PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
GKN - 24 April 2018 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
As I informed the House on 27 March, the Enterprise Act 2002 sets out three circumstances in which a takeover can be referred to the Competition and Markets Authority on public interest grounds. They are financial stability, media plurality and national security. Any such reference must take place within four months of the completion of the transaction, and must result from a quasi-judicial decision, made impartially, on the basis of an open mind and solely on the evidence presented. No grounds were advanced for a reference on the grounds of media plurality or financial stability. To inform my decision on national security, I asked for a comprehensive assessment to be made by the Ministry of Defence and other bodies concerned with our national security.
The Secretary of State for Defence has written to advise me that the MOD has completed its detailed analysis and has agreed with Melrose a set of undertakings, specifically: to ensure that the Government are informed in advance of any plans to divest a business, a component of a business, or assets which engage in activities that the Ministry of Defence considers to have national security implications; to ensure that the Government have early visibility of any prospective purchasers, including structures of consortia and persons holding significant influence and control; to prevent the disposal of the relevant business, components of a business or assets without the consent of the Government; to ensure that the Government receive suitable protections from any subsequent purchaser in the event of any future sale of elements of the business; to ensure the continuation of contractual obligations to protect intellectual property and classified information; to ensure the continued maintenance of any capabilities with a national security dimension; and to provide the MOD with powers to inspect information and facilities to ensure the protection of classified information.
Those undertakings are combined with the undertakings that Melrose agreed to make in response to my letter of 26 March, including undertakings not to dispose of the aerospace business for at least five years without the Government’s consent; to maintain a UK stock exchange listing for at least five years; to ensure that the business remains headquartered in the UK, and that a majority of directors are resident in the UK; to ensure that both the aerospace and Driveline divisions retain the rights to the GKN name; and to guarantee that spending on research and development will take place on at least GKN’s previous level, amounting to a minimum of 2.2% of sales for the next five financial years. In important respects, those undertakings go beyond commitments given by the previous management team. Melrose has also agreed to meet my officials and me every six months to provide updates on its ownership of GKN.
On the basis of the commitments given relating to national security, the Ministry of Defence concluded that statutory intervention was not required. That is consistent with the other assessments that I have received. On the basis of the assessments that I have considered and the undertakings that have been entered into, my judgment is that there are not reasonable and proportionate grounds to make a statutory intervention on the grounds of national security.
GKN is a very important business, performing vital work in industries—aerospace and automotive in particular—with an expanding global market in which British innovation and excellence offer great opportunities. This takeover bid has entailed a vigorous debate about which of the two alternative British managements could most credibly reap those opportunities. The shareholders chose—initially by a small majority, and finally more substantially—new management. All UK public companies are subject to that challenge of how they can best be run: it is an essential part of the competitive business environment for which Britain is renowned.
The takeover bid has been important in wider ways. It is the first contested bid in which the new regime of legally binding commitments on future conduct has applied. The commitments that have been made reflect the strong interest of stakeholders—including employees, UK taxpayers, suppliers, and research and development partnerships—in knowing the future intentions of a bidder, provided in a way that is binding. These responsibilities, which broadly reflect those placed on directors of ongoing businesses by section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, are important to ensure that the longer-term and strategic interests of our economy are considered and addressed during takeover bids.
Now that such an ability to make post-offer undertakings has been established, I expect them to be implemented. The new management’s stewardship of these important businesses carries with it important responsibilities for our economy and our country. I look to the management to honour its commitments in both the spirit and the letter, and to create a strong future for GKN, its employees, its suppliers, and the industrial sectors in which it will play a major role.
I gave the House a commitment that I would carry out my legal responsibilities seriously, meticulously and fairly, and that I would keep the House up to date at every phase of these proceedings. I believe that I have done so, and I commend my statement to the House.
There are two issues that I must raise today: the fact that the reported assurances obtained by the Government, both in the letter of 27 March and subsequently, are not sufficient to guarantee the security of the long-term prospects of the company and, indeed, the workforce; and the inadequate capacity of the takeover regime to protect companies outside the very limited grounds of national defence, media plurality and financial stability.
First, as I made clear last month, the assurances obtained by the Government in Melrose’s letter of 27 March were sadly inadequate. Apart from the first five assurances which were post-offer undertakings, what was in the letter was completely unenforceable. For example, there were no post-offer undertakings on maintaining employment or tax residency, which could easily constitute such undertakings. Indeed, the maintenance of employment is vital to our national security, and the loss of these jobs will cause the diminishment of vital skills that are integral to our defence industry.
Putting aside issues of enforceability, what of the assurances that have been reported since 27 March? The reported veto power that the Secretary of State for Defence has to stop the sale of certain businesses will not, I am afraid, solve the national security problem. Melrose reportedly has a short-term outlook which undermines the long term that is required for defence projects. That is important, and a veto on the sale of certain parts of the business by the Defence Secretary will not help significantly. Sadly, the Government’s failure to address the short-term horizons of Melrose may damage the capability of a business to deliver projects that could last for 10, 15 or 20 years.
Secondly, our takeover regime is inadequate, and the Secretary of State is acutely aware of that. If a takeover falls outside the grounds of national defence, media plurality and national stability, the Secretary of State cannot act, even though the takeover may be harmful for the business, harmful for employees, harmful to research and development, and harmful to supply chains.
Let us take the case of Unilever. Last year it was threatened with a takeover, and there was nothing that the Government could do because the takeover fell outside the three public interest exemptions. Unilever has since commented on the inadequacy of the UK takeover regime, and its recent decision to place its headquarters in the Netherlands was, as reported by the Financial Times, arguably driven by a desire to escape the poor safeguards for takeovers in the UK. Labour Members have called on the Government to broaden the public interest test. The measures that the Government have proposed so far are not good enough. We know that, in GKN’s case, they already had the power to act and did not do so. However, our takeover rules would not have prevented Unilever from being taken over had Kraft been prepared to follow through, because that had nothing to do with any of the three exemptions.
I agree with the Secretary of State that our takeover regime must be open enough to encourage foreign investment, but it must also protect against short-termism and long-term damage to our economy and national security. Arguably, too often it is short-termism that prevails. Only this week we heard reports that the hedge funds that bought GKN shares to make Melrose’s takeover possible are now targeting Melrose, shorting the company on the stock exchange.
What we needed from the Secretary of State today was not just a waving through of the deal, but action, both in obtaining concrete assurances from Melrose on the future of GKN and its workforce, and in the form of clear plans to reform and widen our takeover regime to protect British businesses. I fear that the short-term predators already smell their next victim—and it is not just Melrose; it is Britain’s industrial future.
The evidence presented to me was that this was a British company taking over another British company, that no such takeover has ever been blocked on national security grounds, and that the Ministry of Defence and the other agencies said there was no reason for intervention on those grounds. I have to tell the hon. Lady that the previous directors of GKN themselves said that there was no reason for an intervention on national security grounds. She should reflect on the commitments that the Defence Secretary and I have secured to retain the aerospace division for at least five years, to ensure that the Government have the right to approve any future sale of any defence business or asset, and to invest in research and development to at least the current level. Not once in the past four months has she engaged in a similarly forensic way to set out what she thinks would be appropriate commitments.
The hon. Lady says that the commitments are inadequate, but they have been given as legal deeds and in some cases set out to the Takeover Panel as post-offer undertakings. The truth is that she has had the opportunity to engage with this matter, but having prejudiced her position by saying from the outset that the takeover should be blocked, she has given away the ability to have influence on what the regime should be.
The hon. Lady knows perfectly well what the Government’s powers on takeovers are, because the 2002 Act was passed under a Labour Government and sets out those limited powers, which are the same as in the rest of Europe. The difference between the Government and the Opposition is that when we came into government, we reformed those powers to allow post-offer undertakings to be given, so the situation when Kraft bid for Cadbury and undertakings were reneged upon cannot happen in the current circumstances. We have taken an active approach to ensuring that all stakeholders’ interests are secured, whereas the hon. Lady preferred to float above it all and simply say no before considering the evidence. We have proceeded responsibly, and she would do the employees of and stakeholders in GKN a service if she engaged more forensically in future.
The Secretary of State mentioned holding Melrose to the spirit and letter of its commitments, but traders have been short selling £725 million, or 17%, of Melrose stock, effectively betting against it making a success of GKN. What action will he take if there is any breach of the spirit or letter of the commitments?
The Secretary of State did not cover jobs in his statement. I asked him following a previous statement to what extent he would require assurances to prevent assets from being stripped and jobs lost, and not just those in the MOD or national security. What assurances has he had on the financial restructuring involved in the takeover, which will mean more debt and less investment at the core of GKN? How will that situation progress the Government’s industrial strategy, and can he explain how allowing the takeover will protect the skilled jobs that we require and tackle productivity issues?
The previous GKN management criticised the commitment to retain the aerospace business, saying that it should not have been entered into given that the sell-off of GKN’s automotive business had already been agreed to. It constitutes a longer-term commitment than was made during the latter period of the previous ownership.
The hon. Gentleman will understand that in obtaining commitments from a bidder, I have to bear in mind commitments that the incumbent management have or have not made. No commitments had been made on the total number of jobs, and indeed the sale programme involved a majority of the business. One of the features of today’s results announcement was that the debt of the previous business was higher than anticipated, and the plans that the new management have set out include paying it down.
The future of GKN was determined by speculators who came on to the share register in the final weeks of the bidding process to make a quick profit. Does the Secretary of State agree that that is no way to determine the future of a great British manufacturing company, and will he now conduct a review of the takeover code to ensure that speculators cannot participate in that way in a vote to decide a company’s long-term future?
“We were persuaded that the introduction of such provisions by legislation or regulation would involve practical difficulties and would be unlikely to achieve the intended effect.”
That was an expert review by a serious person, but of course in all circumstances such as this we keep our corporate governance arrangements under review, and I will certainly do that now.
On the hon. Lady’s point about differential voting rights for shareholders, I mentioned the John Kay report, which her predecessor Committee scrutinised—I think the right hon. Member for Twickenham (Sir Vince Cable) gave evidence backing the report’s judgment. I know that her Committee is correctly interested in keeping our arrangements up to date, and if she and her colleagues want to review these matters, what their predecessors said is a good example of how that can be done.
“GKN is a very important business, performing vital work in industries—aerospace and automotive in particular—with an expanding global market in which British innovation and excellence offer great opportunities.”
Does he understand from his regular meetings with Melrose that it is thinking of adapting its business model so that these vital interests can be kept for a longer term than they would otherwise have been? If not, would this British company consider selling first to another British company?
I mentioned in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Rachel Maclean) that Airbus’s chief executive has not repeated the reports that were made previously. I have discussed the matter with Melrose and its intention is to develop a relationship that it hopes will prosper in the future.
We have also seen a lukewarm commitment on R&D. GKN’s current R&D is at only half to two thirds that of its main competitors. Why did the Minister not seek a more ambitious undertaking that the takeover will enhance value and increase GKN’s R&D spending target to that of its main international competitors? I echo the sentiments of other Members on the need to amend our shareholder takeover rules to ensure that short-term interests of people with no industrial knowledge or understanding of companies are not permitted to distort the interest of stakeholders in the long-term value of this company.
If GKN were a German company in Germany or a French company in France this kind of speculative takeover would be prevented one way or another. One way to prevent it would be to have substantial stateholdings in such companies, and France, in particular, has done that over many years to make sure French companies remain French. Will the Government not look to France and Germany for the best way forward?
For the constituents of the hon. Member for Luton South (Mr Shuker), during the takeover bid, the incumbent management criticised the commitment to hold the aerospace division for five years. Given that a majority of the company was to be sold as part of the incumbent management’s plans, it is fair to observe that it is not clear there would be any greater stability—I put it as mildly as that—if the incumbent management had continued, rather than the new management that shareholders chose to manage the company.
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