PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill - 7 February 2017 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
[Natascha Engel in the Chair]
New Clause 1
Parliamentary approval for agreements with the Union
“(1) Where a Minister of the Crown proposes to conclude an agreement with the European Union setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union—
(a) the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement of the proposed terms of the agreement, and
(b) no Minister of the Crown may conclude any such agreement unless the proposed terms have been approved by resolution of both Houses.
(2) The requirements of subsection (1) also apply where a Minister of the Crown proposes to conclude an agreement with the European Union for the future relationship of the United Kingdom with the European Union.
(3) In the case of a proposed agreement setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the statement under subsection (1)(a) must be laid before the proposed terms are agreed with the Commission with a view to their approval by the European Parliament or the Council.”—(Keir Starmer.)
This new clause requires Ministers to seek the approval of Parliament of any proposed Withdrawal Agreement before final terms are agreed with the Commission and prior to endorsement by the European Parliament and Council.
Brought up, and read the First time.
New clause 18—New Treaties with the European Union—
“So far as any of the provisions of any new treaty with the European Union may depend for ratification solely upon the exercise of prerogative, they shall not be ratified except with the express approval of Parliament.”
This new clause would ensure that any future treaties made with the European Union must be ratified with the express approval of Parliament.
New clause 19—Future relationship with the European Union—
“(1) Following the exercise of the power in section 1, any new treaty or relationship with the European Union must be subject to the express approval of Parliament.
(2) It shall be the policy of Her Majesty’s Government that, in the event of Parliament declining to approve such a new treaty or relationship, further time to continue negotiations with the European Union shall be sought.”
This new clause seeks to ensure that, if Parliament declines to give approval to any new deal or treaty following the negotiations in respect of the triggering of Article 50(2), that Her Majesty’s Government shall endeavour to seek further time to continue negotiations for an alternative relationship with the European Union.
New clause 28—Parliamentary sovereignty—
“Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that a vote on the proposed agreement setting out—
(a) the arrangements for withdrawal, and
(b) the future relationship with the European Union
will take place in the House of Commons before any vote in the European Parliament.”
This new clause puts a requirement on the Prime Minister to ensure a vote on final terms takes place in the House of Commons before the European Parliament votes on the deal.
New clause 54—Negotiating timeframe—
“Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that if Parliament does not approve the terms for withdrawal and the future relationship within 24 months of notifying the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU, she will request that the European Council extends the time period for negotiations.”
This new clause makes provision for a situation in which negotiations have not been concluded or in which Parliament has not approved the deal either because of time constraints or because it has declined to give approval. In any of these situations the Prime Minister would seek extra time to continue negotiations with the EU.
New clause 99—Parliamentary approval of the final terms of withdrawal from the EU—
“The United Kingdom shall withdraw from the EU once either—
(a) Royal Assent is granted to an Act of Parliament that approves—
(i) the arrangements for withdrawal, and
(ii) the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU
as agreed to between the United Kingdom and EU, or
(b) Royal Assent is granted to an Act of Parliament that approves the United Kingdom’s withdrawal without an agreement being reached between the United Kingdom and the EU.”
This new clause aims to embed parliamentary sovereignty throughout the process and requires primary legislation to give effect to any agreement on withdrawal or for withdrawal without such an agreement.
New clause 110—Future relationship with the European Union—
“(1) Following the exercise of the power in section 1, any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union must not be concluded unless the proposed terms have been subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.
(2) In the case of any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union, the proposed terms must be approved by resolution of each House of Parliament before they are agreed with the European Commission, with a view to their approval by the European Parliament or the European Council.”
This new clause seeks to ensure that Parliament must give approval to any new deal or Treaty following the negotiations in respect of the triggering of Article 50(2), and that any new Treaty or relationship must be approved by Parliament in advance of final agreement with the European Commission, European Parliament or European Council.
New clause 137—Future relationship with the European Union—
“(1) Following the exercise of the power in Section 1, any new treaty or relationship with the European Union must be subject to the express approval of Parliament.
(2) In the event of Parliament declining to approve the new treaty or relationship set out in subsection (1), Her Majesty’s Government shall seek to negotiate an alternative new agreement with the European Union.”
The Prime Minister has guaranteed that Parliament will have a vote on the final deal between the UK and the EU. This new clause is intended to make that vote meaningful by ensuring that if Parliament votes against the terms of such a deal, the Government shall try to negotiate an alternative future trading agreement and shall not default without agreement to the World Trade Organisation rules.
New clause 175—Request for Suspension of Authorisation—
“If Parliament has not approved terms on which the UK will leave the European Union within the two years specified in Clause 3 of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, or any extension of the negotiation period agreed in accordance with that clause, then the Government must request the European Council to consider the notification authorised by this Act as suspended.”
This new clause would require that Her Majesty’s Government request the European Council to suspend the notification of the United Kingdom’s intention to leave the European Union if Parliament does not approve the terms of departure.
New clause 180—UK—EU membership: reset (No.2)—
“The Prime Minister may not exercise the power under section 1(1) until she has sought an undertaking from the European Council that failure by the Parliament of the United Kingdom to approve the terms of exit for the UK will result in the maintenance of UK membership on existing terms.”
New clause 182—Parliamentary approval for agreements with the Union—
“(1) Where a Minister of the Crown proposes to conclude an agreement with the European Union setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union—
(a) the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement of the proposed terms of the agreement, and
(b) no Minister of the Crown may conclude any such agreement unless the proposed terms have been approved by resolution of both Houses.
(2) The requirements of subsection (1) also apply where a Minister of the Crown proposes to conclude an agreement with the European Union for the future relationship of the United Kingdom with the European Union.
(3) In the case of a proposed agreement setting out the arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the statement under subsection (1)(a) must be laid before the proposed terms are agreed with the Commission with a view to their approval by the European Parliament or the Council.
(4) In laying a statement before Parliament under subsection (1)(a), Her Majesty’s Government shall have regard to the requirements of Parliament for adequate time to consider the statement before the proposed terms are put to each House for approval under subsection (1)(b).”
This new clause is an alternative version of NC1 which provides for additional time being allowed for consideration by Parliament of the proposed terms of the agreement before the vote.
Amendment 50, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published an assessment on whether such a notification can later be revoked, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 20, page 1, line 5, at end insert—
“(3) If the power is exercised under subsection (1), the Prime Minister’s commitment to hold a vote in both Houses of Parliament on the outcome of the negotiations with the European Union shall include the option to retain membership of the EU.”
Recognising that the Government wishes to begin negotiations on a deal to leave the EU, and recognising the Supreme Court ruling on the sovereignty of Parliament, this amendment provides a safety net, ensuring that there is a real vote on the outcome deal that provides the option of the UK staying in a reformed EU should the final terms of the deal be detrimental to the UK’s national interest.
Amendment 43, page 1, line 5, at end insert—
“(3) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must prepare and publish a report on the process for ratifying the United Kingdom’s new relationship with the European Union through a public referendum.”
It is important that we have the right ongoing future relationship with our EU partners. Labour has been forceful in arguing for maintaining close collaboration with our partners in the fields of medicine, science, research, education, culture, security, policing and counter-terrorism. Although the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State maintain the idea that all this can be agreed within two years, leaving just an implementation stage, the reality is that we will have two deals: the article 50 agreement and a new UK-EU treaty setting out the new arrangements, along with transitional arrangements.
To be clear, we all have a vested interest, on behalf of all our constituents, in getting the right outcome, and that raises the proper role of Parliament in this process. That is why I have consistently argued for three elements of scrutiny and accountability, and this is a debate that, in a sense, has been going on for the last three months. The first element, which I started the argument for last October, was that, at the start, we should have a plan or White Paper—a formal document setting out the negotiating objectives. We should then have a system for reporting back during the negotiations, and we should have a vote at the end of the exercise. Those are the three elements of scrutiny and accountability that I have argued for.
What is significant about what has just been said is that it covers the article 50 agreement and it covers any future relationship. That is the first time we have heard this. It is a very significant position by the Government, and I am grateful that it has been made. It is very important that it has been made, because, on both sides of the House, there has been real anxiety that it should cover both bases.
Whether it goes far enough for the fall-back position, I will reflect on. Ideally, of course, one would want that covered, but I do not want to underplay the significance of what has just been said about the two deals, because this is the first time that clarity has been given; it is the first time the point has been conceded. It is an argument I have been making for three months, and it is very important that it has now been conceded: it is important for my colleagues, and I am sure it is important for people across the House.
Equally important is the timing—that the vote should be before the deal is concluded. The great fear was that there would be a concluded deal, which would make any vote in this House meaningless.
What I hope can now happen on the back of that concession is what I anticipate will happen in the European Parliament: by regularly reporting, updating the House and setting out the direction of travel, there can be agreement about progress, and what happens at the end will not come as a surprise to any of us in this House. But what has been said by the Minister is a very significant statement of the position, which meets in large part everything I have been driving at in new clause 1.
Let me make some progress, because we have not got very far. [Interruption.] Well, I have not got very far. Looking again at the big picture, there is a commitment in paragraph 7.1 of the White Paper—this is important for trade unions, for working people and for constituents who have repeatedly raised these points—to convert all EU-derived rights, including workers’ rights, into domestic law. I do not think that commitment has been heard loudly enough. We certainly intend to hold the Government to that at every step of the way, along with other EU rights such as environmental and consumer rights.
I have consistently argued that the Prime Minister cannot, in the article 50 negotiations, negotiate to change domestic law or policy—that will require primary legislation. Paragraph 1.8 of the White Paper makes it clear that the Government do not accept that the Prime Minister would have that authority, and expressly refers to separate Bills on immigration and on customs. I highlight that because there is huge concern among my colleagues about the threat made by the Prime Minister to alter our social and economic model and turn the UK into a tax haven. That cannot happen without primary legislation. It is important that we note that.
So far as the vote is concerned, there has been a change of position, and it is important that I set that out. Initially, the Secretary of State for Brexit said back in October that he would observe the requirements of treaty ratification. Then in December, at the Dispatch Box, he almost said that we would get a vote—he said that it was “inconceivable” that we would not. Then, just before Christmas at the Liaison Committee, the Prime Minister appeared to back away from that altogether under questioning from the Chairman of the Brexit Committee, and the fact of a vote was only conceded after Christmas. Then in paragraph 1.12 of the White Paper, there was a commitment to a vote on the final deal. Today has taken us a lot further forward. That demonstrates how, by chipping away and arguing away, we are making progress on accountability and scrutiny.
In the end, there is stark choice for the House. If we are to have a vote, it will be either before the deal is concluded, or afterwards, in which case it will be a fait accompli. This concession appears to suggest that it will be before it is concluded. I recognise that there are other issues that flow off the back of that timing, but that is critical, because the sequence of events at the end of the exercise is extremely important to what the House can meaningfully say or do about the agreement that is put to us for a vote.
“If this Parliament is not willing to accept a deal that has been decided on…with the European Union, then, as I have said, we will have to fall back on other arrangements.”—[Official Report, 25 January 2017; Vol. 620, c. 295.]
That does not guarantee that this House will have the final decision on our future relationship with the EU.
May I first repeat what I said to the shadow Secretary of State when I intervened on him a few moments ago? The Government have repeatedly committed from the Dispatch Box to a vote in both Houses on the final deal before it comes into force. That, I repeat and confirm, will cover not only the withdrawal agreement but the future arrangement that we propose with the European Union. I confirm again that the Government will bring forward a motion on the final agreement—
I believe that parliamentary sovereignty requires that Parliament should have the ability to influence the Government’s position before they conclude the deal, so that those with whom the Government are dealing—the other parties to the negotiations—know that the British Government have to produce an agreement that will get the support of Parliament. If the Government wait until hands have been shaken with all the other Europeans before coming here, Parliament will be told, “If you reject the agreement, you will have nothing and it will be a WTO disaster.” That would give the Government a majority, but not a very satisfactory conclusion.
This will be a difficult and complex agreement, and the negotiation will, from time to time, be subject to reports to the House, to the Exiting the European Union Committee and so on. What we are proposing, and what I am committing to from the Dispatch Box, is that before the final agreement is concluded—the final draft agreement, if you like—it will be put to a vote of this House and a vote of the other place. That, we intend, will be before it is put to the European Parliament. That is as clear as I can make it.
“fall back on other arrangements.”—[Official Report, 25 January 2017; Vol. 620, c. 295.]
Can he be absolutely clear about what he meant by falling back on other arrangements?
Equally, however, we could end up in a situation where the agreement is made at one minute to midnight at the end of the two-year period. If the Government do not then conclude an agreement to bring it to the House after that, but before it goes to the European Parliament, we could end up with no deal at all. The Minister may agree that the Government have a real dilemma. It is important that the House should understand those limitations, because they go fundamentally to the question of whether an amendment can be reasonably crafted to meet that situation.
Let me say this. It will be a meaningful vote. As I have said, it will be the choice between leaving the European Union with a negotiated deal or not. To send the Government back to the negotiating table would be the surest way of undermining our negotiating position and delivering a worse deal. In any case, we cannot unilaterally extend—
I turn to the amendments. The shadow Secretary of State has referred to his new clauses 1, 18, 19, 28, 54, 110, 137, 175 and 182, which all seek, in one way or another, to ensure that Parliament will have a vote on the final deal that we agree with the European Union. Let me assure Members again, as I have said in answer to interventions, that the House will be involved throughout the entire process of withdrawal. Again, I remind the House of the extent of the Secretary of State’s engagement.
I was reminding the House of what the Secretary of State has already done in terms of engagement. He has made six oral statements and there have been more than 10 debates—four in Government time. More than 30 Select Committee inquiries are going on at the moment. Furthermore, there will be many more votes on primary legislation between now and departure from the European Union.
I suggest that the amendments that I have referred to are unnecessary. I reiterate that both Houses will get a vote on the final deal before it comes into force and I can confirm, once again, that it will cover both the withdrawal agreement and our future relationship. However, we are confident that we will bring back a deal that Parliament will want to support. The choice will be meaningful: whether to accept that deal or to move ahead without a deal.
Before the Minister led us through the dance of the seven veils, I was going to question him on the irrevocability or revocability of article 50. I still think that that goes to the heart of what we are debating. However, I say directly to the Minister, with regard to what he described as a “serious announcement”, that if one makes a serious announcement in the course of the Committee stage of a Bill of this importance, it should be followed by an amendment. If we were here debating the Dangerous Dogs Bill, which I remember debating some time ago, and a serious announcement was made, that serious announcement would be followed by an amendment to the Bill. If that is good enough for a Bill of that description, how much more important is it to have such an amendment when we are debating the biggest constitutional change facing this country for half a century.
We thank the Minister for his announcement and the apparent concession. We do not doubt for a second the seriousness with which he makes his serious announcement, but I think that most of us—including the Minister himself—would think that such an announcement should be followed by an amendment to the Bill so that it could go through the proper processes, with hon. Members being able and willing properly to debate an announcement of such seriousness.
I give way to the former Chief Whip, who seems through these proceedings so anxious to regain his previous elevated position.
The hon. Lady’s point goes to the heart of the dilemma the House will find itself in, unless we take action to the contrary. It strikes at the question of whether article 50, once invoked, is irrevocable or not. In my point of order earlier, I tried to give a flavour of the Government’s confusion, but it was a brief point of order and I want to give the full flavour of the Government’s confusion.
The Brexit Secretary said in the Exiting the European Union Committee, when asked about this specific point, that
“one of the virtues of the article 50 process is that it sets you on way. It is very difficult to see it being revoked. We do not intend to revoke it. It may not be revocable—I don’t know.”
That is the basis on which we are being asked to take this fundamental decision that will affect the future of this country. We have to know these things, because they will determine the position the House finds itself in.
If article 50 is irrevocable—if after the two years, unless there is a unanimous agreement from the other 27 members of the European Union, the negotiations stop, the guillotine comes down and we are left with a bad deal or no deal—any vote in the House against that sword of Damocles hanging over the House will not be a proper, informed judgment.
Of course, the noble Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who drafted article 50, believes it to be revocable. Presumably, he had that in mind when he drafted the article in the first place.
We make an effort to solve the problem in new clause 180, which we call the reset amendment. It asks the Prime Minister to seek from the European Council an agreement that if this House and the other place refuse to agree the terms negotiated, we will reset to our existing membership of the European Union on the current terms and try again. We would then approve a deal only once we believed its terms were in the interests of this country. The Prime Minister should be prepared to present us not with a bad deal or no deal—not a bad deal or World Trade Organisation terms—but a deal that we know is in the interests of our constituents and the country. That is fundamental to this debate.
I know and understand the exigencies of political leadership, but the date of the end of March came about at the Tory conference because Brexiteers were beginning to get a bit flappy about whether the Prime Minister was a born-again Brexiteer or still a secret submarine remainer. I cannot understand why people think—even on the Brexiteer side, because presumably the Brexiteers want success for this country and its economy—that it is a good idea to invoke article 50 before we know what the destination will be. Similarly, I cannot believe that it is a good idea to leave the European economic area, which is governed by different agreements and instruments, until we know what the alternative is. Instead of giving these points away and putting all the negotiating power in the hands of those we are negotiating with—they are our partners now, but in any negotiation there is a tension between two parties—any negotiation depends on the cards in your hand. If the other side know that after two years the sword of Damocles comes down, it puts them in a much more powerful position in the negotiation.
I argue strongly for the new clause and the amendments we have tabled, which aim to secure the position at the end of the negotiations before we embark on something that will leave this House not just with a bad deal or no deal, but with a metaphorical gun pointed at our head when we address these serious questions. We have to know the end position before we embark on that fundamentally dangerous course.
We are being invited to believe that if the House of Commons decided that it did not like the deal the Government negotiated for our future relationship with the EU and voted it down, the rest of the EU would immediately say sorry and offer us a better deal. I just do not think that that is practical politics. I do not understand how Members believe that that is going to happen. What could happen, however, is that those in the rest of the EU who want to keep the UK and our contributions in the EU might think that it would be a rather good idea to offer a very poor deal to try to tempt Parliament into voting the deal down, meaning that there would then be no deal at all. That might suit their particular agenda.
“Do you want to accept the new negotiated relationship with the EU or not?”?
How on earth and why on earth has he changed his mind since then?
The point that Opposition Members and their amendments miss is that once we send the article 50 letter, we have notified our intention to leave. If there is no agreement after two years, we are out of the European Union. The right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) rightly asked whether the notification is irrevocable, but he did not give his own answer to that. I found it very disappointing that the SNP, which takes such a strong interest in these proceedings, has no party view on whether it is irrevocable. Personally, I accept the testimony of both the Attorney General and the noble Lord who was the advocate for the remain side in the Supreme Court case that it is irrevocable. The House has to make its decision in light of that.
As far as I am concerned, this is irrevocable for another democratic reason: the public were told they were making the decision about whether we stayed in or left the EU. Some 52% of the public, if not the others, expect this House to deliver their wishes. That was what the Minister told this House when we passed the European Referendum Act 2015. Every voter in the country was told by a leaflet sent at our expense by the Government: “You, the people, are making the decision”. Rightly, this House, when under the Supreme Court’s guidance it was given the opportunity to have a specific vote on whether to send the letter to leave the European Union, voted to do so by a majority of 384, with just the SNP and a few others in disagreement. It fully understood that the British people had taken the decision and fully understood that it has to do their bidding.
People are trying to make these negotiations far more complicated and longwinded than they need be. Because of the Prime Minister’s admirable clarity in her 12 points, we do not need to negotiate borders, money, taking back control, sorting out our own laws, getting rid of ECJ jurisdiction and so on. Those are matters of Government policy mandated by the British people—they are things we will just do. We will be negotiating just two things. First, will we have a bill to pay when we leave? My answer is simply: no, of course not. There is no legal power in the treaties to charge Britain any bill, and there is no legal power for any Minister to make an ex gratia payment to the EU over and above the legal payments in our contributions up to the date of our exit.
Secondly, the Government need, primarily, to sort out our future trading relationship with the EU. We will make the generous offer of carrying on as we are at the moment and registering it as a free trade agreement. If the EU does not like that, “most favoured nation” terms under WTO rules will be fine. That is how we trade with the rest of the world—very successfully and at a profit.
Members should relax and understand that things can be much easier. There will be no economic damage. The Government have taken an admirable position and made wonderful concessions to the other side, so I hope that those on the other side will accept them gratefully and gracefully, in the knowledge that they have had an impact on this debate.
I am pleased to follow the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), but I am disappointed that he has not come clean to the Committee on the fact that he has identified an alternative process he hopes to use to secure the kind of Brexit he wants. He did not refer to another blog he wrote recently, in which he said:
“Being in the EU is a bit like being a student in a College. All the time you belong to the College you have to pay fees... When you depart you have no further financial obligations”.
This is a somewhat outmoded view of the way student finances work, but putting that to one side, he evidently has not read the excellent paper by Alex Barker of the Financial Times pointing out that the obligations on us will fall into three categories: legally binding budget commitments; pension promises to EU officials; and contingent liabilities, which indeed are arguable.
The right hon. Member for Wokingham has also pointed out that Ministers can only authorise spending and sign cheques with parliamentary approval. He is right about that, and it is right that we have that say, but he is hoping to use that moment to veto the withdrawal arrangements and scupper the chances of a more constructive and productive future relationship. On Second Reading, the right hon. Member for Tatton (Mr Osborne) said—this was astute if somewhat tasteless—that it
“will be a trade-off, as all divorces are, between access and money.”—[Official Report, 1 February 2017; Vol. 620, c. 1035.]
For the right hon. Member for Wokingham and his friends, there is no trade-off—he does not want access or money.
New clause 54 calls for extra time. Hon. Members have already raised the need for extra time if Parliament declines to approve the final terms. The new clause adds a scenario in which the Government have not managed to complete the negotiations within the 24 months specified in article 50. This is more likely than not. Almost everyone who has looked at the matter in detail is incredulous that we can complete these negotiations in 24 months. The record on completing trade deals is not good, and there are many more strands to this negotiation. It would be patently absurd to flip to a damaging situation without an agreement, if we can see, once we are in the negotiations and have the detailed work schedule, that a further six or 12 months would bring us to a successful conclusion. Similarly, it is possible that the Minister’s optimism is well founded but that, while the negotiations have been completed, the parliamentary process has not. In that instance, too, we ought to have extra time.
New clause 99 addresses a different matter. It would embed parliamentary sovereignty in the process of approving the final terms of withdrawal and ensure that the UK withdrew on terms approved by Parliament. Bringing back control and restoring parliamentary sovereignty were a major plank of the Brexit campaign. The new clause is the fulfilment of that promise—the working out in practice of what was promised. The Prime Minister has already said that Parliament should have a vote at the end of the process, and new clause 99 strengthens that promise by requiring primary legislation to give effect to any agreement on arrangements for withdrawal and, even more importantly, on the future relationship. This is important, so that Parliament does not have to give only a metaphorical thumbs-up, which could, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) has said, be meaningless. Instead, Parliament can undertake line-by-line scrutiny. Brexit has major constitutional, political, economic and social consequences. It is right for Parliament to approve the way in which it is done. This new clause will improve the dynamic of the negotiations and strengthen the Prime Minister’s hands. She can say to the EU, “Parliament won’t agree to that.”
The Supreme Court said in its judgment:
In line with the Supreme Court judgment, new clause 99 embeds parliamentary approval as a constitutional requirement, which the EU must respect.
The new clause deals with the issue raised at the beginning of the debate by the right hon. Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry): what to do in the absence of any agreement. Either the Prime Minister’s negotiations will succeed in reaching a satisfactory conclusion or they will not. New clause 99 provides for both scenarios— legislation in the second as well as the first instance—so that Parliament is in control and is able to decide the basis for leaving. The new clause does not block Brexit; it does not slow down the negotiations. I voted to give the Bill a Second Reading, and my constituents are leave voters. This is about Parliament having sovereign control over the process.
I think most rational people would say that the new relationship is more important than the terms of withdrawal.
“unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”
That can happen, and it will depend on how the negotiations are undertaken, on where we have got to, and on their tone.
I have consulted my constituents on the kind of Brexit they want: they do not want the cliff-edge option, and there are all sorts of things about Europe that they like, even though the majority voted to leave. They like the customs union; they like the social chapter; they like co-operation and collaboration; and they particularly like the European arrest warrant.
At the time, I tabled some 150 amendments, and I voted against the treaty 47 or 50 times. I have to say that I will not vote against this Bill in any circumstances whatsoever. Indeed, this will be the first occasion on which I shall not have voted against European legislation since 1986. The legislation passed during that year included the Single European Act. When I tabled the sovereignty amendment to that legislation, I was not even allowed to speak to it because it was not selected for debate, which I found difficult to accept at the time. However, we have now moved well ahead. We have had a referendum, the proposal for which was accepted by six to one in the House. We have also had a vote on the principle of this very Bill, which was passed by 498— 500 if we include the tellers—to 114.
In deference to the other Members who wish to speak, I shall not go through the intricacies of this vast number of new clauses. I do not think that that would help us much, for a very simple reason—the bottom line is that they would effectively provide for a veto to override the result of the referendum. It is as simple as that.
The bottom line is that we are faced with a simple decision, which is going to be decided in a vote later today, I imagine—it might be in part tomorrow as well, and then there will be Third Reading. I hope that all these attempts to, in my judgment, produce different versions of delay will effectively be overridden by the vote taken by the House as a whole, in line with the decision taken by the British people. That is the right way to proceed.
I would like to add one further point, with respect to the Bill itself. I am in no way criticising the selection of amendments, because I think it is entirely right that we should have an opportunity to look at a variety of permutations before the main vote is cast. But I have to remind the Committee that the Bill, which was passed by 498 to 114, simply says that it will
“confer power on the Prime Minister to notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention”,
as expressed by the referendum itself,
“to withdraw from the EU.”
Clause 1 simply says this, and no more:
“The Prime Minister may notify, under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU.”
I am glad to see that it goes on to say—just to put this matter to bed, in case anybody tries to argue that, somehow or other, this could be overridden by some other European Union gambit— that “This section”, which we have already passed in principle,
“has effect despite any provision made by or under the European Communities Act 1972 or any other enactment.”
In other words, nothing that emanates from the European Union is to stand in its way. That is a very simple proposition. The Bill is short because it should be short.
I would just like to make one last point, looking back at what the Supreme Court said. The Supreme Court made a judgment on one simple question: should we express the intention to withdraw and notify under article 50 by prerogative or by Bill? There was a big battle, and many people took differing views. We respect the Supreme Court decision, and that is why we have this Bill. The fact is that that is final.
In paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment, the court itself made it clear what the judgment was meant to be about, which was whether this should be done by Bill or prerogative. The court said it should be done by Bill. It added—these are my last words on the subject for the moment—that it was about one particular issue, which was the one I have mentioned. The court then said the judgment had nothing to do with the terms of withdrawal, nothing to do with the method, nothing to do with the timing and nothing to do with the relationship between ourselves and the European Union. Yet new clause 1 spends its entire verbiage going into the very questions that the Supreme Court said the decision was not about. So that new clause and the others are all inconsistent both with the Supreme Court decision and with the decisions taken on Second Reading.
On 23 June last year, a narrow majority voted to leave the European Union. I deeply regret that outcome, but I am a democrat and I accept it. However, voting for departure is not the same as voting for the destination. The Government should now give the British people a decision referendum, to be held when the EU negotiations are concluded. I admit that “mandate referendum” and “decision referendum” are not terms that I have used before in this context. They are not really my words; they are the words that were used by the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union when he eloquently made the case in 2012 for holding a referendum on the deal at the end of the process, which is Liberal Democrat policy today.
I want to quote the Brexit Secretary directly. I do not want to paraphrase him or risk misquoting him in any way. Describing the strategy of having two referendums—a mandate referendum and a decision referendum—he said:
“The aim of this strategy is to give the British people the final say, but it is also to massively reinforce the legitimacy and negotiating power of the British negotiating team.”
I shall not say this often during this process, but I completely and utterly agree with the Brexit Secretary on that. As we have learned, his words were endorsed the following day by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) on his blog, although we have now discovered that he did not really mean it; he was just saying that as a ruse.
It is true that this argument began with democracy, but it cannot now end with a stitch-up. That is especially true given that the leave campaign offered no plan, no instructions, no prospectus and no vision of what “out” would look like. At no point did it produce any credible or unified position on what the UK would look like outside the European Union.
Forgive me if I am being pedantic, but the reality is that we are not talking about a second referendum. One could argue that the referendum on 23 June was the second referendum. We are arguing for a referendum on the terms of the deal, which has not been put to the British people.
A few of them are here now, so I want to give a little credit to our SNP colleagues. During the Scottish independence referendum, they were able to produce a 670-page White Paper on exactly what leaving the United Kingdom would look like. Of course, I did not agree with them, but at least the people of Scotland knew what they were voting for or what they would be rejecting. If that vote in 2014 had gone the other way, there would have been no need for a second vote on the independence deal.
This Government are going to take some monumental decisions over the next two years. I still believe that it will be impossible for them to negotiate a deal that is better than the one we currently have inside the European Union, but the negotiations will happen and a deal will be reached. When all is said and done, someone will have to decide whether the deal is good enough for the people of Britain. Surely the only right and logical step is to allow the people—not politicians in Whitehall, Brussels or even this House—to decide whether it is the right deal for them, their families, their jobs and our country. No one in this Government, House or country has any idea of what deal the Prime Minister will negotiate with Europe. It is completely unknown.
The Government claim to be enforcing the will of the people, but that is nonsense. If I was being very generous, the best I could say is that the Government are interpreting the will of the people; some would say they are taking the result and twisting it to mean something quite different. The Conservatives won a mandate in the May 2015 general election, having made two promises on this in their manifesto. The first was to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union. The second was to keep Britain in the European single market. That second pledge was not caveated, time-limited or contingent on the outcome of any referendum. It was a clear pledge and the Government are now breaking it.
The Government are making a choice, one that the British people have not given them permission to make. This choice is not just damaging to our country, but divisive. The Prime Minister had the opportunity to pursue a form of Brexit that united our country, achieved consensus, reflected the closeness of the vote, and sought to deal with and heal the divisions between leave and remain. Instead, she chose to pursue the hardest, and most divisive and destructive form of Brexit. She is tearing us out of the single market and leaving us isolated against the might of world superpowers.
I passionately believe that ending our membership of the world’s biggest free market will do untold damage to this country and to prospects and opportunities, especially for young people, who voted so heavily to remain. This market is vital for our economy, which is why my party refuses to stop making the case that this deal must include membership of the single market. Those who settle for access to the single market rather than membership are, I respectfully suggest, waving the white flag to this assault on British business and on the cost of living for every family in the country.
Given that the Government are making a set of extreme and arbitrary choices that were not on the ballot paper last June, the only thing a democrat can do is to give the people the final say. If the Prime Minister is so confident that what she is planning is what people voted for, why would she not give them a vote on the final deal?
The final deal will not be legitimate, it will not be consented to and our country will not achieve closure if it is imposed on the British people through a stitch-up in the corridors of power in Brussels and Whitehall. Democracy means accepting the will of the people at the beginning of the process and at the end of the process. Democracy means respecting the majority and it also means not giving up on one’s beliefs, rolling over and conceding when the going gets tough. You keep fighting for what you believe to be right and that is what Liberal Democrats will do. So we agree with the Brexit Secretary: let us let the people have their say. Let us let them take back control.
The interesting thing about this interesting debate is that it is one of those moments when the cloak of obscurity is lifted from an issue and the dynamic that is actually going on becomes clear. We have reached the crunch issue. We have reached the point at which we are discussing whether the effect of the Supreme Court judgment should be that Parliament has the option at some future date of overruling the British people and cancelling the leaving of the EU, or whether it should not have that ability.
My right hon. Friend the Minister made it perfectly clear that there will be a vote, but he also made it perfectly clear that that vote will be between the option of accepting a particular set of arrangements that have been negotiated by Her Majesty’s Government, and not accepting those arrangements and thereby leaving the EU without either a withdrawal agreement or an arrangement for the future. He is right to be optimistic that we can reach such agreements, but neither of us can possibly know whether we will. It is therefore right, if one is trying to follow the logic of the referendum decision, that the judgment of this House should simply be about whether the deal is good enough to warrant doing or, on the contrary, we should leave without a deal.
That is a completely different proposition from the one which, in various guises, some on the Opposition Benches—I exempt entirely from this the Opposition Front-Bench team—are putting, which is that Parliament should instead be given, by one means or another, the ability to countermand the British people’s decision to leave the EU by having a vote either on whether we should or should not leave or, in the proposition of the leader of the Liberal Democrats, on whether the people should have a second referendum on whether we should leave. In both of those propositions is a clear determination to undo the effect of the referendum, and we have now reached the point at which that has come out into the open.
“We say: yes to the Single Market.”
That sounds pretty unequivocal.
It seems to me to be perfectly clear that those of us who campaigned to leave and those of us who campaigned to remain have a choice: we can either accept the referendum result or reject it. I accept it, and some Opposition Members also take that view. It may be that some take the view that we should reject the referendum result, and that is a perfectly honourable view. The leader of the Liberal Democrats was effectively arguing, more openly, that we should reject the referendum result. I do not in any way decry his ability to argue that, but everybody who is arguing that should come out openly to that effect, as he did, and not pretend that they are trying to invent some method of parliamentary scrutiny. They are doing nothing of the kind; they are trying to invent a means of undoing the result of the referendum. This House has voted conclusively not to undo the result of the referendum. I think the House was right to do that, but whether it was right or not, it should do that with its eyes open and should not be gulled by anybody into passing amendments that have an effect that it has not signed up to openly.
Leaving that aside, however, I accept that the Liberal Democrat proposition is that it should be not this House directly that countermands the referendum, but a second referendum. The proposition of the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron), which is perfectly decent and honourable, is that however many times it takes, the British people should go on being asked to reverse their original decision, and that one should never give up trying to do so because the right answer is to remain. That is a perfectly respectable proposition, but it is not the proposition of a democrat. It is the proposition of a clerisy that knows the answer and believes that people who vote otherwise are misguided and need to be led, time after time, to revise their opinion by whatever means until at last they give the answer that is required.
Unfortunately, that is the very dynamic that has given rise to this whole problem. We are at this juncture today, because our Government passed the Maastricht treaty against the will of the British people and without consulting them, and took us into a form of the European Union to which the people had never consented. That eventually produced the democratic result that the hon. Gentleman and I both dislike. His answer to that is to go on with that logic until at last the British people totally lose faith in any semblance of democracy in this country. Personally, I cannot accept that proposition. In the end, much as I would have preferred to remain, I would rather be in a country that is run as a democracy and that has faith in its governance. We can only achieve that today by fulfilling the terms of the referendum.
I want to turn briefly to the new clauses; by comparison it is a minor point. New clause 1 is fairly innocuous. I am delighted that my right hon. Friend the Minister has indicated that we will not accept it, because there is a scintilla of doubt about whether it is itself justiciable. It says that the statement of the proposed terms of the agreement must be accepted. If that is written into the law, a very clever lawyer—Lord Pannick and others are very clever lawyers—might be able to mount some kind of judicial review of the question of whether the Government had in fact brought forward a statement of the proposed terms of the agreement that was adequate to the intent of the Bill, or the Act. I doubt that that would occur, so, personally, I do not have any very strong feelings about the new clause.
New clauses 99 and 110, about which some Opposition Members have spoken, are entirely different in character. Each of them makes it clear in two different ways that the House of Commons would be called on to make a set of decisions that are justiciable and potentially undermine the leaving of the EU.
In the case of new clause 99, notwithstanding my exchange with the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), it is perfectly clear in paragraph (b) that if Parliament found itself in a position in which it had not approved the withdrawal without agreement then it would have created an appalling conflict of laws. Article 50 is very explicit. It says:
“The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification”.
If the EU had agreed unanimously not to extend the period, the treaties would cease to apply, but Parliament would have, prospectively, voted not to leave. If Parliament has voted not to leave and the treaties do not apply, who in this House could possibly say which of these two laws is superior to the other? We would be in a position of intolerable legal conflict. Clearly, new clause 99 is deficient as a piece of legislation. I hope therefore that those who propose it will take that point and not press it.
New clause 110 is not as bad as new clause 99, although it is very odd because it says:
“any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union must not be concluded unless the proposed terms have been subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
Now, it is possible to be subject to approval without being approved, and it is entirely unclear whether new clause 110 refers to approval or to the process that might have led to approval. That, itself, would be justiciable.
Quite apart from that bad drafting, the new clause creates a legal minefield, because it makes it clear that
“any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union must not be concluded”.
Now, one possible relationship that “must not be concluded” without parliamentary approval would be the relationship of not being in the EU, so the new clause, arguably at least—this could be contested in court—would be an opportunity for Parliament to reverse the intent of the referendum and deny leaving.
New clauses 99 and 110 look as innocuous as new clause 1. In fact, they are neither innocuous nor well drafted, but poorly drafted and highly noxious. They fulfil the purposes to which I referred in the earlier part of my remarks: to gull Parliament, if it were to accept either new clause, into putting itself in the position of potentially reversing the decision of the British people. I very much hope that even if the Minister is at any time remotely tempted to accept new clause 1, he will never accept new clauses 99 or 110 at any rate, and that we will steadfastly resist such amendments should they appear here or in the other place.
Such a situation has arisen because we have resisted having legislation that governs the House of Commons in order to avoid the judges becoming the judges of what should happen in the House of Commons. We have invented, over a very long period, the principle of comity—that the judges do not intervene in the legislature, and the legislature does not intervene in the decisions of the judiciary. To legislate for how the House of Commons proceeds would move over a dangerous line. I am therefore with my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) in hoping that we will not accept new clause 1. I am just saying that if we were tempted at all to introduce any piece of new legislation at any stage, it should certainly look like new clause 1, not new clauses 99 and 110. Those new clauses would subvert the referendum, and we cannot allow that.
It has been an interesting debate so far. There was a moment of frisson and excitement—well, excitement in parliamentary terms—at the beginning when the Brexit Minister, the right hon. Member for Clwyd West (Mr Jones), who is still in his place, stood up and breathlessly said, “Let me give you a concession. I’ll indicate that something here is substantively different.” At the Dispatch Box, he clarified a little further—not much further—than the Prime Minister did in her speech at Lancaster House the timing of the vote that Parliament will have, but the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) quickly spotted that, in the definitions of when a negotiation is concluded and when it is signed off, there is still a grey area as to what the timing would be.
I suppose it is some small mercy that many hon. Members might say that this is some level of progress, but having been marched up to the top of the hill in the expectation that this was a great concession, I am afraid that, as the minutes have ticked by, we have marched back down the hill again. Through the probing of many hon. Members on both sides of the House, we have discovered a number of things about the vote, and we should not forget that we are trying in this section of the debate to secure a properly meaningful vote at the end so that parliamentary sovereignty can come first, as the Supreme Court emphasised in its judgment.
When pressed, the Minister had to admit that if we ended up with no deal, the House would not get a vote on that circumstance. That is deeply regrettable because new clause 110 deliberately talks about a “new Treaty or relationship”. A relationship, of course, involves the connection between two entities. That connection can be a positive new one, but it can also be one with a disjoint within it. We should have a vote if that relationship includes no deal.
The Minister said we would not be having a vote if there was no deal. That is extremely disappointing; it is not in the spirit of the concession being sought. We were looking for a concession on not just the timing of the parliamentary vote but the scope—in other words, the circumstances in which, having gone through the negotiations, we would be able to vote.
It is a little like travelling for two years down that road of negotiation, getting to the edge of the canyon and having a point of decision: are we going to have that bridge across the chasm—that might be the new treaty, which might take us to that new future—or are we going to decide to jump off into the unknown and into the abyss? Parliament should have the right to decide that. That is the concession I think many hon. Members were seeking, and it is not the concession we received.
What was particularly disappointing and deflating in the Minister’s so-called concession, which now feels quite hollow, was that he went on to say that if Parliament did decide to vote against a draft deal, he would not go back into negotiations—that the Government would feel that this was somehow “a sign of weakness”. I think that is entirely wrong; if Parliament says, “With respect to the Government, this is not quite good enough. Please go back and seek further points of clarification and further concessions in the negotiation,” that should be a source of strength for the Government. Quite frankly, I believe it strengthens the arm of the Government for them to be able to say, “You know, we would like to do this, but Parliament is really keen for a better deal.” It is quite useful for the Prime Minister to have that. New clause 110 is helpful to the Prime Minister. It is disappointing that the Minister did not just say this in response to pressure from hon. Members but had it in his script. He had pre-prepared the circumstances where he was going to say that he was not prepared to go back into negotiations if Parliament declined to give support to the new arrangements. We can see that the concession is not quite all that it was meant to be.
The Minister could make that verbal concession. He is a very able Minister, but Ministers can be here today and gone tomorrow; they come and they go. Having such clarity enshrined in the Bill is really important for hon. Members. This is a question that transcends party political issues. The Minister should hear the voice of Members in all parts of the Committee. We recognise that we are going to be leaving the European Union, but we want the best possible deal for Britain, and Parliament is sovereign here. Yes, we have Ministers who lead on the negotiations, but they cannot cut Parliament out of this altogether. That should be a source of strength for them.
Now that we have had partial acceptance from the Government that the vote needs to take place in Parliament sufficiently early on the draft arrangements, I hope that Parliament would then have a sufficient period of time to say to Ministers, for example, “We like 90% of the deal that you’ve done, but we’d like you to go back again, within the time that remains, to get a slightly better deal.” This is simply the role that Parliament should have. Taking Parliament out of that process altogether would be a great shame.
The wording of new clause 110 is very deliberate in talking about the new relationship as well as a new treaty. It is important that we take the opportunity that the Supreme Court has given us. Not only that, but we should listen to the entreaties of the Prime Minister herself in her own White Paper, where the 12th of her 12 points said that we would not aspire to a cliff edge—that we would try to get a deal. This new clause simply seeks to facilitate, in many ways, the role that Parliament could have in achieving the very thing that the Prime Minister has said that she wants.
I am afraid to say to the Minister that Hobson’s choice, take-it-or-leave-it style votes are not acceptable and not good enough for Parliament. We must have a continued say in this. I urge members of the Committee, across the parties, to consider the role that new clause 110 could play in making the vote meaningful.
Our problem is that we cannot predict what the situation will be in two years’ time. We have no idea what the political landscape will be in this country. We do not know what the economic conditions will be, and we do not know whether we will be doing very well in the run-up to Brexit or very badly. We cannot predict the political landscape on the European continent or the state of the European Union, and how that might affect the negotiations. Nor can we predict the wider security situation on our continent.
That is why the idea that the House in some way forgoes its responsibility to safeguard the electorate’s interests because a referendum has taken place is simply not a view to which I am prepared to subscribe. In such circumstances, we need to have regard to the situation and to the difficulties that the Government face because of its unpredictability, but we must rule nothing out.
To pick up a point that has been made—I repeat it, because it is my position and I shall hold to it until the end—public opinion on this matter may change radically, and the House would be entitled to take that into account. Equally, I accept that at the moment there is no such evidence, and it is our duty to get on with the business of trying to operate Brexit.
How do we introduce safeguards into the process? Of course there is an ultimate safeguard, as the House has the power to stop the Government in their tracks, but that tends to be a rather chaotic process that leads, usually, to Governments falling from office. It is an option that one can never entirely rule out in one’s career in politics, but it is not one that I particularly want to visit on my Front-Bench colleagues. However, this is an important matter, and one of the risks that they undoubtedly run in this process is that it could happen to them. We cannot exclude that possibility.
It is very much better that we should have some process by which Parliament can provide input and influence the matter in such a way as to facilitate debate and enable us collectively to reach outcomes that we can, at least, accept and that may be in the national interest.
One point that should be made is that it is usual for Government to bring important treaties to the House for approval before signing them. That is a common phenomenon; it is not unusual. There is a long history of doing that with important treaties, so we cannot simply say, “Normally, we ratify them after they are signed.” The obvious course of action, sequentially, is for the Government to publish the White Paper—I am delighted that we succeeded in securing one, because it sets out a plan—and then to get on with the treaty negotiations. In an ideal world, I would like the Government to come back before anything is concluded to ask the House for its approval and to indicate what they have succeeded in achieving. The House will have to make judgments at that time in relation to the overall situation.
I had a role in trying to see how the Government could provide some assurance about the process. It is not perfect—the Minister has read out what he has—but I say to the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Angela Smith) that, as the shadow Secretary of State said, it is a very significant step forward from what had been said previously. To my mind, it has provided helpful clarification.
The most obvious difficulty is the finite nature of the negotiating period under article 50. One of the things I was interested in was whether we could secure from the Government an undertaking that we would have a vote at the end of the process—before, in fact, the signing of the deal with the Commission. Contrary to what is set out in new clause 110, the Council of Ministers and the Commission are not two separate processes. The Commission will sign the initial agreement when the Council of Ministers gives it the authority to do so, and it then goes to the European Parliament for ratification or approval—call it what you will. Those are not two separate things.
Our problem is that if the negotiation follows the pattern that we have often come across in the course of EU negotiations—running to the 11th hour, 59th minute and 59th second—and we are about to drop off the edge, I confess that I do not particularly wish to fetter the Government’s discretion by insisting that at that precise moment they have to say, “We’re terribly sorry, but we can’t give you a decision until 48 hours after we have dropped off because we have to go back and get approval from both Houses of Parliament.” That is a real problem inherent in what to my point of view is the ghastly labyrinth into which, I am afraid, we have been plunged. We have to try to work our way through it with common sense.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend also agree that we need something on paper to clarify these highly important points? Does he join me in inviting the Minister to table an amendment in the House of Lords to give precise effect to whatever the concession is meant to mean? If we pass either new clause 99 or new clause 110, it could be replaced by that Government amendment, if Ministers were to come up with a better clarification. What we cannot do is leave the debate to continue for the next two years on what the Minister did or did not mean when he made his statement to the Committee today.
I do not want to take up more of the Committee’s time. Although I have had great difficulty over this matter today and in the days leading up to this debate, my inclination, for the reasons I have given, is to accept the assurance given by my right hon. Friend the Minister, which seems to me to be a constructive step forward. However, he has to face up to the fact that this issue will not go away. Even when we have enacted this Bill and triggered article 50, this will be a recurrent theme throughout the negotiating process that will come back much, much harder as we get closer to the outcome and as it becomes clearer, from all the leaks that will come from Brussels, what sort of deal or non-deal we will have, so the Government had better have a strategy. If their strategy is to avoid this House, I have to say to the Minister that they will fail miserably. I do not want that to happen. I want to guide this process as best I can, as a former Law Officer, towards a satisfactory conclusion.
I will do my best to support the Government and I welcome the Minister’s comments. In the circumstances, having looked at the amendments, those comments are the best solution we have this evening. However, that does not mean that the Government will not have to continue thinking about how they involve the House. Otherwise, this House will simply involve itself.
I disagreed with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, however, on the substantive point he made in respect of the concession made by the Brexit Minister. I disagree that the Government have made a substantive concession today. I confess that I am far less sanguine than some of my right hon. and hon. Friends about that. It does not feel to me that we have moved much beyond where we were in the Lancaster House speech. What is being offered to the House is a debate right at the end of the process, at a point—we do not know when exactly—seemingly in the dog days of the process. A choice at that point will be between the deal on offer, which in my view is likely to be a bad deal—one predicated on our leaving the single market and the customs union; the rock hard Brexit we all feared—and no deal. If there is no deal, the Minister confirmed today that the country will face exiting the European Union on WTO terms. What does that mean for the country? According to the director general of the WTO, it would mean a reduction in trade of around £9 billion per annum to the UK. Before the referendum, the Treasury thought it would mean an annual reduction in receipts of £45 billion per year. That was the reduction in GDP it foresaw. It is an eye-watering sum, equivalent to putting 10p on the basic rate of income tax. That is why, above all else, we have to consider where we are going incredibly carefully. If we end up there, it will be a disaster for Britain.
I said earlier that I wanted to speak in favour of amendment 43, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron), but I would have liked to speak to my new clause 52, or even new clause 131, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which would both have gone further and insisted on there being a second referendum. Apparently we cannot consider those amendments, however, because they would require a money commitment that the Bill does not have. That is ironic, given that the potential cost of falling out of the EU is £45 billion. Spending £100 million to make sure we do not do that seems like a pretty good deal.
I am insisting that we consider a second referendum—a confirmatory or ratificatory referendum, or whatever we want to call it—because I sincerely believe that Brexit will be a disaster for our country, and one that will cost us and future generations in lost trade, revenues and opportunities. I equally believe that it is a disaster for us to be dividing the country on this issue, as we have been, in respect of our values and the other crucial things we hold in concert.
It was deeply destructive for us to have engaged in Brexit and unleashed a catalytic force of destructive politics, not just in this country but across the west. It is to my eternal regret that Parliament launched down this route without being sufficiently vigilant or diligent with regard to the risks we faced in the referendum or the nature of the referendum we were offering to the country. It was a profoundly flawed referendum in many ways, and one that many across the House feel could have been dramatically improved with greater scrutiny and care. Why did we not offer that scrutiny? I do not think that many Members on either side of the debate seriously thought we would lose. There was a widespread view that the referendum was agreed for ideological reasons—to solve the culture wars that have raged in the Tory party for 30-odd years—and it was not considered carefully enough.
The House has an opportunity to make amends for the mistake that we—not the people—made. The people voted on the terms and the question we offered them, with the information we provided and on the basis of the 50%-plus-1 margin we put into statute. We have an opportunity to rectify some of those mistakes, and I feel that we should. We should follow the view of the Brexit Secretary when he was on the Back Benches, and, as the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale said, we should have a final confirmatory referendum.
We had a mandate referendum, the result of which was that we should leave the EU, but we do not know what the terms of that leaving will be. It is perfectly legitimate for us to consider what they might be. It would not be to deny democracy to do that; it would be to double down on it. The problem with simply pushing for a vote in this place on the terms of the deal is that we run the risk of leaving the people doubly dissatisfied. It is perfectly possible for this House to reject the prospect of our falling out of the European Union on WTO terms, because of the costs that will become apparent when we see the extra costs for our car production, for chemicals, for financial services and for all the other things that would see their tariff price rise for export out of this country. It is perfectly possible, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said, that we start to see a change in the country’s views in respect of Brexit when those things happen.
I think it was back in September or October when a number of people on these Benches said that what now happens, as we leave the EU—for the referendum result has been accepted—transcends normal party political divides because it is so important. It is important, frankly, not for my generation but for my children and the grandchildren to come. As others have said—possibly on the Opposition side; I do not care, and I will give credit to whoever said it—this is the most important set of negotiations that we have entered for decades, and it is critical that we get them right because of the consequences for generations to come.
Can we, in effect, stop the sort of—I nearly said willy-waving, Mr Howarth, but that might not be a parliamentary term. However, that is actually what it is, and it is not acceptable any more. Let us try to come together to heal the divide. This needs to be said. Let me extrapolate from the vote, not just in my constituency but in Nottingham and with a look to Ashfield. The borough is bigger than my constituency and excludes Eastwood and Brinsley—wonderful places well worth a visit, but I will not go into the demography. In short, I think that the vote for leave in my constituency was about the national average—perhaps 51%, possibly as much as 52%. Some of my constituents voted to leave the European Union, as indeed did people across the country, because they wanted, and were adamant about this place having true sovereignty, or true parliamentary sovereignty.
The awful irony is that, since the vote—I am going to be very honest about this—many people feel that Parliament has been completely excluded. The Government had to be brought here. This Bill is before us because some brave citizens—and they were brave—went to court to say that parliamentary sovereignty must mean that: it must be sovereign and it must exceed the powers of the Government and the Executive. It has felt, as I say, as though this place has been excluded at all stages. And so it has come about that we are leaving the single market, and we have abandoned free movement. We have abandoned long-held beliefs in all parts of the House, with no cross-party divide. In some instances, we have voted against everything that we have believed in for decades.
Last week, when we voted to translate the result of the referendum into action, we did not vote according to our consciences or our long-held beliefs. I did not vote with my conscience, and if I am truthful about it, I am not sure that I voted in the best interests of my constituents. That upsets me, because I did not come here for the sake of a career; I came here because I wanted to represent my constituents and do the very best for them. I genuinely do not know whether I did that last week. However, I was true to the promise that I had made to my constituents. I had promised them that if they voted leave, they would get leave, and that is what drove me through the Lobbies last week with a heavy heart and against my conscience.
I do believe that I did the right thing, and I can look myself in the mirror every morning believing that I have been true to the promise that I made to my constituents; but I am jiggered if I am not now going to be true to my belief in parliamentary sovereignty. I do not want to vote against my Government. I have never been disloyal to my Government, even though at times—well, we won’t go into that. I have always been true and loyal to them. In this instance, however, I think that new clause 110 embodies admirable objectives. Goodness me, anyone would think that the new clause was revolutionary. All it would do is ensure that whatever happens—be it a deal or something else—Parliament must approve it, and I certainly support my Government and my Prime Minister in all their efforts to secure that deal.
I thank the Minister for the concession that he has made. If Members do not like the word “concession”, I will abandon it, but what the Minister has said has been the right thing to say. I completely agreed with the excellent speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). This is progress, and it is the right thing to do. What concerns me is what will happen if, despite their best efforts, the Government fail, through no fault of their own, and we have no deal. How revolutionary is it to say, in the event of no deal, and at the right and meaningful time as we proceed to that new relationship, “Please could we have a say—not on behalf of Parliament, but on behalf of all our constituents?” That is why we come to this place.
There may indeed be circumstances—and the hardline Brexiteers have surely missed this point—from which they may want to protect themselves. They may then want that debate. It is also possible that WTO tariffs and the other developments that the hon. Gentleman and I fear would be in our best interests. That is the whole point: we do not know where we shall be in two years’ time. It is right for us to keep our options open, and it is right for us to have a debate and a vote.
We have just heard three excellent, calm, rational speeches explaining the things that are tearing this country apart. Is it not now time for us all to understand that not only are we talking to our own constituents, but that this House is being listened to across the world, that the people who will be deciding on Brexit are also listening, and that those who are ever more triumphalist, aggressive and bellicose will be the worst enemies when it comes to our getting to where we will need to be?
People have put their trust, as I have, in my Prime Minister and my Government. I have said to them, as somebody who has always believed in our continuing membership of the EU, that we lost that debate, and I now trust the Prime Minister and the Government when it comes to the abandoning of the single market and freedom of movement, and even, goodness forbid that this happens, leaving the customs union. I will continue to fight for all those things, because I believe in them, but I trust my Prime Minister and Government to get the best deal for our country. I think this Bill is a good vehicle to deliver the result and in many ways should not be amended, but all we are asking is that this place, in the event of no deal, actually has a voice and a vote.
If the Government cannot see the profound logic and sense of that, it will leave people like me with no alternative but to make my voice clear and heard on behalf of all my constituents and to support the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) in this amendment. It is reasonable and fair, and it encompasses, in what it seeks to achieve, the right thing.
I want us to come together and to get the best deal, and in the even that we do not get a deal, I want to make sure that this place absolutely gets that say and that vote. On that basis, I will continue to listen to the debate, but I have to say that I am minded to vote in favour of this amendment and make that clear not for any design to cause trouble or anything else, but to stand up for what is right for all my constituents.
Also, if there is no deal, there will be no vote. That matters, because it would be possible for the Executive, with power concentrated in their hands, to decide to reject a deal from the EU that Parliament might have accepted. The Executive would have the power to decide simply to go down the WTO route rather than going for any of the many alternatives, without giving Parliament a say in the matter. There would be no opportunity for Parliament to say, “Actually, there is a better deal on offer and the Government should be working with the EU to get that deal, which would be in the interest of all our constituents.” We should not give the Executive that concentration of power to choose the WTO route without a debate or a vote. There should be a vote on an alternative.
The second challenge in the Government’s approach is that, if there were a deal, the timing of any vote would still make it difficult for Parliament. A vote would take place after the deal had been agreed with the 27 countries and with the Commission, but before it went to the European Parliament. Again, this Parliament would only get a choice between the Executive’s deal and the WTO terms, even if we knew that a better or fairer deal was on offer.
I hope that there will be agreement across the House on this point. I hope that the Government will come up with the best possible Brexit deal and that such a deal will have Parliament’s strong support and endorsement. If that does not happen, however, and if things unravel along the way, what opportunity will there be for Parliament to have its say and to try to bring things back together? That brings me back to the timing of the vote. Leaving it to the very end of the process would make that very hard to do.
Some of this comes down to timing. I accept that there is an article 50 timescale of two years and that it will be for the EU to decide what happens at the end if no deal is in place, but that also matters for the timing of the vote. At the moment, based on what the Minister said earlier, the vote will come at the very end of the process and could end up being at the end of the two years. The strength of new clause 110 is that it would require the vote to be held before the deal went to the European Commission, the European Council or the European Parliament. The advantage of that is that we would have a parliamentary debate and a vote earlier in the process, and that if there were no agreement, there would still be the opportunity for further negotiations and debates before we reached the article 50 cliff edge.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman suggests that there might be an alternative way for Parliament to exercise its sovereignty, but what might that be in practice? We could have a Backbench Business Committee motion or an Opposition day motion that the Government could then ignore. We could have a no confidence motion, but that would not be the appropriate response when we should be considering the alternatives in order to get a better deal out of the negotiations.
If the right hon. and learned Gentleman were to come up with an alternative way for Parliament to exercise its sovereignty that I have not thought of, there might be an alternative to a vote today. If we want legislation that ensures that there is recourse to Parliament on these important issues, which will affect us for so many years to come, the right thing to do is to get something in the Bill.
There are many ways in which the Government could provide recourse to Parliament. They could table a manuscript amendment that simply puts into practice what they have said today, which would be immensely helpful and might provide the reassurance that many hon. Members need.
New clause 99 would mean that withdrawal would have to be through an Act of Parliament. On such a serious matter, there is a strong case for decisions to be made through Acts of Parliament—that would happen on other similarly weighty matters. To be honest, much of what new clause 110 would do would simply be to include in the Bill what the Minister has already said he will do. However, it would provide reassurance, with the added benefit of clarity that there will be a vote if there is no deal and we go down the WTO route. Also, the vote would be earlier in the process, which would give Parliament the opportunity to have a say before we get to the final crunch at the end of the negotiations.
The honest truth is that new clause 110 is not that radical. It would simply put into practice and embed in legislation the things that some Government Members have said they would like to achieve, so why do we not simply include it in the Bill so that we have that reassurance? Ultimately, there is a reason why all of this is important. Both sides in the referendum debate talked about parliamentary sovereignty, and with that comes parliamentary responsibility. We have already shown that responsibility by deciding to respect the result of the referendum on Second Reading, but with that comes the responsibility to recognise that we have to get the best possible Brexit deal for our whole country, rather than just walking away from the process of debating the deal. If we end up walking away, power will be concentrated in the hands of the Executive. I have never supported such concentrations of power, and every one of us should be part of making sure that we get the best possible Brexit deal.
I agree with the principle that Parliament should vote on the final deal. I argued for that during the referendum, and I certainly have not changed my mind. On top of that, as people talk about Parliament being stripped of its role, it is worth pointing out that any domestic implementing legislation as a result of any deals reached at international level will, of course, require parliamentary approval in the usual way. The legal effects of Brexit at home will be dealt with through enactment of legislation in advance of the ratification of the international treaties.
On the international element, it is useful to distinguish between two key components of the diplomacy: the terms of exit and the terms of any new relationship agreement on trade, security and the other areas of co-operation that we all agree we want to preserve. With that in mind, I welcome again the White Paper and the Lancaster House speech that, as we talk about all the process and procedure, set out a positive vision for Britain, post-Brexit, as a self-governing democracy, a strong European neighbour and a global leader on free trade.
I confess that, as a former Foreign Office lawyer who spent six years advising on both EU law and treaty interpretation, I find article 50 palpably clear on the surface. It disapplies the EU treaties two years after article 50 is triggered. The language is mandatory as a matter of treaty law, so if Parliament refuses to approve the terms of any exit agreement, the UK drops out without one.
Before there is general hysteria across the House, including among Government Members, let me say that there is a general principle of customary international law, which is also true of common law, that where there is a general rule, there can be exceptions, but those must be interpreted narrowly. There are exceptions on this. There is an exception if the EU unanimously agrees to extend the period under article 50(3). If we look at the clear language used, we can see that it is conceivable to imagine that happening only in very exceptional circumstances—if at all—for a limited period and in relation to the exit terms. That is what the provision says. The agreement on our post-Brexit relationship with the EU could be prolonged as long as both sides wish, but that will not delay the exit, and it is extremely doubtful that article 50(3) could be used to delay departure on those grounds. That means many of the amendments we are considering are, in practice, unlawful, as well as unwise.
There is a second exception, and it is not true to say that triggering article 50 is irreversible. It can be reversed but, as I explained earlier, we would have to follow the specific exception envisaged in article 50(5), which offers a means to reverse the process of departure: we leave and then apply to rejoin. That is the clear language in article 50, which of course is binding as a matter of UK law. It was a previous Labour Government, with Liberal Democrat support, who signed us up not only to the Lisbon treaty, but explicitly to the fetters we now face. That is why I suffer a little when I hear some of the railing against the difficult legal confines the Government find themselves in not just as a matter of their own policy, but as a matter of law.
The choice on the final deal is clear: the British Parliament can veto the exit agreement and/or the terms of the new relationship agreement, but in that case Britain would leave the EU without agreeing terms. On the new relationship agreement, the UK Government would of course be free to revert for further negotiations, but that could not delay or stop Brexit from happening under the terms of article 50. Those facts will rightly and understandably focus our minds, as they are doing here today, and with a sense of trepidation. They will also focus minds—this is why it was crafted in the way it was—on the other side of the channel, among our European friends. So, on the assumption that it would take at least 18 months to agree all the terms of any new relationship agreement, the idea that Parliament voting down any deal would send the UK back to a further round of meaningful negotiations, before Britain formally leaves, is at odds with the procedure in the Lisbon treaty, and I find it neither feasible nor credible.
In fairness to the previous Government, the ostensible aim of article 50 was to facilitate certainty, to focus the minds of the negotiating parties and to avoid withdrawal leaving a lingering shadow over not only the EU—although that was probably foremost in its consideration—but the departing nation. Many of the amendments and new clauses we are considering are counterproductive precisely because in seeking to fetter the Government in the negotiations they would weaken our flexibility and negotiating position and, critically, make the risk of no deal more likely. Members who support the amendments and new clauses must face up to the fact that they are courting the very scenario that they and we say we so dearly seek to avoid.
For my part, I could not countenance voting for attempts to put the negotiating aims in binding legislation and give them statutory force, because that would set the Government up to face a blizzard of legal challenges on the final deal. That would be deeply irresponsible because, whether unintentionally or otherwise, it would seem to me to amount to poison-pill tactics.
I turn specifically to the amendments and new clauses. The Government’s assurances ought to be enough to satisfy those who might be tempted by new clauses 1, 18 or 99. The Government have rightly promised to give Parliament a vote on the final deal, and I pay tribute to the shadow Minister, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), who approached that matter in a sensible, sober and responsible way.
The other cluster of new clauses that have attracted attention are new clauses 19, 54 and 137, which would require that a parliamentary vote against the deal would send the UK Government back to renegotiate with the EU. As someone who has negotiated treaties—mainly bilateral treaties, but some multilateral—I can entirely understand why that is attractive. The truth is that if Parliament does not agree the exit terms, it is theoretically possible that the UK Government could revert to meaningful negotiations with the EU, if the draft agreement is concluded within around a year or, exceptionally, if the EU agreed a short extension. In practice, that is utterly inconceivable. It is total fantasy. Why would the EU give us better divorce terms just because Parliament did not like them? In reality, we would not even get the extension or better terms, and would leave without an agreement.
If Parliament does not approve the agreement on the new relationship, there is no express provision for the extension of negotiations and no clear basis for withdrawal to be delayed. We would exit on two years, but could revert back to revived negotiations on the future relationship. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) pointed out, the question of whether implementation would be phased and of transitional arrangements would become far more salient. Besides those legal considerations, any delay to the timetable would inject an additional dose of uncertainty into the entire process, which would be bad for business and frustrating for the public, and which would harm rather than reinforce our negotiating position.
New clause 28, which deals with parliamentary approval before the European Parliament has its say, has been dealt with by the reassurances given by the Minister, which I certainly welcome. I am not convinced by new clauses 110 or 182, on parliamentary approval happening before the Commission concludes the new relationship agreement, because we would not know the date on which it would approve such an agreement and could not know the terms of the deal until it had done so. That reinforces in my mind the concern that exists about Members who, in good faith, are trying to dictate what will inevitably be a fluid diplomatic process through the entirely inappropriate vehicle of binding legislation. That cannot hope to cater for all the potential eventualities that we need to be ready to adapt to as a matter of multilateral diplomacy.
Finally, let me turn to amendment 43, which has been tabled by the Liberal Democrats and the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) in particular. In a competitive field, this is certainly the clear winner for the worst amendment that has been tabled. It is probably illegal because there is no scope for a departing member, which has triggered article 50, to reverse its decision. That is clear from article 50(5).
The amendment is clearly designed to reverse Brexit, despite Members passing the 2015 referendum legislation by six to one on the very clear understanding that we would respect the result. The amendment is probably beyond undemocratic and illegal; it is just plain tricksy. It was open to any Member to table amendments and then to stipulate that there would be a second referendum —why not have the best of three?—to give the British people a chance to do the hokey cokey. However, there is a very clear reason why no one tabled such an amendment: the public would have shuddered at the prospect. No one proposed such an amendment and we did not hold the referendum on that basis.
I support a final vote on the deal, and welcome the fact that the Government are striving to reassure all Members about the Bill, but this House should be under no illusion that such a vote cannot and would not frustrate the verdict of the people. In fairness, I think that most Members from all parts of the House recognise that. Many amendments on which we are deliberating in this group are legally flawed. Above all, these new clauses would attempt to tie up the Government in procedural knots at the crucial moment in the two years of Brexit negotiations. The public expect all of us to be focused on securing the very best deal for the whole country and not, either intentionally or inadvertently, to be laying elephant traps that can only make striving for that deal harder. For that reason, I hope that the Committee will vote down all the amendments and new clauses this evening.
I am now entering my 17th year in the House. In that time, it is usual to strike up relationships across the House. I want to make a confession: I have a relationship with the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith)—I am sorry that he is not in his place—who has the unusual honour of also being a fan of Tottenham Hotspur. There have been occasions when we have been at White Hart Lane together, talking about his favourite subject: the sovereignty of this Parliament and the European Union. There have been occasions when my eyes have glazed over, because I do not see the issue in the same way.
In the past few months, as I have grown increasingly depressed about the direction of travel on which we are now set, I have looked for a silver lining. The silver lining is, of course that, in the 17 years that I have been an MP, we have been in the European Union—effectively, we had decided to pool some of our sovereignty with Europe, which meant that I had less power. Well, the power is now coming back, and, as a result of all the work of the right hon. Gentleman, the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) and others, I will be a powerful Member of Parliament. Yet we are now in a situation, in this important time, in which we need that sovereignty, and the very same people who were asking for it now stand up to argue that we should put that power somewhere else.
Many hon. Members who have been Back Benchers for some years argue that we should put the power with the Executive, and that the Prime Minister and her Cabinet should make all the huge decisions about our economy and direction of travel. They argue, perversely, that the power should solely be with the 27 other countries of the European Union, and that they should determine our direction alongside the European Commission, the Council and, ultimately, the European Parliament—power everywhere else except here. And who will suffer as a consequence of this Parliament not acting? Our constituents. That is why this is not the time to play party politics and why I was happy to vote against my party last week. This is absolutely the time to stand up for our constituents.
If we were to exit without a proper deal, this great country would be in the bizarre situation of having no trading relations with the rest of the world, which is a situation we will not have been in since some time before King Henry VIII and the beginning of empire— ridiculous. It would be madness. World Trade Organisation rules? Insane. Of course power must rest here, which is why I have put my name to a number of new clauses and why I stand with my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), who tabled new clause 110. We must give this place power or we will regret it hugely.
To me, this is very much a point of principle, and three principles have exercised me and many colleagues. The first is the thorny question of what parliamentary sovereignty means. Far be it from me to take exception with that very learned gentleman, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab), but my understanding is that article 50 was effectively drafted on the back of a fag packet by negotiators, specifically at the request of UK participants in the treaty, on the expectation that it would never be triggered; such a situation was inconceivable. Therefore, it seems not inconceivable to set out what we believe our sovereign parliamentary process should be against that rather poorly drafted aspect of the treaty.
So many leave campaigners told me that they were campaigning to restore our sovereignty. That sovereignty has now been confirmed by the Supreme Court. It is absolutely right that we have had confirmation today that Parliament will have a vote on the terms of the deal. The timing of that vote is crucial. It will not be a done deal that is then brought back to us. There will be an opportunity to influence, shape, negotiate and do what we have done so well over the past four days—days, by the way, that we were not intended to have. We have had the opportunity to get into the nitty-gritty of what it means to trigger article 50, and what a vote would look like. I, for one, feel far better informed than I did at the start of the process. This is exactly what we are sent here to do.
My second point of principle, which I referenced earlier, relates to equivalence. If we look at the negotiation for exit, it is bizarre that while the European Parliament has a number of go/no-go decision points where it effectively has a right of veto, we have been scared to give the same to this Parliament. That does not sit well with me as somebody who wants to stand up for this sovereign Parliament; it is a very perverse thing, and I am glad we are trying to correct it.
The third point of principle relates to representation. I am still mystified that there are those who think they should be scared of Parliament. How many more votes do we need to have to demonstrate the overwhelming support in this place for executing the will of the British people? They gave us a mandate, and we are not going to replay the arguments. We have a mandate, and we know we need to get on with this. We have now had two votes suggesting that right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House—possibly with the exception of those from north of the border—accept the view of the Union. We should not be scared of bringing these things to Parliament.
Ultimately, are we not here to represent our constituents? We do not want a second referendum, and I completely agree with my neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), that it would be absurd to go back. However, we are the next best thing: we are the opportunity to bring up what our constituents are saying, and many of them still have lots of questions about what this process looks like. We can put those questions to each other and to Ministers, and we can represent our constituents. The principle of representation is absolutely vital.
I have to say that the tone of these debates—we have heard a little of this today, although things are starting to calm down—sometimes borders on the hysterical. I feel sometimes that I am sitting with colleagues who are like jihadis in their support for a hard Brexit. No Brexit is hard enough—“Begone you evil Europeans. We never want you to darken our doors again!”[Interruption.] People say, “Steady on, Claire,” but I am afraid I heard speeches last week making exactly that point. The point is that the more we get these things out in the open, the more we will not be led by some of the more hysterical tabloid newspapers out there, but actually have an open and frank conversation with each other about what we want to do better.
On the issues of scrutiny, representation and parliamentary sovereignty, I am very interested in the proposals made by the Opposition. I am pleased to say I have heard some very substantial concessions today on the timing and the detail, although there is an equivocality about the ending, which still does not sit well with me. While it might not be the Government’s and the Prime Minister’s intention to bring forward a bad deal, we still have not allowed ourselves to put that to the test. So before I decide which way to vote, I am going to listen very carefully to what the Minister has to say. I am hoping to get his assurance that, if there is no deal, that can be put within the bounds of what I think should happen, which is a parliamentary decision on this vital step for our country.
A significant part of the argument for leaving the European Union was about restoring parliamentary sovereignty so that this House could take decisions about the country’s future, yet attempts to assert that sovereignty have been constantly dismissed as undermining the Government, if not the country. The cry over and over again has been, “Blank cheque, blank cheque, blank cheque.” We should not give a blank cheque; there is a legitimate role for us.
The new clause seeks to do two things: first, to enshrine in the legislation the Prime Minister’s promise of a parliamentary vote on a final deal; and, secondly, to assert what can happen if Parliament declines to approve the final deal.
The Government have set out their aims in the White Paper and in other statements. The White Paper defines the Government’s aim as
“the freest possible trade in goods and services between the UK and the EU.”
The Secretary of State for Brexit said that this would be
“a comprehensive free trade agreement and a comprehensive customs agreement that will deliver the exact same benefits as we have”.—[Official Report, 24 January 2017; Vol. 620, c. 169.]
That is the test the Government have set themselves. I wish them well in ensuring that we do get the exact same benefits as we have.
This new clause does not seek to tie the Government’s hands in the negotiations. It does not seek to influence the content; it focuses on what happens if Parliament declines to approve the final deal. The choice that we do not want to be presented with, I am afraid, is the one that the Minister set out at the beginning, which is defining as success whatever the Government negotiate or falling back on the WTO. I do not want to go through the WTO rules in detail, but let me give just one example: a 10% tariff on car exports. Take the Nissan Qashqai, proudly made in the north-east of England. That tariff would mean a surcharge of over £2,000 on each car made in the north-east, compared with a competitor vehicle made in a plant in the European Union, or even another Nissan model made in the EU. On food and drink, the tariffs are 20%, and on some agricultural products they are even higher. That is before one even gets to the weakness of enforcement mechanisms within the WTO, where businesses cannot even take enforcement cases and only Governments can do so.
The Government themselves say that they do not want this option. They set out 12 points in their White Paper, the 12th of which says that they want
“a smooth, mutually beneficial exit”.
Paragraph 12.2 says:
“It is…in no one’s interests for there to be a cliff-edge for business or a threat to stability…Instead, we want to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two year Article 50 process has concluded.”
This new clause empowers Parliament to avoid the very outcome that the Government themselves say in the White Paper that they want to avoid. For that reason, it is not, as too many Members have asserted, some attempt to undermine the Government. We should be using the power of Parliament to influence these negotiations.
Let me deal with the “five minutes to midnight” point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It is hardly unknown for the European Union to schedule another round of talks—it happens very frequently. In these circumstances, we would be entirely within our rights to strengthen our Government’s hand by saying, “Go back and renegotiate on this point or that point.”
The point of all of this is to avoid the choice between being told that we have to define as success, on the first account of it, whatever the Government have managed to negotiate, or default to the WTO. To be honest, a concession on timing that does not allow us to ask the Government to go back and negotiate a better agreement is simply holding a gun to Parliament’s head a few months earlier than would otherwise have been the case. This new clause is about taking all the claims made for decades about parliamentary sovereignty and making them real, rather than giving us a choice between deal or no deal, take it or leave it, my way or the highway. Frankly, Parliament and the country deserve better than that.
Secondly, the Minister says that he expects and intends that this place will get a say before the European Parliament. In what circumstances is it practically possible for us not to have that if the Government want us to have it? Thirdly, will he answer the equivalence point that has been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry)? We must be able to have at least as much say as the European Parliament.
Fourthly, will the Minister clarify that the WTO cliff-edge issue needs to be subsumed into the issue of transitional arrangements? If the Government put the need to negotiate transitional arrangements as their No. 1 priority and they succeed at least in getting a deal on that, that deal can trigger article 50(3) to enable an extended period of further discussion, should all other aspects of the deal fail. Does he accept that that is a reasonable and sensible approach to take the debate forward? If he does, I might consider not voting against the Government, as I am minded, uncharacteristically, to do. I will listen carefully to what he has to say.
May I deal first with the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), the Chair of the Treasury Committee? He asked direct questions that had been raised during the debate. I thought that I had answered them with some clarity, but I am happy to clarify further. First, he asked what this honourable House would be asked to approve. It would be the final agreed draft of the agreement before it was submitted to the European Parliament. He mentioned that we had indicated that we expected and intended that that would happen before the European Parliament debated the agreement. The reason why that formulation is used is that what the Commission does with the information it sends to the European Parliament is out of our hands. Although we would do our very best to ensure that the House voted first, we cannot control what the Commission does.
My right hon. Friend raised the issue of equivalence. Of course, the difference is that the European Parliament has a role prescribed for it in article 50, but this House does not. In practical terms, I suggest that a vote of this House would be a matter of significance. Finally, he raised transitional arrangements, which have been mentioned by a number of hon. Members. As the Prime Minister has already made clear, it is our intention, if necessary, to look to a period of implementation for whatever arrangement we arrive at with the European Union.
As I was saying, this has been an important debate and the quality of the contributions has been extremely high. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Anna Soubry) said, we have to remember that this will be the most important negotiation that this country has entered into for at least half a century. It is therefore entirely right that the House should play an important part in the process of the negotiation of the agreement.
I have heard the words “rubber stamp” being used, but that is far from what the Government have in mind. We have every intention that, throughout the process of negotiation, the House will be kept fully informed, consistent with the need to ensure that confidentiality is maintained. I do not think that anyone would regard that as an unreasonable way forward. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) highlighted the need for reporting, and the Government intend to do that.
I should like to speak about a number of other measures that I have not dealt with previously, but which have attracted attention in the debate. New clause 18 would specify that any new treaty with the EU should not be ratified except with the express approval of Parliament. I can only repeat the commitment that I have made several times this afternoon at the Dispatch Box: there will be a vote on the final deal.
New clause 110 is similar to new clause 18, but it also specifies that any new relationship would be subject to approval by a resolution of Parliament. I believe that the measure is unnecessary. It asks for a vote of each House on a new treaty or any new agreement reached with the EU, but I repeat again that there will be a vote on the final draft treaty and any other agreement. In any event, as my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) pointed out, it calls for a vote before terms are agreed, leaving it open to the Commission to change its mind or position without any apparent recourse for this place.
New clause 137 would require the Government to seek to negotiate a new agreement with the EU if Parliament rejects a deal. Again, I reject the measure. Although we are confident that we will achieve a deal acceptable to Parliament, if Parliament were to reject that deal, it would be a sure sign of weakness, as I have said, to return to the EU and ask for other terms. We would be likely to achieve only a worse deal. Furthermore, there is no obligation on the EU to continue negotiating with us beyond the two-year period specified in article 50.
New clause 175 would effectively require the Government to request that we remain a member of the EU if the terms were not approved by Parliament. Frankly, to do so would be to betray the outcome of the referendum, and the Government are not prepared to accept that. I must make it absolutely clear that the Government want Parliament to be engaged throughout this process.
New clauses 18 and 19 would require any new treaties agreed with the EU to be subject to the ratification of Parliament. We have always said that we will observe the constitutional and legal obligations that apply to the final deal, and that remains the case. As we have confirmed, the final agreement will be subject to a vote of this House before it is concluded.
We approach the negotiations not expecting failure, but anticipating success. Let me remind Members that we are seeking in the Bill to do one simple, straightforward thing: to follow the instructions we received from the British people in the referendum. Remaining a member of the European Union is not an option. The process for leaving the EU is set out in article 50, and it is not within our power unilaterally to extend the negotiations.
New clause 99 envisages yet another Act of Parliament to approve the arrangements for our withdrawal and our future relationship with the EU. It would require yet another Act of Parliament for us to withdraw from the EU in the absence of a negotiated deal. The new clause is wholly otiose. While we are ready for any outcome, an exit without a trade agreement is emphatically not what we seek. However, let me be clear that keeping open the prospect of staying in the EU, as is envisaged by new clause 99, would only encourage the EU to give us the worst possible deal in the hope that we would change our mind.
Amendment 43 calls for a referendum on our membership of the European Union after we have negotiated a final deal. That was tabled by the Liberal Democrats.
This has been an important debate. We have considered the new clauses and amendments very carefully but, for all the reasons I have given, we reject them and invite Members not to press them to a Division.
I recognise that that leaves a number of unanswered questions, most importantly about the consequences and precise timing of the vote. As the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) says, to some extent we just do not know. From the various work I have done in Brussels, it is quite clear that the plan there is to have a deal that is capable of being put to the European Parliament in October 2018. That should be the ambition, because if a deal were put to this House in October 2018, there would be a number of consequences for the House to consider. I accept that there are questions. It is important that others reflect on the concessions that have been made and consider what kind of amendment might capture them.
In the circumstances, I will not press new clause 1 to a Division in the hope—although this is not my decision—that it will allow space for other new clauses to be put to the vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 110
Future relationship with the European Union
“(1) Following the exercise of the power in section 1, any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union must not be concluded unless the proposed terms have been subject to approval by resolution of each House of Parliament.
(2) In the case of any new Treaty or relationship with the European Union, the proposed terms must be approved by resolution of each House of Parliament before they are agreed with the European Commission, with a view to their approval by the European Parliament or the European Council.”—(Chris Leslie.)
This new clause seeks to ensure that Parliament must give approval to any new deal or Treaty following the negotiations in respect of the triggering of Article 50(2), and that any new Treaty or relationship must be approved by Parliament in advance of final agreement with the European Commission, European Parliament or European Council.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Brought up.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
Brought up, and read the First time.
New clause 42—Equality—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an equality impact assessment, 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an equality impact assessment in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 43—Customs Union—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an impact assessment of the effect of leaving the Customs Union on the United Kingdom.
(2) The impact assessment in subsection (1) shall be laid before Parliament 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment of leaving the Customs Union (independently of decisions on the Single Market) in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 44—Supply Chains—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an impact assessment of the risks to supply chains presented by the introduction of non-tariff custom barriers, 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment on the risk to supply chains from any new non-tariff barriers in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 45—Environmental protection—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an impact assessment of the effect on—
(a) environmental protection standards,
(b) farm business viability,
(c) animal welfare standards,
(d) food security, and
(e) food safety
18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment on environmental standards, farm viability and food safety in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 46—Climate change—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an impact assessment of the value of participation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the Single Energy Market in achieving our climate change commitments, 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment on climate change objectives and the contribution of the Emissions Trading System and the energy market to meeting these in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 47—Research and Development collaboration —impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish an impact assessment of the effect of—
(a) leaving Horizon 2020, and
(b) setting up alternative arrangements for international collaboration on research and development by universities and other institutions
18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment on leaving Horizon 2020 and alternative Research and Development collaborations in good time before Parliament votes on the final agreement.
New clause 48—Agencies—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake that she will publish impact assessments of—
(a) rescinding membership of the agencies listed in subsection (2), and
(b) setting up national arrangements in place of the agencies listed in subsection (2).
(2) Subsection (1) applies to the—
(a) Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),
(b) Office of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC Office),
(c) Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO),
(d) European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex),
(e) European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA),
(f) European Asylum Support Office (EASO),
(g) European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA),
(h) European Banking Authority (EBA),
(i) European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC),
(j) European Chemicals Agency (ECHA),
(k) European Environment Agency (EEA),
(l) European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA),
(m) European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA),
(n) European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),
(o) European Medicines Agency (EMA),
(p) European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA),
(q) European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA),
(r) European Police Office (Europol),
(s) European Union Agency for Railways (ERA),
(t) European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and
(u) European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).
(3) The impact assessments in subsection (1) shall be laid before Parliament 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or prior to a vote on the negotiations in the European Parliament, whichever is the sooner.”
The effect of this would be to require the Government to publish impact assessments for each agency to determine whether value for money for consumers, businesses and taxpayers would be achieved by leaving each one and setting up national arrangements.
New clause 49—Impact assessment: withdrawal from single market and Customs Union—
Before giving notice under section 1(1), of her intention to notify under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the EU, the Prime Minster shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a detailed assessment of the anticipated impact of the decision to withdraw from the Single Market and Customs Union of the EU on—
(a) the nature and extent of any tariffs that will or may be imposed on goods and services from the UK entering the EU and goods and services from the EU entering the UK;
(b) the terms of proposed trade agreements with the EU or EU Member states and the expected timeframe for the negotiation and ratification of said trade agreements;
(c) the proposed status of rights guaranteed by the law of the European Union, including—
(i) labour rights,
(ii) health and safety at work,
(iii) the Working Time Directive,
(iv) consumer rights, and
(v) environmental standards;
(d) the proposed status of—
(i) EU citizens living in the UK and,
(ii) UK citizens living in the EU, after the EU has exited the EU;
(e) estimates as to the impact of the UK leaving the EU on—
(i) the balance of trade,
(ii) GDP, and
(iii) unemployment.”
New clause 98—Protected characteristics—Equality Impact Assessments—
‘(1) In negotiating and concluding an agreement in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the impact of any new relationship with the European Union on protected characteristics, as set out in the Equality Act 2010.
(2) Any report the Government lays before Parliament on the progress of the withdrawal negotiation must be accompanied by an Equality Impact Assessment.
(3) Neither House of Parliament may approve by resolution any new relationship with the European Union unless an Equality Impact Assessment has been laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause would place specific duties on the Government to demonstrate compliance with the 2010 Equality Act, ensuring that the impact of decisions on women and those with protected characteristics are considered and debated at every stage of the process.
New clause 101—Environment—Environmental Impact Assessment—
Before issuing any notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister shall give an undertaking to lay before each House of Parliament a full Environmental Impact Statement on the terms of the agreement reached with the European Union on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.”
New clause 102—Economic Divergence—Impact Assessment—
Before issuing any notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister shall give an undertaking to lay before each House of Parliament an impact assessment of the costs to businesses and the environment as a result of divergence in regulations between the UK and countries in the EU single market, once the UK has withdrawn from the EU.”
New clause 103—EU Customs Union and the European single market—Impact Assessment—
‘(1) Before issuing any notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister shall give an undertaking to lay before each House of Parliament an impact assessment on the UK of leaving the EU Customs Union and the European single market.
(2) The impact assessment shall include the following information for each sector of the economy—
(a) the nature and extent of any tariffs that will or may be imposed on goods and services from the UK entering the EU and goods and services from the EU entering the UK;
(b) the effect of non-tariff custom barriers that will or may be imposed on goods and services from the UK entering the EU and goods and services from the EU entering the UK;
(c) changes in the rules of origin regulations and the administrative burdens for business.”
New clause 106—Withdrawal from Free Movement of persons—Impact Assessment—
‘(1) Before issuing any notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister shall give an undertaking to lay before each House of Parliament an impact assessment of withdrawal from Directive 2004/38/EC (free movement of persons).
(2) The impact assessment shall include the impact on withdrawal for each sector of the economy and include effects of—
(a) labour shortages,
(b) changes in costs of labour,
(c) administrative burdens for employers,
(d) effects on the cost base for companies; and
(e) effect on consumers.”
New clause 107—Employment Training needs—Impact Assessment—
‘(1) Before issuing any notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister shall give an undertaking to lay before each House of Parliament an impact assessment of the skills training needed to supply the necessary skills needed for the UK economy after the UK leaves the European Union.
(2) The impact assessment should detail—
(a) the resources needed to meet the needs of training needs of the UK post commencement of leaving the European Union; and
(b) how government will work with UK companies to train future employees and upskill employees post commencement of leaving the European Union in the context of changes in UK immigration policy.”
New clause 143—Financial liability of the UK towards the EU—
The Prime Minister may not exercise the power under section 1 until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has—
(a) published an assessment of the financial liability of the UK towards the EU following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and
(b) made a statement to the House of Commons on the economic impact of the United Kingdom leaving the single market.”
New clause 152—Natural Environment—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must lay before both Houses of Parliament an impact assessment covering the impact of leaving—
(a) the European Union, and
(b) the Single Market
on the natural environment, including the marine environment, until 2042.”
This new clause would require the Government to set out the impact on the natural environment of leaving the European Union and leaving the Single Market on the natural environment covering the expected duration of the Government’s 25-year plan for the environment.
New clause 153—Chemicals Regulation—impact assessment—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must lay before both Houses of Parliament an impact assessment covering the impact of leaving—
(a) the European Union, and
(b) the Single Market
on the assessment and regulation of chemicals for safety and environmental protection.”
New clause 154—Rural Economy and Environment—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must lay before both Houses of Parliament an impact assessment covering the impact of leaving—
(a) the European Union,
(b) the Single Market, and
(c) the Customs Union
on the rural economy and environment.
(2) An impact assessment laid under subsection (1) shall in particular cover the impact on—
(a) tariff and non-tariff barriers to export,
(b) farm incomes and viability,
(c) environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards, and
(d) international competitiveness of UK farms.”
New clause 155—Land Management Payments—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must lay before both Houses of Parliament an impact assessment covering the impact of leaving—
(a) the European Union,
(b) the Common Agricultural Policy, and
(c) the Single Market
on land management and rural development payments.
(2) An impact assessment laid under subsection (1) shall in particular cover the impact on—
(a) funding for environmental protection,
(b) funding for rural development, and
(c) farm incomes and viability.”
New clause 167—Rights and opportunities of young people—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must undertake to publish an assessment of the effect of leaving the European Union on the rights and opportunities of people aged under 25 in the United Kingdom, including—
(a) the effect on the ability to work and travel visa-free in the EU,
(b) the effect on the ability to study in other EU member states on the same terms as on the day on which Royal Assent is given to this Act, and
(c) the effect on the ability to participate in EU programmes designed to provide opportunities to young people, including programmes to facilitate studying in other EU member states.
(2) The impact assessment in subsection (1) shall be laid before Parliament before—
(a) 12 months have elapsed after this Act receives Royal Assent, or
(b) the day on which Her Majesty’s Government declares that agreement has been reached on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause would require the Government to undertake an impact assessment of the effect of leaving the EU on the rights and opportunities of young UK nationals and how they will differ from their European counterparts.
New clause 187—Euratom—impact assessment—
‘(1) Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must commit to publish an impact assessment of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) on the nuclear industry within the United Kingdom.
(2) The impact assessment should include, but not be limited to, the impact on—
(a) nuclear research;
(b) health and safety in the nuclear industry; and
(c) employment in the nuclear industry.
(3) The impact assessment shall be published either 18 months after this Act receives Royal Assent or before a vote in the European Parliament on the withdrawal deal agreed between the European Union and the United Kingdom, whichever is the sooner.”
This new clause requires the Prime Minister to publish an impact assessment on the effect on the UK’s nuclear industry should the UK withdraw from Euratom.
Amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 2, at beginning insert—
“If a report has been laid before both Houses of Parliament setting out the estimated impact on the public finances of the UK withdrawing from the European Single Market,”
This amendment ensures that prior to any notification of the Prime Minister‘s intention to notify the United Kingdom‘s withdrawal from the EU, a report shall be published setting out the anticipated implications of exiting from the Single Market
Amendment 24, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“after Her Majesty’s Government has published a report on the implications, costs and benefits for Gibraltar.”
Amendment 25, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“after Her Majesty’s Government has published a report on the implications of and costs and benefits for the British Overseas Territories.”
Amendment 26, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“after Her Majesty’s Government has published a report on the implications of and costs and benefits for the Crown Dependencies.”
Amendment 27, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“after Her Majesty’s Government has published a report on the implications of and costs and benefits for the Commonwealth.”
Amendment 28, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“after Her Majesty’s Government has published a report on the implications of and costs and benefits for European Foreign and Defence Policy Co-operation.”
Amendment 47, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published an assessment on the financial liability of the United Kingdom towards the EU on completion of the Article 50 withdrawal process, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 48, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of Exchequer has published a revised Treasury forecast on the state of the economy, and laid a copy of the report before Parliament.”
Amendment 49, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has published an assessment of the level of agricultural maintenance support grants beyond 2020, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 51, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) unless a Minister of the Crown has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on Scottish sea ports, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 52, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published an assessment of the financial implications of leaving the European Union for charities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 53, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published a report on the relationship between the Channel Islands and the European Union with regard to the 1972 Act of Accession Protocol No 3, and laid a copy of the report before Parliament.”
Amendment 57, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published a revised Strategic Defence and Security Review, and laid a copy of the review before Parliament.”
Amendment 58, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Development Fund, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 59, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a report giving a medium-term economic forecast in the event of the United Kingdom leaving the single market, and laid a copy of the report before Parliament.”
Amendment 61, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published a revised National Security Strategy, and laid a copy of the review before Parliament.”
Amendment 62, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published an assessment of future payments to the EU after the Prime Minister makes the notification.”
Amendment 64, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Education has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 65, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Health has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 66, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 67, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Justice has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 68, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Home Secretary has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 69, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Defence has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 70, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the responsibilities of Her Majesty’s Treasury, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 71, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Foreign Secretary has published an assessment on the impact of the UK withdrawing from the EU on the responsibilities of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 72, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 73, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for International Trade has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 74, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 75, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 76, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for International Development has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 77, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport has published an assessment on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on the department’s responsibilities, and laid a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”
Amendment 79, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until the Chancellor of the Exchequer has published a report on matters relating to the pensions of UK nationals living and working in the European Union on the date that the United Kingdom withdraws from the EU.”
Amendment 80, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published an equality impact assessment on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, and laid a copy of the report before Parliament.”
Amendment 82, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) The Prime Minister may not notify under subsection (1) until a Minister of the Crown has published regional and national economic impact assessments on the impact of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU.”
Amendment 11, page 1, line 5, at end insert—
‘(3) Before exercising the power under subsection (1), the Prime Minister must prepare and publish a report on the effect of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on national finances, including the impact on health spending.
This amendment calls for the Government to publish a report on the effect of EU withdrawal on the national finances, particularly health spending following claims in the referendum campaign that EU withdrawal would allow an additional £350 million per week to be spent on the National Health Service.
Amendment 39, page 1, line 5, at end insert—
‘(3) Before the Prime Minister issues a notification under this section, Her Majesty’s Government has a duty to lay before both Houses of Parliament a review of the independence and effectiveness of the current environmental regulators, including a detailed assessment of their capacity to effectively implement and enforce EU-derived environmental legislation upon withdrawal from the European Union.”
This amendment would ensure that UK environmental regulators and enforcement agencies —namely the Environment Agency, Natural England and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs — are adequately funded and authorised to effectively perform the regulatory functions currently undertaken by institutions of the European Union.
New clause 17—EU Assets and Liabilities—
Within 30 days of the coming into force of this Act the Secretary of State shall publish a full account of the assets and liabilities held by Her Majesty’s Government in respect of the UK’s relationship with the European Union.”
This new clause would ensure that the Government publishes an account of the assets and liabilities held by Her Majesty’s Government in respect of our relationship with the European Union.
New clause 31—Regions of England—draft framework—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must set out a draft framework for the future relationship with the European Union which includes particular reference to the impacts on the regions of England.”
New clause 41—Public spending implications—
Before exercising the power under section 1, the Prime Minister must set out a draft framework for the future relationship with the European Union which includes reference to the impact on public spending.”
New clause 138—Trade Agreements—
The Prime Minister may not exercise the power under section 1 until a Minister of the Crown has published a report on the number and terms of trade agreements outlined with countries outside of the European Union, and laid a copy of the report before Parliament.”
When it comes to the crucial issue of the impact of different trading models on our economy, the Government’s White Paper falls far short of what is required to ensure that we are able to have informed discussions and debates in this place. Indeed, it offers little beyond assurances that the Government will prioritise securing the freest and most frictionless trade possible in goods and services. The House and, more importantly, businesses across the country that stand to be affected deserve to be made aware of the Government’s evaluation of the likely impact of different future trading relations. The Government can provide them with that evaluation without revealing their negotiating hand by publishing any impact assessments that have been undertaken by Her Majesty’s Treasury. That is the purpose of new clause 5.
Returning to new clause 5, we know that the analysis that we want published exists. Ministers have made it clear, both from the Dispatch box and in response to specific parliamentary questions, that the Government are conducting a broad range of analyses at macroeconomic and sectoral levels to understand the impact of leaving the EU on all aspects of the UK. If I recall rightly, the Secretary of State said last week that 58 sectors are now being analysed. We are not asking the Government to do anything new, so I hope that the new clause is not interpreted as a mechanism to delay or frustrate the triggering of article 50. If Ministers maintain that no impact assessments have been finalised, new clause 5 seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State reports as much to both Houses.
I hope that the Minister does not simply echo those who have argued and will argue that publishing any information would undermine the Government’s negotiating strategy. We heard that argument prior to the Government conceding a speech and a White Paper, and we will no doubt hear it in the months ahead. I say to hon. Members who take that view, whether out of genuine concern or simply because they in effect want the legislature to shut up shop for the next 18 months, that the detailed analysis of the kind that we are asking to be published is out there. Other organisations are doing it—not just the Government.
Reputable and well-regarded organisations such as the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and the IFS have published detailed analysis of the cost and benefits of future trading relations with the EU, as have other less reputable organisations. The quality of analysis that the Government and the Treasury are able to produce will match, if not surpass, that analysis, and hon. Members should be able to access it. More importantly, businesses across the country need to be able to see it, so that they can adequately plan for their futures.
Labour Members look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts. The purpose of new clause 98, in the name of my hon. Friends, is simple. It would ensure that the impact of decisions on women and those with protected characteristics was considered and debated at every stage of the negotiation process. It may have escaped the attention of some hon. Members, but the word “equality” does not appear once in the White Paper. Indeed, the White Paper contains no mention of race, disability, sexuality or gender identity, which is astonishing. How can we secure a Brexit that works for everyone, as hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have repeated ad nauseam, if black, Asian and minority ethnic people, disabled people and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities are not given due consideration when the different negotiating positions are being weighed up?
The process and the final deal must have regard to equalities and the protection and extension of rights for those with protected characteristics. New clause 98 would ensure that equalities considerations were at the forefront of Government thinking throughout the withdrawal process and inform the final deal. Doing so would help to ensure that we got the best deal for everyone, wherever they were and, crucially, whoever they were. It would ensure that any negative impact on women or those with protected characteristics must be transparently presented and considered, and that if there was a risk of a disproportionate impact, the Government took steps to mitigate it.
New clause 98 is in line with recommendations from the cross-party Women and Equalities Committee, which has called for greater transparency on the impact of Government decisions on women and those with protected characteristics. It would help to improve scrutiny and accountability, and I look forward to the Minister giving it due consideration in his response.
I have a simple concern as to why there is such a peculiar sense of the vital importance of these particular forecasts, which give huge credit to the Treasury’s ability to forecast where we may be going in almost every sector. As my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) said, many of the forecasts have been fundamentally wrong in the past, so I asked the Library how accurate the Treasury forecast of May 2016 turned out to be. It is worth relating exactly how accurate it turned out to be, even when the Treasury had such a huge array of figures and possibilities before it:
“In May 2016, the Treasury published forecasts for the immediate economic impact of voting to leave the EU. It forecast for a recession to occur in the second half of 2016, with quarterly GDP growth of -0.1% in both Q3 2016 and Q4 2016 forecast (a second ‘severe shock’ scenario was also shown with a deep recession occurring; under this scenario growth of -1.0% in Q3 2016 and -0.4% in Q4 2016 was forecast). In reality, the economy continued to grow at its pre-referendum pace, with quarterly growth of +0.6%”.
Now the figure has been adjusted again by the Governor of the Bank of England to close to 2%, with the prospect of further adjustments.
My point is that new clause 5 states:
“The Prime Minister may not give notice under section 1 until either HM Treasury has published any impact assessment…HM Treasury has laid a statement before both Houses of Parliament”.
With respect, I say to the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that this is not just a helpful attempt to get information to the House; it is exactly what he said it was not. It is clearly a back-door attempt to make it almost impossible for the Government to get on and trigger article 50. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) said, the referendum verdict was to trigger article 50. The people were not asked, “Shall we trigger article 50 only after we have laid various reports of notables who believe the economy is good, bad or indifferent?” They were asked, “Do you want to leave or do you want to stay?” They chose to leave and we have to get on with it. The idea that the Government are going to go into a negotiation without any idea about what they favour and what they think will, by and large, on the margins, be better for us is ridiculous.
The House must recognise that it is going to be swamped with information of this sort; every forecasting agency is going to be in the game of telling us where we are, and none will be the wiser. Everybody in the House will take the worst or best one, depending on what they want. If the OBR has a margin for error of £90 billion, people can take whatever position they want. But it does not change anything, because we are leaving. The nature of the agreement that we get with the EU, if we get one, is not going to be based on a bunch of forecasts. It will be based on what those negotiating for the EU think is in their general best interest and what we from the UK manage to persuade them is in our mutual best interest. That is what a negotiation is about.
Anybody who has been engaged in negotiation in business will know that you start with your base, bottom line, worst case for you and try to improve upon that, and the other side does the same. This is not going to be about one side saying, “I tell you what my forecast comes to. It tells me we are going to be better off. What does your forecast tell?” and the other side saying, “Ours says we are going to be better off and you will be better off, so which forecast are we going to take?” The battle of forecasts is a ludicrous and pointless exercise.
The head of the Office for Budget Responsibility is on the record as saying that in the end, almost all forecasts are wrong—
We should look around us and listen to what various politicians in Europe are saying. We keep forgetting that their position is really what will end up setting the kind of arrangement we get. I was interested to read 24 hours ago that the German Finance Minister has changed his position. He has now said that there is no way on earth that the Germans should have any concept of trying to punish the United Kingdom; quite the contrary, he said that they need the City of London to succeed and thrive, because without it they will be poorer. He went on to say that they will therefore absolutely have to come to an arrangement with the United Kingdom, because it is in all of our interests. That is the best forecast we can get, because it is about what people believe is in their mutual best interests.
The other day, I had the privilege of engaging with a company in the pre-packaged potato industry that turns over €400 million a year. Although it sells all over the world, 39% of its product is sold to the United Kingdom, and it does very well out of that. Even as we speak, it is grouping together to cajole the relevant Governments and persuade them that the very last thing it wants is to have its business wrecked by some artificial attempt to put up a block to the United Kingdom. These things are already in train, and they are nothing to do with forecasts and all to do with people caring about their futures and jobs.
I make no bones about this: I am an optimist. There is nothing in the new clause that would in any way help the Government. Even more importantly, it would not enable the House to reach any kind of measured conclusion, such as letting the Government trigger article 50. I will conclude now unless somebody wants to intervene.
Ultimately, if the Opposition are really honest, these new clauses and amendments are really about making sure that the Government’s hands are tied, and slowing down the process in the vague hope that, somehow, people’s opinions will change and it will all look too difficult. These forecasts will then allow everyone to go out and say, “Oh my God, this is so terrible. Look what will happen if we do not get this arrangement or that arrangement.”
I do not wish to sow the seeds of dissention, so I simply say that the new clause and the related amendments, which would put another set of shackles around the Government’s hands and stop them getting on with what the British people voted for on 23 June last year, must be rejected, because the Government must seek the best deal they can in line with what is good for the EU and for the United Kingdom.
I am bound to say that I wish we were not here. As the right hon. Members for Chingford and Woodford Green and for Surrey Heath know well, because I debated with them a lot during the campaign, I campaigned strongly for us to stay in the European Union. I led the Labour “In for Britain” campaign in Greater London, and played a role in the “Britain Stronger In Europe” campaign nationally. But we lost. As a democrat, I accept that result, which is why I supported the Bill’s Second Reading. Of course, I respect people who interpreted the referendum result differently. Although we all have different views on whether to trigger article 50, we can all agree that while various promises were made by both sides in the referendum campaign, the key pledge of the winning side was that if we leave the European Union, £350 million extra a week will go to the NHS, which is why I tabled amendment 11.
Dominic Cummings, who worked, of course, for the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath and who ran the Vote Leave campaign, said on his blog last month that the £350 million NHS argument was “necessary to win”. He said:
“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests No.”
Hon. Members can go and read that on his blog. So the importance of that pledge cannot be overestimated. It cannot be detached from the triggering of article 50. It is inextricably linked to why millions of people voted to leave, to our withdrawal from the European Union and, therefore, to this Bill.
“We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead.”
None of them disowned that pledge during the campaign. They also stood by a big sign saying:
“Let’s give our NHS the £350 million the EU takes every week.”
We know the NHS needs the extra cash, so it was not unreasonable for people to believe those promises. The Health Committee—people on both sides of the House sit on it—pointed out recently that the deficit in NHS trusts and foundation trusts in 2015-16 was £3.45 billion. We know that Ministers’ claimed increases in NHS funding are being funded by reductions in other areas of health spending that fall outside NHS England’s budgets. We know that reductions in spending on social care are having a serious impact, which is translating into increased A&E attendances, emergency admissions and delays in people leaving hospital. The NHS needs that extra cash, so it was not unreasonable for people who voted to leave the European Union to think that that pledge would be delivered on.
For all these reasons I have tabled amendment 11, which, as the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg) stated, is very reasonable. It requires the Prime Minister to set out how the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will impact on the national finances, particularly on health spending. In short, she needs to set out how she is going to make good on that Vote Leave pledge to spend £350 million extra per week on the NHS.
I hope that we will have the opportunity not only to debate this amendment but to vote on it too. It has been signed by more Members than any other amendment. It is supported across parties and of course has the support of the Opposition Front Bench. In the end, in our democracy, it is in this House that Members are held to account for the promises they make and the things they say to the people. What better way to test the resolve of people such as the right hon. Members for Chingford and Woodford Green and for Surrey Heath than for there to be a vote on this issue so that people can see whether they meant what they said?
These people will never be forgiven if they betray the trust of the people by breaking their promise to do all they can to ensure that the £350 million extra per week for the NHS is delivered. They all know that only too well. Mr Cummings, who, as I have said, worked for the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath, discloses in the blog I mentioned that the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath planned to deliver, in part, on that pledge as part of the Foreign Secretary’s leadership campaign. Mr Cummings writes that when he told the Foreign Secretary
“‘you should start off by being unusual, a politician who actually delivers what they promise’”,
the reply was
“‘Absolutely. ABSOLUTELY. We MUST do this, no question, we’ll park our tanks EVERYWHERE’”.
Apparently, the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath strongly agreed. Mr Cummings goes on to say:
“If they had not blown up this would have happened.”
No doubt the Minister will say to us that there are a number of reasons why the Government cannot support the amendment. I am going to pre-empt him and deal with each in turn. First, there are those who claim that it was not a pledge at all. The Transport Secretary has said:
“The specific proposal by the Vote Leave campaign was in fact to spend £100 million a week”—
of the £350 million—
“on the NHS. I hope that aspiration will be met.”
I say to the Transport Secretary, who of course is not here, that the poster, which the Vote Leave campaigners all stood by, did not indicate that that was an aspiration or use the £100 million figure. It was a pledge, pure and simple. The poster did not read, “Let’s aspire to spend £100 million extra.”
The other, and connected, argument that is made is that the commitment was given by one side in a referendum campaign, not by a Government, so we should leave the matter alone and get on with things—we should all shut up. I am sorry, but I do not think that that will wash. Whether they were Ministers or not, all the key Vote Leave campaigners were Members of this House. As I have said, if our democracy is to mean anything, it is that Members of this House answer and are held to account in this House for the promises that they make to the people. After all, as has been said, they campaigned in the name of parliamentary sovereignty. If Parliament is sovereign, they should be held to account here.
Either those people made the pledge in the expectation of delivering on it, in which case they must now show us the money and vote for this very reasonable amendment, or they made it in the knowledge that it would never be met, in which case they will never be forgiven for their betrayal of those who, in good faith, relied on that promise.
My party established the national health service in the face of opposition from the right hon. Gentleman’s party. We have a far better record of providing the funding and support to our NHS. We need no lectures or demands from his party, which is in government and throwing it all into chaos.
I finish by saying this to the right hon. Gentleman. His Prime Minister goes around saying, “Brexit means Brexit”. If Brexit means anything, it is that he and all his colleagues who campaigned for Vote Leave need to deliver on their promise to put £350 million extra per week into the NHS. I look forward to seeing the right hon. Gentleman in the Division Lobby tomorrow.
The hon. Member for Streatham is right: people do want us to take back control of the money currently spent on our behalf by the European Union. But if we accept his amendment and the other amendments and new clauses before us, we will be seeking only to delay and, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, to procrastinate, to put off the day when we eventually leave the European Union and can then spend that additional money on our NHS or, indeed, any other priority. If any Member of this House wants to see taxpayers’ money that is currently controlled by the European Union spent on our NHS, on reducing VAT on fuel or, say, on improving infrastructure in the Western Isles, they have a duty to vote down these new clauses and amendments, which seek to frustrate the honouring of the sovereign will of the British people.
The reason I oppose all the new clauses and amendments is that, as was pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, every single one of them, if implemented, would delay and potentially frustrate the legislation. They would require a huge list of impact assessments to be published and other work to be undertaken before we could trigger article 50.
I know that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) said that it was not the mission of the Labour party to delay, but he is rather in the position of what guerrilla organisations call a cleanskin—an innocent who has been put in the way of gunfire by other wilier figures, such as the shadow Chief Whip who is in his place. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is entirely sincere in his belief that the new clauses and amendments would not delay or complicate the legislation, nor frustrate the will of the British people, but I have to say that he is wrong. He is in the position of the Roman general, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator, “the delayer”: everything that he is doing—every single one of these new clauses and amendments—seeks to delay.
Let me draw attention briefly, for example, to new clause 48, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). Subsection (1), as clarified by subsection (2)(s), would require us to have an impact assessment on leaving the European Union Agency for Railways. It may have escaped her notice, but Britain is an island.
More than that, if we were to publish impact assessments on every single one of these areas, we would be falling prey to a fallacy that politicians and other officials often fall prey to, which is imagining that the diligent work of our excellent civil servants can somehow predict the future—a future in which there are so many branching histories, so many contingent events and so many unknowns. If we produce an impact assessment on leaving the European Union Agency for Railways, how do we know how leaving that agency might be impacted by the enlightened proposals being brought forward by my right hon. Friend the Transport Secretary for the more effective unification and cohesion of our transport network? We cannot know, unless we have that fact in play, but we do not yet know—quite rightly, because he is taking time to consult and deliberate—what that policy will be. What we would be doing is commissioning the policy equivalent of a pig in a poke. With that, I am very happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman.
“the Prime Minister must prepare and publish a report on the effect of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on national finances, including the impact on health spending.”?
Surely, as a humble seeker of truth, he might want to know the answer to that?
Further, if we were to have published the Government’s policy advice in every area, which is the inference behind the hon. Gentleman’s question, it would make the business of Government impossible. He might remember, as I certainly do, reading the words of the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in his autobiography, “A Journey”, in which he said that the Freedom of Information Act was his biggest mistake—I think there were some bigger. [Laughter.] That is one view that commands a consensus around the House. He thought he had handed a weapon to his enemies and made impossible the business of Government, which requires confidential advice to be prepared by civil servants and accepted by Ministers.
When I was a Minister, I received excellent advice—my mistakes were all my own, all the good ideas were civil servants’. Nevertheless, however good the civil service advice that a Minister receives, it is only one source of wisdom, and every Minister worth his or her salt will want to consult widely. Any Minister who sought to steer only by civil service advice would rightly be held by the House to be a timid mouse constrained by their brief, incapable of ranging more widely and of making a judgment in the national interest.
“exercising the power under section 1”
and before triggering article 50, publish an impact assessment of the effect on the United Kingdom of leaving the customs union. How can we know that?
I am sanguine about leaving. I take the lead from Shanker Singham and other distinguished trade negotiators that leaving the United Kingdom—[Interruption.] A Freudian slip: I mean leaving the customs union—will lead not just to GDP growth in the United Kingdom, but across the world. I take that view, but it is entirely open to others to take a different view, and it is entirely open to Her Majesty’s Government to choose to follow policies that, once we have left the customs union, will either maximise or minimise our GDP. Once again, by insisting on a narrow focus on what is believed to be one truth and holding up the advance of this legislation as a result, the promoters of this new clause are, I am afraid, once again seeking to frustrate democracy.
Having said all that, and having placed on the record my support for both this legislation and the principle of judicial review, if we accept any of these new clauses or amendments, we will subject the operation of article 50 to judicial review. That would mean that if any single one of these impact assessments were not prepared in exactly the right way, at the right time, with appropriate care, the whole process and the democratic will of the British people could be upended. Different people have different views about experts—I shall come on to them in a few moments—but I know whereof I speak.
As I have said, I made a number of mistakes during my ministerial career—too much for us to be able to run over now, given that our debate has to close at 9 o’clock. One thing I remember is that judicial review on the basis of a relatively small infraction, as admitted by the judge, of an equality impact assessment—one I deeply regret—nevertheless resulted in the paralysis of this Government’s school capital building programme. Now, if we want to create a feast for lawyers and a festival for litigators, we should accept these new clauses and bring in these amendments. In so doing, we will see the tills ching in the Middle and Inner Temples and hands wring up and down the country, as we once again frustrate the will of the people.
Are we to accept that for the first time ever, once the impact assessments have been published, an official Government document will be taken by my friends in the Scottish National party or the Labour party as holy writ? Are they going to say, “Thank heavens, this document bears the name of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, so it absolutely must be right, because this is the only way in which I can form a judgment on whether or not leaving the European Union will be a success”? Can I expect the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) to say, “Oh look, the impact assessment from the Department for Exiting the European Union said X, and now, six months later, X has been satisfied, so I am going to give up and accept that the Secretary of State is right, because everything that he has done is in accordance with what he has previously said he would do”?
Let me now deal with the substantive point made by the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber, because it is critical. He argues that the only way in which we as Back Benchers and Opposition spokesmen can effectively scrutinise the Government is through impact assessments. That is a grotesque misunderstanding of the opportunities that are available to us in the House through freedom of information requests, parliamentary questions—written or oral—and the diligent use of all the other tools that enable us to scrutinise the Executive. The idea that we are mute and blind until an impact assessment has been published, the idea that there is no relevant tool available to us and no relevant source of information that we can quarry other than an impact assessment—
That idea is a misunderestimation—if I may borrow a phrase from George W. Bush—of what all of us, as Members of Parliament, are capable of.
That brings me to my final point—
The idea that we should seek, as these amendments and new clauses seek to do, to delay the will of the British people would, rather than restoring the confidence in this House that the vote on 23 June was designed to do, only lower public confidence in us. For that reason—because it would mean that a glorious liberation was curdled by parliamentary delaying tactics of a discredited kind—I hope the entire House will vote against these new clauses and all these amendments in order to uphold the sovereign will of the British people as freely expressed on 23 June last year.
Government Members who have spoken were quite exercised about the possibility of the amendments causing some delay to the triggering of article 50, but I am not entirely sure what that delay might be. I have read the Bill—all 137 words of it—and nowhere in it is there a date for the triggering of article 50. The Bill gives the power to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister alone—as I said last week, it is a very presidential power, not a parliamentary power—to choose the date on which article 50 is triggered.
I might add that in the time that the Scottish Parliament took that vote, as well as votes on several amendments, barely one Member had spoken in this debate. Voting in the Scottish Parliament is far quicker than here; its Members can vote on far more amendments than we ever can, because they do not have the archaic procedures that we have to put up with down here.
Yesterday’s amendment paper had more pages—142—than there are words in the Bill, but today we are down to just 121 pages. The number of amendments that have been tabled highlights the dreadful inadequacies of both the Bill and this scrutiny process. There is nowhere near enough time to consider the massive implications of what Brexit will actually mean and how the Government intend to achieve it, and of course there is still no kind of meaningful information on what they think those implications might be.
The Scottish National party—for the record, that is its name, as I think Hansard is probably fed up with hearing—has always understood that our kind of independence is defined by our interdependence and by the role that we want to play in the world, whereas it is increasingly clear that the hard right, Tory Brexit that is being foisted upon us against our will is an isolationist independence—[Interruption.] It is Trumpist, triumphant and narrow nationalism, as I hear my colleagues saying from the Back Benches.
The Government must give us a benchmark. They must give us their own assessment against which we can measure and test these things so that we can hold them to account. The Chair of the Procedure Committee, the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker), under whom I am proud to serve but who is not in the Chamber, has said that we are accountable to our voters—that is absolutely correct. However, the Government are accountable to us, and they have to provide us with the necessary information so that we can hold them to account.
The First Minister herself said on 24 June that we would respect, listen to and understand the people in Scotland who voted to leave the European Union. We never heard anything like that from the Prime Minister about those on the other side. The First Minister’s words were reflected in the compromise position that was published by the Scottish Government. They have moved heaven and earth to try to reach a compromise arrangement with this Government, but their words are still falling on deaf ears.
I want to address some of the new clauses and amendments that have been tabled by various factions on the Labour Benches, and I shall focus particularly on the ones relating to Euratom. The exchanges on this subject on Second Reading demonstrated the utter chaos that has gripped this Administration and their predecessor. Euratom’s role is to provide a framework for nuclear energy safety and development. I would have thought that, no matter how much some of the Brexiteers hate the European Union institutions, this one would have been among the least controversial. Surely there must be consensus on protecting us from nuclear meltdowns. Do they not think that that is a good idea? No.
The Command Paper that the UK Government published in February last year on the impact of Brexit made no mention of coming out of Euratom. Nevertheless, we are being taken out of it without any warning and, if the Government will not accept the Labour new clause on this matter, there will be no further discussion about it. I do not remember the subject featuring on the side of buses or in showpiece debates, yet here we are with another ill-thought-out unintended consequence of a Brexit vote that started as an internal ideological battle among Conservative Members and that is going to leave decades of uncertainty in its wake for us all. That is just one example. Each new clause and amendment, from whatever party, that calls for an impact assessment shows the Government’s lack of preparation across the whole suite of policy.
We want to test the will of the House on new clause 143. It tests the Government not only on the practical costs of Brexit but on the hard money, because we know that the financial costs will be high. It is simply not in the interests of the remaining member states for the UK to be better off as a result of Brexit. We have already seen the shocks to the currency market described by my hon. Friend the Member for Badenoch and so on—[Laughter.] I am not quite as good at this as the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Michael Gove). We have seen the shocks to the currency market and the revisions that have already happened in the economic forecasts. Withdrawing from the European Union and exiting the single market will lead to an enormous hit on our economy, and new clause 143 calls on the Chancellor to bring forward further revised forecasts and an assessment of the UK’s financial liability to the EU on the completion of the triggering of article 50.
We have seen the leaked reports of the Government’s assessment that a hard Brexit could cost the UK economy up to £66 billion a year—9.5% of GDP—if we revert to WTO terms. The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman), with whom I serve on the Procedure Committee, said earlier that analysis in the Financial Times shows that the cost of simply leaving is up to €20 billion due to the shared assets that we are a part of, and that there are up to €300 billion of payment liabilities that need to be settled in the negotiations. Even after all that, there will be ongoing costs, as well as funds that we might wish to continue to contribute to. That is covered in amendment 58, which is about the European development fund. The European development fund is the main method for providing European community aid for development co-operation in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the overseas countries and territories of EU member states.
Over the years, the UK has contributed around £10 billion to the EDF, which has been a crucial component, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride, Strathaven and Lesmahagow (Dr Cameron) says, of our meeting the 0.7% aid commitment. According to the Government’s timetable, Brexit will happen before the end of the current 2020 commitment period, so what will happen after Brexit? The other important thing about the EDF is that it is one of the main instruments for providing development capacity to British overseas territories, so how will they be affected? What plans are being made for them? We are trying to test such things through the amendments.
The Government have indicated from time to time that they ought to continue funding the EDF, so perhaps there are European institutions that they will have to continue to fund and support, and to have some kind of retained membership of. That makes me wonder. We hear about hard Brexit and soft Brexit, but perhaps this is some sort of hokey-cokey Brexit whereby we leave everything and then have to start joining things again: “You put your left wing in; Your right wing out; In, out, in, out”—I do not want to think about anything being shaken all about.
Amendment 49 calls for a report from the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on the level of agricultural maintenance support grants beyond 2020.
Amendment 51 calls for a report on the impact of UK withdrawal on Scottish seaports. The problems caused by Brexit that are facing Scottish seaports are expensive and complex. Concerns for the maritime industry surround general policy areas such as employment law, immigration, border controls and contract law, as well as transport-specific areas such as freedom to trade, safety, the environment, tonnage tax and security. The White Paper offers only more uncertainty.
The UK Government’s stated approach to immigration post-Brexit may create an increased need for border activity at Scottish seaports, and the Government’s preferred arrangements for trading post-Brexit—out of the EU customs arrangements—will necessitate additional customs checks on exports and imports at seaports, and will affect trade volume at seaports, so the Government have to mitigate that uncertainty by publishing a full impact assessment of those complex issues for Scottish seaports before triggering article 50.
Amendment 52 calls for an assessment of financial implications for charities, on which I have a certain amount of experience from my international development portfolio. International development charities across the United Kingdom are already feeling the impact of Brexit and the currency fluctuations. Money that they had raised—money that the UK public had voluntarily donated—is now worth less as a direct result of the Brexit decision, which is having an impact on the day-to-day lives of people in developing countries to whom charities had pledged money that is now not worth what it was when the pledges were made. I hear nothing from the UK Government saying that they want to make up the difference or give the charities any kind of support. UK charities generally receive some £200 million a year from the social fund, through EU structural funds and from the regional development fund.
Amendment 53 calls for a report on the relationship between the Channel Islands and the EU. The Channel Islands are not a member of the EU, but they have access to the single market and now face being denied that by a hard Tory Brexit. That is why our amendment seeks a report that sets out the full implication of the relationship between the Channel Islands and the EU, and the impact that Brexit will have. That is vital because there will be a serious impact on many key Channel Islands industries, including finance and fisheries. Again, that is an example of why we need these impact assessments.
Amendment 57 calls for a revised strategic defence and security review. The last SDSR was based on the 2015 national security risk assessment, which took place before the European referendum and did not consider any post-Brexit scenarios. As such, it is no longer fit for purpose. The SDSR makes no mention of the EU’s common security and defence policy, whereas the White Paper outlines existing UK participation in the CSDP and expresses the intention to continue that co-operation post-Brexit. Again, we see the in and out of the Tories’ Brexit.
I have already spoken about amendment 58, so I shall move on to amendment 59, which calls for a report on the medium-term economic forecast in the event of the UK leaving the single market. Again, Scottish National party Members have made points about the dangerous long-term and medium-term economic realities of a hard Tory Brexit. We know that the OBR forecast said:
“we asked the Government in September for ‘a formal statement of Government policy as regards its desired trade regime and system of migration control, as a basis for our projections’. The Government directed us to two public statements by the Prime Minister that it stated were relevant”.
Given the far-reaching and devastating consequences that leaving the single market would have on the economy, teamed with the lack of detail given to the OBR, it has to be the Treasury’s responsibility to publish a medium-term forecast.
Amendment 61 calls for a revised national security strategy. The existing national security strategy is based on a 2015 assessment that took no account of Brexit—[Interruption.] I am not sure what Government Members are so concerned about. It is completely legitimate for Opposition Members to table amendments to the Bill and it is perfectly right and proper that we have the opportunity to debate them.
On the point about Liechtenstein, I do know how to spell it, but I will not find it by looking at page 54, chart 9.3 of the Brexit White Paper. Amendment 62 calls on the Chancellor to publish an assessment of future payments to the European Union. It is similar to new clause 143, which we want to push to a vote later on this evening, so some of the points should have been covered already.
Amendment 64 calls on the Secretary of State for Education to publish an impact assessment on her Department’s responsibility in this area. We have already heard from some Members about the serious implications regarding the ability of our universities to attract talented researchers and students in the event of the UK leaving the European Union. Figures for 2014-15 show that there were 13,450 full-time equivalent EU students studying for undergraduate degrees at Scottish universities. Frankly, almost every single one of them will have been shocked and saddened by the result on 23 June. None the less, they have appreciated the warm welcome and reassurances that have been provided to them by academic institutions up and down Scotland, by the Scottish Government and by the friends, neighbours and families who live in their cities.
I want to talk more about education and health before I start to wind up. There are elements of education that are shared with the European Union. Will they also be devolved fully to the Scottish Parliament? That also applies to some aspects of health. Leaving the EU will have serious implications for the workforce of our health service. According to the Trade Union Congress, just under 50,000 citizens from the European economic area work in the NHS—9,000 doctors, 18,000 nurses, and the list goes on. Those people are a vital source of skills and experience, plugging gaps left by the underfunding of training places, especially in England and Wales, in recent years. This again is where the failure of the UK Government to guarantee the rights of EU nationals to remain and to live and work in the UK after we leave the EU is causing uncertainty and disappointment.
The UK Government have also yet to set out how they will deal with cross-border health issues after leaving the European Union.
Amendment 66 is important because it calls for the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to publish an impact assessment on her Department’s responsibilities, which, of course, include the common fisheries policy.
Leaving the EU will create significant uncertainty within the agricultural sector, and the UK Government have to produce an assessment of that. It is particularly true in the case of the food and drink industry, as I am sure that hon. Members who were at the briefing from people in the food and drink industry earlier today would want to know. Some 69% of Scotland’s overseas food exports go to the European Union.
Amendment 68 calls for the Home Secretary to publish an impact assessment on her Department’s responsibilities. We heard about immigration earlier. Is that responsibility going to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, as the right hon. Member for Surrey Heath called for during the campaign? Our membership of Europol, our participation in the European arrest warrant and other key areas of co-operation on security remain at serious risk following Brexit, and that is why we need an impact assessment on the role of the Home Office.
Likewise, amendment 69 calls for the Secretary of State for Defence to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. As I said on Second Reading, we are at risk of being left with Trump, Trident and a transatlantic tax treaty. At this rate, Trump and Trident will be the beginning and end of the UK’s security policy.
The point made by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Nadine Dorries) is exactly what amendment 70 touches on. It calls on the Chancellor to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. The responsibility of the Treasury will change quite significantly. As we heard from the Brexiteers throughout the campaign, the Treasury currently channels all this money into the European Union. It is going to have to reabsorb that money and have the structures to apportion it back out to lots of different Government Departments.
Talking of maps, my hon. Friend brings me to amendment 71, which calls for the Foreign Secretary to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. We need clarity on the working relationships and the division of labour between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for Exiting the European Union, especially as regards the UK’s permanent representation at the European Union, which we have to assume will continue in some form.
Amendment 72—perhaps the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith) will want to intervene on this—calls on the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions to publish an impact assessment on his responsibilities. The Scottish Government are seeking to give people in Scotland reassurances that they are allowed live and work here.
One of the key agreements of the UK’s renegotiation in earlier years was that the UK would be able to establish a four-year period before non-UK EU nationals have access to in-work benefits such as tax credits, child benefit and housing benefit. It is unclear whether the new deal that is done with the EU will enable the UK to impose such restrictions. The Scottish Government did not approve of the proposal and would want to seek different arrangements if they could. Again, there is a question about whether these powers will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. There were only two pages—
The token total of two pages on securing rights for EU nationals is telling about the UK Government’s real priorities.
Amendment 73 calls for the Secretary of State for International Trade to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. Trade policy is currently under EU competence, and leaving the EU single market and customs union would mean that it fell under the responsibility of the UK Government. The Secretary of State therefore needs to outline how his Department is going to make use of its new competence over trade policy.
Amendment 74 calls for the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. The vote to leave the European Union has plunged our business and energy sector into further uncertainty.
It is important that we consider our amendment about BEIS, because the vote to leave the EU has plunged the business and energy sectors into further uncertainty.
Amendment 75 calls on the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government to publish an impact assessment on his Department’s responsibilities. Local government throughout the UK receives a host of funding from the European Union, not least the structural funds that we have heard about many times.
Amendment 76 calls on the Secretary of State for International Development to publish an impact assessment on her Department’s responsibilities. Again, we need clarity and a full commitment to 0.7% of gross national income going to overseas development. That is similar to the amendment in my name, amendment 58, which I have already spoken about.
Amendment 77 calls on the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to publish an impact assessment.
The UK Government need to clarify what involvement the EU’s digital single market, which is vital for supporting highly paid jobs in an exciting growth sector, will have. They have been completely silent on the digital single market, which will be one of the most important sectors of our economy—like tourism, which also comes under the remit of the DCMS. Approximately 20,000 EU nationals work in Scotland’s hospitality sector—12% of the total. What will be the impact on them?
Amendment 79 calls for the Chancellor to publish a report on matters relating to the pensions of UK nationals living and working in the European Union. Again, that is an area of great uncertainty, and I have heard about it from my own constituents. Some 400,000 UK nationals living in the EU receive a pension from the United Kingdom Government, and they are incredibly concerned about the impact of Brexit. The Government have done nothing to reassure them.
Amendment 80, one of the most important, calls on the Government to publish an equality impact assessment. We heard earlier from the hon. Member for Streatham (Mr Umunna) about the whole range of minority and interest groups in our society—faith groups, LGBT groups and so on—that are completely absent from the UK Government’s White Paper. That is why it is important that we hear about them in an impact assessment.
Amendment 82 calls for a regional and national economic impact assessment.
Finally, new clause 138 addresses trade agreements. We have heard the FCO and the Department for International Trade boasting in public about new trade agreements that the UK will sign after it leaves the EU. Of course, it cannot sign them until it has left. That is why the Government have to be transparent and report on which trade agreements they are working on and give details on the nature and terms of those deals. It is crucial that the UK Government inform and consult Parliament in their ongoing trade talks and allow scrutiny throughout the process.
This is only the beginning. The Government want to bring forward the great repeal Bill, increasingly known as “the great power grab”. They must be willing to stand up to the scrutiny of the House. We have been sent here to do a job, and that is what we have done this evening with our amendments. That is what we will continue to do during the passage of this Bill and all the future legislation that comes with Brexit. [Interruption.]
I congratulate the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich (Matthew Pennycook) on making a clear and concise speech. Indeed, other hon. Gentlemen in the Chamber could have learned from his conciseness.
The House has voted repeatedly that the Government should do nothing to undermine the negotiating position of the UK. The new clauses and amendments would all require the Government to publish some form of assessment of the implications of the UK’s exit from the European Union or particular aspects of it, from the single market, to the environment, to research and development.
Let us not forget what this very straightforward Bill is about. It is about respecting the decision taken in the referendum—a referendum that saw a lengthy and wide-ranging public debate about the impact of remaining in or leaving the EU. The Bill is not about whether we leave the EU or how; it simply allows the Government to implement the decision taken by the people of the United Kingdom in the referendum following that long campaign.
As the Committee knows, the Government are carrying out a wide-ranging programme of analysis relating to our exit from and our future relationship with the European Union. That analysis will be used to underpin our exit negotiations with the EU, to define the future partnership with the EU and to inform our understanding of how EU exit will affect our domestic policies.
Our programme of analysis is important in enabling us to seize the opportunities and in ensuring that our EU exit is a smooth and orderly process. As we discussed yesterday, the Joint Ministerial Committee on exit negotiations was set up to develop a UK-wide approach to the forthcoming negotiations. I know that analysis has been and can be exchanged confidentially through that forum. The Committee should be in no doubt that policy relating to EU exit is underpinned by rigorous and extensive analytical and assessment work. As with all internal analytical work in government, it is not the standard practice to give a public commentary as the analysis develops.
We have said all along that we will lay out as much detail as possible on EU exit, provided that doing so does not risk damaging our negotiating position. The House voted on a motion that confirmed that there should be no disclosure of material that could damage the UK in negotiations. In any negotiation, information on potential economic or financial considerations is very important to the negotiating capital and position of all parties.
Most of the new clauses and amendments would require the Government to publish analysis or assessment work before the process of negotiating with our European Union partners begins and, indeed, before the Prime Minister provides a notification under article 50, as Government Members have pointed out repeatedly. Those include new clause 5, which stands in the names of the Leader of the Opposition and many other Members; new clause 49, which stands in the names of the hon. Member for Pontypridd (Owen Smith) and many other Members; and new clause 143, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins) and many other SNP Members; as well as more than 40 other proposals that I do not intend to list. The common requirement is that we publish information at a time when it could either delay the triggering of article 50 or jeopardise the UK’s negotiating position. That runs contrary to the approach that has already been accepted by this House. For that reason, I cannot accept those new clauses and amendments.
I want to touch briefly on amendments 24 to 26, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) to ensure that the Government take account of our responsibilities to represent the interests of Gibraltar, the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories. I assure him that we are doing exactly that. The amendments are not necessary. I met the members of the Joint Ministerial Council for the overseas territories this morning to take their views on board in this process.
As a former Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Women and Equalities, I welcome the interest in new clause 98, which makes reference to the Equality Act 2010 and protected characteristics. We are, of course, assessing a wide range of impacts as we develop our negotiating position, and we will continue to do so throughout the negotiation period. The Equality Act already provides a strong framework to ensure that the UK is well placed to continue driving equality forward. I assure the Committee that all the protections covered in the Equality Act 2006 and the Equality Act 2010 will continue to apply once the UK has left the European Union.
The Prime Minister has been clear: we want the UK to emerge from this period of change stronger, fairer, and more united and outward-looking than ever before. We want to get the right deal abroad, but ensure we get a better deal for ordinary working people at home. In the White Paper, we set out our ambition to use this moment of change to build a stronger economy and a fairer society by embracing genuine economic and social reform.
New clauses 42 to 48 and new clause 187 were tabled by the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) who, sadly, is no longer in her place. What they have in common is a requirement for the Government to publish impact assessments no later than 18 months after Royal Assent. We cannot know, however, that 18 months after Royal Assent we will not still be engaged in negotiations with the European Union. If we were, those negotiations might be at an important and decisive stage. The new clauses could significantly jeopardise our negotiating position, so I hope the hon. Lady will not press them.
Similarly, new clause 167, in the name of the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra), requires publication no later than 12 months after Royal Assent, and new clause 17, in the name of the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), specifies publication 30 days after the Act comes into force. In each case, I reiterate and amplify my previous objection that the United Kingdom might well be in the middle of negotiations with the European Union.
I turn now to the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Angela Smith) and others, including new clauses 101, 102, 103, 106 and 107. I would be happy to give way to the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) on the matter of the environment at this point.
On the environment, the Prime Minister made very clear in her speech that Parliament will have the opportunity to debate and scrutinise any policy changes that result from our exit and the forthcoming negotiations. I have given evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee and have appeared before the House on a number of occasions. I have been clear that the UK will still seek to be an international leader on environmental co-operation. As part of the great repeal Bill, as the hon. Lady says, we will bring current EU law, including the current framework of environmental regulation, into domestic British law. We will ensure that that law has practical effect. This will preserve protections, and any future changes in the law will be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. This House will therefore have the opportunity to debate this and other topics throughout the process.
That and future debates will no doubt draw on many assessments of what leaving the EU will mean for a wide variety of issues. The Government will also shortly be launching two closely linked Green Papers on food, farming and fisheries, and on the environment. They will be the next important stage in our dialogue on future policy with industry, environmental non-governmental organisations and the wider public.
No one can say what the final elements of the new agreement with the EU will be, and we do not know exactly how the timetable will work after negotiations are concluded. Parliament will have its say, but so too will others. Greater certainty will emerge as we go through the process, but for now there remain unknowns. For these reasons, we do not consider it wise or prudent to fix now in statute what the Government must publish at the end of a process that has not even begun or been timetabled. Doing so would constrain the flexibility of the UK Government at the end of the process and therefore potentially during negotiations. I come back to the simple purpose of the Bill—to allow the process of negotiation to begin and, in so doing, to respect the decision of the people of the UK in the referendum.
New clause 167, on young people, was also tabled by the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston, who unfortunately has had to leave us. I recently participated in a roundtable, along with colleagues from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, with a wide range of young people from all over the country—from Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England—to talk about their views on Brexit. It was interesting to hear from groups such as Undivided, bringing people together from both sides of the campaign to talk about the future. Every Member wants to focus on delivering a bright future for the young people of the UK, so I welcome the intention behind the new clause, but we can do that by coming together to represent the 100%, focusing on the future, getting the right deal for the UK in a new partnership with the EU and working together to deliver the opportunities those young people want.
Unfortunately, the new clause would require us to produce an economic analysis and so put us in the position of potentially giving information to the other side in the negotiations that could prejudice our position. The new clause also mentions the importance of Erasmus. The Government recognise the value of international exchange for students and are considering all the options for collaboration in education and training post-Brexit. In the spirit of looking to the future, however, we should not use the Bill to publish information that could undermine our negotiating position.
For all the reasons I have set out, I hope that hon. Members concerned will not press their amendments. We will produce careful assessments of the vast majority of these factors as we prepare for and take part in the negotiations, and we will use them as evidence to protect the national interests of the United Kingdom, but we cannot and should not commit to putting that information into the hands of the other side. Well intentioned as the amendments are, I urge the Committee to reject them so that we can get on with the Bill in the interests of the whole United Kingdom.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83D).
Brought up.
Question put, That the clause be added to the Bill.
The occupant of the Chair left the Chair (Standing Order No. 83D).
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.
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