PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Sale of Arms: War in Yemen - 13 July 2020 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
The revised methodology was developed to address the Court of Appeal’s judgment. It considers all allegations that are assessed as likely to have occurred and that have been caused by fixed-wing aircraft, reflecting the factual circumstances that the court proceedings concerned. It remains the case, however, that it can be extremely difficult to reach firm conclusions as to whether specific incidents violate the principles of international humanitarian law. Therefore, where an incident is assessed as a possible breach, it is regarded for the purposes of the relevant analysis as if there were breaches of IHL. I emphasise that that analysis is just one part of the assessment.
In retaking these decisions, the Secretary of State has considered the full range of information available to the Government. Some of that information is necessarily sensitive and confidential. I am therefore not able to go into detail about individual assessments. The crucial point is that we have assessed that there were a small number of incidents that have been treated, for the purposes of this analysis, as violations of international humanitarian law. However, these were isolated incidents and our analysis shows that Saudi Arabia has a genuine intent and the capacity to comply with international humanitarian law and the specific commitments it has made.
It is on that basis that the Secretary of State has assessed that there is not a clear risk that the export of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
First, we welcome the Secretary of State’s assessment of possible violations of international law in Yemen, but can the Minister explain why his brother Ministers have been telling the House for the last five years that such an assessment was impossible for Britain to make, and that it could be made only by Saudi Arabia itself? Were those Ministers simply wrong?
Secondly, the Secretary of State has concluded that where international law was broken in Yemen these were “isolated incidents”. Can the Minister tell us how many such incidents were identified, so that we can understand how they define the word “isolated”?
Thirdly, the Government say they have found no patterns of civilian infrastructure being targeted. Can the Minister therefore explain why, for 17 months at the start of the war, Saudi planes systematically destroyed Yemen’s means of food production, bombing farmland, markets, milk plants and fishing boats? If that is not a pattern, what is?
Fourthly, as well as deliberate targeting, the Minister will know that the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas is in itself a war crime, but the Government say the Saudis could not have meant to break international law because their violations
“occurred at different times, in different circumstances and for different reasons.”—[Official Report, 7 July 2020; Vol. 678, c. 339WS.]
Does the Minister not agree that that sounds like the very definition of the word “indiscriminate”?
Fifthly, the Government have concluded that Saudi Arabia has both the intent and capacity to comply with international law, but if that is the case, will the Minister explain the cause of the occasions on which it has failed to do that?
Finally, it would help all of us to understand the Government’s decision if they would agree to publish the full assessment that underpinned it, including the analysis of each so-called isolated incident. If the Minister believes this decision is not just moral and lawful but correct, then surely he has nothing to fear from publishing that assessment and letting us all decide for ourselves.
Ministers have of course not been wrong in their assessment; if they had been wrong, they would have come to the Dispatch Box. The consolidated criteria have been used in all the assessments of the licences. The number of incidents is an operational question; the role of the Department for International Trade is in assessing the consolidated criteria.
The right hon. Lady talked about a number of incidents over different times and in different ways. The assessment was that there is no pattern in the behaviour of Saudi Arabia, and that these were isolated incidents over some considerable time and also at different times.
The right hon. Lady mentioned the intention and capacity to comply and publish the full assessment of the various incidents and asked for a full analysis of each incident. It is worth saying—as you, Mr Speaker, will certainly understand—that assessments of the different incidents that took place in Yemen will often be informed by confidential information that comes to the Government not necessarily from Saudi Arabia; it would not be appropriate for us to publish those assessments. What we have published, however, are the consolidated criteria and the quarterly lists of each licence that has been granted.
The part of my right hon. Friend’s question about the Committees on Arms Export Controls is properly a matter for the Committee, under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier). However, he has said that the International Development Committee will continue to take part in its public sessions for as long as that Committee continues in existence.
On my right hon. Friend’s other point about DFID officials, the Government are obviously very keen that DFID and international development expertise in the region continues to be recognised and utilised.
With the UN ascribing tens of thousands of civilian deaths to the Saudi military, how can the Secretary of State tell the UK with any certainty that there is not a clear risk of serious violations in exporting arms, describing previous violations as merely “isolated incidents”? Can the Minister tell us how many isolated incidents there are? Who collated this evidence? Will he explain why the UK is going against the international community? Surely these actions remove any legitimacy that the UK Government can be a stronger force for good in the world.
In terms of the number and type of incidents, I am not at liberty to publish that, given the confidential nature of a lot of the information involved. However, what I can say is that the UK has one of the strongest arms control regimes in the world, we use the consolidated EU and national criteria and we are now using the revised methodology to come to these decisions that we are happy with.
“we have a brilliant arms industry in the United Kingdom, and I have no problem with arms sales to other countries, as long as they are properly controlled”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 July 2020; Vol. 804, c. 1346.]
I agree with that—and it was from the Labour spokesman in the House of Lords at a similar urgent question on Friday. I think we can all agree that BAE Systems and others in this field do a great job for the UK overall.
“clear risk the equipment being exported might be used in the serious violation of international humanitarian law”.
Those are the criteria we follow when assessing export licences.
“The conflict in Yemen shows no real signs of abating as it enters its sixth year”.
This will result in even more civilian casualties, both as a direct and indirect result of the conflict. After the UK Government’s arms export policy to Saudi Arabia was found to be unlawful last year, can the Minister explain how continued UK arms sales for potential use in this theatre can possibly help prevent the loss of yet more innocent Yemeni lives?
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