PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE
Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting) - 16 January 2024 (Commons/Public Bill Committees)

It is a pleasure to resume proceedings with you in the Chair, Ms Bardell. I shall resist the temptation to start again for your benefit; I am sure you can look in the Official Report should you want to see the first part of my contribution.

I was talking about the inclusion of non-disclosure requirements in suspension orders, and I want to understand what the Minister thinks their function is. Is it to stop individuals who have had their domain name, IP address or website suspended or taken off them using it as a marketing tool or tool of notoriety? That would be a restriction on liberty and free speech, so I would be interested in the Government’s evidence base for that. Presumably, that must not apply to them talking to, say, their legal counsel, so what are the factors? There is no test in the Bill that a judge must apply.

Moving on to co-operation, since the internet by its nature is a global venture, we are glad that this is a four-nations provision, but there is some irregularity across the four nations, and I want to probe that with the Minister. Under paragraph 12 of schedule 3, in England and Wales, the “appropriate officers” who can make an application for an order are

“a constable…a National Crime Agency officer…an officer of Revenue and Customs…a member of staff of the Financial Conduct Authority, or…a person designated or appointed as an enforcement officer by the Gambling Commission under section 303 of the Gambling Act 2005”.

That seems quite a comprehensive list.

For Northern Ireland, the list is the same, except that it does not include the designated person from the Gambling Commission. Given the scourge of black-market gambling and the challenge it presents, is there not concern that it might be displaced to Northern Ireland? I wonder if the Minister might explain where he is up to with that. For Scotland, the list is just “a procurator fiscal”. That is a different approach. Presumably, it is the one favoured by the Scottish Government, but I hope the Minister might detail some of his discussions in this regard.

We know that many, if not most, of the sort of sites we have been discussing will be based outside the UK. The clause and the schedule give us a handy tool for UK-based ventures, but what more can the Minister tell us—he mentioned this a little in his opening speech—about his attempts to have some degree of harmony of regimes with our partners abroad, and what conversations does he think UK agencies should be having with their overseas counterparts to make sure that the powers that they have can be used to protect the British people?

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Ms Bardell, and I hope that we get to do so many more times during the Committee’s remaining sittings. I thank the shadow Minister for his considered contribution on clause 20 and schedule 3. I will turn first to his questions regarding the conditions set out in schedule 3, in particular at paragraph 4.

Condition 1 sets the threshold for this power to be available to investigative agencies such as the National Crime Agency and the police, meaning that those agencies cannot apply for an order unless the IP address or domain name is being used in serious crime. Condition 2, which operates separately and additively, requires a connection to the UK jurisdiction, and any one of the four limbs listed at paragraph 4(3) can apply; as the hon. Gentleman correctly identified, the word “or” is used at the end of paragraph 4(3)(c), making it clear that only one of the limbs (a) to (d) in condition 2 have to be met. If one is met, that is sufficient for condition 2 as a whole to be met. Those four limbs specify different ways in which the domain name or IP address might link to serious crime in the UK’s jurisdiction. I hope that that makes it clear how those conditions operate.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why the non-disclosure power was needed. Its purpose is simply to prevent the criminal behind the IP address or domain name from being tipped off, inadvertently or otherwise, that a law enforcement agency is looking into them. We would not want the criminals to know they were being looked at. That is why the provision is constructed in that way.

The hon. Gentleman asked about territorial applicability. The Gambling Commission is principally an England and Wales body, and has only very limited functions in Northern Ireland. However, typically, if a gambling service is made available on the internet, it will be available in Northern Ireland as much as in England and Wales. If we go after a service provider in relation to a breach in England and Wales, shutting down the domain or IP address will also have the effect of preventing it from being accessed elsewhere.

For Scotland, the definition of “appropriate officer” is limited to a procurator fiscal. That reflects the different arrangements in Scotland and our discussions so far with the Scottish Government. Generally speaking, we respect the view of the Scottish Government when it comes to the application of the law in Scotland—I am sure Ms Bardell would impartially endorse that from the Chair. Where the Bill touches on devolved matters in relation to the Scottish jurisdiction, we correspond with the Scottish Government and proceed in general—I would not say always—by mutual consent.

For the reasons that we have already discussed, we can all welcome the purpose of clause 20 and the accompanying schedule 3. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 21

Access to driver licence records

I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 21, page 17, line 33, after “subsection” insert

“, and may make consequential amendments of this section”.

This amendment will ensure that, in the event that the list of bodies to which the new provisions apply is amended by the regulations, any necessary consequential amendments may also be made by the regulations.

Clause 21 will facilitate the ability of police and other law enforcement officers to access driver information from the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency automatically at the point of need for all policing and law enforcement purposes. The clause contains provisions for regulations and a code of practice to enable changes to be made for the purposes of access to driver data.

Police and other law enforcement officers frequently need to deal with unpredictable circumstances while operating under time pressure, and the police have provided compelling operational examples in which they could deal better with threats and harms faced by the public if they had direct and automatic access to DVLA driving licence data. That is why the Bill contains this clause.

Currently, automatic access to the DVLA driving licence data is limited to matters concerned with enforcing road traffic offences and Road Traffic Act 1988 purposes, which means that the police do not have automatic access to driving licence data for other purposes, such as investigating wider types of crime. They do have manual access to the data, but that is quite laborious and takes a long time. The clause builds on an existing regulation-making power and requires the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the purposes for which, and the circumstances in which, the police can automatically access the driving licence database, so that all policing and law enforcement purposes are included.

The clause essentially expands an existing manual process and makes it automatic. At the moment, the automatic access applies only to road traffic matters. Given that we hold this data, I am sure that members of the Committee would expect the police to be able to access it in pursuit of criminals. Through the clause, we are delivering on our commitment to support the police by providing them with the tools they need. Members will recall that in the oral evidence sessions back in December, we heard support for the provisions from the National Crime Agency, the College of Policing and His Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary and fire and rescue services, Andy Cooke.

We are also taking the opportunity to make the legislation simpler and more transparent. Under the current system, some law enforcement staff have access to the DVLA driving licence database and others do not. The clause allows all police and law enforcement organisations listed in proposed new section 71(4) of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 to access DVLA driver information. It also changes the current legislative quirk whereby police staff are defined by law as police constables solely for the purpose of DVLA driver data, which is rather anomalous. It will define those permitted to access DVLA driver data as “authorised persons”, and regulations will set out the process for those individuals to become authorised.

We are conscious that police access to such personal data needs to be reasonable and proportionate, as set out in existing data protection legislation. That is why the clause will bolster the governance arrangements in this area by making them more transparent and straightforward, in preparation for the regulations that will broaden the access regime. In particular, the clause makes it clear which bodies can access DVLA driver data, which is necessary as the current legislation could be improved upon. There is a mechanism to amend the list of organisations that have access, while requiring the chief officer to be responsible for ensuring that appropriate training and oversight is provided by their organisation. That obviously includes the delivery of their data governance obligations.

Government amendment 33 ensures that if regulations amend the list of law enforcement bodies in subsection (4) of proposed new section 71 of the 2000 Act, such regulations may make consequential amendments to section 71—for example, to the definition of “chief officer”. Amendments 34 and 35 clarify the meaning of the term “chief officer” for each of the listed law enforcement agencies.

With your permission, Ms Bardell, I will speak to amendment 60 once I have heard the shadow Minister’s comments so I can respond to them. I hope I have set out why it is important that we put on a sounder and clearer footing the organisations and individuals who can access this data, and lay the groundwork to make automatic access possible for law enforcement purposes. I am sure we can all get behind that.

I want to speak to amendment 60 in my name. I do not know whether the Official Report can capture this, but my feeling is, “Hmm!” There are things I hoped the Minister would say, not least because it would have reduced my contribution by half, but he did not, so I will have to see whether I can get him to say them.

This is a very important clause. It is a long-standing, accepted principle that under certain circumstances police officers can use driver information held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency. At the moment, it is for purposes related to the enforcement of road traffic offences. It is a well-established and uncontroversial principle that officers can talk to the DVLA and get information. We have no quibble with the clause seeking to make that a smoother process, and we have no problem with subsection (4) of proposed new section 71 of the 2000 Act, which broadens and clarifies who can ask for that information, but the clause potentially contains a very broad extension of powers.

Paragraph 370 of the explanatory notes says:

“This clause replaces existing section 71 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 with a new section 71, and inserts a new section 71A into that Act. It provides for police and law enforcement bodies to have access to driving licence data held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (“DVLA”) and provides powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations concerning the purposes for which such data may be used and any conditions which need to be met by any person accessing the data.”

That is a really significant change. The police had access to DVLA information in relation to a very narrow set of offences, but the clause is essentially saying that the information is fair play for enforcement agencies, subject to whatever regulations a Secretary of State may set in the future. That is an egregious use of Henry VIII powers. If the Government have a regime in mind, they should say what it is. Instead, we are possibly giving over the entire DVLA database to the Secretary of State, and it is currently not clear what it will be used for.

First, for clarity, I should say that the purpose for which the information might be made automatically accessible is circumscribed by the words at the very end of the newly created section 71(2), which says the that Secretary of State

“may prescribe only such purposes and circumstances as are related to policing or law enforcement.”

It is not for any purpose; it has to be related to policing and law enforcement.

Secondly, I pointed out that the police already have the ability to access the data manually for police and law enforcement purposes. The clause simply paves the way for them to do what they currently do manually and instead do it automatically, provided that it is for a police or law enforcement purpose.

I hope those two points give some reassurance that the clause is not some gigantic land grab. It simply makes automatic what is currently manual and it is circumscribed in the way that I described.

The second point and the tone of the Minister’s contribution certainly give me a degree of comfort. The first point does not give me any comfort at all. The line that he quoted, which provides that the Secretary of State

“may prescribe only such purposes and circumstances as are related to policing or law enforcement”,

is a landing zone as wide as could possibly be needed to give police access to the DVLA database for all sorts of things. I will get on to that shortly. I would be delighted if the scenarios I am about to talk about are not what the Government intend, or even silly ones. I do not think that is the case, but I will be the gladdest person in the room if it is.

At the moment, I think the public would think there are sensible uses of the data, such as to double-check the last known addresses of a wanted person. Taken in extremis, however, the clause could mean that all the photos on the DVLA database become fair game for law enforcement. There are 41.2 million vehicles registered with the DVLA. We are talking about the data of tens of millions of people and, crucially, their photographs. The landing zone that I described under subsection (2) of proposed new section 71 means that someone’s photo could be used for a huge range of things.

Starting from where we think the public would be on this, the public expect and know that retrospective facial recognition is already used routinely. If a person commits a crime, they know that their custody photo will be held on file and that, if they are convicted, it could be held for six to 10 years, depending on the nature of the offence. It is a tale as old as the technology that the photo might subsequently be checked against footage relating to another crime and used for its detection. Similarly, if someone commits an act that means that their DNA is kept on file, that might be used in relation to unsolved crimes that happened in the past or to tackle offending in the future. All that is sensible.

On both fronts, we start in a sensible place, with the use of the DVLA database for cross-references to help detect crime, and the use of photos of offenders that lie on file to detect crime. The risk comes when we mix those two sensible principles.

I have listened carefully to my hon. Friend. Does he agree that there is a danger that we will get mission creep and, more importantly, that the public will see it as such? As time moves on, we will get another bit, another bit and another bit.

I absolutely agree, and that is exactly the point I am about to make. It is a legitimate anxiety. If that is wrong and I am somehow being conspiratorial, albeit it is not my nature, the Minister can tell me and that would give me a degree of comfort, but I think, and it has been expressed to me by interest groups, that there is a legitimate anxiety that the clause could mean that the police will access tens of millions of driver photos to solve crimes.

There is a problem with that on two fronts. First, we have the question whether that is a fair balance between individual liberty and collective safety. If that is what the Government want, we need to have that debate much more clearly before we get to these specifics. Secondly, certainly for the photos that are on file today, probably each one of us in the room, Members and beyond, is on that database, but none of us will have given our photograph with informed consent, knowing they were going to be used for the proposed purpose. That is a huge problem, not least because it is a kind of coercion. I would still give my photo on that basis, because the ability to drive is fundamental to my needs—certainly for work, never mind family life. But, again, it is a form of state coercion, rather than something that would necessarily be the right thing to do. Many people—many of my constituents, I know—would not consent on that basis. We live in an age of high-profile conspiracy theories and those who make an industry of them, and we should not give grist to the mill of yet another one.

I give way to the Minister; nothing would please me more than to be contradicted.

Existing DVLA data, including photographs —I have a driving licence; I am sure that the hon. Member has one and everybody on the Committee probably does as well—can already be searched by the police; or rather they can request information on a manual basis. That can happen already, to each and every one of those 40-odd million records, for law enforcement purposes. That has a statutory basis, via schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018, which allows access to that kind of data for police and law enforcement purposes. The principle of police access to that data for law enforcement purposes is already there.

I pose a brief example: if somebody was wanted for an offence such as rape, and the police could not track them down and they were not on the custody image database—let us say that they had never been into custody—would the Committee want the database to be searched to see whether a recognition match could be obtained to find that person? That can happen at the moment, and I think that is right. I would like to check whether the shadow Minister agrees.

There is a significant difference between what the Minister talks about, which is using, on an individual basis, information that is available to cross-reference—perhaps to deal with known aliases or known addresses—and where this could go. I mean a broad-scale use of surveillance, seemingly without any guardrails, that would essentially allow tens of millions—I think it is in the 40-something millions—of photos to be put on essentially the same footing as photos from the custody suite.

I heard the Minister’s intervention, but I am increasingly concerned about the point I made about mission creep and proportionality. That is what we must bear in mind. Would my hon. Friend agree? This partly goes back to amendments 61, 58 and 59: let us be as precise and specific as we can—in fact, let us have some control rather than this mission creep, and always have human rights and the question of proportionality in the back of our minds.

“Proportionality” is the exact word here. It is about finding balance, as I say, between individual liberty and our collective safety. If we are saying that, in all instances where the police have a photo of a possible offender, we have complete comfort about their searching the entire DVLA database to try and identify that person—well, that is a very significant change. I would argue strongly that that is different from saying, “Well, we think we might know who it is; let’s apply for the driving licence of an individual.” I think that the public would see a big difference.

The issue becomes even more important given the pace of technological change; we have been talking about retrospective facial recognition technologies here, but live facial recognition technologies are developing at breakneck speed: cameras can scan huge crowds of people, check who they are and flag persons of concern. The Minister, I think, has a degree of enthusiasm for that technology; it is a plank of his plans around violence against retail workers, and shop theft more widely.

I recently visited South Wales police because I wanted to understand the use of this technology. With your indulgence, Ms Bardell, I will take this opportunity to put on the record my thanks to the police and crime commissioner for South Wales, Alun Michael, for his work. He is stepping down from public office at May’s elections after more than half a century in different posts. He has sat in the chair that I occupy; he has sat in the chair that the Minister occupies; he has sat in Cabinet, and he is one of the few PCCs to have served the entire 12 years of that post’s existence. His is a life of extraordinary public service to the UK and Wales, and to Cardiff, and we have been very lucky to have him.

As I was saying, South Wales police is very much in the vanguard of facial recognition technology. In a recent oral questions, the Minister graciously made reference to the work of South Wales police in this area, particularly the oversight that it is doing through the PCC’s office, which may well be a good model—in fact, it very much is. However, it is not without controversy, partly because it is in the vanguard and that sort of disruption is generating significant public interest.

There was quite a bit of public debate around one of the events in question: a Beyoncé concert at the Principality Stadium. That was a huge event. It had incredible hype; people really did everything to try to get tickets. Live facial recognition technology was used at that concert. The police advertised it, defined a public watch list, and said, “We are looking for anyone who is a known terrorist, in light of the Manchester bombing, and for paedophiles, in view of the likely attendees of the concert.” That probably finds the right balance: the public are informed and there is a defined watch list. There is a degree of common sense there.

As I said, what South Wales police have put in place, and what I think we are going to see across the country, is a model where we have civilian balance to the operational independence of the police and where the public’s representative, as we have in England and Wales in the form of police and crime commissioners, is able to know what is happening and to have public oversight. However, there is a real risk around how that sort of technology could be combined with the powers in this clause. The use of live facial recognition technologies could be combined with the entire DVLA photo database for the purposes of live blanket surveillance. I do not think that is what the Government want, but I do think that we have to hear that they do not. Relying on Henry VIII powers makes it even worse.

It is welcome that, according to proposed new section 71A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, a code of practice will be issued. That is really important, and speaks to my amendment 60, which is a pretty basic attempt to put some degree of parliamentary guardrail on to this new technology and its use in law enforcement. It states that once the Bill has received Royal Assent, a report on its usage must be published by the Secretary of State on an annual basis. I will be honest: I am not precious about the form that that should take, but I am precious about technology that has moved at great pace and with which there has been very little parliamentary engagement at all.

Stronger guardrails should be set. We have to be really cautious about other changes we might make, such as those in clause 21, that would mean that a significant database could be used for proactive surveillance of people who have never done anything other than apply for a provisional licence. That point could be held, but we would have to argue with the public and build public confidence around it. We would have to be shown the evidence for the effectiveness and the operational cases. I do not think the Government have done that.

My hope is that I am taking the issue far beyond what the Government intend. I will be very glad if that is the case. Part of the problem is that we are relying on regulations when we have no idea what their form will be. I stop at this point. I hope the Minister will be able to give the Committee some comfort.

I have listened extremely carefully to the shadow Minister and the Minister. I take issues of data protection and privacy very seriously, but I also believe that members of the public expect us to try to keep them safe, and expect the police to be able to use technology to try to keep them safe.

I listened to what the hon. Member for Nottingham North said about the facial recognition technology used in south Wales. Those same south Wales cameras were used last half-term in my constituency of Chelmsford and in Southend in Essex. As a result, a number of individuals were arrested, including somebody who had come into Chelmsford from outside and was wanted for a very high-profile sexual offence. What the Minister has been saying about being able to use this technology to arrest rapists is not hypothetical; it has happened, and it happened in my constituency in Chelmsford.

I am sorry to ask the right hon. Member to give way, because I have said so much—but I guess the point I was making about the Beyoncé concert was about having a defined watch list of people known and suspected of having done significant crimes. Such measures feel like a proportionate tactic to apprehend them, but is that enough for us to say that therefore everybody’s faces ought to be in play, even though the vast majority have never done anything wrong?

I was just coming to that point. I completely hear what the hon. Gentleman is saying about widening out the potential dataset of photographs that could be used. I suspect that most members of the public would say it is utterly reasonable to widen out the set of faces we could look at. For instance, we might have a picture of somebody who is a rapist and was never known before, but their photograph might have appeared on a wider database such as that from the DVLA, rather than on a known potential suspect list. If that helped to find really dangerous criminals, I suspect most members of the public would accept that.

I agree that there need to be very strong measures to make sure that we do not turn into a surveillance society, such as we have seen in some much more autocratic countries, where those pictures can then be used against innocent people. I believe the Minister is trying to say that the protection is there in the Bill. When these cameras have been used, there have been very strong rules about where they can be used. The cameras used in both Chelmsford and Southend were highly publicised, with signs and alerts that the technology was being used in that place on that day. Those sorts of measures are important.

I would be interested in a bit more clarity from the Minister about ensuring that we do not turn to inappropriate use, as we have seen in some autocratic countries, while also ensuring that we can help the public by making use of the best technology to identify those who have committed the most serious crimes.

I would like to speak to a couple of matters concerning the clause, and then talk about the read-across into facial recognition. I think there is some conflation of two different kinds of facial recognition—live and retrospective—only one of which is relevant here. I will explain how that works and how it might be relevant.

Let me speak first to the to the substance of the clause. First, just to be precise, this is not a Henry VIII power, which is a piece of secondary legislation that can amend primary legislation. This does not create a regulation-making power to amend primary legislation; it simply creates a list. It is not technically a Henry VIII power, but it does specify the circumstances, or the policing and enforcement purposes, for which data can be used.

Secondly, we are not passing clause 21 expressly to authorise the use of DVLA data for facial recognition or indeed for any particular law enforcement purpose; we are simply creating a regulation-making power. Regulations might be brought forward using this power to do any number of law enforcement activities, including facial recognition, but that would, of course, have to be debated at the time and subject to the affirmative procedure. This is enabling legislation; we are not actually passing the substance of any particular power today.

Since members of the Committee have raised questions about facial recognition, I would like to address them. There are essentially two different kinds of facial recognition—separate concepts—one of which is relevant and one of which is not. Let me start with the one that would not be relevant here: live facial recognition. Live facial recognition would never need to use images from the DVLA database, the passport database or anything else. Live facial recognition takes a watch list of people wanted for criminal offences or wanted by the court.

Such technology was run recently in Croydon—my borough—where I think there are about 12,000 people wanted for criminal offences. The camera was set up, as it was in Southend and Chelmsford, in Wales, for the coronation and at the Silverstone Grand Prix. Everyone who walked past those cameras in Croydon town centre got scanned. There were public signs up; the authorised professional practice says that public signs have to be put up, which I would have thought would mean criminals would not walk past the cameras—but they do.

Over a couple of afternoons in Croydon, several thousand people walked past the cameras, despite the fact that there was a sign up saying, “The police are using live facial recognition” and in the course of those two afternoons, there were 17 alerts and all were accurate. The police would stop each person, have a conversation, ask for ID and so on, and all 17 had been accurately identified. Those 17 people were all arrested because they were wanted for offences. One of them was a wanted rapist who would otherwise not have been caught. It was just good fortune that that wanted rapist had to walk past the camera and was apprehended. Were it not for that, that wanted rapist would still be wandering around. There was another person who had been wanted for grievous bodily harm since 2015—for eight years—and they were arrested as well. In Croydon, the scheme was run in the first couple of weeks of December.

Concerns have been raised previously about accuracy and disproportionality: does the technology pick on members of certain ethnic communities, as it were? There was litigation that preceded South Wales using it, back in about 2020. I join the shadow Minister in commending Alun Michael for his work on live facial recognition, where he has shown real leadership, and for his long career in public life—in Parliament as a Secretary of State, as Welsh First Minister, and as a police and crime commissioner for the last 12 years or so.

The litigation happened, and the court set out certain conditions that had to be met, one of which was around accuracy—I think the false positive rate had to be one in 1,000—and disproportionality. The algorithm was improved and tested by the National Physical Laboratory at 0.6, which is the setting that the police use. At that setting, it found that the false positive rate was, I think—I am speaking from memory—one in 6,000, which is six times more accurate than the court specified, and that there was no disproportionality based on either gender or ethnicity.

For the one-in-6,000 false positive, what would happen—this has not happened in Croydon, because only 17 people were stopped—is that the police would say, “Excuse me, sir or madam, can you just identify yourself?” If they turn out not to be the person the police think they are, obviously the police will say, “Sorry to disturb you—off you go.” But that is one in 6,000, and it did not happen in Croydon, because the police did not stop 6,000 people.

So that is live facial recognition. The police do not need access to a DVLA database or password database, or even the custody database; they just need a list of people who are wanted. In the examples in Chelmsford, Southend and Croydon, they caught people who were wanted for offences or who had absconded from court, who would otherwise still be wandering around. It was used at the coronation. Three camera points were set up and, similarly to the Welsh example, the watch list included known terrorists, fixated people—people who are obsessed by the monarchy—and also wanted offenders. I think three wanted people were caught on the coronation day, including a wanted sex offender who happened to wander past the camera. The technology has also been used in Soho to try and catch robbers who were stealing mobile phones and so on.

I hope that illustrates to the Committee how live facial recognition is useful. It comes under the auspices of the Supreme Court judgment in the Bridges case, and authorised professional practice is published by the College of Policing. I think the Information Commissioner’s Office has also looked at it. Live facial recognition, which does not need DVLA data anyway, has a good basis, and it is catching people who would otherwise not get caught.

We can all come up with our examples, whether they be of rapists or a missing person, for example—who would not want to find a missing person who might have been missing for years and who we are trying to find? That is not the issue. We have used DNA in the past, and we all think it is wonderful, but it is used within parameters. Yes, let us have CCTV and facial recognition, but they have to be used within a certain context.

Then there is body-worn video and the move towards using algorithms in the detection and prevention of crime —and, in some places, the deterrence of crime—and also the issues around AI. I do not think there is a problem with that at all, but it has to be set in a context. We should not take a piecemeal approach to the whole question of technology. We are dealing with a vast area, and this must be set in that wider context. Perhaps the Minister can go off and think this through, outside this Criminal Justice Bill, and set in process a review of the whole question of artificial intelligence and so on, as part of crime reduction, crime prevention and crime detection.

The hon. Gentleman is making a very reasonable point. In fact, I was going to come on to it later, but I will address it now. As for the current deployments of live facial recognition in places such as Wales, Croydon, Southend, Chelmsford, Soho and elsewhere, a framework was set out by the case of Bridges v. South Wales Police. There is authorised professional practice from the College, but that framework is there. The hon. Gentleman is, however, making the valid point that it would be useful to set out—outside of this Committee, as he said—a broader strategy, framework or explanation of how the technology can be used. That is not just the case for live facial recognition, but also for the retrospective recognition, which I will come on to in a minute. It is all set out, and we could perhaps debate and discuss it in the round.

The hon. Gentleman is making a reasonable point about something that I had in mind to do in the relatively near future. That is something that I am working on in the Home Office, and his suggestion has spurred me on to expedite that. We want to have this set out transparently and comprehensively so that everybody can look at it and know where they stand. It has actually been done in relation to live facial recognition, but it would be helpful to set it out in a broader context.

The point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle (Peter Dowd) made is far more eloquent than mine. The Minister is clearly very enthusiastic and learned about this issue. When he was talking about how live facial recognition does not rely on DVLA data or any photographic data at all, the Minister said that we just need a list. What does that rely on, then? It must rely on some sort of photographic data.

My second point—I will try to be slightly more eloquent and not sound like I am asking my kids to turn the telly on for me because I do not understand it—is about my kids. I do not mind my DVLA data being used; I will tick the box or whatever. It strikes me, however, that my son has a driving licence, and I feel slightly anxious about the way that large groups of young boys get treated like they are a rabble. There are all the brilliant examples of this, such as finding missing people or catching rapists—“Great. Wahey! Let’s lock them all up”—but I feel slightly less comfortable about my son’s photo being used, funnily enough, in what might be a broad-brush police and crime approach.

I thank the hon. Lady. On the first question, which was about how live facial recognition works, we first of all need a watchlist—the list of wanted people—and then the photographs. Maybe there will be someone who is wanted for rape, and we have that person’s photograph. Maybe it is someone the police have encountered before, but they just cannot find them. Maybe the police have gone to what they think is the person’s home address, and the person is not there, but they have their photograph. They have that data. Then, in the case of the Croydon deployment in early December, there were 12,000 photographs of people who were wanted for different offences—the police had those photographs.

Then, the faces of people walking down the road are scanned. Each time someone walks past, their face is scanned to see whether it matches. For the vast majority, there is no match, and the scan is instantaneously, immediately and automatically deleted. There is no need for any manual intervention; it gets deleted straight away, like this—although I am not sure how my clicking my fingers will be rendered in Hansard. If the hon. Lady or I had walked past, we would be scanned and, one hopes, there would not be a match. Then there would be instant, automatic deletion. If someone is scanned and their photograph is one of the 12,000 on the list, however, there is a flash—that was a double click, for the benefit of Hansard—and an alert is sounded. The officer will then go over and say, “Excuse me, sir”—all of the 17 who were stopped were men, by the way.

You shock me!

The officer will go over and say, “Excuse me, sir, what is your name?” When he has established that the match is accurate and that they are who the system thinks they are, it is a case of, “You are under arrest for X, Y or Z”.

That is how the live system works. There is no need to access any standing database such as that of DVLA; we just need the pictures of the 12,000 wanted persons. Depending on the deployment, we can choose who goes on that list. In the South Wales deployment, they were particularly concerned about terrorists who might try to cause an explosion in the arena or paedophiles who might seek to prey on the young girls going to the Beyoncé concert. The list can be varied depending on the location. I would hope, though, that any watchlist would always include people who are wanted for offences.

I will now come on to retrospective facial recognition. I repeat that we are not authorising this today by passing this clause; we are simply creating a power to make regulations in the future to do so. I just thought I would be clear about that. We are not creating this power; we are simply creating a legislative framework through which future regulations might be brought forward.

On a technical point, could this technology also be used to find witnesses on the bus, for example? I do not expect the Minister to know the answer to that question, but just to add a bit more enthusiasm to his love of this technology, I can see that there might be such uses for it.

That is a really good question and I do not know the answer to it. However, I can certainly find out and come back to the Committee. I know that this technology can be used to find missing persons. If someone has gone missing, the police can do a search and see if they pop up somewhere.

As for finding witnesses, of course the witness has not committed a crime, so one would have to be a little bit careful about infringing on their rights. However, I will take that question away and get an answer, and I will write to the hon. Lady and the shadow Minister, and indeed the rest of the Committee, because it is a very good question. I am afraid that, as I stand here today, I do not know the answer, but that could help to find witnesses.

The Minister is being very generous with his time. There is a degree of comfort with the point about regulation. If concerns continue to grow about the use of DVLA data in retrospective facial recognition, Parliament will have its day. And on that basis, I will not divide the Committee.

However, I want to press the Minister on something else. He is right to say that this clause is an enabling clause, but he must have an idea of what he wants it to enable. Why is it in the Bill? The Government must have something in mind for it; otherwise, there is no point in it standing part of the Bill.

I think that I have just spent the last five minutes or so—

So it is for that, then.

It could be; that is certainly a possibility that I have in mind. If those regulations were brought forward, and maybe there would be some further clarifying codes of practice and so on that will be needed as well, it would in theory be possible to bring forward regulations such that, if the person or the suspect—it might be the murderer in that Coventry nightclub, or the sex offender on that bus. Imagine if their image was not on the custody database; imagine that they had never been arrested, or convicted, or anything. The police did not have their picture; they would not have found them. It would obviously be useful, particularly for more serious offences, to be able automatically to search other facial image databases besides the custody one, in order to catch the rapist, the serious sex offender and so on.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley asked a question about her son. There is a question of proportionality here. For example, regarding this database, in these regulations one could—this is not for the Committee today, but I am just saying it—specify a threshold, and say that this would only be used for crimes over a certain level of seriousness. Obviously, rape and murder would meet that. GBH, drug supply, firearms, knives and so on, might also be specified, but a parking ticket would probably not be. In these regulations—this is one of the reasons why the wording is flexible—one could specify that threshold, and we would obviously then debate where that balance should lie. One does have to be cognisant of proportionality and privacy considerations, as indeed data protection law in any case requires us to do.

I hope I have given the Committee a bit of a flavour of how these regulation powers—

An education, Minister!

It is not often that someone says that after I have been speaking. I hope I have given a bit of a flavour of how this could help catch serious criminals who might otherwise not be caught. We would debate the specifics when the time came. There would, of course, be a code of practice and everything else to set out those guard rails. I have already indicated in response to, I think, the hon. Member for Bootle, that there is a case for a wider policy statement setting out the strategy in this area, which we can discuss and debate.

I appreciate that we have strayed a little beyond the strict confines of this clause, Ms Bardell, but the Opposition raised some reasonable questions that I really wanted to try hard to answer. I will finish by saying that I spoke to my local police commanders, Superintendent Mitch Carr and Chief Superintendent Andy Brittain, encouraging the deployment of live facial recognition in Croydon. I know 17 people got arrested. We have heard how it was done in Essex: in Southend and in Chelmsford. I encourage members of this Committee to talk to their local police and say, “Try it out in your area,” and see who gets caught. At the moment, South Wales police and the Met have the necessary vans, but they will lend them. I think South Wales police lent the vans to Essex. If anyone wants to suggest it, they could ask their chief constable to borrow the van from South Wales police or the Met, try out in their constituency, and see who gets caught.

Amendment 33 agreed to.

Amendments made: 34, in clause 21, page 18, line 19, leave out “police force listed in subsection (4)” and insert “body”.

This amendment and amendment 35 specify in more detail the relevant chief officers of bodies to which the provisions will apply.

Amendment 35, in clause 21, page 18, line 20, at end insert—

“(aa) in relation to a police force listed in subsection (4)(b) to (d), the chief constable of that police force;

(ab) in relation to a service police force listed in subsection (4)(p) to (r), the Provost Marshal of that service police force;

(ac) in relation to the tri-service serious crime unit, the Provost Marshal for serious crime;

(ad) in relation to the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, the Service Police Complaints Commissioner;”—(Chris Philp.)

See the statement for amendment 34.

Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 22

Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Bardell. I am pleased to be able to speak to the provision contained in clause 22, which has had widespread support from Members across the House. In the past year or two, several high-profile murderers—Thomas Cashman, Jordan McSweeney, and most recently Lucy Letby—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings, causing the victims’ families significant further distress. This can be seen as the final insult, and it is also the coward’s approach, affronting the victims one last time by robbing their families of a chance to look them in the eye as the judge determines their fate. The worst offenders should be required to face the consequence of their actions, and hear society’s condemnation expressed through the sentencing remarks of the judge. Indeed, it is with those words ringing in their ears that they should hear the prison door clang shut.

Clause 22 inserts new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the sentencing code. New section 41A creates an express statutory power for a Crown court judge to directly order the most serious offenders to attend their sentencing hearing. It applies to adults and children who are convicted of a sentence for which the maximum potential penalty is life. Any offender falling in that category who refuses to attend without a reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court. In the case of an adult offender they could face a maximum penalty of an additional two years in prison; in the case of a child offender who refuses to attend, the maximum penalty is a £2,500 fine.

New section 41B is intended to enshrine current common law practice in statute, making it absolutely clear that the Crown court has a power in law to direct a prison to produce any adult offender, not just those looking at a potential life sentence, to court for their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult offender to court for their sentencing hearing where it is necessary and proportionate. The final decision on reasonable force remains with the prison governor and the escorting staff working under his or her authority. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for that purpose, in line with existing policy. It will remain a matter for judges to decide whether to order an individual to attend court or to require a prison to produce them.

I thank my hon. Friend and the Government for bringing forward this clause, which I wholeheartedly support. It is a way of ensuring that there is an element of responsibility that the public can see in what is, after all, an open court forum.

On the use of reasonable force—if the Minister does not have an answer today, perhaps she can write to me—is there a way of ensuring that there is a mitigation against the possibility of the offenders raising civil proceedings against the state for alleged excessive force? Has any thought been given to that? If not, perhaps the Department could write to the Committee to explain how that would be dealt with. We would not want a situation where the public then say, “How is this individual able to make a claim against the state on the grounds that he or she had to attend court?”

I thank my hon. Friend for his sensible question; I will write to him. One of the points I have clarified is that prison officers understand the use of reasonable force, because they have to use it at other times, and it is well understood by the police. “Reasonable force” has a meaning in context—it is not just a judgment call to be made on the day. However, that is a good point, and it deserves a response.

Returning to my remarks, in exercising their discretion a judge may decide not to order an individual to attend if they may cause significant disruption in court or further distress to victims, or if there is a significant mental health complaint that may prevent their attendance. Courts will also be required to consult with young offending teams before any decision is made on a child offender. I recognise that the provisions may not guarantee that every offender will end up attending their sentencing hearing.

I am unsure whether the Minister has considered the issue in relation to the victims charter. The victim’s family could be in court. Is there the potential, as part of the victims charter, to consult the family—

Or the victim.

Yes—to consult the victim or the victim’s family on that issue? The victim or their family could be sat there, and the person could be brought in and be challenging, difficult and so on. As part of victims’ rights, would the Minister consider giving consideration to the consultation of the victim or their family in those situations?

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is generally accepted—this is consistent with the thrust of what we have heard—that it is an affront to the victim’s family when the defendant, who is a ward of the court for the purposes of the criminal proceedings, elects not to attend their sentencing. It has always been presented in one way, but the hon. Gentleman is correct: there is an argument to be made, particularly if the defendant is difficult, disruptive or perhaps politically motivated—[Interruption.] I have been reminded that it is for judges to decide, but the point that the hon. Gentleman makes is that perhaps the victim’s family should be part of that decision-making exercise.

Yes, I think it is important that families be consulted throughout the process and beyond it. The judge has discretion, but the victim should have the right to be consulted. What the judge does is a completely different matter, but the families or the victim should be consulted if appropriate.

Let me revert to the hon. Gentleman in writing on that point. I conceded that there is no guarantee that every single offender will attend their sentencing, but the Bill provides a power for a Crown court judge to order that to happen in certain circumstances. It will also ensure that serious offenders who fail to attend receive punishment. That sends the clear message that offenders are expected to attend their sentencing hearing, and that the wider public have the right to see that justice is done. I commend the clause to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. I assure the Minister that in the interests of a continuing atmosphere of co-operative working, I, like my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for policing, will be constructive in my comments, to enable the Government to justify their legislation by explaining how it will work. Where we have reservations or see the need to offer new ideas, we will do so to help them get it right. I am sure that they are as keen as we are to improve this Bill and ensure it is fit for purpose. Judging by the huge number of Government amendments, they have already recognised at least some of its weaknesses.

As outlined, the first part of clause 22 enables the Crown court to directly order an individual to attend their sentencing hearing by creating an express statutory power to make an attendance order. According to the Library research document, and as the Minister mentioned, any adult who refuses to attend without reasonable excuse will commit a contempt and therefore faces a maximum penalty of an additional custodial sentence of up to 24 months. Any child who refuses to attend faces a penalty of £2,500, but I wonder how a child will ever be in a position to pay such a penalty, particularly if they are given a custodial sentence.

The second part of the clause creates an express power for judges to require prisons to produce adults to court for sentencing hearings. It also makes it clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult to court for their sentencing hearing where that is necessary and proportionate. However, the final decision on whether to use reasonable force remains with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to use of reasonable force for this purpose, in line with domestic policy, guided by the Taylor review of 2020 and the UK’s commitments under the UN convention on the rights of the child. We can only welcome that.

There are many questions that the Minister needs to answer about how easy it will be to implement this policy. We will not oppose the clause, but would like her to spell out how practical it is, and what alternative provision she has in mind if it is impossible to compel a defendant to attend a sentencing hearing.

There is nothing in the Government’s explanatory notes about the resources needed to deliver the policy, and I hope that the Minister will address that. If it is not resourced, it simply will not happen, so we seek clarity there. Likewise, there is little if anything about how the staff who will be at the sharp end of delivering a defendant to court will be protected.

We would also like to understand what the new law would add to judges’ existing powers to compel people to attend their sentencing hearing. Above all, we would like to explore with the Minister whether this new law could actually work, and whether it is in the best interests of the victims. We do not want them to be further traumatised by the sentencing hearing.

We know why this proposal is being brought forward. The Minister talked about a number of high-profile cases in which the defendants refused to attend their sentencing hearing. There have been many: Zahid Younis, in September 2020, sentenced for the murder of Henriett Szucs and Mihrican Mustafa; Koci Selamaj, in April 2022, for the murder of Sabina Nessa; Jordan McSweeney, in December 2022, for the murder of Zara Aleena;Thomas Cashman, in July 2023, for the murder of Olivia Pratt-Korbel; and of course Lucy Letby, in August 2023, for the murder and attempted murder of 13 infants. In those cases, the families never had the chance to look the killer in the eye, or to spell out the effects of their loss.

Perhaps that is why the witnesses we questioned at the start of this Bill’s progress in Committee were supportive of the new law, though from the quotations I am about to use from their evidence, it is clear that many questions are still to be answered. Baljit Ubhey, director of strategy and policy at the Crown Prosecution Service—apologies if I mispronounce these names—described it as

“an important measure, given some of the high-profile cases we have seen and the impact they have had on victims.”

She went on:

“We will have to look very carefully at how we apply for that power—which allows the court or the prosecutor to apply for compulsory attendance—and seek victims’ views”.

Others have made that point this afternoon. She went on:

“The consideration to think about is whether that would cause extra violence. There is something in the Bill about the use of force, which prison custody officers would need to think about”.

I will address that in detail later. Baljit went on:

“I can see why it is in the Bill, but we will have to wait and see how it operates in practice.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 20, Q46.]

Baroness Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, expressed concerns about victims:

“In terms of victims and their families, both personally and professionally assumptions are made about them when people do not even understand the victim’s journey. I get annoyed at that. I think this is a very important point, because victims sit there for weeks…on end, listening to evidence and having no voice at all. Part of the victims code is to have the victim impact statement, and there is the ability to read it out if there is conviction. I think it should be respected that the family have that kind of relationship, because they have listened to that evidence about their loved ones.”

She went on:

“I also think that you do not know how to judge an offender. They could say that they are coming in the dock and then not play ball. I have seen for myself—evidence shows this—that even through the court trial they will turn their backs, goad you and do everything. If it is still to the judge’s discretion and direction, I would like—I have said this previously—for the judge to own the courtroom if the offender does play in the dock and does not respect the perimeters. Victims’ families are told to respect the perimeters of the courtroom, and the judiciary needs to have that respect. If it happens that they do not want to turn up in dock, a deadline should be put on what is going on. If not, put something in their cell if they are in the court building.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 25, Q59.]

I ask the Minister to address Baroness Newlove’s concerns, which many of us in Committee share, and specifically the concern about how a defendant kicking off will be dealt with under this proposed new law.

Dame Vera Baird KC, the former Victims’ Commissioner, questioned the need for the clause at all:

“As I am sure the Ministers know very well, this adds absolutely nothing to the current law. A judge can order somebody to come into court. If they do not, it is a contempt of court.”

When I pointed out to her during the evidence session that the

“clause actually talks about using ‘reasonable force’”,

she responded:

“But you can already use reasonable force. As long as it is proportionate and necessary, the Prison Service is entitled to use reasonable force to fulfil the orders of the judge. If the judge says, ‘You must come’ and you do not come, it is, No. 1, a contempt of court”—

just as in the proposals before us—

“And guess what the maximum sentence is for a contempt of court? It is two years, exactly as it is in the Bill. If a person does not want to come and the officers regard it as necessary and proportionate to use force to bring them, they are entitled to do exactly that to fulfil the judge’s requirements. There is really no change here.

I well understand the sense from a victim that they want this moment—‘Right, he’s going to face what he’s done now and I’m going to get some benefit from that.’ But the reality is that you cannot capture somebody’s mind, can you? There are always risks that people who are dragged into court might be a nuisance.”

Later on, she said:

“I think it was the former Lord Chief Justice John Thomas who suggested that a better way was to make sure that if the person does not come out of the cell, he is in a cell to which the sentencing can be broadcast. He cannot get away and the victims know that he has, as it were, faced his moment.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 59-60, Q156-157.]

I hope that the Minister will take the time to outline just what her proposal adds to the law, and what alternatives there are to forcing an angry, abusive and possibly violent defendant to sit in the dock.

I will now move on to proposed new section 41B(4) of the sentencing code, which refers to using “reasonable force” to ensure that a defendant attends court. We heard evidence from Mark Fairhurst, chairman of the Prison Officers Association, on the issue. Members will recollect that he told the Committee that he saw no problem for his members in delivering their role in the policy. He told us:

“It is quite easy for prison officers to force someone to attend court; we restrain them on to a cellular vehicle and then they are taken to court. The problem arises at the other end because the courts are run by private security firms now. Have they got the staffing levels needed to take someone who has been recalcitrant off a bus and into a cell in the court? Have they got the resources to drag them into the dock if they are still displaying violent tendencies? Will that disrupt proceedings in the court? Will they be abusive to victims? Will it be distressing for the victims of crime to witness that in the dock? There are a lot of issues we need to look at.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 96, Q39.]

I have made some inquiries about how reasonable force is currently used by prison officers to deliver a defendant into the hands of the security company or court that receives them. It came as a surprise to learn that it involves three prison officers in full riot gear—including overalls, gloves, steel-toed boots, helmets and shields—approaching the prisoner, securing them and getting them into the transport vehicle. Their job is then complete, and responsibility passes to the private security firm staff to deliver the defendant to the court. Unlike the prison officers, neither private security staff nor receiving court staff are equipped with either the personal protective equipment or the training to transfer the defendant first into the court cell and then to the dock.

That level of restraint of a defendant, and risk to employees of the court or agency staff, may be required only occasionally, but what training and equipment will agency and court staff be provided with to ensure that they are as protected as our prison officers? Training is a real issue, and I would be obliged if the Minister would outline what training staff will receive to ensure their and the defendant’s safety. What financial provision has been or will be made to provide such support for staff? The Minister will be the first to recognise our duty of care to these people. If she wants the measure to succeed, she must outline to the Committee exactly how it can be implemented safely. What risk assessment of the whole policy has been conducted? Perhaps more relevantly, what risk assessments will be conducted each time the measure is applied?

I mentioned the case of Lucy Letby. She refused to attend her sentencing hearing and refused to attend via video link. She remained in the cells below Manchester Crown court as bereaved family members delivered victim personal statements, and the judge passed a whole life order in her absence. Like Letby, Thomas Cashman travelled to Manchester Crown court but declined to leave his cell for his sentencing hearing, claiming that he had been provoked by court officials.

Assuming that the Minister’s intention is that defendants such as Letby and Cashman would be forced into court, can she advise how that will be done, and whether she believes such an action is in the best interests of the victims? Perhaps she believes that sanctions can be placed on such people. However, in Letby’s case, the threat of a lengthier sentence would be entirely pointless, because the sentence of life without parole is the most severe penalty the law of England and Wales allows. What sanction can be placed on an offender who knows that the judge will pass a whole life order? Will they be refused visiting rights, or other rights enjoyed by prisoners? What are the Minister’s thoughts on Baroness Newlove’s view that, if defendants object to leaving their cell, a live link should be set up inside? That is also the view of the former Lord Chief Justice, as we heard. It is hard to see how that will be achieved when our justice system’s funding is already stretched to the limit. Perhaps the Minister can also address that.

The charity Justice is also cautious about the introduction of new powers to compel defendants’ attendance at sentencing heroes—hearings. Not heroes; there are no heroes in this business. The charity said that the new powers are unlikely to address the issue in a positive manner:

“A statutory power to require individuals facing a life sentence to attend sentencing hearings is at best unnecessary and at worst, when backed by force, dangerous.”

The briefing from Justice aligns with others in saying that this policy puts staff at risk. It goes on to say that it is questionable whether the discretion to use force in proposed new clause 41B(4) is real, or merely apparent in view of subsection (6). That subsection provides that a

“person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.”

Given that subsection (4) provides the authority to use reasonable force, failure to use such force when it is available arguably places those responsible for securing production at risk of being held in contempt themselves for failing to comply with a court order. Prison governors and custody officers are accordingly placed in an invidious position.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I would like to clarify immediately that attendance by video link is attendance. If the judge deems that the person would be disruptive in the courtroom, they will still be deemed to have attended if there is a live video link to the cell.

I think the hon. Gentleman asked about methods of restraint, and I will deal with that through two points. It is, of course, within the power of the Prison Service to have the person restrained in the cell, so that they are compelled to listen to the judge’s sentencing remarks. Prison officers are familiar with exercising restraint, and with moving disruptive or reluctant prisoners around the estate, and out of the estate into court.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether court security staff would have sufficient training and would be able to carry out their role. That is a fair point, but they are protected at work under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, which would cover something like this. It would be for the employer to ensure that staff are reasonably safe in carrying out roles. I would anticipate that a judge could take this issue into consideration in making their order in the first place. I remind him that there is more than one way that a person can be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing.

I gave the example of prison officers in full riot gear, and with shields, restraining a prisoner. Is the Minister really saying that the employer will be responsible for providing similar equipment to court staff, to ensure that they carry out this policy?

Just to be clear, that is not the statutory duty that would apply. If somebody was deemed to be that level of violent, threatening or difficult, one might assume that the judge consider that very carefully and exercise their discretion. I have said that there is more than one way that attendance is deemed to have taken place, and it does not involve being dragged kicking and screaming into the courtroom. I hope that answers some of the questions. The duty on the employer is to create a reasonably safe place of work, obviously within the parameters that some court staff are engaged in a security capacity and therefore a more robust form of engagement might be reasonably anticipated. I will leave that there.

The hon. Gentleman made a good point about the sanction. If somebody faces a whole-life tariff, why does adding a couple of years matter? It is true that with a whole-life tariff, a person probably has the greatest difficulty with an increased sentence, but I remind the hon. Gentleman very gently of Jordan McSweeney, who used that argument when he said he would not attend. This was reported. He said he did not want to go to court and did not care because he was going to get a long sentence anyway. He got 37 years. But shortly afterwards he was in the Court of Appeal, appealing against his sentence. He was successful and got it reduced by four years. So he did care about the length of his sentence. I think that rather negates that point, if I may say so.

A point was made by the former Victims’ Commissioner, Vera Baird, that I want to take forward. I tried to make this point in my speech, but perhaps I was not clear enough. We accept that the judge now has discretion to make such an order, but we have found that it is not evenly or always applied. It depends who the judge is and where they are sitting. By putting the measure in the Bill, we are creating a power in statute for a judge to make an order to compel a person to attend their sentencing for any serious offence where the maximum is a life sentence, as I have said. That is a change. In proposed new section 41B, the judges can direct a prison to produce any adult offender irrespective of the offence.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but I do not accept her explanation of how this adds to the law. Perhaps she would like to take it away and come back to the Committee to spell out exactly how it does. Her explanation, I am afraid, did not cut it.

Let me give the hon. Gentleman a practical illustration. Lucy Letby was not compelled to attend her sentencing hearing. She was a young woman in her early 30s and not obviously a massive danger to the victims’ families or somebody who was going to be disruptive, yet the judge did not compel her attendance. We think that the provisions in the Bill alter that and make it far more likely that somebody would be required to attend their hearing.

With regard to that particular case, the Minister is absolutely right. It would seem that somebody could use reasonable force to get Lucy Letby there. The fact that she is a woman and the vast majority of the security staff in the court would be men would, I imagine, make them pause with concern as employers. My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East just pointed out to me that these court security officers earn around £18,000 a year. If this piece of law is saying that it is still up to the judge, where is the compulsion? Currently, it is up to the judge. In Lucy Letby’s case, it was up to the judge. The measure still says that it is up to the judge. So why does it make a difference?

The difference it makes is that now we will not necessarily even see a judge consider exercising that discretion. By putting it into primary legislation—I appreciate the word “may” is used, and I am not going to pretend otherwise—you are essentially saying to the judge, “The time has come for you to exercise your discretion. Considering this defendant, in these circumstances in this case, are you going to compel attendance in the circumstances that are set out in the Bill?” There are other examples of where we put things on the statute book that existed somewhat loosely as a practice or in common law and were not been evenly applied, and it has ended up with a much more linear application of something that we think is socially desirable. That is the effect.

I want to make one other point. The hon. Member for Stockton North made some good points about people in riot gear, but I think one of the things he would perhaps gently concede, looking back particularly over the last two to three years of some of the most high-profile cases, is that it has developed into something of a trend. In some high-profile cases, people are aware that they have got away with not going. People say to their lawyer, “Do I have to go?” and the answer is no. The clause changes that. Actually, if you get back into a pattern where the defendant is in the dock for sentencing, you will see much less resistance. I am afraid to say that there has been a bit of contagion around this particularly pernicious conduct, and the clause is aiming to right that wrong. By embedding a practice where effectively they do have to go, or at least they will be video linked up, there will be no way in which the court will not be able to see their face as the remarks are read out to them. In some way or another, I hope that alters this ugly pattern of behaviour.

I totally agree that somebody should be held accountable and should appear in court. We have already established that prison officers will load the prisoner on to a van. Those prison officers, for no other reason, are on approximately £30,000 a year. They will have had appropriate Home Office training to do that job. However, at the other end, you are asking security officers, who may only have a Security Industry Authority licence and are on approximately £19,000 to £20,000 a year, to do the job that you have asked the prison officers to do. Why would they want to put their life on the line in dealing with these potentially dangerous people for that kind of money, without the appropriate training to allow them to do the job?

I think that warrants a further answer to Committee members. I think that the measure is feasible and could be considered by the judge. On most occasions, you will not be dealing with a necessity for three people in riot gear, but I accept that that might occur. You are entitled to an answer as to what it would look like at the court stage of the proceedings if the judge had decided that somebody who was deemed to be that dangerous on the way in was going to be transported to court. I accept that, so we will get back to you.

The Minister’s point about the trend in high-profile criminals opting not to face the music in court was well made. That is why we certainly will not oppose, and in fact support, this provision. However, it is fair for us to ask and understand exactly how these things will happen. The Minister suggests that the provision is different from the existing powers. Does that mean that perhaps through the judiciary, the judges will be given some form of direction in relation to this piece of legislation that will say to them that if a defendant refuses to appear, they must consider whether they are going to compel them to do so? Or will we be in the same place as we are now, where it is just up to the judge whether it suits him or not?

The statutory intention is that judges will exercise this power. It is plainly recognised and has been well publicised that there is public opprobrium towards the idea that the defendant, particularly in very serious cases, somehow has any kind of control at the end of the process. To be completely honest, the video link would not have been a viable option for a judge until very recently—probably in the life of this Parliament since the general election—but now that that exists, we would reasonably expect judges to make that order as a minimum quite frequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor

Amendment made: 36, in clause 23, page 22, line 11, at end insert—

“(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (7) insert—

‘(8) In section 70A of the Sentencing Code (sexual grooming of child as aggravating factor)—

(a) the references in that section to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence, and

(b) the reference in subsection (1) to a specified child sex offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified child sex offence.’”—(Laura Farris.)

This amendment modifies section 70A of the Sentencing Code (inserted by clause 23), as it applies under the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

I am pleased to be able to speak to clause 23. We are all familiar with the range of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming—

I thank the Chair, and remember her direction to direct my own remarks towards her, which I will try to do on this occasion.

I am pleased to speak to the provisions contained in clause 23. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in child sexual exploitation—in Rochdale, Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Oxford and Reading, and those are just the ones we know about. The discovery of the network of those grooming gangs was a significant factor in this Government’s setting up the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, chaired by Professor Jay, who did the initial report into Rotherham. The Government believe that grooming gang members should face sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offending, which is why, last April, the Prime Minister made a commitment to introduce a new statutory aggravating factor to target grooming behaviour.

This new measure, introduced by clause 23, creates a statutory obligation to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. In plain English, that means they will get a longer sentence. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.

It is already the case that both grooming behaviour against the victim and acting together with others to commit an offence are high-culpability sentencing guidelines for a number of sexual offences. However, this measure goes further by creating an obligation to aggravate the sentence in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by a defendant who is a participant in a grooming gang, even if they did not personally groom the victim. That means the aggravating factor will, for the first time, capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed elsewhere: for example, where an offender assaults a victim who has been previously groomed by another member of the same grooming gang.

The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. It will remain within the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor irrespective of the offence being sentenced where it is deemed to be relevant to the offending.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Ms Bardell. I am pleased that the Minister leaned on it being a year on from the child abuse inquiry—not one of whose recommendations, I think it is fair to say, has yet come to fruition. Well, hope springs eternal for this year! There are plenty of recommendations for the Government to crack on with in this regard, and I look forward to seeing some sort of timeline from the Home Office of any progress in that particular area.

New clause 25, which I tabled, seeks to try to include adult grooming victims on the same footing as children. The grooming of adults is widely and wildly misunderstood, despite there being considerable overlaps of perpetrators and, in fact, perpetrator behaviours and tactics of those seen in cases of child sexual grooming.

At the moment, sexual grooming is a crime only when the victim is a child, but grooming can and does happen to adults as well. It is a technique used by perpetrators to ensure compliance on the part of the victim and to avoid detection, as the victim’s actions are more likely to appear consensual when they are being groomed. Grooming is a deliberate process of limiting the freedoms of a person by gaining control over them and creating a dependency.

New clause 25 would make an aggravating factor of grooming in certain adult cases, including around domestic and sexual abuse. That would both challenge the misconception that adults cannot be groomed and send a message to perpetrators of domestic and sexual abuse that the grooming of adults is being taken seriously and will not be tolerated.

The 2018 Spicer report acknowledged for the first time that not only children but women over 18 are being groomed and sexually exploited. Since 2019, STAGE, the partnership against adult sexual exploitation—I make a declaration that I am the chair—has supported over 700 adult women who have experienced grooming just in the north-east and Yorkshire. The issue is widespread and prevalent in every part of the UK, but is under-represented in UK legislation.

STAGE’s work has confirmed that grooming is a common technique used to manipulate people for sexual exploitation. It has a negative impact on people’s ability to consent and to make capacitated decisions. However, for adults who have experienced grooming, this is often reduced to making “poor life choices”, because of the belief that grooming can only happen to children.

Everything that we heard yesterday about what was said to the girls in Rochdale is being said today to somebody over the age of 18, or even to somebody of the age of 18. Adult victims of grooming are repeatedly asked victim-blaming questions such as “Why did you get back in the car?”, “Why did you stay with them?” and “Why didn’t you leave?” by professionals and services that are meant to be protecting them. This ignores the immense impact of grooming. Because of this, many victims and survivors feel unable to leave their perpetrator, or may not even recognise the abuse that they are experiencing. Until the grooming of adults is recognised in legislation, it will continue to be misunderstood by law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and victims will not be adequately protected. That is why I have tabled new clause 25.

Yesterday, in the light of the Rochdale report, I thought of a woman I had supported. I wanted to make sure, because of the media, that she was okay, because when these sorts of things happen it is pretty traumatic for women who have been exploited in childhood and adulthood. She is 27 years old, so the legislation we are debating would not include her. I needed to search through my email to find her phone number. I found among my emails a letter that I had forgotten, which she had written to the now ex-Home Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). I will read it now:

“Following on from your statement on the 2nd of April 2023, I am writing this letter as a victim who has been let down by countless professionals and services, but worryingly the Home Office itself.

I will begin by providing a summary of my experiences. I was groomed at the age of 13 and this then led on to me experiencing sexual and criminal exploitation for over a decade, whereby I was trafficked all-round the country and sold from one gang to another. There were countless times where I was gang-raped, injected with heroin and left black and blue. I was exposed to serious and organised crime and my perpetrators would laugh at how they continued getting away with what they were doing to me and so many other girls. I did not see any of my family for years and my childhood and early adulthood was stolen away from me.

Whilst I acknowledge your statement that you vow to stamp out child grooming gangs, that is a very easy statement to make. Victims of this crime all around the country have heard it all before. Although you’ve announced new measures to tackle the issue, it makes me question how is this achievable when there are so many flaws in the systems already in place, such as The National Referral Mechanism (NRM).

The police did not refer me into the NRM, despite them full well knowing I had been trafficked. I have spoken with several police officers over the years who do not know what the NRM is, let alone know that they are first responders. It took 562 days for me to get my conclusive grounds decision and for most of that time I continued to be exploited. Nearly a year ago, I was sitting in a hotel paid for by the police, after I’d been physically and sexually assaulted. My accommodation was not safe, and I had requested a safe house. After a lot of back and forth, I was eventually told by…the Home Office’s contractor for NRM services, that a safe house was not an option as I was a British national and that there were no other appropriate housing options. I had to return to unsafe accommodation to then be raped and physically assaulted again.

As you have overseen a system that has routinely let vulnerable people down, I would like to know what action has or is going to be taken to improve this?

I spent days and days in police interviews going into as much detail as I possibly could, with the hope that I would get justice and the men who had tortured me would end up behind bars. The reality is so many victims like me must drop out of investigations because we are not safeguarded, resulting in thousands of perpetrators on the streets continuing to exploit and intimidate vulnerable children and adults. If possible, imagine you are at a police station as a victim of this crime and a stream of text messages come through your phone from your perpetrators saying that they know where you are and that if you do not leave, they will kill you and your family. That is just one example of a threat I have received.

This is not going to stop until appropriate measures are put in place to protect us. In the meantime, the trauma victims experience at the hands of their exploiters is exacerbated when we are routinely let down by the so-called systems in place to protect us. I haven’t even covered in this letter, the battles we face accessing support for our mental health and the legal challenges.

I do hope that you read this letter and that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on an example of someone who has experienced failures from the Home Office.”

I just ask that we do not fail her again and that we recognise the abuses that she suffered. For women who have been sexually exploited in adulthood—by the way, the sexual exploitation of adults is not defined in law; it has no legislation around it, but believe you me, there are some new clauses coming down the line later—I ask that we recognise that the people who groom children go on to groom the same women as they turn into adults, when they do not have the same protections. I completely agree with everything that the Minister has said; I just want it for her as well. That is all that new clause 25 seeks.

As the Minister outlined, clause 23 creates a new aggravating factor to apply when a court is sentencing an adult for a specified child sex offence and that offence was facilitated by or involved the grooming of a children—that is, a person under 18. The court is required to treat the grooming as an aggravating factor, but that does not apply where the person who committed the offence was a child under 18 at the time of the offence.

Clause 23 requires the judge to state in open court that the offence had been aggravated by grooming. It could be undertaken by the offender, or a third party, and committed against the victim of the underlying offence, or a third party. Where the grooming is undertaken or facilitated by that third party, the offence will be considered to be aggravated if the offender knew or could be reasonably expected to have known about the grooming when the offence took place. The person groomed need not be the victim of the offence.

I understand from the Government’s explanatory notes that this is to allow for a case, for example, where child A is groomed to recruit child B and an offence is then committed against child B. Clause 23 also does not require that the grooming be undertaken as part of a gang.

We must not lose the context in which this clause operates, which is horrific cases of offenders preying on the most vulnerable. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile prosecutions of grooming gangs, including in Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Rochdale and Oxford. In 2014, the independent inquiry into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham between 1997 and 2013 identified that at least 1,400 children and young people in Rotherham had been sexually abused or exploited. Who knows how many children there are across the country if one area had as many as that?

Just yesterday, the report on child sexual exploitation in Rochdale was published, again illustrating and demonstrating the extent of the crime. I am sure everyone on the Committee will share my sadness in hearing my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) speaking in the media over the last 24 hours about how things have not got any better. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley also talked about how none of the recommendations has yet been implemented.

Let me start with the shadow Minister’s comments. He asked about the definition of grooming, the nature of the prosecution and the scope of a grooming gang. There is no definition of grooming because of the broad range of behaviour that it can encompass. Identifying a grooming gang is a task for the police working in conjunction with the CPS. One force told me recently about a grooming gang prosecution in which they had to identify the number of defendants. They were talking about tens of defendants and tens of victims, and some of the defendants in the grooming gang had never met each other and had no idea who the other people were. It was quite a difficult exercise for the CPS to judge how best to get a prosecution and a conviction. In that case, they succeeded, but that is why the definition is not set out in law. It is dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The shadow Minister challenges me to explain what this provision adds, when grooming is already an aggravating factor and is often considered in child sex offences and taken seriously. I hope I have explained, but I will clarify again if he did not understand. We are simply adding that a member of a grooming gang, as defined within the parameters of that case, can be subject to the aggravation provision at sentencing, irrespective of the fact that they did not directly groom the victim of that child sexual offence. They could be a tangential member of the gang—perhaps one of the people who has never met one of the other defendants, such as in the case I just outlined—yet they could still be subject to the aggravation.

The shadow Minister asked about cost. That is a fair question, and I will have to come back to him in writing on that. We will add it to the list.

I feel I know what grooming is, but, on the Minister’s earlier point about the Court of Appeal reducing the sentence, without a proper definition of grooming or at least a working definition in secondary legislation or regulation, are we not at risk of appeal? I do not know whether she or any of us has sat through a lot of court cases like this, but the idea that there is heavy knowledge in police forces, the CPS and the judges of our country about exactly what grooming or coercive control are, I have to say, is for the birds. I am a bit worried about the risk of appeal on a loosey-goosey case that could be grooming. Why would someone not just take it to appeal immediately, if their sentence was aggravated?

I will come back to that. For the purposes of this afternoon’s Public Bill Committee, the issue is not whether the courts have an adequate understanding of grooming.

I will give my experience. I was appointed as counsel to the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I worked on that inquiry from 2016 to 2017, and it is on my Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I was also instructed by a Telford victim in a public law challenge—not a criminal law challenge in the High Court—against the local authority in relation to its breaches of various duties to her. So I have direct familiarity with cases of this nature.

There are many, many issues with this kind of offence. I think that the courts understand child sexual exploitation and grooming gangs and that it is left deliberately loose in law so that a range of behaviours can be encompassed. The one that the public are most familiar with is sexual exploitation, but there are other forms of grooming that go much wider and where there is no sexual element. It is right that that flexibility exists so that somebody is not outside the possibility of being a victim of a grooming offence.

This is an incredibly complex, difficult, challenging and sensitive subject. A question arises, though, and I will put it to the Minister. There are many definitions of grooming. There are international definitions —legal definitions in other countries—of what grooming is. So while I accept the point the Minister makes about trying to keep it flexible, we have the capacity to easily —if not easily, then as clearly as we can—determine what exploitation or grooming actually is. The work has been done and we have to build upon it. Does the Minister not agree that it is not beyond the wit of this Parliament to try to determine or define what we consider grooming to be? I say that with all of the sensitivity that I can bring.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I promise that I will give some thought to that, but I just wanted to come back to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. This is not about creating a new offence. The treatment that the victim the hon. Lady described was subjected to is already covered by criminal law. This amendment is simply about an aggravating element going into statute in relation to grooming.

As the hon. Lady is well aware, the difference is that we are confining our amendment to the grooming of children for sexual purposes. That is our amendment. We have focused our amendment on that because child sexual exploitation by grooming gangs has been so problematic and so serious.

I will go back to some of the examples that the hon. Lady gave, although it is very difficult to respond to an individual’s case in the context of a Public Bill Committee, because I do not know all the details. I think that the hon. Lady said that the person was 27 and had been groomed since the age of 13. The vast part of what she suffered in the early days would be captured by this provision, because she was a child. I appreciate what the hon. Lady said about the continuing grooming—I think she said that that person is still being groomed today.

Continuously, yes.

But, in a case of this nature, the judge would still have the discretion to consider that treatment as an aggravating circumstance, so there is nothing precluding a judge—they would have to get to the end of the trial, get the conviction and get the offence—from treating it as aggravating. I have not been given an example, in the context of this particular clause, of somebody going to court about a case of this nature, getting the conviction and then getting a sentence that was not sufficiently serious.

You would be lucky.

Well, grooming cases are brought to court, and convictions come from those cases.

One thing that I would gently say, since the example of Rochdale has come up a lot, is that the report that was published yesterday relates to the period between 2004 and 2013. When we worked on IICSA, Rochdale and Rotherham directly informed why IICSA was set up and why Alexis Jay was appointed chair of that inquiry. IICSA was informed by all the cases we were looking at, whether it was Dolphin Square, residential schools, the Catholic Church or the Australian migrant scheme. Even though Andy Burnham commissioned that review, it related to a time period that goes quite a long way back, starting from 20 years ago, rather than what is happening in your—[Interruption.]

I will intervene.

What came out of yesterday's report was shocking, but it was also known. As I said, it informed IICSA. We looked at Rotherham extensively throughout. I did not read the report and say, “I’ve never heard any of this before.” I knew about it, and I had spent time on stuff like this. I am simply saying about the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described—a horrific case—is that the clause would, first, cover a perpetrator being brought to justice who had abused her as a child. Secondly, if her case got to court and she got a conviction on the multiple offences that she seems to be describing, there is nothing to stop the judge from treating it as aggravating and enhancing the sentence.

If there is nothing to stop a judge in a case where an adult has been sexually exploited as an adult because of multiple perpetrators over many years—different faces changing, some just in adulthood, some from childhood, but basically a pattern is set when someone abuses a child and that carries on for a lot of their life—is the Minister saying that as we can already aggravate on the basis of grooming an adult, what do we need this piece of legislation for children? Also, to push back heavily, I cited in my speech the 700 cases of adult sexual exploitation found in Yorkshire and Newcastle alone, so if her idea is that adult sexual exploitation is not a big issue in our country, on the same scale if not greater than child exploitation, I suggest that she has not been out to the country.

I will keep my remarks concise. Let us look at adult sexual exploitation—I accept, by the way, the breadth of the problem without reservation. First, the adult, simply by virtue of being an adult, has more ability to vocalise their experience than a child does. Secondly, there are more forms of exploitation—for example, forced labour or human trafficking, both of which overlapped with what the hon. Lady described. The case of children who are victims of grooming gangs is specific, and it is also a direct thing that we dealt with. The clause is directed just at children.

I hear the point that the Minister makes about the ability to vocalise. I gently challenge her on that one, however, because people who have been abused and exploited for many years, from childhood through, also find it incredibly difficult to vocalise. There is no question about that whatever. That is not to dismiss anything she says, but it is to recognise that vocalisation does not start at 18, 20 or 21; it might never, ever appear, given the nature of the exploitation and abuse that has happened to that particular person. I ask her just to think on that particular issue, not necessarily to respond now, but to put it into the mix.

I have to take this back to what it is. It is not about creating an offence. It is not about saying, “If you sexually exploit a child, you’ve committed a criminal offence, but if you sexually exploit an adult woman, you haven’t.” That is not what this is about, and I do not want to get lost in that. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a series of offences that, if they achieved convictions, would be category A offences. They are unbelievably serious offences. We are not denying that.

The clause, however, is directed at grooming gangs as they relate to children. The purpose of the clause is to capture the wider membership of the grooming gangs so that even if people did not directly groom the victim, they are on the hook for the same aggravation. It is to bring in the entirety of the grooming gang. As I said, that is usually defined by the CPS in terms of how it will choose to prosecute a case. That can be very wide indeed. It can bring hundreds to court, or certainly tens, but that is a decision for the CPS. The clause potentially brings all gang members within the scope of the aggravation, simply because they have been identified as part of the gang, if one of those victims has been groomed. That is the purpose of the clause.

I did not for one second think that I was asking for a new offence. If I had been, I would have tried to write it into the clause. The Minister is suggesting that there are not wide-scale gangs grooming adults in our country that need targeting. It is exactly the same. There are grooming gangs. Perhaps we could all spend a bit of time at the National Crime Agency or watch any drama about organised crime, which always includes drugs, sexual exploitation and prostitution. There are grooming gangs grooming adults, both men and women. Especially when we are talking about men, it is very silenced. There is a trade in drug addict, down-and-out men in our country that would make people’s toes curl. I have rarely met a young heroin addict who was not traded for sex by powerful men.

I cannot believe the categorisation of it. I do not believe it, because I know the Minister well. For children it is, “grooming matters more”. For adults, we might as well say, from what I have heard today, “Why did you get back in the car?” I have to say, it is not characteristic and not what I was expecting. I find it very disappointing. There is no crime of adult sexual exploitation. It does not exist. It is as if we just do not care that adults get sexually exploited. It is as if we tolerate it in society.

The hon. Lady is making an excellent point. There is a rise in cuckooing in particular, which is the exploitation of adults. It used to be for drug dealers and so on, but now it is being used for prostitution as well. I just want to add that to the hon. Lady’s excellent comments.

I absolutely agree. There is undoubtedly a pattern with cuckooing. Funnily enough, one of the other things we do not define in law, which I am hoping goes through in the Victims and Prisoners Bill, is child criminal exploitation. Apparently the really important grooming gangs in those cases we do not consider important enough to define in law. Let us hope that that changes as these many Bills that all cross over each other pass through. I absolutely hope to see cuckooing in this Bill before the end of its passage.

I want to stand here and make a statement on this idea that it is any different. When adults are sexually exploited, for instance an 18-year-old being sold, raped, beaten, held at gunpoint and frightened, the idea that they could come and speak—it is just unrecognisable to me.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Murder: end of relationship aggravating factor

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 sets out the new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected with the end of a relationship. This provision is one of four that the Government are taking forward in response to the independent review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide that was undertaken by Clare Wade KC. Together they will ensure that the seriousness of murder committed in a domestic context is reflected in our sentencing framework. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic. In other words, the perpetrator is a partner or former partner of the victim.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 6MC.] (Correction) The vast majority of these homicides are committed by men against women and usually follow a pattern of years of abuse prior to the homicide.

The legal framework for murder sentencing is contained in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 20 years ago. While every case of murder carries a mandatory life sentence, this framework sets out the principles to guide the court in determining the minimum custodial term. It is a non-exhaustive list. It is always open to judges to consider aggravating and mitigating factors not contained in schedule 21.

Until now, schedule 21 has contained no express recognition of the seriousness of domestic murders, but over the past 20 years—I would argue particularly in the past five—our understanding of offending committed in a domestic context has improved. As Clare Wade highlighted in her review, our sentencing framework needs to be updated to reflect that. On the overall measures, last year, a statutory instrument was laid before Parliament to introduce both a statutory aggravating factor and a statutory mitigating factor for murder in relation to controlling or coercive behaviour, in line with the recommendations. Where an abusive partner has killed their victim, in recognition of the seriousness of the preceding abuse of coercive control and the experience of the victim before death, the coercive control will constitute an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.

A new mitigating factor will apply in cases where the victim of an abusive partner or family member has killed their abuser, in recognition of their experience as a victim of abuse preceding the killing, which is exactly what happened in the Sally Challen case. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal—it is essentially taking the court’s conclusion and making it a statutory mitigating factor.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction)

We have also introduced new statutory aggravating factor for murders involving gratuitous and excessive force, sometimes referred to as overkill. That is something that Clare Wade found to be strikingly prevalent in not only domestic murders,[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) but all the cases she assessed. The perpetrator in cases of overkill—to use that shorthand—was male in all but one case.

Clause 24 introduces the fourth legislative measure that the Government committed to take forward in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations. This provision will make murders connected to the end of a relationship, or the victim’s stated intention to end a relationship, a statutory aggravating factor. In 40% of the murder cases analysed by Clare Wade as part of her review, the murder occurred at the end, or perceived end—an important qualification—of the relationship. The perpetrator was male in all those cases, and, in over two thirds of them, a history of coercive or controlling behaviour was also identified.

Killing in those circumstances is often the final controlling act of an abusive partner. As Clare Wade put it in her report, when the perpetrator learns he no longer has control over his partner because she is going to leave, the final act is homicide—the last way he can control her. The old shorthand used in court is: “If I can’t have you, no one will.” It is striking how often it twins with overkill—the use of gratuitous and excessive violence—at that moment. They often occur at the same time.

While it is for the judge to determine the appropriate weight given to the aggravating factors in each case, we expect that this change, along with the other statutory aggravating factors we have introduced in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations, will have a significant impact on the minimum custodial terms. It will also get the court to consider the nature and context of domestic homicides specifically, which has never happened before. These changes mark a step change in the way our sentencing framework responds to and understands cases of domestic murder. For the first time, the nature of these murders and the unique harms underpinning them will be recognised expressly in our sentencing framework. The perpetrators must serve sentences that truly reflect the severity of their crimes.

I will speak to new clauses 27 to 29. I do not disagree on the issue. I worked very closely with the families to get Clare Wade’s review up and running under the then Lord Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland)—who I believe was just speaking in the Chamber, making a nuisance of himself today as well. While we are making these changes, I think that Clare Wade has herself said, as have many of the families involved, that making these limited and piecemeal changes is not good enough. I will place some of my own thoughts on record for the sake of showing the many ways in which the aggravating factors for cases of domestic homicide need to be updated.

It can be arranged.

A girl can dream! I will speak to a number of changes because, if we are going to make a point about the end of a relationship, we have to also think about some of the other aggravating factors to try and level the playing field regarding sentencing. I have a list of case studies here of murderers and how long they went away for: 15 years, twelve and a half years—brutally murdering women—16 years, 15 years for a man who then went on to murder somebody else on his release. So, the level of time that we give for this particular crime is woeful.

New clause 27 would make honour-based abuse an aggravating factor in murder cases. Banaz Mahmod was killed in a so-called honour killing in 2006 by her father—not somebody she was ending a relationship with—her uncle, and five other men. She was murdered for leaving her abusive husband, for desiring a divorce and for meeting a new boyfriend who those men disapproved of. She was murdered because she was accused of bringing dishonour and shame on her family and the community.

The men that killed Banaz had boasted and joked about the murder, and were supported by other members of the extended family, who made investigations and prosecution as difficult as possible. The police estimated that there were about 50 men involved in her murder and related crimes.

Before her death, Banaz suffered greatly, reporting rape and violence, threats to kill and an attempt on her life. She went to the police five times. She named the suspects who would eventually kill her. The police did not hear; they did not act. In 2008, a commissioner for the then Independent Police Complaints Commission found serious failings in the police handling of the case.

For many years, Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who I consider a friend, has campaigned alongside Southall Black Sisters for a law that recognises the horror of honour-based killing explicitly in sentencing. New clause 27 would do that. It would introduce honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in murder cases.

Such a new clause will increase confidence in the criminal justice system, sending a strong message that this violence can never be accepted, excused or ignored. As the Women and Equalities Committee stated, an explicit reference “would strengthen the understanding that honour-based abuse is taken seriously by the criminal justice system and only ever as an aggravating factor.” That would have an impact upstream, too, ensuring that agencies do not misunderstand, ignore or turn a blind eye to honour-based abuse due to ignorance or to fear of being seen as culturally insensitive or racist.

Those women must be protected. We must reach them before it is too late. That is particularly important, as honour-based abuse is a high-risk crime that involves multiple perpetrators and colluders and sometimes multiple victims, because of shared codes of honour. Too many victims are at risk for us not to act.

New clause 28 argues that strangulation should be classified as an aggravating factor in sentencing murders. From previous times that I have worked on this issue with the Minister present, I know that she cares deeply about strangulation, and the arguments for the new clause seem unquestionable. First, the nature of the violence: strangulation is a gendered form of killing. That is how men brutally and callously kill women. The 10-year femicide census showed that strangulation was the second most common method for men who kill women, and Clare Wade’s review demonstrated its prevalence.

It is hard to find words to reflect the horror of killing someone by strangulation—the vulnerability of the victim, the intimacy of being eye to eye, the length of time that it would take to kill someone in that way, and the fear that the victim must experience in their final moments. Many bereaved families I work with speak to me about how that haunts them. That must be reflected in the sentencing framework.

Furthermore, new clause 28 follows new laws on non-fatal strangulation—the Minister may remember them her time on the Back Benches—which were introduced under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. How we understand the role of strangulation in domestic abuse is changing. It is now understood as a form of coercive control and an accurate red-flag predicter of homicide. If someone is strangled, they are much more likely to go on to be murdered. We must change how it is considered in sentencing.

A judge can recognise strangulation as serious or sadistic under schedule 21—I say again that that needs review—but strangulation is not being recognised. It is simply not being recognised for the horror that it is. In 59% of the strangulation cases looked at by Clare Wade’s review, the method of killing was not seen as an aggravating factor. Significantly, in 73% of the remaining cases where the offence was said to be aggravated by the nature of the killing, the strangulation was accompanied by either an assault or an attack with a weapon. That suggests that the seriousness of the violence denoted by strangulation in and of itself is not being acknowledged.

In law, we place a lot of emphasis on weapons, but as we see in many gendered murders, many male perpetrators do not need a weapon. Such a perpetrator carries his weapon everywhere he goes, and that is his strength, his arms, his physical power. He does not need a weapon, so his culpability should not be decreased because he did not use one; he did use one. That is not a point in law that has gone unrecognised in other crimes; our bodily differences are recognised. For example, for the crime of rape, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 explicitly states that it can be done only with a penis. That recognises that a man’s body can be a weapon. I am not asking for anything beyond what exists in current law.

A three-year study of 204 adult cases of non-fatal strangulation showed that one in six had been strangled to the point where the victim lost consciousness. Symptoms of such violence include strokes, depression, memory loss, seizures, motor and speech disorders, and paralysis. Studies have shown that victims of non-fatal strangulation are seven times more likely to be murdered by their partner. The true nature of strangulation must be understood, as must its relationship with misogyny. Strangulation is about silencing. It is about exerting power, fear and control. As the member of a focus group who attended for Clare Wade’s review explained:

“It is almost always about the perpetrators wanting the last word but if you work with the perpetrators, you hear this over and over again—like I wanted her to shut up I wanted her to be quiet but I wanted to win you have to have the last word. That is what the whole kind of attacking the throat and putting the hands over the mouth—it is all about silencing.”

I very much hope that the understanding of an aggravation in the use of strangulation in a killing can be considered.

On a slightly different note, new clause 29 would ensure that infidelity can never be used as a defence to murder. The Minister said earlier when commenting on perpetrators attending court that common law practice sometimes needs writing into primary legislation. I very much agree with her, which is why I am seeking for this amendment to be made. While it is still written in our legislation that someone can use infidelity as a defence for murder, it is not used in common law.

Currently, infidelity cannot be used as a defence or mitigation. However, the latter is common-law principle rather than in statute. Section 55(6)(c) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides that sexual infidelity cannot be relied upon in a defence of a loss of control. That was passed following the wrath about “crime of passion” defences going through the criminal justice system in response to domestic murders, and it revoked previous laws on provocation. The legislative change was brought about due to the incredible work of domestic abuse campaigners.

However, the legislation did not concurrently prevent sexual infidelity being a mitigating factor in sentencing in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020—I feel like I am really attacking schedule 21 today, but I am not keen on it if I am honest—thereby creating an inconsistency in the law. The law on provocation changed, but the sentencing principle that surrounded it did not. Common-law principles on the whole prevent this inconsistency from playing out. I will spend the entirety of the Committee stage saying, “In real life, that does not really happen.” Well, in real life this does not happen. It is not something that I am mortally frightened of. It no longer happens that someone is allowed to say that because their wife cheated on them it is fine that they killed her. A million other defences are made, but not that one anymore.

The defence still exists in law; however, it is not used, on the basis that precedent allows for factual scenarios to be disregarded in mitigation where they run contrary to the policy behind existing legislation, even where there may not be a statutory bar. Despite that, it is important to regularise common-law principles in statute for the avoidance of confusion and to fill lacunas in the law. New clause 29 ensures that no judge could ever stray and use it as a mitigating factor.

New clauses 27, 28 and 29 speak to the larger issue of how we see and respond to the killing of women. How we sentence crimes reflects how seriously we take them. At the heart of these debates is how seriously we take the violent deaths of women and the stealing of their lives. I am afraid to say that at the moment, and we do not take it as seriously as we take other crimes. Several years ago, two mothers walked into my office, Carole Gould and Julie Devey. Their relentless campaigning, at personal cost, has hugely elevated the issue of how we should hold the people who kill women to account. Their daughters were both murdered in brutal, violent attacks by their ex-partners. Ellie was 17 and Poppy was 24. They had their futures stolen from them by two men who had decided, as Julie once described, that

“if they couldn’t have them no one else could either”.

Their mothers began campaigning to challenge the discrepancy in the sentences given in cases where the victim, often a woman, is killed in the home and in other homicides where the victim is killed in public spaces. The distinction commonly turns on the fact that if a perpetrator brought a weapon to the scene of a crime, the starting point for sentencing is 25 years. If, however, the weapon is not brought but found, as with a kitchen knife—my kitchen knife comes back into play from earlier—the starting point is only 15 years. That is 10 years’ difference.

The example that is repeatedly given to demonstrate that inequality is that if someone brings a knife with them and kills their victim with a single stab, they will receive a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years; but if the victim is suffocated, strangled, beaten, or stabbed hundreds of times to the point of mutilation with a knife found at the scene, the starting point is 15 years. With the discretion of the judge and the mitigating and aggravating factors, Clare Wade’s research suggested that on average that resulted in a six-and-a-half-year difference between the two sorts of crimes. That cannot be right.

Follow that!

Clause 24 would insert a new aggravating factor into paragraph 9 of schedule 21 to the sentencing code, to be considered when determining the minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It would apply where the offence was connected with the end of the offender’s intimate personal relationship with the victim; the victim intending to bring about the end of that intimate personal relationship; or a belief by the offender that the intimate personal relationship had ended or that the victim intended to bring about the end of the personal relationship. The new statutory aggravating factor would apply to offences committed on or after the date the relevant provision comes into force.

We do not oppose the clause, but I hope that the Minister will clearly define what is meant by “intimate personal relationship”. We will discuss clause 30 later, but it refers to

“controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.

Does clause 24, then, refer only to that of a partner or ex-partner?

We know the context surrounding this measure. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic—that is, they are committed by the partner, ex-partner or relative of the victim. They represent an average of nearly 160 homicides per year, with almost 90 being committed by a partner or ex-partner, over the last 10 years. I join others in commending the excellent work of Clare Wade KC, who utilised her expertise in this field to conduct the independent domestic homicide sentencing review, published on 17 March 2023.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the review coincided with an ongoing campaign by the families of two women who were murdered by their male partners: Ellie Gould, who was 17 at the time of her murder by Thomas Griffiths, and Poppy Devey Waterhouse, who was 24 when she was murdered by Joe Atkinson. In her report, Clare makes the important argument that not only are women wronged by a breach of trust, which is an integral part of domestic abuse, but the harms to them often extend to further harm to secondary victims in the form of families, many of whom are the children—we have heard that before—and friends of the victim. There is also the harm to society in general, which, to date, may not have been sufficiently considered.

Clare made it clear to Committee members in her oral evidence session that the proposals in the Bill fall well short of what she set out in her report. In her evidence, Clare said, of clause 24:

“I have to say that it looks a little odd in the Bill because it is, as it were, stand-alone. The intent behind the policy is to have a coherent legislative policy that addresses all the harms, and addresses the particular harms in these cases. We now have in the secondary legislation the aggravating factor of coercive control as something that has happened in terms of the history of the relationship by a perpetrator towards a victim, and vice versa—it is a mitigating factor as well.”

Does the Minister understand why the clause looks a little odd? Perhaps she needs to do some work to make it fit for purpose and able to capture more of Clare’s recommendations.

I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has tabled new clauses 27, 28 and 29 in respect of these matters, which we will come on to. I am pleased that the Government are accepting the recommendation to make a murder that takes place at the end of a relationship a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for murder. In 48% of murder cases looked at in the Wade report, the sentencing remarks disclosed that there were reports of either jealousy or resentment on the part of the perpetrator at the breakdown of the relationship. In the majority of cases, that appeared to be the catalyst for the murder.

The perpetrator was male in all but one of those 43 cases. A history of controlling or coercive behaviour was identified within the case sample. Clare also said in her oral evidence that

“these killings nearly always happen within the context or confines of domestic abuse and, in the cases we looked at, we found that there was frequently an escalation in domestic abuse when the victim—in the majority of cases, a woman who is killed by her male partner—wants to leave the relationship. That particular recommendation was made because not only is that a real harm, and that represents the real danger, but the policy underlying the other recommendations is one that places the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour at the forefront of the thinking.

The real harm in terms of coercive control, which the law does not yet recognise, is entrapment. It is not fear, as in being continually afraid, and it is not necessarily physical injury. It is entrapment, which is what prevents people who are being abused from leaving relationships. Putting that into legislation as an aggravating factor that can be taken into account by the courts would make it clear that that is one of the harms, but it would also, I suppose, bring to our consciousness the real harm in domestic abuse.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 114-115, Q64.]

In the Government’s response to the Wade report, they proposed four legislative measures to give domestic homicide specialist consideration in the sentencing framework for murder for the first time. Clause 24 is the final one of these measures, with three already laid before Parliament as draft statutory instruments. I will not rehearse again the issues around grooming, which have been covered previously, but does the Minister recognise that she may have lost an opportunity to bring forward more of the recommendations from Clare’s review?

Although we certainly do not oppose the clause, we must consider the practical implications at this stage. In the Government’s impact assessment, they state that the impacts of the clause

“fall beyond the 10-year period”

of measurement. However, in the longer term, the impact assessment states that the measure

“is estimated to require a further 42 additional prison places in steady state, reached around 2065, at a 40-year net present cost”

of £19.2 million. To reaffirm what I said in reference to clause 23, without the Government getting on with tackling the crisis in our prisons, any measures that impact on capacity are a cause for a degree of concern.

I turn briefly to the new clauses that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley spoke about so comprehensively. Again, I find it difficult to add value to what she had to say. New clauses 27 and 28 would introduce aggravating factors for honour-based abuse and strangulation respectively. New clause 29 would ensure that sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence for murder. I cannot add much to what my hon. Friend said in her well-illustrated speech, and I take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to her. She has many years of working in this space. From what I have seen, heard and read, I know my hon. Friend has been not just a leading voice fighting for change, but a driving force in supporting both organisations and individuals.

We on the Opposition side recognise the importance of tightening up sentencing in this area. As outlined in my speech on clause 23, that will form a vital part of the wholesale review that Labour has committed to, so we can consider all the measures necessary to ensure that the criminal justice system works for victims. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I align myself with the shadow Minister’s comments about the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I would like to pick up where the shadow Minister left off, in talking about sentencing more broadly. That will bring me on, quite naturally, to the new clause concerning strangulation.

I agree with the reservation about the gendered aspect of strangulation throughout domestic abuse and particularly in domestic homicide. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the problem with the law at the moment, where if someone takes a weapon to the scene of the crime, they get longer than if they use a weapon that, for example, comes out of the kitchen drawer. It is well known that this is the Ben Kinsella amendment, which Jack Straw introduced in 2007 in response to a campaign fought very passionately by Ben’s sister, Brooke, and his family.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) Ben was a young man killed in gang violence, and his sister campaigned very passionately for a 25-year starting point for anybody who takes a weapon to the scene of the crime. Clare Wade dealt with that issue quite extensively in her report. I am not expressing a view of the Government here; I am just reflecting what Clare Wade said. She was critical of the starting point. In fact, she was quite critical of starting points in general.

The Government are conducting a murder sentencing consultation at the moment. It is on the Government website, and it remains open until March this year. It addresses all these points, including where sentences do not look like they are quite right—where some are too low or too high; I am not saying that they are necessarily too high, but it is about whether starting points are right. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will forgive me, I will say no to the new cause about strangulation, but I encourage her—particularly given her background and expertise—and all Members to contribute to that consultation, because we are looking at this blend of issues at the moment.

Another important concern that Clare Wade recognised in her report was about ranking methods of murder. A well-known example is that a 25-year starting point applies to any convicted offender who has taken a weapon to the scene of the crime, but a victim of domestic abuse—what we might in the old language call “the battered wife”—is almost always going to use a weapon. That is the only way a woman is likely to kill a man, and a woman has very often taken one to the scene of the crime. We did not actually intend to capture that category of offender, but the law currently does.

We think it is important that we are not, at this point, setting one category of offence above another, and that we conduct this consultation and consider this area of the law carefully. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley effectively acknowledged, and as I think Clare Wade also did, some issues need to be looked at in the round. I hope the hon. Lady will understand why, on that basis, I will say no to her new clause, with all due deference and respect for how she made the case so powerfully put in Clare Wade’s report. All Governments should consider it carefully. That is my first point.

The second point was about honour-based abuse, which again the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley articulated well. We are clear that we will not allow political or cultural sensitivities to get in the way of tackling it. There is no specific offence for such abuse; the term is used to encompass various offences, including not only the usual range of domestic abuse, but some of the psychological pressure that the hon. Lady described. Forced marriage can fall within that, with elements of family shame. She talked about a case with a large number of participants who were part of the abusive ring.

I appreciate being able to make an intervention. During my contribution, I talked about Clare Wade and the clause being a little odd because it is a stand-alone one. I know that the Minister has addressed the new clauses of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, but will she comment on that? Is there an opportunity to adopt more of the recommendations of the Clare Wade report?

I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. We are thinking hard on that point.

I want to check that I have not missed anything from section 55, where anything

“done or said amounted to sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”

That is still good law. I suggest that the issue of some defendants claiming as a defence that they had killed a victim because she had been unfaithful to them has now been resolved and it is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the loss of control defence.

Clare Wade recommended that sexual infidelity should also be prohibited from being considered as a mitigating factor when it came to sentencing. We published our response to her review in July last year, setting out why we will not take that forward. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline already expressly states that provocation is no mitigation to an offence in a domestic context, except in rare circumstances. No evidence was provided in the review that sexual infidelity was ever being taken into account inappropriately as mitigation. I am therefore satisfied—it is the only point on which I really disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that the law already has sufficient protection in place. I urge the hon. Member not to move the new clauses.

I do not actually move them yet, as we do not do that for new clauses until the end. I was saying to myself, “I don’t think I have to do anything.”

I have, of course, already taken part in the consultation alongside the Killed Women network, which I work with incredibly closely. To the Minister’s final point, I started my remarks by saying that I do not agree with myself, having to do a piecemeal job. Schedule 21 needs an overhaul, but we will all start tinkering with it until it ends up in the place it already is, with bolt-ons and batons hanging off it, when something much more fundamental, in a modern world, needs doing.

On the final point about the defences, it may surprise the Minister to hear that that definitely came to me from some pretty eminent lawyers who work in the field—maybe even Clare Wade. I will take that back and speak to them about what exactly was concerning them with regard to that particular issue. I will bring it back to the Committee when we discuss new clauses at the end, of which there will be loads.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)