PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Southport Inquiry - 13 April 2026 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
We do so in the shadow of the events of 29 July 2024. I will not name the perpetrator, nor dwell on the details of the crimes that saw three beautiful young girls murdered, the attempted murder of eight other children and two adults, and lasting physical and psychological harm to many more. I know that I speak on behalf of the whole House when I say that my thoughts today are with all those affected. In honour of them and the memory of three murdered girls, Elsie Dot Stancombe, Bebe King and Alice da Silva Aguiar, we must now act to prevent similar attacks. It was for that reason that my predecessor appointed Sir Adrian Fulford to lead a full statutory inquiry.
The inquiry’s work has two parts. The first, which reported today, considered the decisions made by the agencies and services that interacted with the perpetrator. That included a range of institutions in the criminal justice system, as well as in education, healthcare and local government. It also considered the actions of the perpetrator’s parents.
The findings of the inquiry are unsparing. Sir Adrian has uncovered systematic failures across multiple public sector organisations. The recording and sharing of information were poor. None of the agencies involved had a full understanding of the risk that the perpetrator posed, and many did not take steps to assess the risk he posed to others. There was a failure by the agencies involved to take responsibility, and nobody was clear as to who was in charge; so the failure, because it belonged to everyone, belonged to no one. Where individuals missed opportunities to intervene, lessons must be learned, but they did so within organisations that repeatedly passed the risk to others and where systemic failings existed.
The perpetrator came into contact with the state on countless occasions. Lancashire police responded to five calls to his home address. The police were called when he was in possession of a knife in a public place. He was referred on several occasions to the multi-agency safeguarding hub. He came into contact with children’s social care, the Early Help service and children’s mental health services. He was referred to Prevent on three occasions. He was convicted of a violent assault and referred to a youth offending team. All failed to identify the risk that the perpetrator posed, and so he fell through the gaps. The warning signs were missed: a growing history of violence, and a clear and continuing intent to commit harm.
In the Home Office, the focus falls on Prevent and policing. Sir Adrian is clear that police should have progressed the perpetrator to the multi-agency Channel programme. Channel could have actively assessed and managed his risk. Instead, he was not deemed suitable because he had no fixed ideology. That ran counter to the guidance at the time, but the thresholds were unclear and the guidance was applied inconsistently. The perpetrator’s multiple referrals were also considered individually, when they should have been seen as a cumulative and compounding risk. The perpetrator did not receive the correct interventions, and his autism diagnosis meant that professionals focused far too much on his vulnerability and far too little on the threat that he might pose to others.
The horrific attack was itself evidence of the ease with which it could be conducted. There were no restrictions to stop the perpetrator watching the violent content that inspired him, downloading instructions to make poison, or viewing terrorist materials online. He was also able to bypass the safeguards that should have stopped him buying and receiving dangerous weapons. These findings are devastating, but they are not surprising. Findings like these have been heard before in inquests and inquiries. This time, however, they must be a spur for change. The inquiry makes 67 recommendations. The Government are reviewing them and will respond to those which relate to national government this summer, and I expect local agencies to do the same.
Since this awful crime, the Government have already acted. That begins with Prevent. Since the Southport attack, the Home Office and counter-terrorism policing have reviewed historical cases to ensure that similar instances were handled correctly, with cases reassessed for any change in risk and managed accordingly. The Government have reviewed the Prevent thresholds and published updated guidance. We have introduced a new Prevent assessment framework, with mandatory training for counter-terrorism case officers. Oversight of repeat Prevent referrals has been strengthened, ensuring that cumulative risk is not missed and senior sign-off is required before a case is closed. To provide independent oversight of the whole system, we have created an independent Prevent commissioner. I thank Lord Anderson, whose term ends today, for so ably taking on that position on an interim basis. I am pleased to say that I have appointed Tim Jacques as the new Prevent commissioner, and he begins his role tomorrow.
This Government have also begun to place greater controls on a dangerously unregulated online world. The Online Safety Act 2023 requires companies to remove illegal content from their platforms. The Act is intended to limit children from encountering content that is legal but poses a risk of significant harm, although that is just the beginning of what can and must be done. The internet remains a dangerous place for children, and we are clear that tech companies have a moral responsibility to keep their users safe. The House should be in no doubt that, when they fail to do so, the Government will intervene. That is why we are consulting on whether to remove children’s access to social media entirely.
I can also announce today that we will legislate to prevent the spread of extreme violent content online. We have also made it harder for people to purchase weapons. The Crime and Policing Bill places new controls on the online sale and delivery of knives. We have banned the manufacture, purchase and possession of ninja swords and zombie-style machetes, and earlier this year we published new guidance mandating that any child caught with a knife must be referred to a youth offending team.
In the aftermath of the attack, the Government commissioned Jonathan Hall KC—the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation—to consider the legislative gaps exposed by the attack. That work identified an inconsistency that clearly needed addressing: unlike for terrorist attacks, there is no crime on the statute book for planning an attack without an underlying ideology. Jonathan Hall therefore recommended the creation of a new offence. That legislation will be brought forward as soon as parliamentary time allows.
The inquiry also identifies a wider issue: rising numbers of young men are fascinated by extreme violence—boys whose minds are warped by time spent in isolation online. That is a risk to us all. Where someone is vulnerable to terrorism, they can and should be managed through the Prevent programme. However, where they are not, there is no clear approach to that risk. Today, we publish the terms of reference for the second part of the Southport inquiry, which will face directly into that challenge. Sir Adrian will provide recommendations on the adequacy of the existing arrangements, across all arms of the state, for identifying and managing the risk posed by violence-fixated individuals. He will explore what specific interventions are required to reduce the risk to the public. He will also review the influence of the internet and social media, and the ease with which weapons can be procured. Sir Adrian begins this work immediately, and will present his final recommendations next spring.
In the summer of 2024, an act of unspeakable evil took place in Southport. Nothing will ever heal the pain of those who survive, including the families who suffered unimaginable loss. Responsibility rests with the perpetrator, but there was also responsibility within the family. The perpetrator’s parents knew the risk that he posed but did not co-operate with the authorities. There is also responsibility on the state, and on all of us here, to learn the lessons from failures, wherever they occurred. That lesson is that the failures happened everywhere. We must ensure that we do not find ourselves here again, grieving deaths that would never have happened had the state—and those who work within it—acted differently. That is our task. I commend this statement to the House.
As the Home Secretary rightly said, this report identifies very serious repeated failings by public bodies. Sir Adrian said that a
“merry-go-round of referrals, assessments, case-closures and ‘hand-offs’”
meant no agency took the lead or properly addressed the danger Rudakubana posed. Multiple opportunities were missed to prevent this tragedy. Sir Adrian also found that Rudakubana’s parents created
“significant obstructions to constructive engagement.”
Sir Adrian makes important recommendations. I am glad the Home Secretary will respond by the summer, and we on the Conservative Benches will support necessary actions.
During the inquiry, we heard evidence given by Rudakubana’s former headteacher Joanne Hodson. She told the inquiry that she was pressured by mental health services to water down the education, health and care plan to minimise the danger posed by Rudakubana because of his ethnicity. Miss Hodson told the inquiry:
“my efforts to include this information in the EHCP were met with hostility by the father and also by mental health services. Miss Steed”,
who was from child and adolescent mental health services,
“even went as far as to accuse me of racially stereotyping AR as ‘a black boy with a knife’. Nothing could be further from the truth”,
but
“in the end…the wording of the EHCP was re-written in many places”.
This contributed to the clear risks being missed.
The Nottingham inquiry into the three tragic murders there identified exactly the same issue: mental health professionals in Nottingham decided not to section Valdo Calocane because they were concerned about an
“over-representation of young black men in detention”.
Even the Government’s notes on the Mental Health Bill accompanying the King’s Speech refer to that issue.
The fixation with ethnic disproportionality is deeply damaging. Ethnicity should never be a consideration: when an agency is taking steps to protect the public, everybody should simply be treated exactly the same. We cannot allow dangerous individuals to avoid detention for public safety simply because of their ethnicity. Everybody should be treated the same. It would be helpful if the Home Secretary made clear from the Dispatch Box that she agrees with that approach and set out how the Government will change their approach in the future.
Today’s report also makes it clear that Rudakubana’s autism was wrongly allowed to inhibit the way he was dealt with, yet the Government’s King’s Speech notes on the Mental Health Bill again expressly said that people with autism should be sectioned less often. Given the findings of today’s report, will the Government reconsider that?
I also want to raise the aftermath of this tragedy, which saw serious rioting. It is of course important to avoid prejudicing criminal trials. However, as Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said:
“The Government has to be aware…that if there is an information gap…then there are other voices, particularly in social media, who will try and fill it.”
He went on:
“Quite often, there’s a fair amount…that can be put into the public domain”,
and indeed in October, two or three months after the attack but well before the trial, information concerning the al-Qaeda terror manual and ricin was put in the public domain without prejudicing the trial. The failure to provide information created an information vacuum in those early days of August 2024, and that vacuum was filled by untrue speculation online, some of it originating outside the UK, which fuelled the riots. Will the Home Secretary therefore commit to making sure that in future such information is routinely released in cases of public interest?
As the mother of Elsie said at the inquiry, this tragedy must be a “line in the sand.” We owe it to the victims, to the survivors and to their families to learn the lessons from this tragedy and to make sure it never happens again.
The shadow Home Secretary referred specifically to the testimony of Mrs Hodson, the headteacher. She gave evidence to the inquiry and I believe that her position was vindicated very strongly by the chair in the inquiry’s findings. Let me be absolutely clear: the only factors that should be taken into account are the potential risks posed by an individual and how best to manage those risks. No other factors are relevant. It is clear, in relation not just to Mrs Hodson’s experience but to the failures that existed across a multiplicity of public agencies, that at the heart of the problem was a failure to assess appropriately the risk that the perpetrator posed to others. He managed to slip through the cracks because no one agency took responsibility for the assessment of that risk, and ultimately for the managing of the risk that the perpetrator posed to others. Those are the only factors that should ever be taken into account. I will be working closely with Ministers from other Departments as we formulate our full response to the inquiry’s findings and set out our expectations of professionals, not just in health but in other public services.
On the diagnosis of autism, in his report Sir Adrian made it clear that it would be
“wrong to make a general association between autism and an increased risk of violent harm to others.”
However, he also found that the way that the perpetrator’s autism manifested itself increased the risk of harm that he posed to others. That shows the absolute importance of taking a case-by-case approach, making sure that all factors are adequately taken into account and that agencies take responsibility for how that risk is to be managed. Again, there are good lessons to learn for health practitioners and others in our local services when it comes to assessment of risk and how it is best managed.
On issues relating to communications after the attack took place, especially at the point when a lot of misinformation was being spread, particularly online, the shadow Home Secretary will know that there has already been a change in practice, having learned the lessons of what happened. There was a well-meaning desire to ensure that nothing was done that might prejudice a trial, but exactly how the rules are applied can be a matter of interpretation and degree. The College of Policing has already created new professional practice in its guidance for police officers, there is already a new Crown Prosecution Service and media protocol, and we are developing a new charter between criminal justice agencies and the media to ensure that whatever information that can be readily and easily be made available is made available at the earliest opportunity. It will always be incredibly important that nothing is done that might prejudice a trial, but I know that the shadow Home Secretary will acknowledge that since this horrific attack there has already been a change in approach to communications by the Government and other agencies. In other instances and cases, the Government and other agencies have made much more information available to the media, and therefore to the public.
I know that the inquiry’s findings and the phase 2 report will be of great interest to Members across the House. I look forward to working not just with the official Opposition but with Members from all parties to ensure that the House is as one in the response to this horrific tragedy—that is what we owe all the victims of this case.
We have already been delivering a number of improvements to the Prevent programme. There is new statutory guidance, improved training, new case management systems and much stronger interventions for people who are already on the programme. We also have a strengthened approach to managing repeat referrals; where there are a number of referrals, which individually might not have led to an onward referral to the Channel stream, the cumulative impact is now being taken into account. There is also a much more robust risk assessment tool. The totality of the changes that we have already made has put the programme in a much stronger position, but in learning of the findings from this inquiry, we will take more action as necessary.
The report lays bare that agency after agency failed to step up and take ownership of the risks that the perpetrator posed. There are monumental failures across a number of authorities, from the police, Prevent and NHS mental health services to children’s social care, youth offending services and the perpetrator’s parents. That is simply not acceptable. Will the Home Secretary confirm how soon she plans to report back on whether the Government will accept all 67 recommendations? Will she commit to providing Parliament with an update on progress every six months?
Today’s report exposes serious oversights by online giants that allowed the perpetrator to collect an arsenal of weapons without effective age verification checks. Will the Home Secretary confirm whether the recently published knife crime strategy will address the ease with which knives are available for purchase online? Will it crack down on big tech companies, like Amazon, that are putting profit above protocol when it comes to the sale of dangerous items?
Finally, the Liberal Democrats have long argued that Prevent is not fit for purpose. It is deeply shocking that the perpetrator was referred three times yet no further action was taken. We understand that was because he did not possess a specific ideology—well, there should be no clearer sign of a system unable to address modern threats. Will the Home Secretary today commit to a full overhaul of Prevent within this Parliament so that future warning signs are not missed? Will she also commit to bringing forward the legislation recommended by Jonathan Hall KC in the next King’s Speech?
There will be a comprehensive response from the Government on all of the inquiry’s phase 1 recommendations. I intend for that to come before the summer so the House will have an opportunity to debate it. As we move to delivery of the Government’s response to the recommendations, I will keep the House updated on our progress, including on where potential future legislation might be needed.
In the Crime and Policing Bill, which is continuing its passage through Parliament, we have introduced new age verification checks both at the point of sale and at the point of delivery of knives. That is a way of directly responding to some of the issues we have seen in this case, whereby the perpetrator was able to slip through the system. That should not be possible in the future once the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament and is implemented.
Let me turn to the question of the threat posed by those who are fixated by violence but do not necessarily have an ideology, by those who have a mixed ideology, or by those who flit between having an ideology and not having one; there is a developing, complex picture of the sorts of threats that we face. We have made it very clear that those who have no fixed ideology but are vulnerable to terrorism are still, and should be, referred to the Prevent programme. That remains the lead programme for dealing with the risk posed by those individuals.
The inquiry recognises that there is a gap through which those who do not have a fixed ideology and are not vulnerable to terrorism might slip. Phase 2 of the inquiry will consider how best to respond to those sorts of cases, and will make recommendations on who should take the lead on dealing with those individuals, but I want to assure the hon. Lady and all Members of the House that the Government are not simply waiting for phase 2 to report. We are already trialling with a number of local authorities a new approach for those who are below the threshold for Prevent, but who present a risk that we are concerned about and who we believe might pose a risk of harm to others. We are thinking about different ways in which agencies might handle that risk in order to make sure those individuals do not slip through the net. As we learn lessons from those pilots, we will seek to start implementing them, while we wait, of course, for Sir Adrian Fulford and the inquiry team to come forward with fuller recommendations in this area in future.
The Southport attack has been ruled a “disaster waiting to happen” after the perpetrator was referred to Prevent on three separate occasions, and Sir Adrian Fulford has highlighted other multi-agency failings. On 20 June 2020, my constituents Gary and Jan Furlong lost their son James, who was murdered during the Forbury Gardens terrorist attack—I am also thinking of them today. Like Southport, the perpetrator of the Forbury Gardens attack had been referred to Prevent four separate times, and multi-agency failures were also highlighted by Sir Adrian Fulford. Like the deaths of Alice, Elsie and Bebe, the deaths of James Furlong, Dr David Wails and Joseph Ritchie-Bennett were ruled to have been “probably avoidable”.
I acknowledge that it will take some time to go through the 67 recommendations that have been made in respect of Southport. However, can the Home Secretary advise the House on whether, despite the improvements to Prevent that she has outlined today, she actually believes that it is fit for purpose? She said in her statement that
“We must ensure we do not find ourselves here again, grieving deaths which should never have happened, had the state, and those who work within it, acted differently”,
but the fact is that we are here again, and we are here time and time again after multi-agency failures. Can the Home Secretary immediately take steps in respect of joined-up partnership working, and outline to us what those steps will be, in order to ensure that no other family has to endure such loss?
I assure my hon. Friend that I am standing up a taskforce to bring together all Government Ministers with relevant responsibilities, to make sure we begin work immediately on improving the systems and processes that are in place at the moment and that we are not simply waiting for the final phase of the inquiry to report—there will be more progress. We have taken steps to reform Prevent. I know that the Prevent strategy and the work it does has been of interest in this House for many years, and has been scrutinised very thoroughly. An intervention programme of this kind is always going to have to move very quickly to deal with changing threat patterns—for example, the way that Islamist extremism might have presented in the era of Daesh and ISIL in Syria becoming prominent is different from how it presents now—and practitioners have to be able to adapt as quickly as the presentation of extremist ideologies is developing. It will always be a work in progress, because the nature of the threat is changing so quickly and regularly. That is something we should acknowledge. However, we can and will have strong mechanisms in place to make sure that the programme does the job we all know it needs to do.
On the substance of the hon. Lady’s point, we must follow the findings of the inquiry’s chair, who said that there were five major failures in this case, including that no single agency took ownership of the risk that the perpetrator posed, that there was poor information recording and management, and that the behaviour was sometimes excused on the basis of the perpetrator’s perceived or diagnosed autism spectrum disorder. There were a range of factors in place, and we should follow the evidence and the findings of the inquiry’s chair. We will respond based on the failures that have been found.
Where a Prevent referral is made because there is a vulnerability to terrorism, there are already systems in place that would enable those risk assessments to be made on the basis of risk posed to others. Of course, in this case, the onward referral to Channel should have been made, but it was not. However, we have to make sure that even where an onward referral to Channel does not take place and somebody does not quite meet the threshold for Prevent, they are still picked up, and that that cultural shift for dealing with risk—for its management and assessment—takes into account all of the findings that Sir Adrian Fulford has made.
That is something the Government will now have to look at closely, to bring forward real change within our health service, within education and within local government. I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that I will take a close personal interest in that because, at the end of the day, preventing harm and keeping our people safe is my responsibility. I will make sure we do everything we can to have those mechanisms as robust as possible for people who meet the threshold for being dealt with through the Prevent strategy and onward referral to Channel. Where people are below that threshold, we still need an answer as a society. I will take a close interest in that myself.
The hon. Gentleman is right to point out that the overall threat picture shows a very challenging environment. The issues with which we are dealing today relate to someone with no fixed ideology who was clearly vulnerable to terrorism and had a fixation with extreme violence. We see that running alongside the more traditional, well-known and understood elements of extremism, such as Islamist or extreme right-wing terrorism, but even within those better understood forms of extremism, we see that the pattern is changing. It is always evolving and developing, which poses a challenge to all the practitioners who must try to keep up with the way in which extremism is presenting itself in our communities. The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that that work is as robust as possible, and to taking every possible step to counter extremism in all its forms.
This is a very full report, and I commend the author for his determination to ensure that political correctness did not influence it. It is clear that a sea change is required in departments so that they are less concerned about offending people and more concerned about protecting our innocents. What lessons can be learned to inform new procedures to ensure that there is accountability in the intelligence and security services in particular?
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