PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
National Security Strategy - 24 June 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
NATO’s member countries meet at a time when the security situation is more in flux than at any time in a generation—a time when Ukraine is in its fourth year of resisting Russia’s invasion; a time when we in Europe are being asked to do more to secure our own defences; a time when security involves not just the traditional realms of air, sea and land, but technology, cyber and the strength of our democratic society; and, as we have seen in recent days, a time of renewed military action in the middle east, with Israel and the United States acting to try to stop Iran developing a nuclear bomb. News of a ceasefire is welcome, but as we have seen, even in recent hours, the situation remains fragile and the focus must now be on a credible plan to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons.
It is to the great pride of my party that NATO was founded in the aftermath of the second world war with the strong support of the post-war Labour Government. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary at the time, said that
“we must face the facts as they are.”—[Official Report, 22 January 1948; Vol. 446, c. 386.]
Today, in this very different age, we too must face the facts as they are.
The generation that founded NATO saw it as a powerful expression of collective security and solidarity: alliances abroad, matched by capacity at home. Our national security strategy, published today and made for these very different times, is inspired by those same values and aims. Every Member of this House understands that the first duty of any Government is to keep the country safe. That is and always will be our No. 1 priority, and our national security strategy sets out how we will do that.
The world has changed fundamentally and continues to change before our eyes. This is indeed an age of radical uncertainty, and the challenge to leadership in times of such change is to understand, to respond and to explain. The British people understand this. They recognise that we are living in a world that is more confrontational, more turbulent and more unpredictable than most of us have experienced in our lifetimes.
When the Prime Minister spoke to the House in February, he promised to produce a national security strategy that would match the scale of the task ahead. The strategy we have published today does that, with a plan that is both clear-eyed and hard-edged about the challenges that we face. It sets out a long-term vision for how we will do three crucial things. First, we will protect security at home by defending our territory, controlling our borders and making the UK a harder target for our enemies—one that is stronger and more resilient to future threats.
Secondly, we will promote strength abroad. That means bolstering our collective security, renewing and refreshing our key alliances, and developing new partnerships in strategic locations across the world. It also means taking a clear-eyed view of how we engage with major powers such as China in order to protect our national security and promote our economic interests, and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will make a further statement on the China audit shortly.
Thirdly, we will increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities by rebuilding our defence industries, training our people, focusing investment on our competitive strengths, and using our exceptional research and innovation base to build up advantages in new frontier technologies.
All this will make us a stronger and more resilient country, but delivering on each commitment will be possible only if all parts of society are pulling in the same direction. Our manufacturing, science and technology industries have to be aligned with national security objectives. Our industrial strategy, published yesterday, will help play to the UK’s strengths and deepen our capabilities. The investments we announced in the spending review also deepen our resilience and strength as a country, with a health service strong enough to cope, safe and secure energy supplies, modern housing and transport for our people, all of which contribute to a strong United Kingdom.
That is why it is so important that all parts of Government and businesses big and small understand that cyber-security is national security, and that our core systems and the revenues of business are being targeted by our adversaries. It is why we as legislators have to ensure that our own laws—from borders to trade—fit with national security. This will take a whole-system approach that reflects today’s reality. National security means strong supply chains, controls on immigration, tackling online harm, energy security, economic security and border security. It transcends foreign and domestic policy, and it all plays a role in how we make Britain a safer, more secure and more sovereign nation.
This document provides the blueprint of how this fits together. The strategy brings together everything we are doing across the full spectrum of national security: the commitment to spend that 5% of our domestic economic output on national security by 2035, meeting our NATO commitments once again; the over £1 billion we are investing in a new network of national biosecurity centres; how we are stepping up in areas such as cyber capability; our anti-corruption strategy to counter illicit finance; the expansion of our legal and law enforcement toolkit; the largest sustained investment in our armed forces since the cold war; our plan for defence investment to unlock real benefits for working people; how we will prioritise NATO explicitly in our defence planning; a vision for not only deepening our alliances with the United States and the European Union, but growing our relationships with other emerging nations; the money we are investing in our brilliant research and development base over the coming years, such as the £750 million for the supercomputer at the University of Edinburgh; and our ambition to gain a competitive advantage in cutting-edge technologies and to embed national security in our artificial intelligence agenda.
We do not underestimate the size of this task. The world is a more dangerous place than at any time since the end of the cold war, yet it is also a place where Britain’s values, capabilities and alliances can make a positive difference. Since we came to power, we have taken step after step to prepare Britain for what lies ahead: record investment in defence, backing our allies, and resisting the false choices put before us that would only have weakened our country. Today’s strategy represents an important contribution to all that work. It recognises that our long-term growth, prosperity and living standards all depend on national security becoming a way of life for people and businesses in the UK. This is a plan for how we protect the British people. It is a plan for today’s times, but rooted in long-held values. It is a plan to defend our national interests, deepen our international alliances and increase our sovereign capabilities, and I commend it to the House.
Protecting our country from internal and external threats to keep the British people and our interests safe is the No. 1 priority for any Government. As a former Home Secretary, I have seen at first hand the incredible efforts of our security and intelligence services to keep us safe. So much of their work will never be disclosed, but I know that the whole House will join me in thanking them for all they do, alongside our police, counter-terrorism operations, the armed forces and all those who work so hard to keep Britain safe.
His Majesty’s Opposition will always work constructively with the Government in the national interest, especially in the current global climate when threats are increasingly complex and multifaceted. Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, non-state terrorist actors and transnational criminals all pose a significant threat to us all. That is why we welcome actions that build on the measures we put in place in government, including our National Security Act 2023, which gives us increased oversight of adversarial action and introduced the foreign influence registration scheme.
The statement and the strategy refer to the three pillars of security at home, strength abroad, and increasing sovereign and asymmetric capabilities, and I will take each in turn. On security at home, protecting critical national infrastructure must be a key component of any national security strategy. How will that work in practice? What resources will be provided? What further steps are being taken to protect people on British soil from transnational repression? With China placing bounties on the heads of people in our own country and both the NSS and the strategic defence review highlighting the threats posed by China, can the right hon. Gentleman confirm that China will be placed on the enhanced tier of FIRS? Will the Government drop their support for the China super-embassy spy hub?
On projecting our strength abroad, the right hon. Gentleman mentioned today’s NATO summit, and the commitment to increase what he calls national security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with 3.5% on core defence. But he does not have a plan to get to 3%, let alone the 3.5%. It is all smoke and mirrors, so when will he deliver a plan to get to 3%, and why will he not heed our calls to hit 3% by the end of this Parliament? That would be a vital stepping stone on the way to the higher defence spending he is seeking. Will the Government give clear information on exactly what spending will be included in the 1.5% target? Is there any new money, and does this, for example, include the costs of Sizewell, as we heard recently?
As well as increasing spending, we need to develop a tougher edge for a dangerous world. Given the security threats that we continue to face, will Labour’s £30 billion Chagos surrender treaty be scrapped? It undermines our national security, and contrary to the Prime Minister’s claim, our loss of sovereignty has been publicly backed by representatives of the regimes in China, Russia and Iran. The costs also hoover up money that we could spend on much-needed defence capabilities at this incredibly dangerous time.
On increasing sovereign and asymmetric capabilities, can the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster explain what support will be given to private enterprise and what investment will support efforts in this area? I also note that the words in the Government’s strategy do not quite align with their broader action—for example, the decision to allow the Chinese firm Mingyang to provide wind turbines for large wind farm projects in the UK. Does he acknowledge the need to protect our energy infrastructure from such potential malign activity, and if so, what concrete steps have been taken to increase the very resilience of our own infrastructure?
Finally, on the important role of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and of parliamentary oversight, we understand that the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, has not been made available to the Committee for questioning. The Government have claimed that it would not be appropriate for him as a special adviser to answer questions from the Committee. However, in this case, it is more than clear that Mr Powell’s role as the National Security Adviser puts him in a unique position—a unique senior position—and it appears that, as the lead adviser for the Government’s national security strategy, it is only right that the Joint Committee be able to put questions to him. Given the important issue here, and Mr Powell’s senior role and central position, will the Government finally let him give evidence to the Committee to allow it to undertake its important work?
We will always work to support the defence and security of Britain, and engage constructively with Ministers and challenge them to do everything possible to keep us safe, so I welcome the chance for these questions to be answered today.
On the resources to protect people, we made our commitment to increase defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. Unlike the Conservative party, we said exactly how we would pay for that, even though it meant a very difficult choice on this side of the House. On the FIRS scheme, the right hon. Lady will be aware that Iran and Russia have been placed on the enhanced tier. She asked about our approach to China. This is a serious question and we must have a serious approach to it. The Conservative party, during its time in government, veered between the naivety of the so-called “golden era” to, in effect, no engagement at all. We believe that both were the wrong approach. Instead, our approach will be marked by a desire to protect our national security and to promote our economic interests; total disengagement is not a good option for the UK, so we will be guided by both. The Foreign Secretary, as I said, will make a fuller statement on China shortly.
The right hon. Lady asks what might be included in the 1.5%. It will include such things as cyber-security, border security and telecoms infrastructure. To those who ask what those things have to do with defence, let me be clear: our opponents and our enemies know that they are part of national security, and we should recognise that, too.
Finally, we have resisted the Opposition’s pleas for us to choose between our allies. In resisting that, I believe we have a strategy that makes our country stronger and enhances Britain’s capabilities. That is at the heart of the strategy we put today. Indeed, we made a conscious choice to increase investment in the country’s future capabilities at the spending review. This will give us increased strength in the future. The spending we have committed to is funded, it is set out in the spending review and that is the approach we will take in the future, too.
The nature of the threats we face continues to evolve, as has become immensely clear to millions of people across the country with the recent cyber-attacks on Marks and Spencer and the Co-op, and in other countries we have seen attempts by authoritarian states to meddle in free and fair elections. That is why we welcome so much of what is contained in the strategy. It is also why the Liberal Democrats have welcomed the Government’s decision to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, although we have urged Ministers to go further.
Given the new NATO target of 5% of GDP, will the Government now urgently convene cross-party talks to establish a consensus on how to get there? We need to show our adversaries we are serious about that commitment. The strategy also has a welcome focus on resilience, something especially important given not just the scale of the threat we face but its varied nature. Will the Minister look at steps taken by our allies such as Estonia to inform their populations about how to deal with those threats, should they arise? To reflect the threat posed to our democracy by hostile actors, will he make protecting our democracy a national security priority? I also note the importance that the review places on sovereign independent capabilities. Is that an admission from the Government that, under President Trump, the United States is no longer a reliable ally? Will the assessment be carried over into defence procurement, where we look to maintain an inextricably close bond with the United States?
“Instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and the undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years.”
May we have some guidance on how we will address that, because that is not entirely clear? In particular, what advice is being given to the nations and regions when they are dealing with our third-biggest trading partner, with whom we need to promote but also protect ourselves?
“We will continue to abide by the important principle—shared by NATO and its key partners—that the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions are inextricably linked”.
But that is not how the US views it. The Trump Administration see them as quite separate, and would prefer the United Kingdom to focus its efforts on the Euro-Atlantic. How does the right hon. Gentleman explain that discrepancy?
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