PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Speaker’s Statement - 21 October 2019 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
Rather, for approximately an hour, 30 points of order were raised with me by no fewer than 24 colleagues expressing disquiet and consternation that the Government intended to require the House to consider again on Monday the same matter which it had decided 48 hours earlier, on the immediately preceding sitting day. It was my privilege to listen and respond to the views of colleagues. I then undertook to reflect further on what Members had said and to give a ruling this afternoon, which I shall now do.
There are two issues, one of substance and the other of circumstances, to consider, and I shall address each in turn.
First, I have to judge whether the motion tabled under section 13(1)(b) of the 2018 Act for debate today is the same in substance as that which was decided on Saturday. Page 397 of “Erskine May” is clear that such a motion
“may not be brought forward again during that same session.”
It is equally clear that adjudication of cases is a matter for the Chair.
I invoked “Erskine May” and ruled on this issue as recently as 18 March 2019. Saturday’s motion sought approval for the withdrawal agreement, the political declaration on the future relationship between the EU and the UK and the declaration concerning the operation of the democratic consent in Northern Ireland provision. Today’s motion seeks approval for the withdrawal agreement, the political declaration on the future relationship between the EU and the UK and the declaration concerning the operation of the democratic consent in Northern Ireland provision. It is clear that the motions are in substance the same. However, this matter was decided fewer than 49 hours ago. After more than three hours of debate, the House voted, by 322 to 306, for Sir Oliver Letwin’s amendment, which stated that
“this House has considered the matter but withholds approval unless and until implementing legislation is passed.”
The second matter for me to consider was whether there had been any change of circumstances that would justify asking the House to reconsider on Monday what it had decided on Saturday. On the face of it, unless an event or development external to the House had interceded, it is hard to see a significant change of circumstances that would warrant a reconsideration on the next sitting day—in this case, a reconsideration pre-announced by the Leader of the House just under 21 minutes after the result of the Division was announced. However, the Government might argue—though, to date, they have not put forward any argument or explanation at all—that the change of circumstances is the Prime Minister’s application on Saturday night for an extension of article 50. This is not persuasive. The application is part of a process, rather than a significant event in itself.
In summary, today’s motion is—[Interruption.] I am extraordinarily grateful to the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge). If he would bear stoically and with fortitude, I shall complete my statement. In summary, today’s motion is in substance the same as Saturday’s motion, and the House has decided the matter. Today’s circumstances are in substance the same as Saturday’s circumstances. My ruling is therefore that the motion will not be debated today, as it would be repetitive and disorderly to do so. For the benefit of colleagues not closely familiar with the so-called “same Question” convention, which is very strong and dates back to 1604, I will summarise the rationale for it in a sentence: it is a necessary rule to ensure the sensible use of the House’s time and proper respect for the decisions that it takes.
If it is not legitimate for the motion to be taken today, what is it legitimate for the Government to do? The answer is that, as the Prime Minister signalled in his point of order on Saturday, as reported at column 653 of Hansard, and in his letter to Members that evening, the Government can introduce their EU withdrawal and implementation Bill. Indeed, they have done just that, presenting the Bill for its First Reading today. I have no doubt that the Leader of the House will offer further details of the intended timetable for the Bill when he makes a business statement later today. Meanwhile, I hope that this ruling and explanation are helpful to the House.
I note the wider point that the hon. Gentleman makes, and I respect the fact that it is a point of view. I intend no discourtesy to him when I say that I think I have made the argument for and explained the rationale behind the judgment that I have made. I am not seeking to rubbish the hon. Gentleman; I am simply making—[Interruption.] No, I am not seeking to rubbish the hon. Gentleman; I am simply making the point that, having reflected on all the considerations and the interests of the House, I have reached the conclusion I have reached. It is important that colleagues hear all parts of it. The hon. Gentleman did not like part of it, as he politely explained in his point of order, but he will also have heard me say what it is open to the Government to do. The Government can introduce their Bill, propose a programme motion for it and proceed with the support of the House, between now and the end of the month, as collectively Parliament prescribes. That seems to me to be entirely proper.
I do not want to get into that, but I suppose what I want to say is this: there are precedents for changes in business being announced on points of order—it is not the norm, but there are precedents—and I do not want to ascribe any improper motive to the Leader of the House, whose personal courtesy to me over the years has been and remains unfailing, and I hope that I have reciprocated it. He made the judgment that he made. There was very little notice that he was going to say what he said, but that was really perhaps a product of the circumstances.
The hon. Gentleman might think that the circumstance could have been anticipated and some advance notice would have been helpful, but we were where we were. I do not complain about having to respond to points of order. The Leader of the House did not stay for all the points of order—he stayed for some of them—but I feel certain that he will since have familiarised himself with all of them. We will hear from the Leader of the House later, and I am sure we look forward to that.
“The European Communities Act 1972 is repealed on exit day.”
Exit day is on 31 October. The Benn Act 2019 has not yet done anything, other than in respect of the letter, to change the repeal of the 1972 Act. Therefore, I simply put it to you, Mr Speaker, that, as you mentioned in your statement, the question whether there are issues relating to the law being obeyed is not an issue at this stage in proceedings. For that reason, I simply ask you whether it is possible for you to reconsider your decision, because the reality is, I am afraid, that the law of the land remains as it was last Friday.
Moreover, I made clear in the statement the option open to the Government, and I reiterated it in response to the hon. Member for Wellingborough. The amendment in the name of Sir Oliver Letwin, I remind not just Members but those attending our proceedings, explicitly specified that the legislation should come first. Suddenly to have at the next sitting day a debate on the same matter upon which an explicit conclusion was reached on Saturday would seem very unusual, and I have made the judgment that I have made.
Colleagues, I am stating the obvious, but when you make a judgment on these matters, manifestly some people, if it is controversial, are pleased and other people are displeased. That is in the nature of the responsibility. I have simply sought to discharge my obligations and to do what I believe to be right, and that is what the Speaker has to do.
Absence of Speaker intervention on this same convention since 1920 or thereabouts is attributable, colleagues, not to the discontinuation of the convention, but rather to general compliance with it, and that is for the protection of the House. We also do not want contradictory and conflicting judgments to be reached in very short order, and what could be shorter order than the next sitting day after the last judgment was made? It may not appeal to everybody, but that is the rationale for the perfectly reasonable judgment that I have made.
Secondly, I hear what the hon. Gentleman says about his Committee conducting an inquiry into the role of the Speaker, and that is absolutely proper—
Thirdly, with regard to how unfortunate it is that one side seems to be disadvantaged by judgments from the Chair, I say to the hon. Gentleman—and there are people in this Chamber who know very well the truth of what I say—that I do not have, off the top of my head, a count of the number of times that I have in the past granted urgent questions, and in some cases, though they were less fashionable at the time, emergency debates, to people of what was then called a Eurosceptic disposition and would now be called a Brexiteer disposition—and he was one of them. When I was granting him and some of his hon. and right hon. Friends the opportunity to challenge, to question, to probe, to scrutinise, and, in some cases, to expose what they thought were the errors of omission or commission of the Government of the day, I do not recall him complaining that I was giving him too many opportunities to make his point and that it was not a fair use of the House’s time—that it was very unfair on his party and a violation of the rights of his Government. Now, it may be that sotto voce he was somehow making this point, but if so, I did not hear it.
I remind the hon. Gentleman additionally, and fourthly, I think, that—yes, I will make this point because it is an important point to make—his hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) tabled an amendment to the Queen’s Speech in 2103 on the case for a referendum on UK membership of the European Union, a most unusual though perfectly proper thing for a Government Back Bencher to do, and I selected that amendment. I did so because I thought that it was well supported and there was a compelling case for it to be considered. So what I am saying to the hon. Gentleman is that when he was getting the decisions in his favour, he was not grumbling. He is grumbling now because he does not like the judgment I have made, but the judgment is an honourable and fair one, and I am afraid that if he does not like it, there is not much I can do about that. I am trying to do the right thing for the House as a whole.
My last point to the hon. Gentleman—and it is very important not just for, or even particularly for, Members of the House, but for those observing our proceedings—is that nothing in what I have said in any way impinges upon the opportunity for the Government to secure approval of their deal and the passage of the appropriate legislation by the end of the month. If the Government have got the numbers, the Government can have their way, and it is not for the Speaker to interfere. The judgment I have made is about the importance of upholding a very long-standing and overwhelmingly observed convention of this House. That is what I have done, and I make absolutely no apology for it whatsoever.
“may I say how delighted I am that you have decided to follow precedent, which is something I am greatly in favour of?”—[Official Report, 18 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 778.]
He went on to make other supporting points. The person who responded in that way was none other than the current Leader of the House, the right hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg). The Leader of the House was very much with me at that time on the same question convention. I take the same view seven months later, and it is for him to explain whether he does.
Having done that, like my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne), and having noted the narrow terms in which you gave your ruling today, I think those terms in your coming to your judgment are reasonable. However, would our knowing what the response is to the letter imposed on the Government by this House to request an extension be a sufficient change of circumstances for you to reconsider the conclusions you have come to today?
I do not want to fall out with the hon. Gentleman, and I appreciate his courteous opening remarks. He will not be surprised to know that, although I absolutely defend his right to his opinion, I do not accept his characterisation of my speakership. I have tried to do the right thing by Parliament. Sometimes people like it when it goes their way and sometimes they do not when it does not, but that is my honest approach. If he disapproves of it, I am sorry about that, because I have known him a long time, but I will live with that. I do not mean that in any discourteous or patronising way, but I will live with that. It is one verdict, and there will be others. However, I have made the judgment I have made, and let us wait and see how events develop.
Secondly, I very specifically was making the point that the matter has been treated of as recently as Saturday, with a very clear decision reached by the House on the amendment to the motion, and therefore it would not be appropriate to consider that matter today.
Thirdly, when the hon. Lady inquires about whether a different formulation of words, or a section or subsection would render such a motion open to a different judgment on the same question and convention, I hope that she will understand when I say that I cannot possibly pronounce on that until I know the circumstances. I would have to see the particulars, and I am grateful for the rather vigorous nodding of the head by the right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) who, at least on that point, seems to agree with me.
“I am not in the business of invoking precedent, nor am I under any obligation to do so…If we were guided only by precedent…nothing…would ever change.”—[Official Report, 9 January 2019; Vol. 652, c. 366-372.]
Can you understand, Sir, in the light of your comments, why some people perceive, perhaps incorrectly, that the only consistency one can find in your rulings is that they always seem to favour one side of the argument, and never the Government, who are trying their best to carry out the mandate given to them by the British people in 2016?
It is true that we are guided not only by precedent, but I would say to the hon. Member for Monmouth (David T. C. Davies) that just because we are not guided only by precedent does not mean that we are not guided at all by precedent. What one has to do is make a balanced judgment about what best serves the interests of the House. All I would say to him is that as recently as Saturday, at the insistence of the Government—and I think with the support of the House—the House met to deliberate on this very matter. Simply to allow the matter to be reconsidered two days later, on the very next sitting day, seems to me to be entirely unreasonable. Nothing that I have said by way of conclusion today flies in the face of contrary expert advice that I have received. I have consulted, I have taken advice, I have listened to people expert in these matters, and I have not been counselled that what I have said today is wrong. I have not been counselled that what I have said today is wrong, and I have a very strong sense that there is a pretty wide acceptance that on this matter my judgment, however inconvenient and irksome to some people, has the advantage of being procedurally right.
If that exhausts for now the appetite of colleagues to raise points of order—I am grateful to colleagues for what they have said, and for the courtesy with which they have expressed themselves, whether they agree with my ruling or not—we will move on to the first of our urgent questions.
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