PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Disruption at Heathrow - 24 March 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
I begin by acknowledging the disruption to everyone affected by this incident. Many homes, schools and businesses temporarily lost power, some families have had to evacuate their homes, and many thousands have had their travel plans impacted. I thank the firefighters and emergency responders who worked in difficult conditions to put the fire out, as well as Heathrow, the National Grid and all the other public services involved for working so hard to get power back on and people back travelling again. This was an unprecedented event, and we must learn any and all lessons we can to ensure that it does not recur.
Let me begin by setting out what we currently know about the cause of the incident. A large fire broke out at North Hyde substation at 11.30 pm on Thursday 20 March, and was brought under control the following day. Due to the impacts, Heathrow airport announced at 4.30 am on Friday that it would close until midnight that day. Power was restored to domestic customers in a matter of hours, after the operator of the local distribution network, Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks, redistributed power through other parts of the network.
By comparison, Heathrow is one of the country’s biggest consumers of electricity and requires as much power as a small city. What we know is that there was an unprecedented outage, and that it was not the result of a single point of failure on the electricity transmission or distribution system. The feed from North Hyde substation is one of three supply points to Heathrow, and the fire caused exceptional damage that took the whole substation out of service. The other supply points continued supplying to Heathrow airport throughout the incident.
Heathrow’s view was that that supply was insufficient to ensure the safe and secure ongoing operation of all systems across the whole airport. It proceeded to reconfigure its internal electricity network to enable the resumption of full operations, utilising the other two external supply points. That required hundreds of systems to be safely powered down, and then safely powered up, with extensive testing. The airport has a range of back-up generators and uninterruptible power supplies, including diesel generators, to provide power to essential systems to enable them safely to land planes. Those back-up systems ensured that safety and security systems and protocols were maintained at all times, but they were never designed to support full operation of the whole airport.
By 2.30 on Friday afternoon, Heathrow began restarting systems to ensure that they were safely operating. By 4 pm, the airport was 100% confident that all systems were safely operating across the whole network, and announced that some flights would be able to restart that day. The first flights, from about 6 pm, were so-called positioning flights, which were to get aircraft and crew to the right places to resume normal operations the following day. That was followed by flights diverted to UK and non-UK airports, to allow passengers to be repatriated, and a small number of outbound long-haul flights. Since Saturday, Heathrow has been fully operational, with more than 250,000 passengers able to fly to and from the airport on Saturday. Due to knock-on impacts of the event, there continued to be some delays and cancellations over the weekend.
Overall, the impact of Heathrow’s closure led to over 1,300 flights and more than 200,000 passengers having their flights cancelled or diverted on Friday, and a further 110 cancelled on Saturday. The Government are acutely aware of the need to ensure that passengers are well looked after and their consumer rights protected. This is why UK law ensures that airlines must provide passengers with a refund within seven days, or passengers must be rerouted to their destination under the same conditions. We are closely monitoring to ensure that passengers are properly supported. To support the recovery, my Department temporarily lifted restrictions on overnight flights, to ease congestion. Heathrow and airlines also added extra capacity into the system to help affected passengers. We allowed rail tickets to be used flexibly to help passengers who were not able to use their original tickets.
Regarding the cause of the fire, the Metropolitan police confirmed that the fire is not believed to be suspicious. However, due to the location of the substation and the impact that this incident has had on critical national infrastructure, the Met’s counter terrorism command is leading our inquiries into this matter. This is due to the specialist resources and capabilities within that command, which can assist in progressing the investigation at pace to help minimise disruption and identify the cause. It would not be appropriate to comment further while these investigations continue, but we will of course update the House once it is appropriate to do so.
Although it is positive that electricity supplies were restored quickly, there will be learnings to ensure that we avoid such incidents reoccurring. That is why on Saturday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, working with Ofgem, commissioned the independent National Energy System Operator to urgently investigate the incident. The review will also seek to understand any wider lessons to be learned for energy resilience for critical national infrastructure. NESO has been asked to report back to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero with initial findings within six weeks.
In addition, Heathrow has asked Ruth Kelly, a former Secretary of State for Transport and an independent member of Heathrow’s board, to undertake a review of its internal resilience. The Kelly review will analyse the robustness and execution of Heathrow’s crisis management plans, the airport’s response, and how it recovered the operation.
Colleagues across the House will appreciate that we do not yet know everything there is to know about the incident, but I will try to answer questions from hon. Members in as much detail as possible based on the latest information I have at my disposal.
I commend the statement to the House.
The loss of power in the Heathrow area caused significant disruption for thousands of travellers and countless businesses. Heathrow is one of the world’s busiest airports and Europe’s busiest air hub. It was scheduled to handle 1,351 flights, carrying up to 291,000 passengers on Friday. However, as we know, the fire at a nearby electrical substation forced planes to be diverted to other airports, with many long-haul flights returning to their points of departure. The financial cost of the shutdown to the airline industry is expected to total tens of millions of pounds, and there are significant question marks over the airport’s possible vulnerability to further disruption in the future.
Before we discuss the specifics of the incident, I ask the Secretary of State to confirm that she will remain engaged with Heathrow, the airlines and other key stakeholders throughout this period to minimise the impact on passengers and the economy.
I note that the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, whom I am pleased to see in his place, has instructed NESO to investigate the incident urgently. It is crucial that NESO’s investigation delivers a clear and objective assessment of the incident’s circumstances and the UK’s broader energy resilience. I ask the Government to keep the House informed as that investigation develops.
I also note that the Secretary of State for Transport will closely monitor Heathrow’s internal investigation into the incident. She is right to do so. Although I trust that she will share any conclusions drawn from the report with the House, may I ask that she provides specific assurance today that she will indeed do so?
Let me focus on the details of the incident, which evidently raises significant concerns about the resilience of Heathrow airport and critical infrastructure in general. On Heathrow’s resilience, important questions arise about why the airport was dependent on a single electrical substation, which proved so vulnerable to such an incident. I understand from media reports and from the Secretary of State’s statement that although two additional substations are capable of powering the airport, doing so would require reconfiguring the power supply structure for all terminals. Does the Secretary of State believe that that set-up is appropriate for the country’s largest airport? Additionally, what assessment has she made of the power supply resilience of other major UK airports?
With regard to the resilience of our critical national infrastructure, the episode underlines the urgent need to ensure that our critical infrastructure is safeguarded against both accidental incidents and deliberate acts of sabotage by malign actors. Hon. Members will recall that when President Putin launched his illegal invasion of Ukraine, global energy markets faced immense disruption, which posed the most significant threat to European energy security since the 1970s. Despite that upheaval, Britain’s energy prices remained broadly stable, but only because the Government of the day took decisive action to protect businesses and households from price spikes as far as possible. That came at a significant financial cost.
The event at Heathrow reminds us that true energy security depends not only on price stability but on the physical safety of our energy infrastructure. Given the crucial role of airports in our economy, we must remain vigilant. In the light of that, what discussions has the Secretary of State had with the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero about ensuring that the energy supply to major airports remains secure? What is the timeline for the Kelly review, and will its findings be made publicly available? Will the Secretary of State engage with colleagues across Government Departments to assess and mitigate the risks posed by malicious actors who will undoubtedly have taken note of this weekend’s events? Finally, what specific steps will she take to strengthen the resilience of our critical national infrastructure?
On the internal investigation that the London Heathrow board has commissioned Ruth Kelly to do, as the hon. Gentleman knows, I have asked to see a copy of that report. Assuming that I have the permission of Heathrow to share it more broadly, I am happy to share its contents with him and the House. On his question about whether I am content with and confident about the set-up for airport power supplies, I am not going to become an armchair electrical engineer; I want to see the report that has been commissioned by the airport and the report that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy has commissioned from NESO. We are also conducting a resilience review of critical national infrastructure via the Cabinet Office, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that we will look at any and all the issues that this incident raises in those reviews. I spoke with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy on Friday evening, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will continue to engage across Government on any of the issues that this incident raises.
There has been talk this weekend about the single point of failure. In this case, that is about not just a particular electricity substation but what happens when our busiest airport closes. All our airports—critical national infrastructure—have an impact when they are at risk. I am told that the next airports national policy statement, like the last one, will cover only Heathrow. Is it not time that we had a national airports strategy to include what happens when any one of our airports is taken out of action?
What has happened is clearly a rare occurrence, but it raises a number of significant questions about the security and management of our critical national infrastructure. While I am pleased to hear that no foul play is currently suspected, the event has revealed vulnerabilities in our national security that may be exploited in future by terrorists and hostile state actors. It is consequently vital that lessons are learned to ensure that an incident like this does not happen again, and I welcome the announcement of a full investigation.
It is deeply concerning that the failure of a single piece of infrastructure has taken down the entire airport. Heathrow is connected to three substations, and while two were impacted, the third was running and had enough capacity—thought to be around 72 MW—to power the whole of Heathrow, which requires a little more than 40 MW. It is evident that Heathrow’s power set-up could not be swiftly reconfigured to allow the third substation to be used. We need to understand why that was, and whether it could be remedied in future. While Heathrow claims that it is normal for airports not to have sufficient back-up capacity to power all of their needs, other industries that require even more power than Heathrow—such as data centres—take more robust steps to ensure they have sufficient back-up systems to counter such failures. Should our key international transport hub not have the same safeguards?
We must also not forget those whose journeys were disrupted. It is estimated that over 200,000 passengers have been impacted by the event. However, under current regulations, most of those passengers will not be eligible for compensation. As such, I have three questions for the Secretary of State. First, what impact, if any, will this incident have on the Government’s plans for expansion at Heathrow? Can the national grid infrastructure cope with a third runway, or will the airport become more prone to failure? Secondly, does the Secretary of State believe that UK airports should be taking steps to increase their back-up capacity, in order to ensure that an incident like this does not happen again? Thirdly, does she believe that the current regulations around passenger compensation are sufficient?
With regard to back-up capacity at airports, I am told that the back-up power systems at Heathrow operated as they should have done during this incident—they did not fail. I do not want to come to knee-jerk conclusions as a result of this unprecedented incident, but we will be looking very closely at the two reviews I mentioned in my statement. I have also worked with the Civil Aviation Authority to ensure that passengers who have been affected by this disruption are aware of their rights.
Now that this site has gained such a high profile, there are concerns about its security for the future. I would welcome some more detailed information coming out of the inquiry about how we will secure the site for the future, not just from accident but from potential attack.
The incident poses questions about whether the current operators are capable of running a third runway, if this fire caused a complete shutdown. Reports indicate that complete closure was not required. Confidence in travelling and in Heathrow are at an all-time low among my constituents and others. Has the Secretary of State made Heathrow officials aware of the need to ensure that contingency plans are not simply notes on paper, but actions to take during a crisis? What has been their response to allay fears caused by the turmoil of last weekend?
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