PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill (Sixth sitting) - 14 September 2023 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)
Debate Detail
Chair(s) † Dame Caroline Dinenage, Sir George Howarth
Members† Blackman, Bob (Harrow East) (Con)
† Buchan, Felicity (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities)
† Clarke-Smith, Brendan (Bassetlaw) (Con)
† David, Wayne (Caerphilly) (Lab)
† Evans, Dr Luke (Bosworth) (Con)
† Fletcher, Colleen (Coventry North East) (Lab)
† Holmes, Paul (Eastleigh) (Con)
† Jenkinson, Mark (Workington) (Con)
† Leadbeater, Kim (Batley and Spen) (Lab)
† McCabe, Steve (Birmingham, Selly Oak) (Lab)
† Nici, Lia (Great Grimsby) (Con)
† Norris, Alex (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
† Qaisar, Ms Anum (Airdrie and Shotts) (SNP)
Richards, Nicola (West Bromwich East) (Con)
† Smith, Greg (Buckingham) (Con)
† Stephens, Chris (Glasgow South West) (SNP)
† Young, Jacob (Redcar) (Con)
ClerksBradley Albrow, Huw Yardley, Committee Clerks
† attended the Committee
Public Bill CommitteeThursday 14 September 2023
[Dame Caroline Dinenage in the Chair]
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill
“, or is about to make”.
This amendment, together with Amendments 26, 27, 28 and 29, would remove the ability of information notices and compliance notices to be given to public bodies prior to an actual contravention of the ban.
Amendment 26, in clause 7, page 5, line 12, leave out
“, or is likely to contravene”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 25.
Amendment 27, in clause 7, page 5, line 15, leave out
“, or is about to publish,”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 25.
Amendment 28, in clause 7, page 5, line 18, leave out
“, or is likely to contravene,”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 25.
Amendment 29, in clause 8, page 6, line 6, leave out
“, or is likely to contravene”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 25.
In considering this clause, we will continue some of the debates we had on clause 4 on Tuesday. We have heard many similar views from a range of parties that the Bill is an unethical attempt to stifle freedom of expression and legitimate concerns of councils and other publicly funded bodies. They will face significant fines for being about to, or likely to, associate with international norms of behaviour. And who will be empowered to conduct investigations into those suspected breaches? Why, it will be UK Government Ministers themselves who are granted that authority! There go freedom of expression and the rule of law. I ask Members to support the SNP amendments.
First and foremost, the powers given to enforcement authorities to be used before such a breach will prevent the sort of deeply divisive activity that we have heard about from representatives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council in oral evidence. It is obviously much better to prevent a breach of the ban in the first place than to wait for a divisive boycott or divestment policy to be put in place before taking action.
I reassure hon. Members that that does not mean that there will be active monitoring of public authorities. Potential breaches will be investigated as and when they are brought to the attention of enforcement authorities by third parties. When flagged to enforcement authorities, it is only where relevant to a potential breach of clause 1 or 4 that an information notice may be issued to require information from a relevant public body.
Finally, the enforcement regime does not provide unprecedented powers for enforcement authorities. It is based on existing regimes. The powers are based on those that the Office for Students already has for regulating universities, and the powers to enforce the ban for local government pension schemes are similar to those that the Pensions Regulator already has. I therefore ask that the amendments be withdrawn.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Amendment proposed: 27, in clause 7, page 5, line 15, leave out
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Amendment proposed: 28, in clause 7, page 5, line 18, leave out
Question put, That the amendment be made.
This amendment removes provisions stipulating that providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach obligations of confidence or other restrictions on disclosure.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dame Caroline.
Clause 7 sets out the significant powers to compel information that will be made available to the enforcement authorities detailed in clause 6. As we have heard, the enforcement authority will most often be the Secretary of State. The provisions in clause 7 provide enforcement authorities with the power to prepare and issue an information notice to request from a relevant public body information relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. The enforcement authority—usually the Secretary of State, as I say—can request any information likely to be useful for it to assess whether the provisions of the Bill have been contravened or are likely to be contravened.
Provision is also made in respect of clause 4, the gagging clause. Clause 7 means that the enforcement authority can request information if it is satisfied that a public body subject to the Bill is about to publish, may publish or has already published a statement prohibited by the Bill. The most egregious provision is subsection (8), which provides:
“A person providing information in compliance with an information notice does not breach—
(a) any obligation of confidence owed by the person in respect of the information, or
(b) any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
“However imposed” is a challenging phrase. It seems to grant the Secretary of State or other relevant bodies the power to issue notices that would not only require all information to be handed over, but override normally protected duties of confidentiality, safeguarding or legal privilege. That is very significant. We would argue that those powers of investigation go beyond the powers of the security services to compel information. There is no clarity or sense of what checks and balances there are. Even the security services, which do not have that degree of power, have oversight mechanisms such as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. Frankly, this seems to be a very strong power to reserve to the Security of State or, indeed, the Office for Students.
We have heard evidence from multiple witnesses who are concerned about these provisions. We did hear from others who are less concerned, but even if colleagues consider the case I have set out to be wrong or overstated, the ambiguity is obvious. At the very least, the Bill is not clear enough. It is important to say that the Government do not—if I have understood properly what the Minister told the Committee last week—want the provisions to supersede legal privilege. That is welcome, and I am keen to have similar commitments regarding safeguarding duties. If that is the case, amendment 10 promotes that.
I believe that the Government ought to accept our amendment, or at least propose an alternative in lieu. What is in the Bill seems overbearing; if not overbearing, it is definitely unclear. That, at least, must be resolved.
The intention behind clause 7 is to provide a power for enforcement authorities to issue information notices to require information from a relevant public body relating to a decision in respect of the Bill. As drafted, the clause sets out a necessary and proportionate power for enforcement authorities properly to investigate potential breaches of the ban.
I must be clear that the clause does not place an undue burden on public bodies in scope of the ban. Information may be requested only if the enforcement authority is satisfied that a person has made or will make a decision or statement in breach of the Bill and that the information is likely to be useful for the enforcement authority’s investigation. Subsection (8) provides standard wording in order to give assurance to the person complying with the information notice that they will not be breaching an obligation of confidence or any other restriction on disclosure. The Bill is by no means unique in including such drafting; the same caveat is provided for in the Agriculture Act 2020, the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Health and Care Act 2022, for example.
The hon. Member for Nottingham North has said that he is concerned that the subsection would override the privilege between lawyer and client. I can reassure him that it does not. Legal professional privilege is a fundamental common-law right, including for those public bodies captured by the Bill, and specific words would not be needed to override it. The information power therefore does not extend to legally privileged material; I can confirm that I will clarify that point explicitly in the Bill’s explanatory notes. I would also add that Richard Hermer KC has subsequently clarified, in written evidence to the Committee on this point, his view that it is likely that a court would not deem legal professional privilege to be overridden by the clause.
Subsection (8) does not provide a right to extract the information, nor does it give a power to the Government; it simply provides the person who is disclosing information necessary to investigate a potential breach with protection against a claim for breach of confidence or any other restriction. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
This subsection is another example of that. The open-ended reference to
“any other restriction on the disclosure of information”
makes no distinction, for example, between somebody expressing a view in a private and in a professional capacity. That cannot be right. Subsection (8) should be deleted.
I hear what the Minister says about the intention behind the clause and about whether it is necessary and proportionate. I can probably agree with “necessary”, but there is still a divergence of views between us on “proportionate”. I also hear what the Minister says about commonality with other pieces of legislation. I am willing to accept that clause 7(8) is not a unique provision, but I do not think that that means that it is therefore the right provision. It could be badly drafted here and elsewhere too; that would not be without precedent.
It seems that the Minister’s strong intention is not to override legal privilege—that is welcome news—and she intends to make that clear in the explanatory notes. That is just about enough to see me off today, but I hope that she will reflect on the point. I do not think that what is set out the Bill is quite clear, given what she has said. I also think that there is a clash with subsection (9).
I know that the matter will be considered in the other place, and on that basis I will not press amendment 10, but I do not think that we are finished here. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
This amendment is to probe the way the legislation appears to “qualify” the data protection legislation.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Caroline.
Like previous clauses that we have discussed, clause 7 is poorly drafted. It hands enforcement authorities powers that risk infringing on civil liberties such as the right to a private life. The clause allows an enforcement authority to compel a person suspected of contravening a ban to provide information, including personal information about people involved with a decision. It is clear that the intention is to prevent a public body from contravening clause 4, the so-called gagging clause. However, the broadness of the clause risks casting too wide a net and infringing on personal data. My amendment 33 seeks clarity from the Government as to how the clause will interact with existing data protection legislation.
Data law exists to protect people’s privacy and data, but the Bill is confusingly drafted. In its current form, the clause could be interpreted as implying that existing data protection legislation is to be read in line with the Bill, rather than the other way around. That obviously raises issues about an individual’s right to data privacy. The circularity of the drafting could potentially mean information disclosure obligations superseding data protection legislation. As has been raised numerous times under other clauses, the drafting clearly suggests that little thought has gone into the powers granted to enforcement authorities. It is unclear whether any assessment has taken place of the legal necessity of the powers or of whether they are proportionate under the General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018.
The drafting of clause 7(8) is particularly concerning. It provides that disclosure of information under the provisions will not breach
“any obligation of confidence owed by the person in respect of the information, or…any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
That is such a broad definition that it potentially includes everything from contractual restrictions and court orders to legal professional privilege and even statutory restrictions on information disclosures.
Many people have raised these concerns, as we know from our evidence sessions last week and from written submissions. I am sure that granting such expansive powers was not the Government’s intention in drafting the clause. I hope that the Minister will provide an explanation of why they have drafted the legislation so confusingly in respect of data protection and why they are granting such expansive powers to enforcement authorities.
The clause has the potential to allow a severe intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy under article 8 of the European convention on human rights, which provides the right to a private life. The grounds on which information can be requested are very wide: someone would need merely to be suspected of being in the process of potentially making a prohibited decision or statement to be required to hand over information. That is compounded by the requirement to provide any information that is
“likely to be useful to the enforcement authority”.
It would be beneficial if the Government explained what kind of information could be requested through an information notice.
Amendment 33 is a probing amendment, so I will not push it to a vote, but I hope that the Government will provide further detail on what evidence individuals will have to provide when issued with an information notice, as well as looking again at the broad powers granted under the clause.
The clause provides a lawful basis for sharing information. This is a standard drafting mechanism that respects the principles of data protection; it does not alter the principles of data protection. As I have already set out, the Bill is by no means unique in including this drafting, which features in various pieces of existing legislation, such as the Building Safety Act 2022 and the Agriculture Act 2020. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Monetary penalties: power
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 11, in clause 10, page 7, line 20, at end insert
“within 60 days of the passage of this Act.”
This amendment specifies that regulations prescribing a maximum monetary penalty must be made within 60 days of the Bill being passed
Amendment 12, in clause 10, page 7, line 21, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment, together with Amendment 13, would require the publication of regulations in matters to which the enforcement authority must, or must not, have regard in exercising its powers within 60 days of the passage of the Act.
Amendment 13, in clause 10, page 7, line 23, at end insert
“within 60 days of the passage of this Act.”
See explanatory statement to Amendment 12.
Clause 10 stand part.
“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, prescribe a maximum penalty for the purposes of section 9”.
Clause 9 states that an enforcement authority may impose a monetary penalty on someone if they do not comply with the provisions of the Bill. Similarly, clause 10(2) states that:
“The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision about matters to which the enforcement authority must, or must not, have regard in exercising its powers under section 9”,
which refers to the power to impose monetary penalties.
The regulations set by the Secretary of State will be highly consequential, because they will show how the sharper elements of the Bill, which we have already discussed, will interact with the rights and freedoms of individuals. They will outline the monetary penalty, but also what the enforcement authority—most often, the Secretary of State—will weigh in making a decision. As drafted the Bill does not specify when the Secretary of State must make these regulations and when they will take effect. That leaves a degree of ambiguity, and a gap where people will be waiting to see when the provisions start to bite.
The Minister previously talked about measures being necessary and proportionate. It is necessary to have an enforcement regime, and proportionate for the shoe to drop at some point; otherwise there is no point in having the legislation. Also, having made a significant number of points around Henry VIII provisions, and, at length, been quite displeased by some of them, even someone with my hard heart would say that it is proportionate for those to be set by regulations, because they will change over time.
The quid pro quo for that is what I have set out in amendments 11, 12 and 13, which remove some of the ambiguity and has the Government say when they intend to set the regulations. These probing amendments—I will not press them to a Division—set out what ought to happen within 60 days of Royal Assent, which would give a degree of clarity for those who are getting their decisions in order and understanding when the provisions are likely to fall. I think that is proportionate. If 60 days is too short or long a period, I hope the Minister will say when the Government intend to do this. I suspect they want to get on with it, but people ought to have that clarity.
It is crucial that the threshold for fines is carefully decided in consultation with enforcement authorities, including the Office for Students and The Pensions Regulator. Since that will also be done by the affirmative procedure, the measure will need to go through both Houses. It will need to go through the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in the House of Lords, and it would need to be debated in both Houses. Clearly, it is a piece of legislation that the Government want to be implemented, so I give the Committee my word that we will do this as expeditiously as possible. It is wrong, however, to commit to 60 days.
The same arguments apply to amendments 12 and 13. We agree that expediency in setting out details of the enforcement regime is important, but we need to take into account proper consultation with the regulators and enforcement authorities, as well as due scrutiny in both Houses. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw the amendments—I know that he said they were probing amendments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 9 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Application of prohibitions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
General provision
12 noon
Amendment proposed: 1, in clause 17, page 10, line 39, at end insert—
“(1A) Section 1 does not apply to decisions made by—
(a) Scottish Ministers, unless a motion has been passed by the Scottish Parliament indicating its consent to this Act;
(b) Welsh Ministers, unless a motion has been passed by Senedd Cymru indicating its consent to this Act;
(c) a Northern Ireland department, unless a motion has been passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly indicating its consent to this Act.”—(Wayne David.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Brought up, and read the First time.
One definition of a human being is that they learn from their mistakes. To do so, they must review their actions against a set of criteria, often through an impact assessment, so as to identify any error, misjudgment or unintended consequence that they may have created. That sometimes leads to a revision or reversal of prior actions. I am sure that we all agree with that statement, given that we are all human beings, are we not? The principle applies to presumptions as well as actions. I am sure the Government hope this legislation will impact only on the countries and territories explicitly named in the Bill, but that may be presumptuous. New clause 1 provides a list of countries whose behaviour might change as a consequence of the Bill being enacted. It might change them for the better, but we ought to be aware that some will see it as a green light to expand their breaches of human rights, confident in the knowledge that the UK has turned a blind eye to their behaviour, all in the interest of expanding trade. We believe that the impact assessment and the timescales proposed are realistic and essential to the reputation of the UK. I ask the Committee to send a clear message to those countries by supporting the new clause.
The UK Government’s trade positions and diplomatic efforts will not be affected by the Bill. Its intent is to ensure that the UK speaks with one voice internationally; it is not to hamper diplomatic relations by publishing arbitrary impact assessments for the countries listed in the new clause. The Bill makes clear where the power to conduct foreign policy is, and allows other public bodies to focus on their core duties. It does not change any aspect of the UK’s foreign policy.
That is not to say that the Government will not carry out impact assessments on international matters when needed. Indeed, we are already committed to producing independently scrutinised impact assessments, such as those for new free trade agreements. Moreover, as with any Act that the House passes, once the Bill is an Act it can be subjected to post-legislative scrutiny by a parliamentary Select Committee to assess how it has worked in practice since coming into force. The additional impact assessment proposed by the hon. Member for Glasgow South West is unnecessary. For those reasons, I ask him to withdraw the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
We will obviously reflect on the changes we want to see in the stages to come. I do think there is going to be a challenge on the Government’s side, because a number of their Members are very critical of the Bill. The fact that no amendments have been agreed will be a test for them. I again thank you, Dame Caroline, and Sir George, as well as the Clerks, for all the help we have had.
Lastly, it was unfortunate that there was no evidence from a Palestine support group in our evidence sessions. I do not believe there was a conspiracy on that. I think it was perhaps more cock-up than conspiracy, but I hope it is something we will all learn from. We should have all views heard, and we might all want to take that point away and reflect on it.
The point the Palestine Solidarity Campaign has made is reasonable given the information that has been supplied to it, but we need to correct the record on how the witnesses were chosen and on the offer that was made in terms of correspondence and evidence so that we could carefully consider all sides. As the hon. Member for Glasgow South West has referred to, we have to go through Report, Third Reading and the other place. It would be grossly unfair, given all the work the Committee has done, were it suggested that we were one-sided and did not hear the other side of the argument.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly to be reported, without amendment.
EAPBB42 Karl Drinkwater
EAPBB43 Local Government Association
EAPBB44 Alyson Tyler
Contains Parliamentary information licensed under the Open Parliament Licence v3.0.