2016, there were 23 preliminary references from UK courts and just one infraction case against the UK. So we do not expect this issue to affect large numbers. None the less, for those affected, it is still important to get this right.
I know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is engaging with this very seriously and constructively and that he is frustrated, but there is no getting around the timing issue that we have.
Nor is there any getting around the long tail of technical, regulatory secondary legislation that we will need to get through if we want to provide the legal certainty that will make for a smooth Brexit.
I just want to address the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich about illustrations of what this power will be used for, because I hope that that will serve to assuage some of the concerns. The power could also be used to legislate, for example, for the status of goods that have been placed on the UK market at the time of our withdrawal, subject, of course, to what we agree with the EU on that. That could include a whole range of very technical, detailed measures to ensure that EU products continue to be made available in the UK, with no additional requirements on relabelling; to define what is meant by “placed on the market” for those products that benefit from the measures agreed; or to establish measures to facilitate continued oversight of those products. Again, these examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. However, I hope that I have at least addressed the kinds of cases that we are talking about, and also given an idea of the scale and volume of the technical separation issues that will need to be legislated for in time for exit day. Clause 9 will make an important contribution to a smooth Brexit in precisely those areas.
Having dealt with the technical scope of the power and some illustrations of the scale of what it is going to be used for, and before I address the timing issues, I want to touch on the limitations and parameters—
It is worth looking very carefully at the limitations and parameters constraining the exercise of clause 9. It can only be used to implement the withdrawal agreement, and even then subsection (3) makes it clear that it cannot be used to levy taxation, to make retrospective provision, to create relevant criminal offences, or to repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998. Paragraph 6 of schedule 7 further requires the affirmative procedure in a whole range of scenarios, from the establishment of new public authority functions to the imposition of any fee exercised by any such authority. Critically—I am not sure that all hon. Members have picked this up—the power endures only until exit day. Its operation is shorter than that under clause 7. On the Government’s current expected timetable, it would, in practice, be used for only about six months, so it is not the open-ended power that some have suggested.
In addition, the Government have accepted the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) to establish a sifting committee to advise on the scrutiny procedures used for secondary legislation under the Bill. That will apply to this clause. That is on top of the Government amendment tabled last week that mandates Ministers to provide explanatory material for all the statutory instruments made under the principal powers of the Bill. We are listening. We are committed to making sure that Parliament plays a crucial role—a fully transparent scrutiny role—in the exercise of clause 9.
In sum, the power under clause 9 is required to legislate domestically for the large number of more technical separation issues that must be settled in time for exit day if we are to have the smooth Brexit that, whether we voted leave or remain, we all agree is crucial from here on in. The regulations—
The regulations will be subject to the established methods of parliamentary scrutiny, with additional scrutiny provided by the new sifting committee. This is a time-limited and constrained power, but it is also an important power to help us to prepare for a smooth Brexit.
Clause 9 is not just an important part of the procedural toolkit; it serves a much bigger function that we must not overlook. It sends a message of clarity and confidence to our EU partners that we are ready, willing and able to conclude and implement a deal. By the same virtue, it sends an equally important message to our citizens and businesses that we are equipped to secure a smooth legal transition. I understand the concerns raised through the various amendments, and we should debate them. I will come on to them, and I hope that I will be able to give hon. Members some further reassurance.
Secondly, why do the Government find so objectionable the idea of activating, if necessary, the third part of article 50, which allows for the Government to ask for an extension if we run out of time as a result of the many unforeseen practical problems? Ministers are talking from the Dispatch Box as though that third part of article 50 did not exist. Why was it included, if not to allow for an extension if the time expires and we have not achieved what we want?
“the substantive provisions will only take effect from the moment of exit.”
I know that he wants to drag me down into the territory of the no deal scenario and Parliament’s ability to send the Government back to renegotiate. As a former Foreign Office lawyer who spent six years in that Department and worked on EU matters, in practice I think it unlikely that that would be meaningful in any way, shape or form. The point has been made in the debate that if that looked likely, we would be positively incentivising the EU to give us, and we would end up with, worse terms. [Interruption.] It is not pure speculation; it is grounded on six years of working as a lawyer in the Foreign Office and conducting negotiations. [Interruption.]
I turn to new clauses 3 and 75, which attempt to remove clause 9 wholesale from the Bill. They would undermine one of the important strategic objectives of the Bill, which is to provide the legal means to implement the withdrawal agreement thoroughly in domestic law. I hope I have explained the important, albeit residual, role that clause 9 stands to play in light of the separate primary legislation covering the withdrawal agreement. To remove clause 9 would increase the legal uncertainty, and I hope that the new clauses will not be pressed.
I want to spend a little bit of time focusing on amendments 7, 47 and 355 and new clause 68, but particularly on amendment 7 in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. May I say at the outset that I do not think he has any ulterior motive in tabling the amendment? I have had a number of constructive conversations with him, and I look forward to more in the future. By dint of that, I hope he accepts that I have followed through on every assurance I have given him, and that I have not failed to live up to the undertakings I have given him. It is in that spirit that we on both sides of the debate need to proceed as the Bill goes through the House.
Amendments 7 and 355 call for a separate statute to be enacted approving the withdrawal agreement before the powers in clause 9 can be used. There are a number of problems with doing so. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) mentioned the constitutional issue, and I agree with him about that. From a practical point of view, however, the crucial problem is the effect that amendment 7 would have in significantly curtailing the timely advantage that we will gain from clause 9. One of the key benefits of the clause is the ability to start to use it reasonably swiftly after the withdrawal agreement has been reached.
To add an unnecessary Bill to the parliamentary agenda—in addition to Parliament’s meaningful vote, as set out in today’s written ministerial statement, and on top of the new withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill—would be restrictive enough. However, to make the first use of the powers in clause 9 wait until the additional legislation has fully passed through Parliament would unduly compress the time we will have to prepare the legislative groundwork, and would risk greater uncertainty. With the greatest respect in the world, I am afraid that is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield is defective.
In rare and exceptional cases, we may need to exercise the powers in clause 9 to pass statutory instruments before the final enactment of the primary legislation, which will be on the date of exit. Let me give an illustration of why it may be necessary for operational changes to be in put in place before that point. An example is where specific statutory authority is needed for a monitoring body to supervise the implementation of the terms of the agreement on citizens’ rights, if that cannot be done in advance under other primary legislation. Such a body would need to be set up beforehand so that it was ready to operate on day one, but we may not know its precise content and contours until relatively late on in the negotiations.
Yes, the potential scope for reliance on clause 9 has been reduced by the Government’s commitment to primary legislation to implement the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period, but it is still important to retain it. The fetter imposed by amendment 7 would risk materially damaging responsible preparations for exit, including in sensitive areas such as citizens’ rights. I know that that is not the intention of my right hon. and learned Friend, to whom I am very happy to give way.
With the genuine and material risk of my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment in mind, I hope I can go further, bridge the gap and reassure hon. Members, and assuage any residual concerns they may have about the operation of clause 9 in practice. I want to provide three very clear assurances to the House.
First, secondary legislation passed under clause 9 will either be affirmative or considered by the Committee established under the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne. Secondly, the Government are committed to publishing such statutory instruments in draft as far as possible, as early as possible, to facilitate maximum scrutiny, which is another point we have discussed.
Thirdly, we expect that the vast majority of statutory instruments enacted under clause 9 will not come into force until exit day, when the withdrawal agreement comes into force. But I can give my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, and the Committee, the concrete assurance that, following the timeframe set out in today’s written ministerial statement, none of the SIs introduced under clause 9 will come into effect until Parliament has voted on the final deal. I hope that that provides important reassurance and is sufficient for hon. Members to withdraw their amendments.
That approach has two advantages. First, it retains our ability to use clause 9 in time to fully implement the withdrawal agreement. It also squarely addresses the concern, fairly and honestly reflected in amendment 7, that there should be a meaningful vote—the critical point made by my right hon. and learned Friend—and that we should not bring new law implementing the withdrawal agreement into effect if Parliament votes that agreement down.
Amendment 47, tabled by the Chair of the Exiting the European Union Committee, is slightly different in that it would make the use of clause 9 dependent on approval of the withdrawal agreement by both Houses without specifying statute. Similar timing concerns apply. We would need to retain the option to ready statutory instruments before such approval, but I have made clear, and I make clear again, that they would not enter into force until Parliament had held its meaningful vote.
New clause 68 replicates the provisions of amendment 47, with the addition that the Government must seek the approval of Parliament no later than three months before the date of exit. We cannot bind ourselves to such strict sequencing constraints when the latter stages of the negotiations remain unknown. To do so, in fact, would be irresponsible. It is also a vague and arguably defective new clause, I say with the greatest respect, because it is not clear whether by the “conclusion” of the agreement the hon. Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) means finalisation of the text, signature, ratification or entry into force. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will not press their new clauses and amendments.
Amendment 116 would require a referendum on accepting the deal or remaining in the EU before the clause 9 power could be used. I do not think that is feasible, and it is not desirable. The Government are clear that the British people have voted to leave the EU. We will deliver on their direction. We will deliver on their mandate. Frankly, this is a pretty thinly veiled attempt to block Brexit and defy the result of the referendum, in contrast to some of the other, legitimate, concerns raised across the House. If hon. Members wanted to hold a second referendum on the terms agreed with the EU, the proper time and place to argue for such a requirement was when the EU Referendum Act 2015 was passed. I therefore urge that the amendment not be pressed.
New clause 4 would require separate legislation to set the exit day, and new clause 66 states that the exit day cannot be set before Parliament has given its approval for the terms of the withdrawal agreement. The Government accept the case for legislative prescription of the exit day for the sake of finality and legal certainty, so I hope that the new clause has been rendered unnecessary.
New clause 19 and amendment 55 mandate that the power in clause 9 cannot be used until the publication of the withdrawal agreement, and that it should not be available until all other exit Bills have passed. It is clear that regulations cannot be made under clause 9 until an agreement exists and its contents are known. It is not necessary, then, to require on top of that that the agreement be published and placed in the House of Commons and House of Lords Libraries before the power can be relied on. It is of course standard practice to lay international treaties before Parliament under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Equally, it is not right to tie the use of this power to the publication of other primary legislation passed in this Session. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) not to press the amendment.
Amendment 361 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), who is the Chair of the Justice Committee.
The amendment would create a separate power to legislate for the implementation period. I hope that the Government’s announcement of a separate Bill—primary legislation—covering the withdrawal agreement and the implementation period addresses his concern.
I turn now to equalities legislation. Last week, the Government tabled amendment 391 to schedule 7. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said that the Government had not come back with any amendments in response to requests. This is a clear example of where we have listened and returned. The amendment will require Ministers to state in writing, when using the powers in clauses 7 to 9, whether they amend equalities legislation and that they have
“so far as required to do so by equalities legislation, had due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under the Equality Act 2010.”
I turn now to amendment 19, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Rhondda. I understand his position and what he is trying to establish, but if the regulations made under clause 9 were to lapse two years after exit day, it would set a very rigid legislative timeframe for the Government and risk unnecessary disruption. If the two-year deadline expired unmet, it would create holes or risk creating holes in the statute book. I sympathise with the intentions behind the amendment, and I just wonder whether it was intended to tempt Eurosceptics on the Government Benches, but it is too rigid a fetter on Parliament’s ability to manage its legislative priorities between now and 2021, and it would risk exacerbating the very uncertainty that the Bill is designed to reduce.
Amendments 74 and 75 attempt to tie the use of clause 9 to our continued membership of the single market and the customs union. The Government have been clear that we are leaving the EU, and that necessarily means we are leaving the single market and the customs union. The amendments rehash old ground. The Government are clear that we are seeking a deep and special partnership with the EU, including as frictionless free trade as possible, and that will inevitably be linked to the withdrawal agreement. It is good news that we are moving to the negotiations on that area, following the success of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and the Prime Minister. The amendments, with the greatest respect to their SNP authors, would be counterproductive on their own terms, because they would undermine our ability to secure and implement the withdrawal agreement, which itself will be necessary for agreeing the future partnership agreement and maintaining barrier-free trade.
In fairness, we have spent a lot of time on those amendments. I want now to turn to amendments 142, 143, 275 and 156 and new clause 38, which seek to restrict the use of clause 9 with respect to citizens’ rights. As the Prime Minister reiterated in her speech in Florence on 22 September and since, we value the contributions of EU citizens living in the UK. We want them to stay. That is why the Government repeatedly made it clear that securing the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK on exit, and equally the rights of UK nationals living on the continent, was a top priority. I am sure the whole House will join me in welcoming the fact that the joint report by the UK and EU negotiators published last Friday forms the basis of the agreement after the first phase of negotiations, which will cover the rights of EU citizens here and British citizens on the continent, giving them the security, the assurances and the confidence they need.
Again, I acknowledge the vital contribution that EU citizens make to our economy and our social and national life. We will ensure that EU citizens living in the UK at the date to be specified in the light of the negotiations will be able to apply for settled status under UK immigration law once they have completed five years’ residence here. In the light of the agreement reached, I hope that hon. Members will not press those amendments.
New clause 38 and amendment 156, meanwhile, cover the specific issue of Irish citizens’ rights. Maintaining the common travel area with Ireland, protecting the reciprocal rights of British and Irish citizens, is a primary objective for the UK and has been since the Prime Minister’s Lancaster House speech in January. The common travel area arrangements between the UK and Ireland and the Crown dependencies, and the associated rights, have existed for many years. They pre-date the UK and Ireland’s membership of the European Union. Although it extends to the whole of the UK, the value of the common travel area and associated rights is clearly most felt in Northern Ireland. These arrangements facilitate, among other things, the north-south co-operation provided for in the Good Friday agreement and daily life on the island of Ireland.
There is a strong appetite on both sides of the border and in all parts of the UK to maintain those rights. They are distinct from EU membership and are already provided for by domestic legislation. The joint report by UK and EU negotiators safeguards these interests. Given that agreement and the strong commitment from both the UK Government and, in fairness, the European Commission that these arrangements are protected and will be protected, new clause 38 and amendment 156 are unnecessary, and I respectfully ask hon. Members not to press them.
The Government recognise that a large number of the UK’s relationships with non-EU partners and international organisations are linked to our membership of the EU, and specifically to the Euratom treaty, which deals with nuclear co-operation. Maintaining close links after we leave is important, and in many cases will be in the interests of both the UK and the EU.
We will work with the Commission on addressing those international agreements when the parties have a shared stake, and a shared interest, in continuity. Similarly, the Government recognise the need to maintain a strong relationship with the EU in the future. We are seeking to forge a deep and special partnership with our EU friends, and our relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies on exit will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. No final decisions have yet been made on our future relationship with the EU’s agencies and bodies after leaving the EU, and we are carefully considering a range of options. Where there is a demonstrable national interest in pursuing a continued relationship with an agency or other EU body, the Government will look very carefully at whether and how we can pursue that, and of course it is a matter for negotiations.
That brings me to why these amendments are, while well-intentioned, unhelpful. The first reason is because negotiations are ongoing and we cannot allow our negotiating position to be prejudiced or pre-empted. The Government are working to achieve the best possible deal with the EU. We welcome the constructive and thoughtful amendments from hon. Members, but we cannot accept any that might undermine the Government’s negotiating position or restrict our room for manoeuvre, not least in terms of striking the kind of arrangements that hon. Members in tabling these amendments want to see.
Secondly, the Government have committed to ensuring that the withdrawal agreement with the EU can be fully implemented in UK law by exit day. The clause 9 power to implement the withdrawal agreement will be crucial in achieving this in the way I have described. This power will help to ensure we are in a position to swiftly implement the contents of the withdrawal agreement required to be in place for day one, ensuring maximum legal certainty upon exit. Again, I respectfully remind hon. Members that, if the UK is unable to implement the withdrawal agreement in time, that risks us being unable to meet our obligations under international law and scuppering the prospects of the very deal I think Members on all sides want to achieve.
To ensure a smooth and orderly exit, it is essential that appropriate legislative changes have been made by the point of exit. We want to give ourselves the capability to make those appropriate changes swiftly, and to support businesses and individuals and make sure the country is ready. The power in the Bill enables that, and those aims will be put at risk by these amendments.
I now turn briefly to amendments 227, 228 and 229, which prevent the clause 9 power from being used until a number of economic assessments have been published. The Government have been undertaking rigorous and extensive analysis to support our exit negotiations, to define our future partnership with the EU and to inform our understanding of how EU exit will affect the UK’s domestic policies. The Government have already established a process for providing economic and fiscal reports. The OBR independently produces official forecasts for the Government and is required to produce detailed five-year forecasts for the economy and public finances twice a year at autumn Budget and spring statement. Those forecasts reflect publicly stated Government policy at the time that those forecasts are made, and that includes policy on leaving the EU.
We have been very clear that we will not disclose material that might undermine the UK in the negotiations. In particular, in any negotiation, information on potential economic considerations is very important to the negotiating capital and negotiating position of all parties.
The Government want to get the best deal for the UK and hope—and, indeed, are confident—that this House is united in that goal, even if the means to achieve it may differ on some aspects of detail, and we do not want the UK’s negotiating position to be undermined. For that reason, we cannot support those amendments.
Amendment 230 requests an assessment of the broader responsibility of the Treasury. That is unnecessary. The Treasury’s core purpose is to be an effective finance and economics Ministry. As a finance Ministry, the Treasury will continue to account for public expenditure and manage the public finances. As an economics Ministry, it will continue to prioritise policy that reduces obstacles to growth, and manage key relationships with finance Ministries overseas. The Government do not see the UK’s withdrawal from the EU changing those core responsibilities of the Treasury, and an assessment to confirm that would be a waste of valuable public finances and is unnecessary.
I turn now to amendments 262 and 263. The Government recognise the huge importance of the legal services sector to the UK economy; it contributed £24 billion in 2015. The Government also recognise that legal services underpin many other important parts of the UK economy, including financial services, manufacturing and the creative industries. We propose a bold and ambitious partnership between the UK and the EU, and we will prioritise securing the freest trade possible in services. The Government are committed to securing the best deal for the legal profession.
In the Government’s July position paper, “Ongoing Union judicial and administrative proceedings”, the Government also made it clear that leaving the EU will end the direct jurisdiction of the European Court. At the same time, the UK is committed to minimising uncertainty and disruption for individuals and businesses, including those arising from changes in the treatment of cases pending at the time of exit. That is why we want an agreement on an implementation period based on the existing structure of rules and regulations, so that there is only one set of changes. The laying of such reports, as proposed in the amendments, would delay and impede the important legislative work necessary to prepare the legal services sector for all possible negotiation outcomes, and I urge hon. Members to withdraw the amendments.
Amendment 343 would prevent regulations from being made under clause 9 before the Secretary of State had laid before Parliament a strategy for a food standards framework after EU withdrawal. The UK has a world-leading set of standards on food safety and quality, backed up by a rigorous legislative framework. The Department of Health, the Food Standards Agency and other relevant Government bodies are working closely together to ensure that the regulatory regime for food safety remains robust as Britain leaves the EU. The Government are committed to ensuring high food standards at home and promoting high standards internationally. There will be opportunities to build on our world-leading reputation for quality and standards, but it would not be appropriate for the Government to tie their use of the clause 9 power to the publishing of any individual or particular reports.
The purpose of clause 9 is to incorporate the withdrawal agreement fully and comprehensively into UK law, so that we can fulfil our obligations under the withdrawal agreement and under international law. The power is not intended to be used to report on the Government’s post-exit domestic strategy. To caveat the power or to define it in that way would cause uncertainty, both for our EU partners and for businesses and citizens in this country. I hope that I have addressed as many of the amendments relating to clause 9 as possible, and that clause 9 will now stand part of the Bill unamended.
I shall now turn briefly to clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7. Clause 16 gives effect to schedule 7, which provides for the parliamentary scrutiny of the secondary legislation made under the powers in the Bill, including under clause 9. The Bill attempts to strike a balance between the need to prepare our statute book in time for the end of the article 50 process and the need, on the other side, for Parliament to undertake proper scrutiny. The Bill does this using long-established parliamentary procedures. These are the usual procedures that have been used by all Governments for decades with no dilution of the normal scrutiny process.
However, the Government have always said that we would listen and reflect on the concerns raised by the House. We understand the concern that there might not be enough scrutiny of the instruments made under the Bill. That is why the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), made it clear in the Committee yesterday that the Government would support the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), which I hope will be supported by the whole of this Committee.
These amendments draw on the Procedure Committee’s expertise and its recent interim report, and will ensure that the House has an opportunity to challenge the appropriateness of the use of the procedure for instruments made under the three main powers in the Bill. The amendments do this without undermining the certainty that we wish to provide. For instruments brought forward under clause 9, as with the other powers in the Bill, this means that where the Government propose the negative procedure for an instrument, the House will be able to recommend that it should instead be debated and voted on as an affirmative instrument, giving an even clearer voice to this House in scrutinising how these powers are used. Other instruments, if not made using the urgency procedure—which I will come to—will be affirmative, guaranteeing the opportunity for a debate on the instrument.
Schedule 7 sets out a series of triggers for the use of the affirmative procedure. These are for some of the substantial uses of the power or for those where more complex decisions are required—for example, creating a new public body, creating new fees or other charges, or creating new powers to legislate. The Minister responsible for the instrument can also choose the affirmative procedure even where the instrument does not meet any of the tests in schedule 7. We have taken the same approach to changes to either primary or secondary legislation. Some changes to primary legislation can be mechanistic and minor, and adopting the affirmative procedure for small corrections to primary legislation would be impractical. Instead, the requirement for affirmative procedures is based on the type of change rather than the type of legislation in which the change is being made.
In rare cases, there are urgency procedures, both in the Bill as introduced and in the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee. I can assure the Committee that we would only use those procedures very sparingly—for example, in cases where there was a clear practical reason to have a correction made in time for exit day or for a particular other day when limited time was available. Such a situation could arise, for example, because the content of a particular statutory instrument was dependent on a negotiation that took place nearer the end of the exit process. I know there are amendments on the paper today, such as those in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie)—I am trying to see whether he is still in his place, but no, he is not at the moment—which seek to restrict the use of this power to “emergency” situations. I hope the Committee will understand that the word “emergency” is not quite right in these circumstances, and that “urgency” is the more accurate description if we are to ensure that we have legal certainty.
Finally—I am grateful to the Committee for its patience—clause 17 is designed to make consequential and transitional provision to other laws as a result, not of our exit from the EU, but of the operation of the Bill. It contains powers to ensure that the Bill is properly bedded into the statute book and could be used, for instance, for housekeeping tasks such as revoking designation orders.
Orders under clause 7 will designate Ministers so that they can exercise the power in section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 to implement EU obligations. Once the 1972 Act is repealed, designation orders will be redundant, so we need to be able to tidy up such laws on the statute book. Hon. Members will know that consequential provisions are a standard part of many pieces of legislation, even legislation of constitutional importance such as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 or the devolution Acts. Equally, transitional provisions are a standard way of smoothing the application of a change in the UK statute book.
The Bill already includes the lengthy schedule 8, which contains consequential amendments, but some more may be needed, and it will take time for departmental experts to identify and correctly resolve others. For example, the Bill amends the definition of “enactment” in the Interpretation Act 1978, and Departments will need to review all the references to “enactment” across the whole statute book to identify any that need amending as a consequence of the Bill. That is not a novel use of a consequential power, because the definition of “enactment” was inserted into the 1978 Act by the Scotland Act 1998, and the consequential power in the 1998 Act was then used to amend other references as a consequence. The Government are therefore taking a normal power to make these and other important but technical consequential amendments as they are identified.
Hon. Members will know that transitional, transitory and saving provisions are standard ways to smooth the introduction of change to the statute book. As with clause 9, it is important that we can provide legal certainty to everyone in the UK, from businesses to individual citizens. For example, the Bill removes the UK from the direct jurisdiction of the Luxembourg Court, but the UK will remain a full member of the EU up until the very moment of exit. The power could therefore make specific provision for court cases still before a court on exit day. Again, schedule 8 introduces some of those measures, but Government will need some residual flexibility to ensure that we do not create uncertainty as we leave. I can reassure the Committee that the Government cannot abuse such powers. Case law and an array of legal authorities provide a very narrow scope for the exercise of the powers, which are necessary to ensure that we can enable a process of exit from the EU that promotes maximum certainty. I commend clauses 16 and 17 and schedule 7 to the Committee.
I cannot impose a time limit in Committee, but if hon. Members speak for more than three minutes, they are depriving someone else of the opportunity to speak. That might indeed be the intention of some hon. Members, and there are many hon. Members who prefer to listen to their own voice than to give any time to others. We shall see in the next hour and a half which is which.
I am sure I can rely on Seema Malhotra to behave properly.
It is a pleasure to follow many hon. Friends and hon. Members in lending my support to new clause 3, amendment 7 and new clause 66, which speak to the intention of Members on both sides of the Committee to engage constructively and thoughtfully on the role of Parliament and on when, and how, Parliament has a say on the fundamental issue of the withdrawal agreement.
I am grateful to have the opportunity to address my new clause 69 and to thank the 40 hon. Members from both sides of the Committee who put their name to it. New clause 69 seeks to lay out a simple road map to provide clarity on the role of Parliament in the final months before Brexit.
The Government put out a statement today, setting out the role of Parliament in approving the agreements and how the agreements will be put into force. Notwithstanding the Minister’s comments, I will lay out why the statement does not go far enough in addressing this fundamental issue—the Minister also did not adequately address these points.
The Brexit Secretary said in his written statement—there is no disagreement with this—that:
“A Withdrawal Agreement will be negotiated under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union…whilst the UK is a member of the EU. It will set out the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU…as well as…any implementation period agreed between both sides.
Article 50(2) of the TEU sets out that the Withdrawal Agreement should take account of the terms for the departing Member State’s future relationship with the EU.”
We believe that partially parallel process is soon to be under way.
Michel Barnier has said that he wants to have the withdrawal agreement finalised by October 2018, which is indeed the Government’s stated intention. The Prime Minister said today that she fully expects the vote to be “well before March 2019.” The Government have committed to holding a vote on the final deal as soon as possible after the negotiations have been finalised, and the Brexit Secretary’s statement says:
“This legislation will be introduced before the UK exits the EU”.
I very much hope that all goes according to plan. It is in the interest of the country for there to be an orderly, stable and predictable Brexit process that enables businesses and families to plan ahead and do all they can to manage the risks of transition. If the Government are as confident of that as they would wish us to believe, I hope they are able to confirm today that they will accept amendment 7 and respond to the points raised in my new clause 69, which seeks to do nothing other than include in the Bill the commitments the Government made in their stated policy intentions. Although I will not be pressing new clause 69 to a vote, I reserve the right to bring back the issues at a later stage.
Legislation is not passed to plan for when things go well but to provide protections and a route map for action when things do not go well. There may well be an honest intention to reach a deal by October 2018, but there is no guarantee. I am not attempting to talk down the Government’s negotiation attempts, but there has been a consistent view—indeed, reiterated by the Prime Minister today—that she fully expects a vote before March 2019. That is not a promise, because we know it cannot be.
I am also representing the views expressed by the Brexit Secretary on 25 October 2017, when he said we could go up to the 59th minute of the eleventh hour. The Government may have sought to row back on that, but the experience suggests and the reality is that it may well end up being the case.
Michel Barnier said this morning that negotiations are difficult and “tough” and that he wants steps to be taken for an “orderly withdrawal”. He has stated today that a full trade deal will not be possible by the time the UK leaves the EU. With only 15 months left to Brexit day, we must recognise that in these complex times the unpredictable can happen, and that in those circumstances, which none of us would wish to see, we need to have planned ahead effectively. We need certainty for Parliament, for our constituents, and for business and industry about how we will proceed.
My new clause states that in the event of no deal being reached by October 2018 or a deal not having been passed by both Houses of Parliament by February 2019, with a month to go the Prime Minister must: seek agreement with the EU to extend the article 50 time period; or seek agreement with the EU to finalise the terms of the withdrawal agreement through the period of transition after the article 50 notice expires and the EU treaties cease to apply to the UK; or seek agreement on any other course of action in line with a resolution of this House. This is important as it gives an opportunity for timely—I repeat, timely—engagement of this House, which is critical in order for any vote to be meaningful.
My new clause does not specify which of those the Government should seek to do, but it sets out three clear options that could be vital in keeping order and stability in the weeks and months before exit day. Let me be clear also that this is not about an unnecessary extension of the process; it is about allowing provision for and clarity on the circumstances in which it may be called upon, most likely for a short period of months. That can only be helpful in managing the risks of Brexit, particularly in the event that a deal is well under way but has not been finalised. It would certainly not be against the spirit of the referendum result, and at the time could precisely be in the national interest.
I do not believe that in truth this approach should be any great distance from Government policy, and it simply picks up on paragraph 3 of article 50, which states:
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”
I do not believe there has been any suggestion from the European Council or elsewhere that such a request would not be agreed to if it were proven to be necessary.
In the light of aspects of stated Government policy, new clause 69 and amendment 7 should be nothing other than helpful. I wish to make a few points on this, Mrs Laing, which I shall summarise. The Government have made it clear that they will want to see a vote of this Parliament—after a challenging journey on that policy, they made that commitment in their manifesto in May. As has been stated today, however, the challenge is that it is not clear, and there certainly is no consensus on, what constitutes “meaningful”. Indeed, there has been a difference in view on this. First, the Secretary of State said:
“The House will have the opportunity to vote on any number of pieces of legislation before we get to the end and then will have a vote to decide whether what it gets is acceptable. I cannot see how it can be made more meaningful than that.”—[Official Report, 2 February 2017; Vol. 620, c. 1222.]
Yet, five days later, his deputy Minister at the time, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones), said:
“Let me say this. It will be a meaningful vote. As I have said, it will be the choice between leaving the European Union with a negotiated deal or not. To send the Government back to the negotiating table would be the surest way of undermining our negotiating position and delivering a worse deal.”—[Official Report, 7 February 2017; Vol. 621, c. 273.]
This is surely the crux of the issue about the ability of Parliament to influence this Government and the negotiations to get the best deal for our country.
That brings me to my final point, which is about the issue of no deal. If the Government were to proceed on the basis of no deal, that itself would not be after a vote of this House. No deal obviously would bring huge risks to our economy and it would have a legally questionable status, and those views of stakeholders are of no surprise to Ministers in this House.
I would rather we were not in this positon and I would rather not have had to table the new clause, but I believe strongly that it would provide important safeguards for the country and for people in our constituencies, who will be picking up the pieces if we crash out of the European Union. Parliamentary scrutiny and sovereignty are our duty and responsibility. I may not push for a vote today, but I reserve the right to bring my new clause back to the House, depending on what further comments the Minister makes. The House deserves a definite timeline for a vote, and to be confident of the meaningfulness of that vote.
I loathe secondary legislation that amends primary legislation expressed in Acts of Parliament. It is an odious practice that has entered the legislative process in this House—this is by no means the first Bill that contains so-called Henry VIII clauses—but I can justify such powers as a basis for reversing the effects of our membership of the EU. It may seem to be an irony, but it is by the process of secondary legislation that we have been gradually integrated into the EU.
We have seen order after order coming under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. More often than not, it was a “take it or take it” option: we did not even have a “take it or leave it” option once it was expressed in EU law. The advantages of allowing secondary legislation under this Bill are that, first, the legislation will ultimately be answerable to the House; secondly, the powers are temporary; thirdly, they can be subject to revision or annulment at any future time; and finally, they are underpinned by the democratic authority of a referendum.
On a “take it or leave it” vote, I do not remember debating a single new treaty that was offered to the House on the basis that we could amend the treaty by passing an Act of Parliament. Whether to accept the Lisbon treaty was a “take it or leave it” decision. We were told that if we did not accept the treaty, it would create such chaos that it would force us to leave the EU.
I do not doubt the bona fides of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others on the Government Benches, but my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) exposed very ably the fact that there are people in the House who want to use amendment 7 as a means to extend the negotiation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe was absolutely explicit on that point. I appreciate that the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook), did his best to avoid answering the question, but he made it clear that he thinks the deadline will have to be extended.
May I just deal with this question of what is a meaningful vote? I cannot find anything clearer than the ministerial statement that was issued this morning. It says that
“the Government has committed to hold a vote on the final deal in Parliament as soon as possible after the negotiations have concluded.”
It continues:
“This vote will take the form of a resolution in both Houses of Parliament and will cover both the withdrawal agreement and the terms for our future relationship. The Government will not implement any parts of the withdrawal agreement—for example by using clause 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill—until after this vote has taken place.”
That seems to provide the assurances that my right hon. and learned Friend is looking for and that the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice has repeated already from the Dispatch Box.
As the Minister has already demonstrated very forcefully, this is not an effective amendment. If my right hon. and learned Friend wants to table a different amendment, as colleagues almost seem to be suggesting, that might be a way to resolve this. I beg my right hon. and hon. Friends on this point. There is a summit tomorrow. This is not the moment to try to defeat the Government—[Interruption.]
My first point is that if taking back control does not mean passing amendment 7, I do not know what does. We were told that we were leaving the European Union to reassert parliamentary sovereignty, and it seems to me that that is exactly what amendment 7 would do. Clearly, the Government are refusing to accept it. We have heard nothing from the Dispatch Box that suggests that they are prepared to concede on this, forcing the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield to press the amendment to a vote. That brings me to my second point.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman and others who are supporting his amendment have been attacked, as he mentioned earlier, not just in this place, but beyond. They have been called mutineers and saboteurs, and have faced all the rest of the abuse. Ministers and other Tory Members of Parliament in particular who have been attacking them have absolutely no right whatever to do so because the reason that the right hon. and learned Gentleman tabled his amendment was that he felt that it was in the national interest.
Now, the Brexit Secretary has voted against his party over 90 times. The International Trade Secretary has done so 19 times; the International Development Secretary, five times; and the Leader of the House, who was here earlier, seven times. Actually, look around the Government Benches. The right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) has voted against his party 73 times; the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), 64 times; the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin), 95 times; and we cannot, of course, forget the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), who has voted against his party more than 100 times. So none of these people can now lecture people who are seeking to do the right thing in the national interest on this amendment. None of them can lecture people about rebelling on this or any other matter.
As my third point, before I quickly wrap up, I want to be absolutely clear about what I believe we mean when we talk about a meaningful vote. For all the technical points that have been made from the Dispatch Box today and for all the high-quality legal debate we have had in this Chamber, the fact of the matter is that we cannot have a meaningful vote on the terms of our withdrawal unless it comes before we leave the European Union. Nothing said from the Government Dispatch Box today or at any other time has committed us to ensuring that we have that vote before we leave.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, who is no longer in his place, talked about time. The reason for the third part of article 50 allowing for an extension is so that people can extend the time if they run out of time to make the practical arrangements for a country’s withdrawal from the European Union. With all due respect to the Minister and his seven years as a Foreign Office lawyer, or whatever his experience, we do not know, unless we ask the question, whether we will be able to get the extension provided for in that article. It is pure speculation on his part to suggest that, somehow, if we run out of time by 29 March 2018, our EU partners will not be reasonable enough to grant us the time to follow the correct procedures in this Parliament.
In a way, my final point was made just now by the hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). We have a duty as legislators to properly scrutinise things that come before us. We will not be forgiven by future generations—of course, many of these people did not vote for us to leave the European Union—unless we scrutinise what the Government are doing to ensure that we get the best deal for these people. Of course, there are many issues that weigh on our shoulders. Everybody here will say they are acting in the national interest, and they act on behalf of their constituents, but let us be honest: there are other issues that always play on people’s minds. How will this affect me and my political journey? How will it affect my party? However, the hon. Lady was absolutely right: this is one of those moments when we have to do the right thing by the country—and nothing else.
“I look forward to the day when the Westminster Parliament is just a council chamber in Europe.”
He suggested I had got the quote from social media, but, in reality, it is given in volume 23 of the International Currency Review from 1996. I thought it wise to put that right, if only for the record.
I note the amendment in the name of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and I see that he is also not in the Chamber. He once suggested that, having been the only Conservative to vote against going into Libya, I was leading the charmed life of a rebel. I think he now knows that when we vote against our Government, we are not leading a charmed life—it is a pretty awkward situation sometimes, and I think he is now finding that out for himself.
Amendment 7 has several flaws. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) set out a number of them. He also spoke about the importance of having clarity of intention when addressing this issue, but I want to raise an additional point that has not been covered. Amendment 7 is fundamentally flawed because it leaves open at least the possibility—given that the EU does not, in reality, want any member to leave—that as there would be no incentive for the EU to negotiate a good deal that this Parliament could accept, we could find ourselves in a permanent state of limbo, deadlocked in unproductive negotiations for months and months with no incentive for the other side to pursue a constructive deal. Members should reflect hard on that practical flaw as they go through the Lobby, assuming that the amendment is put to the vote.
If that was the case, it would be an outrage with regard to the result of the EU referendum, in which over 17 million people voted to leave with the best possible deal. Those 17 million people had no third option on the ballot paper. There was not an option of staying in a semi-permanent state of negotiating limbo while talks progressed over a period of months and maybe years; it was a very clear yes or no. In addition, such a limbo—
Such a limbo would not be business-friendly as it would continue to create uncertainty when business wants certainty on a deal for making investment decisions. I now give way to my hon. Friend.
While most of us want a deal, those who criticise the Prime Minister’s position that no deal is better than a bad deal create a series of straw men to support their case. The term “no deal” itself is something of a misnomer, because it creates the idea of some sort of cliff edge. Nothing could be further from the truth. Trade flows regardless of trade deals. The UK would simply revert to using the same WTO rules that govern its trade with countries such as the United States, China, Australia, New Zealand and Brazil—hardly unimportant countries.
As for the trade deals themselves, the next straw man is the suggestion that the UK would find it difficult to negotiate them in sufficient time. If Australia can negotiate trade deals with China, South Korea and Japan within 18 months, there is no reason why the UK cannot do likewise. If anything, a trade deal with the EU will be easy to negotiate because many of the trade barriers have already been removed.
The suggestion that inward investment would suffer without a trade deal is another straw man. That is to ignore the fact that investment is about relative advantage, as anybody who has worked in the City or in industry will understand. Our much lower corporation tax rates, our more flexible labour market practices and policies, the strength of our R and D and science, our language and our time zone more than compensate for having to pay an average WTO tariff of 3% to 5%, particularly given that the currency has already depreciated.
Tonight I will be supporting the Government and rejecting amendment 7. The Prime Minister has been very clear that we will be leaving the EU—that includes the customs union and the single market—in March 2019, and that the European Court of Justice will have no further jurisdiction over British law. I support the stance that no deal is better than a bad deal, and that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. That includes any proposed financial settlement.
My final point is that there is another reason why I support the Government, and it relates to trust. We are not privy to the ups and downs or the ins and outs of the negotiations, so one has to make a judgment as to whether the individuals concerned are honourable. I believe the Prime Minister to be honourable in what she has said. Having known the Ministers involved for many years, I also trust them to deliver the best possible deal. I suggest that those who support proposals such as amendment 7 should trust the EU a little less and their own Government a little more. Our Government have, after all, made concessions in good faith.
If the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) thinks that the European Union is keen to drag things out, he has clearly not spoken to many EU diplomats. They want this to be over; they are not as obsessed with Brexit as he might be.
I commend the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) for his rational discourse in relation to amendment 7. Unlike me, he cannot be described as wanting to stop Brexit. He does not want to, but I do—democratically, with a vote on the deal. That is covered by amendment 120, which we will vote on next Wednesday. But he and I are certainly in the same place when it comes to the importance of parliamentary sovereignty, and legislative rigour and accuracy. He set out cogent arguments in favour of amendment 7, and he described the extent to which he has bent over backwards in the last few weeks to try to secure agreement from the Government on a way forward, but failed to do so.
The Minister’s main argument against amendment 7 was time pressure. The Government have, to a great extent, inflicted that problem on themselves, whether through the general election that they called, by triggering article 50 when they did, or by refusing to entertain the option of extending the article 50 process. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said that EU had not offered such an extension but, as I understand it, the UK has at no point ever asked for one. The right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield set out a very neat solution to the problem that the Government outlined, and the Minister did not manage to convince the very experienced senior Members who were sitting behind him. He might not have seen it, but the body language and facial expressions of those behind him reinforced the point that, frankly, the Government have not deployed very cogent arguments in favour of opposing amendment 7. I look forward to voting on that amendment, and to Parliament taking back control.
I want to make it clear, however, that I very much accept the good faith of those who argue for amendment 7. Those of us who opposed the Government when they were very pro-European should not criticise Members such as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve)—Disraeli pronounced the constituency name slightly differently—when they decide to take the reverse position of the one we took in previous years. What they are doing is completely reasonable.
I follow the Minister’s argument that there are circumstances in which clause 9 could be useful. If an agreement comes relatively late on, I understand that there will be an urgency in getting statutory instruments presented. There also will be a Prorogation before May 2019, so there might be a delay in the proceedings on the withdrawal and implementation Bill and therefore a need for urgent action. If we pass a motion, as may be legislatively required, to accept the proposed statutory instruments, that will both maintain parliamentary control and give the Government the flexibility that they are likely to need.
This issue becomes very significant because, as we leave, we will want legislative continuity and clarity. The date has been set, and that has been debated, but the key is that the date has been set by previous decisions of Parliament. It is in no sense an erosion of parliamentary sovereignty, because the date is set out in the Act triggering article 50 and in the Act incorporating the Lisbon treaty into UK law. The timeframe was set under voluntary Acts of Parliament requiring things to be done by 29 March 2019. It therefore follows that there is some pressure on time, so it is perfectly reasonable for the Government to ask for such flexibility.
I conclude on the vote at the end—the final meaningful vote. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), as he so often does, made an elegant point when he said that this is a metaphysical decision for us about the meaning of meaning. The issue is that Her Majesty’s Government have already promised that we will have a vote on the deal before the European Parliament does, but there is no deal until the European Parliament has voted. The European Parliament has to agree to the deal—as part of the article 50 package, this is decided by an enhanced qualified majority vote, subject to the approval of the European Parliament—but we have already been promised a vote before the matter is voted on by the European Parliament.
In the whole schedule leading to the ratification and approval of the withdrawal agreement, there is a requirement for a vote in this House. There is also a requirement, now agreed with the European Union, that there will be a withdrawal and implementation Bill—[Interruption.] I am sorry that the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) is getting impatient, but this is a very important matter. The rights of Parliament will absolutely and clearly be preserved, and I hope that Her Majesty’s Government will listen to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset, because his is a solution with which I think everybody can be happy.
On the first issue, all that is being offered is a take-it-or-leave-it vote on whatever the Government agree, with no guarantee that the actual vote will take place before exit day. The written ministerial statement is clear that the legislation—not the vote—
“will be introduced before the UK exits the EU”.
In reality, it will be a choice between giving the Government a blank cheque and in effect turning this Parliament into a rubber stamp, or taking a leap into the abyss.
What meaningful say will this House have if the alternative to rubber-stamping the Government’s deal is no transition agreement, meaning that our businesses will face a cliff edge; no deal for EU citizens living here or for UK citizens abroad; and no deal on the Irish border, which is so vital for protecting the Good Friday agreement? The sword of Damocles is over our heads, and we should say no.
A meaningful vote would give this House sufficient time and mean that it would not face a last-minute threat. It would give this House the power to send the Government back to the negotiating table, and the power to request that the remaining EU27 extend the article 50 deadline if we needed to get a better deal. That is also why it is so important not to have a fixed time and date in the Bill—because we may well need all the flexibility we can get.
The final overall trade deal with the EU will govern the UK’s future relationship with the EU for decades to come, but what is on offer is even worse. The written ministerial statement says that
“the agreement governing our future relationship…may take the form of a single agreement or a number of agreements covering different aspects of the relationship.”
It is pretty clear what will happen in the EU27 countries. The statement says that
“agreements on the future relationship are likely to require the consent of the European Parliament and conclusion by the Council. If both the EU and Member States are exercising their competences in an agreement, Member States will also need to ratify it.”
What do we get here? The statement says that the Government will introduce further legislation only
“where it is needed to implement the terms of the future relationship”.
There is no guarantee of any legislation, apart from when the Government deem it necessary, and there is no ability to disagree to or amend those deals, only to implement them.
That is unacceptable. MPs must have a meaningful vote on the initial withdrawal agreement and on the future trade agreement or agreements—and that must be on the face of the Bill. Nothing that the Prime Minister or the Brexit Minister have said today, or in the Brexit Secretary’s written ministerial statement, have addressed those concerns at all. Even if they had, words and assurances are not enough. The Prime Minister is not in a position to give us those assurances—indeed, no one on the Government Front Bench is, because they may not be there when our future trade and other deals with the EU are agreed. It will be many years before that happens. They have not addressed any of those points, and I say to hon. Members on both the Opposition and Government Benches that this is the time to put country before party. If we want an influence and a say over the future of this country, I urge them to vote for amendment 7.
The people of Mid Norfolk voted to bring powers back to Parliament. They want Parliament to be given the powers to scrutinise legislation, and they want to stop the process of European legislation too often passing through unscrutinised and this House passing bad legislation. Do not take it from me, take it from my hon. Friends who I suspect I am going to disagree with tonight. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) put it beautifully:
“This referendum gives the British people the great opportunity to restore their precious but damaged democracy.”
He went on to say that
“the sovereignty of the British people required a sovereign Parliament that they could dismiss and they could influence”—[Official Report, 9 June 2015; Vol. 596, c. 1099.]
in the legislation that we pass. Clause 9 goes right to the heart of whether we have that power. Do not take it from me, take it from the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which has argued that clause 9 could enable significant constitutional rights, such as the rights of EU citizens resident in the UK, to be implemented in domestic law by negative procedure regulations, even if that requires amendments to primary legislation. The Committee also criticised clause 9 for providing the ability to amend provisions of the Bill through secondary legislation, saying that it was “wholly unacceptable”. The report argues that clause 9 is the widest Henry VIII power in the Bill.
It is for those reasons, I think, that we have heard doubts about the clause this afternoon, in a most fascinating debate, from hon. Members who, like me, support the Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) described the clause as containing “mischief” and urged the Government to take heed and recommend a compromise. The hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) has said very eloquently and very consistently that he is not comfortable with the clause. We all know what happened—the clause was drafted before the Government, laudably, promised to give this House a vote. That having been done, as my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and for North East Hertfordshire (Sir Oliver Heald), a former Attorney General and a former Solicitor General, have made clear in legal terms rather more powerfully than I can, the clause makes no sense.
This afternoon we have heard Back Benchers on all sides ask Ministers to provide clarity on why these extraordinary powers are needed. We have not heard the answer. In such circumstances, the all-important trust that goes right to the heart of this issue—between Back Benchers and Front Benchers, between Parliament and the Executive, and between the people and their Parliament—is stretched. Those who fear a conspiracy against Brexit—a conspiracy to use the scrutiny they have fought so hard against them. However, to turn that back around on those of us who want to reassure the people of this country that this is not a conspiracy against them but a moment of renewal inverts the logic of this moment. To hear only a traditional stubbornness from the Front Bench—one that I have shared in my time on the Front Bench; we know the brief, with civil servants saying, “Don’t give an inch”—without any reason or explanation is worrying. If this was simply some technocratic measure to do with a minor implementation of minor secondary legislation, I dare say the Committee would not be worried, but this is a Committee of the whole House for good reason: this goes right to the heart of the protection of our liberties. One of the worst aspects of the problem we are all trying to solve is Parliament passing legislation without scrutinising it.
I have not voted against my Government once since I came here eight years ago, other than once in my first week in voting to give the Backbench Business Committee powers to have a debate each week. I am a democrat first and foremost. I understand how difficult this is for Ministers, but the Government could, in half an hour’s time, signal that they take democracy in this House seriously and are listening and that they will come back in the new year with a sensible amendment that can satisfy us all.
It is incredibly ironic to hear the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), and the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr Baker), great troubadours of parliamentary scrutiny, champions of this place’s right to scrutinise legislation, batting us off tonight in the style of hardened Ministers being told by their officials not to give an inch. It will not carry, and it does not suit or befit them as champions of parliamentary democracy. This is Committee stage, which is when Parliament should amend legislation or invite the Government to improve it. I will be supporting amendment 7, and if we lose, I will vote against clause 9 and invite the Government to come back with proposals that I can support and that reflect the powers they say they need, but for reasons they have not explained this afternoon.
To me, it is pretty obvious. If the vote is between a deal and a crash-out, a deal wins. If the vote is between a deal and the status quo, with access to the single market, the status quo wins. Surely nobody is going to put the country—our constituents, themselves and their families—into a worse situation than we have now or raise the possibility of higher trade tariffs with up to 94 countries, as well the base load of the 27 EU countries. Another question: is this going to be a transition deal or a maintenance deal? Last Monday, the Prime Minister said she did not want two cliff edges, so it looks as if there is going to be a maintenance deal.
Opponents of amendment 7 are treating it as if it somehow aims to block Brexit or remove powers from their hands. It does not block Brexit. This is a Brexiteer Parliament, unfortunately. It is rolling over to article 50. Both Front-Bench teams want out of the single market and out of the customs union. The amendment, tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), would put power in the hands of parliamentarians. To reject the amendment would be like setting sail on a cruise liner, striking an iceberg and finding out you had refused to bring any lifeboats. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) fears that the other side will not be incentivised to make a deal. If that situation arises, deal with it then—do not tie our hands now for the sake of actions we might want to take in the future. The hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) finds himself deferring, I think, to the European Parliament, which is a very interesting thing.
My final plea tonight is to wider society. As Chair of the International Trade Committee, I have companies coming to me moaning and telling me about Brexit. They have to step up to the plate and take part in this debate. We should have had impact assessments tonight, but we did not get any—they are more elusive than Donald Trump’s tax returns. Companies in the City have to start informing this debate. They should have been doing it before now, because it would have helped tonight. My plea is aimed at boardrooms across the UK: they must get their voices heard, because if they do not, they will go down with this lot here.
The Government, to be fair, acknowledged that. After presenting the Bill to Parliament, there came a point where they said, “No, we will need a Bill to implement the EU withdrawal agreement.” That is right, but what a mess. In my view, Parliament is entitled to have a meaningful vote on the agreement before the powers in clause 9 are used, so there needs to be a trigger in clause 9; otherwise, once the Government have reached agreement with the EU, they would be able just to start laying legislation.
Of course, we have had some welcome commitments tonight and during the day, but on something as important as this, where there are very significant powers involved, I feel that as parliamentarians and lawmakers we should have a say and the Bill should reflect what the Government are saying. If they are saying, as I believe they are, that what I have described will not happen until Parliament has approved the agreement, it should say that in the Bill. Indeed, it was noticeable that those who do not agree with the amendment, such as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), all agree that the provisions are flawed. It has been some time now that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) has been saying, “Come forward with your own amendment, O Government, so that this is in the right order and it has the protections that lawmakers would expect in the Bill.”
I am sad to vote, as I am going to, for article 7—[Interruption.] I said “article”, just like my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset. I am sad to vote for amendment 7, but I feel I should and that it is an important principle that, when we make the law, we get it right in the Bill.
If the process of Brexit could be summed up in one word, it would be “control”. For me, taking back control also means bringing the exercise of powers as close as possible to the people. The final deal will be subject to ratification by all EU member states, the EU Parliament and sub-state parliaments, variously numbered at 33, 37 or 38—take your pick. By the same token, I believe that the constituent parts of the UK should have the same final say as our counterparts in the EU. The final deal with the EU should be approved in statute passed by both the Westminster Parliament and the devolved Administrations, hence amendment 355.
We have repeated our arguments many times for remaining in the European single market and customs union. Wales’s goods-based, export-led economy relies on its close links with the EU single market, with 67% of all Welsh exports going to the EU and the single market sustaining 200,000 jobs. We already know that the stakes are high for Wales, so Wales must have a stake and a say in the final deal. I will not revisit the arguments I have made during previous debates on the Bill about the constitutional intricacies of the Sewel convention, but I wish to say to my Labour friends that not giving the devolved Governments a stake in the final deal risks subjecting our nation to policies, and indeed an ideology, that have so far caused our country grievous harm.
To conclude these brief remarks, the whole argument boils down to control. Following the referendum, the principle of returning control is not at issue. What is at issue is where that control lies. The minority Government party asserts that finally control rests here and here alone, but if the UK is a shared enterprise, based on mutual respect between Westminster and the devolved Governments, that party should also accept my amendment 355, which, to adapt a phrase from the Father of the House, is the fundamental minimum for a devolved parliamentary democracy.
What does “a meaningful vote” mean? If it means “deal or no deal”, I think that that is a recipe for securing the best possible deal, but if it means “deal or no deal, or go back to the negotiating table”, perhaps indefinitely and with no time limit, I think that that is counterproductive. It would be detrimental, and would undermine our negotiating position. I am not suggesting for a second that that is the desire of those who promote a meaningful vote of that kind, but I think that that would be the effect.
Rather than looking only at the legal context, we need also to look at the political, economic and financial contexts. Of course the negotiations were always going to be difficult after 44 years of integration with the European Union, but they will also be difficult because of the European Union’s position. The EU clearly does not want us to leave, which is understandable for some of the reasons that I have given, but also, primarily, it does not want others to leave, and that must be its priority during the negotiations. If this were a marriage of equals and therefore a divorce of equals, that meaningful vote with those three different options would be fine, but that is not where we are. Of course, the EU also recognises that 75% of Members of Parliament were on the remain side of the argument.
We have to look at the EU’s perspective as well as that of the UK, which is why I think that the Prime Minister was not only right to offer a fair deal in her Florence speech, but right to say that we would not be afraid to walk away with no deal. That gives the EU one chance to get this right, whereas a meaningful vote-plus would give the EU many, many chances to get this right—to give the worst possible deal to get it right. Its incentive would be to put the worst deal on the table initially, knowing that Parliament would reject it and keep going back to the table. That cannot be the right negotiating position.
None of us wants to leave on the basis of no deal. WTO rules would clearly not be in the country’s interests, and it would not be in my own interests outside Parliament either. Nevertheless, I do not want to be locked into an organisation that simply will not let us leave other than on disadvantageous terms.
Let me end by saying that I will be supporting the Government this evening. In my view, it is time for us to grit our teeth and simply get on with it.
The Prime Minister’s decision to set the exit date and to write it into law is another panic move, and it puts her into a self-tying straitjacket. It is a sop to the hard Brexiteers, and it creates a rod for the negotiators’ backs. It weakens, rather than strengthens, the UK’s position in the crucial nine months that are left for us to negotiate a good deal. Eighteen months after the referendum, we have seen the bluff and bluster on the withdrawal agreement. The Foreign Secretary has gone from telling our European partners to go whistle to being little Tommy Tucker singing for his supper to the tune of £40 billion. We have seen a tug of war take place on EU citizens’ rights, and a deal on no hard border with Ireland taking place in frantic late-night phone calls—a deal that the Brexit Secretary later undermined by calling it a mere “statement of intent”, which has caused all sorts of problems.
It may be stating the obvious, but it cannot be reiterated enough that the Government are presiding over a monumental task of immense importance for the future of this country. In any such change, it is imperative that Parliament maintains close scrutiny and oversight of the process—of all aspects of the withdrawal agreement, from security co-operation to ease of trade with our European partners—so that we, as Members of Parliament, can best represent our constituents. These aspects must be scrutinised and debated by this House. If we are not given a say on that detail, we cannot fulfil our responsibilities to our constituents, and those responsibilities are the most motivating factor behind my support for a meaningful vote on the deal.
Clause 9 provides sweeping powers to the Government to deal with some residual situation, as the Minister described it, that he would like to retain control over. I am afraid that I am not willing to vote to give away the parliamentary sovereignty that I exercise on behalf of my constituents for some residual control to the Executive. If the Minister needs that power in relation to the withdrawal Bill, he needs to come back to this House and ask for it and explain why. I am afraid I found his explanation at the Dispatch Box today utterly unconvincing. Although I am grateful for the indication he has given about Report stage, unless that amendment is submitted in manuscript now, or amendment 7 is accepted, I will vote for amendment 7 tonight.
We have been pushing discussions with this Government for weeks and we have made our point very clear. I fully back the Prime Minister. I support her in trying to get the best deal for Britain, but I will not give away parliamentary sovereignty to the Executive on the basis of a request for them to have residual powers in this Bill.
On the first point, it is crystal clear that this vote cannot be meaningful if it is binary. It has to be taken on the basis of us having an opportunity to instruct the Government to extend article 50 if necessary. On the second point, article 50 clearly gives the Government the opportunity to seek an extension of the period, and there is no reason whatever why the EU27 would reject that request. It is enshrined in the treaties, and for that to have meaning, they would clearly have to listen to our request. Why on earth would they not accept that request if it was in our mutual interest to do so?
Having paid tribute to those right hon. and hon. Members for what they are doing this evening, I commend the terms of amendment 7 to the Committee. I will be honoured to go through the Division Lobby with those right hon. and hon. Members this evening.
I welcome the fact that the Government are going to bring forward a withdrawal agreement and an implementation Bill, and nothing I have heard today has indicated to me any sense of urgency or any reason why a statutory instrument will need to be put through in a hurry. As far as I am concerned, I am prepared to stay up all night long to pass legislation to get us out of the European Union as soon as possible. For that reason, I urge the Government to withdraw clause 9, and I have to say that I will not be able to support it on stand part.
I might say that the sovereignty of this Parliament is why we are here in the first place, so I applaud the Government Members who are standing by their principles and remembering the importance of coming back to debate in this House. This is about timing. We may have had a discussion about what is meaningful, but I think we all know what is meaningless. It is meaningless to have a debate and a vote in this House after the decision is made. For all those reasons, I hope that we will return after the vote on amendment 7 and find that we really have given back sovereignty to the UK Parliament.
I am new to British legislation, but I have heard it time and again from Members as diverse as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) that the powers in clause 9 are inappropriate, too strong and could mean that the Government are able to make material changes to legislation without a scrutiny process before we leave. I am therefore extremely pleased that the Minister made his announcement at the last minute. If he would like to, I would love him to intervene once more to ensure that everybody has heard exactly what he said.
That is why we need a vote, and that is why Ministers should just stop arguing. They should either ditch clause 9 and agree to new clause 3, or agree to amendment 7.
In order to support the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9
Implementing the Withdrawal Agreement
Amendment proposed: 7, page 6, line 45, at end insert “, subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union.”—(Mr Grieve.)
To require the final deal with the EU to be approved by statute passed by Parliament.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
More than six hours having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings, the proceedings were interrupted (Programme Order, 11 September).
The Chair put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Amendment proposed: 30, page 7, line 2, leave out ‘(including modifying this Act)’ and insert
Question put,That the amendment be made.
Amendment proposed: 241, page 7, line 9, at end insert—
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Brought up.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Amendments made: 392, page 39, line 33, at end insert—
Amendment 393, page 42, line 4, at end insert—
Amendment 394, page 42, line 31, at end insert—
Amendment 395, page 43, line 19, at end insert—
Amendment 396, page 43, line 47, at end insert—
Amendment 397, page 45, line 11, at end insert—
Amendment 398, page 45, line 40, at end insert—
Amendment made: 391, page 47, line 26, at end insert—
Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.
Amendment made: 383, page 14, line 8, leave out “or the appointment of” and insert
Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Amendment 345, in clause 8, page 6, line 32, at end insert—
“(2A) Regulations under subsection (1) may, in particular, include regulations to match or exceed World Health Organisation air quality standards.”
This amendment is intended to ensure that the UK continues to meet international air quality standards after withdrawal from the EU.
Amendment 292, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(e) impose or increase taxation”
This amendment would prevent the imposition or increase of a tax by regulations made under Clause 8 to comply with international obligations.
Amendment 390, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
“(e) confer a power to legislate (other than a power to make rules of procedure for a court or tribunal).”
Amendment 352, page 6, line 40, at end insert—
“(5) Any power to make, confirm or approve subordinate legislation conferred or modified under this Act and its schedules must be used, and may only be used, insofar as is necessary to ensure that standards of equalities, environmental protection and employment protection, and consumer standards will continue to remain in all respects equivalent to those extant in the EU.
(6) In particular, no agreement relating to international trade or investment with the EU or with a third-party state or states shall be made that permits or requires standards of equalities, environmental protection and employment protection, and consumer standards to fall below those extant in the EU at the time.”
This amendment would ensure that in exercising the powers under this provision, the Government maintains equivalent standards to the EU, and in particular, in making trade agreements.
Clause 8 stand part.
In speaking to new clause 20, I want to make a couple of introductory remarks. Over the last 44 years, I think, of Britain’s membership of the EU, the UK has accrued a massive array of international obligations, rights and authorisations via a series of 759 treaties—this is absolutely right—with 168 non-EU countries. Of course, after 29 March 2019, those treaties, because we have accrued them by virtue of our membership of the EU, will fall away. They will cease to exist; they will be no more; they will have ceased to be; they will have expired—they will be ex-treaties. The United Kingdom will no longer be party to those agreements with those third countries, unless of course we have made efforts to replace them beforehand to provide for a smooth continuation.
New clause 20 would require Her Majesty’s Government to publish one month after Royal Assent—we can give them that month to get themselves together—a comprehensive assessment of each of those treaties, agreements and obligations; to set out if there are any requirements they want to amend or renegotiate; and to make an assessment of whether the powers in clause 8 might need to be used. Sir David, you will know, in your eagle-eyed way, that clause 8 gives powers to Ministers, for two years at least, to make a series of orders and regulations to prevent or remedy any breach in those international treaties, as if achieved by an Act of Parliament. I pay tribute to the late Paul McClean, the Financial Times journalist who sadly died in September, who, in one of his final reports, carried out an extremely comprehensive analysis and assessment of some of these many treaties and international obligations.
Those treaties break down as follows: 295 bilateral and multilateral trade deals, whose approval is needed to recreate any multilateral arrangements that will fall away as we leave the European Union; 202 regulatory co-operation agreements, including on data sharing, anti-trust and so forth; 69 treaties on fisheries, including access to waters and sustainable stocks; 65 treaties on transport and aviation services agreements; 49 treaties on customs agreements, including on the transportation of goods; 45 treaties on nuclear agreements, including on the use of nuclear fuel with other countries, parts and know-how; and 34 treaties on agriculture.
Imagine, Sir David, that you are a Government Minister at this point in time and you are thinking, “Well okay, I’ve got all these 759 treaties. What are we going to do? How are we going to deal with this? How much time is it going to take to renegotiate them or at least make sure they can be carried over?” Let us assume that all the other parties to those agreements are happy simply to cut and paste them across. Of course, we cannot necessarily assume that, but let us do so. If, for each agreement, it took a civil servant one day to analyse the contents, a day to contact the third party country concerned, of which there are 160, perhaps a day to track down the decision makers in the relevant Departments here in the UK and the other country, perhaps a couple of days in dialogue with that other country—it would be pretty good if they could do it in a couple of days—and maybe a day to bring together our Ministers and their Ministers, we would be talking, on top of the costs of travelling to those other countries and legal costs, some tens of thousands of hours of civil service time.
I have long been in favour of the arms trade treaty, parts of which fall within EU competence. The EU as a whole was involved in the negotiations on the treaty, and we are a party to it as an individual country. We also have the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria as well as domestic legislation. The arms trade is one of the issues that cut across many different areas of competence, and we are party to a number of treaties relating to it. Is that not exactly the sort of issue that should be examined?
We in the UK are thinking that we must replace a lot of these treaties. When we leave the EU, our exit will affect not just us but the EU, because a great many of its treaties, obligations and agreements with third countries around the world were predicated on the existence of 28 members. Minus the UK, the other members may need to renegotiate their treaties as well. Ministers might not give two hoots about the implications of that, but those on the EU side of the negotiating table probably do care about it, and that will have ramifications for our negotiations.
Of course, the Foreign Secretary was always telling us that all the other countries around the world were queuing up to do deals with us. He had to fight them off as they asked, “Please may we have a new trade agreement with you?” I have not personally seen that particular queue, but perhaps when the Minister winds up the debate he will be able to tell us how many countries have been knocking on our door seeking new trade agreements.
We must also bear in mind that there are 164 members of the WTO, and they have rights of veto and objection on many occasions. In fact, we recently tried to lodge a suggestion on dividing tariff-rate quotas. This is getting technical, but that is basically dividing up the EU’s share of low or zero-tariff allowances when countries such as New Zealand or Australia try to import lamb. Amazingly, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America have lodged an objection to the British divvy-up of those tariff-rate quotas. Of course, apparently America should have been knocking on our door, as we were at the front of the queue, supposedly, but it still lodged an objection to our very first relationship with the WTO.
The 36 regional and bilateral free trade agreements with 63 other countries are exceptionally important, but there are also trade-related agreements, including mutual recognition agreements and standards for conformity assessments. The Department for International Trade has also said that there are multiple hundreds of mutual recognition agreements. The list is getting bigger and bigger, and it is all on the shoulders of the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr Walker).
“All have agreed roll over.”
The current Minister of State at the Department, the Minister for Trade Policy, retweeted that. However, when we ask the Secretary of State whether countries have agreed that they all roll over, we are told, “Well, we haven’t had any objections from them to suggest they might not roll over.” Will they want to renegotiate? We are told, “Well, we haven’t heard from them yet.” This is an incredible example of trying to put the best possible gloss on the situation, and to get past exit day and worry about it all afterwards. The Government will then pretend that everybody knew about this beforehand.
I will finish my remarks now because I want to hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Geraint Davies); we need an assessment of these treaties and of what could be lost; we need an assessment of the risks and of what is at stake; and we need honesty and transparency from Ministers about the consequences. This is not what the public expected when they voted in the referendum, and that is why I urge Members to support new clause 20.
As for our negotiations with other countries, if we exit the EU and expect Chile or Uruguay or some other country to offer us the same trade terms that it has with the EU, which is a much bigger bloc, at a time when we are much weaker, we will be seen among the international trading community as a vulnerable victim of our own self-inflicted harm. They will say, “We will give these terms to the EU, but you are just a small player compared with the critical mass of the EU.” That would undermine not only the financial impact of the terms of trade, but the standards that we currently enjoy.
People will be aware that the REACH arrangements—the registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals—mean that manufacturers in Europe are required to prove that a chemical is safe before it is sold. In America, however, manufacturers can basically sell asbestos and other harmful products, and it is for the United States Environmental Protection Agency to tell them that they cannot. The worry is that our regime and our standards may change as we are thrust into the hands of the United States, and that workers’ rights, human rights and other rights may change due to China.
The Minister will know that the widespread use of hormones in meat production in America is giving rise to premature puberty among children, and that the widespread use of antibiotics is leading to much greater resistance to them. There is also chlorinated chicken, genetically modified food and other things, and we will be under enormous pressure from the United States to accept standards that are below those that we enjoy as a member of the EU. Donald Trump stood up at his inauguration and said that he would protect the American economy from the foreign countries that were taking America’s jobs, and he has already shown in the Bombardier case that he will play tough. The United States is a much bigger player than Britain, and the competition between the EU and the US is a matched fight when it comes to the negotiation of a deal such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We will be a much smaller player, and we will have left the conditions of the EU.
Ministers currently have quite widespread powers to sign deals. The current International Trade Secretary signed a provisional agreement for the comprehensive economic and trade agreement without parliamentary approval, and we should be drawing such powers in for parliamentary scrutiny, amendment and agreement. There is a risk that a negotiated settlement that reduces the standards that our citizens enjoy will happen outside this place. I therefore tabled amendment 352, which seeks to maintain the same standards, rights and protections that we enjoy in Europe, as protection in case we end up being asked to vote on trade deals that have all sorts of dire consequences beneath the surface for public health, workers’ rights and consumer protection.
“There are no health reasons why you could not eat chicken that had been washed in chlorinated water.”
Our own International Trade Secretary therefore seems to be advocating the consumption of chlorinated chicken.
As the right hon. Gentleman says, the concern is that the International Trade Secretary, even at this early stage, will look to undermine consumer standards, health standards and other standards in order to fix a deal and have something on the table to avoid the humiliation we see coming. As has been pointed out, it is in the interest of other countries to hold back from striking an early deal and to let the UK sweat. We will be in a difficult place if we do not have agreement on tariffs with the EU and elsewhere.
With those blueprints for a harmonious future, we are now jumping ship. We will be left on our own, floating around in the sea and striking out to hold on to bits of timber for dear life. This is very frightening. Earlier we discussed the situation of a deal or no deal, but the problem is that when we do strike a deal, the EU is not there to penalise or punish us; it is simply there to respect the interests of the EU27, which it will. The EU27 will tell us what we are getting, and we will have to like it or lump it. Lump it would be much more painful—we would go on to WTO rules, which people often mention in this Chamber. People need to remember that WTO rules apply only to goods, not services. The trade in services agreement is currently being negotiated outside the WTO so, because 80% of our exports are services, a large amount of our exports will not even have trade with tariffs; there will simply be no agreement on trade. As there is ambiguity between goods and services, such as with cars—cars are two thirds services because of subcontracted labour, lawyers, payroll and various other things—it is a complex area.
A no deal situation would be catastrophic, and the Europeans know that, so they will say what they want and we will have to accept it. If that is unacceptable and much worse than the status quo, the people of Britain should have a final say with a vote on the exit deal. That is not in amendment 352—people do not need to worry about that—although the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) has tabled amendment 120, which we will consider next week. Half the public already want a vote on the exit deal. Only 34% do not want a vote, and 16% do not know. As it emerges how appalling the future being created at the hands of this Government will be, there will be growth in support for such a vote.
Amendment 352 simply says that we should aim to, and would require us to, enjoy the current protections, rights and standards we have in the EU in future trade agreements, in the knowledge that those standards are going up, as I pointed out is happening in the case of Japan. All I am asking for is that we keep the current parity, so that as Europe moves up we at least stay the same, rather than plunge down into the depths of poverty, lower health standards and so on.
The real motive—the hon. Gentleman made it absolutely explicit—is to reopen a question that he does not believe was given sufficient attention at the referendum. That has just been confirmed by the hon. Member for Swansea East—
The purpose of the clause, as set out in the Bill’s explanatory notes, is to give
“ministers of the Crown the power to make secondary legislation to enable continued compliance with the UK’s international obligations by preventing or remedying any breaches that might otherwise arise as a result of withdrawal.”
I say to the Minister gently that it is not entirely clear what breaches might require the clause 8 power. It is not clear to us that where breaches occur they could not, in most cases, be remedied by clause 7 or by powers contained in other legislation, for example the Trade Bill, which has already been published, or domestic legislation. I do not intend to discuss what my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie) said in his comprehensive speech, in which he gave a set of examples about the types of international treaties and obligations the Government will have to deal with. However, it would be useful to hear some further examples from the Minister. To date, we have heard about only one international obligation, or perhaps a couple, where the Government believe the clause 8 power must be used. As the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee noted, the Government have not been explicit about the sort of obligations they have in mind for this clause.
On the scope of clause 8, we have many of the same concerns that we have about the scope of the powers in clauses 7, 9 and 17. Clause 8(3) contains some, although not all, of the explicit restrictions that apply in clause 7. In any case, we believe, just as we do with those clauses—that is why we tabled amendment 27 to clause 9 and amendment 25 to clause 7—that the scope of the delegated powers in clause 8 should be circumscribed so that they cannot be used to reduce rights or freedoms.
I know that many Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh), wish to make speeches, so with that I draw my remarks to a close.
It is important to focus on children, their rights and the effect of Brexit on their future. In all of this, our children have had very little voice or decision-making opportunities for the future of the UK. All our children depend on UK, EU, international and UN provisions and treaties to protect them and to secure their future rights. It is sad and ironic that it was this Conservative Government who refused to let 16 and 17-year-olds participate in the EU referendum.
No one said it better than my former colleague and my dear friend, the previous Member for Gordon—I know all Members miss him as much as I do—who summed up the hokey-cokey politics of this Conservative Government by saying:
“The case for votes for 16 and 17-year-olds has been demonstrated by the Scottish referendum—not as some academic exercise but on the joyful and practical experience of a generation of Scotland’s young people…Claims that teenagers are disengaged with politics or incapable of understanding constitutional issues was blown apart by the great contribution by young people in Scotland during the campaign…It is a ludicrous situation and nothing better illustrates the total lack of imagination which typifies the Conservative Party at its worst and their headlong pursuit of self-interest…It encapsulates Tory arrogance and the insult to young people will neither be forgotten nor forgiven.”
That is an extremely good point.
I remember studying, not that long ago, politics at the University of Stirling, where I learned about further EU integration. It seems very sad that the students of the future will be studying this process, our performance and the decisions that were made. I wonder what the textbooks and political history books will say and how they will read. I think they will say that this has been a political catastrophe—a series of unfortunate events.
It is important to reflect on the fact that, whatever people thought of the Scottish referendum, it was held up as a gold standard and that, when the Electoral Commission reflected on the referendum on Brexit, its view was that it happened in too short a timescale and that there was not proper opportunity for debate and discussion. That is important. It is sad that we set a gold standard on one referendum and then seemed to go backwards.
The other day, sitting on the Tube, reading the Evening Standard, I was quite aghast to read an article celebrating its new appointment of a journalist to Brussels. Is it not ironic that news agencies and the press are suddenly appointing journalists to Brussels? Not that long ago, I read a report that said that, out of all the countries in the EU, the nations of the UK had the worst representation in terms of journalistic reportage. So it is no surprise that, after 10 years and longer of blaming the EU for all our ills and of not properly reporting on it, people were ill-informed and we did not have a proper period for debate.
I come back to my point about children. The House of Commons Library briefing paper on Brexit stretches to almost 200 pages, yet children are mentioned only three times. The Brexit White Paper mentions children only once. It urges us all to work towards a stronger, fairer and more global Britain. Well, is that not ironic because we are going to be weaker, less equal and less outward-looking? We are going to be the exact opposite of what those right-wing Brexiteers seemed to want for us across the UK.
The Executive powers provided in clause 8 put current UK international obligations under serious threat. As we know, the UK Government cannot be trusted to uphold international obligations. We have seen time and again instances of them turning a blind eye to our obligations. In Yemen, for example, more than 300 incidents that could violate international law have been tracked by the Ministry of Defence since the conflict began two years ago, yet the UK continues to sell arms to Saudi Arabia.
One of my hon. Friends talked about the Trade Union Act 2016 and how workers’ rights have been rolled back. When all this power comes back, supposedly, to the UK, what faith can we have that our rights and obligations will be upheld by this Government?
We have spoken about Erasmus, regulations and what our young people are going to do. I strongly believe that the whole rhetoric in this process has been damaging. Some of the phrases that have emerged, the slogans that have been put on the side of buses and the way that political discourse has developed during this period echo, sadly, the Trump Administration. That scares me and, I am sure, many others deeply. We hear that Brexit means Brexit, that it will be a red, white and blue Brexit, that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, that there are economic impact studies, there are no economic impact studies—yes there are, oh no there are not—and that the post-Brexit trade deal will be the easiest in human history. We have had a political hokey-cokey on the grandest scale and who are going to be the ones who lose out the most? It is going to be the young people of our nations who have to deal with the impact of Brexit and clean up the mess that many in this Government seem hell-bent on creating. For their sake—for your children’s sake—and for the future of all our nations in the UK, let us stop this madness.
As we leave the EU, it is essential that the Government can ensure that we do not breach any of the UK’s international obligations. These international obligations stretch from our promises to other nations, some of which were mentioned by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Mr Leslie), to those we have undertaken as a sovereign and responsible participant in international organisations such as the Council of Europe and global ones such as the WTO. This need to prevent breaches of our international obligations is the reasoning behind the clause.
Clause 8 is needed—I think that this answers the point made by the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich—because not all the UK’s international obligations that might be affected by withdrawing from the EU are implemented domestically in what will be retained EU law. Those which are implemented elsewhere are therefore out of scope of the correcting power in clause 7. In addition, there are restrictions on the use of clause 7 relating to, for example, taxation that might, in some circumstances, prevent important changes to comply with international arrangements from being made. We need this power because we need to be prepared for all eventualities.
I would like to clarify that any SIs made under clause 8 that transfer a legislative function, or create or amend any power to legislate, will be subject to the affirmative procedure, as provided for in clause 7. Therefore, Parliament will be able to debate any transfer of powers, and consider the proposed scope of such powers and the scrutiny proposed for their future exercise. Clause 8 gives Ministers a temporary and limited power, as my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) said, to make regulations to prevent or remedy breaches of international obligations. The provision contained in the secondary legislation must be an appropriate way of doing so and will have to pass before this House under the parliamentary procedures that we have been discussing over the past couple of days. In addition to its limited goals, the power is subject to a number of further limitations. It expires two years after exit day and, as listed in subsection (3), it cannot “make retrospective provision”, create certain types of criminal offence,
“implement the withdrawal agreement, or…amend…the Human Rights Act”.
I will turn briefly to the amendments and respond to new clause 20 in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East. My Department is leading cross-Government work to assess and act on the international agreements for which, as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, arrangements will need to be made to ensure continuity for businesses and individuals. Any that require implementing legislation or parliamentary scrutiny before ratification will go through the appropriate, well-established procedures. We are working with our international partners to identify the full range of our agreements that might be impacted by our exit from the EU, and we will be taking their views into account. It would not be appropriate at this stage to publish the type of assessment proposed in new clause 20. Doing so would prejudice the outcome of these discussions and how any action would be put into practice.
We do recognise the need to promote stability for businesses and individuals, and we will aim to transition agreements as seamlessly as possible. I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Swansea West—I am afraid he is no longer in his place—and I would like to reassure him that this clause has nothing to do with future trade agreements. It is purely to do with our existing international commitments and how we make sure we continue to meet them in the context of leaving the EU.
Clause 8 is a very specific power, which will be available only where a breach of our current international obligations arises from the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. It ensures that we will be able to continue to honour international obligations, which might otherwise be affected by our withdrawal, and it is key to ensuring that we can take our place on the global stage as a fully independent nation. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Members for Nottingham East and for Swansea West will consider not pressing their amendments.
I want to address amendment 345 in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. It is well intentioned but unnecessary. The power in clause 8 has a narrow and specific purpose, and can be used where our international obligations might be breached as a result of leaving the EU. World Health Organisation guidelines are not international obligations; they are used to inform air quality standards in international and EU legislation, but they do not, of themselves, form an obligation to be complied with.
The UK has a strong track record on protecting our environment, and in leaving the EU, we will safeguard and improve on that. The whole purpose of this clause is to ensure that we leave the EU with maximum certainty, continuity and control, and that, as far as possible, the same rules, laws and international obligations apply on the day after exit as on the day before.
Of course, some of the existing mechanisms that allow scrutiny of environmental targets and standards by Governments will not be carried over into our law, and that is why the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced on 12 November our intention to consult on a new, independent statutory body to advise and challenge Government, and potentially other bodies—
That body will also potentially advise and challenge other bodies on environmental legislation, stepping in when needed to hold them to account and to enforce standards. The Government will consult on the specific scope and powers of that body early next year.
We have a number of amendments—from the hon. Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), the right hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) and the hon. Member for Wakefield, whom I will do my best to give a chance to speak—that seek to place further restrictions on the use of the clause 8 power, beyond those already in the clause. These amendments give me another opportunity to restate our firm commitment to ensuring that environmental protections and the rights of individuals—particularly EU citizens resident in the UK—are maintained as we bring EU law on to the UK statute book. This commitment will be reflected in the use of this clause to ensure that, from day one of withdrawal from the EU, the UK is able to comply with its international obligations.
As we stressed during yesterday’s debate on clause 7, the defence and security of the realm is always the first duty of Government, and the Government are absolutely committed to national security and securing the right future arrangements for security with the EU. I would like to take the opportunity to reassure the Committee that we cannot see that anything that damages our national security would be an appropriate way to ensure continued compliance with international obligations. The same would be true of any change to equalities legislation.
All these amendments are well intentioned, but we have been clear in previous debates that we will preserve rights through this Bill, and not reduce them. In those earlier debates, we also set out that, by giving no definition of what, for example, an environmental protection is, or how one might judge that such a protection was being weakened, amendments along these lines risk unnecessary litigation, undermining the certainty that this Bill aims to create.
In the specific context of clause 8, which is about upholding our international obligations, it is very difficult to see how that could do anything other than require us to preserve rights and protections. Parliament has already approved the UK being party to a number of international conventions and international organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation. We are committed to these international relationships. A key part of that is ensuring that we fully comply with our international obligations. Leaving the customs union and the single market may alter the way in which the UK complies with some of these obligations, specifically with regard to the treatment of WTO most favoured nation status.
Amendment 292 in the name of the hon. Member for Wakefield—I know that she wants to speak to it—does not acknowledge these changes in respect of taxation, or the fact that there will not always be a clear choice about how to comply with such obligations in future. Clause 8 gives Ministers the flexibility to make those changes. Of course, however, we will listen to what she has to say. I understand the honourable intentions behind these amendments, but we believe that this clause is well drafted to continue to meet our international obligations.
The UK is a nation whose word is its bond. This Government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill to ensure a smooth and orderly exit from the EU. Our desire to leave the EU in this way applies both to the actions we take domestically and to our actions in relation to international partners. Clause 8 is key to delivering that, and I commend it to the Committee.
Clause 8 allows Ministers to make any regulations to prevent or remedy any breach in our international obligations as we leave the EU, but it also contains a Henry VIII power allowing for those regulations to do anything that an Act of Parliament can do. That includes amending or repealing any Act of Parliament ever passed. It is the most extraordinary and unusual power. I was going to raise the Northern Ireland Act 1998, so I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) for getting the Minister on the record on that.
The Government have been very scant on the details about the sorts of international obligations that may be affected. They have also been unable to say—I was listening carefully to the Minister—why regulations under clause 8 can impose or increase taxation. We do not want to end up in a situation where the Government can raise tax-like charges by statutory instrument. That gives away the supremacy of this place on taxation. The “appropriateness” test is too broad, and it undermines the supremacy of Parliament. We cannot have taxation by the back door.
Crucially, I did not hear the Minister say anything about tertiary legislation. We have focused a lot on SIs—the secondary stuff. Tertiary legislation enables a new public body that needs to be set up, such as a chemicals body, to charge fees. This may not be controversial at first, but there may come a time when such bodies want to increase the fees, as happened when the Ministry of Justice wanted to increase probate fees by, I think, 1,500%. Why is there a double standard in clause 8 as regards secondary and tertiary legislation? We want tertiary legislation to be given the same parliamentary control and the same time limits as secondary legislation. My amendment 292 seeks to restore the supremacy of the House on financial matters.
I want briefly to deal with the environmental regulation that the Minister talked about. The Government currently have a “one in, three out” rule. Many of our environmental regulations come from international mixed agreements signed and ratified, as he said, by the UK and the EU; some are bilateral and some are multilateral. The Environmental Audit Committee has been looking at our progress in reducing fluorinated gases. These are very powerful greenhouse gases with a global warming potential 14,000 times more harmful than carbon dioxide. They are in commercial refrigeration systems, in our car air-conditioning systems, and in 70% of the 60 million asthma inhalers that we use in this country every year. Targets for reducing those gases are set and monitored by the European Union, but we are also a signatory to the UN framework, so it is a mixed agreement. We have just ratified the Kigali amendment to reduce F-gases by 85% by 2036. That agreement is monitored by the EU, so the Bill will convert the regulation into UK law and we will need new regulations.
The explanatory memorandum states that the new regulations may be subject to the Government’s “one in, three out” rule. We cannot have the Government making hundreds, if not thousands, of new regulations that get caught under that absurd administrative rule, so I want the Minister to assure the House that it will be scrapped. I have written about that as the Committee Chair, and Lord Henley has said that there is no clarity about it and no decision has been made. That has to change.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
EEA Agreement
“(1) No Minister may, under this Act, notify the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EEA Agreement, whether under Article 127 of that Agreement or otherwise.
(2) Regulations under this Act may not make any provision that would constitute a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the EEA Agreement.
(3) Regulations under this Act may not amend or repeal subsection (1) or (2).”—(Heidi Alexander.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Amendment proposed: 26, page 6, line 38, at end insert—
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair to report progress and ask leave to sit again (Programme Order, 11 September).
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.
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