PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
China Espionage: Government Security Response - 18 November 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)

With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a statement on Chinese espionage targeting UK democratic institutions, and on the Government’s action to counter the breadth of threats posed by China and wider state actors.

Before I begin, let me first pay tribute to the crew member of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Tidesurge who is missing off the coast of the Republic of Ireland. I know that the whole House will join me in sending our very best wishes to the ship’s company, and to their families back home. This tragic incident is a reminder of the sacrifice that members of our armed forces make in the service of our country.

Earlier today, MI5 issued an espionage alert to Members of this House, Members of the other place and parliamentary staff to warn them about ongoing targeting of our democratic institutions by Chinese actors. Before I set out the threat and what we are doing to meet it, let me thank you, Mr Speaker, for your support in issuing the alert, and for your tireless efforts to safeguard the security of this place and the people who serve within it. I encourage all parliamentary colleagues to read the alert, and to get in touch with the Parliamentary Security Department if they have any immediate concerns.

Our intelligence agencies have warned that China is attempting to recruit and cultivate individuals with access to sensitive information about Parliament and the UK Government. MI5 has stated that this activity is being carried out by a group of Chinese intelligence officers—often masked through the use of cover companies or external headhunters. It is not just parliamentarians who should be concerned by this; parliamentary staff, economists, think-tank employees, geopolitical consultants and Government officials have all been targeted for their networks and access to politicians. I urge all parliamentarians and their staff to be wary that China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value, and will gather individual pieces of information to build a wider picture.

Let me speak plainly: this activity involves a covert and calculated attempt by a foreign power to interfere with our sovereign affairs in favour of its own interests, and this Government will not tolerate it. It builds on a pattern of activity that we have seen from China, with cyber-operations by Chinese state-affiliated actors targeting parliamentarians’ emails in 2021, attempted foreign interference activity by Christine Lee in 2022, and other more recent cases. We will take all necessary measures to protect our national interests, our citizens and our democratic way of life, including by working with our allies and partners.

The world has changed a great deal since I first stepped forward to serve our country almost 30 years ago, and while some things have changed, some things remain the same. In the various roles I have held since then, I have always believed in the importance of being clear-eyed about the nature of the threats that we face, and about the need to ensure that the tools we use to respond to those threats are kept up to date. This Government’s first duty is to protect our national security, and we will not hesitate to hold all state actors to account.

On 6 November, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke with her Chinese counterpart, Director Wang Yi. She was clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security, particularly relating to the UK’s Parliament and democracy, will not be tolerated. Today, I am setting out a comprehensive package of measures that we are taking to disrupt and deter the threats posed by China, as well as by state actors more widely. We are launching a counter political interference and espionage action plan, which is supported by Ministers from across Government and co-ordinated by me. I will set out in detail to the House what that plan will entail.

First, we will strengthen the legislative tools available to Government to disrupt the threat. We will introduce the elections Bill, which will include measures to safeguard against covert political funding. They will include tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients, and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission. I can confirm that we are also working on new powers to counter foreign interference, including a proscription-type tool to disrupt proxy organisations that are undermining our security, and an extension to the maximum penalties for election interference offences.

Secondly, working with the parliamentary security authorities, we are launching a series of protective security campaigns, co-ordinated through the defending democracy taskforce. These will help all those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report suspicious state threat activity. The campaigns, which will build on the guidance that was launched by the National Protective Security Authority in October, will include tailored security briefings for the devolved Governments and for political parties via the parliamentary parties panel by the end of this year, as well as new security guidance in January for all candidates taking part in devolved and local elections in May.

Thirdly, we are building a campaign that uses all levers at the Government’s disposal to degrade the ecosystem of proxy cover companies, organisations and individuals that are being used by foreign states to facilitate interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions. The National Protective Security Authority, building on its “Think Before You Link” campaign, will strengthen its engagement with professional networking sites to make them a more hostile operating environment for foreign agents.

As Security Minister, I am privileged to see the diligence of the security services, law enforcement and civil servants who work tirelessly, day and night, to keep the UK safe. Noting China’s low threshold for information gathering, this Government are providing the resources needed to protect our national interests. I can announce that the Government have committed to investing £170 million to renew the sovereign encrypted technology that our officials use to do their vital work. This programme of work will help to ensure that sensitive diplomatic, economic, trade, security, law enforcement and policy development arrangements are safeguarded from espionage by any state threat actor.

I can also announce that this Government have completed the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to the national intelligence law of the People’s Republic of China from all sensitive sites we maintain in the UK and around the world. Moreover, we will invest £130 million next year, through the integrated security fund, in building the UK’s resilience against threats posed by states such as China. Among other projects, this investment will build Counter Terrorism Policing’s ability to enforce the National Security Act 2023, and fund the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority’s work supporting our most critical businesses in protecting their intellectual property. Indeed, the National Protective Security Authority’s work is an important reminder that China poses threats not just to our democratic institutions, but to other sectors. Let me talk briefly about two other sectors in particular.

The first sector is education, which is one of the UK’s most important global assets, in part due to the UK’s steadfast commitment to academic freedom and excellence. There is value for the UK in engagement with China on education. However, operating in today’s uncertain international context presents many challenges for our great universities. It is because of their excellence that states like China are attempting to influence these universities’ independent research, and to interfere with activity on campuses. Ministers have already raised our concerns about this activity with their counterparts in Beijing, and the Office for Students recently issued new guidance to help universities protect the freedoms that their staff and students enjoy. I can announce that as part of our ongoing commitment to working collectively to address these risks, Ministers will host a closed event with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference, and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience.

Secondly, on advanced manufacturing, the Department for Business and Trade is working to strengthen and scale our new economic security advisory service, which will help businesses navigate economic security issues, such as espionage and intellectual property theft. The service is already engaging with businesses in the advanced manufacturing sector, and as it matures, it will support other sectors of the economy. It will provide a new digital offer, and will assist businesses with complex economic security cases in navigating the support from His Majesty’s Government.

In October, I told the House that this Government remain steadfast in our commitment to disrupting and holding state actors accountable for widescale cyber-espionage operations. We stand ready to go further to disrupt, degrade and protect against the dangerous and unrestrained offensive cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold. Earlier this year, the NCSC, with international allies, called out three technology companies, based in China, for their global malicious cyber-campaign targeting critical networks. Just last week, we introduced the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which will help make it harder to target critical sectors of the economy and the public sector with cyber-attacks, including malicious cyber-activity emanating from China’s territory. The Government will continue to take further action against China-based actors involved in malicious cyber-activity against the UK and our allies. This will form part of a broader campaign that the UK is delivering to disrupt and degrade the dangerous cyber-ecosystem that China has allowed to take hold within its territory. Let me assure hon. Members that we will not shy away from using all the tools at our disposal, including sanctions, as necessary.

Our country has a long and proud history as a seafaring nation that trades with countries around the world that share our way of life, and with those that do not. China is the world’s second-largest economy, and, together with Hong Kong, is the UK’s third-largest trading partner. It is in our long-term strategic interests to continue to engage with China. We must co-operate on issues on which our interests align—climate, global health, trade, scientific research, illegal migration, and serious and organised crime, to name just a few—but we will always challenge any country, including China, that attempts to interfere, influence or undermine the integrity of our democratic institutions, and we will take all measures necessary to protect UK national security. That is why we have taken action today. I am clear that further steps can and absolutely will be taken to disrupt and deter China’s espionage activity, wherever it takes place. We will update our security powers to keep pace with the threat, help those who work in politics to recognise, resist and report the threat, and work with partners across the economy to strengthen their security against the threat.

Our strategy is not just to co-operate. We will engage China where necessary, but we will always act to defend our interests, and challenge where our values are threatened. I commend this statement to the House.

The Minister took 14 minutes. This is a very important subject, so I have no problem with that, but it may be helpful to say to the shadow Minister that if she needs more minutes, they are there.

My heart goes out to the missing crew member, their ship’s company, and their loved ones at home. Let us all hope for good news.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of this statement, and for his time last week, but the revelations today are no surprise. They are the latest in an ever-growing list of actions by the Chinese Communist party to interfere in our sovereign affairs and try to undermine our democracy and our country. The pernicious nature of this threat should not be underestimated. I welcome the Minister’s plans for a new proscription tool to counter foreign interference, and the fact that the Government have completed the work that we started of stripping surveillance equipment manufactured in China from sensitive sites. On education, however, the plans to discuss foreign interference with vice-chancellors are quite inadequate. I have had those discussions, and faced nothing but naivety and intransigence. They are also useless unless the Government are willing to use their teeth to defend those institutions that are under attack.

Earlier this month, Norway and Denmark alerted us to the existence of dual-use kill switches in Chinese-made electric buses. These switches allow China to switch off buses and bring chaos to transport systems. Can the Minister give an update on the investigation of our bus networks, and the chips that have been placed in Ministry of Defence vehicles, which require our members of the armed forces to be silent while travelling around our country in defence of our nation?

On academic freedom, Sheffield Hallam University was blackmailed by Chinese security services into cancelling research on state-sanctioned Uyghur slave labour. What update can the Minister give on the police investigation into that, and the coercive campaign? Will he admit that it was a mistake for his party to cancel our university free speech provisions, and will he convince the Government to reintroduce them, now that the threat is on the front pages of our newspapers? It is only by drawing a red line and taking action to establish some form of deterrence that we will see threats abate.

In the face of this hostility, the Government appear to be delegating difficult conversations to officials. On the collapse of the case against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry, the Government saw fit only to call in a senior official to have a conversation with a Chinese chargé d’affaires. Last week, Hongkonger Chloe Cheung said that the Government were not keeping her safe. The Government’s response to a bounty being put on her head, and to kidnap notes being delivered to her neighbours, asking them to take her to the Chinese embassy, was the same rhetorical tap on the knuckles. This is insufficient if the Government seriously want to deter further attacks on our country.

We Conservative Members recognise the threat from the Chinese Communist party, and we want to work with the Government, so we have a few suggestions. The Minister today stated that the Chinese Government are using proxy organisations to interfere in, and commit espionage against, our democracy. That is literally why we introduced the foreign influence registration scheme. Instead of carrying out their communications plan and holding the private, closed-door meetings announced today, we urge the Government to put China in the enhanced tier of the FIR scheme. In opposition, Labour supported our National Security Act 2023, yet in government, it refuses to use it as it was designed. That is perverse. Why vote for a defensive tool, only to leave it on the shelf when we are under threat?

The decision on the new Chinese embassy is expected shortly. We would refuse permission for that embassy. If the Government will not, will they at least require the Chinese Government to pay for sensitive underground cables to be re-routed away from the embassy? We hear that multiple Government visits to China are planned before Christmas and the new year. Will those now be cancelled? What message does it send when, despite an attack on this House and our Parliament, Ministers are happily jetting off to stride down red carpets with the Government responsible?

Finally, we need a comprehensive audit of our vulnerabilities across our society and our economy. The recent export controls on critical minerals demonstrate China’s willingness to weaponise its economic heft. We need to know where our vulnerabilities lie, and to increase our resilience accordingly. That means publishing the shelved China audit, because how can an entire civil service base its posture on a document that most will never be allowed to read? It needs to be published. Sensitive parts can be redacted. As for the possibility of the Chinese authorities taking any offence at its contents, the contents are down to their actions, not ours.

We face an acute threat to our democracy, and in the face of that threat, we have yet to see repercussions for the Chinese Communist party. To defend our nation, the Government must have a firm policy of deterrence. Justice was denied last month, but the Government have the tools and the ability to act. When will they take action to make it clear to the Chinese Communist party that it will not get away with attacks on our democracy?

The Government can cancel the Joint Economic and Trade Commission talks, impose sanctions, cancel propaganda visits to China and put the Chinese Communist party in the enhanced foreign influence registration scheme tier. When they do any of those things, the Opposition will be here, ready to help. Until that time, the Chinese Communist party will think that our country is unwilling to deter future acts of hostility and unwilling to defend our democracy or our country.

It is good to see the hon. Lady in her place. I am grateful for her comments today and for the contact that we have had recently. I hope she knows that this is a conversation that I want to continue to have with her and colleagues on the Opposition Benches. We take very seriously the points she has made today and on countless other occasions.

Let me try to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance; if I am not able to do so, I would be happy to meet her again in the very near future. As she will understand, there are sensitivities that mean it is more difficult to get into the detail of some things, but let me see what I can say to try to provide some assurances.

The package that we have announced today is, by any metric, comprehensive, although I have been clear about the Government’s willingness to go further when and where that is required. The measures we have announced today will help us to tackle economic, academic, cyber and espionage threats that we face from China and other state actors. The impact of the measures will be immediate, but, as I say, we will not hesitate to go further where necessary; when we say that national security is the first priority of this Government, we take that incredibly seriously.

The hon. Lady is right that the threats we face from China require actions not words, but I gently reiterate some of the announcements that we have confirmed today. The work that we are taking forward will be co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office and me as part of a new counter-political interference and espionage plan; that will be the fulcrum point for co-ordinating activity right across Government and across law enforcement. She will have heard what I have said about the new guidance briefings that will be issued to Members of this House, the devolved Assemblies and candidates standing for election next May.

We are also putting our money where our mouth is. We have announced £170 million specifically towards renewing our sovereign encrypted technical capability and another £130 million on projects such as building the capacity of counter-terrorism police, working with the NCSC and the NPSA to protect intellectual property.

I have also referenced, as the hon. Lady did, the removal of surveillance equipment manufactured by companies subject to China’s national intelligence law—work that I absolutely acknowledge began under the previous Government. I am pleased to confirm that we have completed that process today. I have issued a written ministerial statement with further detail on that. There is also an important legislative angle to all this, which is why we introduced the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill just last week, and why I give an assurance that we will introduce the elections Bill at the earliest available opportunity.

All these measures are important in their own right, but they are more important when they are brought together. In the end, though—I think the hon. Lady will agree with this—what really matters is our mindset, and our mindset is born of an absolute desire to work collaboratively across this place to protect our country and all the people who live here. Will that involve making some tough choices? Yes; the truth of the matter is that it will involve making some tough choices. The previous Government made some tough choices, and this Government will have to make tough choices. Like all our G7 counterparts, we will engage with those choices in a clear-eyed way. I do not think any serious Member of this House thinks that we should not be engaging with China—the debate is around the nature of the engagement.

The hon. Lady made some important points, and if I am not able to address them adequately, I will come back to her. She raised the importance of education and academic freedoms; I completely agree with her on that. She referenced Sheffield Hallam University specifically. She will understand that because of ongoing active inquiries into the matter, it would not be appropriate to comment on the specifics of what has allegedly happened at Sheffield Hallam. However, her points are well made, and I give her an absolute assurance that we take them incredibly seriously.

It did not come as a huge surprise to me that the hon. Lady also raised the issue of FIRS. She will remember that FIRS is a product of the National Security Act 2023. Some Members of this House said that we would not introduce FIRS at all; then, when we confirmed that we were going to introduce it, they said that we would not be able to do so by 1 July. I gave a categorical assurance that we would introduce it by 1 July, and we did. We are looking closely at whether it is necessary to make further additions to the enhanced tier, but I can say to the hon. Lady that no decision has yet been made with regard to China specifically.

The hon. Lady also asked me about the embassy. There has been much discussion about that matter in this place, and we are moving towards a point of decision. She will understand that that is not a decision for me; it will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government in a quasi-judicial capacity. As a consequence of that, I am limited in what I can say. However, as I have said previously, I can say that national security has been the core priority throughout.

The hon. Lady spoke about visits to China. I would take a different view to her characterisation of those visits: I think it is important that members of this Government—Ministers and senior Ministers—engage with our counterparts in China, as it is only by engaging that we are provided with an opportunity to deliver tough and consistent messages. I can categorically assure her that any Minister or official who travels from this country to China will deliver a series of strong and coherent messages aligned with the messages that I have delivered to the House today.

The hon. Lady also asked about the audit. She will know that the previous Foreign Secretary gave a statement in this House about the China audit, but I will look carefully at the specific points she has made.

In concluding my response to the hon. Lady, I hope that she knows how seriously we take these matters, and I assure her categorically that I am very happy to work collaboratively with her and colleagues on the Opposition Benches to ensure that we secure the right outcome for the country.

I, too, send my condolences to the family of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary member who has been lost. The RFA is unique in that it is largely civilian-crewed by members of the RMT trade union, working alongside Royal Navy personnel. They work as a very professional, tight family; any loss like this will be a real blow to them.

I wish to raise the issue of the security of Chinese nationals and others in this country. Two weeks ago I was at a demonstration on behalf of Lee Cheuk-yan—our colleague, the former general secretary of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and founder of the Labour party in Hong Kong—who has been in prison now for four years. At those demonstrations, there is always a fear of the monitoring of demonstrators and particularly for the security of Chinese nationals in this country. I would welcome the Minister’s view on what further action could be taken to reassure people that, in the exercise of their democratic rights in this country, they do not become vulnerable to any actions by the Chinese state here.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, not least for his opening remarks, which I know will have been shared by the whole House. He raises an important point about transnational repression. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. We have relatively recently completed a very significant piece of work looking at the issue of transnational repression through the defending democracy taskforce. The Government are absolutely crystal clear that it is completely unacceptable for China—or any other country, for that matter—to target individuals resident in this country.

I recently met members of the Hong Kong community, who raised significant concerns about their being targeted. I was clear to them, as I am clear to my right hon. Friend, that none of that activity is remotely acceptable to the Government, and that we will do everything we can to ensure both that the individuals he refers to are kept safe and that they feel as though they are being kept safe.

I come to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, who obviously has some extra time allocated as well.

I am grateful to the Minister, as always, for advance sight of the statement. The news that the CCP is waging a campaign to infiltrate our Parliament is deeply offensive to our sovereignty, though perhaps it is not surprising to those who have been paying attention to the recent collapsed espionage case and the uncovering of interference at a UK university. The attempts to corrupt our democracy and Government must be rooted out.

We therefore welcome the counter-political interference and espionage action plan as a first step. It is absolutely right that the Government implement those measures to challenge Beijing’s espionage capabilities in the UK and the transnational repression it exports to our shores. New measures to disrupt proxy organisations, new penalties for election interference and the removal of potentially compromised surveillance equipment have our full backing. However, in the face of persistent, flagrant transgressions by the CCP, the plan by itself is not sufficient.

Beijing has tried to bully our Government, most recently on permission for the proposed new Chinese embassy at Tower Bridge, warning of consequences if the Government do not approve the plans. Beijing has oppressed and intimidated British nationals. We cannot afford to shy away from this challenge and leave key, pressing issues unresolved. I note the Minister’s comments about the Chinese mega-embassy. May I put on record my party’s repeated call to urge the Government to block the plan, to show that attempts to intimidate will be firmly rebuked? I further note the Minister’s comments about FIRS. Will he update the House on his current thinking about when he might come back with a decision to add China to the scheme’s enhanced tier?

The Minister said that the forthcoming elections Bill will include measures

“to safeguard against covert political funding…tougher risk assessment rules for donor recipients and enhanced enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission.”

This is a good opportunity. Will the Minister confirm that that will include donations via cryptocurrency and the associated transparency concerns? Will he also confirm that there will be new risk assessment rules and enforcement powers for donations funnelled through third-party organisations such as think-tanks?

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her broad welcoming of the plan. She makes a number of points, including several about which she has consistently raised concerns in the Chamber and with me outside it. Let me say to her and to other Members that, with regard to the embassy and any other area of policy, nobody will intimidate members of this Government to do anything other than what is in our country’s national interests.

I understand why certain hon. Members want to refer to the embassy as a “super-embassy” or by other descriptive terms. The judgment will have to be made by the Secretary of State, but I, along with other ministerial colleagues, have been crystal clear that national security is and will remain a core priority throughout this process. There have been various comments and points made by people inside and outside this House on the national security implications of the embassy that are not correct. It is a quasi-judicial matter and I am limited in what I can say, but I reiterate the assurance about the importance of the national security elements underpinning any decision.

On the elections Bill, the hon. Lady made some important and valid points. She will understand that that piece of legislation sits with another Government Department. I am sure the Department will have heard her points, but if it has not, I will represent those points on her behalf.

Sheffield Hallam University in my constituency is home to internationally respected researchers, including Professor Laura Murphy, whose excellent work on forced labour in China has been met with coercion, intimidation and attempts at interference linked to the Chinese state. At a time when universities are increasingly financially vulnerable due to a sharp decline in international student numbers, the risk of hostile states exploiting that vulnerability is growing. I welcome the closed event for vice-chancellors to address those concerns. Will the Minister explain whether that event will explore how academics such as Professor Murphy will be protected from being silenced, and will more robust support be provided to universities that are left exposed to pressure, intimidation and undue influence?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Sheffield is a great city, and she will know better than anyone that it is blessed with two outstanding academic institutions. She knows that as the local MP, and I know that from my time spent as the regional mayor. For reasons that I know she will understand, because there remain active inquiries into this matter, I am limited in what I can say about the specifics. I can say more generally that any attempt by any foreign state to intimidate and coerce universities to limit free speech and academic freedoms in the UK will not be tolerated. The Government made that clear to Beijing after learning of the case.

The new Office for Students recently issued guidance to make it explicit that universities should not tolerate attempts by foreign states to suppress academic freedom. I am pleased that she welcomes the closed event with vice-chancellors. We will make sure that both the vice-chancellors from the city of Sheffield are invited to attend. I am happy to discuss these matters further with her.

I call the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee.

Does the Minister consider that China represents a current threat to this country? Will he also expand on the work his officials are doing with the Members and Members’ Staff Services Team to remove potential security weaknesses, not just from this building but from MPs’ constituency offices and our homes?

I am grateful to the Chair of the Select Committee, as I always am. On her second point, let me come back to her. She raises a valid concern and, rather than give her a response now, let me consider the facts of the case and I will come back to her with a more considered response.

On her first point, I fear that I will disappoint her and maybe some other Conservative Members by not diverting from the policy that the Government have previously confirmed in this place. The Government fully recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security in the form of cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions, including the transnational oppression of Hongkongers in this country. That is why we have made the announcements that we have and why we will continue to do everything that we can to guard against that threat.

I thank the Minister for his statement and put on record my tribute to the missing crew member, those searching for them and all those who keep us safe.

I welcome the package of measures that the Minister has set out today. With the news about the networking sites, while not new, it is important to keep the risk elevated and to remind those potentially affected of that. He knows, because we have conversed about this regularly, that I take an interest in the defending democracy taskforce. Will he therefore say a little bit more about the series of protective security campaigns that will be co-ordinated through it? I suggest that as part of the outreach to all the different stakeholders that he has mentioned, the taskforce gives thought to some sort of centralised toolkit that pulls together all the guidance and information, which is evergreen and constantly updated, to ensure that all affected stakeholders, in and outside this place, have it at their fingertips so we can keep ourselves safe from people who are a threat to us.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his comments today and for his previous points about the importance of the defending democracy taskforce. It was not a given that the Government would necessarily continue in the way that the previous Government and the previous Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat), had invested in the taskforce. However, I took the view, on good advice from my predecessor, that that was the best way—the fulcrum—to co-ordinate that activity across Government. I think he was right about that. That is why we have really invested in it as a process, that is why it is truly wired across Government and law enforcement, that is why the Prime Minister recently renewed its mandate and that is why I personally invest a significant amount of time in it every single day. I believe in its work and I believe that it provides the right forum to lead that work, including the kind of work that my hon. Friend mentioned.

The protective security campaigns are really important because, while most right hon. and hon. Members are sensible and diligent Members of this House, we have to ensure that everybody who might be at threat or at risk has the information that they need in order to make informed decisions. That is why, on a number of fronts, we will up our game and ensure that all the necessary information is provided to the people who need it. My hon. Friend’s point about the toolkit is a really good one, and I will take it away, consider it and come back to him. I am grateful to him for his contribution.

I shall begin, if I may, by saying to the Minister: you’re welcome. It is a pleasure to hear his statement today and to hear the areas where he is taking things forward. I particularly welcome the update on connected devices. There are a few other areas where connected devices are very real. My hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) spoke from the Dispatch Box about vehicles, which are intelligence-gathering platforms on wheels when they are made in Beijing and shipped over here, and there is a whole series of other areas where we are seeing this level of threat continue and deepen.

The Minister also spoke about the fact that we need a relationship with China, and I do not disagree with him on that, but it is somewhat insulting when the Chancellor goes to Beijing and comes back with £600 million of investment over five years. Frankly, that is peanuts. Chinese foreign direct investment in the UK is less than 0.2%, according to the Government’s own trade and investment figures. We need to look at where we can compensate for that dependency, perhaps by increasing US FDI by 1%, which would be almost double the Chinese investment. We need to look around the world at alternatives. We also need to be clear eyed about the threats, and I reiterate the point that my hon. Friend made from the Dispatch Box: we need to place China on the enhanced tier of FIRS.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his points and the advice that he has offered previously. His points about connected devices and vehicles are well made, and I can give him an absolute assurance that we consider them very carefully. He made a point about engagement and referenced the Chancellor’s visit. I can assure him that all Ministers and officials who visit China will deliver a coherent and strong set of messages about our concerns with regard to our national security. I said earlier that the Foreign Secretary had spoken specifically about these matters with her Chinese counterpart on 6 November. She was absolutely clear with the Foreign Minister that any activity that threatens UK national security would not be tolerated, so I can give the right hon. Gentleman and the House an absolute assurance that, even where there are engagement activities that might, on the face of it, relate to other areas of Government business, there will be a consistency about the messaging.

The right hon. Gentleman will know, though, from his time in government that in addition to the areas of co-operation and areas where there is a requirement to engage that I listed earlier, both within departmental responsibilities that sit in the Home Office, there is often merit in engaging with China on a range of matters that are not necessarily particularly well understood. We need to have that constructive engagement with the country, but it needs to be underpinned by a desire to enhance and preserve our national security, and that is the approach that I will always take.

First, I thank the Minister for the strength of his message about our efforts to stop the transnational repression of our constituents, including the Hongkongers in Milton Keynes. Can we continue to have a dialogue about how my constituents continue to feel unsafe in the UK? I want to raise an issue that goes alongside the Speaker’s Conference, which is how we protect and defend our democracy in the online world, particularly from foreign state actors and their proxies and non-state actors who use the online environment to destabilise our democracy. Will the Minister meet me to talk about the amendments that I am preparing for the elections Bill to ensure that we protect ourselves from online threats just as much as we do from offline threats?

Let me reiterate what I said previously about how completely unacceptable it is that any transnational repression takes place in this country. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. My hon. Friend is right to raise the important work done by the Speaker’s Conference. At the most recent meeting of the defending democracy taskforce, we looked carefully at the recommendations. A lot of positive work has been done, and we want to work closely with Mr Speaker to deliver where we can on the recommendations.

My hon. Friend is also right to raise the importance of the online environment, and these are conversations that I am having with colleagues across Government, including in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. On her point about a meeting, she will understand that that particular piece of legislation is a Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government lead, but I will make sure that she gets a meeting with the relevant Minister, whether that is myself or a colleague in the other Department.

In Wokingham, we have a really strong Hong Kong community, and they tell me regularly how concerned they are about the growing threat of Chinese espionage and China’s influence in our politics. Many of them have bounties levied on their heads. What is the Minister doing to ease the concerns in our Hong Kong community, especially among my constituents, and what is he doing to protect them and our institutions?

That is an entirely fair and reasonable point. Let me give the hon. Gentleman a reassurance, further to what I have already said today and on other occasions. The Government will continue to stand with and support members of the Hong Kong community who have relocated here to the UK. I recently met members of that community myself, specifically to discuss their concerns. The defending democracy taskforce is doing a lot of work on our response to transnational repression, but if the hon. Gentleman has any further concerns, I would be happy to meet him to discuss them further.

Do the Government accept that China is a bad faith actor whose basic technique can be summed up by a single phrase: buy influence and build dependency? Is that not exactly what has happened in our universities?

The right hon. Gentleman speaks with great authority on this matter, and he will know that I am limited in the way in which I can describe the nature of the relationship. I have given him the characterisation that I think is appropriate. We have to be pragmatic in the world that we live in. We have to do what we can to secure our national security, while at the same time ensuring that we are engaging in a way that is advantageous to our country and our economy. Any Government—the previous one and this one—have to balance those sometimes competing interests, but this Government will do it in a way that always ensures that we safeguard our national security.

I have great respect for the Minister. However, listening to what he has said today about the China espionage case, which follows the collapsed spy case, the Christine Lee case and the other spying that took place here in the House, does he not look back and think that it is peculiar? We now have Hongkongers here in the UK with bounties on their heads who are being threatened daily by China and dragged into illegal police stations. He talked about all the other things: threats to our democracy, threats to our industry, cyber threats through the internet of things, threats to our universities, and threats to our MPs who are sanctioned and who have to face these challenges daily. Does that not make a mockery of the idea that China is not a continuing threat, and of the fact that it is not in the upper tier of FIRS, as my hon. Friend the shadow Minister called for? Surely it is time for that to happen. The No. 1 priority for a Government is the defence of the realm. Balancing priorities does not trump defence of the realm.

I have a lot of respect for the right hon. Gentleman, who has engaged with these matters consistently for a number of years, and rightly so. We have today announced a comprehensive set of measures, but I have been clear about the Government’s willingness to go further where required. I have also been clear on this and previous occasions about the nature of the threat and the Government’s concerns about it. He is right that the defence of the realm is the most important job of any Government, but we must also be honest about the fact that we need to engage with China. We must therefore engage on our terms and in a way that is advantageous to us.

I know that the right hon. Gentleman has a long-standing interest in the embassy, and he knows what my response about that will be. I understand his point about FIRS; he will have heard the response that I have already given. I hope that, despite the concerns he has expressed, he acknowledges that we take these matters seriously and are doing everything we can to address the nature of the threat.

I welcome a great deal of what the Minister said in his statement. As I am sure he agrees, just as we know that China can simultaneously represent a national security threat and economic opportunity, China knows it too. That means that—even if it were not the right thing to do in and of itself, which of course it is—standing up for our national security is unlikely to prejudice any international trading relationship that we seek to pursue with China, because China respects strength.

May I ask the Minister for help on one specific question in relation to the embassy? I know that he respects the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. He knows that that Committee is relied upon by this House to provide judgment on matters in which intelligence is involved and the House cannot do so itself. The embassy is clearly one such matter. If the Government seek to make a decision on that before Christmas—he may not be able to say whether that is still the case—will he ensure that the ISC has all the material we need to make a judgment on behalf of the House? As yet, we do not have it.

I often find myself in violent agreement with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who makes good points in a reasonable way. It is not necessarily for me to talk about the nature of our diplomatic relationship with China, because, as he will understand, that is an issue on which the Foreign Office leads, but he is right in his characterisation of our approach. I believe in being straight with this House and with the countries that we deal with. He is right that it does not in any way disadvantage us to be straightforward and strong. That is why I have chosen the language that I have used today very carefully to indicate the strength of feeling about the nature of the threat that we face.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman made an entirely reasonable point about the embassy. I will not bore him and the House with further discussion about it being a quasi-judicial decision that will be made by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, although that is clearly the case. There is an important role for the ISC in considering the nature of the decision. At the appropriate moment, when we are able to do so, I will ensure that his Committee is properly briefed on that issue.

I welcome the Minister’s comments and repeat the calls for China to be added to FIRS. I have specific concerns about Edinburgh and Scotland in general. One relates to our energy security given the continuing lack of clarity about what is to happen to Mingyang and whether, if it is to take part in the construction of the offshore wind farm in the North sea, mitigations will be in place to prevent it from having on/off switches.

We have a large Chinese consulate in Edinburgh West. My constituents are concerned about the size of the dishes on the roof and about activity there. Having myself been subjected to filming while speaking at a Hong Kong rally, I am concerned about the security of Hong Kong nationals in Edinburgh. With the Scottish elections coming up next year, can the Minister reassure me that there have been discussions with the devolved authorities to ensure that they are aware of the continued and increasing threat posed by Chinese espionage?

I am grateful to the hon. Lady, who makes important points about her great city. I can give her an assurance that there is such engagement, but I will reflect on the points that she makes and consider whether we need to do more. She will acknowledge that I referred specifically to the devolved Assemblies in my opening remarks, but if she thinks that we could and should be doing more, I would be very happy to have that conversation with her.

This is a welcome statement from the Security Minister, whom I hold in high regard, as does the House. He will be familiar with the report on China produced by the ISC—of which I was and remain a member—which dealt with exactly the matters that he has described: the widespread penetration of our universities, the theft of intellectual property and the attempt to compromise our democratic institutions. Will he add to his list a review of contracts with China—public sector contracts, Government contracts and so on—particularly those relating to sensitive matters? He said that he was a plain-speaking man, so, mindful of the collapse of the recent trial, will he do the simple task of saying from the Dispatch Box that China is a threat to our national security?

I am always grateful to the right hon. Gentleman—one of my predecessors—for his contributions, to which I listen very carefully. On his final point, he knows precisely what the Government’s line is with regard to China. He makes a good point about the contribution of the ISC. I hope that members of that Committee understand and recognise the importance that we attach to their work. We intend to have regular contact with the Committee, including in the near future. He makes an entirely reasonable point about contracts; I will take that away, undertake to look at it and come back to him privately with a response.

I welcome the package and the Minister’s commitment to continued engagement with Beijing, but does he share my view that one cannot reason with a tiger when one’s head is in its mouth? We are rapidly approaching that position because of the stranglehold that China has on this country by virtue of our reliance on critical minerals and rare earths. As he seeks to strengthen our position, will he ensure that we diversify our ability to gain access to those critical elements, thus ensuring that China respects this country rather than sees us as weaklings—a situation that would of course deteriorate further in the event that, God forbid, China controls Taiwan?

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, as I always am. I am conscious that I have now been joined on the Treasury Bench by the Foreign Secretary, so I will have to be extremely careful about how I characterise the relationship with China. I hope it will provide some reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman if I say that the Government will bring forward a critical minerals strategy. It will be led by the Department for Business and Trade but there will be significant input from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. I hope that he understands how seriously we take these matters. I understand why he characterises the relationship in the way that he does, but I know that, as a former Minister himself, he will understand that there is a degree of practical reality about how we manage that relationship. Yes, we ensure that we underpin our national security, but we must engage in other areas. It is important that we do that in a clear-eyed way, and that is how the Government will proceed.

Order. I encourage the remaining Members to ask short questions and the Minister to give short answers. There is an important statement and a very heavily subscribed debate to come.

Our devolved nations, local authorities and educational institutions are not being made adequately aware of the risks that China poses, as is evidenced in Sunday’s report by David Leask. The Minister has mentioned briefings with devolved Governments, guidance for candidates and a closed event with university vice-chancellors, but will he ensure that those are not one-off events, and that they will be continual and offer up-to-date information from this day forward? Will he meet me and the SNP group urgently?

I can give the hon. Member the assurance he seeks in terms of our desire to work closely with the devolved Administrations. That is absolutely the way in which I want to proceed, as I said in response to the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) a moment ago. Of course I would be happy to meet with him and his group.

Is it not clear that the threat from China is becoming deeper, wider and more serious? While I welcome the Security Minister’s statement, it does not have a single deterrent in it, as was highlighted by the shadow Security Minister. I want to be helpful to the Minister. He mentioned the encrypted system that he will introduce and fund. Will he consider reviewing Government security classifications policy, so that we can have a review of Government papers that are classified but also of the threat to this place? He mentioned China’s low threshold. Would he consider reclassifying confidential, pre-publication Select Committee inquiry documents, so that any leaking of those documents—as with the leaking of Government documents by civil servants—has a far tougher sanction?

The right hon. Member makes an important point about leaking, which is something I take very seriously as the Minister responsible for the Government security group. I can give him an assurance. I hope that the package of measures we have brought forward conveys the strength of feeling and how seriously we take these issues. As he always does, he made a number of other really useful and constructive points. Rather than come back to him now, I will look carefully at them and consider them further.

It is not a coincidence that, just a few weeks after the collapse of the China spy case, MI5 is issuing this major espionage alert. China smells weakness. With regard to the embassy, while the Minister says it is a decision for another Minister, the reality is that it is a strategically important decision by this Government on behalf of the British people. Does he understand that the British people will be shocked if planning consent is granted, and China will again smell weakness?

This is a strong package of measures we have announced today, but I have also been crystal clear about our determination to act further where necessary. That is the right approach. It will mean we are best able to guard our national security, while at the same time engaging with China on other areas of policy, including illegal migration.

The Minister stresses the importance of mindset, so can he tell me whether it was a failure of mindset that underpinned the failure to secure the prosecution of two alleged Chinese agents? Why should parliamentarians now trust that he has the mindset to keep us safe?

As I said in the House yesterday, and as I hope the hon. Lady and other Members will understand, those decisions were not taken by the Government; they were taken independently by the Crown Prosecution Service, which is rightly independent of Government. The Government have today brought forward a strong package of measures, and I hope that she and her colleagues will support them.

I have previously mentioned that the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on transnational repression specifically singled out China for having the most comprehensive TNR campaign in the UK of any country. The report called for China to be on the enhanced tier of FIRS. If all the actions the Chinese Government are taking—the espionage, the bounties on people’s heads and the clear attempts to subvert democracy—do not qualify them to be on that enhanced tier, does that not undermine the scheme?

First, let me say that I very much appreciate the work of the hon. Member’s Committee, and specifically the report it published on transnational repression, to which we responded fully. I understand why he makes the point about FIRS. He knows what the Government’s position is at this particular moment, and I spelt it out earlier: FIRS is an important tool, and we will carefully consider how best to use it.

The Chinese general Sun Tzu said that

“the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”

Are we not presenting an opportunity for defeat when members of our military ride around in Chinese cars, and why on earth are this Government facilitating secretive trade trips to Beijing for members of the Scottish Government?

Sun Tzu said a number of things, and perhaps they lend themselves to a debate all of its own. I am not aware of the specific point the hon. Member made, but I am happy to look into it if that would be helpful.

According to media reports, administrators at Sheffield Hallam University told a professor of Chinese studies that she would have to abandon her research. That followed a separate defamation lawsuit against Sheffield Hallam University, as was reported by the BBC. I appreciate that the Minister cannot comment on the specifics of that case, but will the Government do more to support universities in resisting so-called SLAPPs—strategic lawsuits against public participation?

It is worth my being clear about the importance this Government attach to academic freedom. We are incredibly proud of our universities, and as a Yorkshire MP, I am incredibly proud of Sheffield Hallam University, as I am of Sheffield University. That is, in part, why we made these announcements today and why we will be holding an event that provides a very good opportunity to engage with vice-chancellors, look carefully at the nature of the challenges they are facing and support them in responding to those challenges.

Madam Deputy Speaker,

“The hon. Gentleman knows the answer: we are looking carefully at whether other countries should be added to the enhanced tier, but we will take that decision in due course and bring it forward in the normal way.”—[Official Report, 20 October 2025; Vol. 773, c. 638.]

That is what the Security Minister said when I asked him for the fourth time last month why China is not included within the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. So I will ask the Minister for the fifth time in as many months, and I am hoping he will offer some clarity this time. Given the range of measures he has just announced, what would it take for the Government to deem China to be a threat, and when will he assess whether China should be added to the enhanced tier?

I admire the hon. Gentleman’s perseverance and patience on this issue. Unfortunately, I am going to disappoint him by referring him to the answer I gave previously.

May I take the Minister back to devolved issues? In the case of Northern Ireland, international trade, quite rightly, is a reserved matter, yet last Wednesday in Belfast, the Chinese Government, no less, hosted a major investment conference in collaboration with the local Department for the Economy, with 120 Chinese companies, including Huawei, ZTE and BYD. At the conclusion of it, they signed a strategic co-operation framework agreement with Invest NI. How is that possible when international trade is a reserved matter? Will this Government finally closely examine the operation of the Stormont Executive and their collaborations with China?

I was in the hon. and learned Member’s part of the world just a couple of weeks ago. We take very seriously the importance of engaging with the devolved Administrations. I will look carefully at the points he has made and reflect on them, and if he wants to discuss them further, I would be happy to do that.

I thank the Minister for his statement; we are greatly encouraged by the steps the Government are taking. I chair an all-party parliamentary group—some Members here are members of it—and we had our website hacked and stories replaced. I have also had conversations that were under surveillance by the Chinese Government while in Northern Ireland, so I am glad the Minister has acknowledged this wide-scale threat. While pouring moneys into security is good, there must be a ramification for trade outcomes where Chinese agents are involved in espionage. The mishandling of the recent court case can never be repeated, and the Government must send the message that our language is set, our defences are raised, and we are not to be trifled with by any foreign powers, certainly not by the Chinese Government.

I am grateful to the hon. Member, as I always am. I hope he sees the commitment this Government have to ensuring that we are best equipped to engage with the nature of the threats we face. That is precisely why I brought forward this package of measures and why I have been crystal clear about the requirement potentially to go further in certain areas. I hope he sees—if he does not, let me give him an assurance—how seriously we take these matters and our desire to work with Members right across the House and with the devolved Administrations, to do everything we can to guard against the nature of the threat, while at the same time ensuring we engage in a way that is in our national interest.

I thank the Security Minister for his statement.