PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Position - 3 December 2018 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
With permission, Mr Speaker, I wish to make a statement to the House. I should make clear the context in which I consider that I am to do so today; my statement is intended to inform the debate that is shortly to commence on the motion to approve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration on the future relationship concluded with the European Union by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.
It is important to understand how the Law Officers habitually give their advice, which may be a mixture of oral and written communications given at different times during fast-developing events. Ministers are advised by their own departmental lawyers, and the points that arise for consideration of the Law Officers are invariably limited to the relatively few of particular importance to the policy decision of the Government. Therefore, my statement today is complemented by a detailed legal commentary, provided for the purpose of the debate and published this morning, that analyses the effect of the agreement as a whole. That legal commentary has been produced with my oversight and approval, and I commend it to the House as both an accurate examination of the provisions of the agreement and a helpful exposition of some of the salient issues that arise from them.
There is, of course, no want of other sources of helpful commentary available to the House, and in making this statement in these unusual circumstances and in answering any questions that hon. Members may have, I consider that I have a solemn and constitutional duty to this House to advise it on these legal questions objectively and impartially, and to place such legal expertise as I have at its disposal. The historical precedents strongly support that view. The House may be sure that I shall discharge this duty with uncompromising and rigorous fidelity. If this agreement is to pass this House, as I strongly believe it should, I do not believe that it can or should pass under any misapprehension whatsoever as to the legal matters on which that judgment should be based.
It is important to recall that the matters of law affecting the withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision that each of us must make. This is a question not of the lawfulness of the Government’s action but of the prudence, as a matter of policy and political judgment, of entering into an international agreement on the terms proposed. In the time available to me, it is impossible to have covered each of the matters of law that might arise from 585 pages of complicated legal text, and no Attorney General—certainly not this one—can instantly possess the answers to all of the pertinent questions that the skill and ingenuity of hon. Members may devise.
However, I am aware that there are certain parts of the agreement the meaning of which attracts the close and keen interest of the House, and it is to some of these that I now turn: first, the Northern Ireland protocol and some of the other provisions of the withdrawal agreement relevant to it. The protocol would come into force, if needed, on the conclusion of the implementation period on 31 December 2020 unless, pursuant to article 132 of the agreement, both the UK and the EU agreed to a single extension for a fixed time of up to one or two years. By article 1, the protocol confirms that it would affect neither the constitutional status of Northern Ireland nor the principle of consent as set out in the Belfast or Good Friday agreement. The statutory guarantee that a majority in Northern Ireland would be required to consent to a change in its constitutional status as part of the United Kingdom and the associated amendment to the Irish constitution to remove its previous territorial claim remain in place.
Once in force, by article 2.1 of the protocol, the parties would be obliged, in good faith, to use their best endeavours to conclude by 31 December 2020 an agreement that supersedes it. There is a separate but closely related duty on the parties under article 184 to negotiate expeditiously and use best endeavours in good faith to conclude an agreement in line with the political declaration. Having regard to those obligations, by article 1.4 of the protocol, it is expressly agreed not to be intended to establish a permanent relationship but to be temporary. That language reflects the fact that article 50 of the Treaty on European Union does not provide a legal basis in Union law for permanent future arrangements with non-member states.
If either party did not comply with its obligations of good faith after the implementation period, it would be open to them to bring a complaint under the dispute settlement provisions set out in articles 164 to 181 of the agreement. These include independent arbitration. Clear and convincing evidence would be required to establish a breach of that obligation. If the protocol were to come into force, it would continue to apply in international law unless and until it was superseded by the intended subsequent agreement, which achieved the stated objectives of maintaining the necessary conditions for continued north-south co-operation, avoiding a hard border and protecting the Belfast agreement in all its dimensions.
There is therefore no unilateral right for either party to terminate this arrangement. This means that if no superseding agreement can be reached within the implementation period, the protocol would be activated and in international law would subsist even if negotiations had broken down. How likely that is to happen is a political question, to which the answer will no doubt depend partly on the extent to which it is in either party’s interests to remain indefinitely within its arrangements.
Under the protocol, the UK would form with the EU a single customs territory for goods for fiscal or tariff purposes. Accordingly, Northern Ireland would form part of the same customs territory as Great Britain, with no tariffs, quotas or checks on rules of origin between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. However, Northern Ireland would additionally apply defined aspects of the EU’s single market rules relating to the regulation and control of the supply of electricity on the island of Ireland; goods, including cross-border VAT rules; and the EU customs code. Those rules would be enforced as they are now, including preliminary references from Northern Ireland courts to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
By those means, the need for any hard border would be avoided, and goods originating in Northern Ireland would be entitled to free circulation throughout the EU’s single market. In all other respects of its regulatory regime, Northern Ireland would follow the applicable UK legislation, save where those were devolved. By article 7, a Northern Ireland business would also enjoy the same free circulation of its goods throughout the United Kingdom, while its EU competitor—whether situated in the Republic of Ireland or elsewhere in the single market—would not.
I turn to the role of Union law and the CJEU under the withdrawal agreement and within the dispute settlement provisions. It is important to place these provisions in the context of the objectives of the agreement, which is the orderly exit of the UK from the EU for our citizens and businesses. To that end, following the implementation period, the agreement provides for the continued application of Union law in defined and strictly limited respects, where it is necessary or desirable for legal certainty to do so.
Although we will legally leave the EU and cease to be a member state on 29 March 2019, part 4 of the agreement provides for an implementation or transition period of 21 months, which is designed to enable our people and our businesses to adjust to the changes that are coming. During that implementation period, so as to give the time, predictability and continuity that is needed, it is provided that Union law should continue to apply, and the laws, systems and institutions of the EU will have the same role and functions as before.
But on the conclusion of that period, on 31 December 2020, that will come to an end. Thereafter, Union law and the Court of Justice will possess a relevance in the United Kingdom only in so far as it is necessary, in limited and specific areas, for the winding down of the obligations of our relationship of 45 years. For example, the rights of our own citizens living in EU member states and of EU citizens in the United Kingdom are created and defined by Union law. If they are to be preserved in equal measure and with the necessary consistency and certainty, it is inevitable that the mutually protected residence and social security rights of those particular groups of people must continue to be defined by reference to that law. Those rights are provided for in part 2 of the agreement.
Our citizens living in member states throughout the EU will continue, as is natural, to depend for their ultimate protection on the CJEU, while EU citizens living in the United Kingdom will look to the UK independent monitoring authority set up under article 159 and to the UK courts. But they will no longer be able, as now, to require our Supreme Court to refer a question of interpretation of their rights under Union law to the CJEU where the determination of such a question is necessary to resolve a dispute.
Instead, pursuant to article 158, the UK courts, for a fixed period of eight years only, may refer—I repeat, may refer—to the CJEU a question of interpretation of part 2 of the agreement in the interests of achieving consistency in the enforcement of the rights of citizens while the new system is established. After that time, our courts will, pursuant to article 4.5, continue to interpret concepts and provisions of Union law in the areas in which the agreement applies it as they always have, and to have due regard to relevant post-implementation case law where, for example, it may be required for the practical operation of the agreement, such as in regard to the co-ordination of social security rights for the protected EU and UK citizens.
Part 3 deals with the lawful conclusion of judicial and administrative proceedings, transactions, processes and other matters that have arisen or commenced under Union legal frameworks before the end of the implementation period, and to which Union law and the role of institutions must continue to apply for their orderly disposition. It allows a four-year limitation period on the power of the Commission to refer to the Court an alleged breach of an obligation incurred prior to the end of the implementation period.
Part 5 deals with our agreed financial obligations. It provides, under article 160, for Union law and the jurisdiction of the Court to apply beyond the implementation period only for the time and purpose of closing out the UK’s financial obligations and entitlements incurred under Union law, again prior to the end of that period.
All these are inherently time-limited functions, and once they are at an end the Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to disputes involving citizens and businesses in the United Kingdom. A dispute between the EU and the UK about the systemic operation or interpretation of the agreement may be referred by either side to an independent arbitration panel in which the Court has no automatic role, but if the panel needs to and a question of interpretation of Union law is relevant to the dispute, it can ask the Court to resolve that question. It is then for the panel to apply that interpretation to the facts of the dispute, and thus decide how the dispute should be resolved.
The divorce and separation of nations from long and intimate unions, just as of human beings, stirs high emotion and calls for wisdom and forbearance. It calls also for calm and measured evaluation by the House of the terms of the separation agreement in the light of the complexity and difficulty of the task it is intended to achieve. The gradual loosening and removal of the legal ties that have bound us to the European Union for 45 years will take time to work out. This agreement and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, already passed by the House, allow for the necessary time and legal means for that process to unfold in a peaceful and orderly way.
I am at the disposal of the House to answer questions, in so far as I can, on these and other legal matters. I commend this statement to the House.
“The protocol would endure indefinitely”
if trade talks broke down. In his statement, the Attorney General talked about political factors that might, in his view, make the backstop temporary, but in reality, that is not the legal position. Perhaps he can confirm that the legal position is as set out in the letter—that the protocol will “endure indefinitely” if the trade talks break down.
On 13 November in this House, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer)—the shadow Brexit Secretary—and I were very clear on what was being sought: the final, full advice provided by the Attorney General to the Cabinet on any completed withdrawal agreement should be made available to all MPs in good time for the vote on the deal. Offers short of that, including of the Attorney General’s statement today and of a summary made by the Government, were rejected, and the House unanimously passed a motion to that effect. [Interruption.] “Playing games,” shouts the Chancellor. On 13 November, the Conservative party could not get one of its MPs to vote against the motion—not one.
The document that has been produced is, in the Attorney General’s own words, a legal commentary, produced with his oversight and approval. It is not the final legal advice to the Cabinet. Frankly, the explainer produced alongside the withdrawal agreement was longer and more detailed than this document. Is not the reality that the Government do not want MPs to see the full legal advice, for fear of the political consequences?
There is no point whatever in trying to hide behind the Law Officers’ convention. The ministerial code and “Erskine May” are very clear: Ministers have the discretion, under that convention, to make advice available in exceptional circumstances. What circumstances could be more exceptional than these? The economic, political and constitutional integrity of our country is at stake.
I quote paragraph 82 of the legal commentary:
“The Agreement does not contain any provision on its termination. In the absence of such a provision, it is not possible under international law…to withdraw from the Agreement unilaterally.”
A straight question to the Attorney General: can he direct me or the House to any other international treaty to which the UK is party that it has no unilateral right to terminate? Can he even name one?
Furthermore, articles 1.4 and 2.1 of the backstop protocol are clear that its provisions
“shall apply unless…they are superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent agreement.”
[Interruption.] No, the “in whole or in part” bit was not commented on in the statement, actually. Put simply, that means that parts of the backstop could become permanent, even in the event of a trade deal being agreed. I ask the Attorney General directly: what is his view on which parts of the backstop arrangement in this protocol are most likely to become permanent?
May I raise with the Attorney General the issue of the impact on the Good Friday agreement? Page 306 of the withdrawal agreement refers to the need for the protocol to be implemented so as to
“maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation,”
including the conditions for possible new arrangements in accordance with the 1998 agreement. So can the Attorney General tell the House, in his view: first, which new arrangements he believes would be in accordance with the 1998 Good Friday agreement; and, secondly, which arrangements he believes would not be in accordance with it?
In the first instance, it will be for you, Mr Speaker, to rule on whether there has been an arguable case of contempt for what we on the Opposition Benches believe to be a failure to comply with the motion of 13 November. For the sake of our economy, our jobs and our futures, all possible information should be made available to Members of this House. The Government should do the right thing and make the full advice available. With so much at stake for all our constituents and with eight days to go before the vote on the deal, this House and this country deserve better from this Government.
The hon. Gentleman told me that I had not said anything about the subsistence of the Northern Ireland protocol. Let me make no bones about the Northern Ireland protocol: it will subsist. We are indefinitely committed to it if it comes into force. There is no point in my trying or the Government trying to disguise that fact. The truth, however, is this: what is the political imperative of either entering into it or not entering into it? That is a calculated equation of risk that each Member of this House is going to have to weigh up, and do so against different alternatives.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned that I should answer whether other treaties are permanent. Hundreds of treaties throughout the world are permanent—treaties on borders, treaties on rivers; the Vienna convention has entire sections on permanent treaties. If the hon. Gentleman wants me to enumerate some, I will write to him with them—I am afraid I do not have them to hand. There is an entire section of the Vienna convention on permanent treaties. The question whether we have a right to terminate under the convention is a matter of construction. Let me make it plain: there is no such right to terminate if the Northern Ireland protocol comes into force. The question of how likely it is to remain in force is a political judgment to be based on factors largely relating, as I have said, to in whose interests it would be to remain in it for longest. [Interruption.]
First, I sincerely congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General on his masterly exposition of the facts and the law, which put paid to quite a lot of the paranoia and conspiracy theories that have been running around all too often in our European debate.
Secondly, does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that it was central to the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—that both sides committed themselves timelessly to an open border, and that will be all wrapped up if we ever move to the Northern Ireland protocol? It would be quite shameful if the European Union, the Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom were given the right unilaterally to terminate that arrangement at a time of their political choosing, so this is perfectly sensible. Does he also agree that both the United Kingdom and the European Union will have reasons to hesitate before going into the protocol—they may prefer to extend the transition agreement—and that neither of the parties will have any political motive for staying indefinitely in that protocol?
In his exposition, I think my right hon. and learned Friend has done what he was trying to do: got rid of all these theories about the ECJ still being involved, as it obviously will have to be, in the rights of British citizens after we leave, and enabled the House to get back to the real political debate that we have to have in the next few days.
The Attorney General and I are both senior lawyers in our own jurisdictions, so I am sure that he will not want to insult my intelligence or that of the House by pretending that this Command Paper reflects in any way the nuanced advice that he will have given to the Cabinet, focused on particular questions such as those that we saw leaked over the weekend. For example, he just said that it is not his belief that we will be trapped in the backstop permanently, but this House, which has to take the final decision—not the Cabinet—is not interested in his belief; it is interested in his legal opinion. Can he confirm, as a matter of law, that there is nothing to prevent the backstop from becoming the permanent UK-EU relationship in the event that the two sides cannot agree a future economic relationship? That is a matter of law.
Will the Attorney General acknowledge something else? He is a democrat, the Government are democrats; they have gone on incessantly about the will of the people for the last two years and profess to believe in parliamentary sovereignty. We sitting in this House are the representatives of the people, and we voted to see his advice in full, not his commentary, so will he undertake to produce that advice—the sort of nuggets that were leaked over the weekend, but in full—before the rise of the House today, and before tomorrow’s debate, or is he prepared to run the risk of being found in contempt of Parliament merely to protect the Conservative and Unionist party against further internal strife?
I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s statement. Page 6 of his document refers to what is defined as “good faith”. He mentioned the International Court of Justice, so I hope he will not mind if I quote from one of its judgments referenced in footnote 8. He talked about how long the backstop should last and what defined “good faith”. The judgment states that
“the failure of the Parties to reach agreement, 16 years after the conclusion of”—
earlier negotiations—
“does not itself establish that either Party has breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith.”
As my right hon. and learned Friend knows, his right hon. Friends on the Front Bench one by one have used good faith as their defence for being locked into this problem of the backstop and as their explanation of how we will get out. As a matter of law, is good faith required for best endeavours?
I remind the House that we are dealing here with the United Kingdom on one hand and the European Union on the other. Their reputations in international forums, and their reputations as a question of international law, are at stake. If you put your name to a solemn legal obligation to negotiate something in good faith within a certain time limit, it is a very serious obligation of which to acquit yourself: it cannot just be played fast and loose with.
Can the Attorney General confirm what he said—that this is an indefinite arrangement that can be permanent in law, despite what some of his Cabinet colleagues are saying? I do not have time to go into all this, because, as other Members have said, we need to see the actual legal advice as requested by the House—that must happen—but can he also confirm that under article 15 of the Northern Ireland protocol, the Northern Ireland customs arrangements mean that Northern Ireland will form part of the EU customs territory and not the United Kingdom’s, although “a single customs territory” is established between the UK and the EU? Will he confirm that under article 4 of the protocol, there is a new right under international law—one that is not in the Belfast agreement of 1998—for the EU to oversee certain aspects of the implementation of that 1998 agreement?
I have added those detailed points, which I will follow up with the Attorney General in later discussions, but the overall context is, as he has said, a deeply unattractive, unsatisfactory agreement. Rather than recommending it, he needs to recommend that it be rejected.
I ask the right hon. Gentleman to think of what the European Union is now accepting. It accepts that Northern Ireland can have free circulation of its goods not only into the single market, but to Great Britain. No other single market trader will have that advantage. Hundreds of single market traders throughout the European Union are going to resent the fact that the goods of a Northern Ireland business situated one mile north of the border can flow smoothly into the single market and smoothly into Great Britain, while theirs cannot. So there are real reasons, which the right hon. Gentleman and I can discuss at greater length, why I do not believe that this will become a permanent solution.
Let us suppose, however, that those negotiations broke down or took an unreasonable length of time. All around the European Union there will be single market traders seeing the benefits that Northern Ireland can have, who will be induced by those benefits to ask, “Should we go on putting up with this uncompetitive arrangement?” And what are they likely to do? Why, they are likely to beat a path to the door of the Commission and the Court, and there to say, “Didn’t you say that article 50 is not a sound legal foundation for this arrangement?” And I tell you frankly, Mr Speaker, they are likely to win.
There are five precedents over the past 40 years of full disclosure being made of an Attorney General’s advice for compelling and exceptional reasons in the public interest. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that he can—as in my view he should—consent on his own independent account as Attorney General under the ministerial code to the full publication of his legal advice given that, as cited in the Queen’s bench division in July 2009, the then Attorney General’s advice on the seminal Factortame case was disclosed, which dealt with the incompatibility of the European Communities Act 1972 with an Act of Parliament, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which was then struck down in the courts, analogous to the legal status of the withdrawal treaty in relation to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act passed by this House in 2018, and with which that treaty is incompatible?
In relation to my right hon. and learned Friend’s second question, it is true that there would be regulatory divergences—as there are within sovereign states throughout the world—between one part of the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom and another, but those divergences could be kept to a minimum. They involve, on my investigation, some 15 forms of product in respect of which checks might have to be carried out at the border. Those 15 forms of product are largely phytosanitary goods in respect of which checks are already carried out in many cases at the ports of Northern Ireland. Therefore, while that border would exist—I find that distasteful myself—the issues are nevertheless mitigable, and the question again is whether that feature should lead us to decline this deal, which I firmly believe is the best way of ensuring that we leave the European Union on 29 March. That is the solemn responsibility that this side of the House—and some on the Opposition side—believed that we had. This is the deal that will ensure that that happens in an orderly way and with legal certainty.
Now, I have a question for the Attorney General on which I want his legal advice. As he will be aware, the withdrawal agreement is legally binding, but the political declaration is not. Can he draw to the House’s attention a single example in international law of when a failure to act in good faith has successfully compelled one party in a negotiation to reach an agreement as extensive as the one that the Government hope to achieve and that is set out in the political declaration covering trade in goods and services, security, foreign policy, broadcasting, data and co-operation on a wide range of matters? If there is such an example, I would very much like to hear about it.
To address the first part of the right hon. Gentleman’s question, I will repeat myself: what does he expect us to do? When he was a member of the Cabinet, if he believed that to take an action would be fundamentally contrary to the public interest of this country, I suspect that he would find that a difficult situation to resolve. The House’s resolution is entitled to the greatest of respect, and the Government and I are inclined to do as much as we can and to go as far as we can, which is why I have come to the House today—it has barely happened more than a few times in the past 50 or so years—to answer the House’s questions. However, I cannot take a step that I believe in conscience would be against the public interest and potentially seriously harmful to a fundamental constitutional principle and the temporal interests of this country in the midst of a negotiation.
It is important to remember that, when one says final agreement, it is of course possible, indeed likely, that it may be a series of agreements reached at different times. My answer to my right hon. Friend is that article 20 creates that ability, but it is not a unilateral right of termination. It does not give us a right to walk away. It creates a procedure and obliges the European Union to consider alternative arrangements that are not part of a final deal.
I think my right hon. Friend went on to ask me about article 50 and the time it might take. The period of years he mentions is probably far too long, but it is impossible to say. What one can say is that, long before any case is brought, the pressure bringing those cases to the Court would be telling upon the Governments of the member states and upon the European Union. The legal uncertainty would be intense, and it is a real factor that this House must weigh up in considering whether the protocol is something that it wishes to support.
In those circumstances, what does it mean? It means that they have split the four freedoms. They have created a situation where we can have the regulatory flexibility that they cannot. They have granted access to the single market for no contribution, without free movement, without signing up to the common fisheries policy and without signing up to the common agricultural policy. For all those reasons, what I say to the right hon. Lady is that if it is painful to us, it will be as painful to them. Where we want to end up is an arrangement that suits us both. This suits neither.
On Sunday, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland told Northern Ireland’s “Inside Politics” with Mark Davenport that even if the backstop kicks in, Great Britain will stick to the same rules as Northern Ireland. Will the Attorney General have a word with her? She is going around Northern Ireland on a tour and saying some things that are actually not accurate, giving the people of Northern Ireland a very wrong impression about what this agreement means.
In this case, I am convinced that to disclose any advice that might have been given would be fundamentally contrary to the interests of this country. [Interruption.] I say to Labour Members that there is no use baying and shouting. What I am trying to do is guard the public interest—that is all. It is time that they grew up and got real. If there were a single item that I thought might be politically embarrassing, I would have no truck with the idea that this advice or any that I might have been given should be disclosed. It is because the public interest is at stake. What part of that proposition is the Labour party incapable of understanding?
I was just saying that these proceedings are in danger of descending into farce. The Attorney General repeatedly says that he will subject himself to what he calls full, frank and thorough questioning, but he knows as well as we do that our capacity to do that questioning is seriously undermined by the fact that we do not have the full legal advice in front of us in order to interrogate it. He talks about the national interest. It is precisely because these are issues of national interest that we wish to see the full legal advice. Will he go away and look again at the principle that, in exceptional times, transparency should take precedence, and therefore produce the full legal advice for this House?
I cannot breach the constitutional convention to a client—in this case, the Government—particularly if I believe, as I do with all candour and sincerity, that it would be contrary to the national interest in the course of a negotiation that might involve discussions about strengths, weaknesses and future strategies. [Interruption.] There was a sedentary comment from the Opposition; this is not arrogance. I wish that I could comply with the request of this House, but if I did, I sincerely believe that it would not be in all our interests. In a court, that matter can be resolved by a judge, but in the procedures of this House—it may very well be that we need to look at those procedures—there is no such arbiter. Therefore, although the House says that I should disclose, I believe that the public interest compels me not to. I am sorry.
The advice that the Attorney General and the Law Officers give on a matter such as this could be replicated by any lawyer of reasonable competence. Why, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) could pop down to his chambers and find half a dozen lawyers capable of giving the same advice that I might have given on these points—probably better. The truth of the matter—what is so important about my advice?
“These provisions apply to measures that affect trade between Great Britain and the EU, but not trade between Northern Ireland and the EU.”
In fact, we would have to comply with another regime. How could any Unionist sign up to that?
I say to hon. Members that I understand entirely their feelings of concern, even distaste, but this is a question affecting the whole United Kingdom and its interests. So vital is the fact that we should have an orderly exit from the European Union that, as people who hold the United Kingdom’s Union at their heart, I would urge them to consider supporting this agreement, for it is our means out of the European Union.
Secondly, my hon. Friend asked about fishing. She is right that in the backstop, there would be no access to our waters other than that to which we agreed.
My view is therefore that we would owe a presently unquantifiable sum were we to leave the European Union without a deal. It is impossible at this stage to say how much. It is true that the European Union is not a member state and is not a state, and therefore it is unable to take the case to the International Court of Justice. It might therefore be difficult to enforce the public international law obligation that existed. However, I ask the House to reflect on the fact that if this country, acknowledging that such obligations probably exist or do exist, did not pay them, it would be likely to cause the deepest resentment, just as it would to any of us who were unpaid a debt. If we leave a club, we pay the bar bill. If we do not pay the bill, we are not likely to get a lot of consideration from the other side.
The circumstance here is that the House has available to it a wide range of highly competent legal advice that is just as good as mine and as those who advise me. There is nothing essential, I suggest to the House, about the advice of the Attorney General being disclosed in this case, but there is something that could lead to severe damage to the public interest. One hon. Lady on the Labour Benches said that I was being arrogant. I am not. I am trying genuinely to protect the public interest. The last thing I want to do is to be at odds with this House. I have been a Member for 13 years. I would very much like to ensure that the House is satisfied, which is why I am here today, answering these questions.
“This is not a real arbitration tribunal—behind it the ECJ decides everything. This is taken from the Ukraine agreement. It is absolutely unbelievable that a country like the UK, which was the first country to accept independent courts, would subject itself to this”?
I am truly sorry that I am not in a position to disclose either the fact or the content of my advice. However, I am doing so not to frustrate the legitimate interests of the Members opposite or Members behind me, but rather and only because I do believe it is against the public interest at a time when we are negotiating and at a time when this involves advice to a Cabinet or might well involve advice to a Cabinet that must, for reasons of fundamental principle, be kept confidential.
The Attorney General has made it clear that the provisions about the backstop are to address having no hard border and that there would have been no agreement without these backstop provisions being in the agreement. When we are making our political judgment about the potential permanence of or the reasons behind the backstop, what credence should we give to the fact that, although WTO terms suggest there would be a hard border, there is the potential for a waiver under WTO article 9.3 and there is the potential for a national security waiver under article 21? Given that the EU and the Republic have both said they would not put up a hard border, what conclusion are we to come to about their good faith and best endeavours?
“During any extended implementation period…the UK would not be part of the Common Agricultural Policy”.
This will, of course, have an effect on Scotland. Can he confirm what legal advice was given with regard to the devolved Government coming out of the common agricultural policy in an extended implementation period?
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