PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Official Secrets Act and Espionage - 3 December 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
I will take this opportunity to thank the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, under my hon. Friend’s chairship, for its diligent and rapid work. The Government will now take the time to consider the Committee’s conclusions and recommendations properly, in conjunction with partners referenced in the report, before responding within the two-month timeframe.
However, I am glad that the JCNSS’s report has reinforced two fundamental points that the Government have made throughout. First, and as the Government have been saying for several weeks, the report makes it clear that there was no evidence of attempts by any Minister, special adviser or senior official to interfere with the prosecution. The report states that it found no evidence of improper influence. Despite ongoing questions about a meeting of senior officials that took place on 1 September, chaired by the National Security Adviser, the report clarifies that there was no deliberate effort to obstruct the prosecution.
The first senior Treasury counsel had already made the judgment on the basis of the evidence that charges could not progress by 22 August, more than a week before the meeting took place. We have been consistent throughout on these points, which runs in sharp contrast to our critics, who initially criticised the Government for intervening in the case and then, when it became clear that that was nonsense, criticised us for not intervening in the case.
Secondly, the JCNSS report reinforces a fundamental point that I have made to this House previously: the root cause of the failure of this case was the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911, which predates the first world war. The 1911 Act created an unrealistic test by requiring the prosecution to prove that China was an enemy. The Law Commission had flagged the term “enemy” as being deeply problematic as far back as 2017. The Government will continue to work tirelessly to ensure that we have the most effective structures and processes in place to support law enforcement partners in mitigating and prosecuting foreign espionage wherever we find it.
More importantly, the ongoing disinformation around the collapse of this case has been distracting from the most important issue that we should be focused on: how the Government can work across this House to ensure that Chinese espionage will never be successful in the United Kingdom. As the Prime Minister stated in his speech at the Lady Mayor’s banquet on Monday:
“Protecting national security is our first duty and we will never waver from our efforts to keep the British people safe.”
That is why, on 18 November, I set out a significant number of measures that this Government are taking to counter the threat that China and other state actors pose to UK democracy and society. In line with the JCNSS report, the Government will continue to strengthen our processes and preparedness for future threats, ensuring that we leverage our new security legislation effectively—
Our inquiry found nothing to suggest a co-ordinated, high-level effort to collapse the prosecution, nor deliberate efforts to obstruct or circumvent constitutional safeguards. However, we did find a process that is beset by confusion and misaligned expectations, and that can, at points, be best described as shambolic. There were systemic failures, and deficiencies in communication, co-ordination and decision making between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Government. Indeed, the episode reflects poorly on the otherwise commendable efforts of public servants to keep our country safe.
Given the conclusions I have just set out, will the Minister give reassurances that the Government will work closely with the CPS to ensure that communications and processes are tightened up, particularly when dealing with cases involving national security? Does the Minister acknowledge that the new National Security Act 2023, while comprehensive, may not entirely cover low-level espionage activity, especially given its structural parallels with the previous legislation? Finally, does the Minister agree that greater support should be given to the deputy National Security Adviser and civil servants acting as witnesses in such cases, to ensure top-level grip on cases with significant public exposure?
My hon. Friend the Chair highlights some important aspects of the report’s conclusions, recommendations and findings, following the work that the Committee undertook. As I have said, the Government approach this issue, and will consider the Committee’s report, with the utmost seriousness. I can give him the assurance that he seeks that the Government are now carefully considering the findings of the report. I give him and the House an absolute assurance that we will respond within the agreed timeframe. He mentioned a couple of other points that I will respond to briefly now, although I am happy to engage with him in more detail, should he think that necessary.
My hon. Friend mentioned the role of the CPS. He will understand that as a Government Minister, I am incredibly limited in what I can say about the CPS, because it is operationally independent of Government. He makes a fair challenge, and we will look carefully at the report’s findings in this area. He also mentioned the National Security Act 2023. While I am not in any way complacent about that legislation, we are in a much stronger position than we were. We keep these matters under review, and along with colleagues across Government, we are constantly seeking to assure ourselves that the legislative framework is fit for purpose and appropriate. I give him an absolute assurance that we take that incredibly seriously.
Finally, my hon. Friend mentioned the deputy National Security Adviser. Let me take the opportunity again to pay tribute to him for the important work that he does. He is a dedicated public servant, and his contribution to our national security is immense. The Government are grateful for his service, as I am sure is the whole House. I will look carefully at the points that my hon. Friend has made, and we will ensure that they are properly reflected in the response he receives from the Government.
“serious systemic failures and deficiencies”,
but calls the Government’s handling of the matter “shambolic”, as the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) just said. It also found—surprise, surprise—that there was enough evidence to prosecute the alleged spies. The Committee writes that
“China posed a range of threats to the United Kingdom’s national security. In our view, it is plain that, taken together, these amounted to a more general active threat to the United Kingdom’s national security.”
The Labour party tried to blame the last Government for the collapse of the case, but this investigation has exposed the fact that that is plainly untrue. I was surprised to hear the Security Minister refer to the deficiencies of the 1911 Act. I draw his attention to paragraph 40 of the report; I think he probably should have read it before he came to the House. It was this Government’s incompetence that ultimately led to these two men not standing trial, and, most worryingly, the report reminds us that there may be many more such cases. Indeed, why should there not be, if foreign spies believe that they can act against this House with impunity and effective immunity?
It is obvious that this Government are not prepared to stand firm. Over the past few days we have heard from the press—not from reports to the House—that the Prime Minister is about to sign off the Chinese mega-embassy in London, despite major security concerns, and that he is preparing to travel to Beijing. Will he, I wonder, have the backbone to stand up for our interests while he is there?
I will ask the Security Minister three very simple and straightforward questions. First, did the Government provide the Joint Committee with the minutes of the 1 September meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser, and if not, why not? Secondly, during the many debates that we have had in the House on this matter, a number of Ministers appear to have made inaccurate and misleading statements on at least six occasions. Will the Minister ensure that corrections are made to Hansard, so that the record is straight? Thirdly, the Joint Committee has concluded, from the evidence it received, that China is a general threat to the United Kingdom’s national security; do the Government agree, and if they do, how can they justify supporting the mega-embassy?
In the aftermath of the trial’s collapse, some Opposition Members accused Ministers, special advisers and civil servants of improper interference. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that some of our most experienced and most dedicated national security experts set out to deliberately withhold information from prosecutors in order to placate the Chinese Government. This report makes it clear that that was baseless and untrue. There were some who suggested that the Conservatives’ failure to update critical national security legislation was immaterial to the case that was being brought to trial. This report makes it clear that the root cause of the collapse was the years of dither and delay that left outdated, ineffective legislation on the statute book long after we knew that it did not protect our country from the modern threats that we face. Some Opposition Members—although not all of them—were all over the place on that legislation, and were all over the place with regard to China, and some of them, sadly, still are.
On China, as the Prime Minister observed this week,
“We had the golden age of relations under David Cameron and George Osborne, which then flipped to an ice age, that some still advocate”,
but no matter how much Opposition Members may wish it to be so, not engaging with China is no option at all. We have made it clear that we will co-operate where we can, but we will always challenge where we must. When we say that national security is the first priority of this Government, we mean it, and since the trial’s collapse, I have announced a comprehensive package that will help us to tackle the economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that China presents. The report to which the hon. Member has referred provides further useful thought on how we can best safeguard our national security, and the Government genuinely welcome that constructive feedback. I look forward to engaging with the Committee, and with responsible Members in all parts of the House, as we continue to consider how best to go on protecting our democracy and our nation.
The hon. Member asked me about the minutes—[Interruption.] He is still asking me about the 1 September meeting.
As Members will know, an independent planning decision will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government by 20 January. National security is the first duty of government, and it has been our core priority throughout this process. The Home Office and the Foreign Office provided views on the security implications of this build throughout the process, and we have been clear about the fact that a decision should not have been taken until we had confirmed that those considerations had been resolved. The letter recently sent to the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government now confirms that all national security issues raised have been addressed. Should the planning decision be approved, the new embassy will replace the seven different sites that currently comprise China’s diplomatic estate in London.
Let me once again urge the Minister to place China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. If he will not do that today, I wonder whether he might give us a date in the diary—say, a week before the Prime Minister’s visit to Beijing; that may well coincide with the date of an announcement on the planning permission for the mega-embassy—and give the House the clarity that it deserves.
The hon. Lady raises the issue of FIRS. As I have said to the House previously, there were Opposition Members who did not think that we would introduce FIRS on time, but we did so. It is a valuable tool and adds significant value to our capabilities with regard to our national security, but at the same time we have to very carefully deliberate the addition of more countries to the enhanced tier. We keep that under very close review, and I would be very happy to discuss the matter with her further.
My hon. Friend raises an entirely fair and reasonable challenge about the organisational lessons that have been learned as a consequence of this process. All Ministers, whether in this Government or in the previous Government, should have approached these kinds of reports with a degree of humility. Undoubtedly, there are lessons that will need to be identified, learned and implemented as a consequence of recent events. As I know he and the House would expect, the Government need to do that in a measured and considered way. I give him and the Joint Committee an absolute assurance that we will look at the detail of the report very closely indeed, and we will respond within the timeframe that the Committee has set us.
“poses real national security threats to the United Kingdom”,
but that it is
“time for a serious approach, to reject the simplistic binary choice. Neither golden age, nor ice age…So our response will not be driven by fear, nor softened by illusion. It will be grounded in strength, clarity and sober realism.”
I agree with the Prime Minister, and I suspect that most sensible Members of this House do as well.
My hon. Friend’s second point is about the creation of another Select Committee, and she will understand that that is above my pay grade. I gently point to the fact that the Government want to have a very good, close and constructive relationship with the ISC. It will be for the ISC to take a view, but that may provide a forum for further parliamentary scrutiny of those matters.
On the right hon. Gentleman’s second point, he has raised the MOU previously. It is an entirely reasonable point for him to raise, both publicly and privately. Let me take it away and come back to him.
Does the Minister welcome the fact that the report makes it clear that the root cause of the case collapsing was the dither and delay from the previous Government? Does he agree with the Prime Minister that that was nothing short of a dereliction of duty when it comes to our national security?
The point my hon. Friend made about the recommendations in the report are absolutely right, and I think it vindicates the basic argument that the Government have sought to bring forward. I say that with humility, because we will want to look carefully at the detail of all the findings and all the recommendations. We will do that over the next number of weeks, and we will take on board lessons where they need to be learned.
“would have expected to be involved intimately in the provision of the Government evidence”.
Why was Jonathan Powell—and Lord Hermer, for that matter, who is described in the report as being “not proactive”—so passive on a matter of national security and alleged spying on Members of this House?
The hon. Member’s substantive point was about FIRS, and he will have heard what I have said today and previously. The Government are looking very closely at whether additional countries should be added to the enhanced tier. When a decision is made about that, we will bring it forward in the usual way.
I hold the hon. Gentleman in very high regard, and I refer him to what the Prime Minister said on Monday. The Prime Minister made an important point that is highly relevant to the question the hon. Gentleman raised:
“Protecting our security is non-negotiable. Our first duty. But by taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to cooperate in other areas.”
I hope he agrees—I know he does—with that.
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