PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Sanctions Implementation and Enforcement - 15 May 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
Sanctions are a powerful tool in our armoury, and a vital foreign policy and national security tool. They are used to deter and disrupt threats and malign behaviour, and to demonstrate our values. Our sanctions support UK interests, protect our citizens, and defend international peace and security. Maximising economic pressure on Russia is key to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, as we debated in the House yesterday. As I said then, the UK has sanctioned over 2,400 targets under our Russia regime, and international sanctions have deprived Putin of $450 billion dollars since the invasion began—an amount of money that would have allowed him to prosecute this terrible war for many more years. Since July 2024, this Government have introduced over 500 new sanctions designations against individuals, entities and ships. Just last Friday, the Prime Minister announced a major package of sanctions to target the decrepit and dangerous shadow fleet carrying Russian oil. This is the largest package of sanctions against the shadow fleet, with 110 targets. According to some estimates, sanctions have crippled 200 ships—almost half of Putin’s entire fleet.
President Zelensky is serious about peace, agreeing in principle to a full, unconditional, and immediate ceasefire. His readiness for that peace is demonstrated by his being in Türkiye. Meanwhile, Putin has dodged and delayed, all the while raining down terror on Ukraine. If Putin does not engage seriously on peace, the UK and our allies will have no choice but to ramp up the economic pressure even further, forcing him to the table.
Alongside taking measures against Russia, we are using designations to uphold human rights and promote democracy around the world. Just last month, we targeted pro-Kremlin operatives responsible for destabilising Moldova, and we sanctioned corrupt officials in Georgia and Guatemala for undermining democracy and the rule of law. We will not stop there. We will continue to expose malign activity wherever we find it, using the full range of sanctions tools at our disposal to shape the world for the better. Sanctions play a crucial part in the Foreign Secretary’s mission to tackle corruption and dirty money, which is vital to protect the UK from criminals and safeguard our democracy. In January, the Foreign Secretary announced our new world-first legislation to use sanctions to crack down on those fuelling irregular migration.
This Government are committed not only to using sanctions effectively, but—this is the main focus of the statement—to ensuring that they are enforced rigorously. That means punishing serious breaches with large fines or criminal prosecutions. In opposition, we recognised that there was a need for greater focus on sanctions enforcement. Since we came to office, we have been working across Government on this, as well as liaising with law enforcement partners and industry. In October, we launched the office of trade sanctions implementation, which has new civil enforcement powers to crack down on those seeking to soften the blow of our sanctions. At the same time, we introduced civil powers for the Department for Transport to enforce transport sanctions.
We have reinforced the office of financial sanctions implementation in His Majesty’s Treasury—known as OFSI for short—and the multi-agency Joint Maritime Security Centre, enabling them better to tackle evasion and develop new tools targeting the Russian shadow fleet, including in the English channel. The investments and improvements that we have made are already paying off. Last month, OFSI imposed a penalty of £465,000 on a major law firm’s subsidiary for breaches of sanctions linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We also saw the UK’s first successful prosecution under the Russia financial sanctions regulations, thanks to excellent work by the National Crime Agency. I commend it and its teams for the incredible work that they have done. I expect to see more enforcement action in the coming year—I obviously cannot go into the details of that in the House, but we should be assured that our teams are working effectively in a range of agencies and across Government.
Funding from the economic deterrence initiative has been critical to strengthening our capabilities and maintaining the UK’s reputation among its allies. That initiative is bolstering sanctions work in the overseas territories and Crown dependencies. For example, in the British Virgin Islands, it has enabled the NCA to support enforcement and combat potential circumvention. Excellent work has been going on in that regard, and we hosted OTs and CDs at Lancaster House just a few months ago, to collaborate and ensure that we are improving capability across those territories.
I turn to the enforcement review. I am determined to go after those who try to evade our sanctions. In October, I launched a cross-ministerial review to look at how we can improve UK sanctions implementation and enforcement. A strong sanctions regime is crucial for achieving our foreign policy goals and, in turn, building a secure and prosperous UK. This forward-leaning review had three goals: first, to make it easier to comply with our sanctions, which will help businesses to support us in our shared goals; secondly, to increase the deterrent effect of enforcement and make it clear that avoiding sanctions does not pay; and, thirdly, to enhance our ability to take robust action against those seeking to evade our measures. We are publishing the report on the conclusions today, and I am glad of this opportunity to set out how we will ensure that the UK’s approach continues to set a gold standard.
We know that the vast majority of businesses agree with our sanctions and are keen to work with us to make sure that they are enforced. To simplify compliance, we have launched a new email alert system to keep UK businesses updated on designations, legislation, licences, and other related topics. We are also making our guidance clearer and easier to access, providing further clarity to UK industry on ownership and control, and introducing a single sanctions list for all designated persons. We will also assess the benefits of creating a single reporting point for suspected breaches. To give our sanctions extra bite and deter evasion, we will publish a new enforcement strategy, making clear the consequences of non-compliance. We will look at new options to accelerate civil penalties for financial sanctions breaches, including via an early settlement scheme, and we are dedicated to strengthening our enforcement tools and ensuring that we have the necessary powers, capabilities, and intelligence.
We have already taken action. Last month, we introduced measures to prevent designated individuals from holding director roles in the UK, protecting our brilliant British businesses. The Department for Business and Trade is updating laws to protect workers who report breaches of financial, transport and certain trade sanctions, giving them crucial whistleblower protections. Those actions, taken together and at pace, will further improve our world-class sanctions regime, allowing the UK to project strength and promote the rule of law across the world.
But we are not satisfied with just those measures. We are committed to exploring other areas, so that we can go even further and deeper to improve enforcement. A number of those areas will take longer to scope; I will be able to update the House on them in due course. We will explore options for more effective join-up on intelligence, including the merits of a new joint sanctions intelligence function. We will consider the introduction of sanctions end-use licensing controls for exports with a high risk of sanctions diversion.
We will continue to support the British overseas territories and Crown dependencies in enhancing their enforcement capabilities, and will explore enhancing transport powers to target specific aircraft with sectoral sanctions. As appropriate, we will update Parliament when additional outcomes have been scoped, including those that require new or amended legislation. We have brought forward a number of pieces of sanctions legislation recently; in addition, we expanded our Russia regime this week into a range of areas, and varied our Syria regime in the light of changed circumstances there.
Let me conclude by reiterating this Government’s commitment to strengthening the implementation and enforcement of UK sanctions. As we deliver the actions set out in the review, we will continue to engage across Departments and with industry, wider stakeholders and international partners to maximise the effectiveness of our work. I commend this statement to the House.
Sanctions are imperative in supporting the rules-based international system and punishing those who breach those rules. The last Conservative Government placed sanctions on Assad and his cruel regime, and helped to lead a co-ordinated approach with our allies on Syria. Britain put in place sanctions on Iran, and worked with the US to reaffirm our shared commitment to opposing those who threatened peace, security and stability in the middle east. In 2021, the UK put in place sanctions, including asset freezes, on Chinese Government officials for gross human rights abuses. Britain led international efforts to sanction Putin and those behind his war machine in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. We put plans in place to set up the office of trade sanctions implementation, which, as the Minister said, was formally established in October. It was set up to bolster our trade sanctions capability, crack down on companies that breach trade sanctions, and co-ordinate across Government to ensure that sanctions are implemented effectively.
At the time, the Minister announced a cross-Government review. We have not yet seen the report, but I wish to press the Minister on a few points. First, what changes are being made to the sanctions implementation and enforcement framework? What role does OTSI play in any changes? The Minister refers to robust action to increase sanctions evasion deterrence, but what specific measures are being considered? He also mentions a new enforcement strategy; when can we expect that to be published? I would welcome clarity on how the new joint sanctions intelligence function fits into our existing intelligence framework. How does he envisage that working with what we are doing with the US and our other Five Eyes partners?
As I am sure the Minister appreciates, thanks to our leaving the European Union, we now have our own sanctions framework. The flexibility to set our own framework and lead the charge with allies and partners cannot be squandered. Does the Minister expect the EU security pact to touch on the independence of our sanctions regime? We should look to build on the strong measures that we have placed on countries and entities. What progress is being made in identifying further sanctions to impose on those already targeted?
Will the Minister give us an assessment of the number of groups and militia operating in Syria? How will he ensure that the relaxation in sanctions benefits the people of Syria? How often will he review the impact of the relaxation of sanctions? Will he commit to putting sanctions on entities and people in Syria if the standards that we expect in relation to protecting rights are not met? Will the Government consider introducing a new bespoke sanctions regime and set of regulations for Syria?
The critical mass of the current UK sanctions on Iran were introduced under the last Conservative Government. Sanctions form one part of the approach to tackling Iran, but what is the Minister’s broader strategy on Iran?
When we were in government, we imposed the largest and most severe set of sanctions that Russia had ever seen. The economic pressure that we have collectively imposed with the international community has crippled the Russian economy and deprived Putin of $400 billion that could have funded his illegal war. We cannot afford to let up on exerting that pressure on Putin’s war machine. Part of that includes tackling Russian assets. What consideration has the Minister given to deploying assets from the sale of Chelsea football club to support Ukraine? Will he confirm a timeframe for deploying that money?
I would welcome clarity on what information is coming forward to the Minister about potential sanctions breaches and loopholes that are being exploited. Does the review sufficiently plug the gaps that have been identified? Will he update us on what action he is taking against any third party countries that are supporting the countries and entities we have already sanctioned?
Finally, how does the Minister plan to deepen our international co-ordination? What discussions have the Government had with the United States? Did the Government have advance knowledge of yesterday’s announcement? Will it have a bearing on UK policy on sanctions on Syria? Sanctions are a crucial tool in our diplomatic arsenal. We must ensure that they operate as effectively as possible to ensure that international norms are adhered to.
The shadow Minister asked me about the overall review. As I said, it is being published now and she can peruse that when she can; I encourage other hon. Members to look at that as well. We welcome feedback and suggestions on it. To summarise a couple of the key themes, we recognise that different sectors are at different levels of maturity with sanctions, and that Government communications and engagement need to reflect that. Some areas need more assistance; there is a lot of will, but they need support. Some of the measures can be very technical and we want to ensure that businesses can comply. Direct engagement between Government and industry is important, as that has the highest impact on compliance.
We need to bring together our efforts so that they are understood. A range of different agencies are doing important and distinct work, but that needs to be understood by the layperson. We need to improve our guidance and ensure we bridge any gaps in unclear regulations. We need to ensure that people understand the consequences of breaching sanctions, as well as the options. If they voluntarily disclose measures, as a number of businesses and others have done, there are ways forward.
The shadow Minister asked me about intelligence and co-operation with other countries, which is crucial. We will explore how that intelligence function works, but I can assure her that there is already a huge amount of co-operation between us and key partners, including in the United States, the EU and elsewhere. Cross-Government co-operation is also important. Our officials work incredibly hard and I pay tribute to the incredible team in the sanctions unit at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, and in other Departments, because they do remarkable work.
The shadow Minister asked specifically about co-operation with the EU. It is important that we co-operate with the EU on sanctions, as we do already. That is being considered, along with a range of measures, as we approach the important summit next week. I assure her that our sanctions policy remains our own, but we can often have maximum effect when we work in co-ordination with others. The EU is progressing its own packages against Russia and others.
On third country circumvention, I have paid particular attention to that issue; indeed, I had meetings just this morning to raise concerns on that specific issue with a partner country. Such meetings are a feature of pretty much every week, and we are bearing down on all the routes that might support measures that undermine our sanctions. On the sale of Chelsea football club, we are determined to see the proceeds reach humanitarian causes in Ukraine as soon as possible, and we are doing everything we can to bring that about quickly, but this is a complex legal issue. The UK is working with international partners, has engaged with Abramovich’s team and is exploring all options to ensure that the proceeds reach vulnerable people in Ukraine who are most in need.
On Syria, the shadow Minister knows that we updated the regime this week, and we remain with those sanctions against the Assad regime, but we have removed restrictions on others. We reserve the right to introduce new sanctions in future circumstances on any regime, but we will keep the situation there under close review and respond to the changing circumstances. We will judge the new Government by their actions.
On Iran, we announced on 14 April further sanctions to tackle the domestic threat posed by the Iranian regime by sanctioning the Iranian-backed, Sweden-based Foxtrot criminal network and its leader, Rawa Majid, for their role in attacks against targets across Europe. We took very firm action in relation to the supply of ballistic missiles to Russia for use in the illegal war in Ukraine. We remain determined that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon, and we are committed to using all tools available to ensure that, including using the UN sanctions snapback mechanism if necessary.
Lastly, the shadow Minister asked about enforcement, how we are having an impact and what difference is being made. I have already given some examples, but another example is that in April, the National Crime Agency secured the first criminal convictions for the breaches of Russian sanctions. Dmitry Ovsyannikov was found guilty of circumventing sanctions regulations and money laundering after receiving £76,000 from his wife and a new Mercedes from his brother, who was also found guilty of circumventing sanctions regulations. They were sentenced to 40 months imprisonment and 15 months imprisonment suspended for 15 months respectively, so the right hon. Lady can be absolutely assured that all the appropriate authorities are acting.
These investigations are often complex and necessarily are not made public. I urge the House to bear with some of our excellent teams in different agencies as they seek to enforce on these regimes.
My right hon. Friend rightly raises the challenge of the actual resources for enforcement. They are across a range of agencies and Departments and are subject to ongoing discussions in the spending review, but, having witnessed the work of a number of those organisations, I can assure her that they are doing some absolutely incredible work. I will give another example: in March, the office of financial sanctions implementation announced the imposition of a civil monetary penalty of £465,000 against HSF Moscow for breaching UK sanctions and publicised the lessons that industry can learn from that case. There is example after example, and I want to see more of them. I will continue to work with our enforcement agencies and others to ensure that is the case.
What lessons can the Minister point to from the review that will ensure that future development and application of our sanctions policy will be truly joined up across the many agencies in Government? Following President Trump’s meeting yesterday with President al-Sharaa, our approach to sanctions in Syria is a critical test of that approach. Can the Minister confirm that the Government will consider lifting further sanctions on Syria only if sanctions relief is preceded by clear progress towards political inclusion and the protection of minority groups and women in Syria?
The Minister knows that the Liberal Democrats have repeatedly urged the Government to use sanctions more robustly against the leaders of countries that have taken actions against British values or in violation of international law. May I therefore urge him to use the impetus from the review to take a fresh look at three cases? Will he and officials urgently review the application of sanctions on supporters of the Georgian Dream party, including Bidzina Ivanishvili and Irakli Kobakhidze, who are working to suppress democracy in Georgia? Will they review that for officials in Hong Kong who have led the suppression of democracy in the city and the extraterritorial intimidation of democracy campaigners resident in the UK? Will they also review that for the extremist members of the Israeli Cabinet, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, who continue to advocate for the conquest of Gaza and the forced displacement of Palestinians from the occupied territories?
The hon. Gentleman also raised three specific contexts. He knows that I will not comment on future designations, but we always welcome input, and I note what he said. In relation to Georgia, we have sanctioned multiple individuals responsible in relation to the repressive actions and corruption that we have seen in recent months, and we keep the situation under close review. I am deeply concerned about the situation in Georgia. I have made that clear to Georgian Dream representatives, and I will make it absolutely clear again. Our teams are working very closely, and the hon. Gentleman knows that we have suspended wider co-operation with Georgia. That is a deep regret, because we had significant and positive relations with it, but as long as it turns away from the Euro-Atlantic path, there must be consequences, as well as consequences for the actions it has taken domestically and otherwise. I note what he has said, but, as he will understand, I will not comment on future designations.
My hon. Friend can be assured that we act around the world through our sanctions regime, and I have given a number of examples—not just geographic areas, but in relation to themes. I have mentioned the theme of tackling illicit finance and kleptocracy more widely. We have introduced a number of measures in that regard, so she can be assured that this is not simply about Russia and Ukraine sanctions, but about acting globally.
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