PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting) - 15 September 2026 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

Q I have two questions, if I may. Dr Prescott, if the test of the Bill is whether it results in fewer arrivals or more removals, what do you think is missing from it? Secondly, Ms Lyons, the Government say that last-minute modern slavery claims have frustrated removals. Do you accept that that is an abuse of the system? If you do not support the Government’s solution to that issue, what do you think the solution is?

Dr Prescott: Obviously, reducing the number of irregular arrivals would be welcome for all concerned, but I gather that this particular session is looking specifically at the modern slavery components. We have to remember that only a relatively small proportion of small boat arrival modern slavery claimants are actually victims of modern slavery. A lot of victims of modern slavery do come here—sometimes legally, sometimes under false pretences. I am not necessarily sure that tying a reduction in small boat arrivals to modern slavery is necessarily a positive thing; I think you are slightly confusing two different issues.

Eleanor Lyons: I think there are already safeguards in place to stop any misuse of the system. There is a high evidential threshold to be recognised and acknowledged as a victim of modern slavery. There are the reasonable ground and conclusive ground stages, and you cannot self-refer to be a victim—you have to be spotted by a designated first responder organisation. Multiple Select Committees over the years have found no evidence of a widespread misuse of the system. The latest Home Office data that has been provided is only for those on high-risk deportation flights, who represent less than 2% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery identified in this country last year. I do not think you need new legislative solutions to deal with any of those challenges; the Home Office already has the powers it needs if it wants to challenge them and tackle them.

I remind the Committee that the largest group of victims in this country are UK nationals. All the changes in the Bill relating to questioning victims’ credibility if they take a long time to come forward, have inconsistencies in their account due to trauma, or have similar exploitative experiences to others—which they normally do, because organised crime groups exploit people in similar ways—mean they will also have their credibility questioned as UK nationals. For me, that undoes years of work by safeguarding professionals in understanding how victims feel scared to come forward and talk about their exploitation.

Q To get the result that we want—tackling that abuse—what else should the Home Office be doing in that space? If this is not a solution, what would you put forward as an alternative, if that abuse does exist?

Eleanor Lyons: If you took the premise that there is an issue with the system, I would focus on better training and support for first responder organisations so that they are good at doing referrals in the first place. There is a real mix in terms of how qualified and competent first responder organisations, such as local authorities, police forces and charities, are. I would also look at a higher quality of decision making from the Government. At the moment, about three quarters of negative decisions that are challenged are then accepted as having been the wrong initial decision by the Government, and are overturned. If there were more opportunities for people to be identified, better-quality decisions and a more trauma-informed approach, we would identify victims earlier in the process and there would be fewer challenges on that part. All this legislation will do is to make it very hard for us to identify or support victims who need help.

Q Thank you all for coming to give evidence to us. More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made. Can you give us some indication of why you think that is and, building on your previous answer, what would help to challenge that?

Eleanor Lyons: Thank you, Minister, for your engagement so far on the Bill. It is very much appreciated. Building on what I was saying, we really need a system that allows for early identification and support of victims of exploitation. That includes all victims of exploitation, UK nationals and non-UK nationals. When I first came into my role three years ago, the big conversation was about what mandatory training would look like for first responder organisations, so that they would know how to spot a potential victim of modern slavery. Many victims themselves do not even recognise that they are being exploited. To introduce early support into the system would make a huge change on that side of things.

I am concerned about the Home Office data on already high-risk flights. Less than 2% of the total number in the national referral mechanism are on those flights. The Home Office has five days to make a “reasonable grounds” decision. It only protects a victim of modern slavery for five days if they are referred into the national referral mechanism. If the Government decide that, actually, they do not think that there are grounds for those people being a victim of modern slavery, after that point they do not get any extra enhancements for indefinite leave to remain, so I do not think that that provides extra protection for victims. All we try to do in that period is to provide them with the support and care they need in their recovery period, if they need it.

Q Would you reject the view that the referral system is exploited?

Eleanor Lyons: I would say that, from the evidence that we have seen—this has been looked at across the years by different Select Committees and academics—there is no evidence of widespread misuse of the system. Of the flights that did not go ahead in 2025 after 3 pm, that is less than 1% of the number of potential victims of modern slavery whom we identified in the UK last year. As I mentioned, if you make these sweeping changes in the legislation, you will also have a negative impact on all victims of modern slavery, in particular cases where we have taken too long to identify them. For example, the survivors of al-Fayed have reached out to me, and they have serious concerns, because we failed them; we did not identify them when we should have done. The Bill would have a negative impact on them, too.

Q If I understand this correctly, the central point that you are making, Eleanor Lyons and Will Prescott, is that the issues that the Bill seeks to address are with not, in your view, so much the law as it stands, but the administration of that law—training, interpretation and the exercise of functions by all sorts of officials. If there are any issues, that is where they lie, rather than the substance of the law as it stands. Is that a fair summary of what you are saying?

Dr Prescott: We have talked about this in our report. You have to be very careful about the sequence in which you do this. At the moment, there are all sorts of gaps in identifying modern slavery victims. A lot of people in first responder organisations—as Eleanor mentioned, you cannot refer yourself into the NRM—are not aware of their responsibilities. There is no dedicated modern slavery lead and, because there is no dedicated lead, everyone is responsible, which in practice means that no one is responsible.

A lot of victims also do not necessarily realise that they are a victim of modern slavery. They obviously do not understand what their rights are. In particular, if they are in an unfamiliar environment and speaking to unfamiliar officials, they will not necessarily be comfortable discussing certain practices that have happened to them. If you are going to tighten the criteria, you really need to fix the gaps in the existing system first, before you look to a much tougher approach.

Q Does the Bill address the gaps you have just identified?

Dr Prescott: It does not really. There are some bits of the Bill that are quite welcome, such as requiring firms to outline the steps they need to take to reduce modern slavery in their supply chains. That is helpful to an extent, but it does not really address the issue of the lack of dedicated first responders in organisations, for example, and it does not deal with fixing the identification problem within the system that we were quite concerned about. I do not think it is quite there yet.

Eleanor Lyons: I do not think the Bill addresses the fundamental issues, because I do not think you need legislation for that. There is a challenge at the moment with the process, because we do not have that training consistently across first responder organisations. I do not think we have the substantial evidence we need to underpin a lot of the changes that the Bill is proposing. It undercuts a lot of work that has been done over the years to recognise that victims of all crime groups and of exploitation take a long time to feel comfortable speaking, and they may be scared to come forward. We are creating exceptional rules for victims of modern slavery that I think are fundamentally unfair.

I would say that the issue with tackling modern slavery in this country is that we do not have dedicated funding for police teams any more, and we have a modern slavery strategy that is over 10 years out of date. If we really want to tackle the issue, we need to look at those big picture things. The Bill is making it harder for victims to come forward, and it does not address the problem of the perpetrators of the crime. Actually, a lot of those things were introduced under previous bits of legislation, and there is already a struggle to enact them at the moment.

Q Good morning, everyone. I have a direct question for Vicky, following on from the previous question. In your submission, you welcomed the Government’s objective of creating a fairer and more efficient asylum system, but you raised concerns about several specific provisions in the Bill. Can you explain to us which aspects of the Bill present the greatest risk to refugee protection?

Vicky Tennant: Thank you very much, and thanks for referring to the observations we shared with the Home Secretary a few weeks ago. What we essentially said is that we are very supportive of the overall objective to improve the asylum system by making it fairer, more efficient and more sustainable, and we think there are elements of the Bill that move in that direction. The spirit of our observations was very much along the lines of highlighting where we felt it could be strengthened to better achieve those objectives.

Of course, as the UN refugee agency we are very focused on what the Bill means for protections and solutions for asylum seekers and refugees. We also very much recognise the importance of public confidence in a well-functioning system—and that means not just a fair and efficient process for refugees, but the ability to return people who are found not to be in need of international protection. It means safe, regular routes for people, so that they are not forced into these dangerous journeys that we are all so conscious of. It is also about facilitating co-operation with international partners to address the challenges. We are very much coming from the perspective of recognising the challenges, and we want to work with the Government to address those. We have approached our engagement with the Bill very much with that in mind.

The observations speak to a number of areas, three of which I would highlight in particular. First, there are the very extensive provisions that deal with the appeals system and the establishment of the new appeals body. From our perspective that is not, in itself, inherently problematic, but what is essential that the body will only be able to achieve the objectives of helping contribute to that fairer and more sustainable asylum system if it has the relevant expertise firmly embedded in both the profile of the adjudicators and the role that legal expertise will play in the adjudication process.

It is clearly important that the body both is, and is seen to be, independent of the initial decision-making process, and is transparent in terms of being open to public scrutiny, including on the quality of the adjudication process. Then there are the procedural safeguards, such as access to legal advice and support, and the possibility for those with protection claims to have an oral hearing. Those are all key safeguards, and they are really essential. What you want is accurate, high-quality decisions so that appellants are not then in a position of lodging more appeals to the first-tier tribunal. We are very happy, by the way, that the possibility of further recourse to the first-tier tribunal is there, but we do not want to see it overused either; we want to see high-quality decisions at the appeal stage and, even better, at the first instance stage. That whole area of appeals is one where we feel that more information and more elements could be provided to facilitate the consideration of the Bill.

The second area—I am going to mention three—is the provision that would allow recovery of the asylum support provided to asylum seekers while their claims are looked into. First, I would highlight that asylum seekers do not have the right to work, so in many cases they are forced to rely on that support. Secondly, they have no control over the length of the process, so they have no control over how long it will take to get a decision. A high proportion of asylum seekers are subsequently recognised as refugees, and essentially saddling them with the prospect of an obligation to repay what could be a really very large sum of money is not going to help to facilitate the integration process at the moment when they should be getting back on their feet. That is not in the interests of refugees, and it is also not in the interests of communities. We also believe that there is an issue of compatibility with the refugee convention. It is quite a technical issue, and we have set it out in detail in the observations. I can say more about that if you would like, but that is an area where we would urge another look.

The third area is in relation to article 8 of the European convention on human rights. In the observations, we have not gone into detail on all the aspects of the changes to article 8—the interpretation of article 8 that is embedded in the Bill. We would just highlight how it could potentially impact refugee family reunion. We should bear in mind that, because of their displacement, refugees have often been separated from families in very chaotic and difficult circumstances. One element of the Bill speaks to the presumption that one would normally have expected cohabitation with the family member being sponsored, but that is difficult in the refugee context—it is a difficult threshold to make. Particularly in view of the suspension of refugee family reunion—that bespoke route—we feel that that could have quite a harmful impact.

Those are the three areas. Clearly, the legislation is only one part of the overall answer, so it also has to be looked at in the context of the wider policy reforms that are being pursued. As UNHCR, we have been very pleased with the level of engagement we have had with the Home Office as these reforms are seen through.

Q I have some further questions to Vicky. In your observations, you do say that efficiency should not be pursued at the expense of “procedural fairness” but also of

“access to protection and successful integration.”

You also warn that the Bill could

“undermine conditions that support successful integration for those ultimately recognised as refugees.”

Could you outline how you think the Bill, in practice, will harm integration?

Vicky Tennant: I would say the key area is the recovery of asylum support. We understand that what is envisaged is potentially up to £10,000 per person to be recovered. Imagine that a refugee has gone through a long and difficult set of experiences before arrival in the UK, and has then gone through the uncertainty of the asylum process, potentially for an extended period of time, where they are unable to work or to start the process of getting back on their feet. Then, just as they are getting into employment and starting to rebuild their lives, the prospect of having to repay a potentially large sum of money could impede that. That was the main element that we felt was relevant to integration.

The article 8 point and the ability to reunite with family members is also relevant. Many times when talking to asylum seekers and refugees, I have seen the anguish, the disruption and the sense of something that is unfinished. Being reunited with family and able to restart family life is an element that is fairly fundamental to integration, from the perspective of not only the refugee, but the UK public and communities. We think that giving refugees the possibility to start afresh and moving them as quickly as possible into the integration journey is important, and we know that that is also one of the Government’s stated objectives.

Q Given the concerns that you have raised, how likely is it that the Bill will restore confidence in the asylum system? If that is not likely, what else would you like to see in it that would restore confidence?

Vicky Tennant: I go back to what I said: legislation is only part of the answer. There are elements of the Bill—particularly those that focus on trying to ensure the quality, efficiency and sustainability of the appeals process—that, if made to work successfully, could contribute to building public confidence in the system. As I said, UNHCR recognises that public confidence is what underpins the refugee convention; we can all speak about the law and the refugee convention, but what is needed to deliver these things in practice is public support for welcoming refugees and for a well-functioning system.

On what would be needed in addition, there is a lot of work under way, particularly to make the first instance decision-making process quicker and to improve the quality of decision making. UNHCR has been working directly with the Home Office on that front for some time, and we have been encouraged by the progress. As I said, it is also about the ability to remove people who are found not be in need of international protection. One can do that only if there is a well-functioning system and there is confidence that it gets the decisions right.

Safe, regular routes are a big part of a well-functioning, fair system. From the public perspective, what we see consistently in the polling and the various surveys that have been done is that the British people want to welcome refugees. There is support for maintaining the UK as a place of refuge, and the more safe, regular, managed pathways there are to do that, the more it can be delivered and that confidence can be sustained.

That cannot be a replacement for access to territorial asylum, which is where it can sometimes be very challenging. As UNHCR, we recognise the challenges the Government face in addressing the crossings in the channel. Nobody wants to see a situation where people are forced into dangerous journeys and where the business is essentially controlled by smugglers and criminals. What is really essential is that you have a good, functioning system for considering asylum claims quickly and removing people who are not in need of asylum, and that also involves the management of arrivals in a sensible way.

Partnership with international partners is an absolutely critical aspect of that, including with France but also with other international partners. That is about co-operation upstream to make sure people have alternatives and do not feel they have no alternative but to move onwards, but it is also about co-operation around the management of arrivals at UK borders. The international standards, the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights provide that common baseline that enables the UK to work with international partners in trying to find solutions to these common challenges.

Q I do not wish to cut you off, but I asked the question to all three panellists. Eleanor, briefly, please.

Eleanor Lyons: Very briefly, touching on part 5 of the Bill in particular, I do not think we will restore confidence in the asylum system by weakening protections for victims of modern slavery. I welcome some parts of the Bill, including better advocacy for child victims of exploitation, devolving decision-making pilots, and work around tackling forced labour in supply chains, but that should go further than it does at the moment.

Fundamentally, the Bill makes it harder for safeguarding professionals to identify victims of exploitation in communities across the country, including child victims and UK national victims, and I do not think that that restores public confidence in the system. Unfortunately, I think it erodes confidence that we are not safeguarding cohorts who need our help and support, who do not get the right to remain even if they are confirmed to be victims of modern slavery.

Q The same question, briefly, Will. Do you also have any international experience that it might be worth us hearing about, maybe from Australia and so on?

Dr Prescott: Building on what the others have said, there are obviously bits in the Bill that are very positive. The expansion of the reporting requirements—again, you have learned a bit from the Australian experience and the Canadian experience—into public sector organisations is obviously very positive. But, to build on the earlier point, the ultimate way to improve confidence is to improve processes in the system. It is about making sure that organisations have a dedicated point of contact so that there is someone who is directly responsible for modern slavery in first responder organisations. It is about improving and standardising training so that people know what signs to look for when they are dealing with potential victims. That is the best way to stop the last-minute claims, which, though small in number—I think Eleanor said they are less than 2%—have a disproportionate psychological effect. That will also be much better for victims. A lot more attention needs to be on improving the processes, improving the training and making sure someone is actually responsible in first responder organisations.

Q We have already mentioned the European convention on human rights, and other articles are involved too. Ms Tennant and Ms Lyons, can you comment on the fact that clause 36 would place an additional burden of proof and onus on the victim to self-identify? We know that the state has a duty under the ECHR and other obligations, such as the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. What is the interplay between making it a harder barrier for people to self-identify and realise that they are a victim of modern-day slavery, and the other articles that are engaged?

Eleanor Lyons: Most of the survivors I have spoken to—I have a summit that draws together 15 lived experience advisory panels from across the UK—did not realise they were being exploited; it took them years of help and support to understand what was happening to them and to feel comfortable talking about it. That is why the premise is there that it should be the state’s responsibility to identify victims of modern slavery and offer them support in their recovery journey. That also has a very practical implication in terms of trying to stop re-trafficking and re-exploitation taking place, and to stop harm increasing.

Clause 36, on the credibility assessment, is problematic because it says to safeguarding professionals, and it puts into law, that it is okay to question victims’ credibility if time has passed before they have come forward, if there are inconsistencies in what they have said or if they are exploited in the same way as someone else. That is an issue across all victim cohorts who have gone through horrific experiences. It is completely unacceptable that we are putting that into primary legislation. That part of the Bill should absolutely be removed completely.

Vicky, do you have anything to add?

Vicky Tennant: I have nothing to add.

Q Good morning, everyone. My question is to Eleanor. I think we can all agree that prevention is better than cure. In a passing comment just now, you mentioned transparency in supply chains being added into the Bill. As it stands right now, and if no action were taken, are we in a good enough position on transparency to tackle modern slavery in our supply chains?

Eleanor Lyons: The UK imports more than £20 billion-worth of goods every year that are at risk of being produced using forced labour. That is tomatoes you see in a supermarket that say they are from Italy but that are from China, or fish from North Korea. All our G7 partners have either introduced mandatory human rights due diligence or forced labour import bans into their legislation. The requirement in the Bill will ask businesses to report on forced labour in their supply chains, not to take action to prevent the harm from happening. We are hugely behind international partners in this space and we are at risk of becoming a dumping ground for the world’s goods that have been made with forced labour.

There is an opportunity to hugely enhance the measures in clauses 44 to 49 in part 5 of the Bill to turn it more towards mandatory human rights due diligence and to ask businesses to actually take steps to prevent harm from happening in their supply chains. That is something that businesses have been calling for. I worked with FTSE 100 partners last year and submitted work to the Office for Responsible Business Conduct. Businesses want this change, because they are being asked to do these things in other jurisdictions. When it comes to their supply chains, us being hugely behind in what we are asking them to do does not work.

Q Ms Tennant, I represent Glasgow, which is one of the areas in the country with the highest need for asylum accommodation. We are a welcoming city and are proud of being so, but you can imagine that the welcome is being tested due to the infrastructure stresses that this is placing on us. You have a long and distinguished career in the United Nations and have seen when asylum housing and refugee housing works well and when it does not. Presumably, you feel that the confidence of the host community is in large part a determinant of that. In your assessment of what has been happening in Britain, particularly over the last decade, where do you think that that confidence level lies at the moment? Are you concerned that we are perhaps not in the place we should be in terms of people perceiving the rules-based order to be intact when it comes to asylum?

Vicky Tennant: I would certainly say that the issue of asylum accommodation and the way in which the reception of asylum seekers and support to asylum seekers are managed has contributed to a crisis of confidence. As I said, the objective of restoring public confidence through a fair and efficient system is one that UNHCR absolutely welcomes. A key element is the fact that asylum seekers have been accommodated for very extended periods of time waiting for decisions on their claims. Simply by virtue of that fact, the volume of support and accommodation required while people are not able to work has grown over the years. We are pleased that there is progress in that space. It is a hugely challenging issue to address.

However, alongside the work on how asylum support accommodation is provided in a way that fosters community welcome and community cohesion, the work on the system itself has to continue. That is certainly where UNHCR has brought our international experience to bear: we have really been leaning in and trying to work closely with the Home Office to see how we can have a system that is functioning more efficiently and getting decisions out more quickly, but also getting decisions right first time.

That is where we go back to the discussion around the appeals body. The most important lever that could be pulled is to improve and ensure the quality of first-instance decision making, such as by ensuring that there is a second pair of eyes on those decisions, so that we do not see cases going into the appeals system unnecessarily. At the moment, there is quite a high rate of cases being withdrawn by the Home Office from the appeals system. That should not be the case. There is also quite a high rate of first-instance decisions being overturned. Those are cases that ideally would not be in the appeals system in the first place. That work on efficient, quality decision making in the first instance is also critical, and it then plays into the issue of asylum support and the length of time that asylum seekers are hosted in the community.

Q I want to return to something you said earlier, Vicky, about the expertise needed for the adjudicators on the new panels. The Government’s memorandum on human rights relies heavily on those people being able to weigh up proportionality, particularly in relation to article 8, and that is quite a high-level legal determination in many cases. Is that one of your concerns about the expertise needed on the tribunals?

Vicky Tennant: It would certainly be really helpful to have more detail on the balance between legally qualified adjudicators and lay adjudicators, what the respective roles of the two profiles will be, and, more widely, how legal expertise and subject matter expertise will be built into the process. Other jurisdictions have a mix of legally qualified adjudicators and other adjudicators. Often, they sit together in panels, and the other adjudicators will often bring subject matter expertise for the specific requirement around knowledge of conditions in countries of origin, for example. The real issue is that it is important that legal expertise is strongly reflected in the appeals body, and more detail on that would be helpful for consideration of the Bill.

Q From your operational experience, what is the single biggest thing missing from the Bill that would help the NCA to tackle the crime gangs behind the crossings? Has the NCA specifically asked the Government for anything that does not feature in the Bill?

Helen Rance: Sorry, could you say the first part of the question again?

Q What is the biggest thing missing from the Bill in helping you to tackle the crime gangs? Did you ask the Government for any specific things that have not come to be?

Helen Rance: In answer to the second part, no—nothing specific has been omitted from the Bill. Obviously, the Bill has more direct focus on modern slavery and human trafficking—which I will call MSHT from now onwards—but in terms of the biggest thing that will help with organised immigration crime, which is a major focus of ours at the National Crime Agency, nothing specific in the Bill will fundamentally change how we investigate serious and organised criminals entering the country. What it will do is make our borders less attractive to criminals entering. That is our overarching opinion on that.

Q Is there a particular feature that you would have liked to see in the Bill to aid you in that objective?

Helen Rance: No.

Q I pass on my thanks to everyone at the NCA for their excellent work. We know how important it is for disrupting the organised, industrial crime that is taking place across borders. It is critical that we intervene and prevent dangerous crossings as early as possible. I wanted to put my thanks on the record for everything that the agency does.

You mentioned the importance of deterrence. That is critical, and it is one of the key things that we want to achieve in the Bill. Could you say a little more about how you think the measures in the Bill will help to deter people and make interventions earlier in the process of illegal immigration?

Helen Rance: In terms of deterrence, we are obviously a law enforcement agency, and we would not make specific definitive judgments on the different effects that the measures will have on deterring crossings or immigration. We very much think that deterrence is about a combination of factors, and is, ultimately, a matter for Government policy. However, we believe that the measures contribute to a system that is seen as firm, fair and less susceptible to exploitation by organised crime groups. It is likely that that will help the overall deterrent effect. The changes to appeals, protection status, asylum arrangements and the removal process might contribute to making the UK a less attractive target for the criminal networks that facilitate illegal immigration.

Q I sit on the Home Affairs Committee and have spoken to your colleagues about smashing the gangs. The NCA has been trying to smash the drug gangs for half a century. Is there anything missing from the Bill that would help you to smash the gangs? What is your view on how far the NCA has progressed in smashing the gangs?

Helen Rance: If “smashing the gangs” means reducing small boat crossings, crossings are down this year compared with last year, and the number—

Q Do you think that is because the gangs have been smashed? Do you think that is why the reduction has happened?

Helen Rance: There is a combination of factors. The law enforcement approach to reducing small boat equipment, to working closely with international partners and to using our international intelligence reach has certainly contributed to that. We would not claim that the work is complete or that we have fixed this, but our efforts have certainly contributed to the reduction in crossings.

Q You are right to say that boat crossings are down 43% this year. Do you feel that the NCA has the resources it needs to continue that trend and go further by implementing the proposals in the Bill?

Helen Rance: Yes. We have very much moved our operational capacity towards immigration crime. Of course, like all agencies, we have a finite budget, but we are focusing it on the disruption of the highest-harm organised immigration crime, individuals and networks. I do not think we would ever say that we have enough money, because more money could always be spent on increased intelligence capability and unique capabilities that we utilise, but we have certainly done a major pivot over the last 18 months towards organised immigration crime, and we have had some excellent results with that pivot.

Q In answer to Matt Vickers’s question, you said that, as a result of the Bill, exploiting our borders will be less attractive for organised criminals. What specific measures in the Bill does your organisation think contributes to that assessment?

Helen Rance: The strongest deterrence effect will come from sustained law enforcement activity. If we can continue to disrupt facilitators, seize boats and engines, and target criminal finances, it will have an effect on the operation of organised immigration individuals and networks. The Bill makes it harder and less attractive for those networks to operate within the United Kingdom.

Q You can do all the things you have described without the Bill, so what in the Bill will make it easier for your organisation to “smash the gangs”?

Helen Rance: Smashing the gangs, to coin a phrase, really comes with a lot of different measures and policies. Target hardening and making the UK less attractive is just one of those measures. I do not think there is anything specific in the Bill, other than making the UK a tougher environment for criminals to operate in and less appealing for them to exploit.

Q On the way in which many refugees seek to reach this country to make asylum claims, what analysis has your agency done of the factors that led to a market for organised immigration crime? When did that increase in demand occur?

Helen Rance: I am not sure that law enforcement is necessarily the right agency to approach for that answer, because we do not deal with the asylum claims.

Q You look at the origins of the crimes, though, and the market that the criminals are exploiting.

Helen Rance: Sorry, I do not completely understand the question; could you phrase that again?

Q The criminals are exploiting a market by acting in a criminal fashion. That market is potential asylum seekers—many of whom, as we heard from the previous panel, have a legitimate claim to be here. Do you know when and why demand occurred for that kind of journey, which the criminals exploit?

Helen Rance: No; I do not have the figures on when that increased.

Q You have come here to comment on legislation that is intended to reduce demand, so I thought that might be a legitimate question to ask.

Helen Rance: When demand rose?

indicated assent.

Helen Rance: No, I do not have those figures.

Q The Bill claims that it will have a deterrent effect on people coming to the UK illegally, but no matter how robust it might be, can it really have a deterrent effect when it seems so easy to set people off in boats from the north of France?

Helen Rance: Its deterrent effect would be the toughening up of the environment. The specifics of this Bill and the launching of boats from France are not specifically linked. This is the deterrent effect of making the UK less attractive in general. From this Bill alone, I cannot comment on the launching of boats.

Q Do you see it having any effect on where migrants might enter the UK and be received and intercepted by law enforcement? I ask because we see boat crossings now stretching as far down as Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. From your position, does anything in the Bill address the expanded geography of where organisations such as yours have to operate?

Helen Rance: There is nothing in this Bill that addresses the geography of where crossings leave from or arrive to.

Q I want to follow up on line of questioning of my colleague Siân Berry. When previous Governments removed safe routes from overseas, did the NCA see an impact on illegal activity by those exploiting vulnerable people? Do you feel confident that the Bill will reverse that?

Helen Rance: I understand the question, but I do not have the statistical figures over the last—

Q I am not asking for a set of statistics; I am asking whether the NCA saw an increase in trafficking and criminal activity as a result of changes to the routes that asylum seekers, refugees and others could undertake.

Helen Rance: Our work is on serious and organised immigration crime networks. I cannot be led to saying that they have increased due to specific measures, because a whole raft of factors make that happen. I am just not in a position to answer that.

Q The Bill seeks to dramatically increase the reporting by companies and individuals. At the National Crime Agency, you work with a plethora of different organisations across the United Kingdom. Do you believe that that increase in reporting will help you to find the illegal routes that are being used in the United Kingdom?

Helen Rance: Any increase in intelligence will certainly help the intelligence picture. It will allow us to identify vulnerable victims and help with the intelligence on organised crime networks.

Q Has the NCA ever received any evidence or intelligence? Has information been gathered from these gangs about their seeking to exploit the Government’s having previously changed the system and removed those overseas routes?

Helen Rance: I am sorry, but I just do not have that sort of information. You can rephrase the question again, but I am not clear that that is a matter for the NCA.

Q I will be brief. We have discussed the gangs a lot and the NCA is obviously investigating. Is the NCA investigating a lot of the criminal activity around the gangs and immigration in the United Kingdom itself—not just gangs over in Europe and elsewhere? Also, are there indications that funding for that activity has come through cryptocurrency?

Helen Rance: Yes, we would investigate the gangs facilitating illegal immigration within the United Kingdom as well as those outside. Cryptocurrency is one of many methods of funding, which is why we are doing a specific amount of work on the criminal finances used. I am not going to comment specifically on how much is cryptocurrency, but there are many methods, of which cryptocurrency is one.

Q Could the Bill do more to legislate around cryptocurrency or should that be dealt with elsewhere?

Helen Rance: I think that should be dealt with elsewhere.

Q To clarify, you say that the criminal investigation of the gangs is not in scope of the Bill. You have been asked to come today to testify about the potential of the Bill to reduce demand, so I think it is completely legitimate for us to ask you about your agency’s analysis of the roots of that demand. The question of the lack of safe routes to claim asylum is very pertinent; I would expect you to have a view on that, at least when it comes to the timeline of what you have noticed in response to previous Government changes.

Helen Rance: That is not something that I was specifically anticipating answering questions about on this specific Bill around modern slavery and human trafficking.

Q Could you come back to us on that? I am sure that there is analysis within the agency on that score.

Helen Rance: Yes, I can come back with some written evidence on that.

Thank you.

Q Is there any risk that the article 8 provisions in the Bill could move litigation on to different questions, rather than increasing the Government’s ability to remove those with no right to be here? If Parliament wanted to go further in restricting the circumstances in which article 8 can prevent removals, what could it do beyond what is proposed in the Bill?

Professor Ekins: Litigation will certainly arise in consequence of these new provisions, if they are enacted; they will not end the controversy in this space. The litigation may turn on different questions, such as whether something counts as “normally”. There is a great deal of uncertainty about how the changes made by the relevant provision, clause 18, will be received by the courts.

In a sense, the legislation leaves untouched the fundamental structure of article 8 in this context, which is individuated proportionality assessment. It tries to clarify, or maybe streamline, some aspects of the way in which article 8 is understood and applied—those changes are to be welcomed, so far as they go—but it is unclear whether, and to what extent, that will restrain the courts in applying article 8.

The legislation takes for granted continuing individuated assessment. The legislation does not purport to be an exclusive code for article 8, does not displace article 8 under the Human Rights Act, and does not direct the courts to focus only on the terms of this legislation and close their eyes to the Strasbourg case law. The way in which article 8 will be understood and applied will be informed to some extent by this new legislation, but there will be arguments about precisely what it means and whether there are conditionals in the legislation at play.

It will always be open to unlawful migrants and asylum seekers who are making arguments by reference to article 8 to invite the court to go back to the Strasbourg Court’s case law and to take this legislation as, in a sense, advisory. I know that that may sound somewhat strange, but that is effectively the structure we have. Parliament is not clearly telling the courts, “Focus only on this legislation, and close your eyes to the other body of case law.” It could attempt to do so: it could go further, by disapplying article 8 under the Human Rights Act and making this an exclusive code for the relevance of family life. That would require some recasting.

To my mind, the more fundamental problem is that we are maintaining individuated proportionality assessment as the test for the lawfulness of removal. That will inevitably be somewhat—“ad hoc” is perhaps the wrong term, but it will be particular and unpredictable. A great deal will turn on the persons who are making the adjudicative decisions. The Bill obviously has something to say about that, but how it will play out is quite unpredictable.

That is a complicated answer to your question. There will certainly be litigation, and it would be a mistake to think that this new legislation will authoritatively determine how article 8 will be understood. It will make some difference, but much turns on how it is received, which you simply cannot tell from where you sit now.

Dr Casey: I agree. There are two different ways, broadly speaking, that this Bill could be received by courts and tribunals. One way—which, so far as the Home Secretary is concerned, would be the positive scenario—is that the tribunal takes very seriously the clear intent behind the Bill, which is to tighten and narrow the circumstances in which article 8 can be invoked and successfully relied on to resist a removal or deportation.

However, as my colleague Richard pointed out, a lot of the wording in the Bill gives leeway for more flexible or generous interpretations for applicants. For example, the Bill says that article 8 applies “normally” only to a nuclear family—partners residing together, or a parent and a child residing together. That “normally” suggests that judges might take a broader understanding of other types of family arrangements. With the standards throughout the Bill—unreasonable impact, “adverse” impact or “unduly harsh”—there is, again, scope to give these a much more generous interpretation, such that, for some judges, it might be hard not to find an instance where deportation could not be considered harsh or as having an adverse impact on a child, because it separates a family unit.

I can imagine some judges—not all, but some—reading these standards in a generous way that would capture a large sweep of cases and defeat removals and deportations. There is a scenario where the reception of the Bill is such that judges retain quite a lot of discretion to come up with their own understanding of the right balance between the public interest and individuals’ family life and, plausibly within the text of the Bill, to reach conclusions that are in tension with the clear policy intent behind the Bill.

I think that that is an unavoidable situation if one accepts the strictures imposed by the ECHR and its jurisprudence because a sine qua non of article 8 law, as articulated by the Court, is that the tribunal must reach its own assessment—it must reach its own assessment of proportionality. At best, Parliament may give indications of where it wants weighting to go but, to stay within the strictures of the ECHR, the courts must have the final say.

Also, in response to the question about whether, if article 8 claims are less attractive, other claims might be made under the ECHR: absolutely. I imagine that article 3 claims will probably increase. The difference between article 3 and article 8, as the Committee will know, is that article 3 is categorical—there is no qualification if the threshold is met. The threshold sometimes includes things like whether removal will lead to substandard medical care, compared with the NHS; that is ill treatment. We could see a spike in such invocations, and the Bill does not touch article 3 claims whatever.

Professor Ekins: I should add that this legislation, as the Committee knows, builds on the Immigration Act 2014, which also attempted to tighten the understanding and application of article 8; that is largely viewed as having been much less effective than Parliament intended in 2014. This legislation will go further and that is to be welcomed, but the earlier Act should be a cautionary tale about the risks of failure.

Q Thank you very much; I appreciate your responses. May I step back from just the article 8 measures and talk about the Bill in the round? What is your view on whether it strikes the right balance when it comes to honouring our obligations to refugees under the conventions? Are we balancing that with taking stronger action to deal with the challenges that we face internationally on illegal immigration? Is the Bill striking the right balance, or can we go further?

Professor Ekins: In my view, the legislation does not strike the right balance, because it fails—as have successive Bills, I think—to take sufficiently robust measures in relation to the problem of illegal migration and people smuggling; I am thinking of the small boats crisis in particular. That is somewhat distinct from the broader problem of unlawful migration, which is clearly a problem—people overstaying, foreign criminals and so on—but the small boats crisis has particular features that warrant a particular response.

To my mind, unfortunately, although the legislation tinkers with aspects of how the refugee convention should be understood in our law—perhaps we will come to that later—it seems, silently at least, to take for granted that persons who have contracted with people smugglers and made it across the channel are entitled to asylum and to remain in the UK. I think that that is a misunderstanding of the terms of the refugee convention, which do entitle us to expel persons from the UK, even when they are genuine refugees under the meaning of the refugee convention. That is a protection that all member states enjoy. It entitles us to expel them to other states, because they have entered in violation of our migration law. It would be different had they entered directly from a state where their lives were in danger, but no one coming from France is in that position. That makes that a structurally different position to other contexts, when people flee danger.

The legislation simply does not address that feature of the problem. The measures it takes—which, as I say, I welcome as far as they go—simply tinker with the edges and do not address the central problem. Genuine refugees will cross the channel but, so long as contracting with people smugglers is a viable route to enter and thus to settle in the UK, that will persist. It is a logical and rational expenditure of funds, and it is a flourishing business so long as you do not care about the lives of people crossing a dangerous water.

There is a failure to recognise the protections that we have as a country under the refugee convention. We may take action that would not place persons in danger—they can be removed to safe third states. As far as I can see, the Bill is focused on increasing administrative adjudicative capacity to process appeal claims more speedily. That is admirable, but it leaves untouched the central structural problem, which I and others writing for Policy Exchange have tried to draw attention to over the years.

Dr Casey: I agree. I do not see anything in the Bill that would deter unlawful channel crossings. But, as has been mentioned, , depending on how the Bill is received in the courts, it might deter overstaying on visas and the breaching of conditions of your permission to reside. That could be valuable, as those are significant numbers, but I do not see anything that would deter unlawful channel crossings in any way.

You could go further in the Bill and, for example, take advantage of provisions in the refugee convention that allow states to return those convicted of serious criminal offences or of threats to national security to their home countries, even if there was a risk of ill treatment. The refugee convention allows that, but it would not be possible within the confines of the ECHR. Article 3 puts a categorical prohibition on those kinds of returns even if the person being returned poses an enormous threat to the United Kingdom itself. So even if you did take full advantage of everything that the refugee convention permitted you to do to protect your own immigration system, the ECHR would pose even more stringent restrictions in many respects.

Professor Ekins: I agree with everything that Dr Casey has said, but I would add that that is article 3 as—in my view—misinterpreted by the Strasbourg Court. Article 3 does provide a categorical prohibition on torture and subjecting people to inhumane treatment; as I say, that has been misinterpreted in recent decades to establish a much more far-reaching bar on taking action that exposes someone to a risk of such action from third parties.

In 2021, we published a paper that addressed in close detail the misinterpretation of the ECHR and its far-reaching impact for immigration and asylum law. That Policy Exchange paper is backed by Lord Hoffmann, former judge of the House of Lords. It makes clear the problem in the Strasbourg Court’s reading of article 3—as well as its reading of article 8, I should add.

Q I would like to turn to the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority. I was in Denmark last week—hardly a slouch when it comes to asylum claims. People there were astounded that we were moving from a judicial to an administrative process for judging these matters. What is your view on the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority?

Dr Casey: I think that if you want to help bring down the quite large backlog in the tribunal system, you will need more first-instance appellate decision makers. Numbers are hard to come by, but I think there are 90 salaried judges in the first tier tribunal and then an indeterminate number of part-time judges. I think the full number might not be more than 200 or 250—so not a lot when it comes to processing tens of thousands of appeals.

If you were to expand the pool of decision makers by requiring less onerous legal qualifications, it would stand to reason that you could recruit more people to process the backlog. That is the positive picture that I imagine the Home Secretary would articulate, and there is a lot to be said for it. But as I see it the risk is that on the current design you just risk moving the backlog. If you have a large pool of people without legal training applying a complicated body of law—extraordinarily complicated: ECHR law, UK domestic law, immigration rules, statutes—they will be more likely to make mistakes and errors of law. Then there would be a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, where there will still be judges. They may then grant more leave to appeal. So you might just relocate the backlog from the first-instance appeal level up to the upper tribunal. That is the risk.

I am loath to say things on the hoof about complicated points of designing institutions, but it might not be a choice between having no legal qualifications and being fit for judicial office with over 12 years’ experience. You could simply require some level of legal qualification, and that would still keep the pool of possible decision makers much broader than it is with the first-tier tribunal. Those are just some initial thoughts on that part of the Bill.

Professor Ekins: For my part, I think it is too strong to say this is a move from a judicial process to an administrative process. It is certainly a change and, if enacted and put in practice, it moves us closer to a model of departmental adjudication. However, that is still not departmental adjudication, as the relevant adjudicators will be at some distance from the Home Secretary, and they will be adjudicating claims appeals and so on.

I think there could be some advantages in the proposed change, namely trying to integrate the process of reviewing particular cases more closely to the immigration and asylum system, and making the public interest in the enforcement of migration law a more pressing consideration. However, there certainly are considerable risks—not least of which, as my colleague has pointed out, is the sheer complexity of this body of law.

To my mind, part of the problem with the body of law is the fact that sometimes, in some critical respects, its application turns on the relevant adjudicator’s individuated assessment of the relevant harshness, proportionality, fairness or otherwise of removing this person who is in violation of migration law. That makes things unpredictable, and it makes the disposition of the relevant adjudicators awfully important, which I think will result in more litigation and appeals.

Changing the persons who are doing that kind of individuated assessment might well result in a different set of outcomes. I do not know who will be recruited for this, but it is conceivable, for example, that former police officers would constitute persons for appointment. They might well—I do not know—take a different view on the fairness or otherwise of removing some persons whose claims come before them from the view taken by the existing cadre of first-tier tribunal judges. However, the same body of law is being applied, and it is complex—that is certainly true—so I think one can expect a lot of appeals.

In addition to that—this a crucial point for the Committee to bear in mind—I think there could be considerable collateral litigation to challenge decisions of the new adjudicative body, and those challenges might be at a high level. If the Bill proceeds into law, when the Home Secretary comes to promulgating secondary legislation and making critical decisions about the structure and operation of the adjudicative body, many of those decisions will be challenged by judicial review. When the adjudicative body is under way, particular decisions will be challenged by way of judicial review, as well as by appeal to the upper tribunal.

Clause 1(8) looks like an attempt to limit the judicial involvement in decisions of the adjudicative body to appeals to the upper tribunal only. If that is the intention, with respect, I think it is going to fail. That is not an effective ouster clause. You can certainly expect—and I do—much litigation and ordinary judicial review proceedings challenging particular decisions of the adjudicative body. Although more adjudicative capacity is certainly welcome, and you need that if you are going to deal with the existing and growing backlog, you have to reckon with the risk that it is not quite as straightforward as is hoped.

Q Are there examples of other jurisdictions that have tried this? I am thinking of Australia.

Professor Ekins: I cannot answer that question offhand, I am afraid. It is certainly the case that different common law and civil law countries take different views, especially those outside the ECHR, of the relevant role of the Department in deciding cases, and the role of courts in reviewing claims about the nature of decision making.

Certainly, if you go back not that long ago in our history, you would have had the Home Office making decisions about the application of the relevant migration law. Those decisions would have been subject to judicial supervision, but that would have been supervision with the court thinking, “Has something gone fundamentally wrong here? Is this a misconstrual of the legislation or a perverse decision, which sometimes happens?” What we have now, and have had, effectively, since a pivotal judgment in 2007, is the relevant judicial body thinking that it is its job to decide on the proportionality, fairness or justice of removal, not the Home Secretary’s. The Home Secretary takes her view, but the judge and the court take their view, and it is the court’s view that prevails. That is a different model, and it does not have to be that way.

Q Given the explosion in the number of people claiming asylum since 2021, it is fair to say that it is a widely held public view that a huge number of those are not genuine. This Bill aims to make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for protection. Does it, in your view? Which provisions specifically do you think make it less attractive to people who do not qualify for asylum?

Professor Ekins: I am not sure whether the Bill really does make it less attractive for people who fail to qualify. As I have said already, it rightly makes it more difficult for some unlawful migrants, who claimed asylum but whose claim has failed, to stay in the UK by relying on their claimed family connection. There are other grounds on which they may resist removal. The Bill expressly preserves the capacity for foreign criminals to resist deportation on family grounds, for example. The Bill, if enacted and well received, will make it marginally—I do not mean that dismissively—easier to remove some of those people. Major obstacles will remain, though.

The provisions you have in mind are perhaps those that concern the recovery of contributions for asylum support. I apologise if I have misread this, but I thought that that would hold regardless of whether one was a genuine refugee. The point is that the Home Secretary would have a power to recover funds from people who have received asylum support. There are limitations there, clearly: they have to have funds to make a contribution, and they cannot be left destitute as a consequence.

That may have a modest deterrent effect, but that will hold for failed asylum seekers, including fraudulent asylum seekers—not every failed asylum seeker is fraudulent, of course—and genuine refugees too. But then it is the policy of the Government, rightly so, to deter genuine refugees from attempting to enter the country , certainly by contracting with people smugglers and entering unlawfully across the channel. That provision goes to your question, but I am not sure that it will have much difference in practice. Personally, I do not think that it is objectionable in principle that, if people have funds to make a contribution to the public funds that they have received, they should make it, but I doubt that many people will be in a position to deliver.

There is the other aspect though, which we have touched on: the changes that clause 22 will make in relation to the understanding of article 33 of the convention. Those provisions concern people who are genuine refugees; it just means that those genuine refugees can none the less be expelled, even to a country where their persecutors are waiting, if they are a danger to the community or a threat to national security. With respect, I find that provision quite oddly drafted; I am not sure why it is framed in the way that it is. It seems back to front, in a sense. At least the Government, and Parliament if it supports the Bill, will be addressing that provision. It is an important protection that we will not really be able to rely on, because any attempt to remove a person who is a threat to national security or a danger to the community will be predictably blocked by the ordinary operation of human rights law, which the Bill otherwise does not tame.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins. I do not see the logical connection between the part 2 changes to the application of article 8 and deterring unlawful crossings. As I mentioned, I could see it having a modest to moderate impact, if interpreted according to the spirit of the Bill, on deterring things like overstaying on a visa or breaching a condition of your permission. One of the features of the Bill is that tribunals are directed that a family life formed when your immigration status is precarious or when you are unlawfully present should have little or no weight, respectively. If the courts took that very seriously and that became common knowledge, that might make you think, “Okay, it will be harder to leverage article 8 to stay.” That could have a deterrent effect, but not on unlawful crossings.

Q Can we briefly return to clause 1(8), which I think you described, Professor Ekins, as a poor attempt at an ouster provision. Would you be able to describe why you think that? If it was better drafted, what would the constitutional and practical benefits be from that clause?

Professor Ekins: We have a long tradition in our country, and in the common law world more broadly, of interpreting ouster clauses—clauses in legislation that would limit the jurisdiction of the court on judicial review—narrowly. The courts take for granted that Parliament is probably not going be excluding their supervisory capacity; if a provision is going to genuinely exclude that capacity, the courts expect it to be spelled out categorically, in black and white. There is a long history of their looking at a clause that you might have thought, especially if you had not really been attending to these clauses and their tradition and reception, did say that, and interpreting it to have a much more limited effect or no effect at all in practice, whereas the point was perhaps to exclude review.

Looking at that clause and knowing what I do about the history of the reception of those clauses, I just do not think it will be understood to mean, “There can be no judicial review of a decision of the adjudicative body that, for example, is procedurally unfair, or that is so unreasonable that no adjudicative body would have reached it.” Now what it might do, and I think this is how it would be read, would be, “No judicial review challenges to that adjudicative decision on grounds of error of law, because, if you think there is an error of law, you appeal to the upper tribunal.” Fine: it would have some limited effect there. But if the point was to categorically exclude judicial review of adjudicative decisions of this body—and I do not know whether that was the policy of the Government or quite what the drafters had in mind—it certainly will not achieve that. I say “certainly”, I think it is probably the case, but I think it is very unlikely.

If you drafted a different ouster clause, then one might have more hope that it would be effective; in a sense, you could specify and categorically exclude the particular grounds of judicial review that you as Parliament do not want this decision of the body to be subject to. Then, in a sense, you are taking full responsibility for what judicial review should look like in relation to this body after the legislation comes into effect.

Parliament has in recent years enacted some more thoroughgoing and careful, if you like, precise, ouster clauses along those lines. These are sometimes called partial ouster clauses, because they do not categorically exclude judicial review, but they very severely limit it. There is one such ouster clause in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which protects some decisions of the upper tribunal from judicial review. That model could be applied here.

I should add there are some drawbacks to so doing, because this new adjudicative body, as our previous discussion may suggest and I think the structure of the Bill shows, is not a court. It will be an adjudicative body with some independence, but it will not be like the upper tribunal, which, frankly, is just like the High Court in a different mode. The constitutional case against doing it is certainly stronger than was the case with the upper tribunal; but, if Parliament takes the view that there should be no judicial review here or it should be only on these specified grounds, then there are other models available for drafting an ouster clause. If I were in your shoes, I would not rest content with clause 1(8) as it stands.

Q That is very helpful, thank you. Do you want to add anything, Dr Casey?

Dr Casey: Yes, I agree. I will just say that I think that, because the Independent Immigration Appeal Authority will not be a judicial body, the courts might be more anxious in scrutinising whether a clause ousts judicial review. At the moment, the way it is drafted, as a public lawyer you read a clause trying to oust and you think how a court would read it. I can imagine a court looking at that at the minute and inserting brackets and making it “A (rational and reasonable) decision of the IIAA”, and interpreting it in that respect.

Q I am keen to come back to some of your comments on article 8. What is your analysis of how it has, slowly over time, come to protect those it was never originally intended to cover, and how can we safeguard against that in the future? Picking up on your point about the potential knock-on effect to article 3, Dr Casey, what mechanisms can we use to prevent article 3 being abused, essentially, on the back of our changes to article 8?

Professor Ekins: On the article 8 point, my own view, which is substantiated in quite some detail in the 2021 Policy Exchange paper with the support of Lord Hoffman that I referred to is that, for a long time in the history of the ECHR, article 8 had nothing to do with immigration and asylum. It was not a provision that was understood to impose limits on the enforcement of migration law or on the deportation and removal of non-citizens, especially foreign criminals and so on. There was no connection there.

A connection has been established in the case law by reading article 8 very expansively and then effectively requiring each particular decision to enforce the migration law of a member state to involve an individuated proportionality assessment about the impact on the particular person being removed—or, in relation to article 8, quite often on his or her family or maybe his or her extended family—and for that to pass judicial muster.

As I say, I think that is an innovation in the case law of the Strasbourg court. I do not want to overstate its novelty—it is an innovation that has been going on for several decades—but it is not part of what the UK and other member states agreed when they agreed the terms of the convention, and I think it should be viewed as a misinterpretation of the convention.

In a sense, the joint declaration of the member states earlier this year recognises that something has gone wrong in the case law of the Court; that it has read article 8—we will come to article 3—to establish a kind of Europe-wide migration and asylum law, beyond the terms agreed by the member states. That needs to be addressed and wound back.

The thought that, in a sense, you are wronging a foreign criminal when you remove him or her from the UK so that he or she cannot maintain a connection with family is just fundamentally misconceived. In the same way, we are not wronging the offender by incarcerating him, which makes it very much more difficult to maintain a flourishing family life; the consequence is a side effect of the wrongful choice made by the offender. Something similar holds, I think, with the wrongful choice made by a person who violates our migration law.

There are harsh consequences in many of these cases, of course, but they are not harsh consequences whereby the UK sets out to wrong someone’s family. That structure has to be more fully recognised. We should see that something has gone badly wrong in thinking that the right to respect for private and family life entails, at least in some cases, a de facto immunity to the application of migration law.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins entirely. The extension of article 8 into the domain of immigration law was a very conspicuous act of judicial lawmaking through the living instrument approach.

As recently as 1985 in the Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom case, you had the UK Government—Sir Peter Rawlinson, the Attorney General—arguing tooth and nail that article 8 did not apply to questions about entry into the UK or removal and that it was just outside the scope. They lost that case, and that has been the EHCR’s position for several decades since then, but it was not understood as part of the original compact when the convention was ratified.

Professor Ekins: You asked us about article 3 as well, I think.

Yes, I did.

Q Do you believe that someone who deliberately enters the UK illegally from a safe country should face a different immigration consequence from someone who enters using a legal route? If not, what alternative deterrents would the Refugee Council support to discourage people from making those dangerous crossings?

Jon Featonby: I am going to focus on the people who enter the UK for the purpose of seeking asylum within the international protection regime. For us, this comes down to how the refugee convention has been interpreted and operationalised since it first came in in 1951. That has been based around countries like the UK requiring somebody to be present in the UK, in their own territory, before they can access the protection systems. By its nature, that means that people have to undertake some of those dangerous journeys to get there.

It is important to recognise that the convention talks about somebody being a refugee once they have been forced to leave a country because of war and persecution, and it is then blind to where that person is. There are obviously benefits if those people do not need to undertake dangerous journeys to get somewhere. There are benefits for the individuals who do not need to put their lives at risk—we see the really deadly consequences that has across the world—and benefits for the host countries themselves if people are able to arrive in an orderly manner and do not have to resort to the types of journeys that they have to now.

It is also part of this important international context that most refugees—most people displaced from their countries—stay in the countries that border the ones they have fled from. Some people move on, and sometimes that can be because the countries neighbouring the place they have fled are no longer safe for them and no longer allow them to try to fulfil their lives, particularly as we see refugee situations becoming increasingly protracted across the globe. That is one of the things that we see lacking in the UK’s response at the moment. It is not just the UK’s response; we have seen the deterrence measures that you mentioned being adopted by successive Governments. We have seen some impact of that, particularly this year in terms of the drop in small boat arrivals.

From the Refugee Council’s point of view, we would argue that the bit that has largely been missing from this is about how you continue to undermine the business model of the people smugglers and the people who take advantage of the people seeking safety. That is where we would talk about the importance of safe and legal routes. The previous Government opened up new routes, and we think that the Afghan and Ukraine schemes are great successes.

One of the challenges that we see at the moment is that those safe routes available to people have dropped over the last year; the number of people arriving on safe routes in the last 12 months is down by about 50%. Refugee family reunion has been temporarily suspended for over a year now, and we have seen the closure of the Afghan schemes. We have been promised that new safe and legal routes will open in the new few months, with arrivals next year, but it seems that those numbers will be quite small.

If we look at what worked in somewhere like the US under President Biden, it was having two sides to the approach: yes, the enforcement approach, but on the other side of that, quite generous, open, safe and legal routes, so that the people who genuinely need safety are able to get to somewhere like the UK without having to put their lives at risk.

Q If you think that the outcome of entering illegally should be the same as the outcome of entering legally, is there any other deterrent in that space? If the immigration consequence is not used as a deterrent, is there anything that the Refugee Council might accept?

Jon Featonby: For the people who are refugees, it is about having an asylum system that first and foremost does what it should do, which is making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time. I think making sure that that happens has been a bit of a challenge under successive Governments now. For the people who are genuinely seeking protection and who need it, the system needs to make sure that they are able to access that protection when they do.

What we have also seen is the challenge at the other end. For the people who are found not to have that protection need, there needs to be a firm and fair system in place to make sure they are removed from the UK as quickly, and hopefully as humanely, as possible. That is probably where there have been challenges. Some of them are legal challenges, but some of it comes down to basic good caseworking in the Home Office.

Q We share your commitment to safe and legal routes; they are an important way to fulfil our obligations. However, as you see, we have large numbers of people who are coming here through irregular means. What proportion of those arriving by irregular means does the Refugee Council think are genuinely fleeing war and persecution? Do you have a view on that?

Jon Featonby: The easiest way to look at some of this is through the immigration statistics published by the Home Office. Since small boats really started in around 2019, the top nationalities have largely stayed the same. There have been people from Afghanistan, Sudan, Eritrea and Iran, and the reasons why people would seek safety from those places are quite well known. Within that time, there have also been spikes from other countries. Quite famously, there was a lot of attention in 2022 on Albanians, but those numbers dropped quite quickly. That was probably a slightly different route from some of the other countries.

The Refugee Council has done some analysis in the past on what you would expect the asylum outcomes to be for those nationalities. Historically, you would expect around two thirds of the people crossing in small boats to go on and get protection. That has dropped slightly in the last year because the overall grant rate has dropped, although one caveat is that because the Home Office has not published appeals outcome statistics for the last three years, it is quite hard to work out exactly what happens once some of those cases go through the appeals process.

Q What are your views on article 8 specifically? We know that the majority of our article 8 grantees have a history of immigration breaches. How can we best protect the immigration system while safeguarding family rights?

Jon Featonby: There is only so much that I can say on this, with my particular focus being on the people we support at the Refugee Council. The previous panel mentioned that, with article 8 rights, there has to be a balance between having a controlled immigration system and a focus on individual cases. From the Refugee Council’s point of view, we will continue to support the individual application interpretation of article 8. We see that in our work with refugee families: for a family that has been forced to displace, it is very much not one size fits all; these families can look like all sorts of different things.

One area where we focus a bit more on article 8, particularly around how the UK defines the core family, is the future system for refugee families to be able to safely reunite. We have shared our concerns around the suspension of that route. By our estimate, there are probably 20,000 people who have not been able to apply to be reunited safely through that route since it was suspended just over a year ago. For us, the important thing to remember about that route is that, for many years, nine in 10 of the visas granted to people on it were for women and children. In terms of family reunion in the future, we see it as important that some of the most vulnerable people who have been displaced from their homes and who are in danger have access to that safe route.

Q Mr Featonby, thank you, and your counterparts at the Scottish Refugee Council, for the work you do to look after the vulnerable; we are very grateful. Of course, that work can go on only if there is public confidence in the system. As you know, applications have risen steadily since 2021. From your perspective, what is the urgency for a change in the legislation to return the trust and confidence in the system that have been eroded over the last few years?

Jon Featonby: There are definitely some positive signs that the Government should be quite proud of. Around the time of the election, we published a report that looked at the state of the asylum system. We described it as a “system in meltdown”, largely caused by the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which had seen productivity in the Home Office drop to its lowest level since the height of the covid pandemic. Since then, the Home Office has done a much better job of being able to make decisions quickly. The latest statistics we have show that about 75% of initial decisions are made within six months of somebody making an application. That is a good thing.

We think some Government priority should be given to how you make sure that people have confidence in the asylum system. That system needs to be doing its basics right: making decisions as quickly as it can that are right the first time; supporting refugees who are found to be in need of protection to get on with their lives, rebuild their lives and contribute fully to UK communities; and providing a way for people who are found to be not in need of protection to be removed safely and humanely. That is where we see some challenges in the Bill. We do not think it addresses some of that context.

The previous panels touched on how the backlog in the asylum system is now at the appeals stage, which is an almost inevitable consequence of dealing with the initial decision backlog. There will be more decisions and therefore more refusals, and therefore more people will go into that appeals process. There are probably three times as many people in the appeals backlog as in the asylum backlog itself. Some of that will work its way through the system as the Government get more on top of the asylum system—what officials refer to as having friction within the asylum system—where the number of decisions they are making is roughly the same as the number of people entering the system.

As a result of the speeding-up of decision making in recent years, we have also seen a reduction in the quality of some decisions, which we think has put unnecessary pressure on the tribunal and left people stuck in the asylum system, and in accommodation, for longer than they should be, at cost to the taxpayer and to those individuals. That is borne out by the appeals statistics that we now get from the first-tier tribunal, which show that in the last year, in two thirds of appeals that were disposed of, either the tribunal granted the appeal or—as is increasingly the case—the initial decision was withdrawn by the Home Office, because once the appeal got towards the tribunal hearing the Home Office found that it was not going to be able to defend the decision. That is why we think there should be a laser focus on initial decision making and on what else can be done to reduce the appeals backlog.

One of our concerns around the IIAA is that the appeals backlog is an urgent problem that needs to be dealt with now, but the best case scenario is probably that the IIAA starts to hear some cases at the back end of next year. It may well be the next election before the IIAA is really up and running. We think that more urgent things could be done without having to rip up the entire tribunal system as it currently is.

Q Clause 23 would empower the Secretary of State to require successful asylum seekers to pay costs for the support that they had during their passage through the system. To what extent might asylum seekers factor that into their decision making?

Jon Featonby: I will take that decision making in a few stages. In terms of whether that measure will deter people from coming to the UK, I do not think it will have any real impact at all. A previous panel touched on how complicated this body of law is. For those who have engaged with successive immigration Bills, it is quite complex. To expect somebody who is seeking protection to follow it, and to expect Parliament or even organisations such as the Refugee Council to be the main place that those people get their information, does not reflect reality.

We are concerned about the potential impact on decision making because it is important to remember that asylum support is available only to those asylum applicants who would otherwise be destitute. The Home Office puts in place quite a high bar for someone to even access support. Our concern is that if people are aware that they may be faced with debts of around £10,000, that will prevent them from accessing support. Their alternative then is to remain destitute. That is obviously very bad for those individuals and families, but it is also well established that putting people in destitution has negative consequences from a public health point of view and for wider communities.

We are also concerned by that provision because, although it applies to anybody who receives asylum support, with some minor exemptions, the majority of people who will ever be in a position to even start to pay back that money are people who are going to go on to get protection. We are concerned that that will take money away from people who probably have very little in the first place and that, because not having paid back that money could be a bar on settlement in the future, it could lead to people looking to borrow the money from quite dangerous moneylenders, putting people at risk of exploitation at that point.

It is quite hard to work out exactly what this will look like because there is not much detail in the Bill, but there are potentially disincentives for refugees to work. In our work at the Refugee Council, we see that people want to be able to work—they want to contribute—and the people who we support into employment, including employment in the NHS, are contributing. We think a far better use of time and resources would be to help refugees to overcome some of the barriers that they face, particularly in employment. That would allow them to contribute far more to the UK, including from tax receipts.

Q Going back to the impact of the repayments, I think you said that people can make claims for asylum support only if they are destitute, but that someone could be in this country and claiming asylum without claiming asylum support—it is not for everybody, and you do not have to claim it. That means there will be more people in the country declining to claim asylum support because of the repayments, and preferring to potentially live in destitution or be exploited. Can you talk about the risk of that? In your written evidence, you also talk about the risks of the Government’s other changes on people’s ability to settle and get jobs. How would that interact with the ability to pay back these payments?

Jon Featonby: The point about asylum support is really important. One of the gaps in some of the background material to the Bill is that the Home Office does not release information about how many people in the asylum system are in receipt of support. Historically, the conventional wisdom has been that it is probably about 50% of people. That reduces and goes up over time, so it quite hard to know exactly how many people are going to be impacted by the asylum support measure. It is absolutely our concern that people who really need support will not want to access it, and that that number will go down. The other thing I did not mention before is that most people in that situation are not allowed to work, so their choice is pretty much between Home Office support, with accommodation provided on a no-choice basis, or destitution. We also have concerns about the knock-on impacts on people’s integration.

The other bit of the Bill that we are particularly concerned about is core protection—that is about not only what is in the Bill, but the wider introduction of the core protection model, some of which started back in March this year. We have already had around 2,000 people who applied for asylum from the beginning of March and were found to need protection being granted a shorter period of leave, 30 months, rather than getting five years’ leave and being on a five-year route to settlement; we understand that they will be on a 20-year route to settlement. I think there is strong evidence that that increased insecurity, and people’s feeling that they have no degree of permanence in the UK, undermines their ability to seek employment and secure housing, and has a number of knock-on impacts on people’s lives.

The other impact of those two measures is that they are going to require an awful lot of Home Office bureaucracy to run. The Home Office currently does not run anything like the asylum support charge, but it will have to have a way of knowing how much money has been paid in by everybody who receives support and what sum still needs to be paid, as well as having a mechanism for dealing with those sums. Similarly, with core protection, if people have to have reviews of their status every two and a half years—potentially they would be in the country for two years—that is an awful lot more Home Office caseworking. The Government have not published an impact assessment published around that. We have done our own assessment and we have worked out that, roughly, it could mean just over 1 million extra reviews over the first decade of the policy being fully in practice.

Alongside the core protection model, there will also be a new in-country work and study route. In fairness to officials, that is really complex to design, but it will also be really complex to run. We think an awful lot more time and effort could be spent on making sure the asylum system is doing some of the basics right. First and foremost, that means making sure that decisions are made as quickly as they can be and are right the first time, and making sure that those people who are in need of protection and are given refugee status are supported to fulfil their potential in the UK—