PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Employment Rights Bill (Eighteenth sitting) - 9 January 2025 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Christopher. I am sure that the whole Committee is grateful for that illuminating update. I will keep my comments brief.

The words that we have talked about at great length—“appearing to the Secretary of State to represent” employees, workers or employers—are a standard form of language that has appeared in industrial relations legislation, and indeed non-industrial relations legislation, since the 1960s at least. Similarly, the wording about an “independent expert” unsurprisingly follows a Whitehall pro forma. Very similar language appears in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023, so its inclusion should not be a matter of contention for the Committee.

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Sir Christopher. As always, I will start by referring to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Following the reference to illumination, I hope to shed light on the advantages of a fair work agency.

We have heard a fair amount of criticism from the Opposition Benches about the suggestion that we set up an advisory board. The shadow Minister asked whether a Member of Parliament could apply to be on it. I do not think that it is entirely clear whether they could. I do not know whether the prohibitions on second jobs for MPs have that scenario in mind, but I imagine that it could fall within the prohibition relating to advising on areas of policy. I also hope that all Members are fully engaged in their day-to-day work of representing their constituents and will not feel it necessary to apply. Indeed, we will play a role here in scrutinising the work of the fair work agency. Given the comments of the hon. Member for Bridgwater, he will not be making an application, in any event.

On the point that academics could also be members of a trade union and could therefore fit into more than one category, anyone in a free society is entitled to join a trade union should they wish to do so. We would not want to make it a condition for job applicants to have to state their trade union membership—that is a slightly McCarthyist road to go down—but members of the Low Pay Commission are already required to declare any interests, including membership of trade unions or political parties. There is an opportunity for transparency in that sense.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield says, the pro forma definitions in the Bill are not novel interpretations. They are tried and tested definitions—I would like to say “trusted” as well, but it is clear that the hon. Member for Bridgwater does not trust us to operate them in the way they have operated in the past—of how people are appointed to such bodies. As has been noted, they have worked successfully for the Low Pay Commission for a quarter of a century.

The shadow Minister was accused of over-egging the pudding, but the hon. Member for Bridgwater broke enough eggs in his criticisms to feed us all for the next month. I think he suggested that we did not need an advisory board at all, which suggests that he does not believe it important that the voice of business have input into the work of the fair work agency. He also said that we did not need more reports, which is one of the roles of the advisory board, and yet only a couple of hours ago he voted for a report into the application of the fair work agency. What he was getting at is that if we have to have this, we need to be assured that there is no jiggery-pokery about who will be appointed to it.

It is good to see you in the Chair, Sir Christopher. The point I was aiming to make is that there is no shortage of free advice from trade unions, employers and independent experts, so there is no need to set up a board to pay people to give advice that is freely available. The Secretary of State should simply take political responsibility for the choices he makes, rather than having advice collected together by a board and passed back to him.

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but this is about how we intend to deal with industrial relations and the workplace in future—the tripartite arrangement, where we get everyone in the room, so they can agree or put different points of view. As has been demonstrated successfully by the Low Pay Commission, that results in the right balance, which is good for the economy and good for workers. It results in settlements that everyone can agree with.

It is good to see you in the Chair, Sir Christopher. To follow up on the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater makes about the advisory board, what is the Minister’s view of ministerial accountability? Will there be transparency on the board’s recommendations and on being held to account for decisions? Over the past several years, Governments of all colours—Conservative, coalition and Labour—have tended to create boards, advisory panels and so forth and have felt obliged to follow the advice that they give. They almost want to derogate from their responsibility. What is the Minister’s view of the advice given by the board? Does he believe that robust ministerial responsibility should still exist, so the Minister could, or should, take decisions that are against the board’s advice? I guess I am asking what the transparency is on the board’s advice to the Minister.

That is a perfectly reasonable question. It is dealt with in the clauses, which we are about to debate and which address the requirement for the board to set out an annual report and strategy. That will inform the Secretary of State of the direction of travel of the fair work agency. Again, this is not an unusual arrangement. If we believe, as we do on the Government Benches, that the fair work agency needs an advisory body—I cannot recall any person or organisation who submitted evidence to the Committee suggesting that that was not an appropriate idea—the logical conclusion of what the hon. Member for Bridgwater suggests is that the Bill should name every single person on it. That is not a practical way to proceed.

I suggest that a huge mountain has been made out of a small molehill. This is an established practice that has worked well and has been seen to work well, and it has support from many stakeholders. It is entirely in line with what we seek to achieve.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Labour market enforcement strategy

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76 will require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a labour market enforcement strategy every three years, which should give an assessment of levels of non-compliance with labour market legislation, as well as what activity is undertaken to address that. Subsection (4) will require the Secretary of State to consult the fair work agency’s advisory board when preparing or revising the enforcement strategy, to benefit from its expertise. Subsection (5) will require the strategy to be laid before Parliament, allowing parliamentary scrutiny in the usual manner. A labour market enforcement strategy is a critical tool to maintain accountability and focus on enforcing labour market legislation. It can help to tackle workplace exploitation by prioritising enforcement in sectors in which workers are at higher risk.

Clause 77 sets out the requirement for the Secretary of State to prepare and publish an annual report about the enforcement of labour market legislation. Subsection (3) will require the Secretary of State to consult the fair work agency’s advisory board when preparing the annual report, to benefit from its expertise. Subsection (4) will require the annual report to be laid before Parliament, allowing parliamentary scrutiny in the usual manner. Clause 77 will promote accountability by requiring an annual report on the fair work agency’s enforcement actions and will allow Parliament to monitor progress in protecting workers’ rights. It will ensure that employment standards are not just set, but actively maintained across the UK. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

It is good to see you in the Chair, Sir Christopher. Clauses 76 and 77 are relatively straightforward. Quite rightly, as is standard in similar legislative provisions, they state explicitly that both the strategy, every three years or so, and the annual report, every year, should be laid before Parliament. That is welcome: it is standard and is in no way under question.

If the Minister is agreeable to it, I would like him to confirm that Members of both Houses will be given the chance to question and debate the documents—certainly the strategy, which is an important document on a longer timescale—rather than their just being laid before the House. Although it would be unusual to specify that in the Bill, will he confirm that when the first strategy is published under clause 76 or the first annual report is published under clause 77, his expectation is that Ministers will be willing to make an oral statement so that the House can properly question it and scrutinise the Secretary of State, or whichever Minister draws the short straw and presents it to the House?

When documents are simply laid before the House, sometimes these things get overlooked. Select Committees sometimes have too much work in their programme to squeeze in a scrutiny session around the publication of such documents; sometimes the House of Commons sees only a written statement. It would be sufficient if the Minister confirmed that his desire is to see these documents not simply laid before Parliament, but actively debated, at least through the means of an oral statement.

I think there is broad support for these clauses. The shadow Minister requests that I commit to an oral statement, but he will be aware that I am not in control of the business of the House. I hope that we would want to ensure that all Members have the opportunity to ask questions, but he will know that a number of other mechanisms—sorry, I am sounding a bit like the Leader of the House now—are available to Members to ensure that particular matters are debated.

I am enjoying the Minister’s audition to be Leader of the House of Commons, a role that I am certain he would do exceptionally well. As I am sure he well understands, although the business of the House is for the business managers and the Leader of the House to negotiate through the usual channels, all I am really asking of him is an in-principle commitment to offer an oral statement at the Dispatch Box. Whether it gets approved or selected by the usual channels is a different matter. An indication of the intent of the Minister and the Department for Business and Trade to offer an oral statement so that these strategies and annual reports can be scrutinised across the House would be important and welcome.

I thank the shadow Minister for destroying any career prospects that I might have had. I certainly believe that the first publication would be of sufficient magnitude for an oral statement to the House. As a Minister I would certainly want to give such a statement, although whether it happens is outside my gift, as the shadow Minister knows. As we do not know when it will happen, or indeed whether either of us will be in the same role by that point, I can probably say no more. Perhaps I will be doing something else, or nothing at all. Who knows? I certainly think that the first publication of the strategy would warrant an oral statement, but for the reasons that I have outlined, I cannot make a cast-iron promise.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Power to obtain documents or information

I beg to move amendment 86, in clause 78, page 83, line 6, leave out “to ascertain” and insert “the purpose of ascertaining”.

This amendment makes a minor drafting correction.

Clause 78 will confer a power on the Secretary of State—although in practice it will be delegated to enforcement officers—to require a person to provide documents or information relevant to an investigation. This is a vital power, and a common power for enforcement agencies to have. It is right that its use be clearly defined. Clause 78(3) defines “enforcement purpose” in relation to the power; Government amendment 86 will make a small drafting correction so that the definition is consistently drafted. This is a technical change, but one that will make sure that this key power is easy to interpret and understand.

Government amendment 90 similarly clarifies the definition of “enforcement purpose”, in this case for the powers of entry in clause 79. As drafted, the Bill has identical definitions of enforcement purposes in clauses 78 and 79, with clause 79 relying on the definition in clause 78. However, these are different powers and the wording on enforcement purposes in clause 78 does not neatly match the provisions of clause 79. It is right that the wording of the definition of “enforcement purpose” in clause 79 should better reflect what the clause says. This amendment therefore clarifies the definition to tailor it to powers of entry. This is, again, a technical change, but one that will make sure that this key power is easy to interpret and understand. I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Government amendments 86 and 90, as the Minister says, will clarify the purposes for which the power conferred by clause 79 to enter premises and inspect documents may be exercised, with a number of conditions. I would be grateful if he clarified whether a warrant will be required to enter business premises and exercise the powers in clause 79. If not, why not? It is a pretty broad power for enforcement officers that they can enter premises for

“the purpose of enabling the Secretary of State to determine whether to exercise any enforcement function”.

I would be grateful if the Minister provided some practical examples of what that means. It seems a pretty broad power to be able to go in simply to see whether there is anything to look at; it seems at odds with statutory precedent.

Amendment 88 is a minor drafting correction. I will not rehearse the usual arguments.

The shadow Minister asks about the requirement for a warrant. The Committee will shortly come on to a clause that deals with that point. I believe that the purposes for which the power is to be used are also set out elsewhere in the Bill.

Amendment 86 agreed to.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Improving the enforcement of workers’ rights is important and depends on access to the right information. Clause 78 introduces a power to obtain documents and information. The power will be conferred on the Secretary of State, but in practice it is a function that Secretary of State will delegate to enforcement officers.

Creating the fair work agency involves bringing together different agencies with different information-gathering powers. Multiple overlapping powers would be confusing and slow down enforcement. The powers of some current enforcement bodies have not kept pace with the times. For example, the employment agency standards inspectorate’s powers are activated only when they enter a premises. That makes no sense in today’s business world where many businesses are operated online and remotely, and documents are stored electronically. It is high time that we brought the legislation into the 21st century.

Clause 78 gives enforcement officers the power to require a person to provide documents and information relevant to an investigation. The person will receive a notice from the officer to provide the relevant documents or information that the officer deems necessary for their purpose. This is a common power for enforcement agencies to have, and it synthesizes and updates the powers that existing enforcement bodies already have.

I broadly accept the Minister’s argument on bringing legislation into the 21st century, and it would be foolish not to acknowledge changes in the way that documents are stored or the fact that certain businesses operate online in a way that they simply did not when the existing legislation was passed. We do not seek to object to that element.

When expanding any power of any enforcement officer under the state, however, there is always a concern to best ensure that the checks and balances that any reasonable person would expect are there. The Bill will undoubtedly become an Act, so I gently ask the Minister how, when these powers are delegated by the current or any future Secretary of State to the enforcement body, the practical application of the use of those powers—particularly those that are a step into the unknown regarding online and electronic document storage—will be assessed and reviewed to check that the right delegations are in place, and that there is no overstretch or unnecessary steps to demand documents that may not be required.

We can all imagine a situation in which, because documents are held in electronic form, some enforcement officers might desire to be over-zealous and ask for far more than they need. I do not see a safeguard to ensure that enforcement officers ask only for things that they categorically and absolutely need within the function of the duties that this or any future Secretary of State delegates to them.

Fair points were made by the Opposition spokespeople. Clearly, the Secretary of State is ultimately responsible to Parliament for the operation of the fair work agency and the use of powers by enforcement officers. I expect that will ensure that there is oversight at least on a parliamentary level. On an operational level, there will also be an opportunity for the advisory body to be involved.

On the modernisation of the rules, I understand that that applies only to the employment agency standards inspectorate, because the other bodies already have those powers. It is not a dramatic extension of the existing powers that are already in place.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 78, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79

Power to enter business premises in order to obtain documents, etc

I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 79, page 83, line 11, leave out “business”.

The effect of this amendment and amendment 89 is that the power in clause 79 may be exercised to enter any premises, including premises used as a dwelling, for the purposes of inspecting or examining documents on the premises, etc. However, NC8 provides that, in the case of a dwelling, the power is not exercisable without a warrant.

I will speak first to amendments 87 to 89 and new clause 8, which are necessary because they represent a vital step forward in ensuring effective enforcement while respecting fundamental rights. Clause 79 enables enforcement officers to enter business premises to carry out inspections. This is a fundamental and necessary clause for the fair work agency to operate. A workplace inspectorate that could not inspect workplaces would not be of much use.

Clause 79 as initially drafted excluded dwellings from that power of entry but, as hon. Members will be aware, a significant number of businesses are now run from private dwellings, particularly within the gig economy and online marketplaces. These amendments therefore expand the scope of the power to cover dwellings that are used as business premises, but it is right that we introduce adequate safeguards for this power, because it in effect allows an arm of the state to enter family homes and disrupt private life. Therefore, there will be a requirement for enforcement officers to obtain a warrant from a justice before entering a dwelling.

We believe this approach strikes a balance between ensuring robust enforcement of labour market legislation and modernising the law to include best practice safeguards. Without this amendment, enforcement efforts would be hampered. Many violations occur in business premises that double as private dwellings. By granting access through a warrant-based system, enforcement officers can efficiently investigate breaches without undermining public trust. The proposed safeguards mirror those in other enforcement frameworks, ensuring consistency and fairness.

This amendment is a necessary evolution of enforcement powers. It ensures that enforcement officers can effectively combat labour market abuses wherever they occur, while upholding and protecting the rights of individuals by ensuring that safeguards are in place.

I now move to amendments 91, 94 and 96, new clause 9 and new schedule 1. The fair work agency is all about simplification, replacing multiple, complex approaches to enforcement with a single, simple system that—unlike this amendment grouping—is easy for employers and workers to understand. These amendments do precisely that by introducing a single process for obtaining warrants across the two powers that require them.

The detailed safeguards included in the new schedule reinforce the transparency, legality and proportionality of these powers, which is vital for public trust in enforcement processes. The amendments also improve the clarity and coherence of the Bill, making it easier to implement and understand. Together, these measures strengthen the Bill, ensuring that robust enforcement mechanisms are paired with the necessary protections for individuals and premises, and I commend them to the Committee.

This is a bumper grouping—amendments, new clauses and even a new schedule. I will start with new clause 8, which provides that an enforcement officer may not exercise the power conferred by clause 79, to enter a business premises for any enforcement purpose, to enter premises that are a dwelling without first obtaining a warrant. As in previous debates in this Committee about dwellings, the official Opposition agree that obtaining a warrant first should be necessary, so we are fine with that.

New clause 9 makes further provision about warrants under part 5 and enables warrants that authorise people to accompany the enforcement officer executing the warrant. It also provides that entry under warrant is unlawful unless it complies with the provisions in new schedule 1 relating to the execution of warrants, which equally seems sensible. The new clause also provides that those persons who are authorised to accompany the enforcement officer can exercise the same powers that the officer may exercise as a result of the warrant. Off the back of that quite niche point, could the Minister explain who the Government envisage accompanying the enforcement officer under those powers—for example, a warranted police officer? Who does the Minister envisage being part of that process?

New schedule 1 makes further provision about applications for the execution of warrants under part 5. Warrants must be executed within three months of being granted. That is fairly standard, so the Opposition find that to be an uncontentious point.

I am pleased that the shadow Minister recognises the need for these safeguards. As for who could accompany an enforcement officer, it would depend on the individual circumstances. It could be a police officer. It might be someone from social services. I had probably best write to the hon. Gentleman to set out in some more detail who that might apply to.

I am afraid that asking how often we expect the powers to be used is rather like asking, “how long is a piece of string?” I would say, though, that some of the recent reports from the labour market enforcement bodies, including even the Low Pay Commission, show that there are actually quite a lot of labour violations in domestic settings—far more than there might have been in the past. That trend may well continue into the future.

I did not quite follow the shadow Minister’s inconsistency point.

I am grateful to the Minister, and I would be happy to follow this matter up in correspondence if we cannot make it clear in Committee. The point I was trying to make was that new schedule 1 makes provision for the execution of warrants under part 5 being granted, which is standard, but as we get into some of the detail, amendments 87 and 89 provide that the power in clause 79 may be exercised to enter any premises, including premises used as a dwelling, whereas new clause 8 provides that in the case of a dwelling, the power is not exercisable without a warrant. It seems to create potential for an extreme legal interpretation, to put those two at odds.

Therefore, if there is a drafting way that the two could be married up, so that it could be made clear that a warrant will always and categorically be required to enter a dwelling, that would be welcome. Perhaps it will be enough for the Minister to simply do so verbally in this Committee.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Certainly that would be my understanding, but I will happily write to him to confirm that.

I now have some more examples of people who might accompany enforcement officers during a visit. I am told that it could be other enforcement officers; IT experts, as data might be stored on computers; or HMRC fraud investigators. As I have suggested, we will write to the hon. Gentleman with a detailed list so he has a better idea of what we are looking at.

Amendment 87 agreed to.

Amendments made: 88, in clause 79, page 83, line 12, at end insert—

“This is subject to section (Power to enter dwelling subject to warrant) (which provides that a warrant is necessary to enter a dwelling).”

This amendment is consequential on NC8.

Amendment 89, in clause 79, page 83, leave out lines 28 and 29.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 87.

Amendment 90, in clause 79, page 83, line 30, leave out from “purpose” to end and insert “means—

(a) the purpose of enabling the Secretary of State to determine whether to exercise any enforcement function;

(b) the purpose of determining whether there has been any non-compliance with relevant labour market legislation;

(c) the purpose of ascertaining whether there are documents on the premises which may be required as evidence in proceedings for any non-compliance with relevant labour market legislation;”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment clarifies the purposes for which the power conferred by clause 79 to enter premises and inspect documents, etc may be exercised.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

On a point of order, Sir Christopher. It is my belief that you have not put Government amendments 91, 94 and 96 to the Committee.

I am sure if we had a Division on that, there would be some interesting comments. It can be difficult to keep up, but your understanding of the current grouping, Sir Christopher, is as mine, which is always an encouraging start.

Turning to clause 79, all the existing employment rights enforcement bodies have powers to enter premises and inspect workplaces to gather information to inform their investigations, but each body’s powers are different and some of them are now very out of date. Clause 79 therefore introduces a single power to enter into any relevant premises to obtain information or documents.

The clause has been drafted with the aim of continuing the current approach to enforcement and compliance, so in general, an officer will agree a time for their visit with the employer in advance and arrange the visit at a reasonable time during business hours. However, it allows an officer to turn up unannounced if they have reasonable grounds to believe that an employer may frustrate entry.

The clause gives power to an officer to inspect or examine any documents on the premises. The officer may also require any person on the premises to produce documents that the officer has grounds to believe are on the premises and are within their control or possession. If the person cannot provide the necessary documents, they will be able to provide them to the officer at a later time and date. An officer can also have access to, and check the operation of, any computer or equipment, as such devices may store information that is necessary for the purposes of an investigation. The clause also allows the officer to seize any documents produced on the premises that may be necessary for the investigation.

To enter a dwelling, as we have discussed, an officer will have to obtain a warrant from a justice. That reasonable safeguard protects the rights of all individuals to family life whilst allowing agents to carry out all the vital work they need to protect the rights of workers.

New clause 49 will restrict the exercise of powers in clauses 78 and 79 in relation to the intelligence services, unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that using the powers would not be prejudicial to national security, the prevention and detection of serious crime and the economic wellbeing of the UK. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a certificate of satisfaction before the powers can be exercised. Conditions on the exercise of either power may also be imposed if necessary. Subsection (5) also states that, other than as provided for in the clause,

“nothing in this Part requires any person to…produce”

or disclose any document or information “containing intelligence service information”.

Government amendment 182 is consequential on Government new clause 49. Clause 108, as introduced, sets out that the enforcement provisions in part 5 generally apply to Crown premises and the parliamentary estate. Clause 108(5) enables the Secretary of State to prevent powers of entry from being exercised in relation to Crown premises when that is deemed necessary for national security reasons. Government amendment 182 amends clause 181 to provide textual consistency and to ensure that new clause 49 functions as intended.

The amendments strike a balance to ensure that the fair work agency does not inadvertently act in a way that could be prejudicial to key national interests that the intelligence services work hard to protect, while also enabling those services to be investigated like other employers. This is vital to ensure that there is not a two-tier system of enforcement whereby some workers have less protection than others because of who their employer is.

I turn to Government amendment 181. Clause 101 imposes restrictions on the disclosure of intelligence service information, which is necessary to protect such information. It also defines “intelligence service information” for the purposes of that restriction. However, new clause 49 contains a slightly different definition, so Government amendment 181 amends that in clause 101 so that it is consistent with the definition in new clause 49(6)(c).

Government amendments 177 to 179 are technical amendments that are consequential on Government amendment 181. They make changes to the definition of “appropriate service chief” in clause 101(4). This is necessary as a result of the amendment to the definition of “intelligence service information” in clause 101 that is made by Government amendment 181. These technical amendments insert wording to clarify who the relevant service chief is in relation to information that has been received directly or indirectly from, or in relation to, each of the intelligence services. This addition is intended to capture information that may be obtained or held by third parties that relates to the intelligence services.

The amendments are part of a series of measures that are intended to balance the need to ensure that intelligence service information is protected, enabling the intelligence services to continue to do their important work, while also ensuring that the fair work agency can exercise relevant powers when necessary.

As we have already heard, part 5 of the Bill contains provisions that provide the building blocks that we will use to create the fair work agency. Several measures in the part, including some new clauses and amendments, are intended to specify how investigatory enforcement powers apply in relation to the intelligence services. They contain exemptions that are necessary to balance the protection of national security while ensuring that the fair work agency can still investigate when appropriate.

Clause 101 defines GCHQ and the intelligence services for clarity. If the amendments and new clauses are agreed to, those terms will be used more widely. The amendments are a technical change to ensure that the defined terms are repositioned to clause 112, which defines terms as they apply across part 5.

I cannot remember, Sir Christopher, whether you were in the Chair when the Committee previously discussed exemptions for the intelligence services, but it seems that we now have a different approach to such exemptions in the amendments that the Minister has just spoken to. I guess it is “Never Say Never Again.”

Ah!

There was always going to be a point when we returned to that.

New clause 49 would restrict the Secretary of State’s ability to exercise enforcement powers in relation to people serving in the intelligence services, unless it has been certified that there was no risk to national security. It would also restrict their ability to require others to provide documents or information relating to the work of the intelligence services.

Amendment 181 amends the definition of “intelligence service information” so that it is consistent with new clause 49, and amendments 177 to 179 are consequential to that. Amendment 205 defines GCHQ and intelligence services for the purposes of part 5 of the Bill—all very sensible—and applies the powers in clauses 78 and 79 to the intelligence services. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the exercise of the power will not be contrary to the public interest, or prejudicial to national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom.

I am genuinely grateful to the Minister and the Government that these exemptions for the intelligence services are included in the amendments and new clause—as I said a couple of moments ago, that represents a very sensible route—but I wonder why they seem to have been added as an afterthought. Did nobody in government consider the importance and the sensitivity of documents held within the intelligence services before the Bill was first presented to the House of Commons?

The shadow Minister was quite right to refer back to our earlier debate on flexible working. Today, he certainly is the man with the golden pun, but this set of rules is slightly different: it still allows the intelligence services to be dealt with, whereas I think his proposal would have excluded the intelligence services altogether. The requirement is just that the Secretary of State is satisfied that the inspections and powers are necessary. Of course, when dealing with highly sensitive intelligence documents, we would want such safeguards, so I am pleased that he supports our measures.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 79, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Supplementary powers in relation to documents

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause is a vital element of the fair work agency’s investigatory powers. It means that enforcement officers can copy documents and require that information is produced in a legible and readable format so that officers can take information away for analysis in slower time. The clause is necessary to ensure thorough inspection of the relevant information and documents for the purpose of the investigation, and it builds on powers that existing bodies have.

Clause 81 allows enforcement officers to retain any documents received under clause 78, or documents seized under clause 79, so that they have time to review documents properly to support their investigations and, if necessary, use those documents as evidence at trial. This reasonable and proportionate power is critical to allow the effective enforcement of employment rights. It is proportionate because if a photograph or a copy can be made of a document, that document is released back to the owner. I hope Members understand why the powers will be necessary so that the fair work agency can pursue its activities effectively.

His Majesty’s loyal Opposition do not object to the thrust of the clauses, particularly the provision about not retaining a physical document if taking a photograph or making a copy of it is practicable. I do not want anyone to misinterpret what I am saying, but although I recognise the need for enforcement agencies to be able to acquire the evidence and documents they need to conclude their right and proper investigations, the question arises, how long may evidence be held by the enforcement agency, or indeed any part of the British state, particularly in cases in which a physical document has not been retained but a photograph or a copy has been taken of it? Clause 81 is pretty explicit about the retention of physical documents, but it is less clear on how long a copy or a photograph may be held by any arm of the state. I look for reassurance from the Minister that the rules will apply to copies as much as to the original documents seized, taken or willingly given to the enforcement officers.

I hope that I can put the shadow Minister’s mind at rest. My interpretation of the provisions of clause 81(2) are that they would apply equally to the provisions of clause 81(3) and that copies would be retained only for as long as necessary for the purposes set out in subsection (2). I will write to him if my understanding is incorrect, but I believe that the legislation is fairly clear on that point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 82

Powers of enforcement officers under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause refers to where provision is made for authorised enforcement officers to exercise relevant powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Those powers are crucial in equipping enforcement officers to effectively investigate labour market offences. The clause forms part of our broader strategy to consolidate fragmented employment and labour practices under one unified fair work agency, including replacing the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority with a strengthened enforcement body.

It is essential that these powers, which are currently exercised by the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, are carried over to the fair work agency so that the agency can respond more swiftly and effectively to offences, ensuring that breaches of employment law are met with appropriate and immediate action. The integration will not only preserve the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority’s valuable work, but expand on it, reinforcing the Government’s commitment to protecting workers’ rights across the labour market. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

This is an uncontentious clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 82 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 83

Offences relating to gangmasters: power to enter premises with warrant

Amendment made: 91, in clause 83, page 85, line 9, leave out “persons or”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC9.

I beg to move amendment 92, in clause 83, page 85, line 10, at end insert—

“(aa) exercise any power conferred by section 79(2) or (4),”.

This amendment would enable an enforcement officer entering premises with a warrant under clause 83 to exercise the same powers to inspect, examine and seize documents as would be exercisable if the officer had entered the premises in reliance on the power conferred by clause 79.

These are minor amendments to ensure that there is consistency between the general power of entry in clause 79 and the power of entry under clause 83. They provide for a consistent approach, which will be easier and simpler to understand. This is a technical change, but one that will ensure that these key powers are easy to interpret and understand.

I heard what the Minister said, and these are indeed relatively minor amendments that do make sense. Amendment 92 enables an enforcement officer entering a premises with a warrant under clause 83 to exercise the same powers to inspect, examine and seize documents as would be exercisable if the officer had entered the premises in reliance on the power conferred by clause 79. Amendments 93 and 95 largely build on that. While we accept the spirit and the letter of the amendments, which all make sense, I cannot pass up yet another opportunity to wonder why they were not in the Bill in the first place.

The clause is an essential measure that empowers enforcement officers to enter premises, including by force if necessary, when investigating unlicensed gang- masters activity under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. It carries over the existing powers of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and brings them together with the other enforcement powers of the fair work agency. It enables officers to gather necessary evidence when there is a reason to suspect illegal labour practices and is a vital step in protecting vulnerable workers from exploitation. It ensures that enforcement officers can conduct thorough investigations to uphold fair labour practices without delay. As at present, enforcement officers will need a warrant to exercise this power.

The clause supports a co-ordinated approach to labour enforcement by integrating the functions of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority into the fair work agency. We are amending the clause as discussed and introducing a new schedule so that the process of applying for and executing a warrant mirrors that in clause 79, to create a single system of enforcement across the employment rights landscape. I commend the clause to the Committee.

As we made clear in the debate on the amendments to the clause, the official Opposition are broadly content, particularly given the explicit requirement for a warrant to enter premises, that we can support it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 83, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Power to request LME undertaking

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The labour market enforcement system was introduced by the Immigration Act 2016. It has proved an effective and flexible system to ensure that employers comply with the law. This set of clauses largely replicates the relevant provisions of the 2016 Act but replaces references to the enforcing authority with references to the Secretary of State, in order to reflect the transfer of functions to the Secretary of State. Clause 72(4) provides that enforcement officers may exercise any enforcement function of the Secretary of State.

Clause 84, together with clause 72(4), will ensure that enforcement officers appointed under clause 72 will have access to the powers they need. It gives the Secretary of State the power to request labour market enforcement undertakings, which are agreements made between the Secretary of State and a non-compliant employer. They outline measures that the employer will take to maintain compliance with the law and set out the prohibitions, restrictions and requirements with which the employer has agreed to comply. Labour market enforcement undertakings are important to ensure effective enforcement of the relevant labour market legislation within the fair work agency’s remit. They are effective in securing timely compliance, fostering collaboration, providing tailored solutions and improving conditions for workers. Labour market enforcement undertakings encourage persons to take responsibility for compliance while reserving more punitive actions for cases where voluntary efforts fail.

Turning to clause 85, the power to request labour market enforcement undertakings will be a key part of the fair work agency’s enforcement powers. Labour market enforcement undertakings are voluntary measures agreed between an individual business and the Secretary of State and seek to correct non-compliance to avoid the need for more extensive powers. Clause 84 gives the Secretary of State the power to request such undertakings, but clause 85 is crucial to ensure that the scope of the undertakings is clear. It does that by defining a “measure” in relation to an undertaking. It also specifies when those measures can be agreed as part of an undertaking and provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to specify additional measures that may be included in an undertaking through affirmative regulations.

Clause 85 largely replicates existing legislation in the Immigration Act 2016, although references to the enforcing authority are again replaced by references to the Secretary of State, in order to reflect the transfer of functions and powers to the Secretary of State. The clause, together with clause 72(4), will ensure that enforcement officers appointed under clause 72 will have access to the powers they need.

Clause 86 closely follows section 16 of the Immigration Act 2016 and carries over elements of the labour market enforcement undertakings system, which has operated well since its introduction. The clause provides that the Secretary of State will be able to specify the time period for which an undertaking will last, with a maximum time of two years. That is sensible flexibility: the more serious or systemic the breach, the longer an undertaking may need to be monitored. Clause 86 will also allow the Secretary of State to release persons from an undertaking, and require a release where the undertaking is no longer serving its purpose. That, again, is sensible flexibility, which will allow the fair work agency to cease subjecting persons to undertakings where they comply with the provisions of the undertaking and show improvements, so that fair work agency officers can thereafter focus on higher-risk employers.

Clause 87 replicates section 17 of the Immigration Act 2016 and provides for how the Secretary of State should give notice to an employer about labour market enforcement undertakings. It replicates the existing law with minimal change—the current system works well. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

I will focus most of my comments on clause 87, on the means of giving notice under the provisions of clause 84. I think we can all fully understand what clause 87(1) means by

“(a) delivering it to the person,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address”.

However, there is some potential for confusion—and a need for greater clarity, be that in advice, notes after the Bill becomes an Act or perhaps more formally during the passage of the Bill—regarding what precisely we mean by “electronic means”. Subsection (8) states:

“‘electronic address’ means any number or address used for the purposes of sending or receiving documents or information by electronic means”.

As Members of this House, we all sometimes have constituents who use all manner of extra means to try to get messages through to us, particularly with the growth of different social media channels and direct messaging. Most reasonable people still define “electronic means” as what is now probably the old-hat electronic means: published email addresses and perhaps text messages via mobile phones, WhatsApp and similar messaging platforms. Some businesses have websites that make it quite difficult to contact the business by means other than a website contact form, or perhaps their only published contact details are via social media channels.

Without wanting to get too detailed and specific, I think it would be welcome if the Minister could—this afternoon would be great, but certainly at some point before the Bill becomes an Act—double-check with the Department and his legal advisers whether things such as Instagram direct messages would count as “electronic means” under the clause. It is very easy—I am guilty; I have done it with some messages—to miss a message that does not come via the expected channels, such as published email addresses, postal addresses or whatever it might be. With social media channels—I have certainly found this with Instagram—it is sometimes very easy for legitimate constituent messages to find their way into junk folders, which are far less straightforward than our inboxes.

If the notices may be issued via those slightly less obvious electronic channels, can we have clarity on that? What safeguards will be put in place to get around the chance of a notice going into some sort of electronic trap—a junk folder, spam folder or whatever it might be—so that the enforcement body can have confidence that the notice it has served has reached the intended recipient? I suppose that these days the same point would apply to the postal method of delivering a notice—we all know that postal deliveries are not as frequent as they used to be—so if such notices are not going to be sent via some form of signed-for or special delivery, how can there be confidence that any notice served under clause 87 has reached the business owner or the director against whom enforcement action is being considered? Clarity is key here.

I am grateful for the general support. The shadow Minister has raised some fair questions and articulated the frustration we all feel when trying to deal with certain organisations. I know it is a Thursday afternoon, but I could talk for some time about how my satellite TV provider has proven quite elusive when I have tried to speak to an individual.

I think I can put the shadow Minister’s mind at ease on this issue. Clearly, the purpose of the undertakings is to encourage compliance, so an undertaking will not appear out of thin air, but will be the result of an ongoing conversation between the employer and the fair work agency. Clause 87(6) specifies that notices or undertakings can be sent by electronic means only if

“the person has indicated that notices under section 84 may be given to…an electronic address”

and in a particular format, so there is already a safeguard in the Bill to ensure that those messages do not go missing. The whole purpose of an undertaking is that there is an agreement between both parties that there will be compliance, so it would not be in the fair work agency’s interest to send things to addresses or places where it was not confident that they would be received. It is all about encouraging compliance, and that is the purpose of the clauses we have just debated, so I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 85 to 87 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88

Power to make LME order on application

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 88 carries over provisions that are currently in section 18 of the Immigration Act 2016. It gives the appropriate court the power to make a labour market enforcement order following an application by the Secretary of State. Labour market enforcement orders are a critical tool in the existing enforcement of employment rights, and it is vital that this system can continue to operate when enforcement is brought together under the fair work agency.

Clause 89 sets out the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may apply for a labour market enforcement order, and largely follows section 19 of the Immigration Act 2016. The Secretary of State may apply for an order if an employer refuses or fails to enter into a labour market enforcement undertaking, or does not comply with the measures in an undertaking that it has entered into. That is a common-sense approach to enforcement, first allowing businesses to fix problems voluntarily, and ordering them to improve only if that does not work. That is the compliance-first approach we want the fair work agency to take.

Clause 90 replicates section 20 of the Immigration Act 2016. It too grants the power to a court, where a person has been convicted of a labour market offence, to make a labour marker enforcement order. That is a reasonable measure, which protects workers by introducing an additional safeguard in relation to rogue employers. The labour market enforcement order may impose measures in accordance with clause 91 to ensure compliance with relevant legislation. This provision is substantially unchanged from the Immigration Act.

Clause 91 largely replicates section 21 of the Immigration Act 2016. It lays out what measures may be imposed in a labour market enforcement order. It also carries over from the Immigration Act 2016 a power for the Secretary of State to specify such measures in regulations. That is an existing power, and it makes sense to keep it to allow for flexibility in enforcing employment rights legislation. The measures are specifically designed to prevent or reduce the risk of the respondent failing to comply with any requirement imposed by or under relevant legislation, thereby protecting workers.

Clause 92 also carries over provisions from the Immigration Act 2016. It specifies that labour market enforcement orders can be granted only for a maximum period of two years and cannot be imposed on those under the age of 18. It also allows for courts, when making an order, to release individuals from undertakings for the labour market offence concerned, and from any other orders, to avoid individuals being subject to multiple undertakings and orders at the same time.

Clause 93 replicates section 23 of the Immigration Act 2016 and allows courts to vary or discharge labour market enforcement orders. Clause 94 carries over the appeals process for labour market enforcement orders from the Immigration Act 2016. The Bill clearly lays out which higher courts will deal with the appeal and what orders those courts may make, which is unchanged from the current regime. Clause 94 ports over the appeals process for labour market enforcement orders from the Immigration Act 2016. A clear appeals process is a vital and necessary way to enable the effective operation of the undertakings and orders system.

Let me turn to Government amendment 189. Schedule 6 outlines consequential amendments to other existing legislation and ensures consistency with the new provisions introduced by the Bill, which is important because it makes our legislative framework cohesive and functional. The amendment makes an essential technical addition to the Sentencing Act 2020, updating it to include reference to the labour market enforcement orders that a court may impose on someone upon conviction of a labour market offence. The amendment ensures that our statutory framework can function effectively. The labour market enforcement order system is an existing system that works well. I therefore commend amendment 189 and clauses 88 to 94 to the Committee.

It is always good to see the Government copying and pasting from a piece of Conservative legislation, with the odd use of the replace function. I will focus my comments largely on Government amendment 189, which makes a consequential amendment to the Sentencing Act 2020 to include labour market enforcement orders in the list of orders that may be made on conviction by a criminal court but that are not dealt with in that Act.

I do not fully understand why the amendment was not included in the Bill on its introduction—it seems a straightforward and should have been in there from the start. But my central question for the Minister is, how does this compare with the current position on enforcement made on conviction by a criminal court? Can the Minister reassure the Committee that this is simply a tidying-up measure that brings existing experience into line with the proposed legislation, or does he envisage the amendment making a material difference?

Let me deal first with the usual concern raised by the shadow Minister about why we have had to table an amendment. He has probably noticed that schedule 6 contains a considerable amount of other legislation. It is not that unexpected that not every piece of legislation affected by the Bill would be covered—that is really what this is about.

The shadow Minister also sought reassurance, and my understanding is that the amendment does not change the current powers of the courts in any meaningful way. If I am incorrect about that, I will of course write to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 88 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 89 to 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95

Evidence of authority

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Enforcement officers need the powers to do their jobs effectively, and that is what we are providing through the Bill. Clause 95 introduces a key safeguard around carrying out the enforcement functions in part 5 of the Bill. It applies to any person proposing to carry out an enforcement function of the Secretary of State and to exercise any of the powers of an enforcement officer. It requires those persons—in practice, fair work agency inspectors—to provide evidence of their appointment when carrying out investigations or taking enforcement action. That evidence will be in the form of official identification, sometimes referred to as a warrant card, provided by the Department.

Existing enforcement bodies provide such evidence currently. For example, section 9(1) of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 requires inspectors of the employment agency standards inspectorate to show evidence of their authority “if so required”. We have mirrored that approach in clauses 95 to 97. Persons acting to carry out the Secretary of State’s enforcement functions and use the powers of enforcement officers will have to provide evidence of their appointment on request. That gives businesses the opportunity to satisfy themselves that an inspection, which is an inconvenience and costs time and money, is genuine. The fact that the clause requires officers to provide this evidence only on request reflects the fact that the fair work agency’s inspectors are likely to be in correspondence with businesses before their premises visit.

The way in which we have drafted the clause is proportionate and reflects existing best practice. It balances having an important safeguard in place with ensuring that that does not create unnecessary operational burdens. I therefore commend clause 95 to the Committee.

As the Minister has said, the clause replicates existing best practice. It is perfectly reasonable that any enforcement officer turning up at any site seeking to engage in enforcement activity—be that under this legislation or in any other field—should have to prove on what authority they are acting. This clause is, therefore, uncontroversial.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 96

Items subject to legal privilege

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause provides a safeguard to ensure the protection of any document or information that is subject to legal professional privilege. Such documents or information do not have to be provided in response to any enforcement action by the fair work agency. As Members will know, legal professional privilege is a well-established principle, and refers to a person’s ability to speak freely and frankly with their legal adviser to obtain advice. It is a key principle in the judicial system in this country.

Practically speaking, the clause means that no provisions relating to the enforcement of labour market legislation —those in part 5 of the Bill—can require a person to produce documents or information they are entitled to withhold on grounds of legal professional privilege in High Court proceedings in England and Wales. The same is true of documents or information a person is entitled to withhold in Court of Session proceedings in Scotland.

No provisions in the enforcement clauses can compel someone to disclose information they could choose to withhold on the grounds of confidentiality of communications. The clause defines communications for this purpose as any communication between a professional legal adviser and their client or as any communication made, connected with or for the purposes of legal proceedings. Protecting legal professional privilege helps to protect the administration of justice and the rights of individuals and other legal persons. It is a well-recognised concept that appears in many other pieces of legislation. For example, section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 exempts from disclosure information subject to legal privilege.

The fair work agency will have strong investigatory enforcement powers. Those are proportionate and justified, and it is important that, where investigations do happen, defendants are able to communicate frankly with any legal advisers representing them. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

As the Minister said, the protection of legal privileges is well established in our legal system. It is important, and the clause is the belt and braces of ensuring that it applies to this legislation. In one respect, I could argue that I do not see why it is necessary to write the protection of legal privilege into the Bill, given how entrenched it is in our system. But it never hurts to have that belt-and-braces approach, and the Opposition object in no way, shape or form to the protection of legal privilege.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97

Privilege against self-incrimination

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 97 provides for another standard safeguard in our legal system: protection against self-incrimination in criminal legal proceedings. The fair work agency has investigatory powers that enable the Secretary of State and the enforcement officers they appoint to require the production of documents and information to enable them to fulfil their functions. It is an offence under clause 104 for anyone, without reasonable excuse, to fail to comply with such a requirement.

The clause protects individuals from self-incrimination by providing that any information they are required to provide under clause 78 is not adduced as evidence against them in criminal proceedings. However, the individual can still choose to voluntarily adduce this information as evidence in the proceedings.

The clause disapplies that protection for certain offences. It provides that the protection does not apply where the offences under trial relate to any of the offences listed in subsection (4)—providing false information or documents under clause 103 of the Bill, or breaching other statutory provisions about false statements and statutory declarations. It is vital, in the context of someone providing false information, to ensure that the right evidence is presented to the court. That, in turn, is crucial to enable the court to come to the right decision.

These protections and exemptions help to ensure the effective functioning and the fairness of our legal system. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

It is becoming almost uncomfortable how much we agree on the current set of clauses. However, these protections, particularly those against self-incrimination, come with the correct, proper and, dare I say it, entirely standard exemptions listed, and the Opposition do not object to the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 98

Disclosure of information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

On clause 98, regulators and enforcement agencies must be able to work together effectively to share information and pool knowledge. For example, if the fair work agency identifies issues with health and safety in the course of its investigations, it should be able to let the Health and Safety Executive know, and vice versa.

Silo working is bad for workers, bad for businesses and bad for the taxpayer. Clause 98 is about preventing silo working. It authorises the two-way sharing of information between the fair work agency and other bodies. It introduces schedule 5, which lists the public bodies with which information can be shared to enable them to exercise their functions. We have tabled amendments to the schedule to add the Pensions Ombudsman, as well as certain authorities in the devolved nations.

The clause also allows for schedule 5 to be amended by affirmative regulations. That provides the flexibility necessary for the fair work agency to respond to changes in the wider labour market and regulatory landscape. Effective information sharing is crucial for successful enforcement of employment rights across agencies. Without the clause, the fair work agency would be unable to receive and share vital information, undermining its ability to effectively enforce those rights.

Clause 99 ensures that the information sharing authorised in clause 98 is efficient and reflective of best practice. Although it is vital that the fair work agency can share information with other bodies, it is critical that personal information is protected. Information will be able to be shared under clause 98 without breaching any obligation of confidence, or other restriction on the disclosure of information.

Clause 99 ensures that information shared under clause 98 is shared in accordance with the relevant data protection laws and remains subject to relevant prohibitions on disclosure in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is crucial to safeguard the ongoing secure handling of information and to ensure that all parties can be confident that that information will be managed in the proper way.

The critical thing in what the Minister just outlined is that any information sharing must happen within the confines of our existing data protection laws. That is absolutely mission critical. Of course, everyone accepts that enforcement agencies must work with other enforcement agencies and that they need to work closely with other Government agencies at times, where there is a compelling need to do so. In that respect, our existing data protection laws will be the necessary safeguard, as well as the explicit recognition of the other agencies that might be conferred with. From that perspective, clauses 98 and 99 are relatively straightforward.

I ask that the Minister to keep a close eye on the Bill as it passes through Parliament, becomes an Act and is enforced, to check on what we commonly call mission creep and to ensure that the powers exercised under these clauses do not, for unnecessary reasons, become too commonplace. For example, some agencies may unnecessarily share a little too information, in a way that is not relevant to an enforcement activity. We can all get behind enforcement activities where proper due process is followed, but there can sometimes be mission creep, which can stretch into realms that a reasonable person would not say was acceptable.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the phrasing in the clause is perhaps a little too ambiguous and could lead to the mission creep he mentions? If that were to happen, it could result in abuse of power.

My hon. Friend eloquently—probably more eloquently than me—gets across the point I was trying to make. Where the wording of legislation is open to wider interpretation, mission creep is often the unintended consequence. I have no doubt the Minister does not want to see that mission creep and wants safeguards in place. However, to my hon. Friend’s point, it would be good if the Minister explained to the Committee when he sums up—or committed to doing so on Report—what safeguards can be put in place to ensure that mission creep does not happen and that elements of information sharing not relevant to a direct, live enforcement investigation or prosecution are not allowed to be shared, as well as the impingements that that would bring on businesses across our country.

The shadow Minister makes a reasonable point. Of course, this will all be subject to data protection legislation and the safeguards contained therein. It is also the case that, if the Secretary of State wishes to expand the list of bodies with which information is shared, there is a requirement to amend that list by way of affirmation regulation, giving parliamentary oversight.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5

Persons to whom information may be disclosed under section 98

I beg to move amendment 97, in schedule 5, page 130, line 22, at end insert—

“The Pensions Ombudsman.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Pensions Ombudsman for the purposes of the Ombudsman’s functions.

This is a large grouping again, and I will turn first to Government amendments 97 to 100. Open, two-way information sharing with the regulator is what clause 98 and schedule 5 are all about. These amendments add Scottish health bodies to schedule 5, which will support those bodies in fulfilling their functions. This has been agreed by Scottish Government officials and the bodies themselves.

Amendment 97 also adds the Pensions Ombudsman to schedule 5. Fair work agency inspectors may come across useful pension information that will help the Pensions Ombudsman in its duties, and it is right that they can share that information. The amendments stand to benefit the bodies concerned and the public by allowing the Secretary of State to share information obtained by the fair work agency that is relevant to the functions of those bodies.

Amendments 171 to 174 are about where the fair work agency, in fulfilling its statutory duties, is likely to obtain information that would be beneficial to other statutory bodies. Clause 98(5) gives the Secretary of State the power to disclose certain information to the persons specified in schedule 5. Amendments 171 to 174 add additional public bodies in the devolved nations to schedule 5. Amendment 171 adds the National Crime Agency, amendment 172 adds Social Care Wales, amendment 173 adds the Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority in Northern Ireland, and amendment 174 adds Welsh Ministers.

The amendments will enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of part 5 enforcement functions to be disclosed to those bodies for the purposes of their functions. The amendments stand to benefit those bodies and the public by allowing the Secretary of State to share information with those bodies that is obtained by the fair work agency and that is relevant to its functions, where the disclosure is relevant to the exercise of those bodies’ own functions. The amendments have all been agreed by the relevant bodies, and on that basis I commend them to the Committee.

As the Minister said, this is a relatively substantial grouping of amendments, and he outlined very clearly what they all seek to do. I will merely pose a couple of questions so that we can get into some of the practicalities of the amendments.

What purpose does the Minister envisage for the data that will be shared with pensions, healthcare and social care services? How do the Government intend to use the powers in those settings, and what safeguards will be in place? I think we all understand the need for information sharing with a lot of the organisations he outlined, but it seems strange to include healthcare, social services and —to many extents—pension operators. If he could give the Committee some practical examples of where he feels that is necessary, it would help us to consider the amendments more clearly before coming to a determination.

The shadow Minister lays down a challenge for me. On the Pensions Ombudsman—I will certainly write to him if anything occurs to me after consultation with officials—it is not unusual for an individual’s payslip or contract to indicate that pension deductions have been made, when they have not actually reached the appropriate pension funds. That may be one example of where such a reference could be made.

The shadow Minister will be aware from the Low Pay Commission’s recent reports that health and social care are the sectors where some of the worst labour market abuses are ongoing, so it is important that we are sighted of particular issues in those sectors. I will take further advice on any other specific examples I might be able to give him, and I will write to him in due course.

Amendment 97 agreed to.

Amendments made: 171, in schedule 5, page 130, line 29, at end insert—

“The National Crime Agency.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the National Crime Agency for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 98, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert—

“Healthcare Improvement Scotland.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Healthcare Improvement Scotland for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 99, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert—

“Social Care and Social Work Improvement Scotland.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Social Care and Social Work Improvement Scotland for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 100, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert—

“The Scottish Social Services Council.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Scottish Social Services Council for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 172, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert—

“Social Care Wales.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to Social Care Wales for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 173, in schedule 5, page 131, line 20, at end insert—

“The Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority in Northern Ireland.”

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Health and Social Care Regulation and Quality Improvement Authority for the purposes of its functions.

Amendment 174, in schedule 5, page 131, line 23, at end insert—

“The Welsh Ministers.”—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill to be disclosed to the Welsh Ministers for the purposes of their functions.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

I will not detain the Committee long. Schedule 5 is the list of bodies with which information can be shared, which obviously now includes the Pensions Ombudsman. As I have indicated, any further bodies would need to be added to the list by affirmative regulations.

We accept the list, but welcome the Minister’s commitment from the previous debate to provide clarity on the organisations on it. We need greater reassurance on those, but for the time being I will certainly not object to the schedule.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 5, as amended, accordingly agreed to.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Restriction on disclosure of HMRC information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Data from His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs will be crucial for the investigation and enforcement of many different employment rights beyond the national minimum wage, which HMRC is specifically tasked to enforce on behalf of the Secretary of State. However, much of HMRC’s data is understandably confidential, and it is therefore prudent to require an extra level of approval before information shared by HMRC is disclosed further.

The clause restricts the disclosure of that information without authorisation from the commissioners of HMRC. If information is inadvertently shared without approval, section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, on wrongful disclosure, applies. The result could be a fine and/or imprisonment for the individual committing the offence. The clause ensures information-sharing best practice across Government and puts in place an appropriate safeguard around the sharing of HMRC data.

On the face of it, this is a sensible clause with appropriate safeguards around HMRC data. The only note of caution I would throw into the mix when involving HMRC in any investigation is that there are arm’s length bodies and then there are arm’s length bodies, and it is well known that HRMC can often prove very independent, if I may put it that way, when it comes to such investigations. I know—and this is relevant—from other work I do, including as chairman of the loan charge and taxpayer fairness all-party parliamentary group, that there can sometimes be some difficulties and challenges in terms of HMRC’s ability to share data and its willingness to engage in a straightforward conversation, even with other enforcement agencies.

I encourage the Minister, prior to enforcement of this legislation, to work with his colleagues in the Treasury team—his right hon. Friend the Chancellor and, more importantly, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury—to find the most straightforward way of getting an agreement in place with HMRC on these enforcement activities, because there are too many tales of woe from other areas, such as the loan charge, in which I take a particular interest on behalf of a number of constituents and which must be got right. HMRC is a body that many right hon. and hon. Friends have found it difficult to get straightforward answers out of under all sorts of Governments—blue ones, red ones and coalition ones—over recent years. I encourage the Minister to do that due diligence and work to ensure that, metaphorically speaking, all the ducks are in a row.

The shadow Minister raises some fair points. I commend him for the work he does on the loan charge, and that all-party group is important. Certainly, HMRC’s functions in terms of the fair work agency will be focused on national minimum wage enforcement. I do not think that that is an area where we have some of the difficulties the shadow Minister referred to, but of course we will make sure. The intention in the clause is to make sure that appropriate safeguards are indeed in place.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Restriction on disclosure of intelligence service information

I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 101, page 95, line 11, leave out from “person” to end of line 12 and insert

“to disclose information to an enforcing authority where—

(a) the person is serving in an intelligence service, or

(b) the information is intelligence service information.”

This amendment would provide that clause 98(2) does not authorise the disclosure of intelligence service information.

When carrying out investigatory and enforcement activity, the enforcement officers will need to obtain information relevant to the Secretary of State’s enforcement functions. That is why clause 98(2) permits the disclosure of information to the Secretary of State or an enforcement officer if the disclosure is made in connection with an enforcement function. But there is a need to ensure that certain categories of information are treated differently, given their likely sensitive nature or content.

One such category is intelligence service information. The chiefs of the intelligence services are under statutory obligations to make sure that information relating to their service is not disclosed unless to do so is in accordance with certain requirements. Clause 101 therefore sets out restrictions on the disclosure of intelligence service information, to ensure that the Bill is consistent with those obligations.

Clause 101(1), as introduced, refers only to persons serving in an intelligence service. After discussion with the intelligence services, it is clear that there is a need to ensure that intelligence service information held by third parties is also protected, so Government amendment 175 widens the restriction at clause 101(1) to ensure that clause 98(2) does not require third parties to disclose intelligence service information to an enforcement officer.

Government amendment 176 is consequential on amendment 175. Amendment 176 inserts wording into clause 101(1) to clarify that the restriction on persons serving in an intelligence service from disclosing information under clause 98(2) does not affect disclosures that such persons could make under intelligence service disclosure arrangements.

These amendments protect intelligence service information from disclosure. They are part of a series of amendments that aim to balance the need to preserve the work that the intelligence services do in protecting key national interests with ensuring that the fair work agency can exercise its functions where necessary. On that basis, I commend the amendments to the Committee.

When it comes to protecting our intelligence services, it turns out that the Minister is not Dr No after all. [Interruption.] I think we will leave it there. The point that I have made so many times is that it is right to protect and exempt our intelligence services to ensure that they can get on with the work they need to do, with the right level of confidentiality, and that the vital work done to protect our country is at all times protected. Therefore, we welcome the amendments, but, as ever, we ask why it has taken until the Bill is in Committee to work out that position and the vital importance of exemptions for the intelligence services.

Amendment 175 agreed to.

Amendments made: 176, in clause 101, page 95, line 13, leave out “such a person” and insert

“a person serving in an intelligence service”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 175.

Amendment 177, in clause 101, page 95, line 24, after “from” insert “, or relating to,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 178, in clause 101, page 95, line 27, after “from” insert “, or relating to,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 179, in clause 101, page 95, line 29, after “from” insert “, or relating to,”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 181.

Amendment 180, in clause 101, page 95, leave out lines 32 to 36.

This amendment is consequential on amendment 205.

Amendment 181, in clause 101, page 96, line 7, leave out “from” and insert

“directly or indirectly from, or that relates to,”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment amends the definition of “intelligence service information” so that it is consistent with NC49.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

The clause ensures that intelligence service information is disclosed to the fair work agency only in accordance with intelligence service disclosure arrangements and cannot be shared by the fair work agency without authorisation from the appropriate service chief. In the course of investigating some employment rights abuses—for example, in cases of modern slavery or coercive employment practices—the fair work agency may make use of information provided by the intelligence services or come into possession of information relevant to the intelligence services. That information is likely to be highly sensitive in nature, and specific disclosure arrangements therefore apply.

The clause authorises a person serving in an intelligence service to make disclosures of information to an enforcement authority in accordance with intelligence service disclosure arrangements. It restricts the disclosure of intelligence service information by an enforcing authority without the authorisation of the appropriate service chief for the intelligence service from which the information was obtained. It is right that there are additional protections for this information, not least on national security grounds. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Yes, absolutely—there is no issue for His Majesty’s loyal Opposition with the protection of our intelligence services.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 101, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102

Offence of failing to comply with LME order

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 102 addresses the need for accountability and compliance with labour market enforcement orders. It creates a clear offence of failing to adhere to a labour market enforcement order without reasonable excuse, sending a strong message that non-compliance will not be tolerated. The clause ports over the existing offence in section 27 of the Immigration Act 2016 and does not create a new offence. The clause is essential to ensure that labour market enforcement orders hold real weight and authority in our legal framework.

The penalties under clause 102 are designed to be fair yet firm, with varying limits for summary conviction in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and up to two years’ imprisonment or fine on conviction on indictment. The range of penalties enables the courts to respond proportionately to the severity of each offence, ensuring that justice is both accessible and effective across the UK. By maintaining meaningful penalties, we maintain a powerful deterrent against non-compliance, which encourages individuals and businesses to uphold their obligations and respect labour laws. The approach we have taken in the clause emphasises both accountability and fairness, ensuring consistent enforcement across jurisdictions.

I turn to clause 103. For the fair work agency to enforce effectively, it needs to rely on the information it gathers. Providing false information slows investigations down and slows down justice for workers. The clause therefore carries over and consolidates offences from predecessor legislation to create a single offence of providing false information. The clause provides that an offence is committed when a person

“produces, or knowingly causes or allows to be produced, any information or document”

that is materially false. It provides that an offence is committed when the person providing information is either aware that it is false when providing it or has not taken reasonable action to confirm its accuracy. The clause also sets out the penalties applicable in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It is right that falsifying documents should carry a criminal penalty.

Clause 104 provides a vital tool in the arsenal of our labour enforcement officers. Employment rights enforcement is generally a civil regime, founded on consensual investigations. That is right and proportionate, but it is important that there is a clear course of action when individuals block or stymie investigations. The clause creates a single offence for anyone who intentionally obstructs an officer or fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with their lawful requirements. In doing so, the clause consolidates similar offences in the predecessor legislation for the current enforcement bodies.

Clause 104 is fundamental to ensuring that enforcement officers can perform their duties without interference, which is essential for effective labour market oversight. Obstructing officers’ work undermines these efforts, delaying investigations and weakening compliance. The clause directly addresses this issue by establishing clear consequences for those who intentionally hinder enforcement officers in the execution of their duties. The penalties in the clause are proportionate but firm, with tailored limits across UK jurisdictions. This approach ensures consistent consequences for obstruction, reinforcing compliance with employment rights law and protecting workers’ rights, fostering a safer and fairer labour market.

I will focus the majority of my comments on Government new clause 50. As the Minister has outlined, the new clause provides a defence to the offence in clause 103 of providing false information or documents in response to a requirement imposed by the Secretary of State under part 5 of the Bill. The defence would apply if the Secretary of State certified that the conduct in question was necessary in the interests of national security, or for those other reasons that the Minister outlined.

I think we can all categorically understand the defence of the conduct being necessary in the interests of national security—that is uncontroversial. Likewise, when it is for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime—that seems relatively uncontroversial. It is slightly more open to interpretation, but is clearly put forward with good will. Indeed, the prevention and detection of serious crime is something that we all wish to see.

On conduct that is

“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”,

again, on the face of it, that is something we all want to see; we all want the economic wellbeing of our great country to be protected. So, on the face of it, these measures seem sensible. However, that third defence—the economic wellbeing defence—seems incredibly broad and ill-defined. I would be grateful if the Minister could provide a more detailed explanation of what exactly it means, and how the discretion of the Secretary of State would be circumscribed in deciding what matters genuinely relate to the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom and what do not.

If we put a bunch of lawyers in a room, they could come up with virtually any reason why something could fall within the interests of the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom. I do not think that anybody—including the Minister, from the perspective of ensuring that his Bill works once it is an Act, or indeed of the national interest of the United Kingdom—would want to see such an ill-defined phrase enabling a legal argument that virtually anything relates to the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom. For example, would a fraction-of-a-per-cent drop in growth be defined as relating to the UK’s economic wellbeing? I do not think that the new clause is sufficiently well defined to give the Minister the powers that I think he is looking for within the confines of this proposed legislation, or indeed to give the outside world the confidence that it needs to understand the full scope of what is going on here.

I understand the point that the shadow Minister is making, but this phrase seems to be well established in the relevant legislation. It appears in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and other legislation that establishes legal parameters around the security services, and appears to have first been used in this House by Douglas Hurd. I do not know whether the Minister will also respond to this, but does the hon. Member accept that these provisions appear to be carrying forward some well-established and understood legal concepts?

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that this is a well-established form of wording, and I do not think there is anything between our positions on national security. However, even if it is well entrenched in previous legislation, leaving “economic wellbeing” so ill-defined presents an open goal to those who would wish to abuse that definition. Indeed, if we had proposed such a broad and ill-defined Opposition amendment, I am sure that Government Members would start to use terms such as “wrecking amendment”, and so on, and to talk about opening up the legislation far too widely.

Although we are not opposed to the spirit and the letter of the bulk of new clause 50, it would be helpful, before this legislation goes any further, if the Minister gave a serious, detailed and clear explanation of what he means by the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, and a guarantee that this will not be used, potentially through misinterpretation, by those in the legal profession such that what the Minister wishes to achieve through this legislation could fall down and be found wanting.

The first thing to say is that the new clause came at the request of the security services, so it is not a whim on the Department’s part, and it applies specifically to the offence under clause 103 of providing false information. It would be rather rash of me to start talking about situations in which that might apply. I understand the hon. Member’s point about the wider economic test being quite broad, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Northfield said, that is the established test in legislation. Given that we are talking about a defence to a specific offence under clause 103, I would suggest that the chance of this being frequently used, or indeed misused, is extremely remote, although as I say, it would be improper for me to speculate on the circumstances in which it might be used, given the sensitivities around the proposals.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 103 and 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 105

Offences by bodies corporate

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 105 applies the offences in part 5 of the Bill to corporate bodies. It is a standard clause that can be found in predecessor legislation, such as section 27 of the Immigration Act 2016. The clause ensures accountability at both the organisational and individual levels, and practicality in legislation. It makes certain that those complicit in the offence can be held personally liable.

Clause 106 applies the offences in part 5 of the Bill to partnerships; clause 107 applies them to unincorporated associations. Subsections (5) and (6) of clause 107 specify that liability is attached to those who committed the offence with consent or who were negligent regarding the offence, as well as to the association. Unincorporated associations play a significant role in various sectors, including sports and community services. These two clauses ensure that all business structures are subject to enforcement. They are standard clauses that are found in predecessor legislation, such as section 30 of the Immigration Act 2016.

Clause 108 sets out how the provisions of part 5 of the Bill relating to the enforcement of labour market legislation apply to the Crown and parliamentary estate. Clause 108(1) provides that all provisions in part 5 are binding on the Crown. Subsection (2) defines Crown premises as any premises

“held or used by or on behalf of the Crown”.

This means that fair work agency inspectors can enter and inspect Crown premises using powers set out earlier in the Bill. We believe this is right. The Crown employs individuals who are entitled to rights in scope of the fair work agency’s remit. The clause will enable officers to carry out investigations and gather information to ensure that the rights of Crown employees are as effectively enforced as other employees’ rights.

The clause also contains certain exemptions that we believe are justified. First, subsection (6) exempts the King’s private estates from the powers of entry. The King’s private estates are defined in the Crown Private Estates Act 1862. They are distinguished from Crown premises. They are not defined as premises used in connection with Crown business and employing staff. Secondly, subsection (6) also exempts

“premises occupied for the purposes of either House of Parliament”

from the powers of entry. The main premises we would expect the fair work agency to enter in relation to Parliament would be the offices of MPs and peers. The wording here ensures that the exemption is wide enough to exempt Members’ offices in the Palace of Westminster and those beyond it. This exemption reflects standard practice.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to amendments we have tabled for national security reasons. Clause 108(5) of the Bill as introduced enables the Secretary of State to exempt Crown premises from powers of entry where they deem it necessary for national security reasons. The starting point of the current drafting is that powers of entry apply generally and need to be disapplied. The exemption applies only to investigations of Crown premises that would have national security implications.

Government new clause 49 restricts the exercise of powers in clauses 78 and 79 in relation to the intelligence services, unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that use of the powers would not be prejudicial to national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the economic wellbeing of the UK. The new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a certificate before the powers can be exercised. Government amendment 182 amends clause 108(1) to provide textual consistency and ensure the new clause functions as intended. Our amendments strike a balance to ensure that the fair work agency is able to investigate the security agencies where necessary, while also ensuring that the powers are not used in a way that could damage the UK’s security interests.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 106 and 107 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 108

Application of this Part to the Crown

Amendment made: 182, in clause 108, page 100, line 2, after “of” insert

“section (Information relating to the intelligence services, etc) and”.—(Justin Madders.)

This amendment is consequential on NC49.

Clause 108, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 109

Abolition of existing enforcement authorities

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Our aim is that the fair work agency will bring together existing state enforcement functions in one place. Delivering this aim means abolishing two existing bodies involved in enforcement of workers’ rights—the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the Director of Labour Market Enforcement—and transferring their functions to the Secretary of State. Clause 109 does that.

The function of enforcing the licensing regime for gangmasters and the GLAA’s responsibilities for enforcing aspects of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 will be transferred to the Secretary of State and carried out by fair work agency enforcement officers. The Director of Labour Market Enforcement’s oversight and reporting functions will also be transferred to the Secretary of State. They are replaced by the new duties on the Secretary of State set out in clauses 75 to 77. Clause 75 requires the Secretary of State to set up an advisory board, and there are also the requirements on an enforcement strategy and annual report.

Abolishing these two bodies is a key part of streamlining the current system of employment rights enforcement, which is fragmented and ineffective. It is not about reducing functionality or enforcement capability. In fact, because of the reforms we are making, we hope that the fair work agency will be greater than the sum of its parts. Employment rights will be enforced more effectively and efficiently, which will be fairer for businesses and workers, and there will be greater clarity on where people need to go to seek help.

Broadly speaking, the clause is uncontroversial. We accept the need to streamline enforcement activities and put them under one roof, notwithstanding my comments about understanding the costs of putting that enforcement body together.

Since we are debating the Employment Rights Bill, I feel it is incumbent on me to pose a question to the Minister as we talk about the abolition, as opposed to the transfer, of existing bodies with existing employees. The term “abolition” has a clear legal meaning, unlike other language that could have been used with respect to the transfer of powers. Will any of the existing employees who engage in enforcement activity under the bodies being abolished by the clause receive redundancy notices? Are they being put out of work or moved to some other part of Government that is not directly related to this enforcement activity, or will all those employees be directly transferred at the discretion of the Secretary of State and deployed under the new agency?

This is an important test of the Bill. Here we have some of the first employees who will be affected by its new provisions. What will happen to those—no doubt very good—people who are currently working as part of the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the Director of Labour Market Enforcement? Upon the enactment of the Bill, they will be among the very first people in our country to work out what their employment rights are.

I welcome the shadow Minister’s commitment to workers’ rights; it seems that listening to me for several weeks has finally rubbed off on him. At this stage, it would be premature for me to say that we intend for any redundancies to transpire. The clear presumption, as we move forward, is that all existing staff will transfer over under existing legal protections. Clearly, other issues may arise when we get into the operational detail, and I do not think that it would be appropriate to talk about workforce matters in a Bill Committee; that ought to be discussed with the workforce first. As I say, my clear understanding at this stage is that all staff will be transferring over, because we have a job to do to ensure that the labour market is enforced properly, and we need everyone on board to do that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 109 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110

Consequential and transitional provision

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause introduces schedules 6 and 7, which make consequential amendments and transitional provisions required to deliver this change. Schedule 6 sets out consequential amendments we are making to various Acts of Parliament as a result of these reforms. Part 1 of schedule 6 covers the consequential amendments to existing powers under relevant pieces of labour market legislation. Part 2 of the schedule sets out the changes required to other Acts.

Schedule 7 sets out transitional and savings provisions we need in place to set up the new body. Part 1 of schedule 7 gives powers to the Secretary of State to make transfer schemes to move staff, property, rights and liabilities of the GLAA and DLME to the Secretary of State. Part 2 of schedule 7 provides for other necessary transitional provisions, such as to ensure that smooth sharing of information can continue and to retain provisions that devolved legislation relies on. The clause and the schedules it introduces are necessary to deliver a functioning statute book and to deliver on the policy intention of upgrading enforcement of workers’ rights.

My thoughts on the clause are similar to those I expressed on the last clause we debated. The language of this one is a little clearer, so the Opposition do not object to it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 110 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6

Consequential amendments relating to Part 5

I beg to move amendment 101, in schedule 6, page 133, line 7, at end insert

“and the italic heading before that section.”

This amendment makes a further consequential amendment to the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.

Schedule 6 outlines consequential amendments to other existing legislation. It ensures consistency with the new provisions introduced by the Bill, which is important to make our legislative framework cohesive and functional.

Amendment 101 ensures textual consistency by removing the italic heading before section 13 of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998. Section 13 is repealed by the Bill. The change is entirely technical, to make sure that all aspects of the legislation are properly aligned and clear for interpretation. Such amendments are common practice when integrating changes into existing legislation and ensure accuracy in our statutory framework. I hope Members will support this uncontroversial and important amendment as it facilitates the clarity and precision of the legislation.

Amendment 102 corrects a small drafting error in schedule 6, and amendment 103 is a consequential change to align with amendment 102. They do not affect the substance of the Bill, but maintain its quality and accuracy.

These are very minor amendments, to which the Opposition do not object.

Amendment 101 agreed to.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Anna McMorrin.)