PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting) - 7 March 2024 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Contributions from Sir John Hayes, are highlighted with a yellow border.
The Committee consisted of the following Members:
Chair(s) Sir Christopher Chope, † Judith Cummins
Members† Aiken, Nickie (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
† Clark, Feryal (Enfield North) (Lab)
† Dowd, Peter (Bootle) (Lab)
† Ellwood, Mr Tobias (Bournemouth East) (Con)
† Everitt, Ben (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)
† Foster, Kevin (Torbay) (Con)
† Hayes, Sir John (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
† Jarvis, Dan (Barnsley Central) (Lab)
† Jones, Mr Kevan (North Durham) (Lab)
† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
† Mann, Scott (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury)
† Mullan, Dr Kieran (Crewe and Nantwich) (Con)
Seely, Bob (Isle of Wight) (Con)
† Swayne, Sir Desmond (New Forest West) (Con)
† Thompson, Owen (Midlothian) (SNP)
† Tugendhat, Tom (Minister for Security)
ClerksHuw Yardley, Katya Cassidy, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 7 March 2024
(Morning)
[Judith Cummins in the Chair]
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]
Chair(s) Sir Christopher Chope, † Judith Cummins
Members† Aiken, Nickie (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
† Clark, Feryal (Enfield North) (Lab)
† Dowd, Peter (Bootle) (Lab)
† Ellwood, Mr Tobias (Bournemouth East) (Con)
† Everitt, Ben (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)
† Foster, Kevin (Torbay) (Con)
† Hayes, Sir John (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
† Jarvis, Dan (Barnsley Central) (Lab)
† Jones, Mr Kevan (North Durham) (Lab)
† McDonald, Stuart C. (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
† Mann, Scott (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury)
† Mullan, Dr Kieran (Crewe and Nantwich) (Con)
Seely, Bob (Isle of Wight) (Con)
† Swayne, Sir Desmond (New Forest West) (Con)
† Thompson, Owen (Midlothian) (SNP)
† Tugendhat, Tom (Minister for Security)
ClerksHuw Yardley, Katya Cassidy, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 7 March 2024
(Morning)
[Judith Cummins in the Chair]
Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [Lords]
The Chair
Before we begin line-by-line consideration, I have a couple of announcements. Hansard colleagues will be immensely grateful if Members email their speaking notes to [email protected]. Please switch off electronic devices or turn them to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Today, we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. I hope we can take these matters formally without debate. I call the Minister to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for this Bill.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 7 March) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 7 March;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 12 March;
2. the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 14; the Schedule; Clauses 15 to 33; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 12 March.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 11.30 am on Thursday 7 March) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Thursday 7 March;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 12 March;
2. the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 14; the Schedule; Clauses 15 to 33; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 12 March.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
00:00:00
The Chair
Copies of written evidence received by the Committee will be made available in the Committee Room, and will be circulated to Members by email.
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room; this shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order they are debated, but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when they come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of that Bill. Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking to it that they wish to do so.
Clause 1
Requirement for authorisation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room; this shows how the selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order they are debated, but in the order they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when they come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the existing clauses of that Bill. Members wishing to press a grouped amendment or new clause to a Division should indicate when speaking to it that they wish to do so.
Clause 1
Requirement for authorisation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
11:33:20
Tom Tugendhat
The Minister for Security
It is a pleasure to be here under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. The exceptional growth in volume and types of data across society globally since 2016 has affected the intelligence services’ ability to work and collaborate at the necessary operational pace. The existing bulk personal dataset safeguards do not account for the way that data and its availability have evolved since the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 was passed. This creates a negative impact on operational agility, while making it increasingly difficult for the intelligence services to develop the necessary capabilities.
Clauses 1 and 2 introduce an alternative regime for bulk personal datasets where there is low or no reasonable expectation of privacy—the so-called low/no regime. Clause 1 specifically provides a mechanism for the intelligence agencies to determine whether bulk personal datasets should be authorised under part 7 of the 2016 Act for sensitive datasets, or proposed new part 7A for low/no datasets.
Clauses 1 and 2 introduce an alternative regime for bulk personal datasets where there is low or no reasonable expectation of privacy—the so-called low/no regime. Clause 1 specifically provides a mechanism for the intelligence agencies to determine whether bulk personal datasets should be authorised under part 7 of the 2016 Act for sensitive datasets, or proposed new part 7A for low/no datasets.
00:00:00
Dan Jarvis
Barnsley Central
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Cummins. I rise to speak very briefly to clause 1, and to thank the Minister for his opening remarks.
At the outset of our consideration, we should all take the opportunity to pay tribute to the exceptional men and women who have served in our law enforcement and security services. We owe them a deep debt of gratitude. Let me say that the Opposition support the Bill, which updates aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is imperative that legal frameworks are updated to ensure that our security and law enforcement services keep up with the challenges to communications technology in an increasingly challenging and complex landscape of threats to our safety and national security. None the less, the important provisions proposed in this Bill need to be scrutinised carefully. The shadow Home Secretary and I made it clear on Second Reading that we will work with the Government to improve it in places, following the example of the constructive cross-party work that was done in the other place.
At the outset of our consideration, we should all take the opportunity to pay tribute to the exceptional men and women who have served in our law enforcement and security services. We owe them a deep debt of gratitude. Let me say that the Opposition support the Bill, which updates aspects of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. It is imperative that legal frameworks are updated to ensure that our security and law enforcement services keep up with the challenges to communications technology in an increasingly challenging and complex landscape of threats to our safety and national security. None the less, the important provisions proposed in this Bill need to be scrutinised carefully. The shadow Home Secretary and I made it clear on Second Reading that we will work with the Government to improve it in places, following the example of the constructive cross-party work that was done in the other place.
11:34:33
Stuart C. McDonald
Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East
It is good to see you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins.
I echo what the shadow Minister says. We are all here to assist the brave personnel in our security and intelligence services, but that does not mean that we will not closely scrutinise this legislation. We did not oppose the Bill on Second Reading. Some parts are good, but we have indicated our serious concerns about other parts because we think the powers go too far. They have not been shown to be necessary and proportionate; rather, they are more for the convenience of the security and intelligence services. How these powers are drafted also causes us concern, because they seem to allow behaviours beyond what we were told the powers were going to be used for. At other times, it is the nature of the oversight that is a concern, as the Bill introduces potentially intrusive powers.
I have one other brief point to make, which I indicated I would make at last night’s meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee. I had hoped that this morning we could perhaps have had some witnesses to guide us through this process. I think that would have been very helpful. It was very helpful in 2016, when we were looking at the original legislation, and I regret that we do not have such an opportunity this morning.
The provisions on bulk personal datasets and so-called low/no datasets are an area where we fear that the legislation is rather more a matter of inconvenience than something that has been shown to be a necessity. That will emerge in the debate about clause 2, which contains quite a lot of the detail about how the regime is supposed to work. Basically, we have been told that there will be a significant increase in the use of bulk personal datasets. We have been told that scrutiny is too slow, so we will either have to remove it or, perhaps more accurately, water it down in relation to these so-called low/no datasets. Fundamentally, I do not like that argument. The Minister will need to make a compelling case.
When we discuss clause 2, it would be useful if the Minister told us how many bulk datasets are retained and examined each year currently; how many datasets it is envisaged will be retained and examined after these powers come into force; what percentage of the datasets he thinks would be considered low/no datasets; how long authorisation processes take currently and why they take that length of time; and why cannot we improve or accelerate that process in some way, rather than having to water it down in the way that this Bill suggests. We will ask the Minister for that sort of evidence, because he is asking us to do away with parts of the oversight system that were put in place in 2016, and we want to understand how that oversight system is causing a problem at the moment. If he cannot explain that, we cannot support this new regime.
I echo what the shadow Minister says. We are all here to assist the brave personnel in our security and intelligence services, but that does not mean that we will not closely scrutinise this legislation. We did not oppose the Bill on Second Reading. Some parts are good, but we have indicated our serious concerns about other parts because we think the powers go too far. They have not been shown to be necessary and proportionate; rather, they are more for the convenience of the security and intelligence services. How these powers are drafted also causes us concern, because they seem to allow behaviours beyond what we were told the powers were going to be used for. At other times, it is the nature of the oversight that is a concern, as the Bill introduces potentially intrusive powers.
I have one other brief point to make, which I indicated I would make at last night’s meeting of the Programming Sub-Committee. I had hoped that this morning we could perhaps have had some witnesses to guide us through this process. I think that would have been very helpful. It was very helpful in 2016, when we were looking at the original legislation, and I regret that we do not have such an opportunity this morning.
The provisions on bulk personal datasets and so-called low/no datasets are an area where we fear that the legislation is rather more a matter of inconvenience than something that has been shown to be a necessity. That will emerge in the debate about clause 2, which contains quite a lot of the detail about how the regime is supposed to work. Basically, we have been told that there will be a significant increase in the use of bulk personal datasets. We have been told that scrutiny is too slow, so we will either have to remove it or, perhaps more accurately, water it down in relation to these so-called low/no datasets. Fundamentally, I do not like that argument. The Minister will need to make a compelling case.
When we discuss clause 2, it would be useful if the Minister told us how many bulk datasets are retained and examined each year currently; how many datasets it is envisaged will be retained and examined after these powers come into force; what percentage of the datasets he thinks would be considered low/no datasets; how long authorisation processes take currently and why they take that length of time; and why cannot we improve or accelerate that process in some way, rather than having to water it down in the way that this Bill suggests. We will ask the Minister for that sort of evidence, because he is asking us to do away with parts of the oversight system that were put in place in 2016, and we want to understand how that oversight system is causing a problem at the moment. If he cannot explain that, we cannot support this new regime.
11:37:18
Mr Kevan Jones
North Durham
It is a pleasure to serve on this Committee with you in the Chair, Mrs Cummins.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said very clearly that there is general support for the Bill. The need for it is self-evident: things have moved on since the passage of the 2016 Act—indeed, they have moved on very quickly in terms of the amount of data there is, not only data that the security services have to deal with but data in general life.
Bringing the legislation up to date is important, but if we look at the Hansard reports of the debates in 2016, when the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings took the original legislation through the House, we see that there was then, quite rightly, concern that the state acquiring bulk data was intrusive into people’s private lives.
Having read those Hansard reports a couple of days ago, I accept that some of the concerns expressed in 2016 were overblown, as are some of the concerns expressed about this Bill. Frankly, if the accusations regarding what our security services are able to do were true, they would be 10 times, if not 100 times bigger than the actual security services we have today. Nevertheless, it is important in a democracy to ensure that the security services act proportionately—I am confident that they do—and that there is the necessary oversight of their actions and how they deal with the data they have. It is not just parliamentarians who need reassurance in that regard, but the public. The public need reassurance about the data that the state is holding.
Examples have been given, but frankly, they are a bit silly, because things such as the electoral register, which you, Mrs Cummins, I and everybody else can access, fall under the existing regime. The expectation that the data will not be made public is ridiculous, and the same is true of some of the other examples that have been given. For instance, some datasets for machine learning are open on the internet for everybody to see. I do not have any problem with that and I do not think that anybody else does.
Oversight, which we will discuss later, is important. We are giving the security services the powers to determine what is low and what is no. Do I trust that they will have the protocols in place to ensure that that process is done fairly? Yes I do, but I have been on the Intelligence and Security Committee for the last seven years; I know exactly how the protocols work internally in those organisations. To reassure the general public, we need a definition of how this process will take place. I will not touch on that now, but later I will raise the question of how we will have independent oversight of that process.
Neither I nor anyone else is saying that we distrust how the security services will handle those datasets, but one thing the ISC has been very clear on is that if we are going to extend the security services’ powers, there needs to be a corresponding extension of oversight to balance that. I do not want to put in place oversight that prevents operational effectiveness; it would be silly to give the security services powers and then make it impossible or too onerous for them to operate in practice, but striking a balance is important in a democracy.
We broadly got that balance right in the 2016 Act. Looking at international comparisons, we are way ahead of many other democracies in how we deal with oversight of those potentially very delicate issues.
My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said very clearly that there is general support for the Bill. The need for it is self-evident: things have moved on since the passage of the 2016 Act—indeed, they have moved on very quickly in terms of the amount of data there is, not only data that the security services have to deal with but data in general life.
Bringing the legislation up to date is important, but if we look at the Hansard reports of the debates in 2016, when the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings took the original legislation through the House, we see that there was then, quite rightly, concern that the state acquiring bulk data was intrusive into people’s private lives.
Having read those Hansard reports a couple of days ago, I accept that some of the concerns expressed in 2016 were overblown, as are some of the concerns expressed about this Bill. Frankly, if the accusations regarding what our security services are able to do were true, they would be 10 times, if not 100 times bigger than the actual security services we have today. Nevertheless, it is important in a democracy to ensure that the security services act proportionately—I am confident that they do—and that there is the necessary oversight of their actions and how they deal with the data they have. It is not just parliamentarians who need reassurance in that regard, but the public. The public need reassurance about the data that the state is holding.
Examples have been given, but frankly, they are a bit silly, because things such as the electoral register, which you, Mrs Cummins, I and everybody else can access, fall under the existing regime. The expectation that the data will not be made public is ridiculous, and the same is true of some of the other examples that have been given. For instance, some datasets for machine learning are open on the internet for everybody to see. I do not have any problem with that and I do not think that anybody else does.
Oversight, which we will discuss later, is important. We are giving the security services the powers to determine what is low and what is no. Do I trust that they will have the protocols in place to ensure that that process is done fairly? Yes I do, but I have been on the Intelligence and Security Committee for the last seven years; I know exactly how the protocols work internally in those organisations. To reassure the general public, we need a definition of how this process will take place. I will not touch on that now, but later I will raise the question of how we will have independent oversight of that process.
Neither I nor anyone else is saying that we distrust how the security services will handle those datasets, but one thing the ISC has been very clear on is that if we are going to extend the security services’ powers, there needs to be a corresponding extension of oversight to balance that. I do not want to put in place oversight that prevents operational effectiveness; it would be silly to give the security services powers and then make it impossible or too onerous for them to operate in practice, but striking a balance is important in a democracy.
We broadly got that balance right in the 2016 Act. Looking at international comparisons, we are way ahead of many other democracies in how we deal with oversight of those potentially very delicate issues.
Sir John Hayes
South Holland and The Deepings
I will not detain the Committee unduly, my Whip will be pleased to know. However, I feel it is important at this juncture—in part because, as the right hon. Member for North Durham says, I was responsible for taking the 2016 legislation through the House, and in part because of my current role on the ISC—to make some comment on the first part of this Bill, which deals with bulk powers. There are misassumptions about bulk powers. The Minister will be aware of how vital they are to the security and intelligence services and to the police. These powers are used in almost all investigations —95% of them—and they are critical if we are to deal with the changing character of the threat we face.
Contextually it is important to note that when the 2016 Act was passed, the nature of the threat was metamorphosising, and that is even more the case now. The scale and character of the threats are altering all the time, so the legal powers available to those we mission to keep us safe need to be fit for purpose and up to date. We knew that when we passed the 2016 Act; we knew that the legislation was dynamic and that it would be supplemented over time to take account of that metamorphosis, which takes two forms. First, the threat now is probably greater from state actors, and secondly, it is greater from those inspired to do harm via the internet in particular. That situation makes an implicit case for the kind of measures the Minister has brought before us today.
Furthermore, there is a paradoxical change in the methodology used by those who seek to do us harm. Because of the nature of technology, those people are now able to do things that they were not able to do when we debated the original Act that this Bill amends. I describe the change as paradoxical because those people have simultaneously learned that they can do immense harm with a vehicle and crude weapon; we know that from some tragic cases in recent years. Those inspired people do not need a sophisticated organisation with all kinds of capabilities; they simply need the perverse, indeed perverted, will to do damage. All of those factors legitimise the case for the measures in the Bill, which we will consider over the coming hours and days—but not weeks I am pleased to say, unless something goes badly wrong.
Contextually it is important to note that when the 2016 Act was passed, the nature of the threat was metamorphosising, and that is even more the case now. The scale and character of the threats are altering all the time, so the legal powers available to those we mission to keep us safe need to be fit for purpose and up to date. We knew that when we passed the 2016 Act; we knew that the legislation was dynamic and that it would be supplemented over time to take account of that metamorphosis, which takes two forms. First, the threat now is probably greater from state actors, and secondly, it is greater from those inspired to do harm via the internet in particular. That situation makes an implicit case for the kind of measures the Minister has brought before us today.
Furthermore, there is a paradoxical change in the methodology used by those who seek to do us harm. Because of the nature of technology, those people are now able to do things that they were not able to do when we debated the original Act that this Bill amends. I describe the change as paradoxical because those people have simultaneously learned that they can do immense harm with a vehicle and crude weapon; we know that from some tragic cases in recent years. Those inspired people do not need a sophisticated organisation with all kinds of capabilities; they simply need the perverse, indeed perverted, will to do damage. All of those factors legitimise the case for the measures in the Bill, which we will consider over the coming hours and days—but not weeks I am pleased to say, unless something goes badly wrong.
I agree entirely with those who say that there is general good will towards measures that are necessary to keep us safe, but with the Committee’s indulgence I will say something about the detail of clause 1 and part 1. Bulk powers are misunderstood by people who do not study such matters closely. The right hon. Member for North Durham made that point when he said that fears are sometimes exaggerated because people fail to grasp quite what the safeguards look like and the circumstances in which bulk powers are used.
I have some letters that I exchanged with my then shadow—now the Leader of the Opposition, no less— when we debated the 2016 Act. We put in place a set of reviews that examined the operational case for bulk powers. The Opposition insisted on that, and as Minister I was pleased to agree with their proposal. Lord Anderson examined the Investigatory Powers Bill then and has since reviewed it. He has made it clear that there is a solid case for the powers, subject to the proper safeguards and oversight, and that there is a case for the powers to be reconsidered in the way that the this amending Bill does.
Some 95% of the cyber-attacks on people and businesses in the UK discovered by the security and intelligence agencies were identified as a result of the powers in part 1. They are used to deal not only with terrorists, but with serious and organised criminals. It is important to understand the National Crime Agency’s role in that, and no doubt the Minister will speak about that in more detail. Much of the crime and terrorism that is identified and countered could not have been thwarted by more conventional means. This is the point that needs to be heard publicly: we simply would not be safe if such additional resources, facilities and legal authority were not available to our counter-terrorism police, the NCA and the agencies.
People sometimes assume that the agencies are searching for a needle in a haystack; actually, they are choosing the haystacks. To do so, they must have legal safeguards, because otherwise they will be subject to challenge. Those challenges will come not from people of good will, such as the people from across the House who are on this Committee. The people who will challenge the agencies are far from people of good will; they are people of ill will, who seek to do us harm.
None the less, I say to the Minister—as he would expect me to—that there are ways in which the Bill could be improved. Let me suggest just one; I will then sit down, before I test the Committee’s indulgence to its very limits, so that we can make some progress. The category authorisations that are associated with part 1 mean that, in the case of bulk personal datasets, an agency will want the power to retain and examine material over a considerable period. They will assess whether it can be handled and approved under the part 7A regime, and if the authorisation is approved by the judicial commissioner, the agency can then internally approve any individual personal dataset to be added to that category.
That is contentious and requires explanation. I am not against it, but the fear is that a category authorisation will be obtained and the internal process will then allow all kinds of other things to be added to it. It is important that we rectify that by ensuring that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office is notified whenever a new individual dataset is added to an existing valid category authorisation. As the Minister knows, this point has been made by the Committee on which the right hon. Member for North Durham and I serve. It seems to me to be reasonable. I do not think it is unhelpful to the agencies or the Minister, and it may provide the additional reassurance we all seek that the powers are subject to appropriate scrutiny and oversight.
With that initial foray into this territory, I will conclude, except to say that in my career in Parliament, I regard taking the original legislation through as my greatest achievement. [Interruption.] My former Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall, is saying it is one among many, but I regard it as the most important thing I have done in Parliament because it is an important matter, not a party political matter; it is important for the safety and security of all our people.
I have some letters that I exchanged with my then shadow—now the Leader of the Opposition, no less— when we debated the 2016 Act. We put in place a set of reviews that examined the operational case for bulk powers. The Opposition insisted on that, and as Minister I was pleased to agree with their proposal. Lord Anderson examined the Investigatory Powers Bill then and has since reviewed it. He has made it clear that there is a solid case for the powers, subject to the proper safeguards and oversight, and that there is a case for the powers to be reconsidered in the way that the this amending Bill does.
Some 95% of the cyber-attacks on people and businesses in the UK discovered by the security and intelligence agencies were identified as a result of the powers in part 1. They are used to deal not only with terrorists, but with serious and organised criminals. It is important to understand the National Crime Agency’s role in that, and no doubt the Minister will speak about that in more detail. Much of the crime and terrorism that is identified and countered could not have been thwarted by more conventional means. This is the point that needs to be heard publicly: we simply would not be safe if such additional resources, facilities and legal authority were not available to our counter-terrorism police, the NCA and the agencies.
People sometimes assume that the agencies are searching for a needle in a haystack; actually, they are choosing the haystacks. To do so, they must have legal safeguards, because otherwise they will be subject to challenge. Those challenges will come not from people of good will, such as the people from across the House who are on this Committee. The people who will challenge the agencies are far from people of good will; they are people of ill will, who seek to do us harm.
None the less, I say to the Minister—as he would expect me to—that there are ways in which the Bill could be improved. Let me suggest just one; I will then sit down, before I test the Committee’s indulgence to its very limits, so that we can make some progress. The category authorisations that are associated with part 1 mean that, in the case of bulk personal datasets, an agency will want the power to retain and examine material over a considerable period. They will assess whether it can be handled and approved under the part 7A regime, and if the authorisation is approved by the judicial commissioner, the agency can then internally approve any individual personal dataset to be added to that category.
That is contentious and requires explanation. I am not against it, but the fear is that a category authorisation will be obtained and the internal process will then allow all kinds of other things to be added to it. It is important that we rectify that by ensuring that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office is notified whenever a new individual dataset is added to an existing valid category authorisation. As the Minister knows, this point has been made by the Committee on which the right hon. Member for North Durham and I serve. It seems to me to be reasonable. I do not think it is unhelpful to the agencies or the Minister, and it may provide the additional reassurance we all seek that the powers are subject to appropriate scrutiny and oversight.
With that initial foray into this territory, I will conclude, except to say that in my career in Parliament, I regard taking the original legislation through as my greatest achievement. [Interruption.] My former Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for North Cornwall, is saying it is one among many, but I regard it as the most important thing I have done in Parliament because it is an important matter, not a party political matter; it is important for the safety and security of all our people.
Tom Tugendhat
What can I say? We have got a little further on clause 1 than I anticipated. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings, the right hon. Member for North Durham and other hon. Members who have spoken. Bulk personal dataset authorisation is clearly an important change, as my shadow, the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, has set out; I was interested to hear the suggestion from my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings that this was the shadow Minister’s first step on the path to greatness and to leading the Opposition. I am grateful for the points that hon. Members have made.
The type of data that may fall into part 7A is indeed covered—things like news articles, academic papers, public and official records, and the sort of bulk personal data that many people would have access to routinely. The changing nature of the need to hold data has meant that bulk personal data must be authorised in a different way than was previously thought. Paragraphs 4.14 and 4.20 of the draft code of practice set out further details of the datasets that would fall under the section 22A test, of which the hon. Member for Barnsley Central is no doubt aware.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East touched on various aspects of data that might fall within this approach. He will remember that Lord Anderson noted in his independent review that MI5 and MI6 estimate that roughly 20% of their bulk personal data holdings would fall into the category of “low and no”; for GCHQ, the figure would be nearer to 8%. Clearly, these things will evolve. To answer the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the simple fact is that our world is producing incomparably greater volumes of data than ever before. The need to understand, handle and triage that data is therefore essential.
It is worth making the point, right at the beginning, that creating and storing huge volumes of data is to nobody’s advantage, and particularly not that of the intelligence services. The only purpose of having or examining data is to enable investigatory operations to get to targets of interest. It is not about anything other than ensuring that investigations can be properly targeted against those who threaten the interests of the British people, under various existing laws. This measure does not change those laws; it merely assists the targeting.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Low or no reasonable expectation of privacy
The type of data that may fall into part 7A is indeed covered—things like news articles, academic papers, public and official records, and the sort of bulk personal data that many people would have access to routinely. The changing nature of the need to hold data has meant that bulk personal data must be authorised in a different way than was previously thought. Paragraphs 4.14 and 4.20 of the draft code of practice set out further details of the datasets that would fall under the section 22A test, of which the hon. Member for Barnsley Central is no doubt aware.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East touched on various aspects of data that might fall within this approach. He will remember that Lord Anderson noted in his independent review that MI5 and MI6 estimate that roughly 20% of their bulk personal data holdings would fall into the category of “low and no”; for GCHQ, the figure would be nearer to 8%. Clearly, these things will evolve. To answer the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, the simple fact is that our world is producing incomparably greater volumes of data than ever before. The need to understand, handle and triage that data is therefore essential.
It is worth making the point, right at the beginning, that creating and storing huge volumes of data is to nobody’s advantage, and particularly not that of the intelligence services. The only purpose of having or examining data is to enable investigatory operations to get to targets of interest. It is not about anything other than ensuring that investigations can be properly targeted against those who threaten the interests of the British people, under various existing laws. This measure does not change those laws; it merely assists the targeting.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Low or no reasonable expectation of privacy
Dan Jarvis
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 2, page 3, line 18, at end insert—
“(1A) This section does not apply to a bulk personal dataset unless it has been published in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018.”
This amendment would ensure bulk personal datasets with low or no expectation of privacy have been published lawfully and in accordance with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.
“(1A) This section does not apply to a bulk personal dataset unless it has been published in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018.”
This amendment would ensure bulk personal datasets with low or no expectation of privacy have been published lawfully and in accordance with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 21, in clause 2, page 3, line 34, at end insert—
“(4) By way of example, bulk datasets of images obtained by CCTV and bulk datasets of Facebook posts are not to be considered datasets where the individuals to whom the data relates could have no, or only a low, reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Probing amendment regarding the scope of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy”.
“(4) By way of example, bulk datasets of images obtained by CCTV and bulk datasets of Facebook posts are not to be considered datasets where the individuals to whom the data relates could have no, or only a low, reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Probing amendment regarding the scope of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy”.
11:57:57
Dan Jarvis
May I reflect on my gentle amusement at hearing the Minister’s remarks about a former shadow Security Minister and his onward passage to becoming Leader of the Opposition? I know that these are matters on which he speaks with great authority.
We have already had very helpful contributions from two senior Intelligence and Security Committee members. Questions about the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs have been raised throughout the Bill’s progress in the other place and on Second Reading in this House, including by members of this Committee. The amendment seeks to probe the meaning of the phrase, but I should be clear at the outset that I do not intend to divide the Committee on this or any other amendment on which I intend to speak.
I will set out two scenarios. It would be genuinely helpful if the Minister could clarify the limits to the factors relating to the Data Protection Act 2018. The first scenario is where the data can be attributed to a leak that, although unintentional, resulted in the unconsented publication of personal information in the public domain. Would a leak of the personal details and working patterns of the staff of Members of this House—a number of hon. Members will remember the one that happened in March 2017—be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy?
The second scenario is the deliberate and unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain. If there were a hack resulting in the unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain, would that information also be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy? Data breaches of that nature occur regularly: the personal information of more than 2 million Duolingo users was compromised last year. A user’s mastery of French verb conjugation is unlikely to be of interest to anyone, with the possible exception of our friends over the channel, but other personal information could be. The Duolingo data was put up for sale on the dark web, so it might be regarded as third party BPDs. It is important that the Minister clarifies the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to those two scenarios.
Labour Members are not opposed to the concept of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs. We want to ensure that the police and security services are not unnecessarily limited in their intelligence gathering, but there need to be parameters for what is considered fair game. There must be clarity on important definitions relating to personal data. I hope that the Minister will respond in the constructive spirit in which the amendment was intended.
We have already had very helpful contributions from two senior Intelligence and Security Committee members. Questions about the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs have been raised throughout the Bill’s progress in the other place and on Second Reading in this House, including by members of this Committee. The amendment seeks to probe the meaning of the phrase, but I should be clear at the outset that I do not intend to divide the Committee on this or any other amendment on which I intend to speak.
I will set out two scenarios. It would be genuinely helpful if the Minister could clarify the limits to the factors relating to the Data Protection Act 2018. The first scenario is where the data can be attributed to a leak that, although unintentional, resulted in the unconsented publication of personal information in the public domain. Would a leak of the personal details and working patterns of the staff of Members of this House—a number of hon. Members will remember the one that happened in March 2017—be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy?
The second scenario is the deliberate and unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain. If there were a hack resulting in the unlawful publication of personal information into the public domain, would that information also be subject to a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy? Data breaches of that nature occur regularly: the personal information of more than 2 million Duolingo users was compromised last year. A user’s mastery of French verb conjugation is unlikely to be of interest to anyone, with the possible exception of our friends over the channel, but other personal information could be. The Duolingo data was put up for sale on the dark web, so it might be regarded as third party BPDs. It is important that the Minister clarifies the meaning of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to those two scenarios.
Labour Members are not opposed to the concept of “low or no reasonable expectation of privacy” in relation to BPDs. We want to ensure that the police and security services are not unnecessarily limited in their intelligence gathering, but there need to be parameters for what is considered fair game. There must be clarity on important definitions relating to personal data. I hope that the Minister will respond in the constructive spirit in which the amendment was intended.
11:58:53
Stuart C. McDonald
Clause 2 will remove the need for further judicial authorisation for personal dataset retention and examination if the datasets are deemed to fit into the low or no category, for which there is already authorisation, or if there is urgency. Many personal datasets can be contained within one warrant, so we have lots of questions about how proposed new part 7A will work. Amendment 14 demands an explanation of how the regime fits alongside data protection standards and how it applies to leaked and hacked datasets, as opposed to those that are lawfully obtained.
Our amendment 21 simply seeks to push the Minister to give examples of personal datasets that would be considered to have a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. I refer hon. Members to a letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), which has been shared with us all:
“There is perhaps some ambiguity or confusion as to what data is envisaged to be caught by these provisions. For example, is it merely online encyclopaedias, Companies House registers or news articles; or would it also cover, for example, quite extensive discussions over the internet or mass voice or face images, as has been mentioned in evidence?”
That is the question that we are getting at here.
The whole concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy seems to have been borrowed from the US, where it has been criticised for permitting fairly intrusive surveillance at quite a considerable scale. To my mind, it difficult to grasp the concept or even understand how the test to be applied. It is bad not just for citizens in general, but for people who are having to make these decisions who are not absolutely clear whether or not they can consider a set of data to have a low or no expectation of privacy.
Would bulk datasets of CCTV images or Facebook posts be no/low? How can someone assess whether a bulk personal dataset falls into the category if they do not know all the information within it because they cannot see it until they have a warrant? If the dataset contains information about many thousands or millions of people, with different types of information about different people, how can there be one single level of expectation? People with a low expectation of complete privacy might reasonably have a high expectation that their data will not be retained and processed by the intelligence services.
Why is the sensitivity of the data not expressly mentioned in the Bill? That should surely be pivotal, particularly if the Government want to operate within our human rights obligations. There is no clarity in the Bill to reassure us that sensitive information such as health data would absolutely not be captured by these provisions. Why could that not be on the face of the Bill? Why is publication the important factor instead? Publication in the context of small Facebook groups, for example, does not mean that there are no expectations that security services would not hold that information.
Our amendment 21 simply seeks to push the Minister to give examples of personal datasets that would be considered to have a low or no reasonable expectation of privacy. I refer hon. Members to a letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), which has been shared with us all:
“There is perhaps some ambiguity or confusion as to what data is envisaged to be caught by these provisions. For example, is it merely online encyclopaedias, Companies House registers or news articles; or would it also cover, for example, quite extensive discussions over the internet or mass voice or face images, as has been mentioned in evidence?”
That is the question that we are getting at here.
The whole concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy seems to have been borrowed from the US, where it has been criticised for permitting fairly intrusive surveillance at quite a considerable scale. To my mind, it difficult to grasp the concept or even understand how the test to be applied. It is bad not just for citizens in general, but for people who are having to make these decisions who are not absolutely clear whether or not they can consider a set of data to have a low or no expectation of privacy.
Would bulk datasets of CCTV images or Facebook posts be no/low? How can someone assess whether a bulk personal dataset falls into the category if they do not know all the information within it because they cannot see it until they have a warrant? If the dataset contains information about many thousands or millions of people, with different types of information about different people, how can there be one single level of expectation? People with a low expectation of complete privacy might reasonably have a high expectation that their data will not be retained and processed by the intelligence services.
Why is the sensitivity of the data not expressly mentioned in the Bill? That should surely be pivotal, particularly if the Government want to operate within our human rights obligations. There is no clarity in the Bill to reassure us that sensitive information such as health data would absolutely not be captured by these provisions. Why could that not be on the face of the Bill? Why is publication the important factor instead? Publication in the context of small Facebook groups, for example, does not mean that there are no expectations that security services would not hold that information.
Again, the US precedent is alarming. The Supreme Court rulings appear to suggest that as soon as someone shares any information with a third party, they are giving up on any expectation of further privacy. Making a phone call means that someone is sharing information with a third party about who they call, and it is therefore no longer private. That seems to me a dangerous approach when virtually everything we do involves sharing information with a third party.
I am very worried about how the clause could be interpreted. I absolutely understand the reasons why the powers have been sought, but I very much fear that the way in which the provisions have been drafted will leave them open to some rather more frightening propositions.
I am very worried about how the clause could be interpreted. I absolutely understand the reasons why the powers have been sought, but I very much fear that the way in which the provisions have been drafted will leave them open to some rather more frightening propositions.
12:01:52
Mr Jones
My hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central has been trying to put a definition around this. That needs to happen. If it is not to be in the Bill, the Minister needs to put on the record exactly what his expectations are, because I can see this being challenged in court. Courts are very good at looking back at what is said and what is actually meant in Parliament, so it is quite important.
There are certain categories that no one has any problems with: open Companies House registers are available to anybody, for example, and so is the open electoral register. But how will the closed electoral register be dealt with? I would argue that people who want to be on the closed register would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that data would not be shared. We know that it is, but somebody might challenge that.
Likewise, there are telephone directories. I am not sure whether they are produced any more. Perhaps I am old-fashioned—I am showing my age now. [Interruption.] Well, I am sure they still exist in a digital format. Those who are old enough to remember will know that there was an ex-directory option for people who did not want their name published; someone could make a conscious decision that they did not want their private phone number to be in the public record. Now it must be all online, but how will that be dealt with? With a directory on which everyone’s number is publicly available, I would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that was public data; I think everyone would assume that. Where they are ex-directory, however, I think most people would reasonably expect their data not to be shared with anybody.
“No expectation of privacy” is very clear—it means things that are publicly available—but “no reasonable expectation” is a dance on the head of a pin. People’s interpretations of what is reasonable will be different. I am reassured that the agencies have protocols for dealing with that, and I am not suggesting for one minute that they will be on fishing expeditions, but we need some clarity on what it all means.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made a point about Facebook and other types of social media. For those who are interested, my “North Durham morning” posts are on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter, or X. I have been doing them for many years.
There are certain categories that no one has any problems with: open Companies House registers are available to anybody, for example, and so is the open electoral register. But how will the closed electoral register be dealt with? I would argue that people who want to be on the closed register would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that data would not be shared. We know that it is, but somebody might challenge that.
Likewise, there are telephone directories. I am not sure whether they are produced any more. Perhaps I am old-fashioned—I am showing my age now. [Interruption.] Well, I am sure they still exist in a digital format. Those who are old enough to remember will know that there was an ex-directory option for people who did not want their name published; someone could make a conscious decision that they did not want their private phone number to be in the public record. Now it must be all online, but how will that be dealt with? With a directory on which everyone’s number is publicly available, I would think that there was a reasonable expectation that that was public data; I think everyone would assume that. Where they are ex-directory, however, I think most people would reasonably expect their data not to be shared with anybody.
“No expectation of privacy” is very clear—it means things that are publicly available—but “no reasonable expectation” is a dance on the head of a pin. People’s interpretations of what is reasonable will be different. I am reassured that the agencies have protocols for dealing with that, and I am not suggesting for one minute that they will be on fishing expeditions, but we need some clarity on what it all means.
The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East made a point about Facebook and other types of social media. For those who are interested, my “North Durham morning” posts are on Instagram, Facebook and Twitter, or X. I have been doing them for many years.
Peter Dowd
Bootle
Very nice they are, too.
Mr Jones
I have no reasonable expectation that those posts are private. I am not suggesting that the security services will want to look at North Durham mornings, but those posts are something that I have put in the public domain. That is fine, but it is different from what the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East was talking about. We might share a photograph or information on a small Facebook group, but do we expect everyone to have access to it? I am not sure that we do. Where does that fit into the definition of “reasonable expectation”? Would the individual think that it was available? That is the point.
12:06:19
Sir John Hayes
The right hon. Gentleman is making a persuasive argument about public expectations of what is reasonable versus what the Bill says and what the agencies do. He is right that there are good operational validations through the agencies’ protocols, but perhaps the best way of explaining the marriage between expectation and what is real would be by example. It would be helpful to hear some examples from the Minister of how the powers that are currently used, and those that will be used under the Bill, are necessary and proportionate; for all these things are about necessity and proportionality. By example, we can probably put this matter to bed.
12:07:05
Mr Jones
Yes. A point was also raised about leaked data. If something is leaked on the internet or any other portal and everyone has access to it, do we then assume that the security services think that it comes under “reasonable expectation”, even though the individual whose data it was perhaps did not want it out there?
I accept that under proposed new section 226B(4)(b),
“the authorisation is necessary for the purpose of the exercise of any function of the intelligence service”,
which is fine. I do not think that people will go on fishing expeditions—we will come on to that issue later— but I note that the phrase “economic well-being” appears later in the Bill, but not in this part. When I have raised the point before, the Government have argued that the phrase is used in other legislation and that they want to be consistent.
If nothing is to be changed in the Bill today or on Report, the Minister needs to put something on the record so that it when somebody challenges this provision in future, which they will, the Government’s intention is clear now and can be interpreted later.
I accept that under proposed new section 226B(4)(b),
“the authorisation is necessary for the purpose of the exercise of any function of the intelligence service”,
which is fine. I do not think that people will go on fishing expeditions—we will come on to that issue later— but I note that the phrase “economic well-being” appears later in the Bill, but not in this part. When I have raised the point before, the Government have argued that the phrase is used in other legislation and that they want to be consistent.
If nothing is to be changed in the Bill today or on Report, the Minister needs to put something on the record so that it when somebody challenges this provision in future, which they will, the Government’s intention is clear now and can be interpreted later.
12:08:51
Owen Thompson
Midlothian
I will be brief. I back up the comments of the right hon. Member for North Durham: much more needs to be done to define clearly what we mean by “low or no”. In many ways, separating the two out would make everything clearer. Everybody can tell what “no expectation of privacy” means. It is when we get to low expectation of privacy that we have debates: “Is it this or is it that?”
The factors considered in determining whether something qualifies as low or no include
“the extent to which…the data has been made public”.
If there is no expectation of privacy, that is obvious, so I do not understand why we cannot have more clarity and say, “This is what we mean by no expectation of privacy, and this is what we mean by low.” It might be fine for us in this room to have an understanding of what we mean, but there needs to be public understanding.
We all know that every time we go on any website, we are asked to click to accept the cookies, and sometimes we cannot progress any further unless we do. Data is being gathered left, right and centre. With the best will in the world, not everyone reads every single line of the terms and conditions. We need to be absolutely clear about exactly what we mean so that legal challenges do not occur down the line.
The factors considered in determining whether something qualifies as low or no include
“the extent to which…the data has been made public”.
If there is no expectation of privacy, that is obvious, so I do not understand why we cannot have more clarity and say, “This is what we mean by no expectation of privacy, and this is what we mean by low.” It might be fine for us in this room to have an understanding of what we mean, but there needs to be public understanding.
We all know that every time we go on any website, we are asked to click to accept the cookies, and sometimes we cannot progress any further unless we do. Data is being gathered left, right and centre. With the best will in the world, not everyone reads every single line of the terms and conditions. We need to be absolutely clear about exactly what we mean so that legal challenges do not occur down the line.
Tom Tugendhat
Before I address those points, I want to address the shadow Minister’s somewhat contentious argument that learning French is not a security issue —that was a bold innovation from him.
The points that have been raised are essential to understanding exactly why the Bill is so important. I will cover the “no” and “low” areas separately, for the reason that the hon. Member for Midlothian touched on. We all know what no expectation is; that has been largely covered, and the reality is that even the slightly more restricted version of the electoral register is shared with political parties, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows.
The points that have been raised are essential to understanding exactly why the Bill is so important. I will cover the “no” and “low” areas separately, for the reason that the hon. Member for Midlothian touched on. We all know what no expectation is; that has been largely covered, and the reality is that even the slightly more restricted version of the electoral register is shared with political parties, as the right hon. Member for North Durham knows.
Mr Jones
I agree with the Minister on party access— we get access to it, for example. However, does the person who ticks that box and takes their name out have a reasonable expectation? Do they know that it is being shared? No, they do not.
Tom Tugendhat
That is what I was going to say. Although the register is not publicly available and therefore would not fit in this category, that is where we get to the line. The “no” is for publicly available data, and that is relatively clear.
The “low” comes in areas such as the idea of leaked papers, which somebody raised—forgive me, I cannot remember who. That is where the Bill sets out terms under which datasets should be considered, because of course it is impossible for me to give an answer that applies to every single dataset into the future. One example that came up recently, as right hon. and hon. Members will remember, is the Panama papers. One would not argue for a second that the people listed in those papers had an expectation of openness initially. However, after those papers had been published and republished over many years, at what stage do we really think the expectation of privacy is maintained?
That is where the dataset becomes low expectation. We have set out the oversight regime in another area of the Bill, but I will touch on it. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a range of responsibilities, the judicial commissioners have other responsibilities for approving warrants and IPCO has responsibility for overseeing the regime. That is where that is addressed—in slightly ways at each moment of influence and each moment of power, but everything is covered.
The “low” comes in areas such as the idea of leaked papers, which somebody raised—forgive me, I cannot remember who. That is where the Bill sets out terms under which datasets should be considered, because of course it is impossible for me to give an answer that applies to every single dataset into the future. One example that came up recently, as right hon. and hon. Members will remember, is the Panama papers. One would not argue for a second that the people listed in those papers had an expectation of openness initially. However, after those papers had been published and republished over many years, at what stage do we really think the expectation of privacy is maintained?
That is where the dataset becomes low expectation. We have set out the oversight regime in another area of the Bill, but I will touch on it. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a range of responsibilities, the judicial commissioners have other responsibilities for approving warrants and IPCO has responsibility for overseeing the regime. That is where that is addressed—in slightly ways at each moment of influence and each moment of power, but everything is covered.
Kevin Foster
Torbay
I am interested in the Minister’s example of the Panama papers. As he rightly says, when those papers were originally held by a bank or a financial institution, there would be an expectation of privacy. However, he is alluding to where they are sourced from. Those papers have been freely circulating on the open internet and anyone can download them, and it is at that point that the low or no expectation would come in. Rather than the nature of the document itself, it is the fact that it is easily available online that matters.
Tom Tugendhat
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The reality is that once papers are effectively public, the argument for privacy somewhat falls away. That is exactly where we are getting to in this area, which is why we have looked at how to oversee it and the different elements within it. Part 7A explains the oversight regime clearly and section 226A really gets to the nub of it.
It is important that we focus there, where the argument comes back to the essential element: when considering whether intelligence services have applied the test correctly, the judicial commissioner will apply the same principles that a court would apply on application for judicial review. We therefore have an internal legal process overseeing this before it would even get to any legal challenge. That is why it is more robust than some voices have gently suggested, and covers many of those internal challenges.
It is important that we focus there, where the argument comes back to the essential element: when considering whether intelligence services have applied the test correctly, the judicial commissioner will apply the same principles that a court would apply on application for judicial review. We therefore have an internal legal process overseeing this before it would even get to any legal challenge. That is why it is more robust than some voices have gently suggested, and covers many of those internal challenges.
Dan Jarvis
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 22, in clause 2, page 4, leave out lines 27 to 30.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 23, in clause 2, page 5, leave out lines 1 to 14.
This amendment would remove proposed new section 226BA, thereby removing the ability to grant “category authorisations”.
Amendment 24, in clause 2, page 5, line 17, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 25, in clause 2, page 5, leave out lines 23 to 25.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 26, in clause 2, page 5, line 34, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 27, in clause 2, page 5, line 39, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 28, in clause 2, page 7, line 3, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 29, in clause 2, page 7, line 27, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 30, in clause 2, page 8, leave out lines 6 to 15.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 31, in clause 2, page 8, leave out lines 19 to 23.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 32, in clause 2, page 8, line 37, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 33, in clause 2, page 8, line 41, leave out from “authorisation” to “they” on page 9, line 1.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 34, in clause 2, page 9, leave out lines 14 to 16.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 35, in clause 2, page 9, leave out from the beginning of line 38 to the end of line 13 on page 10.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 36, in clause 2, page 11, leave out lines 17 to 29.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 37, in clause 2, page 11, leave out lines 32 and 33.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 23, in clause 2, page 5, leave out lines 1 to 14.
This amendment would remove proposed new section 226BA, thereby removing the ability to grant “category authorisations”.
Amendment 24, in clause 2, page 5, line 17, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 25, in clause 2, page 5, leave out lines 23 to 25.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 26, in clause 2, page 5, line 34, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 27, in clause 2, page 5, line 39, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 28, in clause 2, page 7, line 3, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 29, in clause 2, page 7, line 27, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 30, in clause 2, page 8, leave out lines 6 to 15.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 31, in clause 2, page 8, leave out lines 19 to 23.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 32, in clause 2, page 8, line 37, leave out “or a category authorisation”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 33, in clause 2, page 8, line 41, leave out from “authorisation” to “they” on page 9, line 1.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 34, in clause 2, page 9, leave out lines 14 to 16.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 35, in clause 2, page 9, leave out from the beginning of line 38 to the end of line 13 on page 10.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 36, in clause 2, page 11, leave out lines 17 to 29.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Amendment 37, in clause 2, page 11, leave out lines 32 and 33.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 23.
Stuart C. McDonald
First, unless I was distracted, I do not think I got a specific answer on the types of data mentioned in the amendment—for example a Facebook post, CCTV footage or anything else.
Tom Tugendhat
Those are covered under sensitive data areas; they would not be covered under bulk personal data. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned health data, and he is absolutely right that I did not answer that. I should be absolutely clear: it is hard to envision a case in which health data would be considered “low or no”, unless it was of very ancient historical standing, or there were other exceptional reasons.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful for that. Could the Minister perhaps follow up on that in writing? That is useful to have on the record.
This discussion is mainly about amendment 23; the other amendments are all consequential. Basically, the amendments would remove the concept of category authorisations from the Bill. Again, I take the same approach as the shadow Minister; I will not be pushing any of these amendments to a vote, but they are designed to probe and allow for debate on some of the important concepts in the Bill.
It is this clause, and the notion of category authorisations, that leads to the restricted judicial oversight of the “low or no” categories that are being retained. It would be useful for the Minister to give us an example here of what a category authorisation might look like. I am not on the ISC, so it is hard for me to understand exactly how broadly they might be drafted. I absolutely appreciate that there are operational reasons why the Government might have to be careful about the examples they give. However, to provide some reassurance, I am sure it would be possible to put on record what one of these authorisations might look like, just so we know how broadly they will be drafted, or indeed how focused they will be.
The Minister spoke a little about oversight at the end of his previous contribution, but it is the oversight of category authorisations that causes me some concern. The tests for a category authorisation set out in proposed new section 226BA of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 are simply that it must be classed as “low or no” and that the decision has been approved by a judicial commissioner. There are none of the other tests that are set out for the individual authorisation, such as it being necessary for the
“exercise of any function of the intelligence service,”
that it
“is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved,”
or that there are various arrangements in place.
It seems to me that the degree of oversight at the stage of granting a category authorisation is far more restricted. That has a knock-on consequence: when the judicial commissioner comes to review the granting of a category authorisation, they are only then considering whether it applies to a “low or no” group of datasets. The judicial commissioner, even on the low-level judicial review criteria, does not look at whether the category authorisation will be necessary or proportionate, or any of the other tests for the other authorisation.
This discussion is mainly about amendment 23; the other amendments are all consequential. Basically, the amendments would remove the concept of category authorisations from the Bill. Again, I take the same approach as the shadow Minister; I will not be pushing any of these amendments to a vote, but they are designed to probe and allow for debate on some of the important concepts in the Bill.
It is this clause, and the notion of category authorisations, that leads to the restricted judicial oversight of the “low or no” categories that are being retained. It would be useful for the Minister to give us an example here of what a category authorisation might look like. I am not on the ISC, so it is hard for me to understand exactly how broadly they might be drafted. I absolutely appreciate that there are operational reasons why the Government might have to be careful about the examples they give. However, to provide some reassurance, I am sure it would be possible to put on record what one of these authorisations might look like, just so we know how broadly they will be drafted, or indeed how focused they will be.
The Minister spoke a little about oversight at the end of his previous contribution, but it is the oversight of category authorisations that causes me some concern. The tests for a category authorisation set out in proposed new section 226BA of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 are simply that it must be classed as “low or no” and that the decision has been approved by a judicial commissioner. There are none of the other tests that are set out for the individual authorisation, such as it being necessary for the
“exercise of any function of the intelligence service,”
that it
“is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved,”
or that there are various arrangements in place.
It seems to me that the degree of oversight at the stage of granting a category authorisation is far more restricted. That has a knock-on consequence: when the judicial commissioner comes to review the granting of a category authorisation, they are only then considering whether it applies to a “low or no” group of datasets. The judicial commissioner, even on the low-level judicial review criteria, does not look at whether the category authorisation will be necessary or proportionate, or any of the other tests for the other authorisation.
Sir John Hayes
I do not want to do the Minister’s job for him, because I am sure he will say this anyway, but when an application is made by an agency for the acquisition and retention of bulk personal datasets, a specific case needs to be made in the warrant application, and a particular case has to be made where that application applies to exceptional material. That case is considered through the double-lock mechanism by both the judicial commissioner and the Minister. That case needs to specify the reason that it is necessary for operational purposes.
Stuart C. McDonald
It is useful to have that explanation. I understand that is the existing process, as the 2016 Act applies just now. However, my simple question concerns the fact that that does not seem to be what is set out here.
Tom Tugendhat
I will just answer that directly, as the hon. Gentleman seems to be running away with this issue slightly. The test set out in proposed new section 226A still applies to all datasets. It is not removed; it goes through the whole thing.
Stuart C. McDonald
That is useful to know. I will pray in aid the fact that we did not have any witnesses; anything I say that is daft, and anywhere that I do not understand how the Bill operates, I will blame on the lack of witnesses.
That is useful to know. I will go away and look at that and make sure that that all makes sense to me. That just leaves me with my earlier request: can we have some examples of what a category authorisation looks like? I can imagine that they could be incredibly broadly drafted, but they could also be very narrow. It would be useful to get a better understanding of how they will operate.
My final point is that the Government’s case appears to centre quite largely on using the material for machine learning. We have heard about language, online encyclopaedias and whatever else. If nothing else, why not use this streamlined process on that category of information and keep the existing processes in place for everything else?
That is useful to know. I will go away and look at that and make sure that that all makes sense to me. That just leaves me with my earlier request: can we have some examples of what a category authorisation looks like? I can imagine that they could be incredibly broadly drafted, but they could also be very narrow. It would be useful to get a better understanding of how they will operate.
My final point is that the Government’s case appears to centre quite largely on using the material for machine learning. We have heard about language, online encyclopaedias and whatever else. If nothing else, why not use this streamlined process on that category of information and keep the existing processes in place for everything else?
Tom Tugendhat
I welcome the spirit in which the hon. Gentleman approaches this issue. He is asking important questions, and I do not challenge at all the validity of the way he has approached the issue; in fact, I should put on record that I am grateful for the way the whole House, and this Committee in particular, have approached it. It is important that any questions that any Member has, particularly the questions honourably and reasonably raised by the hon. Gentleman, are addressed.
The hon. Gentleman’s question on category authorisation is important, because the individual authorisation authorises the retention or retention and examination of a bulk personal dataset, to which part 7A applies. In other words, for every individual dataset there will be an individual authorisation. The normal rule is that each individual authorisation must be approved in advance by a traditional commissioner, as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings quite rightly addressed.
A category authorisation does not itself authorise the retention or retention and examination of a dataset; rather, the category itself is the means by which the normal rule of prior judicial approval may be disapplied in respect of the individual authorisation of datasets that fall within the description approved by the category authorisation. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East knows, that allows for the internal authorisation of an individual dataset that falls within an existing category. By definition, those categories are narrow enough to be identifiable but large enough to be useful. The reality is that that must be done on a case-by-case basis, but under the watchful eye of not just the unit within the intelligence service that requests it, but a senior officer in that service and a judicial commissioner.
That oversight means that we have an effective way of ensuring that we are able to use bulk personal data as categorised in different areas in a speedy fashion to enable the detection and prevention of harm, but with the oversight regime that the hon. Gentleman quite rightly expects of any apparatus of the state. The intelligence services in particular, for reasons of operational necessity, operate in the shadows, and therefore require an extra guarantee of reliance.
The hon. Gentleman’s question on category authorisation is important, because the individual authorisation authorises the retention or retention and examination of a bulk personal dataset, to which part 7A applies. In other words, for every individual dataset there will be an individual authorisation. The normal rule is that each individual authorisation must be approved in advance by a traditional commissioner, as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings quite rightly addressed.
A category authorisation does not itself authorise the retention or retention and examination of a dataset; rather, the category itself is the means by which the normal rule of prior judicial approval may be disapplied in respect of the individual authorisation of datasets that fall within the description approved by the category authorisation. As the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East knows, that allows for the internal authorisation of an individual dataset that falls within an existing category. By definition, those categories are narrow enough to be identifiable but large enough to be useful. The reality is that that must be done on a case-by-case basis, but under the watchful eye of not just the unit within the intelligence service that requests it, but a senior officer in that service and a judicial commissioner.
That oversight means that we have an effective way of ensuring that we are able to use bulk personal data as categorised in different areas in a speedy fashion to enable the detection and prevention of harm, but with the oversight regime that the hon. Gentleman quite rightly expects of any apparatus of the state. The intelligence services in particular, for reasons of operational necessity, operate in the shadows, and therefore require an extra guarantee of reliance.
Stuart C. McDonald
I will go away and consider what the Minister said. Our basic issue here is that a process is in place whereby every single individual dataset must be approved and have the approval and authorisation of a judicial commissioner. Under this scheme, if there is a category authorisation and then an individual authorisation under it, there will not necessarily be any involvement from a judicial commissioner. That is the bit that we have an issue with.
Tom Tugendhat
May I come back straightaway on that? To be clear, category authorisations are reviewed by IPCO at the very latest a year—12 months—after the authorisation, but they could actually be reviewed at any point. I am afraid the idea that a category authorisation stands forever just because it has been allowed is not accurate—I know that is not what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting. The judicial commissioner would have oversight of the wider category authorisation, and the IPCO review means that the whole thing is checked at the very latest every 12 months, and probably more frequently than that.
Stuart C. McDonald
Again, I get all that, and I do not think that we are really at cross-purposes. However, we are talking about 12 months of access to datasets without necessarily having them before a judicial commissioner.
I do not think that anyone disputes that this is a slightly weaker form of oversight, which is because the services want to access this material at scale and regard the existing oversight mechanisms as cumbersome, slow and whatever else. We still ask the question of whether there is another way to do that that would still involve judicial commissioners but happen much more randomly and at scale. However, we will go away and consider that. I repeat my request—I know it is not easy—for some examples to reassure members of the public on how exactly this will work. That would be useful. In the meantime, I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I do not think that anyone disputes that this is a slightly weaker form of oversight, which is because the services want to access this material at scale and regard the existing oversight mechanisms as cumbersome, slow and whatever else. We still ask the question of whether there is another way to do that that would still involve judicial commissioners but happen much more randomly and at scale. However, we will go away and consider that. I repeat my request—I know it is not easy—for some examples to reassure members of the public on how exactly this will work. That would be useful. In the meantime, I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dan Jarvis
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 2, page 5, line 14, at end insert—
“(4) The head of an intelligence service, or a person acting on their behalf, must notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practical after a decision has been taken to include a bulk personal dataset within a category authorisation in effect under this section.”
This amendment would require that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is notified when a new bulk personal dataset is added by an intelligence agency to an existing category authorisation.
“(4) The head of an intelligence service, or a person acting on their behalf, must notify the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practical after a decision has been taken to include a bulk personal dataset within a category authorisation in effect under this section.”
This amendment would require that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is notified when a new bulk personal dataset is added by an intelligence agency to an existing category authorisation.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 38, in clause 2, page 11, line 21, at end insert—
“(1A) The report provided under subsection (1) must include an annex listing the bulk datasets retained or retained and examined under each category authorisation granted during the relevant period.”
This amendment would require information about the scale and nature of use of category authorisations to be provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
“(1A) The report provided under subsection (1) must include an annex listing the bulk datasets retained or retained and examined under each category authorisation granted during the relevant period.”
This amendment would require information about the scale and nature of use of category authorisations to be provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Dan Jarvis
The issue of closing the gap between adding a bulk personal dataset to an existing category authorisation was raised on Second Reading by my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, who has a long-standing interest in these matters. I agree with the argument he made on Second Reading and the simple solution he proposed to close the gap: a one-line email to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical.
Any such email would not be seeking real-time approval and would not necessarily be reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in isolation, but rather as part of a wider trend of what is being added to existing category authorisations. Labour does not seek to create additional work for the men and women who serve in our police and security services. On the contrary, a simple arrangement —to send a single-line email—would enhance wider oversight arrangements, while keeping extra requirements for the police and security services to an absolute minimum. In response to my right hon. Friend on the matter on Second Reading, the Minister said the IPA 2016
“allows the collection… with prior authorisation”
and that
“This is intended to speed the process up.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2024; Vol. 745, c. 556.]
We do not intend to slow the process down through the amendment, as any such notification would be made after it had happened. I therefore ask the Minister whether the problem is the act of notifying the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical, or the potential volume of notifications, that mean he deems it an unworkable arrangement. I would appreciate if he could be as open as possible in answering those questions. If the Government do not accept the amendment, perhaps a conversation could take place between my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, the Minister and myself to agree a practicable solution.
Any such email would not be seeking real-time approval and would not necessarily be reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in isolation, but rather as part of a wider trend of what is being added to existing category authorisations. Labour does not seek to create additional work for the men and women who serve in our police and security services. On the contrary, a simple arrangement —to send a single-line email—would enhance wider oversight arrangements, while keeping extra requirements for the police and security services to an absolute minimum. In response to my right hon. Friend on the matter on Second Reading, the Minister said the IPA 2016
“allows the collection… with prior authorisation”
and that
“This is intended to speed the process up.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2024; Vol. 745, c. 556.]
We do not intend to slow the process down through the amendment, as any such notification would be made after it had happened. I therefore ask the Minister whether the problem is the act of notifying the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practical, or the potential volume of notifications, that mean he deems it an unworkable arrangement. I would appreciate if he could be as open as possible in answering those questions. If the Government do not accept the amendment, perhaps a conversation could take place between my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, the Minister and myself to agree a practicable solution.
Mr Jones
As my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central said, I raised the matter on Second Reading. In no way do I or other members of the ISC want to slow down the process or give more work to the hard-working men and women of our security services. However, as I understand it, the only reason put forward by the Government was that it would impair operational agility.
The amendment proposes, and what I proposed, is not for the security services to go through an authorisation, as my hon. Friend just said; it is literally an email saying, “This is what we are doing.” Members might ask why that is important. It is important because we are giving the security services new powers in the Bill and for IPCO to be informed in real time. I accept the retrospective look at them, but at least if there was a trend, we could see it.
The Government have also tried to argue that there is no need for more oversight because it is a low or no dataset, much lower than those governed by the existing section 7 of the IPA. We have just had the argument about the definition of “low” and “no”, but it means that we are giving the security services additional powers here. I am not for one minute suggesting that the internal protocols within those security services will lead to things that are just a free-for-all, as some might suggest, but it gives that assurance that there is oversight of what is happening in real time.
If we were asking for authorisation of each one, I would accept that it would be too burdensome and would slow down the process, but this is literally a one-line email so the IPCO knows what is needed. I do not understand why the Government are resisting that, except that—let us be honest, Minister—we have form on this. With the National Security Bill, there was an idea that it would be a weakness on the Government’s part to accept any amendments from the ISC. However, there was one slight change made with Lord West’s amendment, so there is possibly a change of attitude. I accept that the Minister respects the ISC—I am not sure it is the same for many people higher up in Government. But that should not be a reason not to accept this very simple amendment, which I think would give people reassurance that there is some real-time oversight of this. If an election was called in the next few weeks, this Bill—
The amendment proposes, and what I proposed, is not for the security services to go through an authorisation, as my hon. Friend just said; it is literally an email saying, “This is what we are doing.” Members might ask why that is important. It is important because we are giving the security services new powers in the Bill and for IPCO to be informed in real time. I accept the retrospective look at them, but at least if there was a trend, we could see it.
The Government have also tried to argue that there is no need for more oversight because it is a low or no dataset, much lower than those governed by the existing section 7 of the IPA. We have just had the argument about the definition of “low” and “no”, but it means that we are giving the security services additional powers here. I am not for one minute suggesting that the internal protocols within those security services will lead to things that are just a free-for-all, as some might suggest, but it gives that assurance that there is oversight of what is happening in real time.
If we were asking for authorisation of each one, I would accept that it would be too burdensome and would slow down the process, but this is literally a one-line email so the IPCO knows what is needed. I do not understand why the Government are resisting that, except that—let us be honest, Minister—we have form on this. With the National Security Bill, there was an idea that it would be a weakness on the Government’s part to accept any amendments from the ISC. However, there was one slight change made with Lord West’s amendment, so there is possibly a change of attitude. I accept that the Minister respects the ISC—I am not sure it is the same for many people higher up in Government. But that should not be a reason not to accept this very simple amendment, which I think would give people reassurance that there is some real-time oversight of this. If an election was called in the next few weeks, this Bill—
12:31:13
Sir John Hayes
I endorse what the right hon. Gentleman said. It is a straightforward matter. The Government could give way on this—because they already have the power to ask for it under existing arrangements—by making it a routine, light-touch process. I take the point that we do not want to impair the alacrity that is necessary for the agency. However, I think a simple change would satisfy the right hon. Gentleman, me, and many others.
12:32:02
Mr Jones
I agree entirely with the right hon. Gentleman. If the amendment goes into the wash-up of the Bill, things like that will have to be included anyway. I do not understand why the Government are dying in a ditch on quite a small amendment that would make no practical difference at all to the operation of this Bill. There are certain people—not including the Minister, who is quite a reasonable individual—who want to make sure that the ISC cannot claim credit for doing anything, which I think is quite sad. If the Minister cannot agree to the amendment as drafted, I echo the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley Central that we draft an amendment that the Government are happy with on Report that fulfils our ambitions on oversight, but that is also practically and technically correct. [Interruption.]
12:32:25
The Chair
I remind members of the public to please turn their electronic devices to silent as well.
12:32:32
Stuart C. McDonald
I will be very brief, because I fully support what the shadow Minister and the right hon. Member for North Durham have said. If we are going to go down the route of somewhat watering down the oversight of certain bulk personal datasets, we need greater transparency and accountability. Our amendment 38 has very similar motivations. It requires complete transparency with the ISC by listing all the bulk personal datasets that would be retained under a category authorisation in the report the Bill requires to be sent to the ISC. It answers the question of how we are supposed to know how these new powers will be and are being used unless we have one of these methods of transparency.
12:33:54
Tom Tugendhat
If I may, I will come to the last point first. The information going to the ISC on this basis would be, as far as possible, the same as that going to the Secretary of State. Obviously, the operational data may not be included, depending on the relevant operational case. I hope that will reassure this Committee and, indeed, the ISC that the intention is to make sure that the ISC is as fully informed as possible.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he will know that the Bill, in many ways, has been a joint project between the Government and the ISC. I have spent many hours with members of the ISC, including the Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and with various members of the Committee. Their input has been exceptionally important to me and has been included in many areas of drafting on this.
Turning to amendment 15, the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, in many ways, have both been the Occam’s razor of the Bill process, not just here, but in other areas. They have been rightly keen that we should not include powers or requirements that would otherwise constrain or block processes or confuse the law. I understand the argument that hon. Members are making about a one-line email, but the reason that I am not convinced—though I am very happy to have the conversation suggested—is that the reality is that it is possible for IPCO to investigate at any point, and it must investigate at 12 months. Therefore, if we ask for a legal requirement on the services, that would force an extra legal duty into the various elements and it will be an extra change.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he will know that the Bill, in many ways, has been a joint project between the Government and the ISC. I have spent many hours with members of the ISC, including the Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), and with various members of the Committee. Their input has been exceptionally important to me and has been included in many areas of drafting on this.
Turning to amendment 15, the right hon. Member for North Durham and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, in many ways, have both been the Occam’s razor of the Bill process, not just here, but in other areas. They have been rightly keen that we should not include powers or requirements that would otherwise constrain or block processes or confuse the law. I understand the argument that hon. Members are making about a one-line email, but the reason that I am not convinced—though I am very happy to have the conversation suggested—is that the reality is that it is possible for IPCO to investigate at any point, and it must investigate at 12 months. Therefore, if we ask for a legal requirement on the services, that would force an extra legal duty into the various elements and it will be an extra change.
12:35:24
Mr Jones
I disagree with the Minister. Yes, IPCO can look back and can go in at any time to look at things, but if it does not know where the needle in the haystack is, how is it going to actually find it in the first place? This is not an onerous proposal, and I do not understand why the Minister is resisting it, to be honest. This measure would just send another reassurance to the public that, again, the extra powers being given to the security services, which I fully support, at least have some oversight. We need to address the Bill in detail and in such a way that we cannot be accused of handing over powers without also providing very light-touch reassurance that there is outside oversight. I accept that, in most cases, IPCO would not actually look at any of these.
12:36:18
Tom Tugendhat
In the spirit with which the right hon. Gentleman has approached this, may I commit to meeting him and the hon. Member for Barnsley Central to discuss this?
12:36:27
Mr Jones
We might do it in the wash-up anyway.
12:36:30
Tom Tugendhat
Well, the right hon. Gentleman could make a virtue of a necessity if he wishes. I certainly will. I shall enjoy meeting him to discuss this, and I hope that he will take that commitment in the spirit with which it is made.
12:36:41
Dan Jarvis
I think that this has been a useful debate. There have been a number of sensible and constructive contributions from both sides of the Committee. The Minister has made a commitment to sit down and discuss this further, and I am grateful for that undertaking. As I have said, we do not intend to push this amendment to a vote.
Peter Dowd
This is as good a time as any to raise this point. If we are going to give the powers to the security services, which nobody objects to with the appropriate oversight, and ask them to do more assessments, more dataset investigations and so on, does my hon. Friend agree that the Minister should give us assurances on resources? Given that we are asking the services to take on additional tasks in one fashion or another, does he agree that we have to set aside the resources? Perhaps, during his meeting with the Minister, he could tease that out a little bit more, because I do not want these powers and responsibilities to be given to the services without them having the appropriate resources— financial and staffing—to do their job.
12:37:53
Mr Jones
Their budget was cut yesterday.
12:37:56
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle. I am happy to give way to the Minister if he wants to respond directly to that point.
12:38:04
Tom Tugendhat
The point about these powers is indeed to make better use of resources. One challenge is that many intelligence officers are tied up doing things that are no longer genuinely necessary for the protection of personal privacy, but they are following processes that, were they to be working for a private organisation —a company or whatever—would no longer be necessary because bulk personal data could simply be bought. Therefore, what we are actually looking at doing is using resources much more efficiently and therefore helping the protection of the British people, from a better financial position. However, the point made by the hon. Member for Bootle on resources is always one that I welcome.
12:38:43
Dan Jarvis
I have nothing further to add, other than to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Duration of bulk personal dataset warrants
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Duration of bulk personal dataset warrants
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 4 stand part.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 3—
Sir John Hayes
We are making sufficient progress, which perhaps permits me to say a word about why, as we have now dealt with those publicly contentious matters around bulk powers, we can move to the next part of the Bill with greater confidence. The Minister has been crystal clear that he—like me, the right hon. Member for North Durham and other members of this Committee—understands fully the important role of oversight and checks and balances. Those checks and balances are multidimensional because of the role of both those elected to this House and the judiciary. I know he will want to expand on that a little as we come to the next part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank my right hon. Friend. Clause 3 amends the duration of bulk personal dataset warrants under section 213 of the IPA from six to 12 months. BPDs tend to be used to support long-term strategic intelligence activities, and a longer warrant duration will enable the value of the BPD to be better demonstrated, which will provide the relevant Secretary of State with a more accurate picture of the necessity and proportionality when an application for renewal is made. The existing part 7 safeguards will remain in place, including the double lock by the judicial commissioner.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Third party bulk personal datasets
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Third party bulk personal datasets
Dan Jarvis
I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 5, page 14, line 34, at end insert—
“(4) A third party BPD warrant may not authorise the examination of a dataset consisting of the contents of the marked electoral register.”
This amendment would prevent a third-party bulk personal dataset consisting of the electoral register, which sets out whether people have voted, from being examined by the intelligence services.
“(4) A third party BPD warrant may not authorise the examination of a dataset consisting of the contents of the marked electoral register.”
This amendment would prevent a third-party bulk personal dataset consisting of the electoral register, which sets out whether people have voted, from being examined by the intelligence services.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.
Dan Jarvis
Amendment 16 relates to third-party BPDs, specifically the use of the marked electoral register, which is a copy of the electoral register usually arranged by a polling station area or ward with names crossed off to indicate who has voted. Copies are available for political parties to buy from local authorities and add to their records, which aid with canvassing and voter engagement on the basis that a person who has previously voted has a higher propensity to vote again, and for that purpose alone.
Compared with the electoral register, the marked electoral register contains a record of individuals who have exercised their democratic right at the ballot box. The Opposition understand entirely that it would be appropriate for copies of the marked electoral register to be examined in an investigation into electoral fraud. Any attempts to undermine our democratic process must be dealt with with the utmost seriousness. However, we do not believe that it is appropriate or proportionate for information relating to voting records, contained in such documents, to be authorised as a third-party BPD. That could establish links between individuals or better understand a subject of interest’s behaviour.
More widely, we have concerns about records of democratic activity, such as any relating to trade union membership, being examined as a third-party BPD. Does the Minister agree that copies of the marked electoral register should be used to defend and strengthen our democratic processes, and for those purposes alone, and that safeguards should be in place to protect other data relating to democratic activity from being examined as a third-party BPD?
Compared with the electoral register, the marked electoral register contains a record of individuals who have exercised their democratic right at the ballot box. The Opposition understand entirely that it would be appropriate for copies of the marked electoral register to be examined in an investigation into electoral fraud. Any attempts to undermine our democratic process must be dealt with with the utmost seriousness. However, we do not believe that it is appropriate or proportionate for information relating to voting records, contained in such documents, to be authorised as a third-party BPD. That could establish links between individuals or better understand a subject of interest’s behaviour.
More widely, we have concerns about records of democratic activity, such as any relating to trade union membership, being examined as a third-party BPD. Does the Minister agree that copies of the marked electoral register should be used to defend and strengthen our democratic processes, and for those purposes alone, and that safeguards should be in place to protect other data relating to democratic activity from being examined as a third-party BPD?
12:44:36
Stuart C. McDonald
I fully understand the questions that have been proposed by the shadow Minister, and it will be interesting to hear the answers that he gets.
On clause 5, it makes sense to ensure that access to third-party bulk personal datasets is subject to the general Investigative Powers Act scheme and oversight regime, including the double lock. Of course, we had extensive debates back in 2016 on whether that double lock was strong enough. My party argued that the judicial review standard was not tough enough and that we should be asking judicial commissioners to look at the positions again on their merits. But we lost that battle, and we are where we are.
Some of these datasets will include hugely personal information on internet searches and shopping history. These profiles can build up a pretty intrusive picture of how we go about our lives, and sometimes not very accurately. We are also talking expressly about personal datasets, which could include health data. That is on the face of the Bill. Does the Minister envisage that such access will be used only to make inquiries on subjects of particular interest, or will it be used for broader trawls of information?
As set out in the letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, there is also concern about how this provision will apply to datasets that have been obtained unlawfully. Should there be additional safeguards on the use of illegally obtained data? What is the Government’s thinking on that?
On clause 5, it makes sense to ensure that access to third-party bulk personal datasets is subject to the general Investigative Powers Act scheme and oversight regime, including the double lock. Of course, we had extensive debates back in 2016 on whether that double lock was strong enough. My party argued that the judicial review standard was not tough enough and that we should be asking judicial commissioners to look at the positions again on their merits. But we lost that battle, and we are where we are.
Some of these datasets will include hugely personal information on internet searches and shopping history. These profiles can build up a pretty intrusive picture of how we go about our lives, and sometimes not very accurately. We are also talking expressly about personal datasets, which could include health data. That is on the face of the Bill. Does the Minister envisage that such access will be used only to make inquiries on subjects of particular interest, or will it be used for broader trawls of information?
As set out in the letter from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, there is also concern about how this provision will apply to datasets that have been obtained unlawfully. Should there be additional safeguards on the use of illegally obtained data? What is the Government’s thinking on that?
Tom Tugendhat
I thank hon. Members for their points. The examination of third-party bulk personal datasets by the intelligence services is vital to their role of protecting the national security and economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom and preventing and detecting serious crime.
Clause 5 places an explicit statutory regime around the intelligence services’ examination, in situ, of bulk datasets held by third parties. The regime would apply only to the intelligence services, in line with the wider part 7 BPD powers in the IPA. The clause puts in place robust oversight and safeguards. For example, third-part dataset warrants are to be subject to a double lock, and the decision to authorise the warrant will need to be approved by both the Secretary of State and an independent judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his office will oversee the regime to ensure the intelligence services’ examination of third-party datasets is both necessary and proportionate. That relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about proportionality and need.
To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, we do not consider it appropriate to exclude specific types of dataset from those for which a third-party dataset warrant can be sought. The reason is, as he knows, that we can begin to go down very tricky routes on this area, as the intelligence services have a requirement to keep safe not just our democracy but our wider nation. Therefore, limiting those different arguments can be problematic. What we are aiming to do is ensure the proportionality requirement is the test applied by both judicial commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The Secretary of State may issue a warrant authorising the examination of a third-party dataset only where it is necessary and proportionate—that is going to be quite a high bar in some of the areas asked about—for the intelligence service to examine the dataset to which the warrant relates. That decision will be double-locked by an independent judicial commissioner who, among other things, is required expressly to review the Secretary of State’s conclusions in respect of necessity and proportionality when deciding whether to approve the decision to issue a warrant. That is already in the Bill. Each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to prior judicial approval.
Clause 5 places an explicit statutory regime around the intelligence services’ examination, in situ, of bulk datasets held by third parties. The regime would apply only to the intelligence services, in line with the wider part 7 BPD powers in the IPA. The clause puts in place robust oversight and safeguards. For example, third-part dataset warrants are to be subject to a double lock, and the decision to authorise the warrant will need to be approved by both the Secretary of State and an independent judicial commissioner. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and his office will oversee the regime to ensure the intelligence services’ examination of third-party datasets is both necessary and proportionate. That relates to the point made by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about proportionality and need.
To answer the point made by the hon. Member for Barnsley Central, we do not consider it appropriate to exclude specific types of dataset from those for which a third-party dataset warrant can be sought. The reason is, as he knows, that we can begin to go down very tricky routes on this area, as the intelligence services have a requirement to keep safe not just our democracy but our wider nation. Therefore, limiting those different arguments can be problematic. What we are aiming to do is ensure the proportionality requirement is the test applied by both judicial commissioners and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The Secretary of State may issue a warrant authorising the examination of a third-party dataset only where it is necessary and proportionate—that is going to be quite a high bar in some of the areas asked about—for the intelligence service to examine the dataset to which the warrant relates. That decision will be double-locked by an independent judicial commissioner who, among other things, is required expressly to review the Secretary of State’s conclusions in respect of necessity and proportionality when deciding whether to approve the decision to issue a warrant. That is already in the Bill. Each decision will be made on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to prior judicial approval.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I have to say, I am struggling to think of a scenario in which it might be necessary and proportionate to examine the marked electoral register. This is something we will reflect on.
Sir John Hayes
I broadly support the Minister’s view of this, but the easiest way to establish the case for this is to be clear about its operational purposes. Clearly, one would not expect the Minister or the agencies to speak about the specifics of operations, but dealing with the operational purposes would help the shadow Minister and the Committee. I am sure the Minister would be happy to do that in broad terms, either now or in writing. It would be really helpful to go through the kinds of operational purposes associated with this inquiry. I do not know what the Minister and the shadow Minister think, but that is how I see it.
Dan Jarvis
That is a helpful and useful suggestion. I am happy to proceed on that basis, if the Minister is.
Tom Tugendhat
I am happy to write to the hon. Member.
12:44:55
Dan Jarvis
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
12:44:55
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 6 makes minor amendments to the 2016 Act to reflect the introduction of parts 7A and 7B, including making it clear that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is responsible for oversight of the part 7B regime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.
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