PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 9) Regulations 2022 - 6 June 2022 (Commons/General Committees)

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship today, Mrs Murray. Before I begin my remarks on this instrument, I want to echo the words of our First Minister in Wales, Mark Drakeford, who said last night that despite our differences on the field—obviously, we congratulate Wales on a remarkable victory and getting to the World cup—Wales stands with Ukraine. It was a testimonial to the strength of spirit from our fans, players and the whole country. We might have differences on the football field, but when it comes to this wicked conflict we stand together.

I thank the Minister and staff at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office for their continued work in developing and implementing sanctions against Russia since the illegal invasion began 100 days ago. I recognise that is not an easy task; it requires constant effort to improve, expand and develop our regime, as set out in the measures today. It is clear that we need to continue to push sanctions forward, and we can go further still in a number of areas.

As I have said many times, the Government can rely on the Labour party to support them to keep pushing further to end Putin’s heinous war of aggression and the wider attempt to undermine our democracies that was mentioned by the Minister. On that, my only point is to ask why we have not done it much earlier? Many of us on all sides, including me when I was in Back-Bench roles, called for action against Russia Today and various online outlets that were spreading disinformation and undermining our own democracy, as well as pushing Putin’s regime’s agenda across the world.

Our actions here in the UK must be commensurate with the bravery, courage and spirit of the Ukrainian people. President Zelensky has repeatedly said his people are fighting not just for Ukraine but for peace and democracy on behalf of all Europeans. We know he is right and we need to continue to work with our allies in lockstep and strength.

It is great to see the measures today, but, as I have asked the Minister in previous Committees, what are we doing about the countries, some of whom we would term as allies, who are not yet implementing such sanctions and measures? It is deeply concerning that some of them have not moved forward. The Minister knows the countries I refer to. We have seen the failure of Serbia to take action. The sanctions implemented by neighbouring countries effectively meant that Sergei Lavrov could not travel to Serbia, which was a good thing, but we want Serbia and other countries to move forward with similar measures and to stand in support of Ukraine. That is even more important as we have seen more erratic, unpredictable and brutal behaviour in the Donbas in recent weeks, with really horrific scenes. We saw President Zelensky bravely visit the front line in the region—a testament to his leadership and courage—but the Ukrainian governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, announced that the Russian shelling of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk has increased tenfold in recent days. That is why we must continue to raise the pressure with such measures. We know that sanctions are a crucial lever at our disposal that can finally fray Russia’s bonds with the global economy and drastically limit its capacity to continue on in this war.

Before I turn to the detail of the regulations, I want to thank the Minister for his letter to me dated 17 May in response to questions from debates on previous measures. Some of them pertain to this instrument as well, so I want to clarify a couple of points. I am grateful to him for providing information on the size of the sanctions taskforce, which he has now told me numbers 150 members of staff. I hope that that will be kept under review and expanded if necessary. He did not give me details on the number of staff at the Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation and it would be good to have some detail on that because it is crucial that we have the best support for businesses and those wanting to comply with and implement the sanctions regime, including under the instrument we are considering today. We need to know that they are getting the best advice, so I need to understand more fully what is being done at that level as well as in the FCDO itself.

I have some other questions about shipping, which I will come back to the Minister on. I am still not clear why some of the measures announced in that area have not moved forward. The Minister also made clear that the Government are continuing to look at the possibility of confiscating and repurposing frozen assets to provide compensation to victims of the war and support Ukraine, and the US, Canada and the European Union have all developed proposals for that. We have effectively seen that happen with the recent sale of Chelsea, and it is certainly what the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport set out. Will the Minister also confirm what is happening to the assets of Russia Today, Sputnik, or other digital companies that are located in the UK? Are we considering freezing and repurposing any of their staff, their buildings, or other things? What measures are we taking to ensure that these measures not only have an immediate effect in stopping what Russia is doing, but has a beneficial effect for Ukraine and those to whom Russia is doing such wicked and terrible things?

I was also pleased by what the Minister said about compliance across the overseas territories, which has been borne out in my own conversations with officials from the Cayman Islands and Gibraltar who I met recently. I draw attention to my recent declaration of interests on that subject, but I was pleased to hear from them both directly about what they have been doing. Can the Minister say whether the measures will also apply in the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories? Given the very difficult governance situation in the British Virgin Islands as a result of recent concerning developments, which the Minister will be familiar with, can he explain what is happening there? That is really important, because a number of digital and online companies operate through overseas territories and a number of companies have arms there. I do not know what full assessment has been made, but it is important to know where those companies are operating through.

It is encouraging that internet services and online media are on the Government’s radar, given how integral they are to propagating Putin’s lies and misinformation. We saw that happen in the Skripal case, where multiple narratives were seeded across the country and, indeed, the world about what happened in that incident that were complete lies and fabrications. We have to be frank, as well: there have been deep attempts to influence all sides of politics—all political flavours and political parties—not just in this country, but in many others. During some of my recent visits to other European countries and elsewhere, I have heard worrying stories about attempts to undermine political parties, public dialogue, and parliamentary and legislative dialogue about what is happening in Ukraine. That has a direct impact, not only enabling Russia to spread lies and disinformation, but undermining support for Governments who may want to take tough action against Russia but, because of the spread of misinformation and disinformation, might not be able to do so. Russia knows that, and has exploited it ruthlessly.

We in the Labour party have warned time and time again that our digital space has been a wild west for far too long, and social media companies and other online entities have been allowed to mark their own homework from the very beginning. I raised those issues over many years on the Home Affairs Committee—again, on a cross-party basis—repeatedly bringing up with social media companies examples of their failure to remove not only extremist and terrorist content and other unacceptable things online, but clear propaganda that was available for people to watch and was actually being pushed into their feeds. I remember doing some searches of a particular conflict—I will not say which one—and then for the next few weeks having propaganda pumped into my YouTube feed that clearly originated from a state.

I also remember some absolutely horrific information that was pumped out about the tragic destruction of MH17 over Ukraine—destroyed by Russian action there, as we know. The tragedy of all those people who lost their lives should never be forgotten, but misinformation and disinformation was propagated about that event as well, largely through those online channels. We have to act on it.

As my hon. Friend is saying, we of course support these important statutory instruments, but there was a failure to act early when some of those warning signs were raised. That is a pattern of behaviour now. We saw it with some of the issues with economic crimes, with issues of property ownership here in London, with some of those properties being used to launder money, and we have seen it with other forms of economic crime. Now that pattern is being displayed in how the internet has not been properly regulated and has been allowed to run amok. Is not all of that a sign that although the governing party get there in the end, it is often too little, too late, when it comes to preventing some of the damage that has been done?

My hon. Friend makes some important points. The Minister is aware that they are points that Labour Members have made in previous debates. It is disappointing at times that the Government have not moved as quickly as we have wanted; indeed, they have not moved as quickly as cross-party voices have called for. Let us remember that it has been cross-party Committees in this House that have raised concerns about Russian financial interests in the UK and online disinformation. We should also think about other countries that use similar tactics, which are regularly being brought up. We need to open our eyes to the way that warfare is being fought today and how autocratic and kleptocratic regimes are attempting to undermine our democracies and our very liberties, let alone, as in this case of course, specifically prosecuting part of the war against Ukraine and its people online and in cyber-space.

There is a broad consensus across the House that online self-regulation simply has not worked. It is encouraging now to see that measures are moving forward and will be debated to a great extent as we consider the Online Safety Bill. The pushback against Russian belligerence must be fought on many fronts and must expand to our digital spaces.

We very much support the steps that the regulations will take to extend the responsibility being placed on social media and internet service providers to ensure that they comply and further limit those persons and entities that have been designated in terms of their reach online. The incorporation of online application stores, or app stores, into the regulations is critical. The fact that the Government are providing Ofcom with the powers and oversight it needs to issue information requests is also crucial here, as is the ability to issue monetary penalties. However, I say to the Minister again that we have seen such powers introduced before and then we have seen a failure to use them or to use them as extensively as they could be used. I certainly hope that, within the bounds of the separation of roles between Government and regulatory agencies, the Government will make it very clear that the expectation—not only of the Government but of the whole House—is that these measures should be used to their full.

I have three final questions for the Minister. First, can he set out what conversations he has had, or indeed his officials have had, with the social media and internet service providers since these measures came into effect? What is his assessment of how they are operating? Does he need to go any further, because—again—my own interactions with some of the companies have been fairly lacking in the past? Some companies have moved forward, but others quite frankly simply have not. They are very quick to move copyrighted Disney content within 20 minutes of it appearing online, but, for example, took months to remove a notorious extremist far-right channel that was being broadcast on Twitter—in broad daylight, without even attempting to hide what it was. I hope that the Minister is bearing down strongly on these companies and can say what conversations he and his officials have had with them.

Will the Minister tell us what the proceeds of the fines that the regulations propose should be issued to those who fail to comply will be used for? Will they be redirected, for example, to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Ukraine and to support those who have fled the country?

Finally, what conversations has the Minister been having with DCMS about the Online Safety Bill? Are there any additional legislative measures that we can introduce during the passage of that Bill to ensure that the regime is as robust as possible and that we have the measures in place to ensure that?

In conclusion, we have just passed the 100-day mark in this brutal, egregious and unconscionable war of aggression, and each day that passes is a lesson to all of us that we need to make this war one that Putin can no longer afford to wage. We should prevent him from waging the war, and inhibiting and constraining the capacity of the use of digital platforms is critical in mitigating or even removing one of the weapons that Putin has in his arsenal and is using. The Government have our support to do so. However, as I close, I will take this opportunity to implore the Minister once again to push on and to continue to expand our sanctions regime at a pace, even when it is difficult—including technically difficult—to do so. If he does that, he will of course have our backing, as we all stand together in this House in support of Ukraine.

I give my full, unequivocal support to what is being proposed today. I have only two questions, which follow on from what the shadow Minister has just asked about.

The first is about co-ordination with our European allies. The Minister talked about partnership and referred to a lockstep movement, but specifically, what co-ordination will there be? For these measures to be maximally effective, there needs to be as close co-ordination as possible with what our European allies are doing.

My second question follows on from the shadow Minister’s question about the powers that the instrument confers on Ofcom. He asked what would happen to the proceeds from any fines. My question is simply, how much will the fines be? What ability will Ofcom have to levy fines? Will they be small fines or large fines? Is there a sliding scale? How will a judgment be made on what is appropriate? What accountability will there be for those decisions?

I support attempts to reduce the amount of propaganda that is experienced, and obviously we do not want what is happening in Russia and Ukraine to continue, but I have a technical question about how this will work operationally.

New regulation 54A(1) talks about the provider of a social media service taking

“reasonable steps to prevent content”

from a “designated person” being experienced by someone in the UK. That is, in essence, what it is about. How does the Minister envisage that a social media provider might, technically, take reasonable steps to ascertain who the people providing content on its service are?

I wonder whether, as can sometimes happen, what is a well-intended type of thing could, in fact, create unintended consequences. For example, would a social media provider, given that it would find it very hard to pinpoint who, specifically, is doing what, just decide to say, “No content from Russia of any kind”? In order to be safe and not be fined by Ofcom, it might just choose not to accept any content or participation from an entire nation.

Might the Minister say a little about how that would operate technically, and whether we are going to be inadvertently requiring KYC—know your customer—or exclusion of data on a wholesale basis in order for a provider to try to comply with these regulations?

A point of order was on my lips already!

This may be a more technical question, and I am happy for the Minister to come back to me on it, but during the response to the covid-19 pandemic, there was a concerted effort around the world, and indeed in this country, to deal with anti-vaxxer information and so on across a range of platforms. Can he give us some assurances that in his or DCMS’s conversations with the social media companies, they are discussing how people can report Russian disinformation if it is not, for example, branded as RT but is clearly spreading lies, and ensure that authorities know about it so that action can be taken? That is where a lot of the stuff comes through quite insidiously.