PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill (Instruction) - 13 September 2021 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
That it be an Instruction to the Committee on the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, That the Committee have leave to make provision relating to the prorogation of Parliament.
Normally an instruction motion of this kind is tabled by the Government themselves when they decide that a Bill they have introduced does not quite stretch far enough to allow it to include some things that they would like to debate. The reason I tabled it—I hope the Government think it is always good to debate all these matters and would therefore want the motion to be carried, which would enable us to debate the matter of Prorogation in Committee—is that the 2019 Prorogation was perhaps the biggest constitutional crisis we have had in the past 20 to 25 years. I see the former Attorney General, the right hon. and learned Member for Torridge and West Devon (Sir Geoffrey Cox), is in his place. I think he has scars on his back from that period. [Interruption.] No, he never has scars on his back. Maybe they are on his front instead. The point is simple: the nation felt at odds with itself in part because of a phenomenal constitutional row between the courts and Parliament about the nature of Prorogation.
To remind the House what happened, on 28 August 2019, the Prime Minister secured a prorogation proclamation from the Queen proroguing Parliament from 9 September to 14 October, a longer Prorogation than there had been for more than 150 years. Normally they last for just six days; this would have been for 34 days. The subsequent (R) Miller v. The Prime Minister and Cherry v. Advocate General for Scotland case ended up in the Supreme Court, which decided unanimously on 24 September that the Prorogation was justiciable and unlawful.
When Parliament returned, never having been prorogued, the Prorogation ceremony was expunged from the Journal of the House of Commons. I think that was the first time the Journal had been altered since 1621, when the King was so angry with the House for having debated the matter of his son’s potential marriage that he ordered the Clerk of the House to bring the Journal to him and tore out the offending page. So I think that 1621 and 2019 are the two times that the Journal has been disturbed in that way. Business continued as if the ceremony had never happened.
The Prime Minister—this is important to my argument—then argued to the Court in 2019 that Prorogation was analogous to Dissolution. At the time, of course, Dissolution was not a prerogative power because of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. None the less, the Prime Minister argued in court that the courts should not interfere in the matter because Prorogation was a prerogative power and should not therefore be justiciable. I think it is bizarre if the Government now want to say that they do not think that Prorogation is analogous to Dissolution and that it should not be debated today.
Incidentally, we also learned from the papers that the Prime Minister gave to the Court—I think under some duress—back in 2019 that he considered the September sittings of Parliament merely to be a
“a rigmarole…to show…MPs are earning their crust”.
So at least all the hon. Members who are here today are earning their crust, by the Prime Minister’s definition.
The Court found, first, that the issue of the Prorogation itself was justiciable because it is not a proceeding in Parliament. The Prime Minister and the Government had tried to argue that it was a proceeding in Parliament and, consequently, under article 9 of the Bill of Rights and the equivalent legislation in the Scottish Parliament, it could not be considered by a court. However, the Supreme Court decided, in paragraph 68:
“The prorogation itself takes place in the House of Lords and in the presence of Members of both Houses. But it cannot sensibly be described as a ‘proceeding in Parliament’. It is not a decision of either House of Parliament. Quite the contrary: it is something which is imposed upon them from outside. It is not something upon which the Members of Parliament can speak or vote.”
This, to me, is the absolutely key point: it is not something upon which Members of either House can speak or vote. That is why I have tabled an amendment that can only be considered during the Committee stage of the Bill if this motion is agreed, which would allow a vote in the House of Commons before Prorogation could proceed. Why that is important is that, quite rightly, lots of Members have wanted to say that the courts should not be interfering in politics. The best way of making sure that they cannot interfere in Prorogation is to introduce—[Interruption.] I can see that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Mr Wragg) is being very pregnant; I will take his intervention in a moment. The best way to make sure that no court could consider the matter of Prorogation is to make it a proceeding in Parliament, and the best way to make it a proceeding in Parliament is to allow a vote. The only way we can allow a vote is if we allow this motion to go through, and then we can debate it in the Bill Committee.
Are there ever normal times in political debate? Surely that is the whole point of constitutional settlements. We do them oddly in this country, because we do not have a written constitution, as the hon. Gentleman knows; we have bits and pieces of the constitution written in lots of different statutes. The danger of proceeding by statute law is that the constitution becomes a constant plaything of the Government of the day. I would always want our constitutional settlement to last at least a generation, if not several, but my anxiety is that we are fiddling with just one part of the equation, not all of it.
Some have argued, as the Government did before the Supreme Court, that a prerogative power is by definition limitless. That flies in the face of history. Successive cases across the centuries, starting in 1611, have proved that every prerogative power has to have a limit. Otherwise, Parliament would never sit; the Government could, in theory, say, “Right—we are going to use our prerogative power of Prorogation just to make Parliament never sit.” That was one of the key things that the Supreme Court found.
My anxiety is that if the Supreme Court has already determined, and it is settled law, that Prorogation is a justiciable matter, it will be justiciable again unless we introduce statute law to change it.
All that we have to bear in mind is what the Supreme Court said in its judgment on what the limit on the power to prorogue would be:
“A decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.”
So everyone who votes against my motion, or against my new clause later if we are able to reach it, will be saying, basically, “Yes, courts, carry on. That is exactly what you should do. You should consider these matters. You should decide at every Prorogation whether the Government are acting lawfully or not.”
Why does Prorogation matter? Although people—not hon. Members, but many others—often confuse it with a recess or an Adjournment, they are completely and utterly different. Prorogation suspends all business. It means that the Government are allowed to put again a question on a motion that has already been decided during that Session, and secure a different outcome if that is what they are trying to do. We know that that was one of the reasons why the 2019 Prorogation happened.
Prorogation suspends all questions. Any written questions that have not yet been answered have to be tabled again. Normally, for four weeks beforehand Ministers do not bother to reply, because they know that Members will have to submit the questions all over again.
Prorogation means that no Select Committee or other Committee of the House can meet or take evidence. That, incidentally, must surely be something we should be able to change. It means that the Parliament Act can be engaged. Of course that is what the Labour Government did in the 1945 to 1950 Parliament—to get through legislation under the 1911 Act. Unlike a recess, which is voted on, Prorogation is not voted on, but the Government still have all the power over it, because just as with a recess, only a Government Minister can table a motion or, indeed, table an amendment. No other Member is allowed to table an amendment to a Government motion for a recess.
So many different elements of the way we do our business which guarantee Back Benchers and Opposition Members an opportunity to engage in and initiate legislative processes are entirely reliant on Standing Orders. When the Government decide to suspend a Session, that starts the clock all over again, but it means that they are entirely in control of how many private Members’ days, Backbench days or Opposition days are provided. We know from our experience last week that the Government can suddenly pull an Opposition day because they do not want a vote on, for instance, universal credit and the cut of £20.
The hon. and learned Lady is absolutely right. This is the irony—or the hypocrisy—of the Government’s position. [Interruption.] I said “of the Government’s position”; I am being very careful.
I find it incomprehensible that the Government would not want to proceed in the direction of my new clause. It is the simplest way of making sure that Prorogation is a proceeding in Parliament, and there would be no need for the ouster clause in the Bill, which many people have suggested to us is unlikely to work and is a nugatory piece of legislation.
We should also bear in mind that the Commonwealth has shown us plenty of examples of Prorogation being fiercely contested. In Australia in 1975, the Governor-General, John Kerr, removed the Labor Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, and then prorogued Parliament before the House of Representatives, which was controlled by the Labor party, could pass a motion of no confidence in Malcolm Fraser. That was a deliberate use of the Prorogation process to prevent proper scrutiny. In Canada in 2008, the Conservative Prime Minister of a minority Government, Stephen Harper, ordered a Prorogation to avoid a no confidence motion in himself—yet another example of the use of a process which I think is a means of trying to prevent proper parliamentary scrutiny.
One of the ironies of the situation that we have in the British constitution is that if the Bill goes forward as the Government plan and without the measure relating to Prorogation, there will be no real requirement that Parliament should ever sit. The Meeting of Parliament Act 1694 says that we should have Parliaments every three years; that is all that we would be relying on as a legislative means. It is true that the Bill of Rights requires taxation to be subject to Parliament’s sitting, and also requires that a standing Army must be endorsed every five years. However, the Supreme Court made the very good point that these practical considerations are scant reassurance, because Parliament could just sit very briefly to deal with those matters.
In short, Madam Deputy Speaker—or “in long”, actually—my point is simple: the best way to ensure that Prorogation is not abused by the Executive, and to ensure that the courts do not interfere in political processes that should remain within the political sphere, is to ensure that there is a vote in Parliament before Prorogation. The only way we can have that vote in Parliament before Prorogation is to debate it later today, and the only way we can do that is to vote in favour of my motion of instruction.
The first point to make is that this is not the right place to debate Prorogation. This is a short and narrowly focused Bill concerning the ending of one Parliament and the beginning of a new one, and the process of getting from one to the other, not the ending of a parliamentary Session. Therefore, the Government’s view is that expanding the Bill to cover Prorogation would not be appropriate.
“no read across from prorogation and dissolution”,
and I agree with that.
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 expressly did not affect the prerogative power to prorogue Parliament. Our Bill to repeal that Act, which is what we are considering today in Committee, therefore does not touch on matters of Prorogation. To do that would significantly widen the scope of the Bill beyond the manifesto commitments of this side of the House and those of the other side of the House, who were clear in their manifesto that they wished to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. It would even go beyond the short title of this Bill. Therefore, it is inappropriate to put such measures in the Bill.
I ought to take this moment to reflect on what we are actually voting on today. The hon. Member for Rhondda has suggested that there might almost be a trap here. I hesitate to suggest that he is laying a trap for Government Members to vote on. That would hardly be in his character, I am sure. However, a few suggestions have been made in the Chamber this afternoon that, if Government Members were to vote against his motion right here, right now, we would be saying that Prorogation was in fact justiciable. I think I can answer that one fairly clearly in saying that we are voting on an instruction to this Committee here today that we should have leave to make provision relating to the Prorogation of Parliament. I am really doing nothing more there than reading from the Order Paper, so we can be quite clear what today’s vote consists of.
Let me point out how much time we have taken to get to what we are doing today on Dissolution. There have been manifesto commitments from both sides of the House, as I have said. There have been detailed reports from Committees of this House and the other place, as well as a high degree of consensus and many years of reflection on the operation of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. I do not believe that a great deal of realistic notice, ahead of the amendment and this instruction, exists in respect of Prorogation. For that reason, I suggest that now is not the time for that debate, and it is not for me to suggest another time for such a debate.
The hon. Member for Rhondda raised some other points that ought to be answered. There are compelling practical reasons why we do not need to go into the territory raised here today. He raised the spectre of a Government using Prorogation simply to keep on going, but the point needs to be made that any Government would want a new parliamentary Session to begin as soon as possible to pass their Queen’s Speech at the earliest opportunity and to have supply. Quite rightly, no Government can operate without supply and they therefore need Parliament to be in existence. No Government, whether the Government of the day or a future Government, would want to introduce hurdles between the end of one parliamentary Session and another. Their purpose would be to move the legislative programme forward so that they could deliver on their commitments to the electorate. These are fundamentally important points about how Governments and Parliament work together, and I think that that is a quite reasonable answer to the points that have been made today about whether a Government could indeed prorogue forever and whether they ought to be stopped in some way.
More broadly, the Sovereign exercises the prerogative power to prorogue Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister and that has always been the case. What I think is coming into this debate on the instruction, and may come into the discussion later if this motion were to be passed, is the concept of introducing prescriptive statutory approaches into our flexible constitutional arrangements, and I would call that unnecessary and undesirable. The whole scheme of what we are doing in the Committee for this Bill is to remove constraining and inflexible schemes and return to flexible arrangements that work well.
Essentially that means that, when the Bill goes to the other place, the unelected Chamber will be able to debate this matter. It is surely perverse that the Government should deny the elected Chamber the same opportunity.
There is no getting away from the fact that the 2019 constitutional crisis caused by the unlawful Prorogation of Parliament was a warning shot that we should legislate in this area to ensure that the courts cannot interfere in matters of Parliament. The most obvious way to do that is to debate and support my hon. Friend’s new clauses and amendments.
The Minister says it is not her place to decide when these matters should be decided, but that they are certainly not in this Bill. What is the point of having a Minister for the Constitution if she cannot decide that such an important constitutional matter be decided today?
It is important that we discuss these matters. We not only had a constitutional crisis in 2019; we had one in 2010, too, which led to the coalition Government. We had not had a coalition Government for a long time, and the truth is that in politics everything that everybody thinks can never happen nearly always does end up happening in some shape or form. That is what constitutions should be ready for. The Minister says she could not imagine a Government would ever do a whole series of different things, including allowing a lengthy Prorogation. Well, there was one. It was in 2019 and it was led by the present Prime Minister, who wanted to prorogue Parliament for 34 days for illegal parliamentary reasons. That is why we got into that pickle in 2019.
Question put.
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