PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
China Spying Case - 28 October 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
That this House calls on the Government to release the minutes of the meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser on 1 September 2025, at which the prosecution of the two alleged Chinese spies, since dropped by the Crown Prosecution Service, was discussed, including all actions arising from that meeting; and further calls on the Government to publish the minutes of all other meetings where the case was discussed, whether by officials or with Ministers, all relevant correspondence between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government and between Departments, including correspondence between the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, Attorney General’s Office, and the Treasury, and advice provided to the Prime Minister relating to the China spy case.
The purpose of this Opposition day debate and of our motion is very simple: transparency—that is all that we ask for. The basic facts are that two men were arrested on suspicion of having spied on hon. Members of this House for China, and the Director of Public Prosecutions has acknowledged that this appears to have been a “gross breach of trust” against hon. Members, yet the case against the two men collapsed because, in the words of the senior Treasury counsel, Tom Little KC, the case was “effectively unsustainable”; it was brought to “a crashing halt” because the Government’s own witness, the deputy National Security Adviser, refused to provide the fatal piece of evidence.
Mr Little had what he called a million-dollar question: was China an active threat to national security? The deputy National Security Adviser repeatedly refused to say yes. The Government effectively refused to say what was patently apparent to anyone remotely alive to the facts of the case. This House has every reason to be told why they refused, and why, for example, the Prime Minister did not intervene to prevent the case collapsing, when we know he was warned that it was unlikely to proceed. It is also reported that the Home Secretary tried to intervene.
We do not call for the publication of this material lightly. We know it is an extraordinary measure to call for the Government to publish documents relating to the formation of policy, but this is an extraordinary event. We have reached this point because the Government have been unable or unwilling to answer basic questions about what they knew when, and why they acted as they did. They have hidden behind civil servants and advisers, when it is Ministers who are supposed to make decisions, and in doing so, they have brought the actions and decisions of those advisers and officials into the spotlight in a way that is most irregular.
Just as worryingly, there has been a persistent inaccuracy and inconsistency in the Government’s statements, to the point where this House can no longer trust a word of theirs. There are a number of examples. First, on 13 October, the Security Minister denied in this House that the mega-mandarin meeting on 1 September, which is the subject of our motion, took place. Last week, the Solicitor General admitted that the meeting did take place. We now know that it was led by the National Security Adviser and attended by the Cabinet Secretary, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, senior representation from the Home Office and the Attorney General’s office, and the chief of MI5, but we still do not know what was said there, what was agreed or why the Government tried to deny its existence.
The second instance of inconsistency and inaccuracy that we draw attention to is from 7 October, when the Prime Minister told journalists that what mattered in this case was the designation of China as it had been in 2023, when the offences were alleged to have occurred. However, last week, on 24 October, the Director of Public Prosecutions said that that was categorically not the case. He said:
“The test was…positively not what the then Government was prepared to, or did, say in public about China…but rather whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
This is a most important point, and one that was revisited yesterday. There is a very serious question about why the deputy National Security Adviser believed that he would
“need to be in line with government policy at the time”,
when the Crown Prosecution Service said that it did not need to know about policy, but about the facts. The Minister should explain to the House why the deputy National Security Adviser chose to ignore the CPS in this case. He should also tell us whether he thinks the deputy National Security Adviser complied with civil procedure rule 35, which requires him to assist the court and overrides any other obligation.
“whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
It was not a question of policy; it was a matter of fact. [Interruption.] I am not going to go through it a third time.
The third example is that on 15 October, the Prime Minister said that the deputy National Security Adviser acted entirely independently, without consultation with Ministers or special advisers, and without political involvement. However, the CPS has now made it clear that there were multiple discussions about what the DNSA would and would not say, starting with one such discussion on 3 July 2025. Moreover, the DNSA’s first witness statement was sighted by
“the then National Security Adviser and the…Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary”,
and
“sent to the…Prime Minister through No.10 private office”,
including special advisers.
A fourth example is that on 20 October, the Minister for Security, who is in his place, told the House:
“Final evidence went in in August, and I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that there is nothing the Prime Minister or any Minister could have done thereafter.”—[Official Report, 20 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 640.]
We now know that there were meetings between the CPS and the Government on 3 and 9 September to attempt to rescue the case. Why did the Security Minister tell the House something that was not correct?
A fifth example is that yesterday, the Cabinet Secretary said that he did not believe that the chief of MI5 had described China as a threat. On 16 October 2025, Ken McCallum said:
“Do Chinese state actors present a UK national security threat? And the answer is, of course, yes they do every day.”
How on earth did the Cabinet Secretary not know that? This issue is of paramount importance. There are many other such examples.
The Government have an opportunity to be clear with us today, not just about the meetings and the dealings of the past six months, but on their position as it stands. Will the Minister tell us what the material difference is between “a range of threats” and “an active security threat”? The deputy National Security Adviser was keen to make that point yesterday. Perhaps most importantly of all, do the Government believe that China is an active security threat? If not, what would it take to cross that threshold? It is time for the Government to publish all the details so that we can see what really happened here.
I know that the Government will protest their innocence and claim that it is all the fault of the CPS, or the last Government, or the legislation, just as they have tried to do for weeks, but such pleas and protests are no good reason for them to refuse to publish the material we are requesting today. This House may have been spied upon. This House has a right to straight answers. This House has a right to see under the bonnet when the safety and privacy of its Members may have been compromised. This House has a right to know the Government’s real position and the Government’s real agenda. If this Government have nothing to hide, they should hide nothing from this House.
As a reminder, following the arrests of Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry in March 2023 as part of a counter-espionage operation, counter-terrorism police requested that the deputy National Security Adviser act as a witness in the case. [Interruption.] Let me go through this, because it is important to the challenges made by the hon. Gentleman. The DNSA made it clear that he would provide evidence on the basis of the Government’s position at the time of the offences, and that is crucial to the judgment that has been made in this case. The first statement was drafted—
The first statement was drafted between August and December 2023. During that time, Counter Terrorism Policing was updated on progress, including the information that the deputy National Security Adviser would not be able to call China an enemy, as that was not the position of the Government at the time of the offences.
“The information that we required related to the period between 31 December 2021 and 3 February 2023. The position of the current Government was not relevant to the case.”
I suggest that the shadow Home Secretary look at the next page.
Before finalising his statement in December 2023, the deputy National Security Adviser sighted the then National Security Adviser and the then Cabinet Office permanent secretary. On 18 December—this was all under the previous Government—the permanent secretary came back with three comments for the DNSA to consider. The DNSA then finalised the statement, and his private office sent a final version of the draft to the then Prime Minister through the No. 10 private office and No. 10 special advisers. Once the statements were submitted they were not shared, and in April 2024, formal charges were laid. That was the position under the previous Government.
Two supplementary witness statements from the DNSA were submitted in February and August 2025, following requests from Counter Terrorism Policing for further detail on the nature and extent of the threat to the UK from China. For the second statement, CTP specifically asked the DNSA to comment on whether China as a state, during the period from 31 December 2021 to 3 February 2023, posed an active threat; and whether that remained the case. For the third statement, CTP requested that the DNSA provide further points of detail regarding the UK Government’s assessment of the nature and extent of the threat, with examples. The DNSA faithfully and with full integrity—I noted that the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster implied that somehow he was not compliant with part 35 of the civil procedure rules—set out the various threats posed by the Chinese state in line with the UK Government’s position at the material time, in order to try to support a successful prosecution. We then come, obviously, to the meeting on 1 September to which the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster referred, and with which I shall deal in a moment.
I was fascinated by the opening speech of the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, in which he talked of the “clarity” of the last Government’s position.
“The government’s approach to China is guided by three pillars: strengthening our national security protections, aligning and cooperating with our partners, and engaging where it is consistent with our interest.”
Who said that? The shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster did in 2023, and here he is now trying to talk about the clarity of the position in 2023.
On 1 September, the National Security Adviser convened a routine meeting to discuss the UK’s relationship with China in the context of this case and several other upcoming moments. That is entirely what we would expect the National Security Adviser to do. We have learned that entirely separately, and entirely independent of Government, the CPS was deliberating on not offering evidence in this case. On 3 September, the DPP told the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA of his intention, subject to confirmation, not to put forward evidence, and unfortunately that decision was confirmed on 9 September. I must say to the Opposition that that is a matter of regret. It is quite rightly an independent decision, but it is a matter of regret. On 15 September 2025, the CPS officially confirmed the decision to discontinue the case against Cash and Berry.
I actually welcome scrutiny of that decision. That is why I welcome the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s inquiry into espionage cases and the Official Secrets Act and the Intelligence and Security Committee’s investigations into how classified intelligence was used. Since we last discussed the matter in this House, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Attorney General, the Cabinet Secretary, the National Security Adviser and the deputy National Security Adviser have all submitted evidence to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.
Yesterday, the Joint Committee heard evidence from the Director of Public Prosecutions and the First Treasury Counsel, and from the Cabinet Secretary and the deputy National Security Adviser at a later session. Tomorrow, the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Attorney General will give more evidence. A question has been raised about the National Security Adviser; he will also be giving evidence soon, and certainly before the end of the year.
Let me be clear with the House: the allegations of political interference in this case are absolutely baseless. The CPS decision to discontinue the case was independent of Government. Indeed, the Opposition should ask what the Director of Public Prosecutions himself said about that; he reiterated it again yesterday when he gave evidence, sitting alongside Tom Little KC.
The shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster asked about the meeting on 1 September. We heard about that yesterday from the Cabinet Secretary and the deputy National Security Adviser, who both attended that meeting: it was a discussion about the bilateral relationship between the UK and China in the context of the case. The Cabinet Secretary made it clear yesterday that the meeting was entirely appropriate; no discussion of evidence took place, and everyone involved was participating on the assumption that the case was going to go ahead.
It was only on 3 September—as was confirmed by him in his evidence to the JCNSS yesterday—that the Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA of his intention, subject to confirmation, that the CPS would not be putting forward evidence at trial. The Attorney General was informed on the same day.
It is important that I finish this point, because I have been challenged on the chronology and I am only too delighted to enlighten the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. The DPP confirmed to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that the position was agreed after a period of internal decision making within the CPS in the run-up to the meeting on 3 September. At that meeting, the DPP made it clear that the facts must not be briefed out further, with the exception of informing the NSA and the permanent secretary at the FCDO. The Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA therefore did not inform anyone else until shortly before the case became public. On 9 September, the CPS confirmed the decision to offer no evidence to the DNSA. That is the chronology.
Let me now directly address what the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster said, because I am conscious of the time. There is already an established mechanism for Parliament to address this issue. The Government are fully co-operating with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry and the ISC, and will provide evidence and appear before the Committee in the usual way.
In the motion, the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is seeking a wide range of documents. He was a Cabinet Office Minister himself, and he knows the sensitivity of those documents. He knows the legal professional privilege—
Let me emphasise that I support parliamentary scrutiny. I support and welcome the ongoing process with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. I support the Government’s continuing to engage with the ISC. What we will not do, though, is accede to the hon. Gentleman’s demand. He knows in his heart of hearts that it would be totally inappropriate for the long list of material he has stuck in the motion to be put in the public domain. Asking for open publication is completely different from the appropriate parliamentary scrutiny which, quite rightly, will go on.
Let me conclude by saying this. The Government and I are gravely disappointed that the trial did not proceed. In response to the point that was put to me by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), the DNSA’s evidence articulated clearly the range of threats that China posed to the UK’s national security and, indeed, our economic security at the material time. In the light of the threats that have been identified—I agree with the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster—this is a very grave matter. The Government are resolute in our determination to work across all parties and in partnership with the parliamentary security authorities, as was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket (Peter Prinsley), to ensure that espionage and interference by China or any other country is not successful in the UK.
The Government and the official Opposition truly have more common ground on this issue than they would like to admit. The common ground is clear in the DNSA’s evidence statements, and it has become clearer as this sorry saga has dragged on. It became clearer still in yesterday’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy that there is barely a cigarette paper between the position of the Conservative party when it was in government and the Labour Government today. The Conservative party will not admit that, because all it wants to do is pretend that the Government are entirely to blame, which is a laudable aim for any Opposition party. The Labour party cannot admit it, because it cannot publicly concede that its position on a matter central to our national security interests is the same as that of the Conservative Government they replaced last summer. It falls to us Liberal Democrats to speak the uncomfortable parts of the truth and tell it like it is, because nobody else is willing or able to do so.
While some of their brave Back Benchers spoke out when the Conservatives were in government, the machinery of the Government were keen to take an approach on China that was far from hawkish. At the heart of this issue is the often unspoken suggestion that we must take a nuanced position on China because our economy is now vulnerable to international threats. The truth is that Conservatives and their allies aligned to the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) cut us adrift from the EU, and they have left Britain more exposed to economic pressure from hostile states than we should be.
We find ourselves in a position where the Government cannot bring themselves to describe as a national security threat a nation whose spies hacked the data of 40 million British voters held by the Electoral Commission. The Government cannot bring themselves to describe as a national security threat a nation that has agreed a “no limits” partnership with Putin, despite Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Just 10 days ago, Beijing was publicly bullying the Government into granting permission for the new Chinese embassy at Tower Bridge, warning of “consequences” if the Government did not approve the plans. Is our weak international trading position, caused by the disastrous Brexit given to us by Conservative and Reform Members, influencing the Government’s decision making on the new embassy? It would seem foolish to argue otherwise.
I would draw a comparison between that and the Government’s position on Russia, which has been listed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. Given the “no limits” relationship between Beijing and Moscow, it is odd that Russia is listed while China is not. If the Government really wanted to strengthen the case for prosecution, perhaps placing China on the enhanced tier would have aided the prosecution, even absent the word “enemy”. The fact that the word “enemy” appeared on the original draft witness statement but was later removed again raises concerns about what was happening during the tenure of the previous Conservative Government. The public deserve clear answers not just from those on the Government Front Bench, but from those on the official Opposition’s Front Bench. Did the DNSA meet Ministers between the initial draft and the final version of the witness statement?
This House owes a debt of gratitude to the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) and the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns), both of whom have shown a great deal of bravery in the very best traditions of British public service. The DNSA’s witness statement referenced “backchannels” used to dissuade those two Members from criticising Confucius institutes in the UK. The Security Minister assured me that he was happy to speak with the Members in question last week about this very point. Has that meeting now taken place, and will the Minister let us know from the Dispatch Box what this Government’s understanding of the word “backchannel” is in that context? Does the word “backchannel” refer to the previous Government’s Whips, officials or others? The public deserve to know which element of the British state was attempting to prevent brave MPs from asking questions. If the Minister cannot let us know, perhaps someone on the Conservative Front Bench or anywhere else on the official Opposition Benches could clarify that for the House.
Finally, I turn to the involvement of the CPS in the collapse of this trial. The Government are adamant that the failure to designate China as an “enemy” is central to the failure to prosecute. I have already addressed the question of how that word was removed from the initial witness statement during the tenure of the previous Government, but I want to draw the House’s attention to the Roussev case, which was referenced earlier, that was being prosecuted at the same time. In that instance, the judge stated that
“any state which presently poses an active threat to the UK’s national security can properly be described as ‘an enemy’ in ordinary language.”
The outcome of that case was the conviction of six Bulgarian nationals last July for operating as part of a Russian espionage network. The CPS has serious questions to answer about why the China case fell apart when the term “enemy” was not an issue for the Roussev case as recently as last July.
Transparency and independence in national security decisions are an essential part of maintaining public trust. This case has thrown that trust into serious jeopardy at a time when the embassy planning application is already undermining the nation’s confidence in the Government’s approach to relations with China. Neither the Government nor the official Opposition have provided clarity. The public could be forgiven for thinking that both sides are ducking responsibility. The Liberal Democrats believe that we need a statutory public inquiry to get to the bottom of what went wrong and how influence over China policy caused the collapse of this case.
Conservative Members are being nothing short of opportunistic and are playing political games with our national security. It is, of course, their job and their right to oppose what the Government are doing, but on issues of national security I would have thought there could be more appreciation of the national interest and the nuances involved.
In my speech I am going to do some myth-busting—quite a useful thing to do in this age of misinformation, disinformation and hyperbolic chest-thumping. What we are seeing is a somewhat phoney, but very definitely opportunistic, brand of national security patriotism. Frankly, if ever over-inflated balloons of confected outrage needed to be burst, it is today. So, I will bust two myths and state two truisms.
Myth No. 1: a narrative that the Tories try to push is that Labour prioritised a strategic relationship with communist China. However, the Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber-attacks to foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions. The true fault lies with the previous Government. The right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), the then Foreign Secretary, said in April 2023 that summing up China in one word as a “threat” was
“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise”.
The Leader of the Opposition, while serving in the Cabinet, also said:
“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.
Now that this trial has collapsed, they are accusing this Government of interfering, when it was their carefully worded Government policy that did not define China as an “enemy”—and there is nothing that present Ministers can do to change that.
Myth No. 2, another myth that the Tories will continue to spread, is that the Labour Government interfered with the delivering of evidence. The shadow Home Secretary has made the accusation that
“the government chose to deliberately submit inadequate evidence that led to two alleged spies getting off scot-free.”
This accusation simply has no real substance, as the Prime Minister has confirmed that no Labour Ministers or special advisers were involved with the provision of evidence for this case.
I shall move on to what I believe all Members across this House know to be true—truism No. 1. It is dangerous to undermine public confidence in the Government on matters of national security for party political advantage. Truism No. 2 is the more important one. It is perfectly possible to hold two thoughts in your mind at the same time: one is that China is clearly a strategic rival to the UK in certain areas, and another is that it is a vital partner, whether on the Security Council, in tackling global challenges or, of course, for trade and investment.
I will conclude, taking the advice of Madam Deputy Speaker, by saying that the Conservatives really do need to look in the mirror on this issue. This Government are acting with integrity.
The problem in this case is that the Government were never prepared to describe that animal as a duck. They must have known from a very early period; indeed, the first senior Treasury counsel said yesterday that, even in August, he had made the point abundantly plain to the Government that unless they reconsidered their approach and described the blasted animal as a duck, the case would go down the pan. There was nothing to prevent the Government, through their expert witness, from saying, “In our view, China was a national security threat in 2021”—nothing at all to prevent that.
There was nothing to prevent that because it was a question of fact. The fact is that the Government were not prepared to change their approach. It is a perfectly legitimate point for the right hon. Member for Torfaen to say to me, “Back in 2021, the policy of the Government was not to describe China as an enemy,” but at that time, we had not had the spying, the intimidation, and the direct targeting of this institution and the democratic assembly of our people that we have now seen by 2025. Things have moved on, and it was incumbent upon the Government to reconsider their approach, which was that they would not describe a duck as a duck. The witness was prepared to say, “It has webbed feet, it swims, it quacks, it has a bill—but we are not prepared to call it a duck.”
Are you telling me, Madam Deputy Speaker, that the right hon. Gentleman can look this House in the eye and say that nobody raised this problem inside No. 10 and said, “We have a policy problem. It is a roadblock to this case. What are we going to do about it?”? Is he saying that that was never discussed with the National Security Adviser, that the DNSA never raised that with any relevant Minister? The Attorney General, when he met on 3 September, said, “Well, I couldn’t intervene on matters of sufficiency of evidence.” That is perfectly true; he cannot intervene, but he could challenge. He could say, “What do you need? Is there anything I can do by way of intercession with ministries to ensure that you get the evidence that you require?” But nothing was said. Nothing was said on 3 September because “nothing” was the policy of the Government. It was to wait while this case slid down the slope straight into the pan where no doubt many of the, not inaptly named, mandarins of Whitehall were perfectly content to see it slide.
There is extraordinary cheek in the right hon. Gentleman, who came to this House four or five years ago with his Humble Address when he asked for legal advice—advice on the most sensitive negotiating matters that this country was engaged in with the Berlaymont—to be disclosed for all to see, now saying that we should not see the truth of what in reality the Government were saying and doing at the time.
If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, it is almost certainly a duck, and when I apply it to what the right hon. Gentleman says, it is almost certainly a complete crock of old—
Secondly, I welcome Mr Speaker’s guidance on how to improve Members’ security. Members must not forget that we have a personal responsibility too to protect ourselves, our fellow Members and our staff from such foreign interference, which includes in our hiring practices and vetting of staff who can work in this building, which has not been often mentioned in this debate.
However, I want mainly to warn of the danger of some of the rhetoric that has been used to date in this case. Of course, it is the job of His Majesty’s Opposition to probe, challenge and scrutinise the Government, yet what has happened in this case goes way beyond that and risks harming us all, just as spying on our Parliament harms us all. I am talking about the repeated unsubstantiated and scurrilous suggestions that any Minister or special adviser in this Government interfered or intervened in the independent decision making of the CPS.
In an article in The Times on 15 October, the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), accused the Government of deliberately choosing to collapse the case:
“It is clear the government chose to deliberately submit inadequate evidence that led to two alleged spies getting off scot-free.”
He went on:
“They must now also explain who was guiding Matt Collins in preparing this evidence.”
That is an appalling accusation to make with zero evidence and an insult to the professional integrity of the deputy National Security Adviser, and I hope the shadow Home Secretary withdraws it. Sadly, he was not alone. On 13 October, the Leader of the Opposition told the BBC:
“This looks like a deliberate decision to collapse the case and curry favour with the regime in China.”
She went on to say that she suspected that Ministers
“have decided that closer economic ties with China were more important than due process and our national security.”
Just look at those words: “looks like” and “suspect”. There is not a shred of evidence, only insinuation. That is not the language of a Prime Minister in waiting.
As the Security Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), has made clear, it was an entirely independent decision by the CPS to discontinue the case, and the CPS has confirmed that it came under no outside pressure to do so. As for the Whitehall meeting on 1 September referenced by the Opposition in their motion, crucially, Mr Collins said yesterday that there had been
“at least four lawyers in the room who ensured that there was no discussion about the evidence”
in the case.
This House has maintained a proud cross-party consensus on Ukraine, helping President Zelensky to stand up to Putin—a consensus that is, sadly, not helped at times by Reform, whose Putin apologists are indeed Moscow’s useful idiots of the 21st century. We need to maintain a similar cross-party consensus in fighting against Chinese threats.
It is vital for our own national security and is in our national interests that we maintain a similar consensus as we have on Ukraine on the threats, challenges and opportunities posed by China. We should all stand firm in this House on issues of national security and human rights and on the threats China poses clearly to our economy, our industrial secrets, our intellectual property, our democracy and, yes, our cyber-space. We should also recognise that it is important that the UK engages with China where it is in our hard-headed national interest—and mutual interest—to do so, from climate change to global health and trade.
That is why the Opposition in government had a policy of protect, align and engage—there is that word “engage” again. How different is that really from our own compete, challenge and co-operate? I know that this place often thrives on political knockabout, with parties trying to seize on opponents’ perceived weakness, but in accusing one’s political opponents of somehow being enemies of the people and plotting non-existent cover-ups, the only beneficiaries are our real enemies abroad.
I am not going to take the blandishments of the hon. Member for Rugby (John Slinger) who told us to look in the mirror. I stopped looking in the mirror a long, long time ago. In fact, when I was elected in 1992 I was told by a journalist at the Express that I could look in the mirror and see my career behind me. I feel like I have been walking backwards ever since.
Can I just say, I think the whole principle that underlies all this is the Government’s behaviour over this decision? I will come to the decision in a second, but I want to address how the Government dealt with the decision—and how they have publicly dealt with it, which is really rather peculiar. It has been almost impossible throughout this to drag information out of the Government about why the DNSA took the decisions he took, where the Government were in this and when meetings took place. Denials slid towards acceptances that dates were in fact as they stood. As I understand it, it was even exclaimed by the Prime Minister that The Sunday Times was lying when it raised the idea of there being a meeting on 1 September containing all the various individuals, including the DNSA.
It has been a sort of meticulous nonsense. Dodge, duck, dive, dip, and dodge—the five Ds of dodgeball, or in this case the five Ds of dodge the spying case. Getting to the truth of this has been painful, and if it is painful for the Government, they have only themselves to blame. Had they come out straightaway at the beginning and been clear about all this, instead of hiding behind the DNSA, they might have found it easier.
I find ridiculous the position that the DNSA stated yesterday—that he was bound to reflect the position of the Government. The DNSA is not bound to reflect the position of the Government. He was asked by the DPP—and therefore bound to respond to the DPP—whether or not he said that China was an active security threat. What I do not understand is how the then DNSA, both at the time and again when giving evidence yesterday, was able to say that China posed a range of threats—just as the Minister said—on different areas all across the board, from sanctions right the way through to espionage. I do not understand the difference between posing a series of significant threats to our national security in different areas across the board and being a threat to our national security. It is impossible to even conceive that we could define this so narrowly that we are unable to come out with the very simple statement: “They pose a threat to our national security.”
From my standpoint, I face a threat. I have been chased and regularly followed by wolf warriors, which are low-level intelligence operatives of China. They have impersonated me abroad and spread lies about what I have said, and those of us who have been sanctioned have been spied on. I know what a threat looks like. It looks like that. It is not a duck; it is a threat. There is no reason why any self-respecting Government could not have said that. The DNSA should have said that straight off—not go out and tell us that the police asked him to introduce what had been in the manifesto of the Labour party in the last election and then say that he knew nothing at all about it previously but had to put this in context. He was not asked to put it in context. The DSNA was asked to state clearly, from what he sees and the evidence he has taken, whether China poses an active security threat.
At the nub of this is another particularly important point. The 1 September meeting is critical in all this, because we have been given assurances throughout this—by the Prime Minister, for example, at Prime Minister’s questions on 15 October. He said:
“There was no further submission of evidence, one way or the other, after any discussion in September.”—[Official Report, 15 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 368.]
Yet we know that now not to be the case. Why was the Prime Minister making such a fundamental statement at Prime Minister’s questions trying to shut this down? Did nobody bother to tell him that this had gone to a meeting? By the way, we were told that at no stage was the National Security Adviser or any other appointed individual at any meetings with or in contact with the DNSA throughout the submission of evidence. That is utterly untrue. We know that the DNSA was at the meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser on 1 September. What did they discuss? Was it football scores or what was right in front of them there and then: the still-unfinished business of whether or not the DNSA was going to comply with the DPP’s requirement for a very clear statement? It is that bit of subterfuge, with dipping and dodging throughout, that is really quite peculiar.
I have respect for the Minister. When he gets to his feet, can we not have this ridiculous game of “You did this” and “You said that”? I would simply like him to recognise that China poses a national security threat. Let us deal with that threat and take clear action, and not play games with terminological inexactitudes about what happened at what meeting.
We now know that the DNSA met all those characters —we do not know who they are—so the minutes of the meeting should be released. If the Government will not release them to Parliament, they can do it in camera to the Intelligence and Security Committee. They should do it to clear the record; I recommend that they do. People like me, the Chairman of Ways and Means and others have suffered attacks from this brutal regime, which has massacred people in China and committed genocide. Surely now is the time to make our position clear.
When I held a roundtable with my local Hong Kong community earlier this year to discuss proposed changes to immigration, I was saddened, but unfortunately not surprised, to hear that many members of the community chose not to attend a meeting with their local MP because they were worried about the long arm of the Chinese state, and the repercussions of the Hong Kong national security law on them and their family. Transnational repression is being used by hostile states to directly prosecute those whom they see as their enemies overseas, but it also has a wider, chilling effect, leaving whole communities afraid to engage with their basic democratic rights.
Meanwhile, I grow increasingly concerned about the influence of foreign actors on misinformation and disinformation online. In recent months, I have seen how anonymous posting on local social media groups in my community can have a pervasive effect on community cohesion and our democracy. Social media companies need to step up and do more on that. I am not suggesting that every anonymous social media post is from a Russian bot, but we all know that Russia and other states are using social media against us.
There have been direct attacks on our democracy, too, such as those from these Chinese spies. Last month, Reform UK’s former leader in Wales, Nathan Gill, pled guilty to eight counts of bribery; he was bribed to make statements in favour of Russia while he was a Member of the European Parliament.
I turn to the China spy case. Part of the reason why the case did not proceed to trial and the two gentlemen could not be prosecuted was prevarication over reforming the Official Secrets Act. The Act was introduced in 1911 —it predates the first world war—and despite unanimous recognition for at least eight years that it was completely out of date and not fit for purpose, the previous Government failed to act to fix the holes in our national security laws and left our country ill defended.
“that China’s view of an ideal future…would be antithetical to the UK’s interests”.
In its conclusion, China was detailed 11 times as a “threat”, an “acute threat” or a “grave threat”. Why can the UK Government today, based on a report from more than two years ago, not describe China as a threat?
I stood for election on a manifesto that committed to our co-operating with China where we can, challenging them where we must, and competing with them where we need to. I genuinely think that is a mature way of dealing with a state that does not share our values, and that poses a great threat to our democracy and to the way that citizens and residents of this country operate within a democracy, but that is also the second-largest economy in the world. As the former director of MI6 said on the “Today” show on the BBC this morning,
“we need to learn to walk and chew gum at the same time.”
We need a mature acceptance of the risks that China poses, and that means recognising that we cannot just walk off the pitch and not deal with the second-largest economy in the world. It is infantile and not realistic to suggest otherwise.
If the new Act had been in place sooner, it is possible that these men could have been prosecuted successfully under it. I therefore have a simple question for Conservative Front Benchers, and they need to be clear on this point: why did they wait so long to replace a vital piece of security legislation, and make sure that we had the appropriate tools to keep this country safe? I am happy to take interventions on that point.
That report is clear and unambiguous in calling out China as a national security threat to UK interests. It is also crystal clear, taking the report as a whole, that China’s threat is both live and active. The report was from July 2023, and the alleged offences took place, apparently, from December ’21 to February ’23. I am aware that the refresh of the integrated review of ’21 was in March ’23. However, the Committee’s inquiry started taking evidence from those senior officials from November 2017 to a similar time in 2019, and then the subsequent Committee carried on its work. Senior national security officials were giving evidence to the ISC about China being a national security threat well before the offences happened in this place.
The key word in this whole episode involving the deputy National Security Adviser—that is, the DNSA for intelligence, defence and security, not the other two remaining DNSAs, unless the Minister wants to correct me—is “active”. The question is whether China was an active threat, as underscored by the testimony to the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy yesterday. The evidence in the ISC’s report would suggest that China has been known to be an active threat for some time. I have mentioned the various reviews. Indeed, in his own witness statement, the DSNA refers to China conducting “large-scale espionage operations”. Again, this is not a historical reference or a past-tense reference; it is clearly referring to the here-and-now operations taking place today. There is clearly an active threat, not just a general or undetermined threat.
China being an active threat was also underscored by the director general of the Security Service’s recent speech, in which he referred to China’s
“cyber-espionage…clandestine technology transfer…interference in UK public life”
and
“harassment and intimidation of opponents”.
Once more, these threats are not just historical; they are current and active, happening in the UK right now. They have not stopped. They are increasing. They continue.
The director general’s speech was explicit. The Security Service is very clear-eyed about the national security threat from China, even though Ministers might be tempted, arguably, to recalibrate and put economic interests over the UK’s national security interests. I wonder whether there might be other factors at work here, too, including underlying vested interests and competing interests between different parts of Government, and even some conflicting personalities. We do not have time to go into that today. Today’s debate is rightly focused on whether politics got in the way of national security.
A wider question might be why a political adviser was appointed to the role of National Security Adviser in the first place, as my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) said. Perhaps there is something to see here. The current National Security Adviser has wide and vast experience, and I pay tribute to him for his important role in the Northern Ireland peace process and other peace-brokering exercises he has done around the world. There is absolutely no doubt that he is a long-standing, distinguished civil servant, but the fact that an outsider, rather than insider, became the National Security Adviser might be an issue as well. Some may see that as a strength, but today’s proceedings might suggest that it could be a weakness in this case. There is a question mark about that, of course.
Back to China. The conclusions and recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s inquiry on China talk about proper oversight. We need to ensure that, for example, the investment security unit has proper oversight by the ISC, because if there was ever a place where it was likely that politics would conflict with the economic interests of this country, it was that unit. That is absolutely critical. When politics gets too close to professional, cool, calm intelligence judgments, the situation will always be fraught with danger, as this country witnessed with the Iraq war. In conclusion, when—
We have had a complex relationship with China for the past decade. I cannot be the only one who is old enough to remember the pictures of the President of China pulling pints in the Plough with the former Prime Minister, who was subsequently the Foreign Secretary when some of what we are talking about was happening. We have not had a consistent approach to China publicly. I say “publicly”, because the evidence we have heard from various Opposition Members this evening makes it quite clear that officials in the last Government were naming China as a threat. They were using that terminology, but unfortunately the political faces of that Administration were not.
I will not get into the rights and wrongs of that, but it is clear that there has been inconsistency in the language applied to China throughout this period. If I were more legally minded, I would say that that may have led to the current situation, in which the CPS is saying one thing and the DNSA is saying something else, and we are getting the interpretation of an illustrious former Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and Tavistock (Sir Geoffrey Cox). By the way, I remember the debate in November 2017 when we argued for a Humble Address. Many Conservative Members said that it was a terrible idea to publish Government information, and it could never be done because it would undermine that information. They said that in the future, they might ask for such information and we would say no, and we are clearly at that point today.
We all invest a lot of time and energy into this job, and into our staff. We are at the mercy of the vetting services to make sure that the staff who work for us are looked into properly. We just do not know, for instance, whether operatives from other hostile states are active in staffing units. We can pretend we do, but we honestly do not. I hope we will get some answers from the Minister about how we have got to this point, but what I want to understand is how will we make sure that the same thing does not happen again.
How will we get to a point, in this Parliament, where we can be sure that every Member of Parliament—regardless of which political party they come from, the position they hold, their standing or their length of service—is free from such political interference, oversight and spying? How can we ensure that no more Members are sanctioned, as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was? He has talked eloquently to the House on numerous occasions about the disruption to his life. For us to do our job properly, we must have confidence in the people around us and the advice we receive from officials, and we have to be certain that the processes that are in place to keep us safe are doing their job.
Ultimately, we all come here to do a job, and to do it well. We are only human, and we ought to hold at the forefront of our minds the fact that mistakes have been made—I think we would all agree on that; I do not think anyone can say, hand on heart, that everything has gone perfectly up to this point—but the key thing is how we learn from that and prevent it from happening again. That, Madam Deputy Speaker, is where I will draw my remarks to a conclusion.
China’s history tells us that already: six decades of military occupation in Tibet; the mass detention, re-education and forced sterilisation of the Uyghur population; we have witnessed democracy come under attack in Hong Kong time and again; and there is the ever-present threat against Taiwan. China runs a global influence operation and it has been acknowledged in this House that the united front has penetrated every sector of the United Kingdom’s economy. We have been well warned.
As I said earlier, and as has been repeated many times, in 2023 the Intelligence and Security Committee said that China was a “threat”, an “acute threat” and a “grave threat”. In 2022, the head of MI5, Ken McCallum, said that the Chinese threat
“might feel abstract. But it’s real and it’s pressing. We need to talk about it. We need to act.”
That is what we have failed to do until now.
If one of the key hinderances to the prosecution appears to be the concern that the Government would not be able to convince the jury that China was an enemy, how would the Minister describe a state that conducts long-term, large-scale espionage operations, including recruiting those who work in Parliament, and that poses a serious national security threat on these islands? Why has it taken the failure of this case for the Government to definitively state that China is a threat? Why has this position come as a response to an embarrassing political crisis?
Why has this position come as a response to an embarrassing political crisis, rather than as the principled position and proactive strategy for which so many of us have been calling for so many years? Why is it, as Luke de Pulford, executive director of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, put it that
“the Chinese Communist Party’s progress towards the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’…has met formidable resistance, not from governments, but little ole’ constituency MPs.”?
That is a really good question to consider.
The Government and the Opposition will squabble over who met with whom when, about who said what when, and about who they can blame to squeeze as much political one-upmanship from this case as possible, but the Chinese Communist party must be laughing at this House right now, as we ping-pong when it is clear that we need national security to be taken very seriously and we need to see China placed on the foreign influence registration scheme.
Public trust and the confidence of international allies are wavering, and the ongoing threat to our national security, democratic institutions and economic infrastructure remains. To conclude, it is time to end the inertia, caution and self-censorship from Whitehall and from Government when it comes to China, and to acknowledge, address and act on the threat that we continuously face.
When the Conservative party brings Opposition day debates to the House, I attend because I am interested to hear the development of thinking in the party as it seeks to become a future Government. I also think about the party’s record in government and where it is going. I will make two points that I think the Opposition will disagree with, but I hope some Members will agree with my third point.
First, any Government, from whichever party, have a duty to invest in the institutions, infrastructure, capabilities and knowledge that enable our long-term advantage and security. Those are not built in five minutes, but they can be built in 14 years. It is my view that in the 14 years that the Conservatives were in power, they gave insufficient regard to building those things that can shore up our security.
Secondly, in cases where the Conservative Government did bother to build or pursue infrastructure, they opened the door to Chinese firms. While the Conservative leadership pretend to know what they think about China now, in truth they did not know what to think about China when they were in office, and that is an important reality to stare at. When it came to Huawei and 5G, the Conservatives were in, then they were out. When it came to nuclear, the Conservatives were in, then they were out. We are still unpacking George Osborne’s mistake on that front.
That contrasts sharply with the position of the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I rediscovered his 2020 Hudson Institute speech, and I thought it was a very good insight into the situation at that time. Looking back at it five years on, it had considerable foresight on what has occurred. I am very sorry and saddened that he has experienced what he has at the hands of the Chinese leadership—other colleagues have experienced the same—but he is in a minority in his party in standing up on these issues.
I do not believe that the Conservative leadership have been as clear in their thinking or as forceful in their condemnation, and for the leadership of the right hon. Gentleman’s party to now pretend that they were is inaccurate and does him a disservice. We should contrast his position with the words of the Leader of the Opposition when she was in Cabinet. As the Business Secretary pursuing business, she said:
“We certainly should not be describing China as a foe”.
We should contrast his position with that of one of the nine Conservative Foreign Secretaries, who said it would be
“impossible, impractical and—most importantly—unwise”
to sum up China in one word as a threat. As a leadership team, the Conservatives need to stop throwing mud and to come to terms with what happened on their watch.
We must also look reality in the face: we cannot shy away from engagement with China. I bet that most Opposition Members have an iPhone in their pocket that was made in China; I bet they have other things in their home that were made in China. We must engage, but all of us in this Parliament must do so with our eyes wide open about the risks that that involves. Some of us in this Parliament have prophesied about that for many years and for longer than others, but we must be aware of that.
The Opposition called this debate to throw mud, but it is an opportunity to think about the wider security context in which we operate. As the months go on, I am intrigued to see what the Conservative party’s posture will be as it contemplates the security and intelligence environment we are in. Will it shy away from engagement with China—a significant market and economic opportunity for us—or seek to engage with China with its eyes wide open?
The Conservatives need to accept that they did less than they could have done in office to create the foundations for our security and economic growth. In so doing, they made us more vulnerable. Until they accept that and apologise for it, it begs the question: why should any of us in this Chamber and in the constituencies we represent listen to them ever again on the subject of keeping our country safe?
Let me take a step back from this issue to look at the way in which the public will perceive it. This is the biggest spy story in this country’s history, at least in this century. We can get into the tit-for-tat about what the PM did or did not know, whether the National Security Adviser speaks to his deputy or not, who told the deputy National Security Adviser that he needs to toe the Government line, and how the Labour manifesto got into the witness statements, but I want to concentrate more on the bigger picture.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) rightly pointed out the behaviour of the Government. The Prime Minister could have sorted this out by coming to the House and speaking about this topic. He could have laid it all out and put it all forward. The only thing we have had has been a statement before Prime Minister’s questions. Of course, we Back Benchers cannot ask questions after such statements—there is no way for us to do so. If the Government are so angry, why is more action not being taken? Why are people not being fired, and why are we still having this debate several weeks on if all the information is so crystal clear that this House can move on?
I am worried that this is a pattern of behaviour with the Prime Minister, because we saw this with the ambassador. The Prime Minister was the decision maker on that issue, but he did not come to this House; he sent one of his Ministers. I expect that the retort from Labour Members will be, “It was always thus”, but the reason this saddens me so much is that the Prime Minister is being judged by the standard that he set. He said that he would do things differently, but he is not. He is not coming to the House to explain when he could do so. We know that the information and the decisions rest with him.
When I pushed the Minister, the hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), about leadership last time, that was not directed at him—I have a great deal of respect for him. He is following the leadership of the Prime Minister, who has not come to this House to explain what is going on. If this issue is as clearcut as Labour Members have said, that would be an easy case to make and this House would believe the Prime Minister, but we are not there. That is why I worry, because it leads to a wider debate and wider concerns among the public about whether something is going on.
My worry, though, is that the public are joining dots. The Government will say that there are no dots to be joined, but the longer this goes on and the more incidents come out, it becomes harder to make that argument. That brings us full circle to where I started, because this is about transparency and releasing the documentation.
Even if the Prime Minister’s account of the situation is true, that means he does not have control over his officials. Serious national security decisions are being made without his knowledge. That, too, is a profound state of weakness. It is important to establish the facts.
Whatever the facts may be, this is not how serious countries behave. Regardless of our politics, we should all want our country to be respected by our friends and our adversaries. Under this Government, our friends see us as unreliable and our adversaries see us as a pushover. It is time for the Government to tell the truth and undo some of the harm that they have done to this country’s standing in the world.
The unanswered question in all this is what happened between the spring of 2024 and September 2025, when suddenly the same evidential test was not met. What changed? It was met, or the charges could never have been brought, but suddenly it was not met and the charges were dropped. It seems pretty clear from what has been said to a Committee of this House that what changed was that the Government backed off in their evidence as to what would establish whether China was an enemy.
The Government were assisted in the meantime by the Bulgarian case, where the Court of Appeal refined “enemy” to “posing threat or threats”. Indeed, the Court said it was a matter of common sense as to whether something or someone was an enemy. There is no greater jury question than to decide whether or not something is common sense. The prosecution looked easier after the Court of Appeal decision, not harder, yet the prosecution was dropped. That is yet to be explained to this House. It seems to me that it can only be explained by the Government’s failing to come up to proof. Since they had come up to proof to bring the charge in the first place, they obviously retreated. We can talk around this as much as we like, but that seems to me to be the immovable reality of the situation.
There are, of course, issues here about the equivocation of the Government towards China, but it is an equivocation that is even infecting devolution. Coming up in Northern Ireland is a co-sponsored conference between the Chinese Government and the Sinn Féin Economy Minister to talk about infrastructure and investment. I say to this Government that they need to take a long, hard look at the way in which devolved institutions, particularly in Stormont, are playing footsie with the Chinese Government.
As recently as 12 days ago, the director general of M15 said that China posed a daily threat. In July 2022, he and his FBI counterpart said that China was posing a growing threat. The former Security Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), said it in April 2024, from that Dispatch Box, and the July 2021 integrated review said that China posed the
“biggest state-based threat to the UK’s economic security.”
It is pretty simple. I have said it, and the Government could have said it, but they did not.
The Government’s commentary on this case has been evasive and sometimes misleading. For example, the Prime Minister claimed in India, on 7 October, that what mattered in this case was the previous Government’s designation of China. He said it again, from that Dispatch Box, on 15 October. He said that the issue was the position of the last Government, and the Paymaster General said it again in his opening speech. That claim, made by the Prime Minister and made again by the Paymaster General earlier today, is categorically untrue. We know it is untrue because on page 4 of his letter, the Director of Public Prosecutions said it was untrue. He said:
“The test was therefore positively not what the then Government was prepared to… say in public…whether framed as…policy or otherwise…but…whether China was—as a matter of fact—an active threat to national security.”
He said it again in evidence yesterday. He said:
“We were looking to the DNSA to provide evidence of the actual threat…and not what government policy was.”
The DPP has said that categorically in writing and in evidence yesterday. What the Prime Minister said was misleading, and I ask this Minister, the Security Minister, to retract it on the Prime Minister’s behalf.
Moreover, the Security Minister himself said on 15 September that the collapse of the case had come as a big surprise to the Government, and that they heard about it only that morning. He said:
“the decision was communicated this morning”.—[Official Report, 15 September 2025; Vol. 772, c. 1187.]
That, I am afraid, was not true. The decision was communicated on 3 September at the latest, and it most certainly did not come as a surprise to the Government.
It was not the case that, as the Minister claimed, he could not comment on why the case had collapsed, as if he did not know about it, because on no fewer than nine different occasions, according to the DPP, the Crown Prosecution Service pleaded with the Government—begged the Government—to say those simple words that I said a couple of minutes ago and the Government, over two years, refused to say. In June 2024, December 2024, February 2025, May 2025, July 2025—twice, on 3 and 10 July—August 2025, 3 September 2025 and 9 September 2025, the CPS begged the Government to say those simple words, and the Government would not say them. Why exactly was the Security Minister acting all surprised on 15 September, claiming that he did not know what was going on, when on nine separate occasions the CPS had pleaded with the Government?
Now we come to the meeting of 1 September, a meeting that the Home Secretary, quoted in The Telegraph on 5 October, claimed did not happen. Well, we now know that it did happen. What we do not know, however, is precisely what was discussed at that meeting. We have not seen the minutes of it, and we do not know the actions arising from it. We do know that it was chaired by Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser. We know that many people were there. We know that the deputy National Security Adviser, Matt Collins, was there. We also know that on 14 August, two and a half weeks before that meeting, he attended a conference that included the First Treasury Counsel, at which it became clear that Mr Collins would not change his evidence, and the case would therefore collapse. So Mr Collins went into that meeting on 1 September, most likely knowing that the case was unlikely to proceed. Was that discussed? Was the possibility of providing more evidence discussed in that meeting? We do not know. That is why the minutes need to be published.
We know for a fact that, on 3 September, the Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Cabinet Secretary and the DNSA that the case was not going to be proceeding on the evidence as it stood. The DPP also said in page 6 of his letter:
“It was agreed that”
the Cabinet Secretary
“might inform a limited group, including some ministers.”
I therefore ask the Security Minister to tell the House now which Ministers were informed pursuant to that meeting on 3 September, and whether they took any action as a result—for example, deciding to provide better evidence, which they could have done. It was recently reported in The Sunday Times that the Home Secretary got wind of this around that time, and decided to try to intervene.
I did ask the Security Minister this in an urgent question last week, and many of my hon. Friends did as well, but he did not answer the question, so perhaps he now can: when did the Home Secretary become aware of the collapse of the trial? Did she try to intervene? If so, how? It is quite clear that the Government, had they wanted to, could have intervened between 3 September, when the Cabinet Secretary was informed and was given permission to inform Ministers, and the meeting on 9 September, six days later, when the CPS tried, one last time—at least the ninth time—to get the evidence it needed, but, once again, it was not forthcoming.
Did the Government have any discussions in that period, between 3 and 9 September, about further evidence that they might have provided? If they did not, why not? A few simple words were all that were needed—words not about the previous Government’s policy, but about the facts as they stood on the ground. I uttered those words just a few minutes ago—it was simple enough—and if this Government had said what I said a few minutes ago, this case would have proceeded. Why did they choose not to do that?
Members of this Parliament have been spied on by a hostile state: a state that has stolen intellectual property on an industrial scale, both covertly and through acquisition; a state that plans to build a large embassy, probably for espionage purposes among other things; a state that has opened secret police stations; a state that has put bounties on the heads of people living in the United Kingdom; and a state that has actively supported Russia in its war against Ukraine. The Government could not produce evidence that it was an active and current threat, even though I think it is quite clear to everyone in this Chamber that it was.
Why did the Government not provide the evidence they were asked to provide at least nine times? Is it because they are more interested in getting some sort of economic bailout from the Chinese, to fix the mess they have created, than they are in our national security? That is the question they need to answer.
If this House and the country are to understand exactly what happened with this case, we need full transparency and full disclosure: the minutes of those meetings, the actions arising from them, and the correspondence with the CPS. If they really want transparency—as the Minister for the Cabinet Office said earlier—all they have to do is support this motion and put this material where it belongs: in the public domain.
As I have repeatedly set out to the House, the Government are extremely disappointed that this case will not be heard in court. I also share Members’ concerns about the threats that we face from espionage.
We have been consistently clear that no Ministers and no special advisers interfered in the provision of evidence under this Government.
Let me return to the DNSA’s evidence. As his written evidence makes clear—this is an important point that the House will want to note—from the moment the DNSA’s witness statement was submitted, he was a fully bound witness in criminal proceedings. His evidence had not yet been heard or tested in court, so his witness evidence could not be and was not shared, and this was later confirmed by the CPS.
In this debate and in recent weeks, there have been a number of different, and at times conflicting, claims about this Government’s involvement in the case, and I want to address those claims directly today. At the DNSA’s request, the word “enemy” was removed from the first witness statement during the drafting process, because it did not reflect the Government’s policy at the time. The DNSA made amendments to ensure that his witness statement text reflected his assessment of the strongest elements of the evidential material provided by Counter Terrorism Policing, by demonstrating that the information that was alleged to have been provided was prejudicial to the safety or the interests of the UK.
When CTP approached the DNSA to write a supplementary statement in November 2024, he was specifically asked to comment on whether China posed an active threat to the UK’s national security during the period of 31 December 2021 to 3 February 2023, and to confirm whether that remains the position at the time of writing. That is why paragraph 6 of the second statement references part of the current Government policy towards China.
As time is short, I want to focus on the DNSA and the evidence that he has given, because that is important for the House. The DNSA confirmed to the JCNSS yesterday that he used language from an answer to a parliamentary question in his third statement, in which he provided the current Government’s position as context, as had been requested. The DNSA’s third statement was written in a way that ensured consistency with his first two statements.
For the sake of clarity, I will say it again: the current National Security Adviser had no role in either the substance of the case or the evidence provided. There has been misreporting, speculation and fabrication about the officials’ meeting that the National Security Adviser chaired on 1 September—the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) mentioned it just a moment ago. I can tell him and the House that a meeting of senior officials took place on 1 September to discuss the UK’s relationship with China. The meeting was specifically set up to provide—
The meeting was specifically set up to provide the FCDO with an opportunity to discuss—at an appropriately senior official level; no Ministers attended the meeting—what the approach would be to handling engagement with China across a range of scenarios related to this case, as well as in relation to wider issues that would come up. Those who attended the meeting were operating on the basis that the trial would go ahead at the start of October.
Meetings such as this are a routine part of the NSA’s role.
Meetings such as this are a routine part of the National Security Adviser’s role of co-ordinating Departments across Government.
I will try to reflect some of the points that have been made in this debate, including the point from the shadow Home Secretary, who asked specifically about the Home Secretary. I can tell him and the House that no Minister—no Minister in this Government—was involved in any aspect of the production of evidence.
The right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green spoke about the nature and the description of the threats we face from China. Let me say to him that it is completely unacceptable that he and other Members of this House are sanctioned, and I give him an absolute assurance of the seriousness with which this Government take those particular threats. My hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Peter Swallow) spoke about transnational repression. He has raised it previously, and I can tell him that the defending democracy taskforce has concluded a review, and the Government have developed a range of support and security mechanisms. Most importantly, however, we condemn any malign activity towards anyone here in the UK.
The right hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) spoke about the work of the ISC, and he was right to do so. The Government welcome the work of the ISC in looking carefully at the circumstances of this case, as we do the important work of the JCNSS. I thought my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Gareth Snell) made the really important point that, given the concerns that have rightly been expressed right across this House about what has happened, we should be trying to seek to work together and establish a consensus. I thought he made that point very powerfully.
Time is running short, so let me say to the House that national security is the first duty of this Government. That is why we oppose the Opposition’s motion, which would see the release not only of information subject to legal professional privilege, but of information vital to the security of the United Kingdom, including advice to the Prime Minister. Successive Governments, including the previous Government in which the shadow Home Secretary served as a Minister, have maintained that position. This is not a question about parliamentary scrutiny. We welcome the ongoing process with the JCNSS, and we look forward to continuing to work with it, as we do with the ISC. This Government will continue to develop a consistent and pragmatic approach to economic engagement, but without compromising our national security.
It is precisely because everything this Government do is rooted in the national interest that I say that this Government are extremely disappointed that this case has collapsed. It is right that the matter is being investigated by the appropriate parliamentary Committees, and we look forward to co-operating with that work.
Question put.
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