PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Surrogacy Law and Legal Parenthood - 7 September 2026 (Commons/Westminster Hall)

I beg to move,

That this House has considered e-petition 763161 relating to surrogacy law and legal parenthood.

It is always a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Pritchard, and I am sure today will be no different. The petition calls for a change in the law so that the intended parents of babies born through surrogacy can be considered to be the legal parents from the moment of their child’s birth. Under current law, that is not possible. Intended parents must go through a months-long process in the courts and be visited by a social worker before they are considered to be the parents of the children in the eyes of the law.

Ahead of this debate, I met the petition’s creator, Adam, his fiancé, Jamie, and their daughter, Leven, who was born via surrogacy in Connecticut. I am pleased to say that Adam and Jamie have joined us in the Public Gallery today. Although baby Leven has not joined them, she made a cameo appearance on our call ahead of the debate. Adam and Jamie are listed as Leven’s parents on her birth certificate in the United States, but more than six months after her birth, they still are not recognised as her legal parents at home in the UK. That is what prompted Adam to create this petition. When we met, he said,

“We’re changing Leven’s nappies, we’re putting her to bed—we are her parents, we’re bringing her up”

and yet he says that babies like her are in “legal limbo” under current legislation.

My role today is to introduce the petition by setting out the petitioners’ views and framing the debate to follow. It is good to see so much interest from Members across the House. In preparation, as well as meeting Adam, I have drawn on the expertise of a range of organisations and individuals, with the expert support of the petitions team. They are often not thanked enough, so I place on record my thanks to the entire team for their support in preparing for the debate.

We met groups such as Surrogacy Concern, Stop Surrogacy Now UK and Brilliant Beginnings, and Dr Herjeet Marway of the University of Birmingham, who is the founding chairperson of SurrogacyUK’s ethics committee. We also met Professor Nick Hopkins of University College London, a former law commissioner for England and Wales, and Professor Gillian Black of the Scottish Law Commission and the University of Edinburgh. Together, they authored the joint Law Commission report on surrogacy reform, which was published in 2023. I will start with the current state of the law and the reforms proposed by that Law Commission report.

When a child is born to parents via surrogacy, whether in this country or abroad, as baby Leven was, the surrogate mother is considered the legal mother at birth under UK law. If she is married or in a civil partnership, her partner will automatically be the second parent on the birth certificate, irrespective of the child’s genetics. There are children out there today whose parents, as considered under UK law, have no genetic relationship to the child at all. That is because in UK law, the person who gives birth to a baby, and no one else, is considered the mother. That has led to a complicated reality in today’s world, where a growing share of babies are not born via natural conception.

If you give birth using a donor egg, you are considered to be the child’s mother in the eyes of the law. But if you cannot carry a baby, and if you and your partner have an embryo that is biologically yours carried by a surrogate, you are not considered to be the legal parents when your child is born. Intended parents and their surrogates can draft a surrogacy agreement setting out how they want parental rights to be arranged for the child, but those documents have no legal standing in the UK.

To become legal parents, intended parents must apply for a parental order through the courts. They have to make that application between six weeks and six months after the baby’s birth. Organisations that specialise in assisting intended parents say that the process normally takes between six and 12 months to complete. In that time, the baby will almost invariably be living with the intended parents, but legally, they are strangers to that child.

The hon. Gentleman is putting the case very well. There are also very practical hurdles, such as registering the child with a GP, the child’s medical circumstances and applying for a passport. The whole thing is illogical. The practicalities add to the timescale, and it is time that the Government address the issue.

It is always a pleasure to see the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) in his place in this Chamber. I will touch on health later, so I ask him to hold fire.

My hon. Friend is being very generous with his time, which I very much appreciate. He and I share the desire for strict rules to prevent abuse of any kind, as I am sure everyone in the House does.

I want to make a point relevant specifically to Scotland. In England, the suitability of intended parents is assessed by the courts and through a publicly funded system, but it is funded privately in Scotland, which means that intended parents potentially have to pay £2,000 or £3,000 extra of their own money to go through the process. Will my hon. Friend join me in calling on the Scottish Government to find a reform to fix that system?

My hon. Friend is right to raise the issue of finance, which I will touch on briefly, so I ask him to bear with me as I get to that part of my speech.

Opponents say that the parental order process is really complex. The document that intended parents have to submit is 200 pages long, meaning that many will seek legal advice. Adam and Jamie say that they expect legal fees for their parental order to be in excess of £10,000. We have just heard from my hon. Friend that it can be even more costly in other parts of the United Kingdom. That money is very real, and intended parents face very real financial difficulties. As the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) said, the process can cause real practical problems. In fact, I have heard of cases in which surrogates have had to dial in to medical appointments for their child in the US for months after birth, because the hospital at home is unable to recognise the intended parents as responsible for their child’s health decisions.

Experts say that, in their experience, the most distressing part of the process for most intended parents is the court-mandated social worker visit. Supporters of the current arrangement compare it to a visit from a health visitor, but opponents say that there is no comparison. The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service is the agency that advises the courts on children’s welfare, and in the vast majority of cases it is involved where a child is believed to be at risk. However, CAFCASS is also involved in surrogacy cases. Its assessments for a parental order involve criminal checks, child protection reports, home visits with parents and a full, detailed report. Although it is incredibly rare to see CAFCASS reports on intended parents that are anything but wholly positive, parents find it extremely distressing to be questioned and scrutinised in a way that parents conceiving without the need for a surrogate simply do not experience.

In 2018, as a result of those difficulties, a previous Government asked the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission to jointly consider reforms to UK surrogacy law. It was a significant piece of work, and the report was published in 2023. It recommended

“a new pathway to legal parenthood”

in surrogacy cases, with the screening of intended parents taking place before birth, so that they could be recognised as legal parents from birth. The proposed pre-birth arrangements included an agreement between the surrogate and the intended parents, with independent legal advice provided to all parties, a preconception assessment of the child’s welfare, and the agreement of a regulated surrogacy organisation to recognise the surrogacy agreement. If the surrogate then withdrew consent, the existing parental order process would apply. If the surrogate changed their mind before the birth, they would be the legal parent at birth. If they changed their mind in the six weeks following birth, they would be able to apply for a parental order.

The authors of the report strongly felt that that struck a balance between protecting all parties—the surrogate, the parents and the children—and, crucially, keeping the child’s welfare as the central concern. Having said that, it is really important to bring in the voices of Professor Hopkins and Professor Black, who made it very clear ahead of this debate that they never intended that part of their proposal to be carved out and delivered in isolation. They proposed a wider package of reforms, and they say that it was only part of a comprehensive solution. Although some who advocate changes to surrogacy law argue that the issue of parental orders can be dealt with as a quick win, the professors believe that it should be addressed as part of a wider package. That package includes, for example, creating a mandatory surrogacy register so that children could find out more about their birth mother and, with their consent, her family, if they wish.

It is also important to note that the Law Commission’s proposal for a new pathway to legal parenthood for intended parents would only apply to surrogacy arrangements here in the UK. It is proposed that the existing parental order system would continue to apply when babies are born abroad via surrogacy. The Law Commission report concluded that it would be impossible to ensure that laws abroad are in line with what we would consider UK norms. That concern is flagged by some of the groups opposed to surrogacy arrangements, as the second most popular destination for UK surrogacy is Nigeria—a country currently subject to special restrictions when it comes to adopting a child due to child welfare concerns.

In preparing for this debate, I heard worrying reports of surrogate mothers, often living in real poverty abroad, being pressed to sign legal agreements under extreme time pressure and without independent legal advice. That is far from being the case everywhere. However, it can never be acceptable, and we should make sure there are proper legal safeguards in place. The Law Commission’s hope is that, by maintaining the UK’s altruistic approach to surrogacy—that is, keeping it not for profit—and updating the law, more intended parents will be able to pursue surrogacy here in the UK and make use of a new parental pathway to be recognised as legal parents from birth.

The petition focuses on a specific part of surrogacy law, but it feeds into a much wider debate. There are some quite stark divisions on the issue, which is understandably very emotive for a large number of people. However, what seems clear is that the current law on surrogacy is no longer working and that a wider conversation about how we should change the legislation in this area would be welcome. I know the Government have said that they will look at this issue when time and capacity allow, but I am very interested to hear more from the Minister about what that might look like and when we might be able to expect it.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I welcome this debate.

As we know, the petition asks for parental orders to be permitted at birth. I believe that Members should approach the proposal with extreme caution. The number of people who have signed the petition—over 113,000, including 226 of my own constituents—is clearly testament to the strength of feeling on the issues. However, the petitioners frame the parental order process as an obstacle to parental rights, but that is fundamentally misleading. The legal process provides important protections for surrogate women and the children they carry. Currently, intended parents can apply for parental orders only after six weeks from the birth, and they must usually do so within six months. That cooling-off period provides a vital safeguard for the surrogate mother, and we should not dispense with it lightly.

I believe we need to take a step back and remember why this House has historically approached surrogacy with so much caution. It is now undeniable that we have moved well beyond the purposes originally used to justify IVF and assisted reproductive technologies. IVF was initially intended to help a childless couple have a child, not to create a contractual market out of pregnancy. That sense of mission creep is also evident when we look at the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. The Warnock committee, whose report led to the Act, did not regard surrogacy as simply another form of fertility treatment. Now, over 40 years later, surrogacy has become just another service routinely offered at clinics across the country. Technology allows us to separate genetic parenthood, gestational motherhood and social parenthood. However, it does not mean those relationships are interchangeable. Technology may give us choices, but it does not absolve us from making ethical judgments about those choices.

It is worth noting that the UK is an outlier in allowing any form of surrogacy at all. Surrogacy is much more strictly limited, or even completely prohibited, in countries including France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. We know that some of those countries are particularly liberal in other areas, so the fact that they are strong on this gives us reason to question why they take that position. That reflects the serious ethical questions that arise when a child is intentionally separated from the woman who carried them in the womb. Commercial surrogacy is illegal across the EU, where it is classed as a form of child trafficking. Indeed, the UN special rapporteur on violence against women and girls has recommended the global abolition of surrogacy. Last year she described surrogacy as characterised by the exploitation of women and children, including girls.

In any future reforms of surrogacy legislation, the welfare and safety of women and children should remain our paramount concern. I acknowledge that the desire of many people who turn to surrogacy is for a child, and that that is a profound need within them. I think that is something on which we are all able to agree. Some women face infertility or repeated pregnancy loss, and some face medical conditions that make it impossible or even unsafe for them to carry a pregnancy themselves. For some people, surrogacy may seem to be the only path to having a child with a genetic connection to them. I do not question the deep desire for that, nor do I underestimate the pain that can come from wanting a child and being unable to have one. That said, compassion for those experiences cannot require us to overlook the women and children affected by surrogacy. By its very nature, surrogacy involves a woman’s body becoming a means to an end. She is carrying a child for the benefit of another family. My concern is that our efforts to help people to become parents risk constructing a system in which women’s reproductive capacity becomes merely a resource for others to use.

One of my main concerns with the petition is that it implies that surrogacy is closer to natural conception than to adoption; I believe that is again misguided. With adoption we do not pretend that the birth mother is irrelevant simply because she will not raise the child herself. That woman has already nurtured the child in her womb for nine months and the law rightly recognises that her role matters: the original birth record remains in existence and the adopted child can access it later in life, as an adult, if they wish. Similarly, a surrogate may not intend to raise the child she carries, but that does not mean that her role should be legally obliterated at birth.

We should also consider the needs of the child. A baby bonds with their mother in utero regardless of whether the surrogate uses her own egg in the pregnancy. The child’s birth mother is an important person in the child’s story and the law should therefore recognise the birth mother’s indispensable contribution in bringing new life into the world.

I also have concerns about financial incentives. In this country a surrogate mother cannot simply be paid a fee for producing a baby. She may receive reasonable expenses, including for things such as maternity clothing, travel and loss of earnings, but typical reimbursements now reach as much as £25,000. I think we would all agree that that is quite a substantial sum, which should give us pause for thought. There is an important distinction between reimbursement and income. It is one thing if a woman is compensated for genuine expenses, but if pregnancy becomes a source of substantial financial benefit, we need to ask whether we are still talking about altruism or whether we are creating a market in all but name. Pregnancy is not risk-free; it can involve serious medical complications. However, uncertainty about whether a payment is reimbursement of an expense or a fee clouds the situation.

We cannot discuss this issue without considering the wider international picture. Most parental orders for UK parents now involve commercial surrogacy abroad; we have heard a lot about that already. It should concern us all that international surrogacy takes place in jurisdictions where the economic circumstances of surrogate mothers are very different from those in Britain. If wealthy countries normalise the commissioning of pregnancies, there will inevitably be markets that meet that demand. In most cases, the women with the least economic power become the people expected to take the greatest physical risks.

I will finish by reiterating that I have enormous sympathy for people who want children and cannot have them naturally. Their longing is real, but true compassion must extend to everyone involved, including to the women whose bodies bear the burdens of pregnancy and childbirth and to the children they bear. Do the Government remain committed to the parental order process and the safeguards that it provides? Those safeguards are not outdated as the petition suggests; indeed, they are needed now more than ever, especially as international surrogacy arrangements are becoming the norm for intended parents in the UK. The parental order process exists to ensure that a child’s welfare comes first and that a surrogate mother’s consent is freely given. Any reform should strengthen those protections for women and children, not diminish them.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. In the years since the passage of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, the number of babies born as a result of surrogacy has increased and the nature of surrogacy arrangements has evolved. As I look through Hansard it appears that, in spite of that change, surrogacy has seldom been debated in this place. I therefore welcome this debate; although I do not agree with its framing, I believe it is long overdue.

This debate is critical as there are fundamental human rights at stake. The first are the rights of women: the rights of women as parents to be protected, to have the very best care and to have no outside pressure on decisions relating to their healthcare and their bodies; and the right of women living in poverty, in war zones or in vulnerable situations, here in the UK and across the globe, not to be forced, coerced or trafficked to service the growing demand for surrogates. The second are the rights of children, as set out in the United Nations convention on the rights of the child, to know where they came from, to have a nationality, and to be cared for by their parents, not separated from them, where possible.

Today I will focus on the rights of women. The Law Commission’s previously published proposals recommend tipping the balance of power away from the rights of the birth mother. That is clearly stated in the introduction of its core report:

“Our reforms respect the autonomy of the surrogate—if she withdraws her consent, the courts will make the final decision on parental status.”

If we were to put those proposals on the statute book, a woman who used her own egg as part of a surrogacy agreement, gave birth to a child and then changed her mind would end up in a court battle in which the judge would decide who the parent or parents of the child are. At present, if the surrogate withholds her consent, a parental order cannot be made; she remains the legal parent. However, under the commission’s preferred model, the birth mother’s name would be removed from the birth certificate altogether, and a judge would be forced to consider the living arrangements of the child until the court proceedings concluded.

The commission’s proposals would shift the balance of rights to the intended parents, but it is important that we, as legislators, consider the bigger picture. There is likely to be an economic imbalance between the surrogate mother and the intended—commissioning—parents: by definition, they are commissioning a child. At present, the expenses paid to surrogates far exceed what was anticipated when the 1985 Act was passed. Although the Law Commission’s proposals claim to provide clarity on expenses, they could still result in commissioning parents paying tens of thousands of pounds to a surrogate, including payments for holidays and gifts. That economic power imbalance prompts the question: is it ever a free choice for a surrogate to enter into a surrogacy agreement?

Before concluding, I want to talk about the international impact of surrogacy. Analysis by Stop Surrogacy Now UK suggests that, in most years since 2013, more than 60% of parental order applications in England and Wales related to surrogacy arrangements where the child was born abroad. It is false hope to think that these proposals will stop the demand from the UK for international surrogacy.

Two of my constituents recently travelled to Mexico, where their children were born by surrogacy. Those births were facilitated by a company called My Surrogacy Journey, which is listed on gov.uk. While in Mexico, they had repeated traumatic experiences with the company relating to issues including insurance for their children, accusations of bullying towards staff and repeated efforts to silence any constructive criticism. I understand that other Members of this House have received similar complaints. Given the severity of these matters, does my hon. Friend agree that the Government should take My Surrogacy Journey down from gov.uk pending a review by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority?

I agree, and I will come to some of those matters shortly.

It is estimated that the international surrogacy industry will be worth more than $200 billion by 2032. The decisions that we take about surrogacy in the UK can help protect vulnerable women and girls in war-torn countries such as Ukraine, as has been mentioned, and low-income countries such as Nigeria from being forced, coerced and trafficked to service the growing demand.

I appreciate the time and consideration that the Law Commission gave to this issue. It heard directly from women who had acted as surrogates, were left displaced and received inadequate medical care. It found that women who had been used as surrogates had not even been told about the genetic parentage make-up of the embryos that had been transferred into their bodies and, as a result, had no information about any inherited conditions that could affect the pregnancy and put them or the baby at risk.

I also welcome the spotlight document published in the last few days by the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, who makes it clear that women in the UK are not only at risk of forced surrogacy but already being identified as such. I have called for a wider debate on surrogacy that would have at its heart women at risk of forced surrogacy and their children.

The Government must fully reject the Law Commission’s proposals. The Scottish Government have already drafted guidance in preparation for the proposals being put on the statute book. Until they are rejected by the UK Government, such preparation will continue.

I hope I have evidenced why we must have a much wider debate on surrogacy. Fifty per cent of responses to the Law Commission’s consultation called for a total ban on surrogacy in the UK. I fully support such a ban, but it should be based on a wider debate that draws on evidence and focuses on reducing harm. In the interim, the Government must immediately recognise the harm and risk that is being inflicted on women and children through international surrogacy and take steps to cut off the UK’s growing demand for it, as that is the only way to play our part in ending the coercion and trafficking of women and children. I understand people’s desire to become parents, but that desire should not take priority over the rights of a child. Surrogacy asks all of us to answer very difficult questions, but answer them we must.

The topic of this debate is a matter of great sensitivity, but I oppose the proposal in the petition. Automatically recognising intended parents as legal parents from birth could remove important safeguards at precisely the moment when a child is most vulnerable.

We should begin with the most important person in this debate: the child. A child cannot consent to a surrogacy arrangement, and they cannot understand the promises adults have made. They cannot know what might happen if circumstances change—and circumstances can change. We have seen cases where arrangements that began with everyone in agreement broke down during the pregnancy. In 2023, the Court of Appeal dealt with a case where a parental order was set aside and the surrogate mother was ultimately awarded contact with the child four times a year. That child was conceived using the surrogate’s own egg. She had to fight for that contact against the wishes of the commissioning parents.

When we are told that everything is agreed before birth, we have to ask what happens when it is not. The current law recognises that possibility. A parental order cannot be applied for until six weeks after birth, and the surrogate has to confirm that she is willingly giving up her parental rights. That six-week period is not a pointless delay; it is a breathing space and a safeguard. It recognises that giving birth to a child is not simply the completion of a contract, but a profound physical and emotional event, and that the law should allow time for circumstances and feelings to be properly considered. The current system also provides scrutiny through the family court and CAFCASS social workers. If we remove that oversight, we are not simply removing paperwork; we are removing an independent layer of protection around a child.

We need to understand how much that matters, because surrogacy is growing rapidly. Parental order applications increased from just 117 in 2011 to 537 in 2025, and the majority of applications now involve international surrogacy. That should make us more cautious, not less. When a child is born through an international arrangement, there can be questions about consent, identity, immigration, the circumstances of the surrogate and whether proper safeguards were followed. As recently as 2025, the High Court dealt with a case where the intended parents had never met the surrogate carrying the child, and did not even have information about her identity. The case took more than 15 months and involved four court hearings. That shows us why proper scrutiny is necessary.

Compassion must never mean abandoning scrutiny, because when adults disagree, a child has to live with the consequences. That is why I cannot support automatic legal parenthood from birth. The child must come first.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Pritchard.

I will begin by recognising the very understandable motivation behind this petition. People who pursue surrogacy do so because they desperately want a family, and nobody should doubt the love that intended parents have for the children they raise. However, I cannot support the change proposed by the petition. The question before us is not whether intended parents are real parents, nor whether they should ultimately receive legal recognition; the question is whether the woman who has carried and given birth to a child should lose her legal status as that child’s mother from the moment of birth. I do not believe that she should.

In our society, some things should never be reduced to questions of contract, individual choice or intention, and motherhood is certainly one of them. Pregnancy cannot simply be a service provided by one person for another, a woman’s body cannot merely be the means by which someone else’s parental intentions are fulfilled and the relationship created through nine months of pregnancy and childbirth cannot be written off because an agreement was reached beforehand.

At present, our law recognises that reality: the woman who carries and gives birth to a child is the legal mother. Intended parents can subsequently acquire legal parenthood through a parental order, but crucially, that process cannot normally begin until six weeks after the birth and requires the mother’s consent. Some describe that as outdated and difficult bureaucracy, but I describe it as a safeguard. Before conception, we cannot know with certainty how a woman will feel after pregnancy, childbirth and holding the baby whom she carried for the first time. Consent matters enormously, but genuine consent must include one having the ability to change one’s mind when the reality is fundamentally different from what could have been understood beforehand. Consent given before pregnancy cannot simply become irrevocable after childbirth.

Another important question is that of independent oversight. Parental orders allow the courts to consider the circumstances of the arrangement, require the mother’s consent and provide for CAFCASS involvement. That protection becomes particularly important in the international dimension of surrogacy, which other Members have mentioned. In the first 11 months of 2025, 139 parental order applications were made for babies born through surrogacy in the UK, compared with 357 for babies born through surrogacy abroad. Therefore, we should think carefully before weakening the safeguards in our law. If parental orders take too long, let us consider making them quicker, and if intended parents face practical difficulties, let us try to address them. We can make the system work better without changing the principle at its heart.

Family, motherhood and childhood cannot be understood through the language of intention and contract, and it is particularly important that the law continues to recognise the reality of motherhood at the moment of birth. A woman who has carried and given birth to a child should not find that her legal relationship with that child has already been extinguished. I cannot support automatically recognising intended parents as the legal parents from birth. The six-week period after birth, the mother’s consent and independent judicial oversight are not antiquated obstacles to modern families, but protections for women and children—important safeguards that I believe are worth keeping.

It is a real pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I thank the hon. Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson) for introducing the debate on this petition on behalf of the Petitions Committee. As the DUP’s health spokesperson, I am particularly interested in advocating for the protection of the women and children at the heart of this process. Although health and social care are devolved, surrogacy policy is a reserved matter and is decided by Westminster. The thrust of my concern and contribution to this debate is more about urging caution to ensure that, while we need to legislate for the new scenarios that we face in modern life, protection is in place and the legislation is thoroughly considered. I think that reflects the opinion of most of us who are putting forward points in the debate.

I recognise that surrogacy can be a lifeline for those struggling with infertility or who are unable to have children themselves. Surrogacy can no doubt represent an extraordinary act of kindness where a woman chooses to help a friend or family member to fulfil their dream of becoming a parent. However, I must stress that I have significant concerns about the increasing commercialisation of surrogacy. I have spoken on this issue in a separate debate in Westminster Hall and I want to reiterate the concerns that I expressed then. An important distinction must be made between the women who voluntarily agree to carry a child for someone they know, perhaps with reasonable expenses being covered, and the wholly exploitative system whereby a woman’s womb becomes a service that can be bought. That concerns me greatly.

The background information that we got from the House of Commons Library—we always thank the Library for its contributions—refers to the international and regional human rights relevant to surrogacy: the right to respect for family life, the rights of the child, women’s rights, the right to equality and non-discrimination, the right to dignity, and protection from human trafficking. A number of issues were outlined in the background information that we got from the Library. We must tread very carefully to not contribute to a market that preys on the financially vulnerable and pressures them to use their bodies for the benefit of others. Compensation for genuine expenses incurred in carrying a baby is one thing; paying a woman for carrying a baby is quite another. The distinction becomes increasingly blurred—the hon. Members for Leicester East (Shivani Raja) and for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) both made contributions on this, and I would echo them—when payments for carrying a child are disguised as expenses. There must be no room for ambiguity in this process. I should have welcomed the Minister to her place. We wish her well in the role that she now plays, and we look forward to her responses to our concerns.

In my intervention on the hon. Member for Lichfield, I referred to the practical hurdles, such as registering the child with a GP, making critical medical decisions for a child who may have complex medical needs, and applying for a passport. Prolonged uncertainty is not in the best interests of the child, nor is it fair to the families who have planned for, prayed for and loved that baby from the beginning. Does the Minister not agree that access to these scientific advances means that we must regulate well for them? That is the thrust of what I am putting forward.

I must also raise my wider concerns about the rapidly growing fertility market, as young women are being encouraged to donate their eggs in return for compensation. In fact, it is the clinics themselves that profit most substantially from the donation, and clinics take advantage —I say this with respect—of those who may be in financial difficulties or who need the money. I would argue that sufficient information is not being provided to these women about the potential long-term health consequences of egg retrieval. I am deeply grieved by any idea that promotes fertility as something that can be bought and sold. That is wrong, and I put that on the record.

The concerns that I have outlined become even more significant when we look internationally. Commercial surrogacy is illegal in the UK but permitted in some countries abroad, leading many UK couples to circumvent the law by using a surrogate abroad. That leaves room for exploitation, as the UK Government cannot control the protections available to those surrogate mothers. I ask the Minister what is being done to close those loopholes. We should legislate, if necessary, to ensure that protection is in place. Will any Government action extend to Northern Ireland? I understand that it will, because the matter is not devolved from Westminster. Therefore, if the Government take a decision here, it will apply to us, but I am keen to have that confirmed.

That brings me to the petition, which calls for the intended parents to become the legal parents of the child from birth, rather than having to go through a parental order process. In the Strangford constituency, 131 people have signed the petition. They did so for a simple reason—because they have concerns. I want to reflect their opinion on this process. I can understand why some families may want to simplify the process, and there is perhaps a balance to be achieved. However, does the Minister agree that any reforms cannot be allowed to come at the expense of safeguards for surrogate mothers and the children themselves? The Minister is a compassionate lady—I say that in all honesty and know it to be the case. In my dealings with her over the years, I have always found her to be of that opinion, but we need some reassurance.

Surrogacy should remain an incredible act of generosity. It cannot be anything else—not a commercial transaction that risks exploiting vulnerable women and commodifying their children. That can never happen. With that in mind, I look forward to the Minister’s answers.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my constituency neighbour, my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson), for opening this debate so thoroughly and thoughtfully. When I read Adam’s petition, I was taken back to the moment that I became a dad. My husband and I fostered and then adopted our children. I remember holding my daughter and son for the first time like it was yesterday. In those moments, there was no question in my mind that I wanted to be their dad, and that is what I am. That is why I was struck by Adam’s description of the moment he and his partner first saw their baby. They became dads in that moment too. However, as my hon. Friend set out, the law does not recognise that reality.

I understand why the current system came about. The rights and autonomy of surrogates and the need to safeguard children should never be brushed aside. Judicial oversight is also important, and reform should not mean removing protections for the surrogate or the child. However, I think we should ask whether the current system gets that balance right.

We now have a situation where almost 1,000 children were born through surrogacy in 2025—roughly double the number a decade earlier. For families who choose surrogacy, the journey to having a child has often already been extraordinarily long. So once that child is born and is being cared for by their intended parents, it is reasonable to ask whether the law should leave their legal parenthood unresolved for months. That has practical implications, which I remember from my time fostering, such as not being able to give consent for something as simple as a vaccination or blood test.

There is a practical point here about our courts. We rightly ask our family courts to deal with cases where there is a genuine dispute, where a child’s welfare needs judicial consideration or where someone’s rights need to be protected. But if a surrogacy arrangement has been properly assessed before the birth, the intended parents have undergone the appropriate checks, the surrogate has had any independent advice and counselling she may need and the necessary safeguards are in place, do we really need to go through a court process to establish legal parenthood?

My hon. Friend neglected to mention the consent of the mother in his list. Does he agree that that is also of paramount importance?

Yes, absolutely. I am making the case that where everybody involved—of course, the mother is paramount in that—is happy with the arrangement and wants to go ahead with it, it could happen ahead of time. My personal belief is that there should be a cooling-off period, even if there is a reform, to ensure space for mothers to change their minds. I am making the point that the system could be far more efficient. I am not suggesting that we remove the courts from the process altogether—they should be there when needed—but a properly regulated system could allow straightforward cases to be dealt with before birth while retaining a route to the courts where there is disagreement, a safeguarding concern, consent changes or judicial oversight is required. That would not weaken safeguards; it would allow the courts to focus their time and attention on the cases where their intervention matters most.

The hon. Member and I have a great shared interest in fostering and adoption and have spoken about those issues a lot in the past. To clarify, is he saying that there should still be a six-week gap between the birth and the parental order being signed, or that there should not, but that if there was a problem, the courts could still get involved afterwards? That strikes me as clouding the water even more. I appreciate where he is coming from, but I was not 100% clear on what he was saying.

I am not a legal expert and do not intend to insert myself into that particular legal debate, but my perspective is that if arrangements are made beforehand and a birth mother changes her mind, there should be a route back to the court and that should be built into the system. We have the six-week window that allows time for reflection, but I believe there is a way in the vast majority of cases where everybody will be happy for the arrangements to go forward and for the intended family to move on with their lives, without having to go to court, unless there is a change of heart.

It is worth putting on record that the Law Commission report in 2023 suggested that, if everything was decided before the birth, the legal parents could have the rights from day one, but the biological, or surrogate, mother would have a chance to go against that in the first six weeks of the baby’s life. Does the hon. Member agree with the Law Commission report, which still has that fundamental safeguard, but which also recognises that the intended parents are the parents from day one?

The hon. Lady and I are very much on the same wavelength; I was about to move on to that. On the carefully formulated proposals the Law Commission came forward with, it has been through that debate and has struck a fair balance. It recommended a new regulated pathway under which intended parents could become legal parents from birth, but with screening and safeguards, while retaining parental orders for cases where court involvement is still necessary, as we have heard.

I would like to acknowledge and thank the 268 of my Cannock Chase constituents who signed the petition—the highest number of signatures in the west midlands. I do not know the individual circumstances of those signatories: some might have experienced infertility, some might be part of the LGBT community and some might simply believe that our laws should better reflect the reality of modern families. However, the signatures of our constituents right across the country show us that this issue touches many more lives than we realise.

I therefore welcome the Government’s recognition that the current pathway and delay to legal parenthood can cause some uncertainty. My ask is simply that we move the conversation and the debate forward. Will the Minister tell us whether discussions are taking place about how we might modernise the system and make sure our courts deal with the cases that genuinely require their time, while retaining the safeguards that matter to surrogates and children? Call me naive, Mr Pritchard, but I believe we can do both, and I hope this rich debate can be a step towards getting the balance right.

No west midlands Member of Parliament is naive, so don’t worry about that.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I give credit to all Members, who have participated in this difficult and sensitive debate in a thoughtful and constructive manner, and particularly to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson) for leading it. I thank Adam and Jamie for starting the petition and the more than 113,000 people who signed it. Many of my constituents asked me to attend the debate today, and I am proud to do so to stand up for families created through surrogacy.

When Adam and Jamie’s daughter was born, they became her dads the moment they held her. They had chosen to become parents and had prepared for their daughter’s arrival. They had so much love to give her, but the law did not recognise them as her parents. Often parents have to go to court to prove that they are the parents of the child they are already loving and caring for. That is just not right for the parents, for the surrogates and, more importantly, for the children, and it does not reflect the reality of the families involved. It creates unnecessary stress and anguish at an already difficult time when people are raising a newborn child.

To suggest that the concept of consent can be questioned after consent has been given is dangerous. No surrogate mother enters into this relationship lightly. It is something that women consider very carefully. I have spoken to friends who would happily be surrogate mums for other families to enable them to have children, because they enjoyed the experience of pregnancy. They would be happy to help in that way, but they would consent to that in the knowledge that they would not be that child’s mum. They would expect that child to have another mother, or mothers, or other fathers. That is the basis on which they give their consent.

To take the concept of consent in legal arguments, when people make wills—they might be vulnerable people or, much of the time, elderly people—there are always questions about whether they were put under undue influence, but there are legal mechanisms to check that that was not the case. Similarly, there are mechanisms to check whether a woman has given consent for sexual intercourse. We need to strengthen checks for consent in surrogacy relationships, but we cannot have a situation where somebody can give consent, which has been adequately checked and monitored, and then withdraw it afterwards. We have to be careful about challenging that, because it goes to the very root of consent, and it is dangerous to do so.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

I would like to make some progress, and the hon. Lady has made a number of points in her own speech and in other interventions.

Same-sex couples, disabled mums or mums who simply cannot have children have gone through an incredibly demanding process to start a family, and their family is treated differently from the moment their child is born. They can be left in limbo for months while social workers carry out assessments and family courts, with already massively long delays, consider their application for a parental order. That leaves them in limbo if their child is ill, taken into hospital, starts nursery school, or any number of things. Meanwhile, they are changing nappies, comforting their baby through all the sleepless nights and making every decision about their care.

Families should not be penalised because of the gender or sexuality of the people who love and raise that child. Our surrogacy laws are more than 40 years old. Families have changed and society has changed; the law must now change too. That is why the Law Commission’s proposals are so important. They set out a new pathway through which intended parents could be recognised as legal parents from birth, rather than waiting for months to obtain a parental order.

The work has been done, the evidence has been gathered and a draft Bill has already been produced. Will the Minister listen to the families who have shared their experiences, publish the Government’s full response to the Law Commission’s report and set out a clear timetable for reform? Adam and Jamie became dads the moment they held their daughter. It is time the law recognised that reality.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. However good the intentions of those bringing forward this petition for affected parents are, and I do not question them, any loosening of the surrogacy laws would be a serious mistake. The text of the petition says that the current law is “outdated” because the woman giving birth to the child is recognised as the legal mother

“even with no biological connection or intention to parent the child.”

Just think about how cold and clinical those words are: “no biological connection”, when that woman carried that child in their body and brought that child into this world. That is the commodification of women’s bodies. To carry a child for nine months, share your body, feel new life kicking inside you and endure the trauma and joy of childbirth—those are experiences that create a profound, undeniable biological connection.

What of intention? The principle behind the petition is that the matter of parenthood would be settled in favour of the commissioning parents according to an intention formed before the child was born. But we all know that an emotional bond, and indeed a physical one, grows as the pregnancy develops. New mothers say that they feel a bond with their newborn that they have never felt before. They often do not want to spend a moment away from their baby when it is born.

The petition asks the law to privilege an arrangement made before pregnancy and birth over the women who actually give birth, many of whom go on to deeply regret their role as a surrogate mother.

The hon. Member says “many” go on to deeply regret the decision to be a surrogate. What does the data show? How many end up regretting their decision, in terms of a percentage of the surrogates in the UK?

I cannot answer that specific question, but I will reference a case later on, and I have personally met such mothers here in Parliament.

Pregnant women are not factories, and babies are not goods to be ordered. I believe this is crossing an ethical line, where human life is treated as a business transaction. The child must have the right to know where it has come from and how it came to be in this world. When a newborn is handed over not because of a tragedy, but because that separation was arranged before the child was even conceived, that child has become a commodity, which it should never be. These children are removed from their birth mothers, and it is simply wrong to treat children in this way.

Implementing the demands of the petition would seal the commodification of mothers and babies through surrogacy, and we need only look at the global surrogacy industry to see where that leads: wealthy couples exploiting desperate women; international human trafficking rings; and exportation and erasure. That is the end destination when we start from the principles implied in the petition.

Even in Britain, where commercial surrogacy is banned, women suffer the consequences. Marie Anne, a surrogate mother, told her story at a conference in Brighton. Recalling the chilling moment after she gave birth, she said:

“They had the baby. They were happy. They didn’t need me anymore so they told me to go home.”

She describes doing a handover in a hospital car park. She also describes the impact on her life, saying:

“I have been diagnosed with complex PTSD…I have a deep fear of hospitals, children and babies…The damage done to me will never be repaired.”

France, Germany, Spain and Italy have all banned surrogacy outright. As President Emmanuel Macron said, surrogacy is

“not compatible with the dignity of women”.

I therefore conclude by urging colleagues to reject both the commodification of babies and mothers implied by the petition and the loosening of surrogacy laws in Britain.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson) for opening the debate and for so thoughtfully laying out both sides, which have been well exercised today.

Being able to start a family is one of life’s greatest privileges. However, for those in many families, whether they are struggling with infertility, are in same-sex relationships or have health issues that would prevent them from having a safe pregnancy, surrogacy has become an option that would allow them to start a family.

The landscape of surrogacy has changed in the years since the first known surrogate baby was born in 1984. Surrogacy is now being widely recognised as a pathway to parenthood, with 67 parental order applications received by the family courts in 2008, rising to 514 in 2025, although I recognise that many different numbers have been suggested today.

I want to pick up on the hon. Lady’s point about healthcare and situations in which women cannot carry a pregnancy. Is she aware of the health risks posed by women carrying embryos that are not their own, and the additional risks to surrogate mothers from being a surrogate?

I do not think any woman enters into any pregnancy lightly, whether it is their own pregnancy or a surrogate pregnancy. I would assume that any surrogate mother is well informed of the risks they are taking in growing a life over nine months, which is no mean feat.

Since 2018, there have been 350 parental order applications from couples in a same-sex relationship, according to Brilliant Beginnings. Adam and Jamie, who brought this petition to the House today, chose to go abroad to the US because they would be recognised as Leven’s parents from day one. I am sure it would have come as a shock to them to discover, before Leven was born, that their home—the UK—does not recognise them as Leven’s legal parents under UK law until the parental order is completed, which can take anywhere between six and 12 months.

My hon. Friend pre-empts what I will go on to say, but he also makes an important point. If I chose to be a surrogate for a friend or a family member, I think my husband would be pretty shocked at being named as the father on a birth certificate, when it was my decision to be a surrogate. Regardless of where we sit in this argument, I think we can all agree that that does not make any sense.

I commend Adam and Jamie for their bravery in sharing their journey to parenthood and the additional challenges that they have faced in securing their rights, which they are already recognised as having in the US, as their daughter’s parents. The journey they took is more common today. Around 500 babies are born through surrogacy to UK parents every year, and nearly three quarters are now born through international surrogacy. The most popular destination is the USA, with the other quarter spread over countries including Canada, Colombia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nigeria and Ukraine.

It is legitimate to raise concerns about surrogacy practices in other countries, especially ones where it is not regulated and there is a risk of trafficking and exploitation. That is why the subject needs to be handled with such sensitivity. We must ensure that the rights of the surrogate, the baby and the intended parents are at the heart of everything we do, and that legislation reflects that.

The recommendations of the Law Commission’s report into surrogacy law, published in 2023, attempted to address many of those issues. The report, requested by the UK Government of the day, sought to create a new pathway to parenthood for UK surrogacy, with intended parents recorded on their child’s birth certificate provided the surrogate does not change her mind. It also called for regulation of non-profit UK surrogacy organisations to oversee the new pathway, including requirements for a written surrogacy agreement, screening, legal advice and counselling, as well as tighter categorisation of permitted payments to UK surrogates. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) highlighted that there should be no doubt between payments and legitimate expenses, and I agree with him.

The Law Commission’s report found a lack of clarity about what payments can be made by the intended parents to the surrogate, which makes the law difficult to apply in practice. We need a law that can be clearly and fairly applied, to ensure that families and surrogates alike understand their rights and responsibilities. However, the report has not had a formal response from Government, even though it was published three years ago, nor has any time been given for the House to debate the wider conversation around surrogacy so that we can reflect the changing environment—a call made by hon. Members from across the House. That is why this needs to be looked at as a matter of urgency.

I ask the Minister today to explain what work is being done to improve clarity on the issue and whether we can expect legislation to address it. As the hon. Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor) said, there is a Bill ready to go. The Liberal Democrats recognise that the current system can create long delays as intended parents apply for a parental order after birth, and we recognise the distress that delays can cause to those involved. It is clear that delays can also cause practical issues for parents who have caring responsibilities but lack legal security, which creates problems around registering.

There have been a couple of mentions of the time it takes to get an order, but parents in the UK adoption system have equally long—often much longer—waits to take on parental rights over a child. We are in danger of creating two separate systems, so that putting in an order for a child through a surrogate is a quick option to become a parent, but we are making it harder for people who have gone through the care system to foster or adopt, or who have gone through a long adoption process. I wonder whether we are inadvertently suggesting that there should be a two-tier system. I wonder what the hon. Lady’s thoughts are on that, because I know that she, like me, is a big advocate of fostering and adoption.

I am in no way suggesting that we create a two-tier system. Talking about how long the adoption process can take, especially for those who have had fostering responsibilities and are transitioning into adopting those children, and talking about how arduous that process can be, including when making sure that children have up-to-date health records and so on, would be a separate debate. We are clearly talking about health services as well. If a child is born with a health concern, the intended parents who are providing their day-to-day care should have the facility to act on behalf of that child to make sure they are well looked after.

It is also worth pointing out at this stage that, if a heterosexual couple presented in a hospital with a child who is poorly, it is very unlikely that a health professional would ask, “Can you please prove that you are the legal parents?”, but for same-sex couples it is more likely that someone would ask that question. We are creating a two-tier system between heterosexual couples who choose surrogacy and homosexual or same-sex couples who choose surrogacy, and I am not in favour of a two-tier system at all.

The Liberal Democrats also believe that, as with all the issues raised in this debate, any decisions regarding the legal parenthood of a new baby must ensure that the rights and wellbeing of all those involved are balanced and respected. I ask the Minister when the Government intend to respond to the report in full and whether they intend to bring forward any legislation on this issue for Parliament to consider—because, although this is Adam and Jamie’s debate, they represent a much wider group of people.

I will finish by saying that so few people have touchpoints with our Parliament and our political system, and passing the threshold to have an issue debated in Parliament is no mean feat; but it should not be the end of the story. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out what the next steps are, to ensure that the conversation about this issue continues.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Pritchard. I start by declaring an interest in this debate as a former member of the appeals panel of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority.

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson) for the tone in which he opened the debate, and I recognise the more than 113,000 people who have signed this petition. Behind many of their signatures will be personal experience of infertility and loss, and a long-held wish to start a family. For intended parents, surrogacy is not simply a legal process; it is about getting a family they never thought they could have, and in many cases, it comes at the end of a long and difficult journey.

Nobody doubts the love that such parents have for their children. Families formed through surrogacy deserve dignity, certainty and respect. However, our job in this House is to consider more than the wishes of the adults involved. We must speak for the child who cannot speak for themselves. We must also protect the woman who carries and gives birth to that child.

The issue for us to consider is whether legal parenthood should pass automatically at birth, before the state has considered the child’s welfare, the surrogate mother’s consent and the circumstances in which the arrangement was made. As a starting-point, any reform to the legislation must do three things: first, and most importantly, it must protect the child; secondly, it must preserve the free and continuing consent of the woman who gives birth; and thirdly, it must address the safeguarding concerns arising from the increase in international commercial surrogacy.

First, on protecting the child, the petition describes the upset and strain of months of court proceedings and visits from social services workers before the intended parents are legally recognised. I understand why that process might feel intrusive and unsettling. Intended parents have planned for the child and cared for them from birth, and already see themselves as a family. However, a parental order is not merely words on a piece of paper; it is the legal means by which parenthood is transferred from one person to another. That is a serious act, with lifelong consequences for the child.

The process, as it currently stands, allows a court to consider the child’s welfare, establish that the surrogate mother has freely consented, examine any payments that have been made either through expenses or cash, and consider the circumstances in which the child will be raised. CAFCASS provides an independent assessment, so that the decision is not based only on what the adults expected or agreed before the child was born.

It is argued by some people that those checks are unnecessary because the overwhelming majority of applications are approved. I simply do not accept that. The fact that a system usually finds that everything is in order does not mean that the checks serve no purpose at all. Their existence helps to ensure that proper standards are followed. If the process is too cumbersome, it should be made more intuitive; if families receive inconsistent advice, that advice should be made clearer; and if the courts or CAFCASS lack the resources to deal with applications promptly, the Government should address that. Delays should be reduced, but that does not warrant the underlying protections’ being diminished. I ask the Minister whether the Government remain committed to the parental order process, and what they will do to reduce unnecessary delays while retaining independent welfare assessments.

My second point concerns the woman who gives birth. Under the present law, the woman who carries and gives birth to a child is the child’s legal mother. Legal parenthood is transferred only after she has given valid consent following the birth. It would be ill-judged to dismiss that as an outdated legal technicality, as it recognises the physical, medical and emotional consequences of pregnancy and childbirth. The law normally prevents consent from being given until six weeks after the child is born. That period of time is necessary: a decision made before childbirth cannot fully account for the experience of giving birth, the mother’s health afterwards or how she may feel when the child is born.

If intended parents became legal parents automatically, that protection would be reversed. The woman who carried and delivered the child would instead have to take legal action if she wished to withdraw her consent or assert her own rights. That should concern us all, particularly where there is a financial or social imbalance between the surrogate mother and the intended parents. A system that depends on someone’s having the knowledge, confidence and money to begin legal proceedings may offer very little protection in practice.

Compassion for intended parents cannot require Parliament to treat the woman who gives birth as a temporary party to somebody else’s story, nor should this be presented as a contest between traditional and modern families. Recognising different kinds of family does not require us to reduce the rights of the woman who carries the child. If the Government are considering recognising intended parents from birth, I ask the Minister to set out what protection would remain for a surrogate mother who changed her mind after giving birth.

The third issue is of growing concern: the increase in international commercial surrogacy. The majority of parental order applications now concern children born overseas. Applications relating to children born internationally reportedly rose from 215 in 2021 to 509 in 2025; in that same year, there were 150 applications relating to children born in the United Kingdom. That marks a significant change in surrogacy in this country. International arrangements may involve large differences in wealth and power, commercial contracts that would not be enforceable here, complicated payment arrangements made through intermediaries and serious doubts about whether consent was properly informed and freely given.

I should have said this in my earlier contribution, but I refer the hon. Gentleman to page 31 of the Library’s “Surrogacy in the UK” briefing, where it refers to some physical circumstances and risks that came up in a Canadian population-based surrogacy study that I think are incredibly important. It says:

“Some research suggests that using an egg from a relative may reduce these risks”.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that we need to consider the Canadian perspective and the surrogacy study that they did?

The hon. Member always comes to these debates well prepared and well briefed. I think the point he is making, which we can all agree on, is that this is an incredibly complex area that we cannot rush to legislate on, nor should we seek to water down the clear protections that currently exist.

We now prohibit commercial arrangements in the UK, yet we allow intended parents to travel overseas to exploit that type of arrangement. I am interested to know whether the shadow Minister thinks that that is a morally coherent position, and whether we should be looking at the rights of UK citizens to exploit commercial surrogacy overseas.

It is almost as if the hon. Gentleman can read my mind, because I was going to say that there is a clear inconsistency in prohibiting the practice here, while allowing such arrangements to be made abroad.

Of course, intended parents may also encounter immigration and nationality problems that they are aware of before entering the arrangement, if those arrangements take place overseas. In some cases, a British court may have difficulty locating the surrogate mother when deciding whether valid consent has been provided. In that case, a parental order process and a CAFCASS assessment would be the only independent scrutiny carried out in this country. The Government’s overseas surrogacy guidance was last updated by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in 2022. Given the rise in international cases, it needs to be updated. It should deal clearly with safeguarding, consent, payments, independent legal advice, immigration and nationality. With that in mind, will the Minister commit to reviewing the international surrogacy arrangements and to publishing updated guidance?

Some will say that the law is outdated. I understand the frustrations behind that argument. There is a case for a quicker process, clearer guidance and greater consistency, but making a process easier for one party does not necessarily make the law better. Reforming the law must also protect those with less power and ensure that the child’s interests are the main consideration.

Of course, families formed through surrogacy deserve our support. However, the child whose future is being decided also deserves independent protection. The woman who gives birth should not lose her rights before she knows how the experience of childbirth has affected her. We can shorten needless delays and give families greater certainty without discarding the principles on which the current system rests. Legal parenthood should be transferred only after the child’s welfare has been properly considered, the surrogate mother’s consent has been confirmed and the arrangement has received the necessary independent scrutiny. In surrogacy as in every other part of family law, the wishes of the adults are important but the welfare of children must always come first.

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Dave Robertson) for his opening speech on behalf of the Petitions Committee. I am pleased to respond to this debate on the proposal, made by a petition signed by over 113,000 members of the public, to change surrogacy law to recognise intended parents from birth. I welcome the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), to his place and congratulate him on his appointment to that role.

This is a well-attended debate, and there have been many valuable contributions. The hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) and my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh North and Leith (Tracy Gilbert) both spoke with great passion about the welfare of women and children, including in the international dimension of surrogacy. I wanted to tell my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), who is no longer in his place, that I was concerned to hear his intervention about his constituents who had a very poor experience going to Mexico with a certain company. The Department is looking into the allegations about My Surrogacy Journey. As part of that assessment, the Department will consider whether it is appropriate for that company to remain on the gov.uk list of agencies.

The hon. Member for Leicester East (Shivani Raja) talked about the rights of the child coming first. My hon. Friend the Member for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) talked about the strength of motherhood and discussed the important issue of consent. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) raised concerns about the commercialisation of surrogacy. My hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Josh Newbury) talked about his personal experience of becoming a dad. My hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor) spoke about the personal experience of Adam and Jamie. She made a strong speech for reform and also spoke about consent. My hon. Friend the Member for Pendle and Clitheroe (Jonathan Hinder) talked about the ethics of surrogacy and referred to the approach taken by other European countries. The hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller), the spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats, made a typically thoughtful speech that set out the Law Commission’s report in some detail.

It is worth saying from the outset that the Government recognise that surrogacy is a complex and sensitive policy issue where detail matters to all those involved in a surrogacy arrangement. The Government always recommend that anyone considering surrogacy should have a clear understanding of what is required for parenthood to legally transfer to the intended parents and should seek specialist legal advice before beginning the process.

I am grateful for the opportunity to reflect on this area of law. The UK was, of course, one of the first countries to introduce a legislative framework for domestic surrogacy. The Government support surrogacy as part of a range of assisted conception options and recognise the important part it can play in supporting people seeking to start a family. In the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, Parliament decided that altruistic surrogacy arrangements would be legally allowed and that surrogates would be entitled to reasonable expenses. The Act was introduced to prevent surrogacy arrangements from taking place on a commercial basis.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield for his informed contribution. He and my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire and Bedworth set out the issues raised by the petitioners, Adam and Jamie, and shared their experience of starting a family through surrogacy and of the pathway to legal parenthood in the United Kingdom. The Government recognise the difficulties that intended parents may encounter when applying for a parental order. We are very grateful to those with lived experience of this matter who feel able to share their stories.

I will set out the current legal position on parental orders. Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the person who gives birth to the child—in this case, the surrogate—is the legal mother when the child is born and has parental responsibility until the courts put in place a parental order. A parental order makes the intended parents the legal parents and permanently removes the surrogate’s legal motherhood. We recognise that the application process for a parental order can be a difficult period for intended parents. Although the safeguarding assessments take time, they are necessary to support the court’s considerations of parental order applications. Each application is carefully considered by the family court on the facts of the individual case, although I note the issues raised about delays in the system.

The debate has highlighted broader questions about whether the current legal framework in the UK continues to reflect modern family formation and contemporary surrogacy practice. The Government acknowledge those concerns and recognise the arguments on both sides—that the law should provide greater clarity, better support and a more streamlined pathway to legal parenthood while maintaining robust safeguards for children, surrogates and intended parents.

There are many reasons why people pursue international surrogacy arrangements. It is a very complex area. The process to bring the child or children to the UK after birth can be long and complicated. Foreign Office guidance makes it clear that if people are considering surrogacy in a foreign country, they are strongly advised to seek specialist independent legal advice in the UK and the relevant country before making any arrangements.

I hear loud and clear the calls for legislative change this afternoon but, given the limited parliamentary time available, the Government are not in a position to bring forward legislation on surrogacy reform immediately. We will, however, continue to consider options for future reform, and we remain engaged with the issues raised by stakeholders, parliamentarians and families with lived experience of surrogacy.

I thank the Minister for making a very thoughtful summing-up speech, as ever. Has she had any conversations with her colleagues in the Department for Work and Pensions about providing clarity on whether the expenses that surrogate mothers receive should count towards their benefits? Under legacy benefits, they did, but under the new version of universal credit, they do not count as unearned income. That thorny issue needs to be looked at, particularly given that £25,000 can be paid to women who may be on benefits, but it does not count as income. Has the Minister had that conversation, and can she look into that?

I am very happy to take that point away and write to the hon. Lady.

Any future reforms need to protect the welfare of children and safeguard those involved in surrogacy arrangements, as well as to maintain public trust. As noted throughout the debate, the Department supported the joint project of the Law Commission for England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission to review the current surrogacy regime. The Law Commissions consulted widely on this topic, generating a wide diversity of views. The previous Government welcomed the Law Commissions’ 2023 report on surrogacy reform, and this Government will respond in due course as time allows.

I am very grateful to all those who have contributed to both sides of the debate. The contributions made today have highlighted again both the strengths of the current surrogacy framework and the challenges that may be faced when navigating it. The Government are clear that the welfare of children born through surrogacy must remain paramount. We recognise the importance of ensuring that children are protected, intended parents are supported in having families, surrogate mothers are protected and surrogacy arrangements operate within a framework that commands public confidence. I am sure that the Minister in the Lords, who has responsibility for this area, would be happy to meet hon. Members to discuss this further. Once again, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield for introducing this important debate and acknowledging the families impacted.

It is always a pleasure to sum up these debates and thank hon. Members for their contributions. The hon. Members for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) and for Leicester East (Shivani Raja) and my hon. Friends the Members for Edinburgh North and Leith (Tracy Gilbert), for Mansfield (Steve Yemm) and for Pendle and Clitheroe (Jonathan Hinder) brought to the table points on the balance of rights between the different parties involved, how disagreements between intended parents and surrogates can be worked through and the importance of surrogates’ rights, and a focus on the rights of the child.

We also heard about the legal complexities around devolution from a number of Members, particularly in Holyrood and Stormont, but I am sure that is also the case for Cardiff. My hon. Friends the Members for Cannock Chase (Josh Newbury) and for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor)—I always say it should be pronounced “Beduth”—highlighted the difficulties faced by intended parents and families navigating a very complex process, the importance of consent as we navigate it, the value of surrogacy to families and how families find a way to start using the process.

It was also great to hear contributions from the hon. Member for Horsham (John Milne), my hon. Friends the Members for Glasgow South (Gordon McKee) and for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), the party spokespersons—the hon. Member for Chichester (Jess Brown-Fuller) for the Liberal Democrats and the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst) for the Conservatives —and the Minister.

It was clear today that this is an incredibly complex and detailed debate, and one that needs to be considered fully. While I am sure the petitioners would have preferred to hear a further update from the Minister, she was very clear when she outlined the current legal position and advice from the Government on surrogacy and that the Government are staying exactly where they are and will get to this when time allows—that was a very paraphrased version of her conclusion. I thank everybody for their time today, and especially you, Mr Pritchard, for chairing.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered e-petition 763161 relating to surrogacy law and legal parenthood.