PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Fourteenth sitting) - 26 February 2025 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

I beg to move amendment 322, in clause 3, page 2, line 13, at end insert—

“except that—

(a) for the purposes of an assessment of capacity under this Act, a person must be assumed not to have capacity unless it is established they do have capacity, and

(b) section 1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 shall not apply.”

This amendment reverses the burden of proof in the Mental Capacity Act, so that those assessing a person’s capacity would not be able to assume that the person has capacity without evidence.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dowd. I accept that we had a long debate on issues relating to mental capacity in respect of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, but we heard in oral evidence significant representations and concerns regarding how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would work in connection with assisted dying. The purpose of the amendment is to reverse the burden of proof in relation to capacity.

In general—rightly, as I have said previously—a person is assumed to have capacity unless it is shown that they do not. As we have heard, that is a deliberately low bar in order to preserve the basic human right to participate in society and to ensure that normal daily life does not require us all to prove that we have capacity every time we make a decision. The downside of that assumption, however, is that in situations of limited or unreliable evidence, or a very borderline case, the person has to be assumed to have capacity. It is surely clear that that could put many people into real danger if such an approach were taken with assisted dying.

We should not be afraid to say that a person who is terminally ill is potentially vulnerable. Depression and stress are common and understandable responses to a terminal diagnosis and, whether we like it or not, some people in our society will prey on the fragile for their own gain. Our job is to confront the risk of someone being given access to an assisted death not because that is their considered wish, but because no conclusive evidence is available to the doctors at the time of the assessment, or because someone is controlling or coercing that person and able to persuade them in favour of an assisted death that they do not truly want by hiding any signs of their impaired capacity until it is too late.

On previous amendments, I have spoken from my personal perspective. As parents of a child with a learning disability, our greatest concern is what will happen to our child after we have gone. That is the principal thing—the sole thing, I think—that keeps my wife and me up in the night: what will be that determination for our daughter one day? I hope that her twin will remain with her, and that her twin will be the person who makes those decisions for her, but that may of course not be the case. I know that we may have to entrust the state or others to make those determinations for her in due course.

Every parent of a child with a learning disability considers that determination every day. I know that it weighs on their minds not only in connection with this clause; the decisions about their child will also weigh on their minds when we get to clause 4. I am not talking about my daughter’s case, because she does not have enough capacity, but for those people who do have enough capacity—we know from the evidence that the majority of people with a learning disability do have enough capacity—the decisions that may be made for them in due course will weigh on their minds.

In those circumstances, I suggest it is appropriate and reasonable that the assisted dying process maintains the other principles of the Mental Capacity Act, but reverses the presumption in favour of capacity in order to keep people safe. We have heard that doctors are familiar with the Act, including in cases where people sometimes do and sometimes do not have capacity. On that basis, it is not a great leap for them to look for evidence that a person does have capacity, rather than the opposite. That is a normal exercise of their judgment. It is a compassionate and common-sense approach.

I remind Members of what I have said previously about the position of the Law Society: the issue of what capacity should mean, and how to assess it, is central to the Bill. The Law Society considers that the Bill should be clearer in its approach to capacity for the purposes of ending a terminally ill person’s life. Although expert opinion may reasonably differ on whether to use the Mental Capacity Act approach or to introduce a stand-alone definition, the utmost clarity is required if the Bill’s safeguards are to be robust and effective. The Law Society’s recommendation is that before the clause becomes law, a comprehensive consultation should be undertaken to allow relevant experts to share views on the appropriate definition of capacity for the purpose of the Bill.

I will not quote everything again—I have quoted it all previously—but we have heard oral evidence on this matter, including concerns about how the Mental Capacity Act may be interpreted, from Professor House, through Baroness Falkner, Fazilet Hadi, Dr Hussain, Chelsea Roff, Professor Owen and Dr Price, to Dan Scorer of Mencap. My amendment is a compassionate and common-sense approach that would provide reassurance to members of the public. I invite the Committee to support it.

Amendment 398, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate, goes further than my amendment, and beyond its scope, but I have some sympathy with it. I will repeat some of what I have said previously, in that I remind the Committee of the statutory principles of the Mental Capacity Act:

“A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity…A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps”—

that remains a grave concern of mine—

“to help him to do so have been taken without success”,

and a person

“is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision.”

I remain happy to stand corrected, as I have continued to ask for clarification on this matter, but my point that doctors or other professionals would have to take all practical steps to help them to make a decision related to assisted death has not been challenged. The matter was clearly considered to some degree previously, given that clause 62 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 states:

“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that nothing in this Act is to be taken to affect the law relating to murder or manslaughter or the operation of section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961…(assisting suicide).”

I also challenge whether the Bill’s authors have considered all the scenarios outlined in chapter 3 of the Mental Capacity Act code of practice, entitled “How should people be helped to make their own decisions?”, and particularly those relating to the involvement of family members and carers. Similarly, in chapter 4, “How does the Act define a person’s capacity to make a decision and how should capacity be assessed?”, the code states at paragraph 4.50:

“For certain kinds of complex decisions (for example, making a will), there are specific legal tests…in addition to the two-stage test for capacity.”

Those tests are laid out, but they do not include this scenario.

As I did yesterday, I refer to the Equality and Human Rights Commission paper provided to Members in advance of Second Reading:

“A vital factor in determining how to manage access to assisted dying will be the concept of mental capacity in the context of a decision of this nature and gravity. It will be important to ensure that all decision-makers involved in the process have a full and clear understanding of the law around mental capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Sensitive consideration must be given, in particular, to the interaction between mental capacity, mental health issues, learning disabilities and conditions such as autism. Clause 30 of the bill states that the Secretary of State ‘may’ issue codes of practice…However, it does not oblige them to do so.”

For those reasons, I remain concerned about continuing to use the full definition under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I therefore commend the amendment to the Committee.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford for his sensitive and well presented amendment. I have a couple of things to say about it.

My hon. Friend says that the Mental Capacity Act is a low bar, but in the Act it is important that when we assess people for mental capacity we look at the gravity and complexity of the situation, and therefore take more consideration of deeper understanding of the issues if the gravity of the decision is very enhanced. There is scope within the Mental Capacity Act to take in these types of assisted dying assessments.

I hear that. There are different decisions, whether it is buying a coffee or seeking an assisted death. Would my hon. Friend concur that, for some individuals in those scenarios who may be by themselves because of the circumstances of their lives and about whose capacity there may be doubt, the doctor must presume in the first instance that they have capacity, and that the doctor must assist them in making a decision?

Yes, I totally accept that. The Mental Capacity Act is set so that we assume capacity and look for evidence of lack of capacity. The great danger with the amendment is that it would change a whole raft of very well used provisions. As Professor Whitty said, the Act is used up and down the country every day; I have used it myself many times, and taught it as well. If we change the emphasis from the presumption of capacity to the presumption of incapacity, which is what my hon. Friend is suggesting, that is a major change in the Act.

Given what my hon. Friend has just said—that he accepts the premise of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford that the doctor would have to assist—can he help me to understand where that leaves the issue of autonomy if a doctor is, as he has agreed, allowed to assist in the decision?

The way the doctor assists, if making a mental capacity assessment, is to try to tease out the four concepts. Does the patient understand what they are being asked to agree to? Sometimes mental capacity assessments are very straightforward and last five minutes; sometimes they last an hour. I have done one that lasted about 90 minutes because it was really important to tease out whether the patient genuinely understood what they were doing. That is the sort of assistance I am talking about. It is not about trying to persuade them to make a decision that I think is the right decision; it is just making sure that they understand it, can remember it and so on.

How does my hon. Friend respond to not one, not two, but multiple witnesses, including the Royal College of Psychiatrists, saying, absolutely contrary to what he is saying, that the Mental Capacity Act is not the right bar and that the bar is too low?

Well, that was disputed by other psychiatrists. We are asking questions about whether the Mental Capacity Act is safe and correct for the Bill. This whole Committee is about making the Bill safe. None of us would dispute that. However, I think that if we accept the amendment, the Bill will become less safe because the amendment would change a massive piece of legislation and therefore have a number of repercussions that we do not understand.

Chris Whitty made the same point that the hon. Gentleman has just made: that there would be knock-on effects and that the Mental Capacity Act works very well currently. Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that Chris Whitty himself misrepresented the Mental Capacity Act in the evidence he gave to the Committee? He had to write to us subsequently to clarify his comment, and his clarification contradicted the hon. Gentleman’s implication that the Mental Capacity Act has different thresholds for different levels of decision. Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that it does not? The Act has one threshold: capacity as it defines it. Some doctors may have longer conversations than others depending on the severity of the case, but the threshold is the same—Chris Whitty misrepresented it.

I agree that the threshold is the same: does the patient have capacity or not? That is the single threshold. We often do mental capacity assessments for inheritance, control of bank accounts and that sort of thing; sometimes we do a very quick mental capacity assessment about the refusal of treatment. How long we take depends on how important the decision is. I suggest that a doctor assessing someone’s capacity to make a decision to end their life would have a serious, long discussion—up to 90 minutes, or possibly even two hours—to make sure that the doctor is convinced that the patient has capacity. The threshold is the same—it is about whether they have capacity—but that does not mean that the conversation is the same. In clinical terms, it is very clear that a conversation on those grounds would be much more involved than, for example, whether a person sees a dentist or not, or other conversations like that.

I totally understand the concerns that the amendment has been tabled to cover; however, my main point is that if we accept the amendment, it will make the Bill less safe. The reason for that is that, as I have said before, if we change something that is well used, and repeatedly used, it will make the interpretation much more complicated. We will have to re-train all the doctors and, I think, it will not protect patients.

At risk of repeating something said in a previous sitting, does the hon. Gentleman accept that the amendment is not trying to amend the Mental Capacity Act itself, and it is not trying to change how the Mental Capacity Act is used in the majority of situations in which it is already used? All it is trying to say is that in this particular circumstance the Act needs to be applied in a different way. We are not trying to rewrite the Act in itself or any aspect of the way in which it is currently used.

I understand what the amendment is trying to do; my argument is that it will not achieve that because it will muddy the waters of a mental capacity assessment, which will make how we do it less safe. I would also like to return to Professor Whitty’s comments and to say that in the majority of cases mental capacity is very clear. It does not actually take very long to assess whether someone has mental capacity.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

It is really important to understand that for the majority of people mental capacity can be assessed reasonably quickly because it is very clear whether they have it or do not have it. What we are talking about, I think, is a small proportion of patients in which it is unclear whether they have mental capacity. There is scope in the Bill for those circumstances, when the patient should be referred to an enhanced level of mental capacity assessment by a psychiatrist or a psychological nurse. In that way, it makes it much safer. We do not need to redesign the Act for that small number of patients because we already have a very safe route to assess capacity.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way; he has been generous with his time. I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has seen the evidence from Alex Ruck Keene KC on mental capacity. He sets out very clearly the myths around mental capacity, one of which is that mental capacity is well understood. He argues that it is not. How would the hon. Gentleman respond to that?

I think that in most cases mental capacity is very well understood, and it is very clear, as I have said. I would say that, as practising clinicians, almost every GP has to do it. I would not sign up a doctor in training if they could not do it. I think it is a little bit rich to suggest that we cannot assess capacity. I agree with many of the comments that have been made about assessing capacity in more difficult cases for most doctors, and I think we do need an avenue, in those situations, to get further opinions.

The hon. Gentleman said it would be rich for people to say that capacity cannot be assessed. That is not the case. I am not convinced about that, and I am not sure, from the evidence I have seen, that anybody is saying that anybody is not capable of assessing capacity per se. Would the hon. Gentleman agree that the argument is about assessing capacity for this Bill in particular? That has not been tested. The Royal College of Psychiatrists is very clear, as are many other experts, including legal experts, that the Bill has not been tested for that purpose. Therefore, the Mental Capacity Act does not meet the purpose for the Bill.

I feel that the Committee has been through these points quite extensively. There is clearly a disagreement in our beliefs; I accept that, but it is very important to make the Bill as simple as possible, because that is the best safeguard. I believe that the Mental Capacity Act is the right test for whether people have capacity. I reiterate that if there is a doubt in the clinician’s mind, there should be an avenue to get an expert opinion on capacity.

Is my hon. Friend reassured, as I am, that although we are focusing here on one conversation, we know from the provisions in the Bill that there will be multiple conversations? There will be a doctor, a second doctor, a psychiatrist, and then oversight by an expert panel. It is not just one assessment of capacity; there are multiple occasions. Does that reassure my hon. Friend, and hopefully other colleagues?

It does reassure me, and I think it should reassure other Committee members. Having eight different people doing a capacity assessment is a very thorough safeguard for capacity. We have gone through the arguments many times in this Committee, but I do not feel that changing the polarity of mental capacity will do anything to make patients in this situation any safer. That is why I do not agree with the amendment. For fear of being interrupted any more, I think I will leave it at that.

I apologise for arriving late; thank you for calling me to speak anyway, Mr Dowd. I rise to speak in favour of amendment 50, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) and to which I have also put my name. I am conscious that we have been through many of the arguments about the Mental Capacity Act today and at an earlier sitting, but I am keen to press the amendment to a vote, because I think it would address some of the issues that have arisen.

The point of dispute appears to be whether the Mental Capacity Act, as it is currently operated for all the purposes for which it is used—I have no doubt that it is a very effective piece of legislation that is widely used and understood by clinicians everywhere, as the hon. Member for Stroud says—is the appropriate measure and tool to use for the Bill. This decision that people are embarking on is like no other, so I think it right and proper to consider whether the Act is the appropriate way to measure whether people are able to make it.

It is useful to reflect on the experience of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who drafted the amendment. I am conscious of the comments that the hon. Member for Ipswich made yesterday about poorly drafted amendments. My understanding is that the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has extensive expertise in the area; he is an expert in mental capacity assessment, and I dare say that if he were in the room he would have many useful and interesting things to say. That is why I think his amendment bears greater weight, to the extent that one Member’s amendment should be regarded as any better than another’s.

Key to the Mental Capacity Act is the capacity test, which is about the ability to understand, retain, use and weigh the relevant information. The amendment attempts to address what it means to make an informed decision. Dr Annabel Price, who gave oral evidence to the Committee in her role with the Royal College of Psychiatrists, said that people planning to make the decision of seeking an assisted death

“would need to be able to understand the impact of the substance they are taking and what the likely positives and negatives of that are…The informed consent process is different from a refusal of treatment, and the informed consent process feeds into the capacity assessment.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 277, Q361.]

The point, which has come up in previous debates, is whether an informed decision to refuse treatment can be regarded as the same as an informed decision to end one’s life. My personal view is that the two things are quite different, and that a different standard of capacity should therefore be brought to bear on the decision.

I support amendment 50 because it sets out in detail how the Mental Capacity Act should be used specifically in relation to this decision. As I said in an intervention on the hon. Member for Stroud, it would not change the Act or tamper in any way with how it is currently used; it would merely specify the particular ways in which it should be used in relation to the decision.

I hear what the hon. Member said about doctors’ use of the Act, as well as what the chief medical officer said. I am also conscious of what the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has said about the variety of experience that he has, as a parent, with professionals’ understanding of the Act. That came across in a lot of the oral evidence. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said, the chief medical officer himself had to clarify the remarks that he made to the Committee in oral evidence. The chief medical officer implied that there were different ways of applying the Act depending on the decision to be made, but there are not—that was a very clear clarification. That implies that there is a difference in the way doctors approach the use of the Act. We cannot have a difference of approach when it comes to a decision of such momentous importance as the decision whether someone has the capacity to choose to end their life.

The amendment reflects the fact that there is value in attempting to standardise how the Mental Capacity Act should be used in relation to the decision. That is why we should agree to it: it is important that Members of this House make a clear statement in the Bill about what we expect doctors to do as they approach an assessment of capacity. We should specify the minimum understanding of capacity to choose an assisted death, which includes an understanding of the likely process of all treatment options, including non-treatment and prognostic uncertainty.

In her evidence, Dr Rachel Clarke said:

“I would not be the first person to make the observation that sometimes doctors can be very pleased with their own abilities at a particular practice, and that practice might be having a conversation where you are assessing someone’s capacity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 80, Q103.]

Doctors have different assessments of their own ability to assess capacity. That is why a standardised approach, as set out in amendment 50, is so important. I stress how important it is that Parliament be the place where the standards for what MPs expect as an assessment of mental capacity are set. We should be the ones to determine them, rather than leaving them to the vagaries of individual clinicians.

The assessment of capacity and the explanation of treatment options to the person considering an assisted death need to include the extent of prognostic certainty about their illness or condition. We spoke yesterday about the difficulty of knowing whether someone has six or 12 months left to live, and of knowing the extent to which they are going to deteriorate. We also covered in detail the relevant and available care and treatment, including palliative care, hospice care or other care. That needs to be part of the conversation about somebody’s capacity to make the decision.

Amendment 50 states that

“a decision to proceed under this Act does not prevent or make unavailable any care and treatment provision that would normally be provided.”

It would therefore be clear that somebody had assessed the full range of their options. The amendment makes clear a fundamental issue that I do not think is otherwise covered by the Mental Capacity Act, or at least not to this level of specificity, which is that

“the person’s decision to proceed…must be theirs alone and not bound or directed by the views or decisions of others.”

We have talked about the importance of that issue in relation to the Bill as a whole, but it would be valuable to include it in the clause as a specific requirement for assessing somebody’s capability.

Doubts have been expressed across the Committee about whether the Bill goes far enough in assessing the extent to which somebody might be under duress or coercion. Putting such a provision in the Bill, as part of the capacity assessment, would be an important and essential safeguard. Once someone has made the decision to seek an assisted death, is the doctor or assessing person confident that the person could unmake the decision or change their mind at any stage?

As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said, there are eight different opportunities for assessing capacity in the process, the last of which is before the patient takes the medicine that will end their life. At all those stages, it is possible to stop the process, and the patient is in total control.

I do not disagree with anything in amendment 50, but I believe that everything in it is already in the Bill, under other clauses. I do not think that the amendment would add anything to the Bill; it would actually make assessing capacity more confusing, from a legal perspective.

What I would say in reply to the first part of the hon. Member’s intervention is that there are plenty of opportunities for the person to change their mind—although I might slightly indelicately point out that there will eventually not be a further opportunity; that is the point of what we are trying to do—but that does not necessarily mean that the person has the capacity to make the right decision at each of those opportunities. That is what the doctors will need to assess.

I return to my earlier point: it is important that Parliament specify, by way of this amendment, precisely what it means by assessing capacity. In the context of all the evidence we heard that there is not necessarily a standardised approach across the medical profession, it is important that the standardised approach be specified in the legislation. Clause 3 is the appropriate place to specify it.

The other major point is that patients need to understand the process by which the assisted death will be enabled. The Bill states elsewhere that it will be by the ingestion of an “approved substance”. It is important that we understand exactly what that means, or what it might mean. We will doubtless get on to talking about the approved substance and the proper legislation around its use.

We did not speak much during the oral evidence sessions about the use of the approved substance, but it is important that people understand that any medical procedure can fail, including with an approved substance, and we do not know how long the substance will take to be effective. Nor do we know what the patient’s experience will be after taking the approved substance. It is important that they understand, to the extent that it is possible for a doctor to give them the information, what they are undertaking.

In his evidence, Professor House said:

“It is a striking feature of the Bill that informed consent is not really specified properly. The doctor is required to ask the person what they want to happen in the event of complications without having previously explained to them what all the complications might be…There is no standard informed consent form related to the Bill, for example—of the sort that you would expect to sign if you were having a serious intervention in the NHS.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Private Member’s Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 169, Q216.]

He said that informed consent was very underspecified in the Bill. The amendment could start to address that. It is important that people have the capacity to understand what they are undertaking—not just that they are choosing an assisted death, but all the potential attendant risks and complications.

I return to my opening point, which is that it is important that Parliament specify a standard by which mental capacity can be assessed in relation to this specific decision. I feel that I have made the point a number of times, but I will make it once more: we are not proposing to rewrite the Mental Capacity Act or tamper in any way with how it is currently used. We are merely setting a higher bar—a higher standard for how it should be applied in this particular case, because of the very specific nature of the decision that patients are being asked to make in this particular circumstance.

I will pick up on some of the points to which my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud referred, given his expertise. We heard from three senior psychiatrists during the evidence sessions, who were very clear; I have already mentioned much of their evidence. The Royal College of Psychiatrists’ written evidence states:

“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill. Extensive consideration needs to be given to what an assessment of mental capacity should consist of for AD/AS prior to the passing of legislation and, indeed, whether a determination through such an assessment can be reliably arrived at in this novel context.”

It goes on to say that the capacity to end one’s life is “entirely different” from assessing for the capacity of deciding treatment.

The Bill moves us into new territory. We need a definition that meets the criteria of what we are assessing, which is to end one’s life. That has never been applied in this country. The Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, requires assessors to presume that someone has capacity until incapacity can be proven, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford referred to in moving amendment 322.

Dr Annabel Price, Professor Allan House and Professor Gareth Owen all expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person is in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Because there is nothing in the current medical assessment that requires careful explanation of these factors, there is a real worry that there will be no opportunity to change them. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground.

Professor Owen said:

“I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience”.

The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts us into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity issue under consideration. He said:

“It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.]

He further said that we are in “uncharted territory”, because the ideas in the Bill are very novel. That is the hub of the Bill: it requires assessors to assume capacity as a starting point. To make the Bill the safest in the world, that is not the yardstick that we should be applying, according to very senior psychiatrists across the country.

Alex Ruck Keene KC also provided evidence to the Committee. He set out some of the myths in a video. There are a few things in this for me. One is the article in The Telegraph, which senior psychiatrists alluded to, that suggested there was a shortage of specialist psychiatrists. We have already had a conversation about the shortage of judges, but we are now having a conversation about the shortage of psychiatrists. Should the measure remain in the Bill as it stands? I would like to understand from the Minister whether that is something that has been assessed, given that we do not have an impact assessment.

Alex Ruck Keene referred to the National Institute for Health and Care Research, which funded a number of research projects in 2022 under the umbrella topic of implementing the Mental Capacity Act in practice—the rationale being that

“The Mental Capacity Act…is designed to empower and protect people who may lack the mental capacity to make their own decisions about their support and treatment, ranging from everyday issues to more serious, life-changing decisions.”

Evidence has highlighted several aspects of the way that the assessments are being carried out that are not compliant with the Mental Capacity Act. If we already have issues with how the Act is being implemented in the everyday work of the NHS and psychiatrists, how many mistakes will be made if the Bill goes through as it is? How much potential is there for mistakes to be made when assessing the capacity of those who are most vulnerable?

The Care Quality Commission in its most recent “State of Care” report in October last year said:

“The Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) directly affects the lives of millions of people. Everyone providing care to people over the age of 16 must be familiar with this vital piece of legislation, which introduced rights and protections for people who may lack mental capacity. A decade after the House of Lords report, we continue to find a lack of understanding of the MCA among providers.”

That is the most recent research, and it is telling us that we have not got this right.

The Mental Capacity Act was passed over 20 years ago in 2005, but is still not understood properly or being applied for the reasons it was supposed to be. If we have not got that right in 20 years, how can we as a Committee be assured that the legislation will be applied properly when it is applied to something that it has never been applied to before and that has not been tested? How can we say that we should be rejecting an amendment that would change that and raise the bar for people? Ultimately, this affects people who are vulnerable; I will come on to that in more detail in the next group of amendments.

That is a real concern, which is why I urge Committee members to support amendment 322 to get the safeguards right. We spent hours talking about capacity, but the amendments to clause 1 were not accepted. This amendment comes from experience, and I really appreciate the personal experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford on this issue, because he speaks about the reality. We are not the experts, and we should be relying on the experts who give us their witness testimony.

In the evidence from Mencap and in large swathes of the written evidence, we have heard grave concerns from communities representing people with learning disabilities about how this legislation was enacted during covid, particularly with “do not resuscitate” notices. Evidence shows that people with learning disabilities were far more likely to have those placed on them. The written evidence we have suggests that that is due to a misinterpretation of the Mental Capacity Act or bias within the medical community. Can my hon. Friend comment on that?

My hon. Friend makes a very valid point. Another issue that we have not got to yet, but that we will be looking at, is the doctors who do not want to take part in this process. We must consider whether there will be a bias; he is right to point that out. Will there be a subconscious bias towards helping people? My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud suggested earlier that doctors assist a person to reach a decision, according to the Mental Capacity Act. This is the crux of it for me: when a doctor is assisting a person in their best interests to come to a decision about treatment, for example, that is a different test from what we are testing here.

I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. I will be speaking to that in the next group of amendments, so I do not want to go through it in detail now, but I absolutely accept that that was a disgraceful situation—

Apologies. My hon. Friend is right that those were different situations, but I remind him of the evidence that we heard from Dr Jamilla, for example. I am glad that he reminded me of this point, because although what happened in covid was done under different circumstances—I agree that what happened with DNRs was a “disgrace”, in his words—that is where the trust in NHS providers was lost. That leads me on to my next point: where there is no trust, there is vulnerability, and that vulnerability, in turn, affects capacity.

That brings me to what Alex Ruck Keene said about vulnerability. If people feel—as they did during covid-19—that they have been DNR-ed and that, as some have said, “They’re going to kill us off!”, then the vulnerability directly impacts on their capacity. I accept that, as my hon. Friend says, these are different situations, but the argument is strong and speaks to supporting this amendment.

There is a myth that mental capacity is well understood, but we have gone through that—there are a lot of myths about mental capacity. The reason that mental capacity is always difficult to assess, according to Alex Ruck Keene, is because 85% of capacity determinations by those who actually understand the law are relatively straightforward—that concurs with the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud—with difficulty arising usually because of not having enough time or not listening to the person. Some research was conducted into the experience of liaison psychiatrists through an interview study across three jurisdictions, which concluded that there are four key sources of difficulty in capacity assessment, spanning both clinical and ethical domains.

Those four sources included, first, a difficulty determining whether the decision is the patient’s own or driven by illness. That is important because we are talking about people who are terminally ill, so their decision-making processes may be impacted because of that, or because there is a vulnerability—either could be possible. The 15% of mental capacity determinations that are difficult include for such people. There may also be, secondly, a difficulty in applying ethical principles or, thirdly, a difficulty in avoiding personal bias. Again, that speaks to the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford—if doctors are already signed up to this Bill and believe in it, will they have a personal bias? A lot of doctors and psychiatrists—according to the last article I read—are saying that they do not agree with it.

I rise to speak to my amendment 398. I recognise that much debate about capacity has already taken place, so I will do my best not to be too repetitive, but it is an important topic and I want to cover a few things.

Fundamentally, I consider the bar for the capacity to make a decision to seek an assisted death to be far too low if, as we have already discussed, the approach currently proposed in the Bill is adopted. The Committee has received powerful written evidence that the Mental Capacity Act, as it stands, is not suitable for assisted dying. The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence:

“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”

The former president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, Baroness Hollins, says:

“The Mental Capacity Act has proved very difficult to implement and doctors have not been found to be good judges of capacity.”

The eating disorders expert Chelsea Roff says:

“The MCA is not fit for purpose for determinations of capacity in life-ending decisions.”

I do not think it is contentious to say that there should be a higher standard for ending one’s own life than for other courses of action. Baroness Hale has called the Mental Capacity Act threshold “not a demanding one.” The Royal College of Psychiatrists says in its written evidence:

“While we are of the view that a person’s capacity to decide treatment can be reliably assessed, an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”

Even if the Mental Capacity Act is working well in some other contexts, it does not necessarily translate well to assisted dying. Professor Gareth Owen told the Committee in oral evidence that although the Mental Capacity Act is quite reliable in current practice,

“in areas of decision making where the decision itself is unsettled or conceptually much more profound or novel—I would suggest that the decision to end one’s own life has those characteristics—you cannot expect there to be such levels of reliability.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 239, Q303.]

The Mental Capacity Act definition of capacity was not created with such a monumental decision with respect to assisted dying in mind. Although I note Chris Whitty’s recommendation that it is the starting point, I do not think it can be the end point. Further provisions are needed to ensure that it is fit for purpose, given the significance of the decision being made. Professor Owen said:

“I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience of the decision to end one’s own life. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground. The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts you into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity question under consideration. It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.]

Dr Sarah Hooper, a retired oncologist, says that

“the patient in question may undoubtedly have ‘capacity’ for most important decisions. However, in the early days after a cancer diagnosis their ability to make clear judgements is nevertheless likely to be impacted. This kind of decision (for assisted suicide), once acted upon, is plainly irreversible. It is a very bad time to make that kind of decision.”

It is true that the Mental Capacity Act is used for decisions to stop life-sustaining treatment, but, as Professor Owen said, we should not simply equate that with assisted dying. As he pointed out:

“One is a refusal; one is a request. One is traditionally considered to be about bodily integrity—it is the so-called shield of the person, or the patient, against the intervention on the body that is being made by the medical profession. You are giving the patient an important right, which is a shield-like right. That contrasts with a request for assisted dying, which is a request. You are involving other people in an act that is an act of ending one’s life. That is not something that the medical profession has been comfortable with, going back thousands of years.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 236, Q288.]

I also draw attention to a great deal of written evidence making the point that the current Mental Capacity Act is not as well understood by medical practitioners as we hope or expect. Alexander Elphinston, a retired solicitor, says,

“from my experience doctors and other medical practitioners often applied the test of mental (in)capacity incorrectly.”

Victoria Wheatley, a palliative medicine consultant, says,

“I have observed a tendency to overestimate a person’s mental capacity in the absence of obvious features to the contrary.”

Alan Thomas, a professor of old age psychiatry at Newcastle University, says:

“The preferences of the assessor bias the capacity decision towards the assessor’s preference.”

I will move on to the specific issues with the current definition of people who lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act when applied to assisted dying, all of which my amendment 398 attempts to address. Part of my amendment does exactly the same as amendment 322, tabled and already eloquently spoken to by the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, so I will be brief on those overlapping bits.

Under the Mental Capacity Act, there is a starting presumption of capacity. That is too lax a standard, as the Royal College of Psychiatrists says in written evidence. I quote:

“The presumption of capacity may be problematic in the context”

of assisted dying, given that the consequence would be the person’s death. This is literally a matter of life and death, and the presumption of capacity must not apply; the work must be done to assess capacity properly and thoroughly. Professor Preston said during the evidence session:

“I think the aim is to have that bit of extra concern, so that we do not presume capacity, but instead almost presume that there is not capacity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 241, Q307.]

I think those are wise words, and my amendment and amendment 322 seek to give that protection.

Both amendments also disapply section 1(3) of the Mental Capacity Act on helping a person to make a decision. The hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has already made his point powerfully about that, so I will not add anything further.

There are some differences where my amendment 398 goes further than amendment 322. First, given the uniqueness and irreversibility of the decision, there should also be a higher threshold of probability. As it stands, a person should be treated as having capacity if that is more likely than not, which is sometimes referred to as the “51% sure” approach. It would be much safer if doctors and judges had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that an applicant has capacity, given the significance of the decision. In my view, 51% sure is just not good enough for such a monumental decision, and amending this part of the Bill would ensure a more rigorous and comprehensive assessment.

Secondly—for me, this is one of the biggest issues with the current approach—the Mental Capacity Act requires an impairment of, or a disturbance to, the mind or brain for someone to be considered not to have capacity, irrespective of whether they can make a decision. Under the Bill currently, even if someone cannot understand, retain or use the information to make a decision—they cannot communicate that decision—they will still be deemed capacitous in the absence of an impairment, or a disturbance, of the mind or brain. In the real world, a doctor could assess a patient who gives the impression of being confused, illogical, erratic or inconsistent—everything about them could scream that they are not in a good place to make the decision—but they will still be considered to have capacity if there is no identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the function of the mind or brain at that point in time. That potentially puts those with depression, anxiety, learning disabilities or eating disorders, or even those in physical pain, in danger of being considered capacitous.

In oral evidence, Professor Alex Ruck Keene said,

“If I doubt that you have capacity to make the decision to take your own life, or end your life, but I cannot prove it, is it logical or are we required to proceed on the basis that you do?...In other words, I think you cannot understand the information, but I cannot prove the reason that you cannot understand it is that you have an impairment or disturbance.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 90, Q120.]

According to his written evidence to the Committee, this means that someone could be approved for assisted dying even if they did not understand the relevant information, as long as they do not have an identifiable impairment of, or disturbance in, the mind or brain. He wrote,

“the Committee may well feel that it would be problematic that such a person should be considered to be eligible for the receipt of assistance in dying.”

In a letter to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC said,

“no matter how intensive the scrutiny of the person’s capacity, this would not address the issue of the situation where the person appears not to be able to understand, retain, use and weigh the relevant information but that is not caused by an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of their mind or brain.”

That is why my amendment seeks to remove this diagnostic element, so that section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act for the purposes of this Bill only would read as,

“a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter.”

That would provide better protections for this life and death decision, and I hope it addresses the issue raised so powerfully by Professor Alex Ruck Keene KC.

As I close, I would like to make reference to amendment 49, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, which sets out starkly the deficiencies of the current capacity test if it remains unamended for the purposes of this Bill. If autonomy is what counts, and we are using the Mental Capacity Act as gatekeeper for assisted death, then the Bill in its current form means that: a person is assumed to have a capacity as a starting point; a clinician only needs to be just over 50% sure that a person has capacity; unwise decision making is not taken into account in determining capacity; and supported decision making is acceptable—for example, for those with learning disabilities.

I ask the Committee members whether they are comfortable with that. If not, then as a minimum, amendment 322 should be accepted, but ideally my amendment 398 should also be, as it goes even further to increase the threshold for capacity and it addresses the significant issue with the diagnostic leg of the test. I am pleased to say that Baroness Finlay, who established and chaired the National Mental Capacity Forum, supports my amendment. Unlike the current drafting of the Bill, my amendment requires that a person is not assumed to have capacity in the first instance. It requires capacity to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, that unwise decision making is considered in assessing, and that a person is not helped to make a decision. I hope the Committee will support it.

I am pleased to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate, who set out with incredible clarity the challenges here and the opportunity we have to build on the Mental Capacity Act, and to fulfil its purposes and the purposes of the Bill to ensure that capacity is properly assessed. I will speak to all the amendments in the group very briefly; I certainly will not repeat material points that have been made already. To clarify, I do not propose to push amendment 49 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge to a vote, although I will speak to it briefly. I hope we will vote on the other amendments.

On tightening capacity assessments, which is what the amendment is trying to do, I would point out that there are a number of amendments coming up that would mandate training for doctors who are registered to assess capacity—for example, amendment 186. In addition, amendment 6 would mandate psychiatric referral if there was any doubt of capacity. Does that not satisfy the hon. Member?

It pleases me but it does not satisfy me. I am encouraged by it, but I am not fully satisfied. Obviously, it is insufficient. The hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Spen Valley put great faith in the training that we are going to introduce. Well, I hope they are right. Let us certainly do as much training as we can— likewise, let us get as much data as we can—but the provision set out is not sufficient, not least because the training will be in the application of the Mental Capacity Act, which we are saying, even if properly applied, has all sorts of problems with it, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate explained.

Yes to training and yes to the option of the referral—that should be mandatory, and I think there is a proposal to effect that. Every additional safeguard is welcome. It goes back to my point about whether we are being thorough or simplistic. I am not sure. If I think there are four assessments, but the hon. Member for Stroud thinks there are eight, does that not fail Chris Whitty’s test of being simple? If eight is in fact thorough, would nine not be even more thorough? The suggestion that we have hit it at the perfect sweet spot and that to veer one side is to introduce all sorts of bureaucratic hurdles seems unrealistic. Surely we can apply a little more rigour to this exercise.

I recognise that this is a vital point; I am not surprised that we keep returning to this important distinction. I do think that there is a vital distinction between accepting treatment and declining a treatment. In fact, the treatment proposed here is not a treatment at all—the British Medical Association specifies that it is not a medical treatment. The termination of life deliberately does not apply to a particular condition, whereas a ventilator, or any treatment that one might decline or withdraw, is specific to a particular condition or illness. There is a difference in purpose, even if the effect—which is death—is the same.

To the hon. Member’s point on whether the MCA is appropriate in cases of withdrawal of treatment; well, there we do seem to have a substantial body of clinical practice over many years, to which I am not aware of many objections. My non-expert view is that it is probably appropriate to continue with the MCA in those cases. I do not have an objection there and I am certainly not making that argument. It may well be that it is appropriate, and I am sure we will constantly review the applicability of that particular test in those circumstances. It might well be that some of the problems that I am identifying with the proposed law may also apply in cases of withdrawal of treatment—but I am not aware of that, because I do think they are substantially different. Even if it were perfectly acceptable to apply the MCA in cases of withdrawal of treatment, that does not mean it is appropriate in this case, because they are fundamentally different scenarios. I do not detect that I have satisfied the hon. Member, but it is always good to have the exchange.

I will conclude my challenge to the suggestion that the MCA is universally understood and properly applied. The Court of Protection case of Patricia, a patient with anorexia nervosa, has been referred to a number of times in the course of our debate. We heard evidence from a group of anorexia sufferers who wrote to the Committee to say:

“The judge in the Court of Protection case of Patricia…stated that he had changed his mind several times while considering the evidence. He then came to a different view on capacity from the treatment team. This single case exemplifies how complex the processes described under Clauses 7, 8 and 12 of the Bill in relation to assessment of capacity are likely to be”.

We are not talking about a straightforward process. It is clear from all the evidence we have had that there is a real problem with the way that the MCA would apply.

I want to make a rather obvious point, which is that when the MCA was debated and passed 20 years ago, assisted dying, or assisted suicide, was not on the table; it was not part of those considerations, as far as I am aware. It turns out that Dignity in Dying was on the case back in those days, although I think it was still called the Voluntary Euthanasia Society then. That group was conscious of what would come—I do not think that others were—and I detect that it is quite pleased now with the influence applied then to ensure that the presumption of capacity would be very useful one day when it came to passing an assisted dying law. It was not the intention of the House of Commons or of the Committee that considered that Bill that in fact they were establishing a test that would be applied in the case of assisting suicide and changing the terms of the Suicide Act. I am sure that if that had been the case, it would have been commented on, and I daresay the Mental Capacity Act would not be in its current form, or there would have been some addendum to that effect.

My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate referred to the very powerful evidence from lawyers, Baroness Hale and the Royal College of Psychiatrists about the challenge here. I want to quickly say, in support of amendment 322 in the name of the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, that my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate made a powerful argument about impairment; it is striking that the MCA only applies when there are cases of impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of the mind or brain—I will not repeat the point she made, but I urge Members to reflect on it.

I will quote Ruth Hughes, a barrister specialising in mental capacity law and inheritance. This refers back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate and I discussed in an earlier sitting about the clear opportunity that the Bill affords people to seek an assisted death for the sole purpose of saving their family money. Ruth Hughes says:

“If the…Bill is passed, then this will lead to some of the most vulnerable people dying for others’ financial gain. That is certain…Although in general I would, of course, accept the importance of the presumption of capacity, in relation to assisted dying, I consider that, the burden of proof for capacity should be reversed so that it is necessary to establish capacity to decide to die positively.”

Amendment 322 is tabled for that very obvious reason: there is a clear financial advantage for family members, and, I am afraid to say, there are many other distressing motivations that people might have that are not intended by the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley. It feels absolutely appropriate that we reverse the burden and have a much higher test of eligibility than that afforded by the Mental Capacity Act.

I want to make another point, although I do not know how hon. Members will feel about it because a lot of people do not accept that we are talking about suicide, even though it is in the terms in the Bill that we are amending the Suicide Act. The assumption of capacity in somebody taking their own life is what is proposed if we adopt clause 3: we are proposing that somebody has capacity if they end their own life. That implies directly that somebody who is standing on a window ledge or a bridge, about to commit suicide, is assumed to have capacity and to be making a rational decision, which other people should support. I say that directly, because there is a direct read-across with the whole topic of suicide prevention, which obviously we all strongly believe in. How can we say that somebody who is about to take their own life, unassisted, does not have capacity and is not making a settled and informed wish? In which case, why should we stop them or try to wrestle them back from the edge?

When people are in what is often termed a “crisis”, that would indicate that they are not in a situation where they have capacity. I do not see how the hon. Gentleman can think that it is reasonable to make a comparison between these two things; they are entirely different, and I am sure everyone here would broadly agree with that—I think, on this one, he is sort of on his own. Would the hon. Gentleman be able to offer any further insight into why he thinks that two wildly different situations are analogous—one is in a medical context where people have all the safeguards, and that layer of security and checking, and the other is someone who might be doing something in a moment of desperation?

The connection is explicitly in terms of the Bill. The Bill disapplies section 2 of the Suicide Act, which makes it illegal to assist somebody to commit suicide. It says that that section no longer applies. This Bill assists people to take their own life—I will not use the word “suicide” if people do not like it. There are other eligibility criteria: I totally acknowledge the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough pointing out that someone has to have a diagnosis of terminal illness, but that is not the point I am making. I am making the point that, under clause 3, we are saying that somebody who wants to take their own life has capacity, according to the very low bar of having a settled and informed wish. We are assuming capacity in the person who wants to end their own life. I suggest that that presents a real challenge to our national suicide prevention strategy—I will leave that point there, but I welcome any challenges to it.

I question whether the hon. Gentleman is making a false equivalence here in the very title of this Bill relating to terminally ill adults.

There are huge challenges around the definition of terminal illness, as we have already acknowledged—but if the right hon. Lady thinks that somebody who is terminally ill should be allowed to jump off a bridge or out of a window without anybody saying, “Wrestle them back,” she should say so. We think that, whether someone has capacity or is in their right mind or not, they should not end their own life. That is the settled view of this country. That is what the law determines. Currently, it is illegal to help someone to do that. We are proposing to change that, to enable people to help somebody to do that in a medical setting.

The implication of clause 3 is very clear: if one has a settled wish, ending one’s own life is something that we regard as acceptable. It will be very difficult to apply the principles of national suicide prevention when we have acknowledged that suicidal people have capacity. I will leave that point—it is not receiving a great echo of affirmation—but I have not heard any objection to it, other than a lot of head shaking.

Upcoming amendment 339 to clause 4 addresses that specific point. The hon. Gentleman has been asked this a number of times today, but would he be satisfied if that amendment was passed?

Sorry—remind me of the detail of the amendment.

Essentially, the amendment would require that if a person is autistic or has a learning disability, they must be given accessible information and sufficient time to consider it. Additionally, there must be at least either a supporter or an independent advocate there. That amendment was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford and will be discussed later.

I would indeed support that amendment; it would go a long way to addressing the concerns that we have here. When we discuss clause 4, I will come on to some suggestions for how we can make sure that people with learning disabilities are properly supported, particularly people with Down’s syndrome.

To finish, I will speak to amendment 50, also tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. If we are going to proceed with the MCA, we need to have it on the face of the Bill, to ensure standardisation —hon. Members have confidently asserted that it happens anyway, although the evidence we have been presented with demonstrates that it does not in all cases. Let us be much more explicit about the requirements that are needed. We should specify the minimum of what needs to be understood for capacity, including understanding the likely process of all treatment options, including non-treatment, and prognostic uncertainty. It is not acceptable, in my view, to have all of that worked out later by clinicians. Parliament must clearly say at this stage what is important.

While Members are looking at the quite extensive terms of amendment 50, it would be good to know what in that list they would object to and why any of it should not be included. It does not change the Mental Capacity Act; it preserves the integrity of the Act. It simply specifies more precisely and gives clear guidance to doctors to ensure that they do the best job they can. Lastly, it states that the patient must have full understanding of the consequences of

“requesting assistance in ending their own life”.

That includes the potential for medical complications at the end. That is a point that has been touched on a little in debate, but I will quickly say a word on that.

It is very important, in my view, that we are clear about what the patient should do, what the doctor should do, what the patient is entitled to do and what the doctor will do, in the event of complications at the end. This is not an abstract question. The Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland gave evidence to us, stating:

“It is important to highlight the lack of scientific evidence for the effectiveness, failure rates or complications of any ‘approved substance’”,

and pointing out that the proposals in the Bill fall quite short of

“the usual practice of approving treatments in the UK, which mandates careful assessment of drugs and their combinations.”

We do not know how that will be applied in this case. It is a point for later in the Bill how we consider which drugs should be used, but it is relevant at this stage to insist that patients are made fully aware of the drugs that will be used and their potential complications. We often refer to Oregon as an inspiration for the Bill, and the law in Oregon requires the applicant to be fully informed by the attending physician of the

“potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed”.

It might be worth considering that.

Professor House, in evidence to us, pointed out that informed consent—which is obviously a principle of the Bill—

“is not really specified properly. The doctor is required to ask the person what they want to happen in the event of complications without having previously explained to them what all the complications might be.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 169, Q216.]

So I think it is important that we specify that those complications are explained to them clearly at the outset.

This is not an abstract point. Sarah Wootton, chief executive of Dignity in Dying—my least favourite organisation—wrote in her book “Last Rights”:

“We have to move away from idealised, sanitised, nursery-rhyme accounts of what death can be…towards truthful, no bullshit, plain-spoken explanations of what could happen.”

I do not think Dignity in Dying applied that test when putting those disgraceful adverts in the tube, showing people dancing round their kitchens anticipating their lovely death, but she is right that we need to be very clear about what actual death can be like with these drugs.

I want to end with a reference to the work of Dr Joel Zivot, an American academic. The only proper study that can be done into people who have been given lethal drugs to die, using any of the drugs that will be used in this case, is of people who have been executed in the United States. Of course it is not possible to do many studies into the after-effects on people who have had an assisted death, but there have been some studies of people on death row. Dr Zivot’s point is that there is real evidence of what looked like trauma, distress and pain suffered by people as they died. Even if they themselves look peaceful—because often the first drug that is administered is a paralytic, so they are rendered immobile, and they may look very peaceful—it is evident that in some cases there is real distress going on beneath that peaceful exterior. We need to do a lot more work on understanding which drugs would be used and what their effects would be, and that needs to be properly explained to patients. All of that would be captured in amendment 50.

We are talking about a whole different area now, but I would say that, as a medical professional, if someone is gaining consent to a treatment it is in their code of practice under the General Medical Council that they explain all these things. We do not need to write it into the Act; that is already in existence. A more general point is that there is a lot of stuff already in the public domain on doctors’ behaviour that does not need to be restated in the Bill. The more we write, the more likely it is that it will be less safe for patients. I would keep it very simple.

I really want someone to explain this point to me: how can it make it more unsafe for patients to state the safeguards explicitly? How can it possibly make it harder, or more dangerous, if we specify what—as the hon. Gentleman said—is good practice currently, which the best doctors already do? I greatly respect him and his medical practice, but is he really saying that every doctor conforms perfectly to the GMC guidance? There are obviously clear problems with the way in which some doctors operate, and this is uncharted territory. Surely for the sake of doctors, as well as patients, it would be appropriate to specify explicitly how they should conduct these assessments, what communications they should make and what patients should be properly informed of. I cannot see how that makes it more dangerous.

I want to concur briefly with my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud; I have done a lot of research into this, believe me. We have the GMC, the British Medical Association and organisations that represent medical practitioners. They have very lengthy codes of conduct and behaviour codes. What we cannot do—and I have tried—is to include all that in the Bill, and we have to be cognisant of that in some of the amendments that we make.

I challenge the hon. Lady, and I would welcome her response to this: we clearly can specify some things that can be done, which is what my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has done in half a page with amendment 50, which clarifies explicitly what information the patient should receive and what they should properly understand. How does including this list of pieces of information make the Bill more dangerous for patients?

I am not saying that this amendment would make it more dangerous, but it would overcomplicate things. That is the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud was making. We need to have a very clear piece of good law, and I think the Bill already covers the points in amendment 50 and others, which I fully appreciate have been put forward in good faith. It is the clarity of the law that sometimes has to be the focus. I absolutely concur with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire on safeguards, but unfortunately I feel that we will probably never get to a point with the Bill where he is happy with the level of safeguards, and maybe he is prepared to acknowledge that.

It is unlikely that I would ever vote for an assisted dying law but, if we are going to have one, I want to make it as safe as possible, which we all want. On those terms, in the spirit of a Bill that is going to pass, why not include these specific pieces of information? The hon. Lady says that, while it would not make the Bill more dangerous, it would overcomplicate it. Again, how does it overcomplicate it to add a few clauses specifying information that must be clearly communicated?

Amendment 50 requires that whoever is medically assessing capacity is also able to understand the legal implications. The final point of the amendment says that they have to understand what the insurance implications are likely to be, which would mean that they would have to inquire into the individual’s financial circumstances. They possibly might need to understand what provision they have made for their family.

It also references what the designation of death is likely to be, which again requires them to decide there and then what they will write on the death certificate, when it happens. As the hon. Member for Stroud said, much of what is in amendment 50 is already either in the Bill or implied by it. As Ministers have said before, we have a duty to the statute book not to embroider it to the extent that it becomes overcomplicated and unworkable. I do not think that any of us would necessarily argue with the points in amendment 50, other than perhaps the last one about legal expertise, but clarity leads to certainty, which leads to safety.

By that logic, the safest, clearest Bill would be one that simply authorised an assisted death without any of these checks whatsoever. My right hon. Friend made the point that this amendment requires the doctor to discuss with a patient all the implications of their death. That is perfectly appropriate—in fact, if that is not being done at some stage in the process, and if that is not clear in the Bill, it absolutely should be. Otherwise, how can we be sure that the person is making a settled, informed decision, with all considerations taken on board?

I am sorry if that imposes a little extra burden on the doctor. One of the great challenges of the Bill is that, if we are to do it properly and genuinely make it a Bill that is strong in its safeguards, a whole lot of people will have to do a whole lot of work. There will be a huge demand on all parts of the public sector. This is required, I am afraid. I do not accept that the content of the amendment is either already in the Bill or implied in it. There might be some remote piece of GMC guidance that touches on this, which we would hope is properly applied, and I appreciate the point about embroidery. Nevertheless, this is not embroidery; this is upholstery—it is necessary for the Bill to be strong.

I want to pick up on a point that the hon. Member made before the previous intervention about the rights of the doctors themselves. This is an important point that we do not consider enough. We talk a lot about the rights of the patient, quite rightly, but this Bill will provide the means by which another person can get involved in someone’s death. It is really important that the legislation protects the rights of that person—the doctor involved—as well. Does he agree that providing greater clarity about the standard required to assess capacity will help the doctor to protect their own rights, perhaps in response to legal challenge from families, and that it is important that we consider the rights of the doctor as well as the patient?

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. It is an interesting irony of the Bill that it is presented as the free choice of individuals, but actually it imposes all sorts of obligations and repercussions on other people—the very term “assisted” conveys that. Many other people will be affected by the decision to take an assisted death. She is right that it would be very helpful for the doctors to be confident that they have done their job properly because they have a clear list of communications they are expected to make.

My understanding is that doctors are indemnified against legal challenge in consequence of decisions they make around this; that is an interesting point and one that I am uncomfortable with, but we will come to that later in the Bill. Leaving lawsuits out of it, from the point of view of the doctor’s professional conduct and their peace of mind, it would be very helpful for them to have it clearly specified what information they are required to convey.

I am grateful for Members’ interventions, and I appreciate the good faith and good sense that has been spoken, but I have not yet heard any reason for objecting to this amendment, other than the possible question of its being otiose and not necessary. That is not a sufficient reason to object to an amendment. We should not be objecting simply on drafting grounds. There can be tidying-up exercises later if there is repetition. I have not heard objections to the content of the amendment, and I would very much welcome Members’ support.

Does the hon. Member agree that the amendment ultimately aims to provide clarity, and that clarity ultimately leads to safety?

Exactly. A few more words of clarification should not be regarded as burdening the Bill or creating bureaucratic obstacles for doctors and patients; the amendment actually specifies more explicitly what is going on. It is almost akin to the debate we had on amendment 181 and those dangerous words “for the avoidance of doubt”; that is essentially what this amendment does, but it goes further, because it imposes clearer obligations on doctors to do their job properly.

Much has been covered today, and the issue of capacity was debated at length when the Committee considered clause 1, but I do have some observations.

I am sympathetic to the assertion that there should be changes to presumption and burden. Those are things that I have considered and spoken about with the promoter of the Bill and, outside the Committee, with experts who gave evidence to the Committee. I have spoken about them publicly as well; I am very sympathetic.

At the heart of this, we have two options. We could change the burden and presumption in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 for the purposes of assisted dying, rewriting 20 years of case law and medical practice. There is certainly some value to that, but that would be a radical departure from current medical practice, and there are other concerns. The alternative is to put in place rigorous processes and training around the Mental Capacity Act to ensure that it is implemented properly. After some reflection, I err on the side of the latter option, for a number of reasons.

First, I accept that there is debate among psychiatrists about this issue. We heard evidence from some who deem the Act not to be suitable for this new realm—I accept that we are entering new grounds, and I will come back to that point—but many psychiatrists and lawyers working in this area would deem it uncomfortable and unnecessary to depart from the Act.

Secondly, there is an oddity in changing presumption. There is an oddity in someone having to prove that they have capacity to fulfil their own desire. That oddity is one of the reasons that the Act is drafted as it is. It is partly—there are two sides to this coin—to ensure that there is no discrimination, partly to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 and human rights more generally, and partly to ensure that we do not end up in a medical situation that is patrician, whereby medical doctors take an intrusive view of capacity rather than meeting the individual as they are.

Thirdly, the Bill, when amended—I will come on to the amendments that give me some comfort—will offer more safeguards than the Mental Capacity Act. Amendment 5 to clause 9(3) would ensure a further level of assessment. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley has indicated that she will support that important amendment, as have all members of the Committee. If there is any doubt, there will be a further assessment by a psychiatrist. That goes some way to reassuring me that it is not necessary to rip up the burden or change the presumption in this area.

I want to make an observation about burden of proof, presumption and the nature of the assessment. Professor Whitty clarified his evidence. It is right that the burden and the presumption do not change, but of course the nature of the assessment rightly changes according to the circumstances. Every assessment of capacity is somewhat different, which is why amendment 50 is too prescriptive, in my view.

Of course, we can consider incredibly serious cases involving deprivation of liberty or the ability to conduct litigation. I have worked with parents whose children are being removed and looked at whether they have the capacity to make decisions about how they present their case. It is very dangerous to compare the severity and the profound nature of different circumstances, but let us not pretend that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to assess the most complex issues of capacity every day.

I am very sympathetic to amendment 50. I have met the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled it, and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to discuss it, but I stress that such a prescriptive provision is not appropriate for primary legislation when we are entering new ground. I accept, as hon. Members with different views have said, that we are entering new territory and that this is difficult. I accept that psychiatrists and medical practitioners will have to think long and hard about the nature of the capacity assessments, especially under clause 9(3), when that is activated. That work will have to be done. It has been set out in primary legislation through some of the training clauses, which have already been referred to.

There is no doubt that there will be a lot of work and consideration, but I do not deem it appropriate to have a clause drafted by one psychiatrist, albeit an undoubtedly esteemed and experienced one: the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, who tabled the amendment. Rather, the work needs to be done as the Bill is implemented over a two-year period. It needs to be done as part of a full consultation with psychiatrists, once the Bill has been passed, and that should be set out in guidance. That is what would usually happen with deprivation of liberty. I do not think it appropriate for primary legislation to set out the factors for a capacity assessment.

My hon. Friend is saying that that will take two years. The MCA, which has been implemented over 20 years, is misunderstood. Does he not see the risk of two years? This is new territory, without change—

We need to be careful when we say that the Mental Capacity Act is misunderstood, full stop. Let us be clear—

Not full stop.

Well, that was the sense—

I am grateful, Mr Dowd.

The evidence that we have received is that this is a test. These are assessments that happen every day across the country. Now, there are more complex assessments, and there will without doubt be areas in which the assessment is not done as rigorously as it should be done, but that is why I am assured by the safeguards in the Bill that if there is any doubt—any doubt—as to capacity at first instance, there will be a full and thorough assessment by a psychiatrist.

Let us think that through for a minute. Any competent psychiatrist trained in this area will no doubt have a sense of what the Mental Capacity Act says and of the normal test for capacity. Someone who is seeking assistance to die from a doctor who has doubts as to their capacity will have been referred. To my mind, it is unfathomable that that assessment, at that stage, would not be rigorous and would not satisfy every Member that it had been done to the correct extent practicable.

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend about that in most cases, but in nine of the 10 cases that went to court, young girls were found to have capacity, but their treatment was stopped, leading to their inevitable death. That is not excluded here.

We are debating lots of different things now, rather than just clause 3. There is an issue as to whether in those cases the individuals were found to have capacity, but we are talking about the process by which someone is found to have capacity, rather than what happens thereafter. We have had that debate, and I am happy to have it, but we are talking now about the process by which people are found to have capacity.

This is the problem with interventions: I have lost my train of thought. This is why people do not take them.

But I am happy to take another, although I may come to regret it.

I have a simple point to make; the hon. Gentleman can work out what he is going to say next while I make my brief intervention.

The point is that the referral to a psychiatrist will happen if the doctor has doubts in their mind. There is not an obligation on the doctor to refer; there is only an opportunity for them to do so, if they conclude that there is a reason. May I put a scenario to the hon. Gentleman? It is not clear whether this could happen under the Bill; well, it could happen, because it is not prohibited. A private practice might establish itself to provide assisted death, with the medical assessments and the support right through to the end—to the final act.

In those circumstances, if a patient goes to one of those clinics, does the hon. Gentleman not see that there might be a risk that the whole incentive of the business, even if it is a charity, will be to expedite the process, tick the boxes and pass people through? Does he not consider it dangerous that there is not an absolute obligation to refer to a psychiatrist and in fact, an obligation to pass a higher capacity test than the one that is currently in the MCA?

That was an intervention that I was grateful to take. I accept the point that there are dangers of a system that somehow incentivises this. That is why the Bill has to have such strict safeguards and such strict regulation of medical practitioners to comply with the law. The point about mandatory referral is key; I would have real concerns about this area of the Bill without that amendment, and unless the sponsor of the Bill had not made it very clear that she would be supporting it. But I take the point.

Yes, there are safeguards and mechanisms in the Bill to ensure that and to protect from a culture that would incentivise this practice.

Will my hon. Friend give way?

No, I am not going to, actually. I am taking my rights.

My final point concerns section 1(4) of the Mental Capacity Act and the discarding of the principle about whether a decision is deemed to be unwise. This is an issue we have already debated, but it is really important. Introducing a best interests test is, to my mind, impossible without ending up with a law that discriminates against certain groups. Essentially, it is impossible to do fairly.

I remain to be convinced. If there were an amendment that could do what I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire wants, I would support it. If there were an amendment that could look into someone’s mind and make sure that they are doing this for reasons that society would deem fit, I would support it, but I think that that is impossible. What the Bill aims to do is assess a person’s capacity and ensure that they are making this decision voluntarily. It also aims to protect them from the influence of third parties and outside sources. That is the only way, if this principle is to be adhered to.

Finally, I will be voting against the amendments, but I will finish where I started. I have genuinely thought long and hard, in particular about the presumption. I have spoken to experts who disagree with me, but in my mind it comes down to whether we rip things up and start again or whether we add rigorous safeguards, practices and processes, which may be a bit more boring but will actually be more effective at protecting any patients who go down this road.

I rise to speak in support of the amendments. Having worked as a mental health nurse for 22 years, I completed mental capacity training many times in my career, and I carried out capacity assessments as part of my day-to-day job. I think that the capacity assessment proposed in the Bill is not safe enough. That was one of the main reasons I voted against the Bill on Second Reading. I have spoken to many people who oppose the Bill, and one of their concerns is about the capacity assessment.

We have talked about capacity assessments every day in this Committee. It is one of the key issues that we will need to resolve to strengthen the Bill if it goes through. One of the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ concerns is that capacity decisions are

“opinions with a margin of error and are time specific. A person’s capacity can change”.

I will talk about my experience with those margins of error.

A person’s capacity can be influenced by various factors, including their life circumstances, the medication they are taking or severe pain. Suicidal thoughts due to their mental state or depression can also influence their capacity. I have worked in acute mental health units. Every day, we carried out capacity assessments, including before we let someone out of the ward, whether they were admitted under the Mental Health Act or were receiving treatment as a voluntary patient. If somebody wanted to leave the ward, before the member of staff opened the door, they had to assess that person’s capacity. Sometimes a person might have said, “I am going to kill myself,” and the nurse would have had to decide whether or not they had capacity before opening the door.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West has talked about unconscious bias. The initial capacity assessment when a person comes to a hospital is very important. If a doctor has assessed at the beginning that the person has capacity, the following assessment can be influenced by that initial assessment. I totally agree with my hon. Friend’s argument about unconscious bias in capacity assessments. As Members have mentioned, the Bill proposes many occasions in the process when capacity will be assessed, but I am still not confident that each capacity assessment will not be influenced by the initial assessment. The amendments would strengthen that area of concern.

My hon. Friend is making a very important speech. Members have alluded to the provision in the Bill that the patient would be present and would potentially have an option to be reassessed. We have heard evidence from various experts on capacity, particularly on the issues of coercion and vulnerability, and doctors have told us that it takes years to build rapport with people. At the second stage, the doctor has to be somebody independent who nobody has met, so how would they be able to tease out whether that person has capacity and whether those other influences are affecting them? Does my hon. Friend share that concern?

I agree that when an independent doctor comes to assess a patient’s capacity and sees them for the very first time, they are more likely to be influenced by the assessment made at the beginning by the doctor who has known them for many days, weeks or months. I agree with my hon. Friend’s argument.

To be clear, the word “independent” means independent of the other doctor, not independent of the patient. The independent doctor could well know the patient. I hope that that clarifies that point.

But it could be the other way around. The Bill does not clarify that the second doctor would know the patient at all.

It is not guaranteed.

It is not guaranteed. I am grateful for that intervention.

We have talked about training for all registered professionals who will be involved in the capacity assessments. As someone who has carried out that training many times, I draw the attention of the Committee to Dr Rachel—