PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
OBR: Resignation of Chair - 3 December 2025 (Commons/Commons Chamber)
Debate Detail
“worst failure in the 15-year history of the OBR.”
While I was making that statement on Monday afternoon, Richard Hughes, the chair of the OBR, resigned. The Chancellor has written to Mr Hughes to thank him for his many years of public service, and I have put my thanks on the record in this House, too. That decision was a matter for Mr Hughes.
We will work closely with the OBR to ensure that robust security arrangements are in place before the spring forecast and for all future forecasts. The permanent secretary to the Treasury will conduct a review of the Treasury’s security processes to inform future fiscal events. As I said when I was again at this Dispatch Box closing the Budget debate yesterday, the Government put the utmost weight on Budget security, including the prevention of leaks of information. A leak inquiry is now under way with the full support of the Chancellor and the whole Treasury team.
There is also speculation in the press today surrounding the letter that the OBR sent to the Treasury Committee last Friday, which I wish to address clearly. The Chancellor was aware of that letter and was content for it to be published, and she agreed that with the permanent secretary.
On Friday, the OBR took the unprecedented step of publishing the details of the pre-measures forecast rounds, and members of the OBR board were clear to the Treasury Committee yesterday that that step was taken because of serious concerns about partial leaks and briefings about their forecasts. In relation to the market-moving briefings made on 14 November, which suggested that the public finances were, after all, in a better position, David Miles stated to the Committee:
“I think there had been a misconception that there had been some good news. It didn’t exist.”
The board members also clarified that those concerns were raised by Richard Hughes with the Treasury before the Budget, and that the information published on Friday was approved by the permanent secretary.
What discussions did the Treasury, including the Chancellor, have with Mr Hughes immediately prior to his resignation? Mr Hughes said last week that he served
“subject to the confidence of the Chancellor”.
Did the Chancellor give Mr Hughes her full confidence? Was any pressure put on Mr Hughes to resign? Did the Chancellor approve the OBR’s publication on Friday and discuss it with the permanent secretary? I believe that the Minister has confirmed that, but perhaps he might do so again. [Interruption.]
As you know, Mr Speaker, I have written to the Financial Conduct Authority seeking a full investigation into matters relating to the Chancellor’s statements on the state of the public finances. I have also written again this morning to the permanent secretary at the Treasury, requesting a full investigation into all these matters.
The reason for publishing the letter was the unique nature of the Budget and the context of the OBR’s productivity review, as it said itself, while acknowledging that that would not become usual practice owing to the importance of preserving a private space for discussions. We are completely committed to the OBR’s independence; it is a vital part of our fiscal framework. In fact, one of the first acts of this Parliament was to introduce a fiscal lock so that the OBR could never be sidelined.
The shadow Chancellor also referred to comments by Professor Miles at the Treasury Committee earlier this week. I note that, among his remarks, Professor Miles was very keen to be clear that the positive headroom number in the forecast of 31 October did not in any way suggest that the OBR assessment was that the fiscal outlook was problem-free.
The Minister says that a leak inquiry is under way in the Treasury; leak inquiries have a habit of not finding someone responsible. But if somebody is found responsible, will they follow the lead set by Richard Hughes?
In testimony given to the Treasury Committee yesterday, the OBR described the “£21 billion average absolute revision” to their pre-measures forecasts as meaning, in effect, that between every six-month forecast, £21 billion on average is wiped off or added to the headroom. That leads me to ask: how can we ensure long termism in the UK’s fiscal institutions, despite this overall focus on headroom?
“£4 billion in the pre-measures forecast is not inconsistent with the sentiment that this is a very challenging fiscal position.”
It is because of that fiscal position that we made the choices that we did.
My hon. Friend asks what further steps the OBR will take. We will work with the National Cyber Security Centre and the OBR to take forward the recommendation that a forensic examination of potential premature access at previous fiscal events is carried out. Let me add that there is no evidence of hostile cyber-activity, but the OBR report’s findings indicated access at previous fiscal events. That is a very serious matter that we will investigate.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to some of Professor Miles’s comments at the Treasury Committee. Professor Miles confirmed that the £4 billion headroom identified in the forecast on 31 October was not inconsistent with the sentiment that this is a very challenging fiscal position.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the OBR’s letter, the nature of its being published and what it speaks about for the future. As I said earlier, the publication of the OBR letter was agreed to by the Chancellor due to the unique nature of this Budget and the context of the OBR’s productivity review, as it said itself, while acknowledging that it would not become usual practice, due to the importance of preserving a private space for discussion.
On the broader point just made by the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), I think we need to be really careful about downplaying the seriousness of the OBR publishing its forecast early. It is not a “narrow matter”, as the right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) said; we cannot simply brush it away. This is a serious leak of highly sensitive information, and we take it very seriously as a Government.
All the staff in my office diligently followed Mr Speaker’s advice on cyber-security and the threat of foreign intervention in our IT, and it is right that we take these matters seriously. However, based on the reports we have seen, I am not convinced that the OBR had taken the same kinds of steps to protect its own systems. Were the OBR and other Government Departments and agencies offered this advice but just did not follow it, or has there been an oversight in how we are managing security right across Government?
My question is about the cyber-security expert reporting back. When do the Government expect to hear back, and can we be assured that, in the interim, the OBR has got its security systems into the shape they need to be in?
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