PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Football Governance Bill (Sixth sitting) - 21 May 2024 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Nokes.

I will continue where I left off, looking at clause 29. I have a question for the Minister on behalf of the Football Supporters’ Association, which pointed out that fans are often privy to local information about owners and officers that might be relevant to a determination of the regulator. Does the Minister believe that the mechanisms in the clause are adequate for the regulator to take relevant input from fans and local communities when making determinations?

Clause 30 provides for cases in which a person becomes an owner or officer without the regulator having made a determination on their suitability. It is important that no loopholes allow owners to skip out of the new tests. Clause 31 gives clubs, and prospective owners and officers, the welcome opportunity to make representations to the regulator should it be minded to determine that someone is not suitable or has not passed the relevant test.

Finally, I am thankful to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for highlighting, through new clause 3, just how important it is that clubs have a guarantee about the future use of their ground. The Minister agreed to write to him about that, and I look forward to seeing the response.

I am speaking in the right place this time. I was pre-emptive in my comments before the break, but that has given the Minister an opportunity to go away and look at the wording that he will come forward with to improve new clause 3.

I take the Minister’s point about the complicated circumstances for many clubs with respect to who owns the ground and what form they own it in, and that is understood. I hope that we can find a way of ensuring that, whatever the complications, the owner cannot simply put the club and the ground into different organisations—different legal constructs—but that in all cases there can be an assurance that the club will have use of the ground going forward, because otherwise the club cannot be sustainable by anyone’s definition.

I thank the Minister for agreeing to go away to look at the issue. I accept that new clause 3 is probably imperfect, and I very much look forward to a perfect clause coming back from him in due course.

I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 32, page 24, line 2, at end insert—

“(2A) A determination period as specified in subsection (2) should have an end date which is as soon as is reasonably practicable.”

This amendment would ask the Secretary of State to propose a timely end date to a determination period.

I welcome the principle of the clause. I will discuss that first, before moving to the amendment.

That decisions on ownership should be taken within a reasonable timeframe is right. Allowing the Secretary of State to set maximum time limits, alongside allowing for extensions where a case is particularly complex, seems a sensible way to go about ensuring that decisions are made in good time. Indeed, although I hope that I have set out my belief that the owners and directors test should be comprehensive, the purchase of any club is likely to be time sensitive. Circumstances are subject to changing quickly on both ends of a deal, and in many cases the right takeover deal can be the difference between a club surviving and not.

Oldham Athletic was in trouble after a period of severe turbulence that saw assets sold, staff unpaid and its main stand unable to be used for certain games due to a lease dispute. After a successful takeover, its new owner, local man Rothwell, cleared Oldham’s debts. Birmingham City and Wigan Athletic also appear to have reversed their fortunes thanks to new ownership. Birmingham City is now one step closer to a new stadium as St Andrew’s falls into disrepair, a long-term project that owners have promised will not be affected by relegation this season. In Wigan’s case, local businessman Mike Danson has appeared to stabilise the club after a period of losses on and off the pitch. Those examples show just how crucial the timing of ownership change can be for clubs in financial distress.

I welcome what the clause is trying to achieve, but I wonder whether it could go one step further. It is of note that the time limits in the clause are not accompanied by a general duty on the regulator to make determinations as soon as is reasonably practicable. That is why I tabled amendment 12. As the English Football League has argued, it is crucial that owners are able to sell their clubs when needed, particularly in instances of financial distress. Protracted takeovers can impact a club’s finances further, and they are hardly an advert for potential investors in clubs.

Given the fear some have expressed about the unintended consequences of the Bill on investment, it is important that the clause is watertight in ensuring that the time limits are truly seen as a maximum, rather than as a target. That is of particular concern given that the clause says that if the regulator does not make a determination within the time limit, it is automatically to be treated as having determined that the prospective owner or officer has failed the test. Again, I understand why that measure is in place—it is dangerous to allow a takeover where a person cannot be approved by the criteria set by the regulator—but we must ensure that the provision is protected against misuse. A regulator working in good faith would surely not time-out a test just to ensure an owner or officer is prevented from being granted a positive determination.

Protections should be built in to the legislation to ensure that it cannot be exploited. Not only is it built into the principles of the regulator to work efficiently, but it is within its general duties to avoid any adverse effects on financial investment in English football. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider amendment 12, which would ensure that determinations are made as expeditiously as possible, and recognise it as in keeping with the underpinnings of the regulator.

The amendment was simply intended to ensure that decisions on owners and directors are made with time sensitivity in mind. I appreciate the Minister’s comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Duties to notify IFR of change in circumstances relating to incumbent owner or officer

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause mirrors the notification requirements for prospective owners and officers, requiring incumbent owners and officers to go through the same process of notifying the regulator in the event of a material change that might affect their suitability. This is an important provision that will ensure that owners and directors cannot circumvent the standards set out in the tests after their appointment. I certainly think it is the intention that the tests should act as the beginning of an ongoing compliance with the standards by owners and clubs, rather than the end.

If an owner or officer becomes subject to criminal proceedings, or new information comes to light about a criminal source of their wealth, it is only right that their suitability should be reviewed by the regulator. For example, the owner and chairman of Fleetwood Town FC was recently found guilty of defrauding creditors, false representation and being concerned with the retention of criminal property. The multimillion-pound fraud operation, which duped firms into expensive energy contracts, earned him jail time amounting to 13 years. Of course, in that case, Mr Pilley resigned following his conviction.

I have no major issues with the clauses, so in the interests of not repeating what the Minister outlined, I will simply welcome them.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 35 and 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37

Matters relevant to determinations

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 37, page 27, line 30, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

This important clause will give comfort to many fans about the agility of the regulator. Of particular note overall is the reference to bankruptcy, which I know many fans will take a great deal of comfort from. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West will speak on that part of the clause if she catches your eye, Ms Nokes.

I advised in my speech on Second Reading that I would table this amendment, if only to impress the importance of independence within the regulator. There has been much commentary on the independence of the independent regulator, and much of it has focused on the fact that it is a political appointment. To allay some of those concerns, I should say that there are more than 600 agencies in Government, of which the largest number sit within the responsibility of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. That is why the Minister always looks so exhausted: because of the number of stakeholders he must deal with. I have been there.

Some of the concern and criticism has focused on clause 37(2), which states that the regulator must

“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives”

of the Government. Throughout the passage of the Bill, there has often been confusion about what certain things within it mean, and the wording of clause 37 has set hares running. The Sunday Times this weekend had an interview with the Premier League’s Richard Masters, in which the journalist—not Richard—made reference to the clause, saying that it

“raised questions as to whether it could be forced to give state-backed clubs such as Manchester City and Newcastle United soft treatment”.

The piece refers to whether the regulator would have any say on the outstanding charges and, if it were to have a say, whether, due to foreign policy, there would be a softer stance on that.

Although we on the Committee understand that the clause relates to ownership, the wider world has somehow got it into its head that it also relates to the administration of the league rules, which is beyond the remit of the regulator. However, the clause would relate to the purchase of the club and, as the Minister will know from his own never-ending media round, also often relates to the public investment fund takeover of Newcastle. As the Minister has outlined, the ownership tests are set out in the legislation and apply to all potential owners and directors, regardless of where they are from, as long as they are not from a country where sanctions are in place.

However, my concern about clause 37(2) is that it adds an element of uncertainty into the test because of the fluidity of our foreign trade policy. For example—I use this with complete poetic licence—Donald Trump decides to add to his golf course portfolio and wishes to buy Arsenal. Concerns about his integrity are well documented, and yet our foreign and trade policy determines that we consider the USA to be one of our key allies and an absolute must for investment and trade in the future. Therefore, do we automatically give the keys to the Emirates to the former, and possibly next, President? Can the Minister confirm that the foreign policy test is just one part of the test, and would not overrule others where there is evidence that other matters might disqualify a prospective owner?

I am also concerned that the clause is not applied fairly across industries. Ofcom does not need to take into account foreign or trade policy when adjudicating on a takeover of a newspaper, but the football regulator does for the takeover of a club. I am not saying that subsection (2) should be removed altogether, although I am not sure I understand the value it brings. Many will be acutely aware that most of our Premier League clubs, and an increasing number of clubs elsewhere in the pyramid, are foreign-owned or owned by British people living in other countries, so it is essential that we have complete transparency in the process, including on at what point subsection (2) is relevant.

However, I fundamentally believe that if we are to truly value the independence of the regulator’s day-to-day decisions from the Government, the subsection ought to be reworded from “must…have regard” to “may…have regard”. In this morning’s sitting, in response to a question from the hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby, the Minister said that we do not want the regulator to be involved in foreign policy. But putting subsection (2) into clause 37 does exactly that. A minor tweak to the wording satisfies everyone, but most of all retains the spirit of independence and removes some of the confusion about who is deciding who owns our football clubs. I am very interested in what the Minister has to say in reply.

Clause 37 has three main parts. It requires the regulator to have regard to determinations from competition organisers, requires the regulator to have regard to foreign policy and trade objectives, and provides the criteria for judging honesty, integrity and financial soundness. I will speak to each of those parts in turn and address amendment 1 with the second part.

On the regulator having regard to determinations from competition organisers, I have already raised the issue of conflicting outcomes and was reassured by the Minister’s explanation, so I will move on to the issue of the influence of Government policy objectives on the regulator.

The clause states that the regulator must have regard to the Government’s “foreign and trade policy objectives” when making determinations on ownership. That has caused concern across the board, including across football governance structures, which usually have a harder time finding consensus, and with fans. That almost unanimous voice tells us something important: everyone wants to see a regulator that is free from undue political interference. I agree. The Government should not be in a position where they can apply pressure to the regulator to make decisions on ownership just because they might be politically favourable. Club ownership must not be a tool used to reward those with which the Government have a positive relationship or penalise those with which they have a negative relationship. That is particularly so given that the Bill empowers the regulator to make decisions on incumbent owners and officers.

However, I understand that there may be circumstances in which national security and foreign policy objectives may be pertinent to the regulator’s decision making. The regulator should, and will want to, have an understanding of all relevant information when making a determination. That is part of the reason why the regulator was chosen as the location of the tests, due to its ability to access relevant information that would not otherwise be available. I therefore do not believe that the intention of the clause was to compromise the independence of the regulator, but to empower it where security or foreign policy objectives are concerned.

Whatever the intention may be, we must ensure that the clause is not open to abuse. I am therefore pleased to offer my support to amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, which suggests that we change “must regard” to “may regard”. That amendment might help to provide some reassurance on the purpose of the clause and the independence of the regulator.

Some further clarification on how the measure will work in practice would also be helpful. In particular, there must be more guidance on how the regulator will be made aware of “foreign and trade policy objectives”. That is particularly important because transparency is a crucial tool for providing accountability, but may be difficult given that some information will naturally be confidential in line with national security considerations. Can the Minister provide any information on what good practice will look like in terms of striking the balance between accountability and security?

Second time lucky, Ms Nokes! I am delighted to talk about this part of the Bill and the important owner and director test, and I want to support clause 37(3) and (4). The current Premier League and English Football League owners and directors test requires that any prospective owner must not have been subject to two or more bankruptcy events—so the current position is that someone could have been subject to one bankruptcy event, and in theory still own a football club. I am pleased to see that the clause removes any minimum number of events; obviously, that will place further emphasis on sustainable management and stewardship, and is much to be commended.

For context, I should say that Southend United Football Club in the National League has had 19 winding-up petitions in the last 25 years; the last one was last Wednesday. During the course of this Bill, the club was in court and was given a further six-week adjournment—hence my interest in making sure that no other clubs in future suffer the same fate as Southend United and its loyal fans.

I want to carry on the debate about clause 37 and reflect on honesty and integrity as set out in subsection (3), on “matters relevant to determinations” of the “requisite honesty and integrity”, and subsection (3)(g), which talks about

“such other matters relating to honesty and integrity as may be specified”

by rules. I would be interested in a little clarity from the Minister about that. Some of the other prerequisites or matters to be considered, such as whether someone is financially sound, can involve hard evidence, and someone’s competence can be tested by qualifications; integrity, however, is a bit of a subjective matter. It is more about things that are not against the law but are certainly not in the spirit of the law, and it is often behavioural.

Does the Minister have any examples that he might want to see in those rules? Someone might have used poor employment practices, for example, as we have seen in other industries, some of which are regulated and some of which are not. The issue would not reach a tribunal so it would not be a piece of hard evidence, but it would bring into question why an owner or officers of a club, in a different business, deployed fire-and-rehire tactics, for example, that were detrimental to their workforce and local community. Similarly, in a positive sense, would there be any consideration of what high integrity might be: for example, owners and officers who championed equality and diversity—an issue that we have been speaking a lot about in this Bill? I would welcome the Minister’s comments.

I will be interested in the Minister’s remarks about amendment 1. I understand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford is making, in seeking to create a bit more flexibility for the regulator. We would all hope that the integrity checks against an individual owner could ultimately “trump”—if she does not mind my using the word—any positive trading relationship. If the person were not considered a good and proper owner, the fact that we had a good trading relationship with their country should make no difference: they should not be able to avoid the checks simply because they come from a trusted trader nation.

However, on the other hand, I can see that having “must” would be helpful for the regulator in two ways. One is that if a would-be owner of a club met all the criteria and therefore should be allowed to acquire the club, but the only block on them was that they were a sanctioned individual, the regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it could not let the deal go through. There would not be grounds for challenge, say, at the Court of Arbitration for Sport over whether an appropriate judgment had been made. There would be no question of the sanctioned person’s suitability on any other grounds. In that particular circumstance, the provision could be helpful.

I imagine that it would be reassuring for the regulator to know that, as was the case when Newcastle United was acquired, if another Premier League club was acquired by a country that was not sanctioned—we did not have a trade embargo with it—but was nevertheless controversial, the regulator would not have to consider that, whether people wanted it to or not, because no Government policy would be saying that we could not trade with or allow investment from that country. The regulator would have the certainty of knowing that it was acting purely within the confines of its role.

I appreciate the intention of the amendment and the reasons behind it, but perhaps the Minister could give us some guidance on whether “must” may be better than “may”.

And sensible.

I have listened carefully to the Minister, as I always do, and I will withdraw the amendment. However, as I understand it, similar provisions do not apply to any other regulator, and other regulators are faced with very similar decisions on a day-to-day basis. We do not take unilateral moral decisions, as the Minister pointed out, but I am happy to discuss the matter further with him. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

Disqualification orders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It is incredibly important that if the regulator is going to take on responsibility for conducting the owners and directors tests, it is also given the teeth to enforce the outcome of those tests. I am pleased to have reached the part of the Bill where we can discuss those powers.

I will speak to each clause in the group in turn, starting with clause 38, on disqualification orders. In some circumstances, a test may reveal that not only is the person in question unsuitable to be an owner or officer of a particular club, but their record is such that they should not be considered for such a role again. I agree with the principle of the clause, which is to ensure that tests are not unnecessarily duplicated and to protect multiple clubs from the same issue.

On clause 39, if the regulator has determined an owner of a club is not suitable, it is right that it is bound to give a direction requiring that person to take reasonable steps to cease being an owner. That binds the regulator to the outcome of its test, rather than giving it discretion over whether a negative determination results in the departure of an incumbent owner. I have a few questions about what that would mean in practice. I am curious to hear the Minister’s take on what taking “all reasonable steps” to cease ownership might involve. It surely implies that a person needs to sell their shares, but what if they are unable to find a buyer? Would they be required to give the club away if there was no willing purchaser? Furthermore, if there is a buyer but they offer a price below market value, or a value that would result in big losses for an owner, would the person still be forced to sell?

The answers to those questions, and a clear direction on the application of the clause, is important for two distinct reasons. First, it matters because this process may have a knock-on effect on people’s willingness to invest in football clubs. Secondly, it matters for the sustainability of the club and its fans. It is important that the club is in the right hands for the right price, or this entire part of the Bill on owners will be undermined. I hope the Minister can today, or in due course, provide some further information on how clause 39 will work in practice.

Clause 40 largely mirrors the removal directions for owners, but applies them to officers. How the clause will work in practice is less complex, as the removal of officers is less likely to hinge on the finances of an outside party. I am also satisfied that the alternative officer arrangements in clause 42, to appoint an interim officer, might mitigate any problems with an officer’s removal.

Clause 41 provides an important protection against unsuitable officers or owners carrying out activities that might negatively impact the club in the long term. When it comes to actions that have an impact on a club’s future, it is right that anyone who has been identified as a potential harm to a club can be limited in those areas if needed.

Finally, I welcome clause 43, which gives the regulator the ultimate power to ensure that a person ceases to be an owner when they have failed to comply with orders given under powers in this part. That power is complimented by the safeguards and notice provisions in clause 44.

The Minister is almost assuming that the regulatory regime is going to make a perfect world, and that there are not going to be failures. The question being asked is: what happens when there are? When there is an owner who is required to sell, what happens to the club in those circumstances?

I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 45, page 37, line 11, leave out from “fans” to “about” in line 12 and insert

“players and staff of regulated clubs in England and Wales”.

Amendment 21 is quite simple, and I am sure that the Minister can accept it without much consideration. It simply applies where a team is prevented from going into a prohibited competition, which I think is absolutely right. The outrage of the European Super League in some ways triggered recognition of the issue and the need to regulate football more appropriately. There are consequences for people who make their living from football, whether they are players or staff members of clubs.

Ben Wright from the PFA very appropriately spelt out the fact that the Bill quite rightly, in many cases, highlights the need to consult and involve fans, but players are not mentioned anywhere. As Ben Wright said, there are only two groups of people who really matter in football:

“those who play it and those who watch it.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 16 May 2024; c. 88, Q145.]

Without those two groups, football would not exist. I hope the Minister thinks about the amendment and comes to the conclusion that he could accept it without undermining the Bill in any way. I hope he might give careful consideration to that.

I am also happy to support amendment 13, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East. It is very much along the same lines as my amendment, and the Minister might rather choose her wording if he cannot support the wording that I have put forward. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on the amendments.

On amendment 22, having

“the full impacts of such a decision”

taken into account seems a fairly obvious thing. The Minister will no doubt tell us that that is the intention of the Bill and that there is no need to add in the extra words, but I am sure he will agree that the extra words are not in any way in conflict with what the Bill is trying to achieve.

I am pleased that we are making good progress in moving on to discuss part 5 of the Bill and the free-standing duties on clubs, which apply to clubs separately to the licence conditions. They are set out by the Bill directly and, in many cases, apply to a club regardless of whether it is licensed.

Clause 45 sets out the duty not to operate within a prohibited competition. I will briefly set out some context before discussing amendments 21, 22 and 13. The clause is clearly designed to prevent a repeat of the European Super League, which rightly prompted immense backlash from fans, clubs and governance structures throughout the English football pyramid when it was first announced over three years ago.

There were many reasons why the project sparked such outrage, and it is important to name a few directly. First, the European Super League was designed, at least to some extent, to be a closed competition. For many of the richest clubs, qualification would have been an automatic right, rather than being meritocratic. It would have taken an axe to one of the most important features of football’s success: the idea that any one team can dream big and become a winner. With qualification based on merit taken out of the equation, the entire structure, purpose and sustainability of football’s existing competitions would have been undermined.

Secondly, the European Super League was launched—

I appreciate your comments, Ms Nokes. I can skip forward to the amendments. I have some separate thoughts on clause 45. I do think that the background is quite important to the amendments, but am happy to move on directly to address them.

Amendments 13 and 21 are on player consultation. It seems like a missed opportunity that the views of players are not to be taken into account by the regulator. That is why I tabled amendment 13, which would expand consultation requirements to include them. Similarly, amendment 21, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would require the regulator to seek the views of players and staff, so I will address both amendments together.

Players in both the clubs that tried to break away and the clubs that were left behind had an instrumental role in demonstrating against the ESL. For example, just 48 hours after the announcement, a group of high-profile Liverpool players issued a collective statement against the Super League. That clearly stated:

“We don’t like it and we don’t want it to happen.”

Meanwhile, Leeds players, while warming up for a game, wore shirts featuring slogans such as “Football is for the fans” and “Earn it.” Players in other clubs followed suit. It is clear from that that players feel passionately about the competitiveness and fairness of the competitions that they operate in, and have a view to share on these issues.

The shadow Minister is making a really interesting speech, but is she not actually making a speech against the amendment, because the players did that without there being a statutory requirement for them to do it?

That is a fair point, but I do not think we should have to rely on players having the bravery to make public statements. We are saying—this is a debate that we rehearsed earlier in Committee—that there should be an obligation on the regulator to consult them, and I will come on to make that argument.

Many players care about the fans and communities that they play for, and it is players who are likely to come under fire if they take part in competitions that fans oppose. At best, they will act as a vehicle for fans hoping to hold their clubs to account. At worst, when competing in closed competitions, players may become the face of the demise of the long tradition of the English football pyramid, without having had any say in the matter. At a time when there has been a particularly concerning rise in abuse of football players—albeit from a shameful minority of fans—that becomes even more concerning.

We rehearsed this somewhat when the representative of the PFA came before us to give evidence. I made the point to him then that we had been told that it was an inability to control costs that was damaging football, but—this was the point I made—actually it is the inability to control wages that is damaging football. That is firmly within the control of players, so I am a little less sympathetic to the argument that the hon. Member is making.

I am not sure it is the case that the players control their own wages. When we look at this Bill, as other hon. Members have said—

They can simply say no.

Yes, that is true, and it is true for all of us and anyone who takes a wage, but I think it is a rather unfair expectation to put upon players. I am not sure that I accept the hon. Member’s argument, but obviously, if he has strong views on this issue, he can make a speech when I have concluded.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East set out, there are two main components in football, and they are the players and the fans. I think it is incredibly curious that this Bill does not mention players at any point. That is why I am making the case for these amendments.

I will draw my remarks to a close in a moment. I would just like to share a few other examples with the Committee. To give a troubling example, we will all remember that, following the penalty shoot-out at the Euro 2020 final, a wave of racist social media abuse was aimed at certain players. Ensuring a duty of care to protect players from abuse deserves its own conversation, but I think it is relevant to raise. It is not right that players are not given any say in relation to prohibited competitions, but could be told that they must compete in one—only to face the wrath of fans afterwards. Football is for the fans, of course, but it cannot exist without the players. I therefore encourage the Minister and members of the Committee to consider the benefit of player input on the regulator’s decision making in that area. Given that fans and the FA will already be consulted for their views, it would only require a simple change to the legislation. I hope that we can all get behind amendment 13 to strengthen the clause as much as possible.

Amendment 22, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, would strengthen the duty of the regulator to understand the view of fans, so that the full impacts of any particular competition are considered. As the European Super League attempt showed, the consequences of a closed competition, where qualification is not based on merit, are plenty. It is therefore important that the full range of impacts is considered. Is the Minister satisfied that the current wording will ensure that, or is amendment 22 needed to require the regulator to take everything into account when gathering the views of relevant stakeholders?

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 13, in clause 45, page 37, line 15, at end insert—

“(aa) professional football players,”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment expands the list of those whom the IFR must consult.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Why does the Bill give powers to the regulator to stop clubs entering into new competitions but no powers to stop fundamental changes to existing competitions, which fans might find just as unsuitable?

It is always a very crowded field in the FA cup replays. I am sure that the Minister has seen the news, today I think, about Tottenham players getting on the plane to go to Australia for their end-of-season friendly. Is that not a smack right in the face of player welfare and ensuring that players are okay? That is why the FA cup replays were allegedly taken off the table.

Apart from my amendments, which I had hoped would strengthen clause 45, I am pleased to offer my support more generally for the clause. I will not repeat my remarks from previous debate, but given the fallout from the so-called Super League attempt, the Bill is absolutely right to make provisions around prohibited competitions.

However, I have three remaining questions on wording that I hope the Minister can clarify. The clause provides that a club will not be able to join a prohibited competition so long as it has been regulated in the last 10 years. However, that does not apply retrospectively, so if a club has never been regulated—as is the case now, before the Bill passes—the rules cannot be enforced. That has sparked concern that clubs might form a breakaway league before the Bill passes and the regulator will be left unable to enforce its own rules. Will the Minister confirm whether the regulator will have any power to act in such a situation?

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 46, page 38, line 15, at end insert—

“(6A) Before the IFR grants an approval under subsection 6 it must—

(a) consult the supporters of the body in question, the relevant competition organisers and persons representing the local community with which the body is associated; and

(b) have regard to the views expressed by those consulted.”

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Nokes.

Clause 46 is welcome, but I have real concern because, although we are again talking about supporter engagement, there is no mention of a requirement or even a power for the independent football regulator to consult any other parties about the disposal of the ground—often a community asset. If the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment, which would allow supporters, local stakeholders and competition organisers to be engaged before any such disposal takes place, will he explain why? What powers does he believe are available to the independent football regulator to ensure that supporters, local stakeholders and competition organisers have a voice in any decision made about ground disposal?

Football stadiums have immense value. First, they have value to fans, who have precious memories going back generations of standing in the same spot watching their club through the lowest lows and highest highs. In many ways, a stadium is one of the strongest ties a club has to the local community. A club’s staff, players and owners might change, but the pitch remains.

Secondly, grounds also have a financial and fundamental value. They are often among the club’s most valuable assets. In well-run clubs, that is positive, but where a club is already financially unstable, home grounds can become vulnerable to sale in a way that seriously undermines the club in the long term. In some cases, they are sold in a desperate attempt to make a return on losses, and in others they are sold by those purposefully wishing to strip a club of its assets before leaving it behind to collapse. Indeed, there are numerous examples of clubs in financial trouble selling their stadiums to give owners some collateral on their investments or to circumvent profit and sustainability rules. Troubled Sheffield Wednesday sold Hillsborough to its owner for a profit of more than £38 million, covering its pre-tax losses of £35 million. Both Reading and Derby sold their grounds in a similar fashion. But a stadium can be sold only once, and without a stadium in their possession, clubs risk not being able to play at all.

We are familiar with the story of Wimbledon FC, whose home was forcibly moved to Milton Keynes in 2003, resulting in the club being renamed. Finances aside, that decision was devastating for local fans, who felt their club had been stolen from them and their community, as we heard in the evidence session. Given that the regulator is a body specifically established to both ensure the financial sustainability and protect the heritage of English football, it is right that it should have a responsibility to ensure that stadium sales do not undermine a club’s future.

There are of course many circumstances in which a club’s selling its stadium and relocating is a sign of progress and positive investment. Tottenham fans, for example, are now enjoying the benefits of a brand-new state-of-the-art ground, while the club is widely considered one of the best in the country. That kind of investment should in no way be discouraged, let alone blocked. The regulator must therefore be equipped to tell the difference between two very different kinds of proposed transactions—those that propel a club forward and those that seriously undermine a club’s long-term financial sustainability or heritage.

With the expertise the regulator will have, I understand why the Government have decided that it is best placed to grant approval on stadium sales and moves. However, I also acknowledge the concern that the FSA and many fans have about their lack of voice in the decision-making processes in both clause 46 and clause 48.

Amendments 3 and 29, tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Liverpool, West Derby and for Sheffield South East, give us the opportunity to discuss the role that fans might play in understanding what a stadium change might mean in terms of the fans, heritage and local community. It is of course the fans who will suffer if their team no longer has anywhere to play, and it is fans who best understand the precious heritage and memory that grounds carry for them and their community.

Clause 48 seems to be based on an understanding of that point to some extent, given that the regulator is explicitly tasked with paying attention to whether a relocation of home games would cause “significant harm” to the heritage. However, as Fair Game points out, it would be curious if the regulator were able to understand the implications for heritage without consulting fans. Will the Minister explain how that might work? On what basis will the regulator make a judgment if it is not through understanding the impact on fans?

Combined with the lack of consultation rights in clause 46, the result is that fans are currently given absolutely no voice on matters to do with stadiums, even though they are the ones who will travel there, buy tickets and offer their support. I understand that the regulator is best placed to make a final decision, but it is unclear to me why fans cannot form one of the inputs that the regulator might consider.

The Government’s White Paper said that the regulator should

“have a remit to consider the implications for club heritage of any proposal, the views of fans and the club’s historical connection to its locality.”

Will the Minister share with us what has happened between the publication of the White Paper and the Bill to cause the Government to divorce the idea of heritage from fans? It must be clear why fans have not been given any say in this process. I hope the Minister will elaborate on that point today.

Finally, I want to examine whether the Bill will be able to prevent some home matches being played abroad if that damages heritage. This is not a purely theoretical proposition. Just a few weeks ago, Tim Howard wrote for a national newspaper about why Premier League games being played in the USA was “inevitable”. FIFA has also reportedly begun the process of allowing league matches to be played overseas. When Tim Payton of the Arsenal Supporters’ Trust gave evidence to the Committee, he warned that the movement of games abroad could be the next catastrophe the size of the Super League.

Clause 48 has the potential to provide assurances that this kind of action could only be taken by clubs with the approval of the regulator, should it be seen to damage heritage. However, the wording does seem to be geared more towards permanent relocation rather than the issue of clubs wishing to play single games, or a small subset, away from home.

Will the Minister confirm whether approval only needs to be sought by clubs wishing to play all of their home games elsewhere or whether it also applies to clubs wanting to play a handful of games elsewhere? In particular, will the regulator be able to have a say on league games being played abroad, and if so, would fans be given a say in the process? Given the salience of this issue with fans, it is important that we are clear on how the clause would apply.

I rise to speak to amendment 29, which I tabled. We will move on to a debate on clause 49 shortly, to which it relates. It is interesting that fans will get a specific consultation, involvement and approval about changing the crests, shirt colours and names, as those are decisions that can be reversed quite easily. We know about the problems at Cardiff with shirt colours and at Hull with the name, but even if those mistakes are made by the owners, they can be changed the following year. A club cannot go back to playing on its old ground if it has been sold and is no longer an asset of the club. In some ways, the issue of where a club plays and its ground is more important for the heritage of the club, and it needs to take account of the interests and wishes of fans.

In clause 48, we have a regulator that will have to look at the significant harm done to the heritage of the club by moving ground. How does the regulator decide what is significant harm to the heritage of the club in isolation? The fans are the ones who understand that. They are the custodians of the club; they are the ones who go every week, whose families have gone to the club for years and whose children will go in the future for years. They are the ones who have a real stake in the heritage of the club, yet there is nothing in the wording that says they must be consulted.

All amendment 29 states is that in looking at the issue of significant harm to the heritage of the club, we should actually ask the fans what they think about it, so that they do not consider that the arrangements will constitute significant harm. I do not know how on earth the regulator will come to a view that is not a view derived from consulting the fans, so I hope that the Minister will give way on this amendment. At the heart of what we are doing here is ensuring that fans are listened to about the issues that are so important to them, and there is nothing more important for fans of a club than where their club plays, so I hope the Minister thinks that this amendment is in the spirit of the Bill and could be accepted.

The Minister is therefore saying that a club makes a proposal, consults with the fans and comes to a view, then the regulator must accept the view that the club has come to. Why does the regulator not have a responsibility to ensure that the fans are comfortable with any proposal in the way that amendment 29 suggests? Why is it simply left to a club, which may have a vested interest, to consult with fans and report at second hand to the regulator?

Where does it say precisely that the club must consult on that? It must consult about shirt colours, names and crests, so where does it specifically say that about the ground?

Which bit of the clause covers that? Can we have the word, please?

That is the IFR’s responsibility, but nowhere in the Bill does it say that fans have to be consulted. Neither the IFR nor the club has to consult on the matter, does it?

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.  

Clause 47

Duty not to appoint administrator without approval

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause sets out that regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated at any point in the last 10 years must seek approval from the regulator before appointing an administrator. I understand that this measure is needed to offer protection against rushed insolvencies that end up having adverse effects. It is also needed so that club owners are not able to appoint firms or people they have connections to as administrators in an attempt to manipulate the administration. Although we hope that, with the regulator’s guidance, fewer clubs will face administration, it is important that, if the worst happens, proper administrators, without conflicting interests, are appointed to oversee the process. I therefore support the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

I will reflect on what the Minister said. I will perhaps do so at a future date, but I will not move it at this stage.

Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49

Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

On the scope of the independent regulator, Liverpool football club tried to trademark the name “Liverpool”, which caused absolute outrage among Liverpool and Everton supporters and market traders. The local community fought back, and the supporters of both football clubs came together. Is something like that within the scope of the regulator’s ability to influence?

Heritage assets are incredibly important to a football club and its fans. They carry the history of where the club is based, what its identity is and the journey fans have been on through the years, in victory and loss. It is therefore pleasing that, in the light of the fan-led review, the FA has updated its rules on changes to club heritage assets. Those rules, supported by the clause, will hopefully ensure that a majority of fans are in favour of a change.

It is not just fans who will benefit from owners not being able to make unilateral changes to heritage items. There have been cases of clubs changing badges and crests without consultation, only to find that fans dislike them and will not buy replica kits or merchandise. Avoiding such situations is beneficial for people on all sides.

I know that some fan groups and Fair Game are disappointed that fans will not have a direct say over changes to a club’s name, because that is done via the FA. However, the FA told us in evidence that it consults fans as part of the name change process, so it would be good if the Minister can confirm whether he thinks that that is adequate.

The clause offers the bare minimum of fan engagement. Clubs can and must build on it through the consultation requirements in other clauses, forging ongoing listening exercises with their supporters on relevant matters. In many ways, therefore, this measure should be seen as a backstop, ensuring that a club cannot be stripped of its identity against the wishes of fans. In that context, I am pleased to welcome it.

Clause 50 ensures that a club notifies the regulator if there is a relevant material change in circumstances affecting the club and, again, we must be clear what “material change” means. However, it is absolutely right that if a shift in a club’s nature, behaviour or external context might impact compliance with its duties under the regulator, the regulator should know about that as soon as possible. I have no issues to raise with clause 50.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 51

Duty to publish a personnel statement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

During our discussion of clause 16, I spoke about the importance of clubs publishing personnel statements. By identifying exactly who holds key positions, including owners and officers, the regulator will be absolutely clear who must be held accountable for the proper fulfilment of licence conditions at each football club. With that in mind, I am pleased to support clause 51.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 52

Duty to pay a levy

I beg to move amendment 30, in clause 52, page 42, line 28, at end insert—

“(9A) The starting point for calculation of the levy payment under subsection (9) applicable to a particular club shall be a percentage of its annual revenue.”

This is a fairly simple clarifying amendment. As we have heard, smaller clubs feel that regulation must be proportionate and that there should be more requirements on very wealthy clubs, because they have the staff and resources to deal with that. Smaller clubs may find the whole issue of regulation very challenging, so amendment 30 simply says that the levy they will have to pay should be a percentage of annual revenue; in other words, a proportionate basis for the levy should be written into the Bill. The Minister may say that that will happen anyway—that that it is what the regulator will do—but the issue is a concern for smaller clubs, and the amendment 30 is an attempt to highlight and deal with it.

When the fan-led review first proposed the creation of an independent regulator for football, it suggested that the most logical way to pay for it would be through a levy on those who would benefit from it: the clubs. I agree with that conclusion, and I am pleased that the Bill confirms that the regulator will be able to require licensed clubs to pay an annual levy.

However, even though clause 52 is relatively detailed, there is surprisingly little on how the levy will be split between the clubs themselves. That is something that amendment 30, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, has sought to rectify. If the regulator is given wide discretion to determine the extent of the levy, clubs further down the pyramid might be concerned that their payments will not be proportionate to their wealth and size. Of course, clause 52 states that the regulator should have regard to the financial resources of each club and the competition it operates in. That is promising, but it is worth clarifying today what that is expected to mean in practice. Will decisions be based on broadcast incomes, as per the fan-led review, or just on average total revenue, as per the White Paper?

There is broad agreement that the richest clubs should subsidise regulation for others. The majority of costs should, in this case, fall on Premier League clubs. The Government identified that these clubs could pay about 80% of the cost, with the six richest clubs taking on 50% of the total cost. The regulator will ultimately dictate the shape of the levy, but it should be under a clear direction to ensure that the levy is progressive and proportionate. It hardly makes sense for a regulator focused on financial sustainability to shackle struggling clubs to paying large fees. It is important that clubs do not fear the introduction of the new regime and view it as an opportunity, rather than being scared into thinking it will be a hindrance.

Clause 53 requires the regulator to consult before making the levy rules. That will include taking input on a draft version of the rules from the Secretary of State, the Treasury, regulated clubs and other appropriate persons. That welcome measure will hopefully shape the levy rules in a progressive way. It is also right that the regulator must publish information about the costs involved in calculating the levy charge before it starts charging in any given year. That transparency will be important, particularly for the clubs, which will want to understand exactly what they are paying for and why.

Overall, I welcome the levy and the method of payment, and I look forward to clarification on how the Minister expects the levy will be set.

On that point, I would be interested to know the Minister’s thoughts. As I understand it, the purpose of the levy is cost recovery rather than to be a redistributive mechanism. Is there a reason why a simple flat percentage should not be sufficient to achieve all that we described? It would offer certainty, but it would also make sure that those with broader shoulders pay more, and it would achieve the IFR’s objective of recovering its costs.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54, with the correction made by amendment 23, is one of the only measures in the Bill that directly places duties on competition organisers. As I have made clear throughout these Committee proceedings, I believe it is extremely important that the regulator has a constructive relationship with existing football governance structures where possible, and that they work together to ensure a coherent regulatory regime. This clause will ensure that by placing a clear duty on competition organisers to keep the regulator updated on the enforcement of its own rules, as well as on areas where they might have information that overlaps with the regulator’s remit.

It is good to see, for example, that competition organisers will report to the regulator on any risk to financial resilience, as well as on any breach of specified competition rules and any subsequent sanctions they are placing on clubs. Competitions will also have to consult the regulator before adding to their own rules; this, again, is a positive step which will hopefully prevent any such rules from undermining the regulator.

However, I do think there needs to be further consideration for how the respective regimes will work when rules and regulation overlap. Ultimately, although the regulator will be consulted on new rules, competition organisers have the final say. The Government’s White Paper says:

“Where rules of industry bodies stray into the Regulator’s remit, the Regulator would have oversight to ensure that regulations are coherent and effective.”

I would like to ask the Minister, therefore, whether he thinks that the regulator has all the powers it needs to make sure that the landscape is coherent and effective when there is crossover. This is important for all of those who enforce rules in football, as well as for clubs.

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 55, page 45, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment allows the regulator to consider the effect of “parachute” payments when assessing the distribution of revenue between competition organisers.

Could I ask for a bit of advice, Ms Nokes? I have a selection list that says that new clause 4, which I also tabled, should be debated with amendment 27, but another selection list says that it should be debated under clause 56. There seems to be some discrepancy. It would be helpful if you could provide an explanation.

Thank you for that clarification—I am sorry for mixing myself up.

Let us get down to the issue of parachute payments, which almost everyone spoke about on Second Reading, and which the Minister seems to believe should be treated as a given in their current form, with no change. I think he has the support of the Premier League—or some clubs in the Premier League, because it is by no means certain that the Premier League speaks with one voice on these issues. But it clearly is a very important issue.

I am calling for the removal of clause 55(2)(b), which stops the regulator, as the backstop, being able to consider removing or changing parachute payments in their current form. Under the regulator’s remit, they have to be treated as a given.

Is the hon. Gentleman talking specifically about parachute payments from the Premier League into the Championship, or is he talking about the smoothing process of the parachute payments to clubs that are relegated from leagues in general, indeed most probably from the EFL into the National League?

I am talking about parachute payments that currently exist, which is what the Bill refers to—I do not think it refers to parachute payments that might exist in the future in some other arrangement.

It is important to place on the record that National League clubs get 100% and then 50% of an EFL deal for League Two upon relegation, and a Championship club once relegated gets one eighth of the Championship deal for one season, and a League One relegation gets one ninth. This is not the same solidarity payment. It is important to remember that, when clubs are relegated to the league below, there is some sort of parachute payment in order to smooth out the process of losing the revenue received from being in that upper league.

The point I was going to go on to make was that I am not suggesting that parachute payments should never be allowed under any income redistribution. That is not the case. My amendment does not say, “No parachute payments”. It says that parachute payments can be considered as part of the overall distribution of finances within the game.

The Bill as drafted states that parachute payments are exempt from consideration at the backstop stage—full stop, end of story. Everything else, including media income, can be considered, but not parachute payments. That seems strange, given that the Minister has repeatedly said that the independence of the regulator needs to be preserved and recognised, and yet on this key issue its hands are being specifically and absolutely tied. That just does not chime as an appropriate situation for the Government to get themselves into compared with everything else that they have said about the Bill. The regulator needs to be independent and have discretion, but on this issue it is not allowed to have the freedom to look at the situation, particularly with regard to the state of the game report. If the regulator believes that it is necessary to revisit the issue of parachute payments in order for income in football to be distributed properly and appropriately, and for it to be sustainable not just for individual clubs but for the whole of the football pyramid, this proposal is a significant mistake.

We must recognise that 80% of what the Premier League gives to the EFL is in parachute payments to a handful of clubs. When the Premier League talks about its generosity to the game, it is talking about generosity to a handful of clubs that have just been in the Premier League. That is not a real position. When we look at the distribution of the media money overall, we find that 92% goes to 25 clubs—namely, the Premier League clubs and five others that have been in and out of the Premier League in the recent past. That is not sustainable, and if a reasonable and fair distribution of money should be agreed in the future, the regulator must have the power to take that into account.

I have also said to the Minister that we ought to look at not just the importance of parachute payments to the clubs that receive them. I do not think that anyone I have met who has talked about this issue has said, “You cannot have parachute payments.” They say that it must be looked at in terms of the totality of the game and the distribution of money. I would understand, very quickly, that a club going up into the Premier League faces an enormous difference between the wage bill it had before being promoted and the wage bill it will need once promoted, and it must have some reassurance on what happens if it gets relegated. That is an understandable situation, but we must also take into account the impact on the finances of clubs in the same division as the relegated clubs and their ability to compete.

It has been said over and over again that Championship clubs are getting completely overstretched, because the holy grail of promotion to the Premier League means that clubs try to extend their budgets beyond what is reasonable. Owners put in large sums of their own money, often beyond what is reasonable and sustainable, in order to compete with clubs with parachute payments, and the difference is enormous. Parachute payment clubs will come down with budgets three times the size of those of many other clubs in that league, so in order to compete clubs often do fairly stupid things to try to ensure that promotion becomes a possibility.

My amendment says that the regulator ought to take account of those issues. It is not reasonable to say to the regulator, “The only thing that matters is parachute payments to protect clubs that get relegated and you should have no regard to the impact on the clubs already in that league.” I hope that the Minister will consider this seriously. It is obviously a concern across the House, as was reflected on Second Reading.

I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley East on the Front Bench has a slightly different way of addressing the issue, but the wording in her amendment 31 relates to what I have just said. Yes, parachute payments and the impact on the clubs that receive them must be taken into account, but the impact on other clubs that must compete with them must also be taken into account. The position under the Bill as drafted is that that cannot happen, because it is fixed as it is and cannot be changed by the regulator.

The Minister will probably say that the leagues themselves could come to an agreement and change it. What happens if they do not do that? There has not been much evidence of the leagues being able to reach an agreement for a long period of time now—that is why we are here debating this Bill. In the end, it is down to the backstop. That backstop, the regulator, needs to have the flexibility to address these very important measures.

Does the format of how parachute payments are directly paid not imperil the Independent Football Regulator’s key objectives, which are to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs and financial resilience? The imbalance in parachute payments is driving clubs into making decisions that they would not usually take.

Absolutely. I just made the point about the enormous difference in budgets that Championship clubs now experience because of that. Of course, when we look at this season of the Championship, three out of the top four clubs have received parachute payments. Yes, other clubs, such as Ipswich, have done remarkably well without them, but clubs are always trying to compete with those clubs receiving the payments. Last year, two of the three clubs that came up had parachute payments, and it is now almost becoming a cycle of clubs getting parachute payments, going back up, then sometimes being relegated, and then getting another lot of parachute payments. That really is not a sustainable position for the clubs receiving those, for the clubs that are trying to compete with them, for the competitiveness of the game, or for the sustainability of the pyramid as a whole. I hope that the Minister will reconsider this because it is an issue that really needs addressing.

I am pleased to be able to discuss part 6 of the Bill, which provides a backstop power in the event that certain thresholds are met and football is unable to resolve the issue of financial distribution. Before I begin to explore this clause, it is important to set out that, in an ideal situation, these powers would never be used. As the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford set out during the evidence sessions, based on her experience with the fan-led review, a football-led solution to the issue of distribution has always been and remains the preference. I hope that can be kept in mind when discussing this part. Indeed, I welcome the powers but my hope is that their enforcement will not actually be necessary.

Clause 55 broadly sets out the process under this part but most importantly defines what might count as “relevant revenue”, which is money to which the backstop will apply. Relevant revenue is broadly defined as revenue received as a result of broadcasting rights, with the Minister given the flexibility to change that if broadcasting is no longer the predominant source of income. There are a couple of things to clarify. First, it would be good if the Minister could confirm whether such broadcast revenue is meant to cover domestic competitions only. Secondly, it would be appreciated if the Minister could clarify whether broadcasting revenue will still be considered relevant if the funding model changes so that it is paid directly to clubs, rather than through competition organisers. Broadly, though, I think this scope is generally accepted as being the right one.

Issues have, however, been identified with clause 55(2)(b), which is the part of the Bill that excludes parachute payments from the definition of relevant revenue. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East tabled amendment 27, and I will speak primarily to amendment 31 in my name. First, I would like to set some background to the issue, as it stems from the fact that there is an ever-growing gap between the Premier League and the EFL. Indeed, 30 years ago, EFL revenues were 75% of those of the Premier League; today they are just 6%. In real figures, that means that 30 years ago the gap was £11 million, and today it is £3 billion.

The Premier League’s approach to mitigating that gap is the so-called parachute payments to clubs relegated from the Premier League for up to three seasons. Those payments help to ensure competitiveness in the Premier League by providing clubs with the confidence to invest on promotion in the knowledge that they will be supported if they are relegated. For example, parachute payments might give the club the confidence to sign players on multi-year contracts, and that is incredibly important to consider. The Premier League’s competitiveness and the fact that any team, no matter their size or experience, can compete on any given day is what makes it the most beloved and exciting league in the world.

However, while they help to boost competitiveness in the Premier League, parachute payments—by the White Paper’s own admission—can distort competition in the Championship. In each of the last six seasons, two of the three clubs promoted from the Championship to the Premier League have been in receipt of parachute payments. The knock-on effect of that is that owners of clubs not in receipt of parachute payments are compelled to put ever greater levels of funding into their clubs to try to remain competitive. That overreliance on increasing owner funding has deeply exposed clubs when the funding does not materialise, as we have seen for Wigan, Bolton and Bury.

Further, the size of parachute payments has increased in recent years. Between 2010 and 2020, they have risen from £30 million to £233 million. That is an eightfold increase in a period in which player wages have only doubled. That means that, of the total distributable revenue of the English and Welsh professional game, the top 25 clubs—those in the Premier League—and the five in receipt of parachute payments in the EFL received 92% last season. That is £3 billion for 25 clubs, and £245 million for the other 67 professional clubs. Given the scale of parachute payments, therefore, it is notable that the Bill has definitively excluded them from the definition of relevant revenue. That is why I have tabled amendment 31.

4.30 pm

I want to be absolutely clear that the amendment is not about abolishing parachute payments; I believe that they provide clubs with the confidence that they need to invest, and they are a crucial tool in ensuring the competitiveness of the best league in the world. The amendment would simply give the regulator discretion to decide that, if certain criteria are met, parachute payments need not be excluded from the revenue to be distributed under the backstop provision.

Certainly, there is no reason to single out parachute payments. Whether people are in favour of significant parachute payments or not, they agree that they have an impact on club finances. As such, they will have a significant impact on the regulator’s objectives of protecting and promoting the financial soundness of clubs and the resilience of English football. Given that that relates to the regulator’s core role, the regulator should have the ultimate say on whether parachute payments are considered as part of the backstop provision.

Further, solidarity payments are explicitly linked to parachute payments. Solidarity payments are worked out as a percentage of the value of a year-three parachute payment. Championship clubs receive 30%, League One clubs receive 4.5%, and League Two clubs receive 3% of the value. The regulator, therefore, might find it difficult to look at one without looking at the other.

I emphasise again that the amendment does not predetermine whether the regulator includes or excludes parachute payments. If the regulator has a case, based on its objective evidence base, that excluding parachute payments from relevant revenue is more likely to make clubs financially sound and promote the financial resilience of English football, they will remain excluded. The amendment simply recognises that it should be the regulator that makes the decision, independent from any vested interests.

When making that decision, the regulator will have to pay explicit regard to the fulfilment of its core objectives and its secondary purposes: financial sustainability, financial resilience, competitiveness and investment. Taken together, those are the principles that should decide whether parachute payments are included—not the leagues and not politicians. Only then will we ensure that the regulator can fulfil the purpose of the Bill.

I will make a few points on parachute payments. It is fair to say that they are not part of the redistribution mechanism between the Premier League and the Football League. They can be set as an amount alongside the redistribution that takes place, but, of course, they are not fixed. They are a contractual arrangement that the Premier League enters into with clubs that are in the league or when they get promoted.

For reasons that hon. Members have rightly set out, if the income of a Premier League club drops by at least half after being relegated, even with parachute payments, that will be a severe challenge to its sustainability. It is anyway and it certainly would be if those payments did not exist. Of course, if a club is promoted straight back up, as Leicester City has been this year, the year-two and year-three parachute payments are not kept by the Football League—the money never goes to the Football League—but goes back to the Premier League. Therefore, in many ways, the payments have nothing to do with the Football League; they are made by the Premier League to its member clubs in the event that they go down.

The question is then whether the existence of parachute payments has such a market-distorting effect that the regulator would have to intervene. It is difficult to see why the regulator would need to intervene on the basis of the impact on the clubs that have been relegated; they clearly need that support. From all the evidence that we heard as a Committee—I have not heard anyone this afternoon say anything to the contrary—there needs to be some compensating mechanism for clubs that go down, otherwise the risks are too great.

It is not always about clubs that have gone up and come straight back down again; it is often about quite large clubs—it was Leicester and Southampton last year. Everton could easily have gone down last season and the impact of such a relegation would have been catastrophic. The regulator would therefore have to take a view as to whether the existence of those payments has a distorting effect on the Championship.

Given the remit of the regulator, I urge hon. Members tabling amendments to be careful what they wish for. The regulator may well take the view that its job is not to have an impact on the nature of competition in the Championship, or to make it easier for more clubs to get promoted. Its interest is to promote financial sustainability, so it could easily take the view that parachute payments should stay because they are necessary for the clubs that are relegated.

Alongside that, there must be effective financial controls on Championship clubs. The question of whether a Championship club feels the need to compete against parachute payments is not necessarily one for the regulator. The regulator’s role is to ensure the financial sustainability of the league, so it might say that it can do that through the checks that it can put in place now, and therefore ensure that the situation created before does not happen again.

One could ask whether it is fair for the Championship to be run such that Championship clubs must compete against Premier League clubs, and cannot cook the books or rely on director’s loans because the regulator will stop them. Of course, in some ways the Championship is not competing with the Premier League. It is a league of clubs seeking to get promoted to the Premier League, but it is also looking to develop its own talent. It can buy talent from the lower leagues and from Europe, as it effectively does already. The TV revenue for the Championship, as it stands today, is already greater than for the top division in the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium or Denmark, all of which are highly-competitive football nations whose pedigree in major international tournaments has been somewhat better than the home nations over the last few decades.

Is it not one of the great strengths of the English pyramid that there is, or should be, the ability for clubs to move around? If there are massive differences in the financial capabilities of the clubs that come down from the Premier League with a view to going back up again very quickly and the other Championship clubs, that effectively removes the element of competition and removes the prospect of promotion from so many clubs that it changes the fundamental nature of the pyramid. Surely that goes against one of the objectives that the Bill is trying to achieve.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The strength of the pyramid is one of the most important parts of the English game. It is probably the reason why the Premier League is such a commercial success—there is real promotion, relegation and competitive matches between the leagues. Parachute payments have come in out of necessity because of the requirement for clubs to jump up into a competition in which players are paid so much more and then to come out of it again. The regulator, as we are setting it up, would view the sustainability of the clubs in the Championship as important.

It is difficult to say that Championship clubs in England cannot recruit talent from other major European leagues and cannot develop their own talent. My concern is that, if all we do is push more money into the Championship, we will see a very large inflation of Championship player salaries. There will not necessarily be an improvement in the quality of players in the Championship but those players will be paid a lot more. There would also be even greater calls for bigger solidarity payments between the Championship and League One.

As the hon. Gentleman knows, League One club owners already complain that unless a big club happens to have been relegated into League One—a league that it is not normally in—getting promoted and sustaining a place in the Championship is becoming increasingly difficult because the Championship has largely become a division of former Premier League clubs. There are one or two exceptions—such as Preston North End, which have never played in the Premier League—but they are increasingly rare.

If the amendment were made and parachute payments were to be considered by the regulator, that might lead the regulator to demand much greater payments from the Premier League to the Championship. The logical argument that the Football League is advancing is that it wants more money for the Championship, not that parachute payments should go.

A question that was raised in the evidence session would also come into play: would it be fair for the medium and smaller clubs in the Premier League if the only method of distribution was UK broadcasting revenue, which the Premier League clubs receive equally? As we heard in the evidence session, that would place a much greater financial burden on clubs such as Brighton, Crystal Palace, Nottingham Forest and Everton than it would on Manchester United, Manchester City, Liverpool and Arsenal, for whom that money is a smaller part of their total revenue. Unless European money, other prize money and commercial gate money could suddenly be considered along with parachute payments, we are picking winners. We are saying, “We are going to favour the Championship side at the expense of the teams that play in the lower half of the Premier League.”

This is a highly complex matter with lots of moving parts. As we have heard throughout the debate on the Bill, the different parts of the football pyramid have different demands and income streams, and would make different cases. It is therefore right that parachute payments are kept out of the Bill, because they are a matter for the Premier League and the clubs that are relegated. Of course, the regulator will still be free to take wider consideration of the sustainability of the whole pyramid, which is purely about redistribution and where the money is drawn from. My concern is that—to use the phrase that we have used throughout the Committee’s consideration of the Bill—the unintended consequence of the amendment would be to create different winners and losers. The regulator has the power to look at all those things in the round.

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Premier League’s objective in having parachute payments protected in this way is to ensure they that continue, while the issue of the pyramid and more competition lower down is met by even more money from the Premier League to the EFL, irrespective of parachute payments? It seems to me that that is not its position; it actually wants to hang on to as much money as it can for Premier League clubs and to protect parachute payments too. I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the multitude of issues surrounding competition between clubs in different leagues, but the fact that we cannot solve everything with this amendment does not mean that we should not address one of the problems.

One of the reasons why the Bill is important is that the biggest problem in the pyramid at the moment is the financial sustainability of Championship clubs. There are different pressures and the greatest financial risks are taken there; some of the biggest failures have been at that level. That is why it is important.

Parachute payments exist only because the Premier League wants a more competitive, more attractive league. It does not want a closed league where the same three clubs are going up and down all the time, and the clubs that come up are just cannon fodder for the teams that play in it regularly. It is incumbent on the regulator to take a view on the sustainability of the pyramid, but the Premier League would not wish for that outcome.

We can choose which seasons we want to pick, but I do not think it is proven that parachute payments are having that effect already. There is plenty of evidence of badly run clubs—Sunderland is a good example from not long ago—that have been relegated from the Championship while still in receipt of parachute payment money. A lot of clubs come down with players who are not worth what they are being paid, and are stuck with a Championship squad on Premier League money. That is a problem that many clubs face.

Many problems are about the poor decisions made by managers and owners in the Championship, and a lack of financial oversight. The regulator needs to fix that financial oversight first, alongside considering redistribution in the round. It is easier to do that if we do not confuse that with parachute payments, which as the hon. Gentleman says are a much bigger quantum than the amount of redistribution anyway. We need to get the financial oversight right and look at redistribution in that context. I am concerned that simply asking the regulator to recommend a transfer through the backstop of money from the Premier League to the EFL corporately without the right financial oversight will pour petrol on the fire and drive wage inflation in the Championship.

The hon. Gentleman is making a really comprehensive argument for parachute payments. I want to be clear that my amendment is not proposing to get rid of parachute payments; it simply says that they should not be ruled out. I appreciate that he is saying that we should get this right before we move on, but we are here now setting the regulation. Obviously, if they are excluded, they are excluded.

I will draw my remarks to a conclusion. I appreciate that—the hon. Member for Sheffield South East makes a similar argument—it is not an argument for the abolition of parachute payments. My concern is that if we take that step, we would have to bring into scope all football money, not just the money that the Premier League pays in redistribution to clubs in the lower leagues and through parachute payments. That would be a much wider step and would require further consideration. If such recommendations are to be made in future, that should be done after the regulator is established and we have the state of the game report.

I find part 6 to be one of the most infuriating parts of the Bill, not because it is a bad aspect of the Bill but because it should not exist. The truth is that if there had been a deal between the two parties—the Premier League and the EFL—part 6 would look very different. We made it clear in the fan-led review that distributions are an issue for football and they should be able to resolve that issue themselves, but that it was important for backstop powers to be there to intervene if no solution was found. That is what part 6 is, and it has become a more controversial part of the Bill than was perhaps ever envisaged. We had hoped back in November 2021, when we published the fan-led review, that there would be a deal.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a slight danger, if we go down the path suggested by the amendment, of creating an even bigger gap between the big six and everyone else? We would basically be saying to the rest of the clubs, “The parachute payments are not for us: they are for you—the other 14 clubs in the Premier League. If you want them, you can pay for them and pay for the solidarity payments for the football league as well”, because that is effectively what would happen.

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. I always refer back to that point in the fan-led review, and we mulled over that issue at length. The truth is that we did not come to a conclusion ourselves, because it is so complex. We have made it clear in the chapter on financial distribution that we hope that there will be reform to the system, but this was back in 2021, for goodness’ sake. I want to bang everybody’s heads together and send them to bed without any tea, because we are dealing with the failure of the leagues to reach a solution, and I hope that the message they get from today’s sitting and the evidence sessions that we had last week is to go away and come up with another solution. The Bill sets out the process if there is no deal on that, and ultimately if there is no amendment to the Bill, let that be an inspiration to people to come together and find a solution.

It would help if the Minister was clear on what he was suggesting the regulator should do to deal with the massive gap between the clubs with parachute payments and those in the Championship without. Is he suggesting that the regulator should come in and tell clubs with parachute payments, “You have got them, but you cannot actually spend them, or not all of them, because that is distorting competition”? It seems a very odd way to try to deal with the problem.

Could the Minister explain what he has just said? I still do not understand how it is going to work. On the regulator’s powers to deal with the problem created by parachute payments, which he accepts could be created, what exactly are those powers? How does he expect the regulator to use them?

I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, I must say. I think that we will be giving further consideration to this, as I hope the Minister will, and that we will come back to this issue on another occasion. I just hope that, by the time we come back, the Minister might be able to better explain the powers of the regulator to smooth out the issues where there are problems for Championship clubs trying to compete with those clubs with parachute payments. I was not convinced about that point from his arguments, but we will consider that further at another stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 31, in clause 55, page 45, line 3, at end insert—

“unless the IFR specifies otherwise in rules.

(2A) The IFR can only make such rules if it can be satisfied that their inclusion furthers its objectives under section 6 by protecting and promoting—

(a) the financial soundness of regulated clubs, and

(b) the financial resilience of English football.

(2B) The IFR should also have regard when making any rules under section 7 to act in such a way that avoids any—

(a) effects on sporting competitiveness of any regulated club against another regulated club,

(b) adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs, and

(c) adverse effects on financial investment in English football.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.